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afghanistan
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afghanistan
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521 total results foundAuthor: Rubin, Barnett R. Title: Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: the False Promise of Crop Eradication Summary: This report by the Center on International Cooperation discusses the alternative of counter-narcotics in addressing the illicit drug market in Afghanistan. Details: New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2008 Source: Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Counter-Narcotics Shelf Number: 116213 |
Author: Goodhand, Jonathan Title: Bandits, Borderlands and Opium Wars: Afghan State-building Viewed from the Margins Summary: This paper explores the linkages between the drugs economy, borderlands and 'post conflict' state building in Afghanistan. It does this through an historical analysis of Sheghnan, a remote district of the Afghan-Tajik border in the north-east. The paper charts the opening and closing of the border; the movement of people, commodities and ideas across the border; the effects of changing political regimes; the role of resources and their effects on local governance; and the complex, multifacted networks that span the border and are involved in the drugs trade. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009 Source: DIIS Working Paper 2009:26 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 117632 |
Author: Wilder, Andrew Title: Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police Summary: This paper provides an overview of the police sector in Afghanistan, assesses reform efforts since 2002, and identifies five key issues that must be addressed if the objective of creating an effective Afghan National Police (ANP) is to be achieved. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007 76p. Source: Internet source Year: 2007 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Police Reform, Policing Shelf Number: 116477 |
Author: Lind, Jo Thori Title: Opium for the Masses? Conflict-Induced Narcotics Production in Afghanistan. Summary: Opium production in Afghanistan has helped finance holy wars against Soviet occupation, violent power contests among warlords, the rise of Taliban and its way to power, and the present resistance against Western intervention. What is less well known is how conflicts have spurred opium production as well. This paper shows how the recent rise in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan can be understood as a direct consequence of the rising violent conflicts. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2009. 30p. Source: CESifo Working Paper; no. 2573 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Narcotics Production Shelf Number: 113843 |
Author: Motley, Kimberley Cy. Title: An Assessment of Juvenile Justice in Afghanistan Summary: As of December 2009 there were 600 children in conflict with the law in Afghanistan, representing eighty girls and 520 boys. This number represents nearly a 30% increase from the 455 juveniles who were reported as being detained in January 2008. This assessment represents qualitative research created, gathered, and analyzed from September 2009 through December 2009. In particular, the information included in this research is a result of information received from personal interviews with the use of translators of three hundred and forty-eight persons working or detained within the juvenile system from twenty-eight provinces. The information was obtained with the hopes that there will be an actual coordination of efforts between international and national partners of tangible projects with the aims to achieve positive results for children in conflict with the law in Afghanistan. Details: Taimani, Kabul: Terre des hommes - Afghanistan Office, 2010. 88p. Source: Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Juvenile Justice Systems(Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 118264 |
Author: Peters, Gretchen Title: How Opium Profits the Taliban Summary: In Afghanistan's poppy-rich southwest, a raging insurgency intersects a thriving opium trade. This study examines how the Taliban profit from narcotics, probes how traffickers influence the strategic goals of the insurgency, and considers the extent to which narcotics are changing the nature of the insurgency itself. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 39p. Source: Peaceworks No. 62 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Markets Shelf Number: 115811 |
Author: Gholami, Hossein Title: Basics of Afghan Law and Criminal Justice: A Manual for the Afghan Police and Legal Professionals Summary: This handbook presents an understanding of the legal concepts for the police and legal professionals in order for them to apply a just concept of the law. Chapters include: jurisprudence; constitutional law; criminal law; juvenile justice policy; criminal procedure; and the police. Details: Berlin: The Federal Government, 2007. 298p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Courts (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 115183 |
Author: Jelsma, Martin Title: Redefining Targets: Towards a Realistic Afghan Drug Control Strategy Summary: This policy briefing provides an update on the drug control efforts in Afghanistan and outlines policy dilemmas on drugs production, trafficking and consumption issues facing Afghan officials and international agencies today. It also reflects concerns and needs of heroin users and - former - opium farmers. Key issues include the chronic absence of coordination of drug control efforts; the foreign-driven and often hypocritical nature of the agenda; and the difficulties in defining realistic drug policy objectives. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009. 12p. Source: Drug Policy Briefing No. 30; Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Control Policy (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 119837 |
Author: Van Heuvelen, Elizabeth S. Title: Uniting the Golden Crescent and Central Asia: The Potential for Greater Regional Cooperation to Curb Afghanistan's Opium Trade Summary: This paper explores the potential for greater regional cooperation betwen Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asian Republics in combating the opium trade. Through examining the history of the regional dynamics of the opium trade, this paper concludes that elimination of the opium trade will require sustained regional cooperation that targets reduction of both supply and demand. There are significant challenges to enacting such a program, but there is also the potential to build on and expand initiatives with similar goals that are already underway. In the context of the Obama administration's broad review of U.S. foreign policy and strategy in the region, now is a fertile time to explore and pursue such efforts. Details: Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, 2009. 35p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 118671 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Statistics and Surveys Section Title: Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims Summary: Poverty and violence are usually portrayed as the biggest challenges confronting Afghanistan. This report, however, reveals that for an overwhelming 59% of the population the daily experience of public dishonesty is a bigger concern than insecurity and unemployment. Details: Geneva: UNODC, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Bribery Shelf Number: 110825 |
Author: Smith, Deborah J. Title: Love, Fear and Discipline: Everyday Violence Toward Children in Afghan Families Summary: This paper is focused on adults' perspectives and opinions on violence toward children, which are at times informed by their own experiences of violence as children. In focusing on adults' perspectives it discusses why parents are violent to the children in their families. The emphasis in this paper is predominantly on physical violence to children, with some discussion of verbal abuse. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008. 73p. Source: Internet Resource; Issues Paper Series Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Child Abuse and Neglect(Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 119155 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Cannabis Survey 2009 Summary: This survey is based on survey data from 1,634 villages in 20 provinces. It shows that there is large-scale cannabis cultivation in exactly half (17 out of 34) of Afghanistan's provinces. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 59p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drugs (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 119181 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims Summary: Based on interviews with 7,600 people in Afghanistan, this report discusses the experiences and perceptions of bribery and corruption in Afghanistan during the period autumn 2008 - autumn 2009. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Bribery Shelf Number: 117725 |
Author: Caulkins, Jonathan P. Title: Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan Summary: This report contributes to the ongoing debate about counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan, and in relation to counter-insurgency operations by adding a heretofore missing element–applied economic analysis of the effect of counter-narcotics policies. It does so by applying to a stylized depiction of the Afghan situation a standard model that economists and policy analysts have applied to a large range of policy areas. Details: New York: New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Enforcement Shelf Number: 119430 |
Author: Nopens, Patrick F.P. Title: Countering Afghan Narcotics: A Litmus Test for Effective NATO and Russia Cooperation? Summary: Afghan opiates kill 100,000 people a year globally. Every year NATO countries lose over 10,000 people to heroin overdoses. In Russia an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people die of drug overdoses yearly. Counter-narcotics in Afghanistan is an area where NATO’s and Russia’s interests clearly coincide. If NATO and Russia cannot find a way of effectively cooperating in this matter, not only will the Afghan narcotic problem spiral completely out of control, but NATO-Russia cooperation could come under pressure. Details: Brussels, Belgium: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2010. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Security Policy Brief, No. 14: Accessed October 5, 2010 at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-gov/SPB-14-Nopens-countering-afghan-narcotics.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 119859 |
Author: Title: Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy Summary: Police reform in Afghanistan is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, but such increased efforts are still yet to be matched by significant improvements in police effectiveness and public confidence. Too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police to fight the insurgency rather than crime. Corruption and political appointments are derailing attempts to professionalise the force. The government and the international community need to reinforce the International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB) as the central forum for prioritising efforts and drive forward with much greater unity of effort. Tangible steps such as appointing a career police commissioner and establishing community liaison boards will build professionalism and wider outreach. A national police force able to uphold the rule of law is crucial to state-building and would help tackle the root causes of alienation that drive the insurgency. Details: Kabur/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Briefing No. 85: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ICG_Afghanistan_Policing_StillSearchingForStrategy.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 119911 |
Author: United Nations Development Programme - Afghanistan: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Title: Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective Summary: From July 9th to July 21st, 2009, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) Surveys conducted a survey of public opinion for UNDP-Afghanistan on the subject of Police Performance and Public Safety perceptions. The main purpose of this study was to provide insight into the opinions of the people of Afghanistan with regard to various policing issues. ACSOR interviewed 5,156 Afghan respondents (2,827 males and 2,329 females), age 18 or older, across all 34 provinces of the country. In Afghanistan, security is the responsibility of several different groups. These include, but are not limited to, local law enforcement officials, Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA) and the National Department of Security (NDS). While questions pertaining to the security of Afghanistan as a whole are addresed, the majority of the questions focused on police in regard to local performance. The main results of the survey showed more positive trends about the police performance than generally perceived. Almost half of Afghans (49%) think the police in their area are controlling crime and 42% strongly agree that the police performance has improved over the past year. 67% of respondents believe that if better trained, police performance is very likely to improve, 65% believe that it is very likely that having better knowledge of the law will lead to improvement, and 58% believe that it is very likely that an increase in pay would improve performance. Under the current circumstances, 34% somewhat agree that police officers should receive higher salaries than teachers. Afghans are hopeful that improvements in the police force are both possible and forthcoming. Respondents also answered affirmatively that interaction between officers and the public are ways to improve police performance, with 65% saying that community meetings between police and local residents would improve security, as would police assistance in the development of “watch groups” (54%). Moreover, 52-54% of Afghans would like to see more female law enforcement officers, particularly to address crimes against women and children. On the negative side, Afghans still believe that corruption is widely present in the police force, in particular amongst those respondents in the Central/Kabul region where 27% of respondents say “a lot” of police misuse their authority, compared to 21% nationwide. There was also a 42% pervasive response, particularly among shop keepers, that gifts and bribes are necessary when interacting with officers. About half of Afghans (51%) think that when performing their duties, police officers in their area are partial in favor of their tribe; however, 52% think that when it comes to recruiting new police cadets, high-ranking police officers are not partial. Regarding security in general, most Afghans (80%) reported that the security situation in their area is good; of this, 96% among those living in Kabul and surrounding provinces. However, respondents in the East and South, as well as rural respondents in general, were less likely to view security as good. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: UNDP Afghanistan Country Office, 2009. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2010 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UNDP_Afghanistan_PolicePerceptionSurvey2009.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Police Corruption Shelf Number: 120175 |
Author: Afghanistan Civil Society Forum Title: Baseline Study for Pilot Democratic Policing Across 8 Districts of Northern Kabul Province Summary: This Baseline Study was undertaken for the Pilot Democratic Policing [sic], being currently implemented by the Ministry of Interior and UNDP. The study documents existing experiences and expectations of the public from their local police; the public and police’s understanding of basic concepts of democratic policing; the role of shuras and other traditional justice system mechanisms; as well as both the public and police’s recommendations for improving police effectiveness and interface between the police and the community on a regular basis. The findings of the Study are based on 1,200 questionnaire responses by the public and police, and eight focus group discussions, undertaken across eight northern districts of Kabul province, including the. 17th police district of Kabul City , Mirbachakoot, Kalakaan, Guldara, Deh Sabz, Qarabagh, Shakar Dara, and Istalif. Very little variation was found among districts, so findings are not differentiated. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Civil Society Forum, 2010. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 4, 2010 at: Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Police Reform Shelf Number: 120190 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Governance, Security and Economic Growth: The Determinants of Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Districts of Jurm and Baharak in Badakhshan Summary: As this report shows the evidence from the centre of Baharak district in Badakhshan is that given the right conditions many households can prosper despite ceasing or significantly reducing opium poppy cultivation. Opium poppy remains an input intensive crop. Not only does land have to be set aside for its cultivation but also water, seed, farm power and most importantly of all labour. When the opportunity cost of allocating these inputs to opium production rise due to the growth in the market for high value vegetable production, the recovery of livestock prices and significant increases in wage labour opportunities, households can make the shift from opium poppy cultivation to legal economic opportunities without enduring economic and political shocks. For instance, it no longer looks as economically attractive to allocate family members to work on such a labour intensive crop as opium poppy cultivation when salaried employment and consistent wage labour opportunities are available, particularly when opium prices are falling. Neither does it make sense to hire a workforce for opium poppy cultivation to substitute for this now gainfully employed family labour given relatively high wage labour rates. Instead it is rational to cultivate less labour intensive crops that can be managed largely utilising the remaining supply of household labour. Of course it is even more conducive to the household if these crops fetch good prices, attract traders to purchase them at the farmgate and obtain advance payments, as is currently the case in central Baharak. Land can also be allocated to fodder crops that are again less labour intensive and serve to increase the value added of livestock which has seen a recovery in prices and market size. As such, combining wage labour opportunities with high value cash crops and livestock production not only has the potential to generate a higher return to household resources but can also offer greater security than simply cultivating opium poppy. Of course in this scenario ‘security’ is not only a function of the different income streams available which act as a safety net against crop or market failure, but also a consequence of the household operating within the ‘rule of law’ and therefore less vulnerable to the potential excesses of both state and non-state actors. In this situation a household will also more often than not be a recipient of public goods such as education, health, physical infrastructure, as well as physical security which all serve to improve economic opportunities and extend social contract between the state and community. As experience in other former opium poppy growing areas in countries like Thailand and Pakistan illustrate once these gains are consolidated farmers are unlikely to return to opium production even when famgate prices increase significantly. However, this paper also shows that the opportunity cost of allocating household resources to opium poppy is not rising for all, indeed these development are typically highly localised and concentrated around central Baharak. In contrast in the more remote areas of Baharak district and across much of the neighbouring district of Jurm, circumstances are such that agricultural commodity and labour markets remain constrained. Limited natural assets, such as land and water, combined with poor roads and high transportation costs preclude the shift to high value vegetable production. Some recovery in livestock is taking place but the benefits of this tend to be concentrated amongst the relatively wealthy who have often restocked their herds using the proceeds from their opium crop. In these areas opium poppy persists all be it at lower levels than in 2006. In the more remote parts of the district of Baharak there is potential for opium to cease once infrastructure is improved, and more marginal households restock their herds and gain better access to labour markets through a growth in labour demand and/or skill development. Wage labour opportunities in Iran will continue to be seen as an important safety valve for households who cannot meet their basic needs by participating in local agricultural and labour markets. In the district of Jurm the prognosis is more bleak. The biggest constraint on reducing opium poppy in this area is the insecurity and poor governance that is currently stymieing the growth of the legal economy. Here the political and financial interests of competing commanders will only serve to continue high levels of dependency on opium production and prevent households making sustainable shifts to legal economic options. There is a danger that the growing insecurity in the centre of the district has a knock on effect in the upper areas in which currently the local commanders remain relatively inactive. In the centre of Jurm the uncertain political and security environment is already impacting on investment decisions. Attempts by the local and central authorities to reduce opium poppy cultivation are viewed with disdain and seen as part of a wider attempt by local commanders to reinforce their political and economic grip over the area. It is also impacting on the legal economy reducing disposable income and subsequently sales and employment opportunities. This in turn is further weakening the relationship between the state and local communities. As such there is a real risk that the political need for short-term results on levels of cultivation could undermine attempts to deliver sustainable development and counter narcotics outcomes. In such an environment greater focus needs to be given to stabilising the security and governance environment through anti corruption measures and extending service delivery, as well as promoting economic growth. It would appear that counter narcotics efforts such as eradication efforts may well have to wait until these pre-requisites are put in place and farmers have viable alternatives to opium poppy cultivation. Details: Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2007. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2010 at: http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-eod-report-Badakhshan.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Economics Shelf Number: 120270 |
Author: Goodhand, Jonathan Title: Drugs and (Dis)Order: A Study of the Opium Trade, Political Settlements and State-Making in Afghanistan Summary: This paper represents one contribution to a wider research project led by the Crisis States Programme2, which examines how patterns of resource mobilisation and rent appropriation, in war to peace transitions, shape wider political relations and institutions. The research aims to test the hypothesis that particular types and patterns of rent appropriation may contribute to more inclusive/exclusive political settlements which translates into more/less stability of the state. Here we are primarily concerned with the political economy of post-Bonn Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the role of the drugs industry and its impacts upon processes of state-building and peace-building. Section one introduces our theoretical framework and background on the Afghan case. Section two gives an overview of the structural characteristics and contemporary dynamics of the drugs industry. Section three provides a comparative analysis of the linkages between drugs, the political settlement and post conflict state-building, through three provincial level studies. Section four building on the case studies and relevant literature draws out some of the underlying relationships and broader patterns connecting drugs, violence and political coalitions in Afghanistan. Section five outlines some tentative conclusions and broader theoretical and policy implications. Details: London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2010. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP83.2.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 120305 |
Author: Wyler, Liana Sun Title: Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance Summary: Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government’s credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress. Major programs include the following: • State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections System Support Program (CSSP); • U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) formal and informal ROL stabilization programs (RLS); • Justice Department’s (DOJ’s) Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, which, with State Department funds, provides legal mentoring and training; and • Defense Department’s (DOD’s) operational support through Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), as well as through Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF-435). It is difficult to identify all the programs, activities, and actors involved in ROL in Afghanistan, in part because of the continued evolution of U.S. strategy and interagency coordination for supporting the Afghan justice sector. Among the most recent shifts in strategy, U.S. efforts are increasingly resourced by a surge in civilian personnel at the provincial and district levels. To align with counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives, the U.S. government is emphasizing not only ministerial-level institution-building, but also projects to improve local-level access to justice, including projects to support informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Policy coordination among U.S. civilian and military entities involved in ROL efforts in Afghanistan also continues to change—including, most recently, the establishment of an Ambassador-led Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (CDROLLE) directorate at the U.S. Embassy, a Generalled Rule of Law Field Force (ROLFF) under the CJIATF-435, as well as an Interagency Planning and Implementation Team (IPIT) to coordinate all civilian and military ROL activities in Afghanistan. Future shifts in policy approaches may also occur as policymakers seek to address growing concerns regarding Afghan corruption. Observers debate whether or to what extent the increased U.S. commitment to and resources for ROL efforts in Afghanistan will help the U.S. government reach its ultimate goal of developing a stable, capable, and legitimate Afghan government. Many would argue that the challenges in Afghanistan to ROL development and justice sector reform remain substantial and many factors undermine prospects for success. Chief among these are ongoing allegations of severe corruption at all levels of the Afghan government, lack of overall security and stability, limited Afghan government capacity, the existence of competing justice mechanisms, and the persistence of traditional attitudes that perpetuate the perception that well-connected Afghans can avoid facing prosecution and conviction. These debates will likely continue in the 112th Congress, as Members remain concerned with all aspects of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, including authorizing and appropriating ROL-related programs and assistance, as well as conducting oversight on policy implementation and effectiveness. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report for Congress R41484: Accessed December 3, 2010 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41484.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 120367 |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed Summary: The illicit drug trade remains a challenge to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces over 90 percent of the world's opium, which competes with the country's licit agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels corruption in Afghanistan. Since 2005, the United States has allotted over $2 billion to stem the production, consumption, and trafficking of illicit drugs while building the Afghan government's capacity to conduct counternarcotics activities on its own. In this report, GAO (1) examines how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has changed; (2) assesses progress made and challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program areas; and (3) assesses U.S. agencies' monitoring and evaluation efforts. To address these objectives, GAO obtained pertinent program documents and interviewed relevant U.S. and Afghan officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy has changed emphasis across program areas over time to align with the overarching counterinsurgency campaign. The 2005 U.S. counternarcotics strategy focused on five program areas: elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and alternative livelihoods. Since then, U.S. Department of Defense (Defense) policy and rules of engagement were changed to allow greater military involvement in Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts due to the ties between traffickers and insurgents. Furthermore, the U.S. counternarcotics strategy has shifted to align more closely with counterinsurgency efforts by de-emphasizing eradication, focusing more on interdiction efforts, and increasing agricultural assistance. The United States' use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure of overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does not capture all aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In recognition of this, the administration is attempting to develop measures that better capture overall counternarcotics success. U.S. agencies have reported progress within counternarcotics program areas, but GAO was unable to fully assess the extent of progress due to a lack of performance measures and interim performance targets to measure Afghan capacity, which are a best practice for performance management. For example, although Defense is training Afghan pilots to fly interdiction missions on their own, this program lacks interim performance targets to judge incremental progress. Furthermore, a lack of security, political will, and Afghan government capacity have challenged some counternarcotics efforts. For example, eradication and public information efforts have been constrained by poor security, particularly in insurgency-dominated provinces. In addition, other challenges affect specific program areas. For example, drug abuse and addiction are prevalent among the Afghan National Police. Monitoring and evaluation are key components of effective program management. Monitoring is essential to ensuring that programs are implemented as intended, and routine evaluation helps program managers make judgments, improve effectiveness, and inform decisions about current and future programming. U.S. agencies in all counternarcotics areas have monitored program progress through direct U.S. agency oversight, contractor reporting, and/or third-party verification. For example, eradication figures were routinely reported by U.S. Department of State (State) officials and contractors, and verified by United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime monitors. U.S. agencies also conducted and documented program evaluations to improve effectiveness in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and public information program areas. However, State has not formally documented evaluations of its justice reform program. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-291: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10291.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Control Shelf Number: 120492 |
Author: Title: Reforming Afghanistan's Broken Judiciary Summary: Afghanistan’s justice system is in a catastrophic state of disrepair. Despite repeated pledges over the last nine years, the majority of Afghans still have little or no access to judicial institutions. Lack of justice has destabilised the country and judicial institutions have withered to near non-existence. Many courts are inoperable and those that do function are understaffed. Insecurity, lack of proper training and low salaries have driven many judges and prosecutors from their jobs. Those who remain are highly susceptible to corruption. Indeed, there is very little that is systematic about the legal system, and there is little evidence that the Afghan government has the resources or political will to tackle the challenge. The public, consequently, has no confidence in the formal justice sector amid an atmosphere of impunity. A growing majority of Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control. To reverse these trends, the Afghan government and international community must prioritise the rule of law as the primary pillar of a vigorous counter-insurgency strategy that privileges the protection of rights equally alongside the protection of life. Restoration of judicial institutions must be at the front and centre of the strategy aimed at stabilising the country. The Afghan government must do more to ensure that judges, prosecutors and defence attorneys understand enough about the law to ensure its fair application. Reinvigoration of the legal review process and the adoption of a more dynamic, coordinated approach to justice sector reform are critical to changing the system. Justice is at the core of peace in Afghanistan and international engagement must hew to the fundamental goal of restoring the balance of powers in government and confronting governmental abuses, past and present. Urgent action is also needed to realign international assistance to strengthen support for legal education, case management, data collection and legal aid. Legal institutions and legal elites have been deeply affected by the political paroxysms of more than three decades of conflict. The judiciary has been scarred by a legacy of political interference by both Afghan powerbrokers and external actors. Judicial independence has, as a result, been one of the main casualties of Afghanistan’s protracted war. The courts, for years, have suffered manipulation from an executive branch that has abused the law to fortify its position in the ongoing tussles between the secular and religious, the centre and periphery, the rich and poor. The Afghan government’s historic inability and persistent unwillingness to resolve conflicts between state codes, Islamic law and customary justice embedded in the legal culture have further destabilised the country. The critical leverage provided to fundamentalists in the constitution has concurrently had a deep impact on the evolution of legal institutions. The strong presidential system adopted under the 2004 constitution has only exacerbated the weakness of judicial institutions. The lack of a clearly defined arbiter of the constitution has undercut the authority of the Supreme Court and transformed the court into a puppet of President Hamid Karzai. Given the wide range of powers granted the president and lack of checks and balances in the system, it is unrealistic to expect change will come from his quarter. The international community, meanwhile, has done little to create incentives for political restraint and accountability within the executive. The National Assembly must, therefore, consider its options for triggering constitutional review either through convening a constitutional Loya Jirga, or grand assembly, or through the adoption of a constitutional amendment requiring the initiation of a full-scale review of the founding document by 2014. Friction between various stakeholders over the priority and content of rule of law reforms is blocking progress. There is a strong need to improve the legal review process by building capacity at the ministry of justice, with combined input from Afghan officials and expert international advisers. At the local level, the government and international community must deliver on the promise made at the 2007 rule of law conference in Rome to support better coordination between primary courts in the provinces and districts and high courts in Kabul. Dysfunction at the provincial level has long been a hallmark of a system unable to resolve tensions between its highly centralised organisation and the diffusion of the population across difficult and often inaccessible terrain. Over the years, the Afghan government and the international community have endeavoured to resolve this problem, most notably through the introduction of regional trainings for Afghan judges and prosecutors. This is not enough. After nearly a decade of financial pledges and promises, neither the government nor the international community have a full picture of the demand for legal services at the provincial and district level. Province-by-province assessments of the courts, attorney general’s office and ministry of justice, including a focused look at caseloads, settlement and conviction rates, shortages in personnel, materiel and infrastructure should be regularly conducted and made available to the public. Developing a concrete, dynamic understanding of deficits in the system is the first step toward crafting an effective strategy for reform. In its desperation to find quick fix solutions, the international community, and the U.S. in particular, has begun to look to the informal justice sector as a means to an undefined end. This is problematic for a number of reasons. While it is true that the use of traditional Afghan jirgas and shuras to resolve disputes, particularly in rural areas, is so widespread that it cannot be ignored, the current government is a long way from having the capacity to integrate the decisions of such councils into the formal system. Their multiplicity, the plurality of customs and the erosion of the social order during years of violent conflict have degraded the positive influence and real authority of such jirgas. Moreover, the exclusion of women from these informal judicial councils poses serious problems for the state’s constitutional obligation to defend the principle of equality under the law. International involvement in this sphere will do little to enhance rule of law in the near term and it may, indeed, sow more confusion over the state’s legal authority and the real objectives of coalition partners. The task of monitoring and evaluating such councils has meanwhile fallen to a private U.S. contractor with an uneven track record in implementing rule of law programs in this and other countries. Outsourcing a task as delicate as monitoring the complex politics of tribal justice to a contractor with limited knowledge of the region is to nobody’s benefit. The U.S. and its NATO allies must also acknowledge that stabilisation will depend as much on the legitimacy of state authority and re-establishment of the rule of law as it will on rebuilding Afghanistan’s police and military. To restore its legitimacy, the Afghan government will have to work much harder to eliminate corruption, ensure fair trial standards and curtail arbitrary detentions. Extrajudicial actions by the U.S. and its coalition partners against Afghan citizens have also distorted the justice system and are fuelling the insurgency. U.S. and NATO actions must conform to national and international laws, including an end to arbitrary detentions. There should be no expectation that Afghan officials and institutions will realign the justice system to conform to international norms until U.S. and NATO allies adjust their own policies and practices. The report ends with a number of recommendations. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 195: Accessed December 16, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Courts Shelf Number: 120534 |
Author: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Title: Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women in Afghanistan Summary: UNAMA Human Rights’ 56-page report: Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan, documents the prevalence of customary practices that violate women’s rights, including child and forced marriage, the giving away of girls to settle disputes, exchange marriages, forced isolation in the home and “honour” killings, describes the Government of Afghanistan’s response to these practices, and makes recommendations to end such practices. UNAMA Human Rights publishes the report produced in cooperation with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights today to mark International Human Rights Day on 10 December and the end of the global 16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence campaign. Based on extensive research discussions and interviews carried out in 2010 in nearly all 34 provinces of Afghanistan with women, men, Government authorities, religious leaders and community groups, UNAMA Human Rights found that such practices are widespread, occurring in rural and urban communities, among all ethnic groups and worsened by three decades of insecurity and poverty. Rooted in discriminatory views and beliefs about the role and position of women in Afghan society, harmful traditional practices cause pain, suffering, humiliation and marginalization for millions of Afghan women and girls. The report observed that harmful practices are further entrenched by the Afghan Government’s inability to fully protect the rights of women and girls, underscoring the need to expedite implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW law) that criminalizes many harmful practices. The report notes that most harmful traditional practices are not only crimes under Afghan law, but are also inconsistent with Sharia law. Extensive discussions with a diverse range of Islamic legal experts informed UNAMA Human Rights’ analysis of the principles of Sharia law. Details: Kabul: UNAMA, 2010. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Human Rights (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 120546 |
Author: Peters, Gretchen Title: Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents enormous challenges and also potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population‐centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Within a realm of poor governance and widespread state corruption, anti‐state actors engage in and protect organized crime—mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping—both to raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustainable licit economy. Militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized, how funds flow through their command chains and how they interact—and sometimes fight — with each other. There is no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier, have simultaneously contributed to a widening sense of anger and frustration among local communities. Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderate Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better protecting local communities who are the main victims of it. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 120547 |
Author: Dufour, Charlotte Title: Strategies to Counter Opiate Production in Afghanistan: Are We On the Right Track? Summary: Almost ten years after the international community’s military intervention and the fall of the Taliban regime, the question of the production of opium in Afghanistan is, more than ever, of central concern to actors and the international community in particular. During the past decade, there has been a succession of policies and programmes aiming to reduce drug production either through eradication, repression or via the implementation of alternative agricultural or rural development activities. What results have these produced? What lessons can be drawn from them? In order to answer these questions, this study analyses the different activities which have been implemented in the last decade as part of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) – by highlighting their strengths and weaknesses and the constraints involved in implementing them – and makes some strategic and operational recommendations to contribute to the debate about policies and programmes. Due to the scale of the subject (the wide variety of activities and large number of actors with very different approaches), the decision was made to analyse in detail a selection of development programmes directly or indirectly related to the fight against opiates, and to give only a general overview of the achievements and key issues of the other pillars of the NDCS. The study is based on detailed analysis of existing literature and on interviews with representatives of Afghan ministries, international governments, United Nations agencies and researchers who work on counter-narcotics activities. Details: Plaisians, France: Groupe URD, 2010. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2011 at: http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Strategies_to_counter_opiate_in_Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Counter-Narcotics Progams Shelf Number: 120688 |
Author: United Nations Development Programme - Afghanistan Title: Police Perception Survey - 2010: The Afghan Perspective Summary: Building on the results of the first–time 2009 police performance survey, the Police Perception Survey - 2010 was conducted across the country by the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Afghanistan. The objective was to consolidate information from a large sample of the Afghan populace, representative of all the regions, to assess the progress of the Afghan police force on a variety of police related issues, according to established baselines of the previous year. The survey was contracted out to the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), which has established itself as a major provider of quantitative and qualitative research in Afghanistan for groups such as the Asia Foundation and the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF). ACSOR interviewed 5,052 Afghans (2,728 males and 2,324 females), age 18 or older, across all 34 provinces of the country. The survey, consisting of 61 substantive questions, many of which in multiple parts, dwelt on a wide variety of issues, directly or indirectly related to police performance. Details: Kabul: United Nations Development Programme - Afghanistan, 2010. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2011 at: http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2011/Police%20Perception%20Survey%20Book%202010%20FINAL%20(6th%20Jan%202011).pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Police Performance (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 120741 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010 Summary: This year’s Afghanistan Opium Survey shows that while the total area under cultivation and the number of families growing opium poppy remained the same as in 2009, opium production fell drastically to roughly half of last year’s levels. The cause of the decline in production was a naturally occurring plant disease that affected Afghanistan’s major opium poppy-growing regions this year. Like opium production, the gross export value of Afghan opiates was halved this year. This indicates that the income of Afghan traffickers from the 2010 opium season is also down. But there is cause for concern. The market responded to the steep drop in opium production with an equally dramatic jump in the market price to more than double 2009 levels. Meanwhile, the price of wheat—one of Afghanistan’s principal crop alternatives to opium—has fallen. At current prices, planting opium poppies is six times more profitable than growing wheat. The high price of opium combined with a low wheat price may encourage more farmers to cultivate opium in 2011. The 2010 Survey continues to underscore the linkage between opium poppy cultivation and security in Afghanistan. In areas where there is a government presence and the rule of law prevails, only a few hundred hectares of opium cultivation remain. Twenty provinces are already poppy-free, and with some additional effort, Afghanistan could achieve five more poppy-free provinces next year (Hirat, Kabul, Kunar, Laghman and Zabul). We encourage their governors, the central Government and donors to help these provinces become poppy-free in 2011. Badghis and Zabul have achieved significant reductions, and we encourage efforts to stop the increased cultivation in Badakhshan and Nangarhar to avoid a return to the worrying levels observed in 2007. The significant expansion of cultivation in Kandahar Province over the past two years must also be stopped, and we urge the governor and other partners to play an active role in preventing any further increase and to ensure progress is made in eradication. Further growth in poppy cultivation in Kandahar would have an adverse effect on other provinces as well. Enabling farmers to make a living and support their families by planting licit crops is the most effective way to stop opium poppy cultivation. Providing villages with agricultural assistance encourages the cultivation of licit crops. For the first time this year, we saw a correlation between provision of agricultural assistance and a drop in opium cultivation. Providing farmers with access to markets for their crops also helps keep them away from opium poppy cultivation. In villages that are close to agricultural markets, farmers plant less poppy than in villages with no access to markets. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 14, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2010_web.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 120925 |
Author: Maass, Citha D. Title: Afghanistan’s Drug Career: from War to Drug Economy Summary: This new AAN thematic report (with SWP Berlin) looks into the beginnings and the evolution of drug production in Afghanistan during its three decades-long war. Starting with the Western-supported anti-Soviet jihad in 1979, drug production became a major base for the country’s war economy. After the fall of the Taleban regime in 2001, the US rehabilitated the former mujahedin leaders who – as the Taleban regime had done – funded themselves to a large extent by trafficking drugs and turned into ‘war entrepreneurs’. From 2002 onwards, President Hamed Karzai co-opted these war entrepreneurs into the new political system. As a result, a new drugs economy consolidated, beginning in 2005, resulting in a new regulative system in post-war Afghanistan which the author terms a ‘criminalized peace’. Details: Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2011. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 5, 2011 at: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/20110401CithaM-Afghanistans_Drug_Career--FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 121248 |
Author: Kego, Walter Title: Europe and Afghan Heroin Summary: As the war in Afghanistan reaches the decade mark, the effort to stem opium poppy cultivation has taken a turn for the worse. International efforts to defeat the Taliban have tapered into a regressed response to the problem that drugs play in this conflict. Anti-drug campaigns are floundering as opium prices rise, which acts as an incitement to continued and renewed farming. This could potentially further destabilize the previous efforts in a war in which there is a desperate need to show progress. Perhaps Europe can recognize a problem of which they are a part and find an alternative way to effectively address the issue at hand. Details: Stockholm: The Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2011. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: ISDP Policy Brief, No. 57: Accessed April 14, 2011 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2011_kego-hedlund_europe-and-afghan-heroin.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 121339 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Poppy Free Provinces: A Measure or a Target? Summary: This report focuses on the concept of “poppy free” provinces — an increasingly important metric by which performance in counter-narcotics in Afghanistan is currently being judged. It is based on the fourth consecutive year of fieldwork conducted in the provinces of Nangarhar and Ghor under the auspices of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit’s Applied Thematic Research into Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy project, known in short as “WOL” and funded by the European Commission. The report does not offer a synthesis of the previous years of fieldwork undertaken, although clearly it draws on the body of knowledge established by this work. The report details the processes by which two provinces achieved what the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has come to refer to as “poppy free” status1 in the 2007/08 growing season. The two provinces are Nangarhar in the East of the country and Ghor in the central region. These are two markedly different provinces, not only from the perspective of the resources that the population have at their disposal, but also in the scale and depth of their engagement in the production and trade in opium. Matching the contrast in resources and engagement in opium poppy cultivation is the way in which Nangarhar and Ghor achieved their “poppy free” status in 2007/08 and the subsequent impact on the socioeconomic and political situation in these two provinces. The report contrasts the way in which these two provinces became opium poppy free in the 2007/08 growing season. It highlights the proactive role played by the Governor of Nangarhar in banning opium poppy: his use of coercion, persuasion and tribal structures to create an environment in which the population was not confident that there was sufficient unity within the tribes to prevent the opium crop being destroyed were they to plant it. The report also outlines how early eradication in key districts served to increase this perception of risk and, when combined with a successful attempt by the local authorities to create the impression that the heightened profile of the Unites States military in the province was primarily aimed at counter-narcotics rather than counterinsurgency, succeeded in deterring planting across Nangarhar. The report highlights how the situation in Ghor could not be more different. Here, the negligible levels of cultivation were the consequence of environmental and market forces. It shows how low opium yields and falling farm-gate prices have acted against opium poppy and, in the wake of dramatic increases in wheat prices in the 2007/08 growing season, have made it irrational to cultivate opium poppy. The reports shows that those who persist with cultivation typically do so because they have no other sources of cash income. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2009. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2011 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AREU_PoppyFreeProvinces_MeasureOrTarget.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Policy Shelf Number: 121398 |
Author: Atabay, Tomris Title: Afghanistan: Implementing Alternatives to Imprisonment, in Line with International Standards and National Legislation Summary: The current assessment forms part of UNODC’s programme to extend penitentiary reform to the provinces of Afghanistan (AFG/R87), building on the UNODC penitentiary reform project ongoing in Afghanistan since 2003 (AFG/R41). The project includes the introduction of initiatives to increase the use of alternatives to prison, in line with the recommendations of international standards, to complement a range of other activities focusing on the infrastructural, normative and operational priorities in the penitentiary system. The assessment provides a review of existing legislation, in terms of their provisions for non-custodial measures and sanctions, with particular focus on the provisions for offenders with mental healthcare needs, drug users, women, juveniles and first time non-violent offenders. It analyses information gathered in Kabul, as regards offences committed by some of these groups and sentences received, with a view to assessing the application of existing provisions for alternatives and potential for expanding the use of non-custodial sanctions and measures. It reviews the capacity of criminal justice institutions and services in the community, provided by the State and NGOs, to implement and support non-custodial measures and sanctions. It comments on the current discussion on forming links with the informal justice structures for diversion from the criminal justice system. Finally, it puts forward a series of recommendations to increase the implementation in practice of existing alternatives to prison, to expand non-custodial measures and sanctions in legislation, and to initiate practical steps to ensure that legislation is applied, and applied to enhance the social reintegration prospects of offenders. The assessment and recommendations are guided by international instruments, including: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; United Nations Standards Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (Tokyo Rules); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules); United Nations Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of mental healthcare (Mental Illness Principles) and United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The assessment has been prepared in the context of priorities and goals set by the Afghanistan Compact, within the overall framework of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and decisions taken at the Justice and Rule of Law Conference held in Rome in July 2007. Details: New York, United Nations, 2008. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://ar.unrol.org/files/Afghanistan_Implementing_Alternatives_Imprisonment[1].pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Alternatives to Incarceration (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 121453 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Where Have All the Flowers Gone? Assessing the Sustainability of Current Reductions in Opium Production in Afghanistan Summary: Levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan have fallen for two consecutive years and it now appears that cultivation will be maintained at this relatively low level for another year. While this allows for progress to be declared against more short-term, area-based counter-narcotics targets, the reasons for the continued decline in cultivation are far from clear. This paper illustrates that current reductions are the result of complex economic, political and environmental processes that are both contextspecific and difficult to maintain. It argues that the coincidence of actions and events that have led to the current fall in production have set in play their own dynamic that could further destabilise parts of rural Afghanistan if not held in check. The paper is divided into three sections. Section 1 draws on detailed fieldwork in two distinct provinces as a way of exploring the different factors that lie behind the current reductions in opium production in Afghanistan. It shows how reductions in Nangarhar are largely a consequence of the concerted efforts of the current governor and the political deals he has struck with tribal leaders, local powerbrokers and to some extent the US military, whereas in Helmand the reductions in cultivation are primarily driven by shifts in the terms of trade between wheat and poppy and continuing concerns over food security. Section 2 explores the resilience of these reductions. It initially examines what opium poppy has been replaced with and highlights that reductions based on wheat are precarious and unlikely to be sustained. The section goes on to analyse the unfolding political environment in Afghanistan and how it might impact levels of opium production in the future, suggesting that the current political settlements that have been critical for reducing opium poppy in provinces such as Nangarhar and Balkh remain fragile and highly dependent on incumbent governors. The final section looks at the current policy environment for counter-narcotics. It suggests that counter-narcotics efforts and objectives have largely been relegated in Afghanistan, where counter-insurgency reigns supreme. This is not completely unwelcome because it has forced the drug control community to evaluate their interventions not simply based on the achievement of short-term, area-based targets but to consider the complex relationship between the achievement of counter-narcotics objectives and the broader goals of improving governance, security and economic growth. However, tensions still exist and this paper suggests that the trajectory of counter-narcotics policy is far from clear, particularly if production were to rise in the 2010/11 growing season. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper Series: Accessed July 2, 2011 at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/sbhrap/research/pdf/Wherehavealltheflowersgone.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 121955 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Managing Concurrent and Repeated Risks: Explaining the Reductions in Opium Production in Central Helmand between 2008 and 2011 Summary: Since 2008 the amount of land cultivated with opium in Helmand province has fallen by an estimated thirty seven per cent. Further dramatic reductions are anticipated in the canal command area of the province in the 2010/11 growing season. These reductions in opium poppy cultivation in central Helmand have occurred at the same time as the deployment of a growing number of national and international troops in the province, changing levels of violence, dramatic shifts in the terms of trade between opium poppy and wheat, the disbursement of increasing amounts of development assistance and the launch of a counter narcotics effort known as the ‘Food Zone Programme’. In this complex environment where so many variables are potentially influencing farmers in their cropping choices, it is difficult to identify the underlying causes of the reduction in opium production without conducting detailed research over a number of years. This Study represents such a body of analytical work and was commissioned to answer two specific questions: (1) what has driven the recent reductions in opium poppy cultivation in Helmand province; and (2) how sustainable will these reductions be? The Study also offers a series of recommendations for policy development and the implementation of programmes that can deliver a more enduring counter narcotics outcome without undermining current stabilisation efforts. The Study draws on both remote sensing and household data collected over a three year period and focuses on twenty three distinct research sites located in the rural areas of the districts of Nahre Seraj, Nad e Ali, Lashkar Gah, Marjeh and Nawa Barakzai in central Helmand. These particular research sites offer sharply contrasting socio-economic, political and environmental conditions that allow the reductions in levels of opium poppy cultivation within the province to be examined, as well as the identification of the differing impact of these reductions on households with different resource endowments and divergent exposure to risk and uncertainty. For example, some sites located in the environs of the cities of Gereshk and Lashkar Gah have experienced an improvement in security, gained from enhanced service provision and an expansion in their portfolio of livelihood activities over the period of the Study. Other research sites are located beyond the environs of the urban areas and have been exposed to repeated and concurrent shocks, such as chronic conflict, a ban on opium production, and a dramatic increase in wheat prices, over the period of the research. Finally there are research sites where the Taliban dominate, where opium persists and where livelihood options are severely limited by environmental factors. Details: London: Independent Drug Policy Consortium, 2011. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: August 1, 2011 at: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Managing-concurrent-and-repeated-risks.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Control Policy Shelf Number: 122242 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment Summary: Over the last decade, the global trade in illicit Afghan opiates has been one of the world’s greatest transnational drug and crime threats – with severe consequences for health, governance and security at national, regional and international levels. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, transnational organized crime groups were the main beneficiaries of the US$68 billion trade in 2009, which they supplemented with other forms of crime such as arms trafficking and human smuggling. In 2009, the Afghan Taliban was estimated to have earned around $150 million from the opiate trade, Afghan drug traffickers $2.2 billion, and Afghan farmers $440 million. While the findings suggest that most insurgent elements content themselves with taxing the trade rather than attempting to become active participants, it now appears that some insurgents involve themselves directly in the heroin supply chain, including in the procurement of acetic anhydride. Anti-government elements based in Afghanistan and Pakistan may gain access to only a fraction of the value of Afghan opiate exports, but this is nonetheless enough to support logistics, operations and recruitment. Areas under insurgent influence, such as the border between Iraq and Turkey and the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, also provide a key competitive advantage for organized crime groups as those areas lie beyond the reach of law enforcement. If global organized crime groups managing the opiate trade pocketed only 10 per cent of the profit, they would have earned at least $7 billion in 2009. All these illicit profits are laundered in one way or another, a process that undermines the vulnerable economies of areas such as the Balkans and Central Asia. Traffickers tend to shift routes and change their modus operandi as law enforcement pressure increases. Traditional methods of land border control may not be sufficient to stem the flow of opiates into destination markets. Details: Geneva: UNODC, 2011. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 122312 |
Author: Reid, Rachel Title: “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police” Summary: With US plans to withdraw troops and hand over security to the Afghan government by 2014, the US and Afghan governments have embraced a high-risk strategy of arming tens of thousands of men in a new village-level defense force. Called the Afghan Local Police (ALP), it is the latest in a long line of new security forces and militias the US and other international forces have worked with in recent years to pave the way for the exit of international troops. The Afghan government has also recently reactivated various irregular armed groups, particularly in the north. “Just Don’t Call it a Militia” — based primarily on interviews in Kabul, Wardak, Herat, and Baghlan, with additional interviews in Kandahar, Kunduz, and Uruzgan—first surveys attempts over the past decade to create civilian defense forces in Afghanistan. While some efforts have been more successful than others, all have at times been hijacked by local strongmen or by ethnic or political factions, spreading fear, exacerbating local political tensions, fueling vendettas and ethnic conflict, and in some areas even playing into the hands of Taliban insurgents, thus subverting the very purpose for which the militias were created. Against this backdrop, we then provide an account of the ALP one year after it was created, detailing instances in which local groups are again being armed without adequate oversight or accountability. We conclude that unless urgent steps are taken to prevent ALP units from engaging in abusive and predatory behavior, the ALP could exacerbate the same perverse dynamics that subverted previous efforts to use civilian defense forces to advance security and public order. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2011 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Militias Shelf Number: 122735 |
Author: Rosenau, William Title: Police Mentoring in Afghanistan: 2007–2009 Summary: The role of the police is an important but largely overlooked aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although academic and policy specialists have examined the role of police in post-conflict environments, the question of how police should be organized, trained, and equipped for counterinsurgency campaigns has received little systematic attention.1 Similarly, US military doctrine and the professional military literature, while not ignoring the subject entirely, do not consider it in any systematic way.2 This gap is particularly ironic, given the prominent role that soldiers and Marines have played in training indigenous police and other security forces in counterinsurgency campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan. If the broader topic of police and counterinsurgency is under-examined, the subject of mentoring—that is, advising and training—foreign police forces is even more neglected. American Marines, soldiers, and other military personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan for the police mentoring mission have few sources of information and analysis available to them. This monograph addresses that gap. Using a series of ten vignettes, this report examines in depth the experiences of individual American and British soldiers and Marines who served as mentors in Afghanistan during the 2007-2009 period. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2010. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/WEB%2012%2021%2010%20Police%20Mentoring%20online%20version.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Mentoring Shelf Number: 122785 |
Author: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Title: Reforming the Afghan National Police Summary: Afghanistan represents one of the largest attempts by the international community at state-building since the end of the Cold War. Nobody doubts the good intentions of the Afghan authorities or the international community in aiming to ensure the stability and long-term sustainability of Afghanistan. Large resources have been devoted to the rehabilitation of the country and progress has undoubtedly been achieved. Afghanistan is unrecognisable from the Taliban-run state at the beginning of this decade. Nevertheless, even by the Afghan government’s own admission, much work remains to be done. This monograph explores one aspect of the massive reconstruction effort; reform of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Much progress has been accomplished, from infrastructure built to the numbers of officers trained. But even by the Afghan government’s own admission, problems remain. Institutional and individual competence to tackle crime remains low, while corruption, police criminality and abuses of power are pervasive. Failing to provide sufficient civil security, the police are unable to fulfil their potential role as a key appendage to the reconstruction effort. Moreover, the acute security and justice deficit confronting Afghan communities presents an existential threat to the current post-Taliban system. Lawlessness is frequently cited as a primary reason for citizen disillusionment with the central government and growing sympathy for insurgent forces. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2009. 190p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 21, 2011 at: http://www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/afghanpolice/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Police Reform Shelf Number: 123076 |
Author: Pain, Adam Title: Opium Poppy Strikes Back: The 2011 Return of Opium in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces Summary: Opium poppy cultivation has re-emerged in Balkh and Badakhshan in 2011. In Badakhshan, it has spread across several districts in rainfed areas and, according to informal estimates, the cultivated area has doubled from official figures of 1,100 hectares (ha) in 2010 to around 2,200 ha. In Balkh—which was declared “poppy-free” in 2006—opium’s return has been more location-specific; it is currently being planted openly on a small scale in Chimtal District. While a rise in opium prices has played an important part, a range of contextual factors including power, insecurity, social identity, agro-ecology and location are also important in explaining the crop’s re-emergence, as well as the patterns of difference within and between the two provinces. Driven by a fall in production in the South in 2010, the rising price of opium is a contributing factor to the expansion of cultivation. However, this has also taken place in the context of a failing rural economy; many households are food insecure, rural employment is scarce and there is rising insecurity. In the eyes of many rural informants, promises made in 2006 to support the rural economy as a return for giving up opium poppy cultivation have not been met. There is also a sense, especially in Badakhshan, that southern provinces are being rewarded with greater levels of development funding despite their failure to give up the crop. Counter-narcotics policies and support to rural development do not appear to have generated the conditions that might encourage households to move permanently away from opium poppy cultivation. The real indicator of effective counter-narcotics strategies is to make farmers relatively insensitive to opium prices; this is clearly not yet the case. There are no easy solutions to the persistence of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. However, evidence from this study suggests a number of ways to improve both counternarcotics strategy and support for the development of the rural economy: • The notion of “poppy free” should be abandoned as an indicator of success. Supply reductions in one place can have price effects that shift production elsewhere. This reflects the irrepressible demand that continues to drive the opium market. • The re-emergence of cultivation in areas where it had declined highlights the limits of previous interventions. It also suggests the lack of a geographically joined-up counter-narcotics strategy. Provinces and districts are not islands and the return of opium cultivation to old areas is a reflection of this. • There is a need to recognise the significant political obstacles that exist to growth. The commodity market in urban centres such as Mazar-i-Sharif is characterised by non-competitive, exclusionary behaviour. A supply-side approach to agricultural development thus makes it difficult to give Afghanistan’s agricultural economy a competitive edge compared to its more powerful regional neighbours. This is especially important as there is also limited room to protect the domestic market from aggressive competition from outside. • The rural economy lacks domestic demand. A broader, less neo-liberal approach could involve using cash transfers and social protection measures to help reduce livelihood risks and increase local purchasing power. Combined with measures to increase agricultural productivity, this could help create the incentives to increase productivity and help reduce the risks of markets for the poor. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1116E%20Opium%20Poppy%20Strikes%20Back%20CS%202011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Narcotics Control Shelf Number: 123233 |
Author: Lamanna, Carlo Title: Drug Trafficking and Security Issues in Afghanistan Summary: Drug production in Afghanistan is a problem that for the moment traces directly to the European citizens’ demand for heroin. Opium cultivation and production have a huge role in the Afghan economy, but the magnitude of its trade goes beyond Afghanistan as more than 80% of the export value reaches the drug trafficking networks. Opium and opiates’ traffickers follow three major routes from Afghanistan to Western Europe, among which the route through Pakistan is really a favoured option. In such an economy, there are actors at the village level, traffickers at regional level, and transnational smuggling enterprises, all working in a pattern of corruption to evade regulatory mechanisms. There are security implications for the western countries’ interests that wish for a stable Afghanistan in a stabilized region. The drug trade across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is not only challenging state control but it is also reinforcing linkages between drug traffickers, criminal groups, and insurgents. Traffickers and insurgents do not necessarily share the same aims, but sometimes it is difficult to draw a clear line of division between them. The ways and means that such networks use to finance insurgency and terrorism in the region through the opiates’ trade require attention and precise strategies to fight them. Eventually, the drug trafficking is a world financial problem. Reducing the drug demand from the markets and eradicating the opiates’ production, as well as disrupting the link between them, require equal attention, and none of them can be underestimated or postponed. President Obama’s counternarcotics policy emphasizes the importance of interdiction and alternative development, and eliminates any U.S. role in eradication efforts. It is the reduction of the belligerent groups’ strength that comes first. Nevertheless, the new strategy also assures the necessary basis for substantial reductions in the size and impacts of the illicit economy in Afghanistan. However, without coordinated mechanisms to fight regional traffickers, the local interdiction efforts could result in unintended consequences of raising the retail price of illegal drugs. Efforts to limit the insurgents’ funds must include measures against money laundering that focus on the global. It is sensible to look forward to having the US and EU in a complementary role to fight the wide and fragmented drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe, in which transnational police operations can parallel and gradually take over the current military operations in Afghanistan. Details: United Kingdom: Royal College of Defence Studies, 2010. 38p. Source: Seaford House Paper 2010: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/B75962C5-EB34-4189-83AF-3E381C75FC59/0/SHP2010LAMANNA.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Border Security (Afghanistan and Pakistan) Shelf Number: 124074 |
Author: DuPée, Matthew C. Title: The Narcotics Emirate of Afghanistan: Armed Polities and Their Roles in Illicit Drug Production and Conflict 1980-2010 Summary: The production of illicit narcotics in low-intensity conflict environments remains a serious concern for U.S. policymakers. Afghanistan is a solid example where the intersection of crime, narcotics production and insurgency has successfully thwarted U.S. stabilization and security efforts despite a 10-year military engagement there. This study seeks to examine the role of crime better, particularly narcotics related criminal enterprise, and its effect on the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan. This study explores political, economic and conflict related factors that facilitate the narcotics industry and forges cooperation between drug trafficking organizations and insurgent movements. A key argument of this study is that nontraditional participants in narcotics production, such as insurgent groups or state representatives and institutions, acquire more than just profit and resources. Participants stand to gain political leverage, the social and political legitimacy derived from “protecting” the livelihoods of rural farmers, as well as “freedom of action;” the ability to operate unimpeded within a given territory or space because of public support. This study also suggests that one additional factor, social control, is a key motivator for an actor’s participation in the narcotics industry. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 143p. Source: Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2012 at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada536901.pdf&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Markets Shelf Number: 124110 |
Author: Samuel Hall Consulting for the International Labour Organization (ILO) Title: Buried in Bricks: A Rapid Assessment of Bonded Labour in Brick Kilns in Afghanistan Summary: This study analyses bonded labour in brick kilns within the broader humanitarian and development context to help stakeholders address the risks of bonded labour in light of social, economic and political policy priorities. It provides a bottom-up and top-down analysis drawing from data gathered from bonded labourers, employers, and local community leaders in Deh Sabz, Kabul, and Surkhroad, Nangarhar, as well as from interviews with stakeholders and experts between August and October 2011. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Samuel Hall Consulting, 2011. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2012 at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_172671.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Child Labor (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 124135 |
Author: Norman, Catherine Title: What do Afghans want from the Police? Views from Helmand Province Summary: The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the international community expect the Afghan police to play a crucial role in maintaining stability in Afghanistan as international troops withdraw. With foreign police trainers, mentors, and advisors remaining in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, the question of what sort of force they should be training is of increasing importance. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Development Division (C10) at Regional Command (Southwest) requested this study to examine what government officials, community leaders, and ordinary residents in Helmand want from the police, so that police mentors will know where they should focus their efforts. RC (SW) leaders recognized that, unless the Afghan government, community leaders, and public want the type of police force the international community is training, the police force will not be maintained after international forces withdraw. This paper provides perspectives gleaned from Helmand province at the end of 2010 and the start of 2011. It is intended to help police advisors and others working in Afghanistan with information they can use to open a dialog with their Afghan partners about the way ahead for the police. Residents of Helmand find it difficult to imagine a police force as found in Western countries because Afghanistan has never had community police. Although Westerners consider it self-evident that police should be professional, provide security, assist with law enforcement, and respond to the public's calls for assistance, the view from Helmand is more nuanced. It does not appear that residents of Helmand want the type of police force that is familiar to small-town Americans. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2012. 54p. Source: D0026181.A2: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2012 at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/What%20Afghans%20want%20from%20the%20Police%20D0026181.A2.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Police-Community Relations (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 124430 |
Author: U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Title: Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan Summary: In Afghanistan, the U.S. military faces one of the most complicated and difficult supply chains in the history of warfare. The task of feeding, fueling, and arming American troops at over 200 forward operating bases and combat outposts sprinkled across a difficult and hostile terrain with only minimal road infrastructure is nothing short of herculean. In order to accomplish this mission, the Department of Defense employs a hitherto unprecedented logistics model: responsibility for the supply chain is almost entirely outsourced to local truckers and Afghan private security providers. The principal contract supporting the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan is called Host Nation Trucking, a $2.16 billion contract split among eight Afghan, American, and Middle Eastern companies. Although there are other supply chain contracts, the HNT contract provides trucking for over 70 percent of the total goods and materiel distributed to U.S. troops in the field, roughly 6,000 to 8,000 truck missions per month. The trucks carry food, supplies, fuel, ammunition, and even Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs). The crucial component of the HNT contract is that the prime contractors are responsible for the security of the cargo that they carry. Most of the prime contractors and their trucking subcontractors hire local Afghan security providers for armed protection of the trucking convoys. Transporting valuable and sensitive supplies in highly remote and insecure locations requires extraordinary levels of security. A typical convoy of 300 supply trucks going from Kabul to Kandahar, for example, will travel with 400 to 500 guards in dozens of trucks armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The private security companies that protect the convoys are frequently involved in armed conflict with alleged insurgents, rival security providers, and other criminal elements. The security providers report having lost hundreds of men over the course of the last year alone, though the veracity of these reports is difficult to judge. Many of the firefights purportedly last for hours and involve significant firepower and frequent civilian casualties. Indeed, in an interview with the Subcommittee staff, the leading convoy security commander in Afghanistan said that he spent $1.5 million on ammunition per month. From one perspective, the HNT contract works quite well: the HNT providers supply almost all U.S. forward operating bases and combat outposts across a difficult and hostile terrain while only rarely needing the assistance of U.S. troops. Nearly all of the risk on the supply chain is borne by contractors, their local Afghan truck drivers, and the private security companies that defend them. During the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), by contrast, its army devoted a substantial portion of its total force structure to defending its supply chain. The HNT contract allows the United States to dedicate a greater proportion of its troops to other counterinsurgency priorities instead of logistics. But outsourcing the supply chain in Afghanistan to contractors has also had significant unintended consequences. The HNT contract fuels warlordism, extortion, and corruption, and it may be a significant source of funding for insurgents. In other words, the logistics contract has an outsized strategic impact on U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense has been largely blind to the potential strategic consequences of its supply chain contingency contracting. U.S. military logisticians have little visibility into what happens to their trucks on the road and virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided. When HNT contractors self-reported to the military that they were being extorted by warlords for protection payments for safe passage and that these payments were “funding the insurgency,” they were largely met with indifference and inaction. Specifically, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Majority staff makes the following findings: Security for the U.S. Supply Chain Is Principally Provided by Warlords; The Highway Warlords Run a Protection Racket; Protection Payments for Safe Passage Are a Significant Potential Source of Funding for the Taliban; Unaccountable Supply Chain Security Contractors Fuel Corruption; Unaccountable Supply Chain Security Contractors Undermine U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy; The Department of Defense Lacks Effective Oversight of Its Supply Chain and Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan; HNT Contractors Warned the Department of Defense About Protection Payments for Safe Passage to No Avail. There are numerous constructive changes that could be made to the U.S. military trucking effort in Afghanistan that would improve contracting integrity while mitigating corrupting influences. As the Department of Defense absorbs the findings in this report and considers its course of action, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Majority staff makes the following recommendations: Assume Direct Contractual Responsibility for Supply Chain Security Providers; Review Counterinsurgency Consequences of the HNT Contract; Consider the Role of Afghan National Security Forces in Highway Security; Inventory Actual Trucking Capacity Available to the Department of Defense; Draft Contracts to Ensure Transparency of Subcontractors; Oversee Contracts to Ensure Contract Transparency and Performance; and Analyze Effect of Coalition Contracting on Afghan Corruption. Details: Washington, DC: The Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 2010. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2012 at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS_Subcommittee/6.22.10_HNT_HEARING/Warlord_Inc_compress.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Conflict Shelf Number: 124583 |
Author: Barr, Heather Title: “I Had To Run Away” The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for “Moral Crimes” in Afghanistan Summary: The fall of the Taliban government promised a new era for women’s rights in Afghanistan. Ten years later there have been many improvements, but Afghan women are often still denied their basic human rights. One example is the plight of an estimated 400 women and girls imprisoned for the “moral crimes” of “running away” (fleeing home without permission) and zina (sex outside marriage). While Afghan law does not prohibit “running away,” the Afghan government and courts treat women and girls who do so as criminals. Zina is a crime in Afghanistan, punishable by up to 15 years in prison. “I Had To Run Away,” based on 58 prison interviews, tells the stories behind “moral crimes” arrests. It shows that these “crimes” usually involve flight from abuse, including forced and underage marriage, domestic violence, rape, forced prostitution, kidnapping, and murder threats. Women and girls accused of “moral crimes” encounter a justice system that is biased against them at every stage. Many receive long prison sentences while their abusers walk free, despite a 2009 law making violence against women a crime. Prosecuting “moral crimes” harms not only the hundreds of women and girls imprisoned, but sends a message to others enduring abuse that they risk both reprisals from their abusers and punishment from a government that should protect them. As the international community winds down its involvement in Afghanistan, Afghan women face an uncertain fate. The imprisonment of women and girls for “moral crimes” is one sign of the difficult present and the frightening future they face. Afghanistan’s international partners should act quickly to ensure that part of their legacy is greater physical and legal protection for women and girls. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012. 129p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 3, 2012 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0312webwcover_0.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Female Victims Shelf Number: 124809 |
Author: Cramer, Sarah Title: Women's Perceptions of the Afghan National Police: Gender Dynamics of Kabul Women and Police Summary: The security needs of Afghan men and women differ. Whereas men bear the brunt of the direct impacts of conflict, women disproportionately suffer from the indirect effects such as increased levels of domestic violence, decreased access to health care and poverty. Due to this difference in security needs, gender must be taken into account when evaluating the relationship between citizens and the Afghan National Police. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung commissioned this study to examine the perceptions active women in Kabul hold of the police. Active, urban women were targeted specifically as they are more likely to interact regularly with police than women that spend a majority of their time at home. The report seeks to: i) establish a gender-focused baseline for the evaluation of community trust building and police capacity building programs; ii) identify major trends and evolutions in public perceptions of the ANP in Kabul, notably amongst women; and iii) propose pragmatic recommendations for improving the relationship between Afghan women and the police. Given its focus on active, urban women, this study is not representative of all Afghan women. It should be used as an entry point for exploration of gender dynamics in the security sector and a tool for advocating a more gender-balanced approach to supporting the Afghan National Police. KEY FINDINGS Positive police approval ratings by both women and men should not be interpreted as a sign of satisfaction with the police, but rather low expectations. The survey revealed a strong correlation between satisfaction with security and satisfaction with police, demonstrating that security is likely the primary factor considered when Kabul residents of both genders evaluate police performance. Corruption appears to be accepted as a fact of life, and does not detract from high approval of police performance (80 percent amongst women). Expectations of civilian policing are extremely low. The police are not viewed as a resource for handling Sexual or Gender-Based Violence, the most prevalent safety issue for Afghan women. The police sector appears to be advancing more quickly than Afghan society in terms of its recognition of women’s risks, needs and rights. In instances where it fails women, the ANP is simply reflecting the restrictions Afghan society imposes on itself. In addition to establishing departments, units and initiatives that specifically target the needs of women, the ANP appears to be mainstreaming women’s issues into broader policies, such as the ANP Code of Conduct. Much of the gender-related progress in the ANP is the result of pressure from the international community. The implementation of progressive policies faces considerable resistance from individuals of all ranks within the ANP and Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI). The effectiveness of programs on gender or human rights within the ANP often hinges on the credibility of the interlocutor. Even more than religious beliefs, shared cultural, ethnic or tribal ties are the keys to this credibility, and are thus essential elements for initiatives intended to promote women’s rights within the police force. Although half of Kabul women are victims of domestic violence, most women would never turn to the police for assistance. Focus groups unanimously stated that family problems should be handled at home or with elders. Women who do seek outside aid are often shunned by their own families. As a result, victims of violence who successfully make it through the justice system often lack a support system to rebuild their lives afterwards. Given that Kabul women are considered to be the most modern and open-minded in Afghanistan, their compliance with this cultural belief and the lack of social services available to women raises serious doubts about the feasibility of addressing domestic violence via the police on a national scale in the short- or even medium-term. The necessity of women police is accepted by the ANP and Afghan society, albeit with restricted roles. For Islamic reasons, policewomen are required to conduct security checks of women. There is a growing acceptance of women investigators in Family Response Units (FRUs), which are designed to handle family-related problems. However, even with training, policewomen are often expected to fetch tea, work in the kitchen, and clean, rather than perform police duties. RECOMMENDATIONS The success of the transition in Afghanistan will depend largely on the capacity of the police to maintain law and order and build trust with communities, thereby maintaining confidence in the state. Sustainability and value for money must be constant factors for any initiatives implemented between now and the 2014 deadline. COMMUNITY LEVEL 1. Focus on community trust building, a cost-effective way to improve state-society relations Meetings between women police and civilians should be held, by the ANP and/or civil society, to improve the visibility of policewomen and the services they provide (within a safe space), to address women’s issues, and to inform women of their rights and rule of law procedures. Community meetings foster dialogue and establish trust. They also provide a forum for police and community members to: i) define their own relationship based on their needs and expectations; ii) ask questions and share concerns; and iii) feel recognised and heard. 2. Implement a badge system, a practical step for increased accountability Visible police identification would provide an inexpensive means of holding police accountable for their actions (e.g. bribery, street harassment). While there is no foolproof means of holding police accountable, the anonymity currently enjoyed by police only contributes to the culture of corruption. 3. Raise awareness of women’s rights with regards to security and related police services Public awareness campaigns should be used to better inform women and their families of women’s rights and how to defend through the formal justice system. Without knowledge of their rights, women do not have the tools to assess their security needs and interest. Campaigns should be tailored to local contexts in order to be perceived as credible. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL 4. Support literacy programs as a primary tool for capacity building Literacy, the key tool for fighting ignorance, renders training more effective and enables self-learning down the road. It also provides police with the ability to do actual police work, which requires reading and writing skills for documenting evidence, recording testimonies, and preparing reports. 5. Train the trainers to enable future training on gender, human rights, and children’s rights Given the ANP’s high turnover rate, train the trainer programs are essential for ensuring the ANP’s capacity to train recruits later. For optimum impact, train the trainer programs should select individuals that are respected and seen as credible in the province(s) in which they work. 6. Legitimise Family Response Units (FRUs) with equipment, training, and a broader mandate FRUs, which serve women’s needs, must first be perceived as legitimate and professional within the ANP before they can be perceived as such by the public. This will require a broader mandate from the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), equipment for documenting evidence, and training. STATE LEVEL 7. Strengthen coordination between police and justice sector for improved rule of law NGOs that assist women with legal issues should be utilised as a resource for bridging the police and justice sectors. Partnerships between Family Response Units and NGOs have the potential to render the formal justice system more accessible to women and increase awareness of police services designed to handle family problems. Regulations within the justice and police sectors also need to be changed so that police and prosecutors can better cooperate on cases. Police in Afghanistan are discouraged and even forbidden in some instances from following up on a case once it has moved on into the justice sector. This removes incentives for police to perform their jobs well when collecting evidence and reporting cases. INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 8. Support civilian policing as a key to maintaining political and social unity in Afghanistan. The international community needs to take a unified stance on the importance of civilian policing. The ANP will play a crucial role (distinct from that of the ANA) in the political and social unity of Afghanistan by ensuring law at the community level and representing the national government in a way that is visible on a daily basis. Details: Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2012 at: http://www.boell.de/downloads/WomensPerceptionAfghanistanPolice.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Attitudes Towards the Police, Women Shelf Number: 124897 |
Author: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) Title: From Arbaki to Local Police: Today's Challenges and Tomorrow's Concerns Summary: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is a national human rights institution that began its work on the basis of the presidential decree in 1381 (2002/03) and was established in accordance with Article 58 of the Afghan Constitution. The AIHRC has been created in order to monitor respect for human rights and promote and protect human rights in Afghanistan. Pursuant to Article 58 of the Afghan Constitution and Article 21 of the Law on the Mandate, Structure, and Duties of the AIHRC, the Commission monitors the situation of human rights in the country. It monitors the implementation of the provisions of the Afghan Constitution and the performance of the executive and judicial branches and of national and international organizations that have implications for the situation of human rights in the country. Based on the laws, the Commission also monitors the security situation. Therefore, it has paid attention to and studied the establishment, behavior, and performance of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The present report on the ALP is the result of interviews with over 70 Afghan security officials, members of provincial councils, members of local councils, local elders, experts, and a number of commanders of international forces. Data from the AIHRC databases has also been used in the production of this report. The information contained in the present report has been collected by the AIHRC monitors as a result of face-to-face interviews with stakeholders in Kabul and in provinces where the ALP has been created. The present report provides an overview of the establishment and behavior of the ALP and briefly assesses the role of the ALP in stability, security, the rule of law, governance, and respect for human rights. The report explores if the ALP has contributed to stability and security in insecure areas, to what extent local population has participated in and supports the establishment of the ALP, and what role the ALP plays in the rule of law or in violations of laws and abuses of human rights. These questions are specifically explored with regard to the future of the ALP and the existing concerns about it. The Afghan Government and the international forces are engaged in the creation of the ALP in insecure districts and the ALP structure is yet to be completed. For this purpose, the report takes a look into the future. The present report makes specific recommendations to the Afghan Government and international community concerning the ALP with a view to improving the security situation, strengthening the rule of law, ensuring good governance, and observing human rights. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), 2012. 49p. Source: Spring 1391 (2012): Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2012 at http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/Reports/Research/English/Report%20on%20Afghan%20Local%20Police%20(Final%20Draft%2C%20English).pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Police Recruitment and Training (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 125319 |
Author: Byrd, William Title: Drugs in Afghanistan - A Forgotten Issue? Implications and Risks for Transition Summary: Opium will continue to be an important part of the Afghan landscape—with political and security as well as economic ramifications. The ongoing security transition (2011-2014) will be accompanied by greater risks to Afghanistan's polity, security and economy from the illicit drug industry, including through likely further increases in opium production. The priority attached to drug issues by the international community appears to be declining; it would be perilous, however, to neglect the drugs issue. Careful management will be needed to mitigate adverse political economy implications, including use of drug money in election campaigns and involvement of local and regional power-holders as well as some at the central government level in the drug industry. Only sustained, broad-based rural development will over time move rural areas away from dependence on opium; agriculture and rural development should be a priority for remaining aid resources for Afghanistan. Drug issues need to be "mainstreamed"—factored into broader political, security, economic and development strategies and programs during transition. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012. 4p. Source: Peace Brief No. 126: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2012 at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/USIP_DrugsinAfghanistan_AForgottenIssue.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Control (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 125327 |
Author: Justice Studio Title: Afghanistan: Child Justice Brief Summary: This document provides an overview of the child justice system in Afghanistan. It emphasises that although there have been clear gains in establishing a separate justice system for children, the practical reality is that the formal state apparatus with ministries, institutions and representatives at the different regional levels, often works in parallel to a customary justice system which operates in rural or volatile areas. Little is known about the way that children are treated in the informal system and there is a legitimate concern that children who are in contact with the justice system do not have their rights respected. Details: London: Justice Studio, 2012. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2012 at: http://www.ipjj.org/fileadmin/data/documents/reports_monitoring_evaluation/JusticeStudio_AfghanistanChildJusticeBrief_2012_EN.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Juvenile Justice Systems (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 125437 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: •Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Summary: For two centuries, Afghanistan was a buffer zone between contending international powers rather than a nation State. Resistance to the Soviet invasion during the Cold War and the following acute civil conflict have, over the past 30 years, wreaked havoc with vital infrastructure and weakened the precarious social contract between centre and periphery. Afghanistan today produces 93 per cent of the world’s opium and poses enormous challenges to reconstruction and state-building. Among the interrelated challenges are corruption, weak governance and poor security. The following pages report on the results of an in-depth thematic evaluation of the response of UNODC to those challenges over the period from December 2001 to March 2007. This is the first technical assistance evaluation of a country programme conducted by UNODC. The present evaluation examines, in turn, efforts to build the capacity of Afghanistan government agencies via five subprogrammes: alternative livelihoods, rule of law, law enforcement, drug demand reduction and illicit crop monitoring. The reports include the following: Volume 1: Consolidated Evaluation Report on the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Volume 2: Alternative Livelihoods Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 3: Law Enforcement Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 4: Rule of Law Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 5: Drug Demand Reduction Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan; Volume 6: Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2008. 6 volumes Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/thematic-evaluation-reports.html Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Control Shelf Number: 115370 |
Author: Lonsdale, Mark V. Title: Criminal Activity in an Insurgent Environment and Counterinsurgency Summary: This paper looks at the criminal component of insurgency in Afghanistan and the inseparable influences of history, geography, culture, governance, and security. It also addresses the closely related issues of the on-going insurgency, terrorism, corruption, and deficiencies in government and military counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Beginning as a focused study of criminal activity in an insurgent environment, this paper grew to include a broader discussion of modern insurgency, terrorism, Islamic militancy, and traditionalist resistance, and how these have been perpetuated by ill-conceived and poorly executed counterinsurgency policies and practices. The reemergence, growth, and continued activity of these various militant groups also had to be viewed in context with the lack of security in Afghanistan, weak governance, slow progress in political, judicial and social reforms, and the often counterproductive effects of U.S. and NATO military operations. Glaring deficiencies in these processes, compounded by an ad hoc approach to counterinsurgency and half-hearted efforts by some donor nations, have fueled the insurgency while facilitating widespread corruption and criminal activity. With the above in mind, this paper addresses a number of questions: 1. What is the current criminal environment in Afghanistan and how have criminal networks and insurgents benefited from the instability? 2. Are the Taliban the only active insurgents or does the insurgency involve traditionalists, nationalists, and malcontents? 3. Is there a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign and has it been successful to date? 4. Why are conventional military forces unsuited to counterinsurgency? 5. Why are the U.S. efforts handicapped by an institutionalized conventional big-war mindset and a resistance to change? 6. Why are the token ISAF forces from several NATO troop-donors largely ineffective? 7. How is the counterinsurgency campaign hindered by a shortage of competent Foreign Service officers and civil-political advisors? 8. Why does the Coalition continue to tolerate rampant corruption and incompetence in the Afghan government and ministries? 9. Are narcotics funding the insurgency and why are the U.S. counter-narcotics policies unacceptable to their NATO allies? 10. How do the Afghans view the U.S. and Coalition forces, the Karzai government, local officials, and the national police? 11. What is the way forward for Afghanistan? 12. With all that we have learned from recent history, how should the counterinsurgency campaign be prosecuted in Afghanistan? Counterinsurgency requires patience, determination, innovation, an acceptance of risk, coupled to a long-term commitment, supported by adequate funding, the appropriate resources, and an unconventional mindset. Unfortunately, while built and trained for full-spectrum attrition and maneuver warfare, conventional brigade combat teams (BCT) are not structured, manned, or equipped for unconventional COIN operations. Nor can they effectively identify, target, and attack criminal-insurgent enterprises. The non-kinetic components of the COIN effort are further hindered by timid civilian administrations, as seen with several NATO contributors and the State Department’s lack of commitment, resources, and competent Foreign Service officers. This paper takes the reader through the full range of criminal and insurgent activities occurring on the ground in Afghanistan; points out deficiencies in current governance, security and military operations; and then offers suggestions on how to better prepare military units, national security forces, and civilian authorities for counterinsurgency and security sector reform. Details: Paris: Department de Recherche sur les Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines Universite Pantheon-Assas, Paris II, 2008. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 15, 2012 at: http://www.drmcc.org/IMG/pdf/COIN_MCC_Lonsdale_18_AUG_2008-2.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 126729 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan: Survey of Commercial Cannabis Cultivation and Production 2011 Summary: The 2011 Survey of Commercial Cannabis Cultivation and Production estimated the total area under cultivation in 2011 at 12,000 hectares and a potential production of 1,300 tons. These figures only include commercial, mono-crop cannabis cultivation as the survey tool cannot capture small-scale “kitchen garden” cultivation of cannabis, which is often for localized and/or personal use and is only thought to account for a small percentage of total production. Afghanistan’s importance as a producer of cannabis resin does not necessarily mean that it is the principal supplier of the world’s big cannabis resin markets in North Africa, Europe and South-West Asia, but its relative importance may be growing whereas that of Morocco, though still very considerable, may be on the decline. Likewise, seizure data imply that not even all the cannabis resin trafficked in South-West Asia originates in Afghanistan. Signs of both stabilisation and change In 2011, cultivation and production of cannabis resin in Afghanistan appeared stable and there was no evidence of substantive change in comparison to the previous UNODC cannabis surveys of 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, the number of cannabis-growing households in Afghanistan increased by 38 per cent, from 47,000 in 2010 to 65,000 in 2011, virtually all of whom were sporadic growers who had chosen that year to cultivate cannabis once again, while only a small amount were first-time cannabis growers. Moreover, commercial cannabis resin cultivation has spread to more and more provinces, being cultivated in almost two thirds of them (21 provinces) in 2011 as opposed to in only half (17 out of 34) in 2009. Principal among the numerous contributing factors to the spread of cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan is the fact that the price of cannabis has increased dramatically in the past few years, with best quality resin rising from US$ 35/kg to US$ 95/kg since 2009. UNODC price monitoring shows that the cannabis price rise has developed in parallel with the opium price hike caused by the opium crop failure in 2010, making its per-hectare income similar to that of opium and thus financially very attractive to farmers. But because cannabis cultivation is less labour intensive — less weeding is involved and the extraction of “garda” (powdered cannabis resin) can be done at home in a matter of weeks with the help of family members instead of hired labour — it is actually more cost-effective than opium. Such advantages contribute to the status of cannabis as a lucrative cash crop. Yet the average area cultivated dropped from 0.4 ha (2009) to 0.29 ha (2011), thus although more households grew cannabis in 2011 they actually cultivated a smaller area than previously, while the per-hectare yield also decreased by 25 per cent from its 2009 level, especially for best quality resin. The increase in the number of households cultivating cannabis may mean that there are more, if smaller scale, cannabis growers who benefit from cannabis as a lucrative sideline on an opportunistic basis. Indeed, the majority of farmers interviewed do not grow cannabis every year, some grow every other year and some do so even less frequently. To a certain extent, the cultivation of cannabis in Afghanistan thus appears to be self limiting — but why? Cannabis is a summer crop and the agricultural area available is much reduced in summer. Indeed, in the south, west and east of the country winter/spring cultivation is predominant, which is when most arable land is available. Cannabis needs irrigation water, which decreases with the arrival of summer and is only sufficient for a partial summer crop. Farmers have to balance different requirements, such as the provision of fodder for livestock, and have risk-minimizing strategies, meaning that they always grow some staple crops and hesitate to devote all their available land to just one crop. Cannabis has a long vegetation period lasting into October/November so no winter crop can be planted on a harvested cannabis field, which must then remain fallow, leading to a loss of income and all the subsequent ramifications. certain portion of farmers do not engage in cannabis cultivation at all because it is forbidden in Islam. The same is true for opium, which, while it is grown by many more households, on much more land and to a far greater extent, often co-exists with cannabis in Afghanistan. For example, commercial cannabis cultivation has shifted over the past half decade from the north to the more insecure south of the country and its cultivation is geographically associated with that of opium. Most cannabis-cultivating provinces also produced poppy in 2011 (15 out of 21 provinces), with the increase in cannabis-cultivating provinces since 2009 mainly being due to poppy provinces commencing commercial cannabis cultivation, to the extent that all major poppy-cultivating provinces also contained cannabis cultivation, while provinces free of poppy and cannabis continued to remain so. Furthermore, to a large extent those involved in cannabis and opium cultivation are actually the same people, even if opium growing households do not grow cannabis every year: in 2011, a large majority of cannabis farmers in Afghanistan (58%) also grew poppy, but only 6% of poppy farmers grew cannabis in that year. Moreover, many opium traffickers also trade in cannabis resin and there seems to be a striking correlation between opium and cannabis farm-gate prices, suggesting a considerable degree of market integration. Another of the principal similarities between poppy and commercial cannabis cultivation is that households growing illicit crops have a much smaller share of remittances than non-growing households, meaning that one or more members of the household works abroad. Cannabis-growing households often do not have to send members abroad as they can earn the necessary cash component by growing cannabis. A similar pattern exists for poppy-growing households. However, there are also some important differences between opium and cannabis production. For example, cannabis garda quality reportedly deteriorates after a couple of months so most farmers sell the complete harvest before that happens (represented by the strong post-harvest dip in prices in the months of January to March). Processing garda into hashish can increase storability but the process is time consuming and adds little value for farmers, who already make a tidy profit by producing garda. Opium, on the other hand, can be stored for years without losing quality, and can be used as a store of value (effectively a bank account), while cannabis, though undoubtedly an attractive cash crop, cannot. The future Another important difference between cannabis and poppy is that there is increasing Government pressure to eradicate poppy cultivation in Afghanistan whereas eradication of cannabis is not underpinned by systematic programmes for eradication and alternative development, nor by the support of financial donors. In addition, the associated lower cost of cannabis cultivation in comparison to poppy cultivation (estimated at 10% and 40% of gross income, respectively) makes it more profitable than opium. The possibility of the commercial production of cannabis gradually playing a much bigger role in the illicit Afghan economy, and eventually replacing opium, is unlikely, but still possible. The huge disparity between the current size of areas under cultivation of the two drugs means that ― even if that were possible ― it would not happen in the short term, while the aforementioned environmental and agricultural limitations of cannabis cultivation would make it difficult. But shedding light on price trend coincidence between opium and cannabis farm-gate prices, cannabis trafficking and export, and cannabis cultivation in neighbouring countries would certainly help understand the future of commercial cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan. Any policy aimed at reducing cannabis production in Afghanistan should, however, take into account the links between the two illicit crops and that there is a large pool of sporadic commercial cannabis farmers who may be prepared to cultivate cannabis more frequently should farm-gate prices remain high. The challenge to policymakers is to understand the decision-making process at the household level regarding the sporadic nature of cannabis cultivation and to develop strategies accordingly. Details: Vienna, UNODC, 2012. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/2011_Afghanistan_Cannabis_Survey_Report_w_cover_small.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Cannabis (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 126985 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: All Bets are Off! Prospects for (B)reaching Agreements and Drug Control in Helmand and Nangarhar in the run up to Transition Summary: The issue of illicit drug production has largely fallen off the policy agenda in Afghanistan. In addition to the increasing focus on the part of Afghanistan’s foreign partners on an exit strategy, this has been to a considerable extent due to a favourable trend in the short-term metrics by which the drugs issue is typically judged. Levels of opium poppy cultivation have seen a reduction from their peak of 197,000 hectares (ha) in 2007 to 123,000 ha in 2010. There has also been a steady increase in the number of provinces where cultivation is negligible and which are classified as “poppy free.” Even a slight increase in cultivation in 2011 to 131,000 ha went largely unnoticed, as did the recurrence of cultivation in the provinces of Kapisa, Baghlan, and Faryab after years of being “poppy free.” It is plausible that even the 2012 figures, and the estimated 18 percent increase in the area under cultivation, can be “handled” by emphasising the 36 percent fall in opium production between 2011 and 2012 - even if it was due to an unprecedented cold snap in March 2012. It seems that amidst the plans for transition by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), concerns over the electoral process, and the cumulative impact of the war, with increases in both civilian casualties and the number of Western soldiers being killed, the uptick in cultivation continues to be of little immediate concern to Western policymakers and politicians. Drawing on in-depth fieldwork in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar, this report reveals that unfortunately such complacency is completely unjustified. In the simplest terms, this report reveals that cultivation in both Helmand and Nangarhar has risen in the 2011-12 growing season, raising doubt as to whether both provinces have an effective model for longterm drug control in Afghanistan. Of far greater concern are the different socioeconomic and political processes that lie behind this rise in cultivation, and what it means for both opium production and stability in the run up to transition, as well as beyond then, after Western combat operations have ceased in December 2014. The report highlights the fragility of the recent reductions in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Then, through an analysis of the different factors that have led to an increase in cultivation in Helmand and Nangarhar in the 2011-12 growing season, it offers insight into how important the illegal drugs trade will to be in the political economy of a post-transition Afghanistan. In particular, the report illustrates just how closely opium poppy cultivation is entangled in the socioeconomic and political fabric of the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar. It highlights how difficult it is to maintain the kinds of bargains that provincial governors have made with the rural elite to elicit their support to reduce opium poppy in areas where the welfare of the rural population is deteriorating and where the government does not have preponderant control over the means of violence. The report shows that it is under these very conditions that the current administration’s desire to ban opium poppy has led to “over-governing”—striving to extend its reach into physical space where it has little history of direct engagement, where the relationship between the state and the rural elite has been at its most fragile, and where past attempts to impose central rule on the population have led to violent repercussions. Ultimately, the report outlines two very different trajectories involving different populations in both provinces. One trajectory applies to populations in areas where the Afghan state has a history of effective control over the rural population, achieved through the rural elite whose interests largely align with those in state power. In these areas, resource endowments and market opportunities permit a sustained shift out of opium production, and it is in these areas that the state and its ban on poppy can prevail. The second trajectory charts a very different course. It applies to populations that have a history of armed resistance against state intervention, an egalitarian tribal system, and an internally divided, competing, and unstable rural elite that includes political adversaries who are keen to capitalise on the failures of their opponents. These are areas where livelihood opportunities are severely constrained by terrain, an effective distance from markets, and have limited resource endowments. In these areas, imposing a ban on opium production has presented the provincial and local political leadership with a significant challenge given that such bans have impoverished the rural population and compelled them to pursue coping strategies that expose them to physical risks, and have led to growing hostility toward the Afghan government and its foreign backers. It is in these areas that, in the absence of foreign military support after December 2014, if not before, the state will have little choice but to rescind its opium ban, retreat to the lowland valleys, and explore new ways to engage with the population and rural elite if it is not to find itself incre asingly besieged. The report shows that based on the evidence from Helmand and Nangarhar, rather than extending the writ of the Afghan government, as some suggest has happened, expanding bans on opium across an ever increasing geographical area, regardless of the socioeconomic and political conditions, has in fact undermined state formation, increased rural discontent, and presented new opportunities for the insurgency. This process, and the resurgence of opium poppy cultivation post-2014, will have major implications for the Afghan state and in turn implications for Western nations who plan to continue to provide development assistance and support to the Afghan state. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2013 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Control (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 127466 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends Summary: Corruption is widely understood to be the improper use of a public or official position for private gain. To strengthen the fight against corruption, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which Afghanistan ratified in 2008, criminalizes various types of corrupt acts committed by public officials or by individuals working for private-sector entities. Quite apart from specific legal definitions, this includes offences such as bribery, embezzlement, abuse of power and nepotism. A further distinction can be made between political or “grand” corruption on the one hand and administrative or “petty” corruption on the other. While the former refers to acts of corruption perpetrated by high-ranking politicians and decision-makers, the latter concerns offences committed by mid- and lower-level public officials who are responsible for administrative procedures and services provided to the public. Political corruption often receives the greatest attention due to its visible impact on political decision-making and good governance, but the pervasive and devastating impact of administrative corruption on the everyday lives of ordinary Afghan citizens receives far less publicity. Yet for the vast majority of the Afghan population, by limiting and distorting their right to access essential public services, hindering their chances of economic development and eroding their trust in government, justice and the rule of law, it is administrative corruption that is most keenly felt. Taking all these different aspects into account, in 2012, as in 2009, the population of Afghanistan considered corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, to be one of the principal challenges facing their country, ahead even of poverty, external influence and the performance of the Government. If during the last three years there have been slight changes in the rating of these issues by the Afghan population, its perceptions of corruption have not improved significantly. This summary report highlights the major findings of a large-scale survey in 2012 on the extent of bribery and other forms of corruption in Afghanistan. The research follows up on a previous UNODC corruption survey in 2009 and, using a structurally similar research design, provides comparative results of the extent and patterns of bribery in Afghanistan. As in 2009, the survey focuses on the respondents’ personal experience of bribery, on the modalities, mechanisms and socio-economic patterns of corruption, as well as on perceptions of corruption. In addition to the general population survey, four sector-specific integrity surveys of civil servants were carried out from 2011 to 2012 in the judiciary, police, local government and education sectors,1 with the purpose of identifying particular integrity challenges in public service and shedding light on sector-specific patterns of corruption. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Bribery Shelf Number: 127629 |
Author: Planty, Donald J. Title: Police Transition in Afghanistan Summary: The forthcoming withdrawal of the NATO training mission in Afghanistan along with U.S. combat forces in 2014 has highlighted the failure to meet Afghanistan’s need for a national police service capable of enforcing the rule of law, controlling crime, and protecting Afghan citizens, despite a decade of effort. The Afghan National Police appears unlikely to be able to enforce the rule of law following the withdrawal because of its configuration as a militarized counterinsurgency force in the fight against the Taliban. Discussions are under way concerning the future of the ANP, but there is no consensus on the future size and mission of the police and no certainty about future sources of the funding, training, and equipment required. Because only two years remain before the deadline for withdrawal, it is imperative that the United States and the international community urgently address the challenge of transforming the ANP from a counterinsurgency force into a police service capable of enforcing the rule of law. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR322.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Law Enforcement Shelf Number: 127726 |
Author: EastWest Institute. Joint U.S. - Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking Title: Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment Summary: Despite the most recent tensions in the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States, cooperation on counternarcotics has endured, developing slowly but steadily. The EastWest Institute’s report Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment focuses on the serious threats these two countries face from the flow of drugs from Afghanistan and its corrosive impact on Afghanistan itself. The contributors to the report point out that preventing an explosion in this opium trade is a prerequisite for improving the security of Afghanistan and its neighbors after the withdrawal of foreign troops next year. Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment is a product of the Russian and American experts who participated in a working group convened by EWI. Leaders in this field from both countries, including representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, provided briefings and other assistance to the group. According to EWI Senior Associate Jacqueline McLaren Miller, the project’s main coordinator, “This report demonstrates that cooperation between Russia and the United States is still possible when both countries are willing to focus on a common challenge.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed the same sentiments at the February 2, 2013 Munich Security Conference when he stated the need for “closer cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan.” There are about 30,000 heroin-related deaths in Russia every year, and most of the heroin comes from Afghanistan. Cooperation between the two countries is necessary to stem predicted growth of opium production in a post-2014 Afghanistan. The report includes a clear warning: “As NATO and U.S. troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, which is still struggling with a highly volatile security situation, weak governance, and major social and economic problems, the size of the opium economy and opiate trafficking are likely to increase and pose an even greater challenge to regional and international security.” This paper will be followed shortly by a Joint Policy Assessment report, which will offer specific policy suggestions for both Russia and the United States to curtail the flow of opiates from Afghanistan. Details: New York: EastWest Institute, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Report 2013-1: Accessed April 12, 2013 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/20526994/JTA%20final%204-11.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 128348 |
Author: Coburn, Noah Title: Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan Summary: This report analyzes the array of programs that dealt with the so-called informal justice sector in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2011. It focuses on a series of pilot projects sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace that engaged local Afghan organizations at the district and provincial levels to observe and record how informal justice systems resolve (or fail to resolve) people’s disputes, and how informal and formal justice actors relate to each other in practice. It also examines the expanding role of international actors in local dispute resolution and the impact that such interventions have had on local practices and perceptions of justice. The report finds that the informal justice sector provides a pervasive and effective, if sometimes flawed, venue for the majority of the Afghan population to access justice and argues that the international community should commit more fully to supporting local informal justice mechanisms. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2013. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2013 at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PW84-Informal%20Justice%20and%20the%20International%20Community%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Dispute Resolution Shelf Number: 128424 |
Author: Fishstein, Paul Title: A Little Bit Poppy-free and a Little Bit Eradicated: Opium poppy cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2011-2012 Summary: While Balkh and Badakhshan have very different geographical, social, political, and historical contexts, it is hard to identify any factors which could significantly reduce cultivation of opium poppy in either province in the foreseeable future. In Balkh, some of the coercive approaches which have reduced opium poppy cultivation are not sustainable in the longer-term, especially where they go against the economic conditions prevailing in the rural economy. In Badakhshan, a half-hearted coercion has produced uneven results. In the context of the 2014 security transition, it is an open question as to whether the Afghan government and its international partners, preoccupied with other issues (e.g., security, presidential elections), will have the motivation and the means to maintain unpopular coercive approaches, especially where they require the application of consistent pressure on local officials and communities which may have different agendas. Household-level field research done during May 2012 in farming communities in two districts in Balkh (Chimtal, Char Bolak) and Badakhshan (Jurm, Khash) which had a history of opium poppy cultivation, revealed very different dynamics within the opium economy. In Balkh, analysis confirmed the role of state presence and coercion in suppressing opium poppy cultivation as well as the correlation of cultivation with insecurity, with poppy concentrated in areas inaccessible to the government. Balkh has retained its “poppy-free” status, first obtained in 2007, while also raising questions about metrics, as little independent or verifiable information is available on the insecure areas in which poppy is grown. It is also possible that in Balkh causality runs in both directions, and that at least some of the insecurity in areas in which opium poppy is found is the result of stresses and grievances connected with the suppression of cultivation. Deployment of local police(who have informally come to be called arbaki) was credited with improving security and helping to maintain the suppression of cultivation; the population is not confident that this security effect will endure, however, and they have raised concerns about the role that the “arbaki” may play, including allegations of involvement in poppy cultivation. In Badakhshan, analysis connected the decision of households to cultivate poppy with their efforts to resolve financial stress (including debt and asset sales) brought on by the long and harsh winter of 2011-12, and, based on the previous year’s experience, the lack of a credible threat of eradication. Among surveyed households, the number who reported growing poppy doubled from the previous year and the area devoted to poppy increased from four to ten percent of total area sown. Unlike in Balkh, where there has been one dominant leader who has been both motivated and capable of suppressing cultivation in most areas of the province, in Badakhshan power has been more contested and fragmented among local commanders and power holders, who have shown little interest in reducing cultivation, trafficking, and other illicit activities. During 2012, Badakhshan was estimated to have had a 13 percent increase in cultivated area, which moved the province into being a “moderate” rather than “low” producer of opium poppy. Also, unlike Balkh where cultivation is largely limited to two districts, cultivation is widely dispersed across the province’s 26 districts. Given Badakhshan’s mountainous geography and highly contested space, the reporting (post-fieldwork) of apparently much more extensive eradication raises the question of whether the authorities are attempting to impose their will in a more aggressive way than previously and, if so, what the reaction of communities and local power holders will be. While farming conditions in the spring of 2012 were much more promising than the previous year, analysis confirmed the importance of off-farm income in household livelihoods. Labour opportunities and wages in Balkh, especially Mazar-e Sharif (the provincial centre of Balkh), were much more plentiful than during the previous drought year. Meanwhile, in Badakhshan labourers were struggling to find work due to the delay in the start of the construction season. In both provinces, farming households, labourers, and shopkeepers spoke longingly of the “good old days” when the economy was thriving due to opium production and trade. While Badakhshan continues to be considered a drug transit route, this activity does not generate the same widespread incomes as did the extensive cultivation of the mid-2000s. The vast majority of surveyed households in Badakhshan were calculated to be existing on US$2 per person per day, with only about one-quarter meeting their grain requirements from their own production. With the political and security situation now on an unknown trajectory, reductions in cultivation may be more difficult to achieve or maintain, especially in an unstable or contested environment. The enormous pressure on power holders and aspirants, already understood to be preparing for post-2014 instability, to conclude local deals in order to control an area or resources will reduce incentives to adhere to national policies where such policies run up against local interests. In Balkh, which has served as a successful model not just of elimination of opium poppy but also economic development under a strong provincial administration, the shifting of emphasis from Kabul and from the international community may reduce the sorts of political incentives that have until now made it worth imposing unpopular policies. The anticipated contraction in the national economy due to the withdrawal of international spending and reduction in local investor confidence may reduce both household livelihoods opportunities and sources of patronage for power holders. Finally, given the dependence of so many households on off-farm income, pressure to relax the suppression of cultivation may rise in proportion to the anticipated contraction of the economy and the reduction in opportunities for work-related migration in the region. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2013 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1305E%20Opium%20in%20Balkh%20and%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study%20May%202013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Eradication Shelf Number: 128976 |
Author: Children Rights Consortium Title: Improving Rehabilitation Services at Juvenile Rehabilitation Centres in Afghanistan : lessons learnt through a pilot project in support of the Herat and Kabul juvenile rehabilitation centres funded through the Italian cooperation office of the Italian emb Summary: Our pilot project was aimed at experimenting ways to improve the assistance to juveniles in JRCs, by focusing mainly on the question: what can be done to improve rehabilitation, re-education and reinsertion efforts with limited resources and making the best use of the existing ones? This project can also be considered as a follow-up action to the national seminar on ‘’Protection of Children in Conflict with the Law (CICL) in Afghanistan through Alternatives to Detention” (Kabul, March 14-16, 2010) that was facilitated and funded through the Justice Program of the Italian Cooperation Office of the Italian Embassy and implemented together with all key stakeholder organizations involved in Juvenile Justice in Afghanistan. A number of specific operational recommendations were made at the workshop, including the need for more field research on concrete case studies/experiences which could help improve the assistance to juveniles in JRCs by providing related best practices. The present project takes up such recommendation and provides valuable lessons learnt from field experiences regarding legal aid assistance to juvenile offenders and action strategies to facilitate their rehabilitation, re-education and reinsertion into civil society. The present report aims at presenting such lessons learnt and sharing them with any other organization involved in this sector. We are very proud of our ex-ante baseline and the impact survey; through them, detailed and comprehensive data was collected and inputted to databases that have been requested by several organizations, many of which found them very useful for planning their own activities. In addition to the ex-ante and the impact assessment survey methodology, we also used a monthly peer questionnaire which gave the opportunity to inmates to evaluate us and measure what, in their views, was the perceived benefit they gained through the project activities. Individual interviews were also used as a very efficient way to gather information and feedback from inmates because they can be implemented rapidly, they can yield a wealth of data and those interviewed know they will remain anonymous. However, this methodology is based on inductive and deductive information gathering that does not allow us to know with certainty how generalized specific bad practices are or if illegal/unprofessional conduct, sometimes reported by interviewees, actually occurred. The main scope of the present report is not to highlight possible wrongdoings of individuals and institutions but to provide constructive suggestions and recommendations aimed at improving the provision of services in the juvenile justice system in Afghanistan, thanks to the inputs of all actors involved. We strongly believe that in Afghanistan, as in any other country, any improvement in the juvenile justice system will bear medium term fruits by helping to decrease the adult crime rate, since many studies have concluded that working properly with juvenile offenders can reduce recidivism by much as 50%. Some stakeholders may disagree with some of the findings of the present report, but its aim is to feed a critical debate that it is hoped will promote and/or inform, eventually, the development of new approaches and strategies with a view to improving the juvenile justice system. Details: Kabul: Children Rights Consortium, 2011. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2013 at: http://www.oijj.org/sites/default/files/jrcs_assistance_in_afghanistan_publication_aschiana.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Juvenile Detention Shelf Number: 129000 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Impacts of Drug Use on Users and their Families in Afghanistan Summary: Afghanistan is the world's largest producer and cultivator of opium poppies; it produces almost three quarters of the world's illicit opium. While a significant amount of the opium produced in Afghanistan is trafficked out of the country, in 2009 it was estimated that almost 10 per cent of Afghans aged between 15 and 64 were drug users. Based on interviews with drug users, the family members of drug users, key informants and Government officials, this study aims to provide an insight into the origins, evolution and impact of drug use on users and their families across Afghanistan. While the study is not nationally representative, it seeks to enhance understanding of drug use in Afghanistan and provide information to help strengthen prevention and treatment policies. All the drug users interviewed during the study were "problem drug users", who used drugs such as opium, heroin, hashish and tranquillizers (for non-medical use) daily or several times a week. Although the use of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) is rising in Afghanistan, the number of ATS users remains small and that group was not interviewed for the present research study. Details: New York: UNODC, 2014. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2014 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Impacts_Study_2014_web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 132097 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Eyes Wide Shut: Counter-Narcotics in Transition Summary: It is now clear that the production and trade of opiates will have a significant influence on not only the economic, political and security landscape, but even the physical terrain of post-Transition Afghanistan. Levels of opium poppy cultivation are already rising; estimated cultivated area rose by 18 percent in 2012 and is likely to rise significantly over the next few years. And this trend may intensify further as politico-military actors make deals and form coalitions in response to the 2014 handover of security responsibility from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Even while NATO forces remain, the coercive power of the Afghan state has diminished in parts of provinces previously described as "models" for counter-narcotics efforts. In provinces such as Helmand and Nangarhar, there is likely to be a return to widespread opium poppy cultivation in the more accessible and fertile areas as NATO and the ANSF cease to operate outside the areas where the state has a history of control. As security forces withdraw, the state has either relinquished control of such territory to anti-government elements (AGEs), or delegated it to local power brokers who may have little interest in reducing opium poppy cultivation, and may even encourage it. Further increases in cultivation are also likely as opium poppy returns in greater amounts to some of the provinces previously deemed "poppy free," such as Ghor, Laghman and even Balkh. Perhaps more worrying is the potential for an expansion of opium into previously uncultivated areas of desert land in the South. The adoption of new technologies-such as deep wells, herbicides and solar power-will likely aid cultivation in these areas, reducing the cost of inputs and increasing productivity. Meanwhile, ill-sequenced and poorly-targeted counter-narcotics and development efforts coupled with a continuing global demand for opiates provide additional incentives for production. Increasing levels of cultivation have wider implications for the political economy of the country. In an increasingly contested rural space, narcotics and counter-narcotics policies are both likely to be a major source of patronage and division. The Taliban have a history of actively encouraging opium poppy cultivation as part of a strategy to gain the support of the rural population and highlight the weakness of provincial administration. By provoking crop destruction as part of counter-narcotics efforts, this strategy also increases rural antipathy to the state and its international partners. The myriad different local security forces operating under the sometimes loose supervision of Afghan and international military forces are less coherent. In some areas of Kandahar and Helmand the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are pursuing an aggressive counter-narcotics effort, conscious that they may lose their salaries and patronage if they do not. In other parts of these provinces as well as in Balkh, farmers allege that members of the ALP and even the Afghan Border Police either benefit from poppy cultivation or grow it themselves. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research And Evaluation Unit, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper Series: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Opium%20BP.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 132135 |
Author: Fishstein, Paul Title: Evolving Terrain: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2013 Summary: It is generally assumed that there will be significant increases in the level of opium poppy cultivation after the critical year 2014, when international military combat forces will withdraw and Afghanistan will select its next president. In 2012-13, at the national level, area cultivated increased for the third consecutive year, and total opium production rose significantly. With 410 hectares (ha) of opium poppy recorded in the province, for the first time since 2007 Balkh is no longer classified as "poppy-free," while Badakhshan saw an increase of 23 percent in area cultivated, despite reported eradication of the largest area of any province. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Balkh%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 132136 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013 Summary: Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reached a sobering record high in 2013. According to the 2013 Afghanistan Opium Survey, cultivation amounted to some 209,000 hectares, outstripping the earlier record in 2007 of 193,000 hectares, and representing a 36 per cent increase over 2012. Moreover, two provinces that had previously been declared poppy-free, Faryab and Balkh in northern Afghanistan, lost this status. All in all, opium production in 2013 went up to some 5,500 tonnes, a 49 per cent increase over 2012. The hazard this situation poses to health, stability and development, and not only in Afghanistan, is well documented and has been internationally recognized frequently. At the same time, Afghanistan's counter narcotic institutions, also with the support of UNODC, have taken a significant step forward in terms of capacity and effectiveness. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics has moved quickly to advance policy and guidelines, as per its mandate. The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan is still far from achieving the seizure rate witnessed in other producing countries, but police have nevertheless tripled their effectiveness over recent years to capturing well over 10 per cent of domestic production. The number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions of powerful figures remains a concern, but progress has also been witnessed with two high profile cases this year. Finally, available services in country to deal with a growing addiction problem have expanded from 30 to 90. These are tangible and hopeful signs of improvement. In order to be successful and sustainable, counter-narcotics efforts must finally break out of their insular, silo approach. If the drug problem is not taken more seriously by aid, development and security actors, the virus of opium will further reduce the resistance of its host, already suffering from dangerously low immune levels due to fragmentation, conflict, patronage, corruption and impunity. What is needed is an integrated, comprehensive response to the drug problem, embedded in a long-term security, development and institution-building agenda. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 24, 2014 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opium_survey_2013_web_small.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 132160 |
Author: Rosen, Liana Title: Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition Summary: Afghanistan is the world's primary source of opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin production, as well as a major global source of cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish). Drug trafficking, a long-standing feature of Afghanistan's post-Taliban political economy, is linked to corruption and insecurity, and provides a source of illicit finance for non-state armed groups. Based on recent production and trafficking trends, the drug problem in Afghanistan appears to be worsening-just as the U.S. government finalizes plans for its future relationship with the government of Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond and reduces its counternarcotics operational presence in the country to Kabul, the national capital. As coalition combat operations in Afghanistan draw to a close in 2014, and as the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces is achieved, some Members of the 113th Congress have expressed concern regarding the future direction and policy prioritization of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in light of diminishing resources and an uncertain political and security environment in 2015 and beyond. According to the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, released in late 2012, the U.S. government envisions a counternarcotics policy future that results in "two simultaneous and parallel transfers of responsibility." Not only does it envision the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces, but also the transfer of counternarcotics programming responsibilities and law enforcement operational activities to the Afghan government. Assuming a reduced U.S. security presence and limited civilian mobility throughout the country, the U.S. government is also increasingly emphasizing a regional approach to combating Afghan drugs. Although some counternarcotics efforts, including eradication and alternative development programming, are already implemented by the government of Afghanistan or by local contractors, others may require a two- to five-year time horizon, or potentially longer, before a complete transition would be feasible, according to Administration officials. Some counternarcotics initiatives are only in their infancy, including the Defense Department's plans to establish a new Regional Narcotics Analysis and Illicit Trafficking Task Force (RNAIT-TF). Other activities, particularly those that required a significant presence at the local and provincial levels, are anticipated to be reduced or limited in scope. The 113th Congress continues to monitor drug trafficking trends in Afghanistan and evaluate U.S. policy responses. Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the topic in early 2014 and included provisions in FY2014 appropriations (P.L. 113-76) that limit the scope of and resources devoted to future counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has also identified narcotics as a "critical issue" for policy makers. This report describes key U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan in the context of the 2014 transition and analyzes policy issues related to these programs for Congress to consider as policy makers examine the drug problem in Afghanistan. The report's Appendix contains historical figures and tables on trends in Afghan drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R43540: Accessed May 19, 2014 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43540.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Law Enforcement Shelf Number: 132395 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: "From Bad They Made It Worse": The concentration of opium poppy in areas of conflict in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar Summary: Levels of drug crop cultivation have long been seen as an indicator of the success or failure of counternarcotics efforts. However, to rely on this indicator is to misunderstand the socioeconomic and political processes that support farmers moving out of opium poppy cultivation, as well as the limited scope of many interventions currently categorized and budgeted as "counternarcotics" by the international community and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/NRM%20CS6%20ver%202%20(2).pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 132549 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan: Survey of Commercial Cannabis Cultivation and Production 2012 Summary: The 2012 Survey of Commercial Cannabis Cultivation and Production estimated the total area under cultivation in 2012 at 10,000 hectares and a potential production of 1,400 tons. These figures only include commercial, mono-crop cannabis cultivation as the survey tool cannot capture small-scale "kitchen garden" cultivation of cannabis, which is often for localized and/or personal use and is thought to account for only a small percentage of total production. - In contrast to previous surveys, the 2012 survey consisted of only two instead of three components: an area survey using satellite imagery and a yield survey. There was no socioeconomic village survey and the survey area was reduced. - In 2012, the estimated area under commercial cannabis cultivation declined by 17% compared to 2011; however, the area covered by the survey was reduced compared to 2011, which reduces the comparability of the two area estimates. - Due to higher per-hectare yields, production increased by 8% compared to 2011. - The decrease in cultivation is mainly attributed to lower levels of cannabis cultivation in Uruzgan province. The area under cannabis cultivation in Uruzgan decreased drastically from more than 1,000 hectares in 2011 to less than 100 hectares in 2012. According to reports from the field, the reason for the reduction was a strictly enforced ban by provincial authorities, which was imposed because cannabis fields seemed to have been used by insurgent groups as hiding places. - In the remaining 15 provinces surveyed, no major changes in cannabis cultivation were observed in 2012 and the 2012 levels of cultivation in these provinces are considered to be stable compared to 2011. - The main reason for the increase in potential production in spite of a decline in cultivation is the better yield of cannabis garda compared to 2011. In 2012, the national average of garda yield (all qualities) was 136 kg/ha, an increase by 21% when compared to 2011 (112 kg/ha). Levels of cannabis garda yield are nearly as high as they have been in 2009 (145 kg/ha). - The MCN/UNODC price monitoring showed that the cannabis prices have declined in 2012 after a price hike in 2011, in parallel to the opium price trends. Despite this, cannabis cultivation is still financially very attractive. In 2012, farmers potentially achieved a gross income of US$ 6,400 per hectare from cannabis resin, which was higher than the gross income from opium (US$ 4,600 per hectare) in the same year. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2014 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/_Afghanistan_Cannabis_Survey_Report_2012.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Cannabis (Afghanistan) Shelf Number: 129922 |
Author: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Title: Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2012 and 2013 Summary: The narcotics trade poisons the Afghan financial sector and undermines the Afghan state's legitimacy by stoking corruption, sustaining criminal networks, and providing significant financial support to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Despite spending over $7 billion to combat opium poppy cultivation and to develop the Afghan government's counternarcotics capacity, opium poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan hit an all-time high in 2013. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghan farmers grew an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of opium poppy in 2013, surpassing the previous peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007. With deteriorating security in many parts of rural Afghanistan and low levels of eradication of poppy fields, further increases in cultivation are likely in 2014. As of June 30, 2014, the United States has spent approximately $7.6 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Multiple sources of funding support these efforts, including the Department of Defense (DOD) Afghan Security Forces Fund, the State Department's (State) International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement fund, the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund, financial support from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Economic Support Fund. Counternarcotics efforts include the development of Afghan government counternarcotics capacity, operational support to Afghan counternarcotics forces; encouragement of alternative livelihoods for Afghan farmers; financial incentives to Afghan authorities to enforce counternarcotics laws; and, in limited instances, counternarcotics operations conducted by U.S. authorities in coordination with their Afghan counterparts. Despite the significant financial expenditure, opium poppy cultivation has far exceeded previous records. Affordable deep-well technology has turned 200,000 hectares of desert in southwestern Afghanistan into arable land over the past decade. Due to relatively high opium prices and the rise of an inexpensive, skilled, and mobile labor force, much of this newly-arable land is dedicated to opium cultivation. Poppy-growing provinces that were once declared 'poppy free' have seen a resurgence in cultivation. Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, considered a model for successful counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts and deemed 'poppy free' by the UNODC in 2008, saw a fourfold increase in opium poppy cultivation between 2012 and 2013. The UNODC estimates that the value of the opium and its derivative products produced in Afghanistan was nearly $3 billion in 2013, up from $2 billion in 2012. This represents an increase of 50 percent in a single year. The attached opium cultivation figures and maps illustrate the increasing cultivation of opium in Afghanistan. Attachment I provides a graph of UNODC poppy cultivation data for 2002 through 2013. The graph includes data for Afghanistan as a whole as well as for two key opium producing provinces. The graph also includes information on some of the factors influencing the cultivation figures. The maps in attachments II and III depict the likely locations and concentrations of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Details: Arlington, VA: Special Inspector's Office, 2014. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: SIGAR-15-10-SP Special Report: Accessed October 23, 2014 at: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Special%20Projects/SIGAR-15-10-SP.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Counter-Narcotics Shelf Number: 133804 |
Author: Long, Austin Title: Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios Summary: Early 2015 is a momentous time for Afghanistan, with deep uncertainty about the post-2014 environment. The mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has come to an end even as political transition from the administration of President Hamid Karzai is perhaps only partly resolved. The Taliban insurgency remains strong enough to pose a significant challenge to the Afghan government, and a negotiated end to the ongoing conflict seems unlikely in the very near term. Economic growth, heavily fueled by ISAF spending in addition to development assistance, may suffer significantly as those external sources of funding decline. Narcotics, a significant portion of the Afghan economy for the past decade, could be poised to assume even greater importance in these circumstances, with major consequences for Afghanistan, the region and the rest of the world. Despite these concerns, post-2014 Afghanistan may not be a catastrophe. The political transition may yet result in a more broadly inclusive government that could help limit ethnic and regional tensions. Combined with significant reduction in the number of foreign troops, successful political transition might weaken the appeal of the Taliban and ultimately allow a negotiated settlement in the medium term. Reduced conflict could allow modest but sustainable economic growth. In conjunction with a robust counternarcotics campaign, these circumstances could at least limit a post-2014 expansion in Afghan narcotrafficking. The future of Afghan narcotrafficking is one of the major shared interests of both the Russian Federation and the United States. It remains so even in the current political climate. Since 2011, the EastWest Institute (EWI) has organized and hosted meetings of the Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking to discuss ways to constructively and jointly enhance bilateral and multilateral efforts against narcotics. Joint efforts between the Russian Federation and the United States to assess and shape the post-2014 environment may be particularly fruitful given the prior Soviet experience with Afghanistan withdrawal and transition. Indeed, many senior Russian policymakers have personal experience with this process, which was much more successful than many analysts anticipated. Lessons from the previous withdrawal and transition are useful for the current context. As this report notes, political cohesion and external support were critical to both the surprising longevity and, subsequently, the equally surprising demise of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Details: New York: EastWest Institute, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2015 at: http://www.ewi.info/idea/post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 134608 |
Author: Goodman, Mary Beth Title: To Stem the Flow of Illicit Drugs from Afghanistan, Follow the Money Summary: Corruption poses an existential challenge to Afghanistan's stability, as well as its political and economic development. Under the leadership of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, there is an opportunity for the United States to capitalize on the newly expressed political will of Afghanistan's elected leaders to curb corruption. Afghanistan's national unity government has prioritized the fight against the epidemic of graft plaguing the country, and this fight is intricately tied to the production and flow of drugs. Although the United States has invested $8 billion-as of December 30, 2014-in counternarcotics efforts, Afghanistan still leads the world in opium production, and its farmers are growing more opium than ever before. The sale of opium and cannabis - another drug of which Afghanistan is a leading cultivator on the international market - produces huge sums of cash that must be laundered, or made clean, so it can appear legitimate. This parallel market and the illicit financial transactions that sustain it have a debilitating impact on the rule of law in Afghanistan; undermine the legitimacy of government institutions; and ultimately impede the ability of the Afghan government to provide basic services to its citizens. Because no bank outside of Afghanistan denominates in the Afghani-the country's national currency-the state's drug trade runs on the flow of international currencies such as U.S. dollars, euros, and British pounds. Moreover, the weak oversight of anti-money laundering controls coupled with the systemic corruption plaguing Afghan institutions serves to compound the narcotics conundrum. The Afghan drug trade poses an immediate and urgent threat to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and to the integrity of the Afghan state itself. Greater efforts must be made to stem the flow of money derived from the narcotics trade in order to significantly reduce Afghanistan's narcotics production and curb corruption. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2015. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2015 at: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AfghanistanNarcotics-brief.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Markets Shelf Number: 134975 |
Author: Passas, Nikos Title: Financial intermediaries - Anti-money laundering allies in cash-based societies? Summary: Many informal cash-based economies run parallel financial systems that are very different to the Western banking concept. Such countries are perceived to have a high risk of money laundering. Looking at Afghanistan, Somalia, and India - where anti-money laundering efforts have yielded mixed results - this paper draws lessons from the operations of financial intermediaries. These countries are considered high risk not only for money laundering and terrorism financing, but also for corruption and political and legal concerns. The issues at hand - risk assessments for remittances, strategies of engaging on the ground, resource management, and alternatives to the existing financial networks - are also valid for other cash-based, low-income societies. In fact, informal remittance channels may provide opportunities to strengthen regulatory and governance capacities. Details: Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issue, April 2015, no. 10: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/financial-intermediaries-anti-money-laundering-allies-in-cash-based-societies/ Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 135403 |
Author: Hughes, Michelle Title: The Afghan National Police in 2015 and Beyond Summary: Summary - The Afghan National Police (ANP) has made remarkable progress, but the challenges are urgent, and critical capabilities remain underdeveloped. Within the framework of the minister of interior's own Strategic Vision, opportunities will arise to close some of the capacity gaps in the coming years. - Helping the ANP shift from a wartime footing to a contextually appropriate community policing model, and advancing professionalism within the ministry and the operating forces, is critical to sustainability. If a national police force is going to succeed, the linkage between policing and governance must be recognized and strengthened. - Managing the expanding array of ANP donors and their activities poses a unique challenge that has yet to be addressed. It is an executive challenge for the Ministry of Interior and a coordination challenge for the international community. For both, it will require a long-term approach. - To facilitate effective evidence-based operations (EvBO) and strengthen the relationship between the ANP and the communities it serves, U.S.-funded activities that build capacity for justice and governance need to be more closely aligned with ANP development. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 346: Accessed May 4, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR346_The_Afghan_National_Police_in_2015_and_Beyond.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Community Policing Shelf Number: 135498 |
Author: Greenfield, Victoria A. Title: Reducing the Cultivation of Opium Poppies in Southern Afghanistan Summary: This report identifies a broad range of factors that drive opium poppy cultivation in southern Afghanistan, the locus of opium production in that country, and assesses the positive and negative effects of programs designed to promote rural development, eradicate opium poppies, or otherwise create incentives for farmers to reduce the cultivation of opium poppies. The authors consider the decision to cultivate opium poppy or other crops from the perspective of farmers who must balance concerns about household income and food sufficiency in the context of socio-economic and environmental factors that, for example, relate to security, eradication, and environmental risks; governance and religiosity; landholding terms and conditions; household circumstances; and agricultural input costs and commodity prices. A factor might encourage or discourage opium poppy cultivation and, in some instances, it could have indeterminate or conflicting effects. Then, the authors examine how rural development, crop eradication, and other programs touch on the factors - and affect poppy cultivation - through mechanisms that include subsidies on fertilizer, high-quality wheat seed, saplings and vines, and farm equipment and facilities; infrastructure investment; training; introduction of non-traditional crops; cash-for-work programs; improved market links; and non-agricultural rural income. On the basis of the assessment, the authors also provide advice on how to design programs that might better serve to reduce the cultivation of opium poppies in southern Afghanistan over the long term. Key Findings -A broad range of socio-economic and other environmental factors, relating to security, eradication, and environmental risks; governance and religiosity; landholding terms and conditions; household circumstances; and agricultural input costs and commodity prices, drive farmers' decisions to cultivate opium poppy or other crops. - Socio-economic and environmental factors that drive farmers' cultivation decisions can present indeterminate or conflicting incentives to produce opium poppy or other crops, depending largely on farmers' relative concerns for household income and food sufficiency and risk tolerance. In consequence, many or most programs can have divergent effects. - Substantial increases in rural incomes must occur before programs to reduce opium poppy cultivation can result in broad-based, sustained declines, but need not suffice. - Near-term, program-led declines in aggregate opium poppy cultivation are highly implausible, but programs can still be directed to foster necessary conditions, especially with regard to incomes, to create better conditions for reducing opium poppy cultivation over the long term. - A modest set of projects holds the most promise for opium poppy reductions, in that they might eventually steer farmers toward legal opportunities. Examples include projects that focus on substantially improving the relative returns of high-value, poppy-competing, legal commodities with well-established accessible markets and boosting rural wages. - The weight of the evidence suggests that a blanket policy of widespread eradication cannot shift southern Afghanistan's rural economy away from illegal cultivation, but does not rule out the possibility that eradication can play a strategic, targeted role, particularly over the longer-term, with advancement of incomes, good governance, and social change. Recommendations - Programs should focus on traditional agricultural products, such as fruit, nuts, grapes, and other perennial orchard crops, with well-established markets; improve product quality through better sorting, grading, and processing; establish stronger links between farms and markets; employ inexpensive, readily available, maintainable, and simple technologies; and try to reach a large enough number of farmers to stimulate and sustain associated support and marketing industries. - Programs should not try to introduce agricultural products new to Afghanistan; rely on complex technologies, especially those that need electricity and other not-yet developed or widely accessible supporting infrastructure; or fail to ensure a local market for the product. - Within the broad contours of that framework, programs that focus on substantially improving the relative returns of high-value, poppy-competing, legal commodities with well-established, accessible markets and boosting rural wages are more likely to shift the rural economy in the direction of legality than other programs over time, as incomes rise. - The weight of the evidence does not support a blanket policy of widespread eradication efforts in Helmand or Kandahar, but it does not rule out a strategic, targeted role, particularly over the longer-term, with advancement of incomes, good governance, and social change. Details: Santa Barbara, CA: RAND, 2015. 266p., app. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1075/RAND_RR1075.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Crop Eradication Shelf Number: 135987 |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: The Future of the Afghan Local Police Summary: The Afghan Local Police (ALP) began as a small U.S. experiment but grew into a significant part of Afghanistan's security apparatus. In hundreds of rural communities, members serve on the front lines of a war that is reaching heights of violence not witnessed since 2001, as insurgents start to credibly threaten major cities. The ALP also stand in the middle of a policy debate about whether the Kabul government can best defend itself with loosely regulated units outside the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) structure. The mixed record suggests that the ALP contribute to security where local factors allow recruitment of members from the villages they patrol and where they respect their own communities. But such conditions do not exist in many districts. The ALP and pro-government militias are cheap but dangerous, and Kabul should resist calls for their expansion. Reforms are needed to strengthen oversight, dismiss ALP in the many locations where they worsen security and incorporate the remaining units into the ANSF. Since 2001, when intelligence officers arrived in northern Afghanistan to raise local militias against the Taliban, the U.S. presence has been associated with a proliferation of irregular or semi-regular forces backed by American sponsors. None has approached the scale of the ALP, which has perhaps 29,000 men deployed in 29 of 34 provinces. Its predecessors were invented to meet short-term tactical requirements, such as assisting counter-terrorism teams in border regions; the ALP is a broader effort to correct strategic problems in the war against the Taliban. U.S. planners realised they were sending Afghan forces into rural communities that treated them as outsiders because of their tribe, ethnicity or urban background. Senior Afghan officials were reluctant to endorse community-based units, in part because they circumvented central government authority, but also because they resembled militias that had contributed to the civil wars of the 1990s. President Hamid Karzai eventually accepted the ALP concept after insisting the armed villagers would at least nominally be categorised as "police" and answer to the interior ministry. He approved a 10,000-man roster as a two- to five-year temporary measure to address growing instability, although the program rapidly expanded. Five years later, officials in President Ashraf Ghani's government are considering plans to increase the roster to 45,000 and seeking money to continue the program after the scheduled September 2018 expiration of U.S. funding. U.S. and Afghan security officials also continue experimenting with other irregular units. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the first vice president and an ex-militia leader, has publicly called for a new force of 20,000. Already, security officials are attempting to raise about 5,000 militiamen in at least seven provinces as a stopgap against rising insecurity. Afghan officials who feel qualms about hastily-raised forces with little training may lose the internal argument if insurgent attacks continue growing in 2015-2016 as forecast, leading to more pressure for quick fixes. However, the ALP program has not improved security in many places and even exacerbated the conflict in a number of districts. A minority of villagers describe it as an indispensable source of protection, without which their districts would become battlegrounds or insurgent havens, but it is more common to hear complaints that ALP prey upon the people they are supposed to guard. Such behaviour often provokes violence: in 2014, an ALP officer was three to six times more likely to be killed on duty than his ANSF counterpart. At times, this reflected the way ALP units have become a central part of the war, singled out by Taliban as important targets. In other places, the high rate resulted from abuses - extortion, kidnapping, extrajudicial killings - that instigated armed responses. Teachers who feel outraged by ALP behaviour and pick up guns to attack an ALP outpost may have no connection to insurgents and may quickly return peacefully to civilian life. Such cases illustrate how ALP can inspire conflict, instead of quelling it. The chequered history suggests further expansion of such forces would be a mistake, but an abrupt halt to the program would give insurgents a military edge, and ex-fighters might also be drawn to banditry and other forms of lawlessness if not carefully reintegrated into society or the ANSF. New policies are needed to extend ALP units with proven good behaviour, while reducing the overall force and ultimately ending the program. The mix of interventions required - strengthened oversight and integration into ANSF of units that would remain after poor ones are disbanded - includes additional training, vetting and discipline. Many domestic and international actors should be empowered to identify where the ALP contributes to instability, including the councils of elders originally convened to approve the program. Oversight mechanisms should have power only to reduce or eliminate ALP where the program is not working, not authorise bigger rosters or shift resources to new locations. Only a minority of the existing ALP would likely pass muster in such a stringent system, but those remaining should receive pay increases equivalent to those received by the national police (ANP), and adequate support from the government and international community. Washington's allies have been reluctant to get involved with the program, but they should set aside their concerns as ALP members become bona fide policemen and leave behind the ALP's history as a U.S. military project. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 268: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-local-police.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Shelf Number: 136338 |
Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Youth and Extremists: Why Are Extremists' Narratives So Appealing? Summary: Four decades of political instability, violent conflict, and socioeconomic crisis has had a devastating impact on Afghanistan and its citizens. As this Peace Brief explains, understanding the process of radicalization and the drivers of violent extremism is vital to designing effective counterstrategies. Summary - Afghanistan's population is among the world's youngest and fastest growing: half its population is under eighteen and more than three-quarters under forty. - The need is dire for strategies and policies to respond to the largest and fastest-growing segment of the population and to enable these citizens to meaningfully engage in their country's affairs. - Many young men are frustrated with real and perceived injustice, regular and observable impunity and corruption, and lack of basic infrastructure and community support facilities. - All those who want to learn more about radical and violent extremist ideologies do not necessarily become violent extremists. - Violent extremist groups such as the Taliban use traditional and modern media tools and platforms to lure youth into jihad. - Being proactively opposed to extremism not only undermines the appeal of such messages but also offers alternative narratives. - To address grievances appropriately, the international community must continue to provide assistance to the Afghan state on fundamental issues, such as corruption and rule of law. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief No. 188: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Extremism Shelf Number: 136458 |
Author: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization Title: Women in Afghan National Police: What Now? Summary: Since 2001 substantial steps have been taken to increase the representation of women in all facets of life in Afghanistan. A major component in these efforts has been increasing the number of women in Afghanistan National Security Forces, particularly in the Afghan National Police (ANP), resulting in a slow but steady increase in the number of policewomen. This paper highlights some of the major barriers to the professionalization of policewomen in ANP, assesses the impact and sustainability of initiatives to support policewomen, and identifies entry points for future interventions to strengthen the presence and increase the number of women in ANP. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://appro.org.af/women-in-afghan-national-police-what-now/ Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Female Police Officers Shelf Number: 136774 |
Author: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization Title: Women in Afghan National Police: A Baseline Assessment Summary: This report identifies challenges and possible measures that could be taken to support the position of women working in the Afghan National Police (ANP). The lack of female leaders in ANP is frequently cited as one of the major obstacles to women's advancement in ANP. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, 2014. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://appro.org.af/women-in-anp-a-baseline-assessment/ Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Female Police Officers Shelf Number: 136775 |
Author: Rubin, Barnett R. Title: Road to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry Summary: This paper examines the historical context of Afghanistan's opium industry, its current nature, and past missteps of the United States and the rest of the international community in addressing the narcotics threat. It also offers recommendations for a more effective counter-narcotics strategy based on three principles: counter-narcotics policy must be integrated with broader international effects; increased security and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan remain essential; and countering the drug threat in Afghanistan will require a full and long-term commitment. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2004. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/13935/azu_acku_pamphlet_hv5840_a23_r83_2004_w.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2004 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trade Shelf Number: 136787 |
Author: Nielsen, Thomas Galasz Title: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror by America and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geographical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over governments' decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare - counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad. When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO's core principle of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case, one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach and engaged itself and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale military operations against the enemy's strongholds - primarily the city of Kabul. At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks from training and operating on Afghan soil. Though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the offensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan. Prior to, and alongside with, the development in Afghanistan, Pakistan faced similar problems with religious extremism and militant groups. Given its status as a key regional actor, the development in Afghanistan created a new situation for Pakistan's security matrix. Afghanistan and its population faced its third big war in four decades. Previous wars, the Soviet Union's 1979-89 intervention, and the 1992-96 civil war, had had a devastating effects in terms of refugees and spill-over to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, with Pakistan experiencing the greatest impact by far. This has had massive negative consequences for Pakistani society, especially in relation to its economy and domestic security. While the country has struggled with these consequences, it is important to remember that positive and stable development in Afghanistan will, conversely, have a massive positive effect on all levels of Pakistani society. It has been argued from many NATO countries that the Afghan insurgency groups have been, and still are being, sustained through their connections into Pakistan and their ability to cross the border and obtain safe havens on Pakistani soil. Adding to the problem is, of course, the continued external funding for religious madrassas in the remote areas of the country where government outreach in relation to education, health care, and other civil services is sparse. The lack of governmental outreach presents an opportune environment for establishing and developing insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, a new turn has seemed to take root in Pakistan, and since June 2014 the Pakistani army has been very active in the Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in counter-militancy, including CT operations. This turn was underlined by the tragic events in December 2014, when terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)6 killed 132 school children and 9 teachers in an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. While claiming responsibility for the dastardly act, the terrorists afterwards stated that the attack was a reaction to the operations conducted by the Pakistani Military in FATA. Details: Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2015. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2015 at: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Shelf Number: 137893 |
Author: Groenewald, Hesta Title: "Hammering the Bread and the Nail": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Afghanistan Summary: The international intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was in many respects a watershed for the country and for the global agenda on combating terrorism. The decision to react to the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 with a military-led response was intended to close down al-Qaeda's operational space in Afghanistan, which the Taliban regime refused to challenge. Yet, the country was also in ongoing civil conflict and the actions of the Taliban regime were as much targeted against the Afghan population as they were causing insecurity for Western countries and Afghanistan's neighbours. Focusing the international intervention on the narrow counter-terrorism aims of defeating al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power meant missing early opportunities to support political transition, development progress and long-term peacebuilding. This research report reviews international engagement in Afghanistan with a view to identifying lessons and recommendations regarding statebuilding, peacebuilding and counterterrorism in the country and elsewhere. Based mostly on existing literature, the report focuses in particular on US, UK and EU involvement. While providing an overview of the key dilemmas, the analysis generates important recommendations for future support to Afghanistan, and also aims to inform ongoing policy debates about international engagement with 'terrorism-generating' contexts. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Shelf Number: 137727 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: The Devil is in the Details: Nangarhar's continued decline into insurgency, violence and widespread drug production Summary: Nangarhar - a province that historically has been one of the major entry points for the capture of Kabul - is in complete disarray. It lies in chaos, riven by a process of political fragmentation that has increased in both pace and severity since the presidential elections and the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG). In fact, there seems little to currently bind the province together given the faltering economy, a reduction in aid flows and the continued disassembling of the political alliances that maintained stability during the early years of Gul Aga Sherzai's governorship. Further catalysing this are the drawdown and subsequent closure of the US-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) - an institution that was, for a period of time, a guarantor for the Afghan state in the province. Indeed, without US military support, and with little direction from Kabul, the Afghan National Defence Security Forces (ANDSF) appear reluctant to leave the sanctuary of their fortified bases. This has led to further losses in government-held territory, particularly in the districts south of the main highway, which runs east to west linking Kabul to the Pakistan border at Torkham. Details: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Brief: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1602E%20The%20Devil%20is%20in%20the%20Details%20Nangarhar%20continued%20decline%20into%20insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug-Related Violence Shelf Number: 137856 |
Author: Larson, Anna Title: Women and power: mobilising around Afghanistan's Elimination of Violence Against Women Law Summary: This case study examines changes to women's voice, leadership and access to decision-making in Afghanistan over the last decade. It engages with two central questions: (i) what are the enabling factors for women's voice, leadership and decision-making in Afghan political processes? And (ii) what do we know about whether and how women's voice, leadership and presence in decision-making roles within these processes actually result in greater gender equality for Afghan women? In particular, this report focuses on one example of an attempt to achieve political change in recent years: the formation and promotion of the Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW), which was brought to parliament in 2013. In unpacking the political processes and relationships that have determined the course of EVAW, this study makes several observations regarding women's greater influence over political processes in Afghan politics. The study concludes with a number of recommendations for how the international development community may better assist parliamentary activities in Afghanistan and help strengthen the role of women in Afghan politics, in a less prescriptive manner than it may have been in the past. Details: London: Overseas Development Institute, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10277.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Gender Shelf Number: 137895 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic analysis Summary: This UNODC report presents a socio-economic analysis of the latest Opium Survey in Afghanistan, which revealed that opium poppy farmers gained considerably less in 2015 compared to the previous year. Figures in the analysis show that the gross income from opium decreased to $3100 per hectare in 2015 - 18 per cent less than the 2014 value of $3800 - and the lowest level since 2002, shortly after the end of the Taliban opium ban. The analysis suggests that four moderate to poor harvests in a row in the main opium poppy growing areas, together with moderate prices, may have made less profitable to invest in new land and to keep high-maintenance fields with expensive irrigation systems. Moreover, opium yields have decreased possibly due to lower land productivity and disease. This is illustrated by the 38 per cent of farmers who have discontinued cultivation in 2015 and who have named agronomic and ecological conditions - such as poppy pests, diseases and bad yields - as reasons for their decision, suggesting that poppy is not such a highly profitable cash crop anymore. During field interviews, several women gave their view on opium cultivation. These farmers seem to be aware of the illicit nature of the crop, but the reasons they give to grow it include their economic necessity. A woman interviewed in the Afghan province of Faryab acknowledged this motive, which is still generally important to start growing opium poppy. "We know that it is harmful for humans but we have more [income related] problems, so we have to cultivate poppy to solve our life problems." Based on the interviews with the farmers, the analysis also shows that in many cases their dependency on poppy cultivation does not seem to be related to the income from poppy sales per se. A significant restriction for farmers to grow alternative crops is the limited access to markets in the main poppy growing areas. Other limiting factors include the need for non-farm job opportunities, better physical and social infrastructure, and enhanced strategies to address political crises and conflicts. Through documents like the socio-economic analysis of the Afghanistan Opium Survey, UNODC assists countries in identifying, analyzing and monitoring global drugs and transnational organized crime threats, helping the international community to define appropriate drug and crime control priorities in general, and in particular to support alternative development initiatives. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 31, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2015_socioeconomic.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Control Shelf Number: 138517 |
Author: Eventon, Ross Title: Through a Broken Glass, Darkly: Drug Policy and the War in Afghanistan Summary: Towards the end of 2014, as NATO was preparing to cease formal combat operations in Afghanistan, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) announced Afghan farmers had cultivated a record 209,000 hectares of opium poppy over the course of the previous year. This level of production had occurred, a Reuters report commented, 'despite years of counter-narcotics efforts that have cost the United States $7.6 billion'. The US Department of Defense put the blame squarely on their local allies who, officials said, had not properly implemented the chosen policies. The drug policy community generally considers technical problems to have undermined 'counternarcotics' efforts, which are, it is commonly argued, poorly chosen, under-funded, and lacking in appreciation of local context. This conception of an occupying army committed to counter-narcotics but failing in its well-intentioned efforts has little basis in fact. It is sustained by a general tendency within the drug policy community to accept the boundaries of debate handed-down by policy-makers. Not just in Afghanistan but around the globe, investigating vitally important context such as 2 the strategic and economic objectives of the occupying powers has been considered strictly off-limits. Taking these factors into account, and locating 'counter-narcotics' operations within the wider war effort, suggests the picture most commonly presented has little relation to what has actually been taking place in Afghanistan over the past 14 years. Details: Swansea University, Global Drug policy Observatory, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Report 5: Accessed May 4, 2016 at: http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/Afghanistan%20Poliy%20Report%20FINALv2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Policy Shelf Number: 138910 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Moving with the Times: How Opium Poppy Cultivation has Adapted to the Changing Environment in Afghanistan Summary: This "watching brief" has described a number of trends with respect to agriculture, land settlement, and opium poppy in several areas of Afghanistan. It highlights two separate but highly related issues. First, what will be farmers' response to changes in technology and agro-economic conditions? While cost-reducing technology such as solar-powered tubewells may allow the cultivation of crops with lower returns than that of opium poppy, will farmers choose to grow these crops or will they stay with poppy? Will they even look to cultivate a second crop of opium poppy in May as some reports from the field suggest? Second, while the new technology has allowed the expansion of agricultural production to former desert areas and supported livelihoods for marginalised households, given Afghanistan's tenuous water resources (leaving aside climate change) and population growth rate, how sustainable is an agriculture that continues to deplete groundwater resources by allowing their use on an essentially "free" basis? Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Watching Brief: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1611E%20Moving%20With%20the%20Times.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Narcotics Shelf Number: 139288 |
Author: Global Witness Title: War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan, Lapis Lazuli and the battle for mineral wealth Summary: new investigation today reveals how Afghanistan's 6,500 year old lapis mines are driving corruption, conflict and extremism in the country. Global Witness has found that the Taliban and other armed groups are earning up to 20 million dollars per year from Afghanistan's lapis mines, the world's main source of the brilliant blue lapis lazuli stone, which is used in jewellery around the world. As a result, the Afghan lapis lazuli stone should now be classified as a conflict mineral. The lapis mines are in the Badakhshan region, once one of the more stable areas in Afghanistan, even at the height of Taliban control. However, violent competition for control of the lucrative mines and their revenue, between local strong men, local MPs and the Taliban has deeply destabilised the province and made it one of the hotbeds of the insurgency. With the Taliban on the outskirts of the mines themselves, as well as controlling key roads into the mining areas, there is now a real risk that the mines could fall into their hands. Global Witness' investigation also includes evidence that the Badakhshan mines are a strategic priority for the so-called Islamic State. Unless the Afghan government acts rapidly to regain control, the battle for the lapis mines is set to intensify and further destabilise the country, as well as fund extremism. The lapis mines in Afghanistan's Badakhshan region are a microcosm of a problem that is replicated across the country, where mining is the Taliban's second biggest source of income. Money from Afghanistan's mines should be an important source of wealth to fund essential services, including security, health and education. Afghanistan sits on over a trillion dollars' worth of mineral, oil and gas deposits, which could provide the government with over $2 billion in revenue a year, if developed properly. But rampant corruption and a failure to secure mining sites means that mines have been targeted by insurgent groups and are now a major contributor to conflict and extremism. The new Afghan mining law, which is currently being amended by the government, fails to include the actions needed to counter this threat, the report warns. Details: London: Global Witness, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/afghanistan/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Conflict Minerals Shelf Number: 139368 |
Author: Marques, Paul R. Title: Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs to Support the Afghan Local Police Summary: RAND researchers assess the ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI) to support the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program; evaluate the range of logistics, personnel management, and training activities essential to the success of ALP's local security mission; and identify lessons from support to the program that might prove useful when undertaking similar efforts to help build local security forces in the future. This analysis relies primarily on interviews conducted in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2015 with Coalition and Afghan officials involved in the ALP program. To a lesser extent, the analysis draws on quantitative logistics and personnel reporting. While some MOI and Coalition initiatives have fared better than others and some are still a work in progress, our research shows some positive results - in the form of recruits processed and vetted, equipment received, forces paid, and candidates trained - with limited Coalition assistance since the end of 2014. However, examples of improved capabilities do not yet equate to an institutional commitment and capacity to sustain the ALP program. Still, for future U.S. government efforts to assist foreign partners in building the capacity of their local security forces, there are important insights that can be derived from the experience of transitioning ALP to full Afghan control. Key Findings Logistics, Personnel Management, and Training Activities Have Progressed but Still Need Work - With Coalition assistance, MOI has made strides to improve its logistics practices and results. The Coalition's 2012 initiative to eliminate bottlenecks when providing ALP with initial equipment was mostly successful. Since the transition of the program to full Afghan control in 2014, the Coalition's ability to assess ALP's logistic situation has been significantly curtailed. Available information indicates that some ALP districts are receiving adequate levels of supplies while others face substantial shortages. More needs to be done if the Afghans are to acquire sufficient capacity to requisition, track, store, transport, distribute, and maintain necessary quantities of ALP equipment and supplies. - Afghans have begun to acquire and demonstrate many of the capabilities necessary to successfully manage ALP personnel. For example, Afghan elders, government officials, and contractors are currently handling all ALP recruiting, vetting, and in-processing tasks with no assistance from the Coalition. Despite these hopeful signs, the deteriorating security situation in parts of Afghanistan has contributed to the development of local militia groups, some of which use the ALP banner but do not follow the rigorous personnel management procedures that are the hallmark of the ALP program. - The state of ALP training is good compared with the situation in the rest of the Afghan police force. As of early 2015, approximately 86 percent of the ALP force had attended a formal training course. Nevertheless, there are still security and logistics concerns in transporting ALP guardians to regional training centers. Thus, many Coalition advisers we spoke to agreed that a hybrid training system -- with local and regional aspects -- was the best option for the future. Recommendations - Advisers must take account of the operating environment and work in concert with various partners. U.S. advisers must do their best to first understand the lay of the land and then recommend a support plan that either circumvents or erodes potential blockages. - Pull-based logistics systems often take a long time to evolve; therefore, rather than attempting to make the immediate leap to a first-tier, pull-based stock replenishment system, donors should consider simpler alternatives that account for the partner's level of resources, literacy, technical competence, communications, and data availability, and then transition to a mature pull-based system at an appropriate pace. - Managing dispersed forces requires a balance between local autonomy and central oversight. Advisers and host-nation officials need to find a balance between encouraging local leaders to take charge of the daily management of local security forces and ensuring that the former raise and employ the latter appropriately and continue to provide adequate support to them. - Centralized training has advantages, but a hybrid system may work best over the long term. To accomplish this, advisers should perform a comprehensive assessment of the training needs of all of the elements of the police force and, along with host-nation officials, develop training plans that employ a combination of regional training centers, local training venues, and mobile training teams. - If politically feasible, a multi-level coalition advisory structure should be maintained until the host nation has an assured sustainment capability. This would permit coalition advisers to continue to work with headquarters officials and local leaders on resolving management issues pertaining to the police and military. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 114p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 27, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1399/RAND_RR1399.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Military Forces Shelf Number: 140061 |
Author: Friesendorf, Cornelius Title: Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police Summary: It is difficult to establish the right relationship between military and civilian elements when reforming the police forces in conflict and post-conflict regions. Principles of civilian and democratic Security Sector Reform (SSR) emphasize the need to separate the military and the police. Nevertheless, everyday reality in many places does not allow the realization of this ideal type. The police must adopt a robust stance in order to close security gaps and proceed against well organized armed criminals or insurgents. In the context of police-building and police reform in fragile states, this means that the police must be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary - with regard to their equipment, approach, structure and duties. The rapid militarization of the police can cause problems. It can lead to a rift between the police and the public which prevents the development of a relationship of trust that is so important for police work. External actors in Afghanistan are in the process of transferring the responsibility for security to Afghan institutions. By the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces are to combat insurgency and protect the state and its citizens. Donors are therefore investing huge sums, not only in training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA), but also in building the Afghan National Police (ANP). This report studies the transition from civilian to military-dominated police-building in Afghanistan. From 2002, Germany was the lead nation responsible for coordinating international assistance for police-building. The German police programme in Afghanistan was designed as a sustainable project with a civilian approach. However, Germany only invested relatively little funds in the building and reform of the ANP. This reflected the initially rather limited involvement of the international community as a whole in Afghanistan. The United States' Afghanistan policy relied on cooperation with the warlords as well as on the military regime in Pakistan. This policy served to strengthen the armed opposition forces. Once it became clear that the building of the ANP was not progressing quickly enough, the USA de facto assumed the lead role in police-building in Afghanistan. This meant a change of paradigm from a civilian-based police reform to a military-based police reform. Militarization was accelerated by the USdominated change of strategy in favour of counterinsurgency in 2009. The report refers to the problems of the dominance of military elements in building the ANP. It is not clear whether the militarization of the ANP has significantly improved the chances of survival for members of the Afghan police. What is certain is that militarization cannot solve the problem of the weak legitimacy of the Afghan state. There is still a lack of trust between the public and the police, especially as the ANP is inadequately equipped to prevent or solve crimes. Moreover, the possible long-term consequences of militarization are problematic: It is easier to militarize the police now than it will be to drive out the spirit of militarization at a later date. The militarization of the ANP is therefore at the best ineffective and at the worst counterproductive. Only a police force which the people trust can be effective. Apart from describing the shift away from a civilian police model and studying the reasons for this transition, the report also has a normative aim: It emphasizes the need for advancing civilian police-building. The preconditions for this in Afghanistan are everything but ideal. The argument that police reform - and SSR in general - must take second place to strengthening the ANP is wrong, however. After all, it was precisely the neglect of police reform that contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in the first place. Police reform can only be sustainable if it is linked to reforms in police administrative structures and supervisory authorities. The rapid, militarized build-up of the police can only create stability in the short term, if at all. The regular police force - the Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police (AUCP) - should concentrate on preventing and solving crime. Admittedly, in Afghanistan this calls for certain military elements in training and equipment so that the police are able to protect themselves from attacks. However, only an understanding of civilian police work can establish an atmosphere of trust between the public and the police. Various steps are necessary to realign police reform in Afghanistan. Civilian police experts, not soldiers, should dominate the strategic approach to police reform. Furthermore, measures must be taken to tackle the shortage of civilian instructors, partners and mentors as quickly as possible. It is also important to support the ANP in the long term. The two to three-year project cycles that are normal for international cooperation are usually not sufficient for sustainable police reform, among other things because they do not give local stakeholders sufficient planning security. Many further steps are necessary to improve police work in Afghanistan. These include the reform of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the clear demarcation of areas of responsibility vis-a-vis other security players, and closer intermeshing with the justice sector. Furthermore, the difficult balancing act between (military) self-defence and the openness of the police towards the public requires regional adjustments. These must be accompanied by training contents and police work that are in touch with the people, as well as by literacy campaigns. This report does not call for a new police strategy but for a gradual realignment of the reform of the Afghan police that will serve the needs of the Afghan people better than efforts to militarize the police. Details: Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif102.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Militarization Shelf Number: 147751 |
Author: Fielding, Marcus Title: War, Law and Order: Case Study: Australian Whole-of-Government Efforts to Develop Security and Criminal Justice Sectors Summary: This paper begins with a description of an Australian Special Forces raid in Afghanistan where civilians were killed and wounded. The subsequent White Paper prompted several questions: What exactly are 'situations of armed conflict short of conventional war'? How does the Australian Defence Force (ADF) 'establish a secure environment in conflict zones'? What role should the ADF play in a 'stabilization' situation? And what can we do to further develop a 'whole-of-government' effort? And have we adequately organized, trained and equipped Australian forces 'for conflicts within societies'? To answer these questions, this paper examines how the Australian Government can assist another state government to restore and maintain public security by developing capacity in its security and criminal justice sectors. But this paper is not just about Australia because Australia's experiences are not unlike those being experienced by the United States, the United Kingdom, and others. This is particularly relevant as the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more of an area of an interest to U.S. National Security. This paper first examines the origins, nature and prevalence of intra-state conflicts. It shows that one common feature of the ADF's interventions over the last few decades has been that forces have often been deployed in support of another state government, and in many instances the immediate and essential task has been to assist in restoring and maintaining public security. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: PKSOI Papers: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://knxup2.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=719206 Year: 2012 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: National Security Shelf Number: 147820 |
Author: Saramad, Mohammad Hossein Title: Causes and Consequences of Bachabazi in Afghanistan (National Inquiry Report) Summary: Children are one of the most vulnerable groups of society, but the children of Afghanistan are more vulnerable than other children due to various reasons such as lack of support mechanisms, extreme poverty, low level of public education and other social, economic and cultural causes. Afghan children are faced with serious threats like kidnapping, trafficking, sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, drug addiction, murder, beatings because of continued armed conflict, insecurity, hard labor and forced recruitment into armed groups, exclusion and deprivation of the right to education, health and recreation It must be said that attempts have been made for the protection and promotion of children's rights, and these efforts have resulted in some achievements, but these efforts have not been effective enough anyway. Based on its legal mandates, the AIHRC launched a national inquiry on causes and negative consequences of Bacha Bazi (pederasty) in Afghanistan. The findings of this National Inquiry are obtained through interviews with perpetrators as well as with victims of this phenomena, local elites and witnesses of this practice. This National Inquiry attended by about 1900 people, including members of the provincial councils, representatives of institutions of justice, elders, experts, academics, representatives of civil society organizations and the media, security organs, religious scholars and the elders from the 14 provinces of the country. Bacha Bazi is not clearly defined in the Afghan laws and there is no specific provision about it. Since this action is a kind of child sexual exploitation and abuse, it is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and other enforced laws in our country But article 427 of the Criminal Law prohibits rape and pederasty (with male and female) and states that the perpetrators shall be sentenced to long term imprisonment The AIHRC's findings show that 56% of perpetrators of Bacha Bazi aged 31 to 50 years, and most victims are children below the age of 18 years. The spread and expansion of Bacha Bazi in Afghanistan has several factors and causes, such as lack of rule of law and corruption, ambiguity and gaps in the law, limited access to justice, poverty, insecurity, and existence of irresponsible armed groups has contributed to the spread of these phenomena. In conclusion specific recommendations have been presented to the government and civil society institutions concerning criminalization of Bacha Bazi, identification of patterns of Bacha Bazi in the country, detention and prosecution of the perpetrators of Bacha Bazi, restoration of the mental health of victimized children, fighting the culture of impunity and strengthening the spirit of respect for human rights and accountability in security detective and judicial organs in the country, conduction of training programs. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 2014. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2016 at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5694c3db4.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Child Sexual Abuse Shelf Number: 146027 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Time to Move on: Developing an Informed Development Response to Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan Summary: After almost 15 years since the fall of the Taliban, the policy discussion on counter-narcotics remains uncertain of which way to proceed. In large part, this is because policy discussion is shaped by a superficial or misguided understanding of opium poppy and its role in rural livelihoods. This is not surprising given the disconnect that policymakers and the international community in Kabul have from rural realities, in large part due to the inability to get out of Kabul or even their own compounds. Another part is the natural tendency to downplay or even ignore problems which appear to be intractable. Many of the policy proposals reflect past thinking which has not proven successful, most notably the search for a “silver bullet” or one single crop that can compete with opium poppy. This focus is in large part the result of the way in which data and analysis have been presented to policy makers, in particular the annual estimates of opium area and yield presented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) along with its analysis of the reasons why farmers grow opium poppy. The most problematic aspects of that methodology are 1) the analysis of why farmers grow opium poppy, and 2) the assumption of a binary choice between wheat and opium poppy. Additional shortcomings are the limitations of the profit maximization model; drugs “fetishism”; focus on gross rather than net returns; endless search for the "silver bullet" (the single crop) which will replace opium poppy; assumption of a homogenous farmer; flawed survey methodology which relies on single responses and fails to correct for social desirability bias; and, lack of willingness to incorporate the work of others. The analysis in this report is based on fieldwork undertaken in the provinces of Balkh, Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar during the harvest and planting seasons of the 2014/15 and 2015/16 agricultural years. The analytical approach is based on the livelihoods framework in which opium poppy is seen as just one crop in a larger, complex system of agricultural commodities, livestock, and off-farm and non-farm income opportunities. More than a decade of fieldwork has allowed the incorporation of the effects of politics and power on farmers' decision-making, as well as questions of varying conditions, especially those that prevail in such vastly different areas as the former desert areas of the southwest. The current approach uses multiple methodologies, including extensive surveys of farmers in the field along with GIS and geo-spatial mapping which assists with research site selection and allows visualization of changes over time in settlements and cropping patterns. Analysis also distinguishes between use of household and hired labour (extremely important in a high-input crop such as opium poppy) and between owner cultivated land and sharecropped land. It reflects variations in fieldwork sites with respect to resources, infrastructure, access to markets and tenure arrangements, so as to capture the diversity in rural Afghanistan. Data collection utilized indirect questions in the field with farmers themselves, thereby avoiding the kind of speculation and bias that interviewing rural elites typically produces. Of course, the usual caveats associated with fieldwork in rural Afghanistan should be kept in mind, and this work should be seen as a "first cut" or "snapshot" that tries to capture conditions within a particular time frame. Fieldwork confirmed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, dramatic change is taking place in Afghanistan's rural economy, as farmers experiment with new varieties, complex cropping systems, and new technology such as chemicals and solar-powered water pumps. In part due to the development of transport and communication infrastructure, rural areas are more and more integrated with urban markets, and off-farm employment has become an increasingly important component of household livelihoods. Not all of this change is positive or sustainable in the long run, especially that which drains aquifers and potentially causes harm to humans, and much of it comes out of a desperate attempt to deal with adversity both agronomic and man-imposed. One of the most striking and consequential transformations is the settling of the former desert areas of south and southwest Afghanistan. The deserts have been made to bloom, although much of the flowering is opium poppy and it is not clear how sustainable life in the former desert will be. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1623E-Time%20to%20Move%20on-Developing%20an%20Informed%20Development%20Response%20to%20Opium%20Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drugs and Crime Shelf Number: 148016 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Global SMART Programme Title: Afghanistan Synthetic Drugs Situation Assessment Summary: Afghanistan's opiate market has annually accounted for the largest share of illicit opium produced worldwide. Alongside the continued dominant presence of an illicit opiate market, recent reports indicate an increasing availability of synthetic drugs in Afghanistan and the South-Western and Central Asian region as a whole. Overall, there continue to be some significant analytical gaps in the information and data relating to synthetic drugs in Afghanistan. The main objective of this report is to offer some initial insights into the extent of synthetic drug production, use, and trafficking in Afghanistan and to highlight important areas for further research. The phenomenon of synthetic drugs cannot be understood by focussing on Afghanistan alone. Rather, this report situates the dynamics of synthetic drugs in the country within the wider context of South-Western and Central Asia in order to understand the recent emergence and origins of synthetic drugs in Afghanistan. Based on this approach, presenting the regional perspective helps to provide a full picture of the synthetic drug situation in Afghanistan. The research process of this report incorporated various resources and strands of information. Much of the data and information presented in this report are derived from field research material that was gathered over an eight-month period. The field research included missions to 5 provinces in Afghanistan, where interviews were conducted with over 100 key informants, drug users and law enforcement officials at government offices, health service centres and drug treatment providers (see Annex). These various sources of information have also been supplemented by official reports involving national aggregate information and data. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/Reports/2017_Afghanistan_Synthetic_Drugs_Assessment_report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 144842 |
Author: Sheikh, Mona Kanwal Title: Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda's Old Hotbed: Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: Ten years ago, the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan were the command post for leaders of Al-Qaeda (AQ). But what has happened with AQ since then? And what sort of collaboration or conflict is there between the dominant Taliban-related movement in the region, AQ, and the new kid in town; Islamic State (IS)? Below I look at the emergence of IS in Afghanistan and Pakistan and at the dynamics that have impacted the relationship between the "old" movements in the region (Taleban and AQ) on the one hand, and IS on the other. IS is still a fledgling movement in the "afpak" region, and therefore there is still no clear picture of its influence and resonance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Because the situation is still unfolding, this article is based on very limited source material about the movement. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Working Paper 2016:07: Accessed March 21, 2017 at: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/148181/1/864003021.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: al-Qaeda Shelf Number: 144541 |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Women and Conflict in Afghanistan Summary: As the presidential election approaches in 2014, with the security transition at the year's end, Afghan women, including parliamentarians and rights activists, are concerned that the hard-won political, economic and social gains achieved since the U.S.- led intervention in 2001 may be rolled back or conceded in negotiations with the insurgents. Afghanistan's stabilisation ultimately rests on the state's accountability to all its citizens, and respect for constitutional, legal and international commitments, including to human rights and gender equality. There will be no sustainable peace unless there is justice, and justice demands that the state respect and protect the rights of women, half its population. Following the Taliban's ouster, Afghan women worked hard to reverse the damage wrought by more than two decades of a civil war that deprived them of the limited progress towards gender equality experienced in earlier times. As a result of international support, donor aid and their own efforts, women are now an essential part of the post-Taliban order and have played a major role in reconstructing the state and its institutions. 40 per cent of all schoolchildren are girls. Women are more than 27 per cent of parliament. They are in the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and are lawyers, entrepreneurs, journalists and civil society activists. In the last twelve years, women's legal status has improved considerably. Gender equality is enshrined in the constitution. The Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law criminalises rape for the first time. The state is now legally bound to protect women from violence. The ministry of women's affairs (MOWA) and the government's National Action Plan for Women (NAPWA) place empowerment at the heart of state building. Yet, women still struggle to avail themselves of their rights and to consolidate and advance their progress. The implementation of laws to ensure women's rights and support their political and economic participation is uneven. Years of prioritising counter-insurgency over community policing have impeded the emergence of a police force able and willing to protect women from violence. Women are a mere 1 per cent of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Female police are marginalised and often incapable of responding effectively to incidents of violence against women. A fraction of the incidents of gender-based violence are tried under the EVAW law. Very few cases even make it to the formal justice system; most are decided by jirgas or shuras (local councils) mainly dominated by strongmen. Moreover, persistent insecurity and violence threaten women's political, economic and social rights. Those in positions of authority are regularly threatened; many have been killed by insurgents. Militants have attacked girls' schools, students and staff. Qualified female teachers and health workers are reluctant to work outside relatively secure urban centres, undermining rural women's and girls' access to education and basic health services. Since the formal transfer of the security lead to the ANSF in mid-2013, insurgent threats to women have increased. Their rights are also under attack from yesterday's warlords, now powerbrokers both within and outside government. Rearming their militias as a hedge against what may happen in the 2014 elections or after the transition and attempting to consolidate their electoral base, including by demonstrating independence from the West, they could undo women's fragile gains. The reversal of progress is already evident. With presidential and provincial council elections due in April, the latest electoral law has reduced the quota - guaranteed seats - for women in provincial assemblies from a quarter to a fifth. If passed by both houses of parliament, a change in the Criminal Prosecution Code disqualifying relatives of the accused from testifying against them would severely constrain women's ability to take abuse cases to court. Conservative members of parliament have strongly opposed the EVAW law, calling it un-Islamic when it was introduced in parliament in May 2013. Though it remains valid at least until a vote in parliament, the attention its detractors have received could undermine its already limited use. A wide range of Afghan and international women's rights organisations have urged President Hamid Karzai, who enacted it by decree in 2009, to speak in favour of the law and endorse its implementation. In the July 2012 Tokyo Framework defining the terms for continued donor aid after the security transition, Kabul pledged to improve governance, enforce rule of law and protect human rights, including by the EVAW law. Signalling that it will not accept the erosion of women's rights, the international community should continue to support women activists and NGOs and in the interest of sustainability help such NGOs gain financial independence by giving core, as well as project-based funding. If patchy implementation of the laws that protect and empower women raises doubts of Kabul's commitment, women are as much, if not more concerned about the efforts, with international backing, to broker peace with the Taliban. They have been sidelined in a process that will determine their future and that of their country. The role of female representatives in Kabul's High Peace Council (HPC) and Provincial Peace Councils (PPC) is largely limited to public outreach. It does not extend to talks with the insurgency. Given their exclusion and the opacity of the negotiations, there is reason for concern. The government and parliament may be tempted to backtrack on pro-women constitutional provisions and laws to assuage conservative powerbrokers within and outside the armed insurgency. Women activists and parliamentarians are not comforted by rhetoric from Kabul and the international community, including U.S. and EU assurances that any peace settlement would be based on respect for the constitution and women's rights. Agreement on protecting the rights of women must be a prerequisite rather than an elusive desired outcome of any reconciliation process. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 252: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/women-and-conflict-in-afghanistan.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Conflict-Related Violence Shelf Number: 131253 |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Sustainable development in an opium production environment. Afghanistan Opium Survey Report 2016 Summary: The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is expanding, leading to a significant increase in its production, according to the latest survey report released today by UNODC. The report reveals that the total cultivation area in Afghanistan increased by 10 per cent from 183,000 to 201,000 hectares compared to the previous year. Similarly, potential opium production saw 43 per cent increase, reaching 4,800 tons in 2016. The report highlights that the impact of illicit drug cultivation and production on economic and social development in Afghanistan is multifaceted. It created an economy based on illicit activities that many communities have become dependent on the income from opium poppy to sustain their livelihoods. In fact, the value of opiates produced in that country is equivalent to a considerable portion of the country's economy in 2016 - some 16 per cent of the GDP - and was worth more than two-thirds of the entire agricultural sector of the country. The illicit economy also discourages private and public investment by fuelling insecurity, violence and insurgency, and creates costs associated with the consumption of opiates for individual drug users and their families. According to the same report, opium poppy harvesting provides labour to temporal workers, one of the most vulnerable groups in terms of poverty and food insecurity. The cultivation provided labour for an estimated 235,100 full-time jobs in 2016, and the sales of opium poppy and derivatives constituted the main source of income of opium poppy farmers, accounting for up to 57 per cent of the annual household income. However, the potential that such cultivation has for sustainably improving livelihoods seems to be limited. Opium poppy farmers reported a higher cash income than other farmers, which may provide more flexibility in the allocation of assets to cope with shocks like food insecurity. Nevertheless, the income incurred from opium was mostly used for covering basic needs such as purchasing food or medical expenses. Further, only few farmers mentioned to invest the income in assets, including agricultural tools or land with potential to build alternatives to opium poppy cultivation. Due to the scale of the drug problem in Afghanistan, the reduction of illicit crop cultivation depends on the achievement of broader development goals, such as well-established and strong state institutions for effective governance, and functioning social protection mechanisms. Also, a stronger inclusion of women into the workforce and the provision of income-generating opportunities, can reduce the dependency of households on illicit crop cultivation and empower women. The report aims to improve the understanding of the different challenges that opium poppy cultivation poses on sustainable development in Afghanistan, and to provide evidence to strengthen rural communities to resist opium poppy cultivation. The survey shows that the development of physical and social infrastructure, in particular in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) related to good health and well-being, and quality education, as well as a strategy to increase security and government control are needed for a sustainable reduction of opium poppy cultivation. The SDGs bring a new vision to alternative development in Afghanistan and can guide a long-term strategy that intends to transform the development paradigm to ensure that all aspects of development are considered, including security, justice, good governance and the rule of law. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_sustainable_development_for_web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Control Shelf Number: 145840 |
Author: Byrd, William Title: Industrial-Scale Looting of Afghanistan's Mineral Resources Summary: Afghanistan has been plagued by large-scale, open looting of mineral resources, involving significant mining operations, bulk transport of minerals along main roads, and crossing the border at just a few, government-controlled points. This mineral looting, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars per year, involves widespread corruption, entrenches warlords and their networks, and fuels both local conflicts and the wider insurgency in Afghanistan. The government needs to begin to get a better handle on resource exploitation and to collect more substantial royalties and taxes from ongoing mining activities. Summary Afghanistan is well endowed with underground resources, but hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of minerals are being extracted yearly, unaccompanied by payment of applicable royalties and taxes to the state. The bulk of this industrial-scale mineral looting - which has burgeoned over the past decade - has occurred not through surreptitious smuggling but openly, in significant mining operations, with visible transport of minerals on large trucks along major highways and across the Afghan border at a few government-controlled points. The prior political penetration of power holders and their networks in government, who became increasingly entrenched over time, explains this pattern of looting, which is engaged in with impunity owing to massive corruption of government agencies charged with overseeing the extractives sector, main highways, and borders. The current political and security climate favors continued and even further increased looting, which strengthens and further entrenches warlords, corrupts the government, partly funds the Taliban and reportedly ISIS, and fuels both local conflicts and the wider insurgency. Although the situation is dire and no answers are easy, near-term recommendations that could begin to make a dent in the problem include halting the issuance of new mining contracts, enforcing existing contracts to ensure taxes and royalties are paid, monitoring the transport of minerals on main roads and across borders, and imposing an emergency levy on mineral exports. The recent appointment of a new minister of mines is a good step forward, but a well-functioning, effective ministry management team will be key to success. Over the medium term, a political consensus is needed that part of the proceeds of mineral exploitation goes to the government budget and that ownership arrangements of mining companies are transparent. In addition, a system of monitoring flows of some Afghan minerals outside the country- as conflict minerals - should be considered. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/sr404-industrial-scale-looting-of-afghanistan-s-mineral-resources.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Looting Shelf Number: 145931 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Cultivation and Production Summary: Key Findings Area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 10% - The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 201,000 hectares in 2016, a 10% increase from the previous year. Strong increases were observed in the Northern region and in Badghis province where the security situation has deteriorated since 2015. - The vast majority (93%) of opium poppy cultivation took place in the Southern, Eastern and Western regions of the country. The Southern region accounted for 59% of total cultivation; the Western for 25% and the Eastern for 9%. The remaining regions (Northern, North-Eastern and Central) together accounted for 7% only. - Hilmand remained the country's major opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Badghis, Kandahar, Uruzgan , Nangarhar, Farah, Badakhshan, and Nimroz. - All regions except the Southern experienced increase in opium poppy-cultivation in 2016, with the largest relative increase being in the Northern region (+324), followed by the Northeastern (+55%), Eastern (+44%), Central (+24%) and Western (+15%; mainly driven by increases in Badghis) regions. - The main opium poppy-growing provinces showed diverging trends. Opium poppy cultivation rose in Badghis (184%), Nangarhar (+43%) and Uruzgan (+37%) whereas decreases were seen in Farah (-57%), Nimroz (-40%), Hilmand (-7%) and Kandahar(-3%). - In the Central (+24%) and Northern (+324%) regions a strong increase was observed, albeit starting from low levels, which coincides with a deterioration of the security situation. - In 2016 the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan decreased from 14 to 13. Opium poppy cultivation in Jawzjan, in the Northern region, was estimated at 409 hectares and this province lost its poppy-free status, which it had regained in 2008. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation has increased from 14 to 21 since 2009 and increase in the poppy affected provinces were mainly in Northern region. Total eradication of opium poppy decreased by 91% - Total eradication of opium poppy decreased by 91% in 2016, to 355 hectares, while more security accidents occurred than in 2015: in 2016, 8 lives were lost and 7 persons were injured. In 2015, 5 lives were lost and 18 persons were injured. - Eradication did not take place in the high opium poppy cultivating provinces, due to the extremely poor security situation in those areas and logistical/financial challenges to organize the eradication teams on time. Potential opium yield and production increased in 2016 - Potential opium production was estimated at 4,800 tons in 2016, an increase of 43% from its 2015 level (3,300 tons). The increase in production is a result of an increase in area under opium poppy cultivation, but more importantly of an increase in opium yield per hectare. - Potential opium production in 2016 might be an underestimation, since a comparison of the quality of the crop made on satellite images indicated that opium yields in Badghis could have been higher than in the other Western provinces used to calculate the regional average applied to this province. In 2016, MCN and UNODC were not able to conduct field measurements in Bhadghis, but in 2017 research will be conducted to have better insight in provincial differences - The average opium yield amounted to 23.8 kilograms per hectare, which was 30% higher than in 2015. Yield increased in all main opium poppy cultivating regions. Increases occurred in the Western region, where the average yield increased by 37% from 16.3 kilograms per hectare in 2015 to 22.3 kilograms per hectare in 2016 and the Southern region (+36%; from 16.1 in 2015 to 22.0 kilograms per hectare in 2016). - Reports from the field indicates that favourable climate condition during harvesting time may have improved the yield. Good quality crop (high plant density) has been also confirmed by satellite imagery and field photographs in the Western and Southern regions. - Accounting for 54% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan. With 24% of national production, the Western region was the country's second most important opium-producing region in 2016, followed by the Eastern region (12%) and Northern region (6%). - In 2016 opium prices increased in all regions of Afghanistan. At almost US$ 0.9 billion, or the equivalent of roughly 5% of Afghanistan's estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production increased by 57% in 2016 with respect to past year (not adjusted for inflation). Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2016_cultivation_production.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Control Shelf Number: 146099 |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Afghanistan Affectations: How to Break Political-Criminal Alliances in Contexts of Transition Summary: The case of Afghanistan analyzes how counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction dynamics have interacted with the generalized predatory criminality in Afghanistan and how the latter became the crux of Afghanistan's dire and fragile predicament. The transition choices by the Afghan government and the international community, particularly the embrace of problematic warlords for the sake of short-term military battlefield advantages and as tools of political cooptation, shaped and reinforced criminality and corruption in post-2001 Afghanistan and thus delegitimized the post-Taliban political dispensation. The analysis identifies four possible inflection points where the international community and the Afghan government could have fundamentally altered the course after the initial choices of the informal distribution of power and its connections to criminality were made in 2001. These four possible inflection points provided opportunities for tackling corruption and criminality in order to limit power abuse and strengthen the rule of law and political inclusiveness-namely: (1) the 2004 disarmament effort; (2) the beginning of the Obama administration and its surge of resources in Afghanistan; (3) the 2014 formation of the NUG whose two protagonists crucially campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; and (4) the 2015 missed opportunity to react resolutely to the Taliban's takeover of Kunduz City. But the international community and the Afghan government failed to take advantage of these possible inflection points. Or to the extent that they tried, such as during the first two years of the Obama administration, other strategic directives, timelines, and imperatives interfered with them and directly contradicted them. Thus, the anti-corruption and anti-criminality efforts were not underpinned by political heft and power, such as cutting off aid to or otherwise sanctioning particular powerbrokers. Hence pernicious individual powerbrokers and the political system quickly learned how to ride the anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts, further delegitimizing the system and enabling a significant intensification of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan. No doubt, the Taliban itself has become deeply involved in all kinds of illicit economies, including drugs, timber, and gems. This involvement has grown over time despite the fact that since its inception in 1994 and as a product of the brutality and chaos of the 1990s civil war, the Taliban defined its purpose as improving governance in Afghanistan and acting against the rampant criminality that swept the country. Indeed, during the administration of President George W. Bush, it was the Taliban's involvement in the drug economy that received most international attention out of all the illicit economies, corruption, and predatory criminality that went on in Afghanistan. Yet the counternarcotics policies which were chosen both failed to accomplish their stated goal of bankrupting the Taliban and turned out to be highly counterproductive. Far from delegitimizing the Taliban in the eyes of local populations as a mere cartel or as narco-guerrillas, efforts to eradicate opium poppy cultivation as well as particular designs of drug interdiction allowed the Taliban to present itself a protector of people's livelihoods and thereby to obtain significant political capital. Thus, the international community mounted the most intense efforts precisely against the wrong type of illicit economy and criminality: the labor-intensive poppy cultivation that underpins much of the country's economic growth and provides elemental livelihoods and human security to vast segments of the rural population. Instead, the anti-crime efforts should have focused on the predatory criminality and non-labor intensive aspects of transactional crimes, such as drug smuggling. The Obama administration at least defunded eradication, but its efforts against predatory crime ultimately proved unsatisfactory. Its efforts against predatory criminality were held hostage to the administration's own strategic decision to define the mission there as principally one of limited couterterrorism and to de-emphasize state-building and also to impose restrictive and counterproductive timeliness on U.S. assistance, particularly military, efforts. Thus, from the very beginning of the U.S. intervention, when there was the largest window of opportunity to embrace Afghan aspirations for good governance and shape the outcome, and throughout 2014 when the number of U.S. troops in Aghanistan was radically reduced, Washington neglected to commit itself to rebuilding Afghanistan in the right way. And earlier inflection point that perhaps could have countered the basic mis-governance trends in the country and the rise of predatory criminality was in 2004 when the first disarmament effort was undertaken. However, that opportunity was missed, with most of the crucial warlords not fully and sufficiently disarmed. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime-Conflict Nexus Series: No 8: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2442/Afghanistan-Affectations-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Crime-Conflict Nexus Shelf Number: 146319 |
Author: Glendenning, Phil Title: The Responsibility to Protect: Afghanistan's current situation, drivers of migration and returnees experience Summary: The Edmund Rice Centre for Justice & Community Education (ERC) has been documenting the fate of rejected asylum seekers returned to Afghanistan by the Australian government since 2002. This report is the continuation of ERC's determination to investigate Australia's most recent deportations to Afghanistan by providing an overview of Afghanistan's current security, political, and socio-economic situation, the drivers and trends of migration, and the returnees' experience, compiled from both primary and secondary sources. The sources selected for preparing this report include scholarly analysis, expert commentary, government and international organisations' documents, officials' statements, and newspaper reports as well as conducting interviews with experts and practitioners working at national and international development agencies in Afghanistan. In addition to relying on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, a number of deported Afghans from Australia, Europe and other countries have been interviewed in the context of returnees' experience in order to broaden the focus of the report. The report concludes that it would be impossible for Australian, European and other governments to guarantee the safety of Afghan returnees in this period of instability. Afghanistan is currently experiencing widespread conflict, intensifying violence, political instability, human rights abuses, lack of rule of law and good governance, economic hardships, and a serious refugee crisis. This has led to a situation whereby many Afghan people have been forced to leave their country and seek refuge in foreign nations in numbers that have not been seen since 2001. Between 2015 and 2016, tens of thousands of Afghans fled their homes in the hope of seeking asylum in Europe and other parts of the world. What is clear is that Afghans are leaving their country for a mixture of reasons, including political, security and economic, and it is not as simple as to claim that they are only leaving because of economic reasons. The report raises concerns that Australian, European and other governments appear to be basing negative protection assessments for Afghan asylum seekers on primarily two premises. Firstly, many Afghans are considered to be fleeing their country due to economic vulnerability, rather than fleeing specific persecution. Secondly, some parts of Afghanistan are considered safe so the rejected Afghan asylum seekers can be returned to their country safely. However, given the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan combined with political instability, corruption, a weak judicial system and economic challenges, such assessments seem to be influenced by the domestic deterrence politics of Australian, European and other governments as a means of avoiding their international protection and human rights obligations. Details: Homebush West, NSW, AUS: Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education, 2017. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 27, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/97586/apo-nid97586-352326.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Asylum Seekers Shelf Number: 146589 |
Author: Gossman, Patricia A. Title: Documentation and Transitional Justice in Afghanistan Summary: Summary - In Afghanistan, the social upheaval resulting from thirty-five years of war has created widely differing narratives of the conflict as various communities and political factions have reconstructed events through the lens of their experiences. - Extensive dislocation of large segments of the population and poor communication throughout the war years meant that Afghans often had no way of knowing what was happening in different parts of the country. - Although the war had several phases, earlier transitions - such as the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1992 - failed to provide an opportunity for investigations into past human rights abuses because the conflict was ongoing. As a consequence, documentation remains thin. Conditions have made it difficult for human rights groups to function; additionally, many records have been either lost or destroyed. - Since 2001, a number of initiatives were launched to investigate and document war crimes and human rights abuses. The relative openness of this period provided increased opportunities to document ongoing abuses occurring in the context of the Taliban insurgency and counterinsurgency effort. - The most ambitious components of transitional justice, as envisioned by Afghan organizations and their international partners, however, appear to be indefinitely stalled given the failure of electoral vetting and the silencing of an Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission report that would have mapped all abuses in the three decades of conflict. - No single report or archive can provide a definitive truth about the past. Such an archive, however, can serve, however imperfectly, as vital evidence in the effort to understand the complex array of factors that have played a part in conflict. - Better documentation and access to other narratives could provide a counterweight to narrow or politically motivated interpretations of past events that could seed future conflict. Details: Washington, DC: Untied States Institute of Peace, 2013. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 337: Accessed August 2, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR337.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Human Rights Abuses Shelf Number: 130012 |
Author: Lakhani, Sadaf Title: Illegal Mining in Afghanistan: A Driver of Conflict Summary: Most mineral extraction in Afghanistan is either illegal or unregulated. In some cases, mines have been operated by local communities for decades under informal arrangements that predate the current regulatory regime. In others, they are controlled or exploited by the Taliban or criminal networks. Illegal and unregulated extraction contribute to conflict by inducing contestation over access to lucrative mining profits and by financing the insurgents and criminal mafias that use violence to gain power. Illegal and unregulated mineral extraction deprives the government of revenue owed in the form of royalties and taxes that, among other things, could fund critical security services. Government control over minerals, however, is not always perceived by communities as beneficial. In some cases, communities support insurgent or mafia control of mines expressly to avoid illegal taxation by corrupt officials or to prevent the government from removing an important source of local income. To achieve its goal of effectively regulated extraction that produces revenue for the government and denies that revenue to the Taliban and criminal groups, the government needs to provide a path for legal operation of mines that improves local welfare. Steps in that direction could include legalization of artisanal mining without undue regulations, a program to deliver better government social services in exchange for formal mine registration and payment of legal taxes, and assistance with new technology and safety for mines. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 226: Accessed August 4, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/pb226-illegal-extraction-of-minerals-as-a-driver-of-conflict-in-afghanistan.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Conflict Minerals Shelf Number: 146710 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Truly Unprecedented: How the Helmand Food Zone supported an increase in the province's capacity to produce opium Summary: The goal of the Helmand Food Zone (HFZ) was to bring about a rapid and significant reduction in opium poppy cultivation. It was funded directly by the UK and US governments to the tune of between US$12 and $18 million per year between the autumn of 2008 and 2012. The program ran alongside a massive increase in the number of international and Afghan military forces fighting in Helmand and increases in the amount of development assistance known as "the surge." Over the course of the HFZ and the surge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) helped the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) extend its writ across central Helmand; security bases were placed "on every junction," access to government services including health and education improved substantially, and the level of opium poppy cultivation fell dramatically from 103,590 hectares in 2008 to 63,307 hectares in 2011. But where do things stand now, five years since the end of the HFZ and three years after the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Helmand? This report draws on in-depth fieldwork and high-resolution imagery between 2008 and 2017 to reveal how unsustainable the HFZ and the surge have proven. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit AREU, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2017 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/1728E-TRULY-UNPRECEDENTED-How-the-Helmand-Food-Zone-supported-an-increase-in-the-province%E2%80%99s-capacity-to-produce-opium.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Illegal Drugs Shelf Number: 148182 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Understanding Control and Influence: What Opium and Tax Reveal about the Writ of the Afghan State Summary: There are a number of organisations that have sought to map government control in Afghanistan. However, given the frequency it is cited in the media and official reports, this paper offers a critique of the current way that North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and US Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) measure government influence and control in Afghanistan. It describes the limits of the current approach within the confines of what is currently known about the methodology. It shows that the concept of state or insurgent "control" over a population or area jars not only with historical understandings of the State in Afghanistan, but also contemporary events across large swathes of the country. It also illustrates how the categories adopted by USFOR-A - "state influence", "insurgent influence" and "contested" - are not mutually exclusive, and argues that district wide assessments do not offer sufficient granular detail to understand how the insurgency gains influence in an area, strengthens its position in rural communities before consolidating its position and encircling a district or provincial center. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit AREU, 2017. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2017 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/1724E-Understanding-Control-and-Influence1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Illegal Drugs Shelf Number: 148184 |
Author: U.S. Department of Defense. Inspector General Title: Implementation of the DoD Leahy Law Regarding Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Summary: Objectives - To evaluate the implementation of the DoD Leahy Law regarding child sexual abuse as it applies to DoD interaction with, and Title 10 support of, the Afghan Security Ministries and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Congressional Concerns - Members of Congress expressed concerns regarding allegations of child sexual abuse in Afghanistan, particularly against young boys by ANDSF personnel. In response, we conducted this evaluation to address the following questions: 1. What laws, regulations, directives, standards, or other guidance, including international laws, treaties, or agreements, exist that impact DoD policy related to allegations of child sexual abuse involving ANDSF personnel; the obligation of DoD‑affiliated personnel to report suspected child sexual abuse by Afghan government officials; and DoD involvement in responding to such reports or allegations? - We identify in this report the laws, regulations, and guidance impacting DoD policy. 2. Is there, or was there, any DoD guidance, informal or otherwise, to discourage reporting by DoD-affiliated personnel? - We did not identify official guidance that discouraged DoD-affiliated personnel from reporting incidents of child sexual abuse. - In some cases, personnel we interviewed explained that they, or someone whom they knew, were told informally that nothing could be done about child sexual abuse because of Afghanistan's status as a sovereign nation, that it was not a priority issue for the command, or that it was best to let the local police handle it. 3. What training has been conducted or planned for DoD personnel on identifying and responding to alleged child sexual abuse, or the obligation to report suspected violations? - The DoD did not conduct training for personnel deployed or deploying to Afghanistan before 2015 on identifying, responding to, or reporting suspected instances of child sexual abuse. In September 2015, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) prepared training slides titled "Mandatory Reporting of Suspected Human Rights Abuses," for use in theater. This training states that Resolute Support (RS) and USFOR-A personnel are required to report any suspected human-rights abuses, including suspected child sexual abuse. USFOR-A personnel conducted such training for DoD personnel deployed to Afghanistan beginning in late 2015. - The DoD also provides Cultural Awareness Training, Combating Trafficking in Persons Training, and Sexual Assault Prevention Training to personnel deploying to or assigned in Afghanistan. However, this training does not specifically instruct U.S. personnel to report allegations of child sexual abuse. 4. How many cases of child sexual abuse alleged against Afghan government officials have been reported to U.S. or Coalition Forces Commands, the Service Inspectors General, or the DoD Office of Inspector General? When were such reports made? What actions were taken and by whom? - Between 2010 and 2016, we identified 16 allegations of child sexual abuse involving Afghan government officials that were reported by DoD and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) personnel to the DoD. However, we could not confirm that the 16 allegations represented the total number reported to U.S. or Coalition Forces Commands in Afghanistan due to inconsistent DoD reporting procedures and an overall lack of unified guidance on reporting and record keeping relating to child sexual abuse. See the response to question 4 in the classified appendix D for additional information on these 16 allegations. 5. How many cases of alleged child sexual abuse have been reported to the Afghan government by DoD affiliated personnel? When were such reports made? What knowledge does the DoD have of action taken by the Afghan government? - We identified that 11 of the 16 allegations reported to the DoD between 2010 and 2016 were reported to officials of the GIRoA by DoD affiliated personnel. - See the classified appendix for additional information. 6 and 7. What legal authority do U.S. Forces in Afghanistan have to intervene in cases in Afghanistan where they observe or suspect child sexual abuse by ANDSF personnel? Are U.S. Forces authorized to use force to stop instances where they witness child sexual abuse by ANDSF personnel? Under the DoD Law of War Program, and consistent with bilateral and international agreements governing U.S. operations in Afghanistan, U.S. Forces who observe a member of the ANDSF sexually abusing a child are not prohibited from intervening and using reasonable force as may be necessary to prevent or stop such sexual abuse. However, U.S. Forces are under no obligation to intervene. 8. What authority do DoD personnel have on bases in Afghanistan to control who can enter the bases, either Afghan Security Force personnel or Afghan civilians? - DoD personnel have the authority to control access to "Agreed Facilities and Areas," which are identified in the "Status of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Forces and NATO Personnel Conducting Mutually Agreed NATO‑Led Activities in Afghanistan" and the "Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan." These agreements authorize NATO or U.S. Forces to control entry into agreed facilities and areas provided for their respective exclusive use and to coordinate entry with Afghan authorities at joint-use agreed facilities and areas, for the purposes of safety and security. 9. What DoD guidance exists for U.S. military personnel regarding intervention and use of force when witnessing child sexual abuse in Afghanistan and what related training is provided? - This question is partially answered in response to questions 6 and 7. Additional information related to this question can be found in the classified appendix to this report. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2017. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 30, 2017 at: https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/15/2001843802/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-018_CHILD_SEXUAL_ABUSE_V2_508_R_REDACTED.PDF Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Child Sexual Abuse Shelf Number: 148587 |
Author: Ondoua, Gervais Ondoua Title: An Assessment of Poaching and Wildlife Trafficking in the Garamba-Bili-Chinko Transboundary Landscape Summary: An assessment of poaching and wildlife trafficking in parts of southeast Central African Republic (CAR) and northeast Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was carried out on behalf of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID's Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) seeks to understand better and address the poaching and trafficking of wildlife in the Garamba-Bili-Chinko landscape of CAR and DRC. This landscape includes the Garamba complex (Garamba National Park and three hunting reserves), the Bili complex (Bili-Uere and Bomu reserves) and the Chinko reserve, and is henceforth referred to as Garamba-Bili-Chinko or GBC. This remote and underdeveloped region is inhabited by agricultural communities and transhumant pastoralists, and lacks income generating opportunities, infrastructure and government services. It is characterized by weak governance and insecurity, the latter perpetuated by the activities of foreign armed groups, notably the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The objectives of this study were to present analyses of: 1) local communities living around the protected areas of the GBC landscape, 2) wildlife trafficking networks operating in the landscape, 3) the Mbororo pastoralists in the landscape, and 4) to make recommendations to USAID for interventions to reduce poaching and wildlife trafficking in this landscape Hunting and poaching were considered at three levels: a) small-scale legal hunting by local people, b) small-scale illegal hunting by relatively local individuals, and c) large-scale illegal hunting by armed non-State and State actors. The latter is organized poaching, and the subsequent trafficking of wildlife is often facilitated by political and administrative authorities as well as criminal networks. Wildlife is taken primarily from protected areas in the region, which are the Garamba complex (Garamba National Park, and Azande, Gangala-na-Bodio and Mondo-Missa hunting domains), the Bili complex (Bili-Uere Hunting Domain, Bomu Wildlife Reserve and Bomu Hunting Domain) and the Chinko Project Area. Details: Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2018 at: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/27772586/1512724398197/Garamba-Bili-Chinko.pdf?token=qmrlSf%2BtC8AJLMNcuKP6%2FN%2F8kBc%3D Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Animal Poaching Shelf Number: 148959 |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Forced Back to Danger: Asylum-Seekers Returned from Europe to Afghanistan Summary: The conflict gripping Afghanistan is widespread and volatile. Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed or injured, and a wide range of people are at additional risk of other serious human rights violations such as persecution or torture. No part of the country can be considered safe. European countries and the European Union have remained wilfully blind to these dangers, and are putting tremendous pressure on Afghanistan to accept large numbers of returns. Returns are increasing, even as dangers in the country have become more severe. To effect these returns, European countries have arbitrarily called some areas of Afghanistan "safe," including Kabul, which is currently the most dangerous part of the country for civilians. The returns from Europe, happening despite the evidence on the ground in Afghanistan, amount to refoulement - that is, transfers to a risk of serious human rights violations. At present, given the grave security and human rights situation across the country, all returns violate the international legal principle of non-refoulement. Amnesty International is calling for a moratorium on all returns to Afghanistan, until they can take place in safety and dignity. Details: London: AI, 2017. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/forced-back-to-danger-asylum-seekers-returned-from-europe-to-afghanistan/ Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Asylum Seekers Shelf Number: 148973 |
Author: Corboz, Julienne Title: Children's Experience of and Perpetration of Violence in Schools: Baseline Evaluation of a Peace Education and Prevention of Violence Program in Jawzjan province, Afghanistan Summary: This report presents the findings of a baseline study conducted to evaluate a peace education and prevention of violence intervention implemented by Help the Afghan Children (HTAC) in Jawzjan province, Afghanistan. This intervention is being implemented and evaluated as part of the What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls? Global Programme, funded by UK aid. HTAC's intervention aims to prevent violence perpetrated against children and between children by implementing peace education programming in schools and communities based on a comprehensive peace education curriculum and complemented by interventions aimed to reduce teacher use of corporal punishment, and work with families and communities to promote more equitable gender norms and reduce the use of violence against women and children. The baseline study involved surveying 770 students (350 boys and 420 girls) in grades seven and eight, and 400 teachers (85 male teachers and 315 female teachers), in 11 schools in Jawzjan province where HTAC is implementing its peace education curriculum The baseline findings indicate that children's experience of violence at home and at school is highly prevalent. A fifth of girls and a slightly smaller proportion of boys reported having experienced any physical beating at home in the past month, and more than a third of girls and an even higher proportion of boys reported having experienced corporal punishment by teachers at school in the past month. Although a large proportion of teachers (35.5%) also reported using corporal punishment in school, most reported using verbal punishment rather than physical punishment, which may indicate that teachers were more reluctant to disclose using violent methods to discipline children, particularly given the illegal status of corporal punishment in schools. The baseline study found that the most significant factors associated with teacher use of corporal punishment in schools are teachers having fewer years of teaching and their use of negative behaviours such as being unprepared for lessons, missing classes and arriving late for class or leaving early. Children's reports of peer violence at school are also highly prevalent. Very large proportions of children, including almost half of boys and a slightly smaller proportion of girls, reported having been the victims of violence perpetrated by peers in the past month. While boys are more likely to be the victims of peer violence, they are also much more likely to perpetrate violence against their peers than girls, with almost a third of boys reporting being perpetrators compared with almost a fifth of girls. Boys are also more likely than girls to play both roles as the victim and perpetrator of violence against their peers. Details: Kabal: Help the Afghan Children, 2017. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2018 at: http://www.whatworks.co.za/documents/publications/166-htac-baseline-report-final-clean/file Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Children and Violence Shelf Number: 149091 |
Author: Nicoletti, Michael Title: Opium production and distribution: Poppies, profits and power in Afghanistan Summary: Opium cultivation has occurred in Asia for centuries, but why has Afghanistan seen such an explosion in opium production during the last two decades? Furthermore, the increase in opium production disrupted the stability of rural livelihood strategies in the countryside. Some research tries to explain this trend by citing the Taliban's financial gains from opium production, or the international market for heroin. While these issues are significant, they alone do not critically examine the multi-faceted role that the opium trade has in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the onset of nearly three decades of permanent turmoil, followed by the Afghan Civil War, the Taliban's reign, and the U.S. invasion in 2001. Before 1979, Afghanistan had a decentralized state and large swaths of the mostly rural country had a subsistence economy based primarily on agriculture, whereas the commercial and industrial sectors were small. A decade after the 2001 U.S. invasion, military occupation, and nation building efforts by the U.S. and its N.A.T.O. allies, the central government's capacities still remain limited, the Taliban insurgency still rages on, with the pervasive insecurity undermining any sustained effort at rebuilding a vestige of a functioning and sustainable national economy. As a result, the country now largely depends on foreign aid, and in many rural areas opium production has become a rural livelihood strategy. After the Soviet invasion in 1980, Afghanistan became the world's leading supplier of opium and has continued to do so in 2011. The prevailing explanations for the proliferation of the opium economy in Afghanistan point out several key factors: opium as a manageable and profitable cash crop brings a monetary income to farmers who are deprived of the ability to produce their food crops due to violence and the destruction of infrastructure, economic stability to farmers, drug trafficking thrives primarily when country has been in a state of permanent turmoil, and the Taliban fund their insurgency because of the drug trade. Some of these ideas are more insightful than others, but they all lack a careful analysis of the geographic, cultural, and social complexities of the context of Afghanistan's opium production. The country is geographically and demographically diverse. The geographical and political experiences for a landowning farmer in Balkh are substantially different than that of a seasonal wage laborer in Helmand. Yet both may earn income from opium production and the prevailing tendency is to view this as a farmer who earns income from illicit crops. These explanations fail to address differences in geography, income, land ownership, state penetration of society, and the internal and external political actions in Afghanistan. The research and literature on drug trafficking in Afghanistan is abundant and contested, especially because of the various external influences in the country. Historically, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. flooded Afghanistan with money and military equipment during the 1980s. The U.S. repeated this policy in its 2001 invasion, thus re-forging relationships with militia commanders that fought the Soviet Union. Part of this relationship, both in the 1980s and more recently, entailed the empowering of armed "resistance" groups to monopolize violence and control aspects of an illicit economy, one of which is opium production. Thus, the changing power relationships are vital in understanding the context of opium production in Afghanistan. The country's glaring lack of infrastructure and economic productivity are areas that were exacerbated by the Soviet Union, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Pakistan that also contribute to the context of opium production and resultant stability. However, using flawed analysis to understand the context of opium production only helps to reinforce the unequal power relationships that drive it and does not address dependency on opium as a livelihood. The question is not whether opium production is defined within the realm of what is legally permissible, or not. The questions that should be emphasized are ones that address the structural drivers of opium production and who actually benefit from it. It should also be concerned with the majority of the population who are involved with opium production, like the Afghan farmers, landowners, informal creditors, and wage and seasonal laborers that predominantly engage in this livelihood strategy. Clearly, a far more nuanced understanding of opium production should address these issues and determine the consequences for this group. A critical analysis of all of the factors involved with Afghanistan's opium production indicates that it may occur as a rural livelihood strategy for farmers, wage laborers, and landowners. It is not such a strategy for insurgents and drug traffickers who profit considerably more and engage in cultivation far less than these other groups. Opium production is neither uniform throughout the country, nor are the people that engage in it. The prevailing assumptions that farmers cultivate solely for profit, that the Taliban drive the insurgency, and that opium spreads corruption need a careful examination. Some farmers may profit whereas others are try to make ends meet. The Taliban have a monopoly on violence in certain areas of the country, but so does the Afghan state and militia commanders that have the support of the U.S. and its allies. This research addresses these issues and demonstrates that opium production as a rural livelihood strategy may or may not be locally generated, the geopolitical context of Afghanistan must be addressed, and those that engage in at as a strategy can become more vulnerable to physical and economic insecurity. Details: Chicago: DePaul University,College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences, 2011. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 4, 2018 at: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=etd Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 150064 |
Author: Global Witness Title: "At Any Price We Will Take the Mines": The Islamic State, The Taliban, and Afghanistan's White Talc Mountains Summary: In April 2017, the largest non-nuclear weapon in the United States arsenal, the 'Mother of All Bombs', crashed into a hillside in the district of Achin in eastern Afghanistan, targeting a network of tunnels held by the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State (known as Islamic State - Khorasan Province, or ISKP). But on satellite photos, craters of another sort stand out, starting just a few hundred meters from the impact area: the marks of extensive mining for minerals at sites along the length of the valley. ISKP controls a limited amount of territory in Afghanistan, but that includes parts of the country's rich mineral wealth, especially talc, chromite and marble. There are conflicting indications about how much they have exploited the mines so far: the available satellite imagery does not appear to show vehicles in the main ISKP-controlled area around Achin's Momand valley, and several sources denied mining had taken place since ISKP seized it in mid-2015. At the same time, multiple other credible sources reported that they have indeed benefitted at least to some extent from extraction and from taxing the minerals trade, and that they had done so with a tighter grip than the Taliban. Whatever the reality, the danger is clear. Natural resources have long had a place in ISKP strategy in other countries, and that seems to be echoed in Afghanistan. In late 2017 more than 60,000 people were displaced by fighting between ISKP and the Taliban for control of other mineral-rich districts close to Achin: a Taliban official explicitly linked the ferocity of the battle to the struggle over the mines. An Afghan police source said ISKP had attempted to build a road to smuggle minerals south over the border to Pakistan. As early as 2015 an Afghan ISKP commander described control of mines in one mineral-rich province as a key priority, saying: "at any price we will take the mines." But the threat from ISKP is just one dramatic illustration of the much wider danger of conflict and corruption around Afghanistan's resources. In Nangarhar, our research documented the Talibans grip on the talc trade, which generates millions for them from just a few districts. Satellite imagery shows extensive activity, including use of heavy machinery, at sites reported to be under Taliban influence, and trucks carrying minerals are routinely taxed. The onward trade is reportedly dominated by politically-connected strongmen, and widespread corruption costs the government millions in revenue. Beyond Nangarhar, mining has been a key revenue source for insurgents, strongmen and illegal militias - and a key driver of instability - across the whole country. And while talc may be the least glamorous of conflict minerals, ultimately much of its value comes from America and Europe. Our research indicated that almost all Afghan talc generates revenue for the Taliban, and almost all is exported to Pakistan. The majority of Pakistani exports in turn actually originate in Afghanistan: and the largest single market for them is the United States, with European countries not far behind. Consumers in those countries are almost certainly unwittingly helping to fund the insurgency. There are no easy responses to this challenge. But there are basic measures which are realistic and could help, and which the government and its allies have yet to implement so far. Part of this is direct pressure. Minerals like talc and marble need trucks to transport and are relatively easy to interdict. Much more could also be done to increase controls on the trade in Pakistan, and further up the supply chain. A greater emphasis on security in mining areas is another fundamental step, although clearly a difficult and risky one: it is hard to deal with illegal mining if armed groups hold the mines. Those measures would help to target the Islamic State and Taliban directly, but returning the mines to government control will be of limited benefit if abusive extraction simply continues under other masters. And durably displacing abusive extraction is difficult without filling the resulting vacuum, with a cleaner extractive sector that benefits all Afghans. That is the ultimate endgame in any case: the aim is not to close down the trade but to make it legitimate. In other words, the Islamic State's interest in Afghanistan's minerals should be an urgent wake-up call not just for the fight against extremist armed groups, but for the wider reform that the sector has been lacking so far. And there are eminently realistic measures to implement that reform, based on the three core principles of transparency, community benefit and monitoring, and stronger oversight. They include amending the law to make contract publication a condition of validity, creating a single transparent account to be used for all payments as a condition for their receipt, and using the network of Community Development Councils to deliver a percentage of mining revenues to local communities. If ordinary traders and local communities can profit from legal mining, it will give them a reason to push back (to the extent they are able) against the takeover of resources by armed groups or corrupt strongmen, and reduce the political pressure on the government to turn a blind eye to abuses. For its part, the Afghan government is relying on mining to help fund its budget and grow the economy, and has specifically identified talc as a priority for development. But without stronger action, it is hard to see those hopes being realistic. To be fair, the government says it recognises the problem, and it deserves real credit for publishing mining contracts and making some strong commitments on more systematic reforms. But progress in actually implementing those reforms has been much more limited, with critical measures like revenue transparency and community benefit often more of an ideal than a reality, and amendments to the mining law still under discussion. A 2015 ban on the talc trade showed that the government could impose effective restrictions on illegal mining, but was dropped within months under pressure from traders. And as a whole, the international response has also been inadequate (with some exceptions): the key concern of the Trump administration, for example, seems to be to press the Afghan government to give US companies a greater stake in Afghan resources. The scale of the challenge is significant - especially for the Afghan government, which faces many other problems, not least a large-scale insurgency. None of our recommendations offers a silver bullet. But even if the government and its partners cannot tackle illegal mining everywhere, they could start by making limited, key areas (like the Nangarhar mines) a particular focus for security and a showcase for reforms, and put in place the higher-level changes which are within their control. Without action, as Nangarhar so powerfully demonstrates, the reasonable expectation is that Afghanistan's resources will do much more harm than good. That is a threat which must not be ignored Details: London: Global Witness, 2018. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2018 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/afghanistan/talc-everyday-mineral-funding-afghan-insurgents/ Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Conflict Minerals Shelf Number: 150455 |
Author: Pain, Adam Title: "Let Them Eat Promises": Closing the Opium Poppy Fields in Balkh and its Consequences Summary: In 2007, many pointed to the example of Balkh Province, where the reported area of opium poppy fell from 7200 hectares (ha) in 2005-06 to zero in 2006-07. Drawing on these area statistics, international agencies have claimed that incentives, and improvements in security and governance, preceded and led to the end of opium cultivation. Afghan officials offer a different interpretation of events and emphasise the failure to respond to the decline that has been achieved, effectively admitting that the closure was due to coercion. The field evidence presented in this report does not support claims that farmers' decisions to stop cultivating opium poppy stemmed from the provision of incentives or development - nor does it find evidence of improved governance or security. If anything, conditions are worse. Moreover, the report discovered that the sudden closure of opium poppy cultivation in 2006 in Balkh has prompted a decline in livelihood security for many rural households, the effects of which have been compounded by the harsh winter and subsequent failure of the rains in early 2008. Prices for livestock have fallen by half since last year, fodder prices have risen, labour wage rates have dropped by two-thirds since 2006, and grain prices have doubled or more. Emigration from downstream villages has been significant; in some cases, 90 percent of the male labour force has left, reportedly mostly to Iran. Not only is labour leaving, but households are also closing up their houses and departing for Pakistan and elsewhere. In short, there is now acute livelihood insecurity in Balkh. The claims for success have been built solely around the indicator of opium poppy area. There are two parties to this debate both using the same indicator but drawing different conclusions from it and for different reasons. For one party, the opium area indicator has been taken as evidence of underlying causal changes (incentives and development) for which opium area reduction is an outcome or goal achievement. The other party uses opium area as a result - something that has been delivered through direct action - and is looking for rewards for having achieved it. There are flaws in both positions that are mutually reinforcing in terms of their negative consequences. The positions are also contradictory but this difficulty appears to have been glossed over given the mutual desire to claim success. Above all, the methods used to end opium poppy cultivation in Balkh are contrary to the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), but this has been ignored. What could better counter-narcotic policy practice in Balkh have been? First, the coerced closure of opium poppy cultivation should not have been accepted; the guidelines of the NDCS should have been followed, requiring careful monitoring of processes of change and rejecting opium area as an appropriate indicator at this stage. Second, a better understanding should have been developed regarding the underlying drivers of opium poppy cultivation in the district. This would have prompted the realisation that off-farm prospects of employment for the effectively landless poor who make up the majority of households - would be extremely limited once the opium economy dried up, and that measures would need to be taken and interventions designed to address this. Will the current demise of opium poppy cultivation hold in Balkh? Certainly downstream villages are not in a strong position to challenge it, being politically weak and water deprived. Will upstream villages rebel? Much depends on the extent to which patronage continues to flow from the authorities, but the evidence suggests upstream villages are far from happy with the consequences of the closure of the opium poppy economy, even though for those with land in such villages there is little evidence that livelihood security is at stake. Balkh though is not Nangarhar, which has more homogenous social identities that can unite to protest. Nevertheless, the impact of counter-narcotic policy's so-called "success" in Balkh could yet push disparate groups into a unified protest. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Case Studies Series: Accessed June 12, 2018 at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1350685/1227_1234789124_afghanistan.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Narcotics Control Shelf Number: 150520 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Still Water Runs Deep: Illicit Poppy and the Transformation of the Deserts of Southwest Afghanistan Summary: The physical and political geography of the deserts of southwest Afghanistan have gone through dramatic change over the last two decades. Located on the periphery of irrigated lands settled by the Afghan state in the 1950s and 1960s, this area has been at the forefront of technological change in Afghan agricultural production since 2003. Initially settled by small numbers of households escaping drought in the 1990s, large tracts of these former desert lands were then captured by local elites and their communities from the adjacent irrigated lands. With access to improved technologies, including deep wells and diesel pumps, and a buoyant opium price, dry rocky soils were transformed into viable agricultural land. An added impetus for further encroachment and development of these former desert lands came in 2008 when the Afghan state-with the help of foreign military forces-coerced the rural population to abandon the opium crop in accessible irrigated areas. These counternarcotics efforts served to evict the land-poor from the provinces of Helmand, Farah and Kandahar, leaving them few options but to seek new lives in the former desert areas. For those that owned land in the former desert areas, this supply of relatively cheap labour skilled in opium production encouraged a further expansion in poppy cultivation, further increasing the total agricultural area and the economic value of their properties. Even with repeated low yields between 2010 and 2014, and fluctuating prices, farmers in these former desert areas adapted and innovated, exploiting herbicides and solar technology from China to reduce opium production costs and further increase the amount of land under cultivation. As this paper argues, these former desert areas should not be seen as marginal and remote, but understood as engines of growth integrated into the global economic system; these are areas that have been transformed by improved access to technologies and an entrepreneurial population that has fully exploited the opportunities opium production has offered. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper: Accessed June 12, 2018 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/1808E-STILL-WATER-RUNS-DEEP-Illicit-Poppy-and-the-Transformation-of-the-Deserts-of-Southwest-Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Illegal Drugs Shelf Number: 150523 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace, and Security Summary: Executive summary Area under opium poppy cultivation and opium production reached a new record high in 2017. In 2017, opium poppy cultivation increased sharply to an unprecedented record high of 328,000 hectares from an estimated 201,000 hectares in 2016. Between 2016 and 2017, the area under cultivation with opium poppy increased by 127,000 hectares - the increase alone exceeded the levels of annual cultivation of 2009 and 2010. Opium poppy cultivation increased strongly in almost all major poppy cultivating provinces. In Hilmand province alone, cultivation increased by 63,700 hectares (+79 per cent) which accounted for about half of the total national increase between 2016 and 2017. Strong increases were observed also in Balkh (+10,000 hectares or almost five times more than in 2016), Kandahar (+7,500 hectares or +37 per cent), Nimroz (+6,200 hectares or +116 per cent), and Uruzgan (+6,000 hectares or +39 per cent). Mainly caused by the increase in area under cultivation but as well due to good yields, potential opium production almost doubled from its 2016 level (4,800 tons) to 9,000 tons in 2017. Accounting for 57 percent of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan, followed by the Northern (16 per cent of national production), Western (13 per cent) and Eastern regions (9 per cent). The MCN/UNODC report "Afghanistan opium survey 2017 - cultivation and production" presents a detailed regional and provincial data on area under cultivation, eradication, yields and production of opium. Details: Afghanistan, 2018. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2018 at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Opium-survey-peace-security-web.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Foreign Assistance Shelf Number: 151472 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Paris Pact Initiative Phase IV - A Partnership to Combat Illicit Traffic in Opiates Originating in Afghanistan Summary: The Paris Pact Initiative (PPI) was established in Paris in 2003 as a broad based international coalition of countries and organizations with the goal of combating the traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan and strengthening linkages between counter-narcotics actors. UNODC's Global Programme (GP) Phase IV (GLOY09) was set up in 2013 and builds upon the previous three phases. The GP is managed by the Paris Pact Coordination Unit (PPCU), Division for Operations, UNODC, acting as coordinator (Secretariat) in support of the partnership and the realization of its goal. The overall objective of GLOY09 is to ensure that "The Paris Pact Initiative combats the illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan including opium cultivation, production and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, in line with the Vienna Declaration and with the assistance of UNODC". The GP attempts to meet this objective through its three component parts. These are 1) Consultative Mechanism 2) Research and Liaison Officer (RLO) Network and 3) Information Management Drugs Monitoring Platform (DMP) and Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM). MAIN FINDINGS The GP as Secretariat to the PPI works at fostering effective partnerships and encouraging cooperation to share global experience and knowledge, highlighted in this evaluation as being of great value. It provides a platform through the Expert Working Groups (EWGs) and the Policy Consultative Group Meeting (PCGM) to help the PPI to achieve its goal. These meetings are well administered, however with room for improvement for further effectiveness through a more formalised structure. The PPCU staff is regarded as hard-working, administering and promoting mechanisms and activities to support the PPI in its objective. The DMP has been effective as an information and research platform but with some concerns over the timely receipt and accuracy of drug seizure reporting data. The potential of the DMP to be leveraged to create further internal and external partnerships is however recognized. Due to outdated data and technology, ADAM has not provided the dividend anticipated in providing an overview of anti-trafficking activity with respect to Afghan opiates. Due to a lack of funding, the RLO Network has reduced in size and scale, thereby reducing its impact for the PPI in 'addressing knowledge gaps along major trafficking routes'. There is confusion on the support the GP is expected to provide to the PPI, affecting the GP's ability to achieve its objective. Some PPI partners believe the GP should focus only on its Secretariat function. Others state it should adopt a more extensive role as UNODC's vehicle in providing additional support to the PPI in implementing its activities, highlighting the potential value of the GP in monitoring the implementation of EWG recommendations. A provision of reliable and predictable funding is needed, something which has not occurred. This has been a major constraint to the sustainability of the GP and has had an impact on GP efficiency. The GP has done much to foster links in-house and it has adopted the 'One UNODC' ethos into its planning, yet, there are areas where internal communication and cooperation need improvement. There is no easily identifiable evidence of impact and the GP further does not systematically monitor impact. There is some indication of impact on internal UNODC processes, including facilitating cross-divisional work. Referring to the PPI, such includes contributing to improving political co-operation and providing an environment for the 'intangible' impact of informal contacts and networks. There is a lack of clarity on how the GP could promote Human Rights and Gender Equality into its work. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2018. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 12, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth-evaluations/2018/GLOY09_Mid-term_In-Depth_Evaluation_Report_October_2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Drug Control Shelf Number: 153398 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Stirring Up the Hornet's Nest: How the Population of Rural Helmand view the current Counterinsurgency Campaign Summary: A central tenet of US counter-insurgency during the Bush and Obama administrations was "winning the hearts and minds" of the population. This was termed a "population-centred" approach and was informed by a strategy of "clear, hold and build," in which coalition and Afghan forces would clear insurgents from a given territory, then hold it while their influence was mitigated, and invest in the development and governance of the area. The assumption was that such a strategy would gain the support of the population. Between 2008 and 2012, Helmand province was a focal point for just such a population-centred counterinsurgency effort. It was estimated that between 2009 and 2011, more than US$648 million was spent in the province in tandem with an inflow of over 20,000 US marines, as well as UK, Danish, and Afghan military forces.2 As early as late 2009, the district of Nawa Barakzai, just south of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, became an emblem of counter-insurgency efforts and cited as an exemplar of the merits of "putting the population first." The approach was then replicated in the neighbouring districts of Nad e Ali and Marjah when over 3,000 US marines, 1,200 soldiers from the UK and 4,400 Afghan forces deployed under Operation Moshtarak in February 2010, while millions of dollars were spent on physical and social infrastructure. Levels of violence declined, but any gains were short-lived following the departure of international military forces in the summer of 2014, which diminished the mobility of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Development investments in central Helmand also dwindled along with the associated donor funds. By the fall of 2016, the insurgency had once again made major inroads, ANDSF had abandoned security checkpoints in Nad e Ali, Marjah and Nawa Barakzai and there were few rural development projects. In the wake of the Trump administration's debates over the future of US assistance to Afghanistan, a new counter-insurgency strategy-the South Asia Policy-came into play. Armed with a change in presidential authorities that supported a more aggressive military position against insurgent forces and those believed to be financing them, the United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), in the words of its commander General Nicholson, would take "the fight to the enemy in all its dimensions." This paper documents how this new strategy is perceived by the rural population of central Helmand, both in the canal-irrigated areas of Marjah, Nawa Barakzai, Nahre Seraj and Nad Ali and in the former desert areas north of the Boghra canal. It is based on the results of fieldwork in rural Helmand in May 2018 and high-resolution imagery. The paper emphasises how, by the turn of 2018, central Helmand was once again a battleground in which the population was not the prize-to coin the phrase used by proponents of population-centric counterinsurgency-but the perceived victims of a campaign of protracted violence that many farmers believe is at the behest of US and Afghan military forces. The paper also suggests that antagonism toward the government and the uptick in violence were exacerbated by a campaign of air strikes targeting heroin labs, a dramatic downturn in opium prices and a worsening economic situation. The allegations of corruption frequently levelled at Afghan officials and security forces without any notable investments in physical or social infrastructure only serve to further alienate the rural population from a government that is thought to only "fill its own pockets." The paper concludes that, in this environment, the US and Afghan government forces may be able to clear parts of central Helmand of insurgent forces, and even hold the area for a time, but there is little to suggest this strategy will win the support of the population. Finally, recommendations are offered. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper: Accessed November 16, 2018 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1814E-STIRRING-UP-THE-HORNET%E2%80%99S-NEST.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Illegal Drugs Shelf Number: 153494 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: High and Dry: Poppy cultivation and the future of those that reside in the former desert areas of South West Afghanistan Summary: The deserts of southwestern Afghanistan have been transformed. Land that was once dry and strewn with rocks, has been cleared, irrigated, and planted with crops by an influx of new settlers. The pace of the settlement of the former desert areas of the southwest is such that by 2018 there was an additional 357,885 hectares of agricultural land compared to 2002, and possibly as many as 3.6 million people residing there. And at a time when the north of the country is experiencing a dramatic drought, a further 29,000 hectares of land came under cultivation in the former deserts of the southwest between 2017 and 2018. In fact, more land was cultivated in the former desert north of the Boghra Canal in Helmand in 2018 than ever before, and there were further signs of migration into the area from farmers looking to escape the uptick in violence in the canal irrigated area following the government's efforts to recapture parts of Nad Ali. The change is such that the former desert lands north of the of the Boghra in Helmand are almost indistinguishable from those areas to the south where US$ 75 million, much of it provided by the United States, was invested in more than 200 km of irrigation canals over a three-decade period. Increased access to technology, relatively low land prices-and at least in the area north of the Boghra Canal-a recovery of opium yields-continue to draw people into these former desert lands. The population has dug in. The markets, that once straddled the Boghra canal, and thereby served both the populations of the desert to the north and the irrigated areas to the south, have lost their importance. Permanent markets have been established deep in the former desert area, north of the canal, reflecting the changing face of central Helmand, the growth in the settled population in these former empty spaces, and the increasing purchasing power of those that live there. However, despite these obvious gains the productivity of these former desert places - and thereby the lives of the population that reside there - is precarious. In recent years the uptick in technology such as herbicides and the use of solar technology to power deep wells has helped farmers overcome falling yields and lower production costs. But at the same time these developments pose a threat to agricultural sustainability and the livelihoods of the population in these former desert areas. The ground water that the area relies on is falling at an increasing rate with the growth in solar-powered technology and there are signs that it is contaminated with nitrates. This paper draws on detailed fieldwork and imagery in 2018 to document the changes in the lives and livelihoods of the population in these rapidly expanding former desert areas of the southwest. It traces changes in agricultural practice, governance and the experiences of the population, both men and women, to illustrate how fragile life is for those living in these former desert areas and the vulnerability of the population. The paper is pioneering in its efforts to document the lives and livelihoods of women in these former desert areas where prevailing levels of insecurity, the tradition of seclusion, and the challenges of conducting fieldwork in the remote former desert spaces mean that this is a population group whose voices are rarely heard. The paper is divided into six sections. The first section outlines the methodology used to conduct research in such difficult and insecure terrain. The second section examines the contrasting histories of settlement of two former desert areas: the area north of the Boghra canal in Helmand and Bakwa, some 100 kilometers to the northwest. The third section looks at the changing face of governance in these former desert areas. It highlights just how incidental the government is to those that live in places like Bakwa and north of the Boghra and provides evidence of the insurgency's growing influence over the population's way of life in matters of security, justice, education, and even environmental policy. The fourth section details agricultural production over the winter of 2017-18 and highlights the critical role that opium production plays in the economic viability of these former desert areas. The fifth section documents the experiences of those that live in these former desert areas, with a particular focus on those women that migrate to the area north of the Boghra Canal on a seasonal basis. Finally, a conclusion is offered. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2018. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper: Accessed November 16, 2018 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1817E-High-and-Dry-Poppy-cultivation-and-the-future-of-those-that-reside-in-the-former-desert-areas-of-South-West-Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Illegal Drugs Shelf Number: 153495 |
Author: Jadoon, Amira Title: Allied and Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: In the years following its official formation in January 2015, the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) has conducted some of the most devastating attacks in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, persisting in the face of U.S. airstrikes, Pakistani military operations, and clashes with the Afghan Taliban. But what exactly is ISK? What are the broader contours of ISK's lethality, targets, and tactics in Afghanistan and Pakistan? More broadly, what explains ISK's demonstrated ability to survive and thrive in the AfPak region, and what do its operational trends and alliances collectively tell us about its future trajectory? To shed light on the above questions, this report draws on open-source materials to uncover various facets of ISK's presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. First, the report provides a comparative assessment of the geography and operational trends of ISK attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan between January 2014 and July 2018. Second, to explain the source of ISK's demonstrated capacity and resilience, the report maps out the universe of ISK's alliances in the AfPak region, explaining various types of cooperation and the quality of cooperation. Third, the report analyzes the direct linkages between ISK and three of its alliances to show the extent to which ISK relies on operational cooperation to sustain its activity. The findings of this report strongly suggest that ISK's continued ability to leverage and make effective use of a lethal, cross-border, and resourceful network in the Khorasan region will define the parameters of its future trajectory. The report concludes with an analysis of the similarities and differences in ISK's activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan and highlights the associated security implications of its alliance hub. Details: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/12/Allied-Lethal.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Islamic State Shelf Number: 153935 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Bombing Heroin Labs in Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the Theatre of Counternarcotics Summary: The US Department of Defence (DoD) has relented. After 16 years of refusing to bend to the pressure of those driving the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan and destroy the 'labs' where opium is processed, DoD finally issued the authorities that allowed these buildings to be destroyed. On the first night of the campaign on 19 November 2017, 10 buildings were leveled. It was claimed that each was a drugs lab funding the Taliban. With the onset of this campaign, those working or residing in these labs were no longer viewed as civilians involved in a criminal activity but as enemy combatants and subject to lethal force. These labs and those operating them now represent in the words of General Nicholson, Commander of both US Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the North Atlantic Council Organization (NATO) Resolute Support Mission, the 'Talibans narcotics financing'. To justify this dramatic change in policy the script used to describe the insurgency has been radically rewritten. Under the most recent rewrite the Taliban are robbed of any political ambition and are described as engaging in violence to protect their criminal activities; they are according to General Nicholson a 'narco insurgency'. The beginnings of this narrative can be traced back to the spring of 2017 when the opium crop was approaching harvest. By the summer, when most policy makers and analysts would have been fully aware that 2017 would see an exponential rise in opium poppy cultivation, the Taliban stood accused of having monopoly control over heroin processing and exports. It is perhaps no coincidence that the air strikes began only four days after the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) officially announced that cultivation had risen by 120,000 hectares over the course of only one growing season, and that an unprecedented 328,000 hectares of opium poppy had been grown in Afghanistan in 2017. This was a rate of growth and a level of total cultivation that sat uncomfortably with USFOR-As assertion that the Afghan government controlled two thirds of the population and that the insurgency had not made any major inroads into territory over the course of the previous year. The air campaign against drugs labs has been accompanied by further hyperbole and additions to the 'narco insurgency' script, including estimates the losses inflicted on drug traffickers and the Taliban, running in the tens of millions of dollars. Drawing on high resolution imagery and field research conducted ten days after the initial air strikes of 19 November 2017, this paper examines the efficacy of this new campaign and the logic that underpins it. The paper questions the contribution that the destruction of drugs labs will make to either 'the war on terror' or 'the war on drugs' and casts doubt on its value for money and its effect, particularly given the potential for civilian casualties and - contrary to official estimates - its negligible effect on the drugs trade and Taliban financing. The paper is written by Dr David Mansfield who has been conducting research in rural Afghanistan for over 20 years. He is a Senior Fellow at LSE and the author of 'A State Built in Sand: How Opium undermined Afghanistan. Details: London, U.K.: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2018. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 17, 2018 at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/united-states/Assets/Documents/Heroin-Labs-in-Afghanistan-Mansfield.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Afghanistan Shelf Number: 153859 |
Author: From, James A Title: Policing in Afghanistan Reform that Respects Tradition: Need for a Strategic Shift Summary: Executive Summary With an intimidating geography that isolates communities, Afghanistan has historically had a decentralized system of government. The police and justice systems that are part of this form of government remain relatively simple, fragmented, and customary. Local communities have tailored policing and justice as an extension of the governance by tribal elders or other governing hierarchies. Such a system provides the necessary flexibility to respond to local conditions and needs. Its primary function is to preserve the local communities through reconciliation rather than retribution and to mitigate the threat of central government tyranny. To the average Afghan citizen the central government is remote, unloved, and mistrusted, hence any attempt to implement a centralized police and justice system will be fraught with difficulties. Today in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) approach to reconstructing the country and reforming its institutions is a Western, top-down one that emphasizes establishing a strong central government in Kabul as the dominant authority in the country - something no one has ever been able to do for any length of time. This strategic objective of centralized power cuts against the grain of Afghan experience, particularly because one of its centerpieces is an expansive plan to recruit, train, equip, and deploy a 160,000-man Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The role of the police, as described in the Police Law of 2005 of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, is akin to community policing and is at odds with the ISAF vision being implemented: one of regime protection, counter-insurgency, and counterterrorism. ISAF is attempting to construct a paramilitary forcegoal that ignores community policingpresumably with the expectation that as the security situation becomes more stable, the police will be able to play a more "conventional" role. The operating assumption appears to be that "security" should be defined only in terms of neutralizing armed groups; a condition that can be met only through military means, hence the rush to construct a vast and expensive force of thinly trained paramilitaries. For most Afghani citizens, however, as for most people in the world, security is a much more personal concern. State security is at best a secondary concern when compared with daily peril from unscrupulous neighbors and hardened criminals. This mismatch has resulted in muddled recruiting, training, and deployment with the result that the ANP is: - NOT effective as a paramilitary force, - NOT effective in community policing, and - NOT sustainable in the longer term. Study results show that: - The current strategy will not create an effective community policing force and has not created an effective paramilitary force. - The current top-down, nationalized approach is counter to Afghan culture in much of the country, ignores the customary security and justice systems serving 80 percent of the population, and is not financially sustainable by the Afghan government. - The ANP is the face of GIRoA to most Afghans; however, it is neither trusted nor welcomed in most communities because of its incompetence and corruption. - Development of the justice system (police, courts, corrections) has not been synchronized and thus does not support ANP enlargement proportionately. Hence, the JAWP team recommends that ISAF create a plan to sustain a force within the limits imposed by the available human capital and the realities of GIRoAs projected revenues: - Create a tailored, decentralized approach that forges links between the customary (largely rural) security and justice structures and the national (largely urban) structures. This will engage the population and be far less expensive in bringing security to the country than a formal, uniformed national police force. - Focus on quality over quantity and develop a "right-sized" and professional ANP. - Synchronize development of the formal justice system to provide a balanced emphasis on police, courts, and corrections. The ANP is presently a resource-intensive, top-down organization that supports the government and not the people. This needs to change fundamentally and to be restructured from the bottom-up, a situation where the police have direct ties with the population and the communities they serve and are selected and vetted by local elders. Unless ISAF basically restructures policing to meet the needs of rural communities, the Taliban will continue to gain influence and legitimacy in this critical periphery of Afghanistan. The strength of the bottom-up approach is that it would help ensure that the police meet the needs of both the people and the government and complement the top-down effort. As Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, who oversees the NATO training effort in Afghanistan, acknowledges, "If we don't get the police fixed, well never change the dynamics in the country. No matter how well we do clearing and holding, we will never build on that progress and sustain it without a police force. We have to get this right." Details: Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019 at: https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JAWD/ida-paper-p-4604.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Afghan National Police Shelf Number: 154114 |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation and Production Summary: Key Findings Area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 63 percent since 2016, reaching a new record high. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 hectares in 2017, a 63 percent increase or 127,000 hectares more compared to the previous year. This level of opium poppy cultivation is a new record high and exceeds the formerly highest value recorded in 2014 (224,000 hectares) by 104,000 hectares or 46 percent. Strong increases were observed in almost all major poppy cultivating provinces. In Hilmand province alone, cultivation increased by 63,700 hectares (+79 percent) which accounted for about half of the total national increase. Strong increases were observed also in Balkh (+10,000 hectares or almost five times more than in 2016), Kandahar (+7,500 hectares or +37%), Nimroz (+6,200 hectares or +116%), and Uruzgan (+6,000 hectares or +39%). The majority (60%) of cultivation took place in the South of the country. The Western region accounted for 17% of total cultivation, the Northern region for 13% and the Eastern region for 7%. The remaining regions (North-eastern and Central) together accounted for 3%. Hilmand remained the country's major opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Badghis, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, Farah, Balkh, Nimroz and Badakhshan. Opium poppy cultivation expanded to new regions and intensified where there was cultivation before. In 2017, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan decreased from 13 to 10. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation increased from 21 to 24. Ghazni, Samangan and Nuristan provinces lost their poppy-free status. Ghazni had been poppy-free for more than two decades (since 1995), Samangan and Nuristan for almost 10 years (since 2007). Starting in 2014, the Northern region experienced a rapid expansion of opium poppy cultivation. In 2014, a total of 574 hectares was cultivated in three out of seven provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari-Pul); in 2017, only one province remained poppy-free (Bamyan) and some 43,000 hectares were cultivated in the other six provinces. Cultivation in Balkh, which was poppy-free until 2014, expanded from 204 hectares in 2015 to 12,100 hectares in 2017. In Jawzjan, which was poppy-free between 2008 and 2015, cultivation increased from 409 hectares in 2016 to 3,200 hectares in 2017. In Sari-Pul (last time poppy-free in 2013), cultivation expanded from 195 hectares in 2014 to 3,600 hectares in 2017. Opium poppy cultivation intensified in the main opium-poppy cultivating provinces by holding a more significant share of the available agricultural land. In Hilmand, a third of the arable land was dedicated to opium poppy in 2017, whereas only 20% was under cultivation in 2016. Less drastically, but still significant increases in density could be observed in Uruzgan and Nangarhar where a fourth of the arable land was under opium poppy cultivation in 2017 compared to 19% in Uruzgan and 16% in Nangarhar in 2016. Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 395 hectares but remained very low. In 2017, 750 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 14 provinces (355 hectares in 7 provinces in 2016). During the 2017 eradication campaign, six lives were lost and eight persons were injured. In 2016, eight lives were lost and seven persons were injured. Potential opium yield and production increased in 2017. Potential opium production was estimated at 9,000 tons in 2017, an increase of 87% from its 2016 level (4,800 tons). The increase in production is mainly a result of an increase in area under opium poppy cultivation, while an increase in opium yield per hectare also contributed. In 2017, the average opium yield amounted to 27.3 kilograms per hectare, which was 15% higher than in 2016. Yields increased in the Southern region by 19% (from 22.0 kilograms per hectare in 2016 to 26.2 kilograms per hectare in 2017), in the North-eastern region by 14% (from 31.2 to 35.4 kilograms per hectare) and in the Eastern region by 8% (from 32.4 to 34.9 kilograms per hectare). In the Central and Northern regions, yields decreased by 5% and 6% respectively and remained stable in the Western region. Accounting for 57% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan. With 16% of national production, the Northern region was the second most important opium-producing region in 2017, followed by the Western region (13%) and Eastern region (9%). In response to the increased supply of opium, 2017 prices at harvest time decreased in all regions (between -7% in the Western region and - 50% in the North-eastern region) of Afghanistan except in the Southern region where prices only dropped in the months after the harvest. At almost US$ 1.4 billion (1.2 - 1.5 billion), equivalent to roughly 7% of Afghanistan's estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production increased by 55% in 2017 as compared to past year. Reasons for the increase. There is no single reason for the massive 2017 increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The multiple drivers are complex and geographically diverse, as many elements continue to influence farmers' decisions regarding opium poppy cultivation. Rule of law-related challenges, such as political instability, lack of government control and security, as well as corruption, have been found to be main drivers of illicit cultivation. Also impact farmers' decisions, for example scarce employment opportunities, lack of quality education and limited access to markets and financial services continue to contribute to the vulnerability of farmers towards opium poppy cultivation. A combination of events may have exacerbated some of these elements and may have led to the large increase in 2017. The shift in strategy by the Afghan government - focusing its efforts against anti-government elements (AGE) in densely populated areas - may have made the rural population more vulnerable to the influence of AGE. This may have subsequently contributed to the strong increase in the area under opium poppy cultivation. Political instability and increased insecurity particularly affected the Northern region, where opium poppy cultivation expanded drastically in the last couple of years. Generally, the weaker engagement of the international aid community may also have reduced the socio-economic development opportunities in rural areas. In Hilmand province, additional factors may have played a role. In 2017, reports from the field indicate that more cheap labour for harvesting might have become available. In combination with increasing yields in 2016, this could have motivated many farmers to take up or expand opium poppy cultivation. The opium harvest requires a large number of skilled labourers, who often come from other provinces of Afghanistan and even from neighbouring countries. In past years, there have been reports of a lack of workers, caused by the on-going fights within Hilmand, which may have led farmers to restrict their investments in opium poppy cultivation to avoid the risk of unharvested fields. The continuing advances in agriculture, including the use of solar panels for powering irrigation pumps and fertilizers and pesticides, may have made opium poppy cultivation increasingly profitable even under unfavourable natural conditions. Solar panels for irrigation seem to have replaced diesel pumps in many areas. These panels require a sizable initial investment, but have lower running costs than diesel-powered pumps and thus can turn desert areas into highly productive arable land at a relatively low cost. The nation-wide high opium farm-gate prices of 2016 might have facilitated some of these investments. Future challenges The 2017 record levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan create multiple challenges for the country, its neighbours and the many other countries that are transit for or destination of Afghan opiates. The significant levels of opium poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates will probably further fuel instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. More high quality, low cost heroin will reach consumer markets across the world, with increased consumption and related harms as a likely consequence. Addressing the opiate problem in Afghanistan remains a shared responsibility. Only a small share of the revenues generated by the cultivation and trafficking of Afghan opiates reaches Afghan drug trafficking groups. Many more billions of dollars are made from trafficking opiates into major consumer markets, mainly in Europe and Asia. Moreover, the transformation of opium into heroin is likely to bring increased trafficking of precursor substances. Tons of precursor chemicals will potentially be diverted from licit international markets and smuggled into Afghanistan to supply manufacturers of heroin. In Afghanistan, one of the least-developed countries worldwide, the impact of the illicit drug cultivation and production on economic, environmental and social development, continues to be multifaceted. The large increase in opium production will reinforce the negative consequences of the already existing large-scale production of opiates. The expanding illicit economy, which in many provinces has permeated rural societies and made many communities dependent on the income from opium poppy, will further constrain the development of the licit economy and potentially further fuel corruption. The increased levels of opium poppy cultivation also have the potential to exacerbate existing environmental damage caused by over-exploitation of the land for opium. The increased availability of opium and heroin in the country might further raise the social and economic costs associated with the consumption of opiates for drug users, their families, and for society in general. To support the Afghan Government in its efforts to counter illicit crop cultivation, continuing analysis and monitoring of the links between the rule of law, illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking is required. The forthcoming MCN/UNODC socio-economic survey report will discuss these factors in detail, presenting an in-depth analysis of the risk factors related to illicit cultivation of opium, as well as the possible consequences and policy considerations for Afghanistan and the international community following this year's record cultivation. Details: Vienna, Austria: 2017. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: http://mcn.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Opium%20Survey%202017%20(Cultivation%20and%20Production).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Development Assistance Shelf Number: 154100 |
Author: Mohammadi, Abdullah Title: "We are the ones they come to when nobody can help": Afghan smugglers' perceptions of themselves and their communities Summary: Afghanistan is one of the top countries of origin of migrants to the extent that dynamics around Afghan migration have gained significance for policy makers and researchers. Concerning refugees more specifically, Afghanistan was the second largest country of origin of refugees worldwide in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018), and the third one in Europe where Afghans amounted to 7 per cent of all first-time asylum applicants (Eurostat, 2018). A significant proportion of Afghan migrants moves to neighbouring countries (primarily the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan) and further afield through the assistance of extensive migrant smuggling networks. While information about Afghan migration flows has become more available in recent years, the understanding of Afghan smuggling networks remains weak, including as to how the Afghan smuggling "business" operates, how it has evolved over the course of the Afghan displacement, and the factors that motivate smugglers. To address these gaps, this paper aims to analyse smugglers' perceptions of themselves and their relationships with their communities in Afghanistan. Qualitative primary data collection took place to support the analysis; 23 smugglers have been interviewed in three sites in Afghanistan. The study focuses on the microlevel; it considers community dynamics and low-level smugglers rather than high-level organizers of smuggling networks. The analysis in this paper is intended to provide insights on how smugglers see themselves, their role in society and the evolution thereof. The paper also provides an analysis of factors that affect perceptions of and trust in smugglers among Afghan society. The paper highlights that smuggling networks have a long-standing and respected place in Afghan culture. Migrant smuggling networks have roots in Islamic pilgrimage and Afghan trade networks and the profession of smuggling has been passed from father to son. As such, communities have historically high levels of trust in smugglers. In recent years, according to smugglers, the profession has become less reputable, as the legal context changed and new smugglers with a more purely financial orientation entered the business. This paper concludes with recommendations to support policy responses and programming concerning migrant smuggling and migration in Afghanistan. Details: Geneva, SWIT" International Organization for Migration, 2019. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Migration Research Series No. 56: Accessed March 28, 2019 at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/mrs_series_56.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Asylum Seekers Shelf Number: 155212 |
Author: Fraser, Erika Title: Violence Against Women and Girls and Education Summary: Violence in schools and amongst school children is widespread and impacts educational attainment, health and well-being. However, schools also provide opportunities for preventing violence, learning about gender equality and respectful relationships, and even reducing violence at home and in future relationships. New evidence from rigorous evaluation of three projects under DFID's What Works to Prevent Violence against Women and Girls Global Programme (What Works) shows the potential of some school-based interventions to prevent multiple forms of violence - in school, at home and in the community even in very challenging settings. Details: s.l.: What Works to Prevent Violence Programme, 2019. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: What Works Evidence Brief, 2019: Accessed May 17, 2019 at: https://www.whatworks.co.za/documents/publications/292-vawg-and-edprint25-03/file Year: 2019 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Children Exposed to Violence Shelf Number: 155994 |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: The Sun Cannot be Hidden by Two Fingers: Illicit Drugs and the Discussions on a Political Settlement in Afghanistan Summary: An issue largely ignored in the current debates on peace and reconciliation is that of illegal drugs production. Drawing on the authors long term research in Afghanistan the paper analyses the role that illicit drugs and the monies they generate play in the conflict. It should not be forgotten that illicit drugs production and trade is currently the largest single economic sector in Afghanistan. Opium poppy is the country's most valuable cash crop worth US$863 million and employs more people than any other industry in Afghanistan, over 500,000 Full Time Equivalent. The crop occupied an estimated 263,000 hectares of land in 2018; three times more land than it did in 2000 when the Taliban imposed an outright ban. Conservative estimates suggest that opiates alone made up more than 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 2018 and that over US$ 40 million in taxes were earned by different armed groups along the value-chain. Given the economic and political importance of the illicit drugs economy in Afghanistan it is unwise to assume the problem away or look to resolve it with wishful and simplistic policy responses - or as the Afghan proverb says the sun cannot be hidden by two fingers. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2019. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2019 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/1904E-The-Sun-Cannot-be-Hidden-by-Two-Fingers1.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Afghanistan Shelf Number: 156349 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production Summary: Area under opium poppy cultivation decreased by 20% since 2017 but remains at very high levels. The total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan was estimated at 263,000 (242,000 - 283,000) hectares in 2018, a 20% or 65,000 hectares decrease compared to the previous year. It is the second highest measurement since the beginning of systematic opium poppy monitoring and recording in 1994. The level of 2018 exceeds the third highest level of 2014 by 17% or 39,000 hectares. Opium poppy cultivation decreased by some 24,000 hectares (-56%) in the Northern region, by 23,200 hectares (-43%) in the Western region and by 15,000 hectares (-8%) in the Southern region. The strong decreases in the Northern and parts of the Western regions were mainly attributed to the adverse effects of a drought. Most of the opium poppy cultivation took place in the Southern region (69%), followed by the Western region (12%). The Eastern and Northern regions accounted for 8% and 7% of total cultivation, respectively. The North-eastern and Central regions together accounted for 4% of the total cultivation. Hilmand remained the country's leading opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Nangarhar. The number of poppy-free provinces in 2018 remained at 10, the same number as in 2017. Nuristan province regained its poppy-free status but Takhar province, which had been poppy-free since 2008, lost it. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation remained at 24. Crops in the Northern region and in Badghis province were heavily affected by a drought. Cultivation of opium poppy in Balkh decreased by 30% from 12,100 hectares in 2017 to 8,500 hectares in 2018. In Jawzjan, opium poppy cultivation decreased by 90% from 3,200 hectares in 2017 to 338 hectares this year, and in Badghis cultivation decreased by 72% from 24,700 hectares in 2017 to 6,970 hectares in 2018. In 2018, 406 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in four provinces, compared to 750 hectares in 14 provinces in 2017. During the 2018 eradication campaign, five lives were lost, and two persons were injured (six lives were lost and eight injured in 2017). Potential opium yield and production decreased in 2018, reducing the potential amount of heroin produced from Afghan opium. Potential opium production was estimated at 6,400 (5,600 - 7,200) tons in 2018, a decrease of 29% from its 2017 level (9,000 tons). The decrease in production was due to decreases in area under opium poppy cultivation and opium yield per hectare. The average opium yield in 2018 was estimated at 24.4 kilograms per hectare, which was 11% lower than in 2017. Yields in the Central, Eastern and Northern regions decreased notably by 47%, 29% and 19% respectively. Yields decreased by 8% in the Southern region and remained stable in the Western and North-eastern regions. The Southern region continued to produce most of the opium in Afghanistan (68% of national production), followed by the Western (11%), Eastern and Northern regions (8% each). The North - eastern and Central regions accounted for 5%. After accounting for consumption of raw opium in the region of Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, it can be estimated that 5,000 to 5,300 tons of opium are potentially available for heroin production in and outside of Afghanistan. This can potentially yield some 360 to 610 tons of heroin of export quality (between 50 and 70 per cent purity) or 250 to 300 tons of pure heroin base. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2018. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2019 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Afghanistan Shelf Number: 156356 |
Author: Wimpelmann, Torunn Title: Adultery, Rape, Escaping the House: The Protection and Policing of Female Sexuality in Afghanistan Summary: This working paper undertakes an initial survey of the dynamics through which the criminalization of female sexuality structures women's access to protection against rape in Afghanistan, examining both legislation and legal practice. Given the relative dearth of existing research and material on this topic in Afghanistan (but see Latiff 2009; Tawfik 2009), this paper is necessarily preliminary in scope. It nonetheless puts forward three, interrelated arguments. Firstly, the paper argues that rape victims' vulnerability to incrimination for zina (and the acute unpredictability about the grounds for incrimination) hinders their access to justice. Secondly, the paper argues that the zina-rape relationship in its narrow sense only partially addresses the nexus between the criminalization of female sexuality and protection against rape. A fuller appreciation of this nexus necessitates zooming out: initially to a peculiar Afghan legal practice - the detaining of women for "running away" from home - and then to how that practice blocks protection against a prevalent form of sexual violence in Afghanistan - forced marriage. Finally, the paper suggests that linkages between the protecting of women against sexual abuse and the policing of female sexual conduct must be understood in the context of a state whose default position has been to relegate female sexuality to family control, rather than to directly intervene. Thus, while the Afghan state has routinely prosecuted and detained women (as well as some men) for consensual sexual transgressions, it has not, by and large, sought to use the figure of the unchaste or immoral woman as a tool for expanding its power over society, in the way witnessed, for instance, in contemporary Iran and Sudan (as well as in Afghanistan during Taliban rule). Correspondingly, the state has also been a reluctant intervener in regulating coercive sexual crimes. In a number of high profile rape cases, the government has only acted when popular mobilization has forced it to. Its standard response, particularly during the Karzai presidency, seems to have been that the regulation of women's sexuality properly belongs to the domain of family control. Details: Bergen, Norway: CHR Michelsen Institute, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2019 at: https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6404-adultery-rape-and-escaping-the-house.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Adultery Shelf Number: 156796 |
Author: Bauck, Petter Title: Review of Prison Advisory Project in Faryab, Afghanistan Summary: Introduction: As part of the international follow-up of the 2001 military intervention, Norway increased its engagement in Afghanistan from the end of 2001. In accordance with the Bonn Agreement, the goal of the engagement was to assist in stabilising and developing the country and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for terrorist operations. At an early stage Norway supported the training of Afghan police. Norwegian police advisors started participating in police training activities in Kabul in 20045 and in the Faryab province in late 2006. Home to the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Norway's engagement in the Faryab province prompted a request for a broader presence of Norwegian advisors to the province's legal sector. In particular, the PRT and the police contingent in Meymaneh emphasised a clear need of a stronger prison sector. There were two main reasons for this emphasis. First, the police advisors visited the provincial prison in Meymaneh and reported an urgent need for improvements in prison conditions. Secondly, a similar request for assistance made by the prison director to the PRT added to the sense of urgency for engaging in prison sector assistance. Details: Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2019 at: https://norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/review-of-prison-advisory-project-in-faryab-afghanistan.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan Keywords: Afghanistan Shelf Number: 156806 |