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honduras
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209 total results foundAuthor: International Labour Office Title: An In-Depth Analysis of Child Labour and Poverty in Honduras Summary: The present document describes the country's political, economic and social context; analyses general labour market conditions and the context within which children's work takes place; a summary of the general situation of children's work in the country; the relationship between children's work and poverty and other conditioning factors; conclusions and recommendations. Details: San José, Costa Rica, International Labour Office, 2004. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 31, 2011 at: Year: 2004 Country: Honduras Keywords: Child Labor (Honduras) Shelf Number: 118325 |
Author: Bosworth, James Title: Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Chaos Summary: Honduras’ geographic features and location make it an ideal midway point between the drug producers in South America and drug consumers in North America. Nobody has a precise number, but the best estimates predict that several hundred tons of cocaine will transit Honduras this year, of which less than 10 percent will be seized by authorities. In its wake, well-funded transnational criminal organizations combined with local gangs are destabilizing the country’s democratic institutions and making it one of the most dangerous countries in the world in terms of violent crime. Since the 1970’s, Honduran criminal organizations focused on getting drugs - particularly cocaine - in, around and through Honduras, taking a cut of the profit along the way. Honduran Juan Ramoìn Matta Ballesteros ran a key organization trafficking cocaine in the early 1980’s between Colombia and Mexico. At times in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, Colombian groups such as Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) exercised management, influence and oversight in the trafficking in Honduras, but the power generally remained with the Honduran transportistas. In the past decade, a crackdown on drug trafficking organizations in Colombia combined with the rise of increasingly powerful Mexican cartels stretching their influence into Central America has impacted the trafficking situation in Honduras. Illicit flights from South America and boats with cocaine moving up both coasts have increased. Youth gangs in Honduras provide the traffickers with organizations that can intimidate and murder for cheap. The Sinaloa Cartel bought or forced its management influence over a number of previously Honduran controlled trafficking routes. The Zetas followed suit. The public security situation in Honduras is among the worst in the world, ranking among the top five nations with the highest number of violent crimes and murders per capita. The government estimates that one person is killed every 88 minutes. The UNODC reported that the province of Atlántida, which includes the port city of La Ceiba, may be among the most violent in the Western Hemisphere with 1 person out of every 1,000 killed in violence crimes. Various press rights organizations believe Honduras, along with Mexico, will be one of the two most dangerous countries for journalists this year. In the past year, the country’s counter-drug czar was killed by a Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and a plot was broken up to assassinate the country’s Minister of Security. To complicate matters, the turmoil in Honduras’ political system over the past two years has opened space for increased organized crime activity. An institutional battle, a military coup, and ongoing complications about the international recognition of Honduras’s government have dissuaded the aid and cooperation believed necessary to fight organized crime. While the following sections of this paper describe the specific influence of the Mexican DTOs and other international organizations, there remains a thriving “independent” industry of transportistas in which people unassociated with specific DTOs move cocaine up the coast and sell it at a higher price to DTOs further north. Groups as small as 2 and as large as 25, usually composed of Nicaraguans or Hondurans, will purchase cocaine in southern parts of Central America (Panama, Costa Rica or Nicaragua) from organizations managed by Colombian and Venezuelan DTOs. They then move the cocaine up the coast to Honduras or Guatemala, where they sell it at a profit on the black market that is run by the Sinaloa, Gulf and Zetas organizations. One such micro-DTO, the Reñazcos, is a Honduran family that operates mostly on the Nicaraguan side of the border, transporting cocaine by land and sea through Nicaraguan territory and into Honduras. Once they move the cocaine into Honduras, they transfer control of the drugs to the Mexican DTOs. Although small in size, the organization has been operating for almost a decade. In 2004 they killed several police officers in the Nicaraguan Caribbean city of Bluefields. The Nicaraguan government claimed in late 2010 that the group tried to break several drug traffickers out of prison in that region. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2010. 33p. Source: Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Honduras Keywords: Criminal Networks Shelf Number: 124218 |
Author: Helbling, Cadet Erringer Title: Modeling Honduran Illicit Drug Networks Summary: In 2009, U.S. assistance to Honduras was suspended due to a staged coup d’état by the Honduran military. As a result, drug trafficking activity steadily increased in Honduras, as police and military forces within the country became less effective in combating this cartel-related activity. Several other factors, including physical location and limited resources, contribute to Honduras’ growing problem which poses a threat both to its stability and to the United States’ national interests in Honduras. A West Point senior capstone, sponsored by the Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) Construction Engineering Research Lab (CERL) and the Center for Nation Reconstruction and Capacity Development (CNRCD) at West Point, is investigating whole of government approaches in support to Civil-Military Operators (CMO) that address the illicit ground trafficking problem. The capstone team is specifically focused in two distinct areas: network flow modeling and system dynamics modeling. Using these approaches, we present a holistic assessment of the complex illicit trafficking networks operating within and throughout Honduras. We argue that by using network flow modeling and system dynamics we can provide insights into interdiction strategies for illicit ground trafficking in Honduras that operate on a holistic scale. Details: West Point, NY: Center for Nation Reconstruction and Capacity Development Department of Systems Engineering, United States Military Academy, 2012. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 30, 2012 at: http://www.usma.edu/cnrcd/CNRCD_Library/Modeling%20Illicit%20Networks.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Honduras Keywords: Drug Cartels Shelf Number: 125806 |
Author: Fuentes, Marco v. Barahona Title: Gangs in Honduras: A Threat to National Security Summary: Gangs in Honduras pose a real threat to national security. These criminal groups continue to develop networking and capabilities that turn them into a sort of new insurgency. Many of these gangs are growing and imposing an ideology of violence, which is contrary to democratic values and which violates human rights. In addition, this paper describes how third generation gangs are working in tandem with the Transnational Crime Organization developing a strong connections, which threaten sovereignty, stability, public security, governability and, consequently, imperil democratic legitimacy. They represent a challenge to the Honduran state that seems to have lost the ability to provide basic rights to its citizens, to control its territory and to enforce law and authority. Prevention of these gangs will require a different comprehensive approach. Gang activity must be countered through governmental commitment and cooperation, actively engagement of the private sector, participation of the local communities and the pledge of international support. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategy Research Project, United States Army War College: Accessed June 21, 2013 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560682 Year: 2012 Country: Honduras Keywords: Gangs (Honduras) Shelf Number: 129125 |
Author: Zinecker, Heidrun Title: Violence in a Homeostatic System – the Case of Honduras Summary: In Central America there are currently three countries with high levels of violence and two with low levels. Honduras, along with El Salvador and Guatemala, belongs to the countries with high levels of violence, while Nicaragua and Costa Rica have relatively low levels of violence in the context of Central America. After El Salvador, Honduras is the country with the highest incidence of violence not only in Central America, but in Latin America as a whole. Honduras has a homicide rate which is five times higher than the world average. This high rate refers to a violence which is virtually exclusively violent crime, and which has nothing whatsoever to do with civil wars, revolutions or other armed political conflicts. The report begins by discussing empirical findings on violence, before going on to look for the causes of the present violence. It takes as its hypothesis, the fact that a particularly significant cause of the high levels of violence is a state security sector which is failing to function as it should, but which nonetheless does not reflect any fundamental failure of the state as a whole. A homeostatic system which was traditionally characteristic of Honduras operated in the past in such as way as essentially to exclude violence. Nowadays, however, the system integrates violence as one of its sub-systems. The report adopts the aetiological approach as used in criminology, and differentiates between enabling and (absent) preventive structures within the societal structures which cause violence. In its analysis of the enabling structures in Honduras the report initially follows the exclusion principle, by stripping frequently mentioned, anticipated in the long term, but ultimately only putative, enabling structures of any linear-causal sense pertaining to present violence. This involves theories which imply that the present high level of violent crime is a continuation of earlier wartime violence, or that turbulent transitions into democracy simply provide a window of opportunity for high intensity violence in the post-transition phase, or that it is historically handed down economic backwardness, poverty and general inequality of income distribution which cause high levels of violence, or that traditional capacity for reform and political stability are a guarantee of low levels of violence. The fact that Honduras calls these theories into question, and in so doing occupies a key position in a comparison of violence within Central America, is due to the country’s specific historical structural characteristics. These are at the basis of a homeostatic system which for a long time excluded violence over a wide area, because it made reforms, inclusion and conflict mediation possible. These country-specific characteristics are: 1) the absence of an oligarchy as a “national class” and any corresponding mechanisms for rule, 2) relatively widespread democratic traditions and a stable political system, based on two traditional parties, 3) political autonomy for the Army and a “soft”, partially reformist military dictatorship, 4) “well distributed” poverty, 5) a weak left wing, and 6) a democratic transition “from above” with the (armed) support of the USA. Since these long-term anticipations do allow an answer to the question of what is specific to Honduras in the form of a homeostatic system, but not to that of the causes of present violence, the report focuses on new configurations in its quest for enabling structures. These new structures arose from the processes of economic and political transformation at the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s, such as 1) from low to high poverty rates and from a relatively fair to a less fair distribution of income, 2) from old (agrarian) rents to new rents (maquila or sweatshop industry, remittances and financial rent), 3) from agrarian rents to financial rents and from a traditionally non-oligarchic elite to a new (financial) oligarchy, and 4) from an inclusive military dictatorship to a more democratic although still politically exclusive regime, as well as from a politicized, politically active to a de-politicized, politically inactive population. In analyzing the (absent) preventive structures the report concentrates on the state security sector. First of all the point is made that in Honduras there has never been a coherent security policy, let alone any security strategy, to contain the new violence. The Honduran security policy followed the Central American cycle customary in intensely violent countries in the region, namely „creation of a new security sector/making the existing one more democratic – ignorance of the security problem – repressive measures – partial withdrawal of repressive measures”. Instead of bad reality being aligned with good laws, the relatively good laws following transition were aligned with the bad reality. This is illustrated especially by the reform of Article 332 of the Honduran penal code, under which the regulations covering illegal gatherings were extended to include the maras. The report goes on to illustrate the poor performance of the police force (poor investigative action, repressive exercise of violence, loss of independence through involvement of the army in domestic security), judiciary (politicization of the judiciary, exemption from punishment, corruption) and penal system (over-crowding, loss of control, massacres). It will be shown that the police, public prosecutor’s office and judges are linked in their lack of performance capacity not in an anarchic way, but in a clear regulatory logic, with the result that non-regulability arises in the security sector system as a whole. Nonetheless the failure of the security sector in Honduras does not equate to state failure, because the failing security sector is compensated by other, particularly well functioning state (party system, presidency and parliament) and informal structures (clientelism, nepotism, personalism or corruption). Not only the weak security sector, but also nonstate violence itself is closely integrated into the system. Political stability exists not in spite of but because of high rates of violence, at least under the precondition that the violence remains criminal and not political in nature. In this way the homeostatic system, from now on with the inclusion of violence, has a new configuration. As a result, violence simultaneously takes the place of capacity for reform, conflict mediation and inclusion, that is, those earlier props of the system, which collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s. At the same time this ensured the continuation of regime hybridity. Instead of putting the (democratic) performance capacity of the security sector at risk, it is in the rational interests of the Honduran oligarchy to incorporate the present violence as a new stabilizing sub-system into the homeostatic system which has been knocked offbalance by processes of economic and political transformation. Oligarchies as a minority rule by definition desire no (inclusive) democracy, because they are not interested in abolishing themselves. For this reason, they can also have no interest in making the security sector completely democratic and subject to the rule of law or making it capable of performing better, because this would in the end rebound on them like a boomerang, against their own involvement in corruption, clientelism and organized crime. In the conclusions drawn by the report, the case is put forward for an integrated strategy for containing violence, aimed not only at all the components of the security sector, but also conceived in both the long and medium term, and at both the economic and political level. At the level of economic enabling structures the report recommends strengthening the middle class and the production of capital goods, so that labour is encouraged instead of criminality, and in the medium term a new kind of conditionality which incites the oligarchy to redirect its rents from the speculative finance sector to that of the production of capital goods. At the level of political enabling structures, inclusion by means of elections should be called for. At the level of preventive structures, focus should be directed at developing an integral security concept and supporting the criminal investigation department and the public prosecutor’s office. At the same time, support must be given to those calling for and those practising the rule of law. The report ends with the hypothesis, explosive in terms of development and peace policy, that it is a mistake to believe that poverty must first of all be tackled so as automatically to bring about the containment of violence as a by-product. Not only war and terrorism, but also violent crime generate extremely high levels of violence and can become a security risk well beyond continental boundaries. Details: Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2008 46p. Source: Internet Resource: PRIF Reports No. 83: Accessed July 1, 2013 at: http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/prif83.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Honduras Keywords: Homicides Shelf Number: 129231 |
Author: Harvey, Rachel Title: From Paper to Practice: An Analysis of the Juvenile Justice System in Honduras Summary: This paper analyses the laws, policies and practice in Honduras for dealing with children in conflict with the law in light of International Minimum Juvenile Justice Standards and Norms. After significant reforms, the juvenile justice system in Honduras seems to uphold these standards. Criminal justice legislation, which has been adopted in the last 10 years to remedy the deficiencies of the old system, largely embraces fundamental human rights and bestows upon children who are in conflict with the law rights that are specific to them. However, when we look beyond the legislation to practice, we find a system that does not consistently uphold the rights that are enshrined in domestic law let alone international minimum juvenile justice standards and norms. Instead we find a system that is hampered and sometimes crippled by a lack of resources, resulting in violations of children’s rights. A lack of political will to address the shortcomings of the juvenile justice system compounds the situation. The focus of the Maduro Government has been the fight against crime, and in particular, the fight against gangs. Four years of a zero tolerance approach has succeeded in reducing the incidents of some types of crimes, however the root causes of offending have been largely neglected. Where efforts have been made to develop prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, there has been a preoccupation by the State, as well as the NGO sector, with gangs. Such an approach has left limited provision for young offenders, many of whom are locked up for long periods in inhuman conditions without adequate programmes of rehabilitation. Coupled with an absence of reintegration programmes, these young people are highly vulnerable to reoffending on release. While communities may be persuaded to feel safer due to the zero tolerance campaign, the reality is that, at best, the problem of delinquency is simply being delayed and contained for a short number of years. The failure of successive governments to transfer not only international law, but also the standards enshrined in domestic legislation from paper to practice is a grave disservice to both the young people caught in the criminal justice system and to the communities that the State is aiming to protect from crime. The State must act, as a matter of urgency, to address the shortcomings of the juvenile justice system and provide adequate prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes not only to implement children’s rights but to impact upon delinquency in the long term. Details: Colchester, UK: University of Essex, Children’s Legal Centre, 2005. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2013 at: http://www.streetchildren.org.uk/_uploads/Publications/4.From_Paper_to_Practice.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Honduras Keywords: Juvenile Delinquents Shelf Number: 129543 |
Author: World Bank. Education Research Resilience Approaches Team Title: A school snapshot amidst urban violence : what can be learned from a resilience rapid assessment -Honduras: Education Resilience Case Report Summary: This country report and the data presented herein are a product of the piloting of the RES-360 tool in Honduras. First, national level data was collected from government strategic plans, focus groups with Ministry of Education leadership, and secondary sources such as national studies on youth violence. Next, focus groups were conducted with teachers, parents, and students from two selected schools in low income neighborhoods affected by violence in the capital, Tegucigalpa Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://wbgfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc/Background/EDR/Honduras_Case_Report%20.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras Keywords: Delinquency Prevention Shelf Number: 132199 |
Author: Sanchez, Arabeska Title: Firearms and Violence in Honduras Summary: More than 42,000 people have been violently killed in Honduras over the past nine years. In 80 per cent of cases the weapon used was a firearm. To explain this, analysts and the media point randomly to the political instability and polarization of the country, the level of corruption in the police and state institutions, and the climate of terror created by gangs and organized crime. Comprehensive solutions based on solid empirical evidence, however, are not yet available. This Research Note is based on a scoping assessment of armed violence in Honduras. It summarizes and briefly unpacks specific characteristics of armed violence in the country and explores some of the key questions that need to be asked. As such, it provides a basis on which work and research can draw to design responses to Honduras's challenges by answering the following questions: What kind of knowledge is needed to tackle the spiralling violence in Honduras? How can actors be mobilized more effectively to influence policy responses to violence? Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Notes No. 39: Accessed May 12, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-39.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras Keywords: Crime Statistics Shelf Number: 132338 |
Author: Berg, Louis-Alexandre Title: Crime, Violence and Community-Based Prevention in Honduras Summary: Violent crime has emerged as a growing development challenge, affecting large segments of societies and taking a severe toll on economic development. In Honduras, the most violent country in the world as measured by its homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013, variations in the level of violence across time and space suggest that some communities have successfully prevented crime. This note summarizes the findings of a study of crime dynamics and prevention practices in Honduras. The research revealed that while the transnational drug trade, economic downturn and political crisis have deepened the effects of organized crime, some communities have prevented these forces from taking root in their neighborhoods. The study identified practices that communities have pursued to prevent violence, and examined the capabilities of communities, municipal governments and national institutions that enable or constrain these responses. In the context of the World Banks Safer Municipalities Project in Honduras, this research points to evidence-based approaches for preventing violence at the community level. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Just Development, Issue 4: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:23587510~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:1974062~isCURL:Y,00.html Year: 2014 Country: Honduras Keywords: Crime Prevention Shelf Number: 132574 |
Author: Owens, Kaitlin Title: Honduras: Journalism in the Shadow of Impunity Summary: This report examines the surge in violence directed against journalists following the ouster of President Jose Manuel Zelaya in June 2009. Since then at least 32 Honduran journalists have been killed and many more continue to work in a climate of fear and self-censorship. Reporters who cover corruption and organized crime are routinely targeted for their work and attacked or killed with almost complete impunity. The sources of the violence against journalists are varied. Transnational drug cartels have infiltrated the country so effectively that the present crisis in Honduras cannot be understood in isolation from its Central American neighbours. That said, it is also clear that the absence of reliable institutions has allowed the violence to escalate far more rapidly than many anticipated. Much of the violence is produced by the state itself, perhaps most significantly by a corrupt police force. In a special report on police criminality in Honduras, the Tegucigalpa-based Violence Observatory (Observatorio de Violencia) found that between January 2011 and November 2012 police officers killed 149 civilians, approximately six per month. The taint of corruption and a culture of impunity have undermined trust among state agencies and public confidence in key institutions. Public distrust of the police is so great that crimes are rarely reported. Moreover, due to widespread corruption and inefficiency among the force, only an estimated 20 per cent of crime is reported, and of that less than four per cent gets investigated. According to the State's own statistics, less than one per cent of all crime in Honduras is subject to a police investigation. Procedural flaws are evident throughout the system. Police often say an investigation is underway when there is none; the office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights (Fiscala Especial de Derechos Humanos) does not have the jurisdiction to try those responsible for the murders of journalists, and lacks resources to conduct even the most basic investigations into other human rights violations. On the other hand, while some legal initiatives are under-resourced, there is also a proliferation of competing agencies that notionally address the same problem. This has created a situation in which institutional responsibility has been so widely diffused that no one is ultimately accountable for the high level of impunity. With current levels of funding, the office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights, which was nominally responsible for over 7,000 investigations in 2012, can only investigate a small percentage of these cases each year. While the office continues to operate with a serious shortage of funds, the Honduran state is able to argue that it has made progress in addressing human rights violations through the establishment of a Special Prosecutor for Human Rights. Given these crises, this report finds that the Honduran judiciary faces significant challenges in establishing an independent legal culture capable of ensuring accountability for human rights abuses. Furthermore, legal mechanisms to protect journalists are needlessly complicated and often confusing. Even international mechanisms such as the precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (iachr) are poorly understood by local police and, at least as currently implemented, offer little real protection. Deep divisions among the journalists themselves hinder the fight against impunity. A striking absence of camaraderie within the profession has impaired its ability to collaborate effectively in protesting violence against journalists and in promoting protection mechanisms. Mutual suspicion is evident in many journalists' scepticism towards the official Association of Journalists of Honduras (Colegio de Periodistas de Honduras - cph) - an institution that has noticeably failed in its legislative mandate to "promote solidarity and mutual assistance among the media." This failure has meant that there is no united front pressing for greater accountability and an end to the violence. The coup that unseated President Zelaya in 2009 brought these problems into the spotlight, but the roots of the crisis lie further back in Honduras' history, notably in its failure during the demilitarization process that began in the 1980s to hold those who had committed serious human rights violations accountable for their actions. A legacy of failed reforms left the state incapable of dealing with rights violations that took place during and after the 2009 coup. As a result, the recent wave of murderous violence has been met with a familiar mixture of inadequate resources, bureaucratic ineptitude, blame-shifting and denial. The coup interrupted the demilitarization of Honduras. One human rights worker we interviewed spoke of the return of a security-state mindset in which peaceful dissent is often met with reflexive violence. Others noted that the re-emergence of the security state had been justified - as in Colombia and Mexico - as an antidote to pervasive corruption and organized crime. But the real lesson to be drawn from the use of force to compensate for the failures of transitional justice is that state actors no longer need to fear being held to account for their actions. As Bertha Oliva, co-ordinator of the Committee of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (Comite de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras - cofadeh) put it: "When we allow impunity for human rights violations, we see the crimes of the past translated into the crimes of the future." Details: Toronto: PEN Canada; London: PEN International, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.pen-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Honduras-Journalism-in-the-Shadow-of-Impunity1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras Keywords: Drug Cartels Shelf Number: 132630 |
Author: Noriega, Roger F. Title: Honduras Under Siege Summary: As stepped-up counternarcotics policies in Colombia and Mexico have increased pressure on regional drug trafficking networks, organized crime syndicates have relocated operations to Central America, where law enforcement agencies and institutions are ill-equipped to withstand the onslaught. These multibillion-dollar gangs are making common cause with some local politicians who are following a playbook honed by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. The result in Venezuela was the birth of a narco-state, and similar dramas are playing out in Central America. Like Chavez, caudillos are using the democratic process to seek power, weaken institutions, and undermine the rule of law - generating turmoil that accommodates narco-trafficking. Making matters worse for Honduras is that left-wing activists abroad, in support of ousted president and Chavez acolyte Manuel Zelaya, are waging a very public campaign of outlandish claims seeking to block any US assistance to help the Honduran government resist the drug cartels. It is imperative that US policymakers vigorously support democracy, the rule of law, and antidrug programs in Honduras. Details: Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin American Outlook No. 3: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.aei.org/files/2013/09/30/-honduras-under-siege_090033609069.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras Keywords: Drug Cartels Shelf Number: 132883 |
Author: Barrick, Kelle Title: Assessing Crime, Resident Trust, and Police Effectiveness in Tegucigalpa, Honduras Summary: According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Central American countries are faced with some of the highest homicide rates in the world (UNODC, 2007). With more than 87 homicides per 100,000 residents, Honduras is one of the region's most violent countries (Arce, 2012). Honduras's proximity to Mexico makes it highly susceptible to the influences of transnational drug trafficking organizations. Recent enforcement efforts in Mexico have disrupted and displaced drug trafficking patterns and Honduras is increasingly being utilized as a transshipment point for Andean cocaine. According to recent estimates, 42% of all cocaine entering the United States first passes through Central America (INL, 2012). Youth street gangs and concentrated levels of poverty are also assumed to be at the center of the country's ongoing struggle with crime (UNODC, 2007; Seelke, 2011). Moreover, there is evidence that the problems associated with violent crime are increasing in Honduras. Whereas violent crime has decreased in Colombia, a country notorious for its violence, in recent years Honduras has experienced a significant increase in homicides and now has the highest per capita homicide rate in the world (U.S. Department of State, 2012). To assist Honduras in addressing these public safety and security issues, the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), has provided funding to establish a Model Precinct in Tegucigalpa's San Miguel Police District. A review of documents provided by INL indicates that as part of the Model Precinct initiative, INL is working with the Polica Nacional de Honduras (PNH) to create a higher level of integrity in the national police force by vetting police officers using background checks and polygraph testing. Police officers will also be trained in management practices, community policing, public relations, report taking, and tactical operations. In addition, police departments will be provided with a variety of equipment, including vehicles, office equipment, tactical and technological equipment, database systems, and street surveillance cameras. INL initiatives are also attempting to prevent and reduce participation in local gangs by providing school-aged children and youth with training in the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) programs. Collectively, these Model Precinct activities are intended to result in a number of benefits for the San Miguel target area in Tegucigalpa. These include reductions in crime and gang activity, enhanced crime fighting and crime prevention capabilities for the police, and improved community perceptions and trust of the police. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2013. 168p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://rti.org/pubs/hte024_baseline_english_final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras Keywords: Crime (Honduras) Shelf Number: 132905 |
Author: Main, Alexander Title: Still Waiting for Justice: An Assessment of the Honduran Public Ministry's Investigation of the May 11, 2012 Killings in Ahuas, Honduras Summary: On May 11, 2012, a joint Honduran and U.S. counternarcotics operation in the remote Ahuas municipality of northeastern Honduras resulted in the killing of four indigenous villagers with no apparent ties to drug trafficking. The four individuals - a 14-year-old boy, two women and a young man - were traveling in a small passenger boat when they were shot and killed by counternarcotics agents. Three other boat passengers were badly injured. According to Honduran authorities, the operation included 13 Honduran police agents, four State Department helicopters with mounted machine guns, eight U.S. government-contracted pilots and 10 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents. In February 2013, DEA spokeswoman Dawn Dearden stated that the Honduran investigation of the incident had "concluded that DEA agents did not fire a single round" and that "the conduct of DEA personnel was consistent with current DEA protocols, policies and procedures." Though 58 members of Congress recently requested a U.S. investigation of the Ahuas killings, a State Department spokesperson has said "there will be no separate investigation." In the following issue brief we take a look at how the Honduran Public Ministry's investigation of the incident was conducted and examine the report on the investigation that the Honduran Attorney General (Fiscal general in Spanish) submitted to the State Department. We find that both the investigation and report have serious flaws including major omissions of key testimony and forensic exams, a one-sided description and analysis of events, and "observations" (in lieu of conclusions) that aren't supported by the evidence that is cited. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research and Rights Action, 2013. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/honduras-ahuas-2013-04.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras Keywords: Drug Enforcement Shelf Number: 132907 |
Author: Carvajal, Roger A. Title: Violence in Honduras: An Analysis of the Failure in Public Security and the State's Response to Criminality Summary: The incidence of violence in Honduras currently is the highest in Honduran history. In 2014, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported the Honduras homicide rate, at 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, as the highest in the world for nations outside of war. It is the foundation of this thesis that the Honduran security collapse is due to unresolved internal factors - political, economic, and societal - as well as the influence of foreign factors and actors - the evolution of the global illicit trade. Two of the most important areas affecting public security in Honduras are the challenges posed by transnational organized crime and the relative weakness and fragility of the Honduran state to provide basic needs and security to the population. The emergence of criminal gangs and drug traffickers, and the government's security policies, are all factors that have worsened public security. The crime environment has overwhelmed the police, military, judicial system and overcrowded the prison system with mostly juvenile petty delinquents. Moreover, with a high impunity rate of nearly 95 percent for homicides, killing in Honduras has become an activity without consequences. The latest state's response is with re-militarization of security, highlighting the dilemma of the challenges of combatting internal violence and transnational organized crime in a weak state. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 10, 2014 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42596/14Jun_Carvajal_Roger.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Honduras Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 133901 |
Author: Haugaard, Lisa Title: Honduras: A Government Failing to Protect its People Summary: With a population of just over 8 million people, Honduras is home to some of the highest poverty rates in Latin America and most violent cities on earth. The deep roots of organized crime, government corruption and abuses by state forces, and impunity for criminals reverberate throughout the small Central American nation, where 97% of murders go unsolved. These factors have forced many Hondurans to flee towards the United States in hopes of finding an income, security and hope for the future. In response, the Obama Administration has proposed a $1 billion aid package to Central America, which Vice President Biden emphasized in his Central America visit last week. Last December, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWGEF) and Center for International Policy (CIP) traveled to Honduras for a first-hand look. What we found was a security situation in shambles and a country in dire need of reform. We have compiled our findings into this report which paints a picture of the most alarming issues facing Honduras today, including mass migration, the disturbing and highly visible militarization of law enforcement, grave threats against human rights defenders, and a lack of an effective and independent justice system. The report also examines the role U.S. assistance has played, and can play, in the plight of the Honduran people. In addition to describing the depth of the problem, the report points to the elements of a solution, including the development of a more effective, independent judiciary, and a thoroughly reformed civilian police force. The ultimate solution must include tackling the underlying issues of poverty and lack of education that help create an environment in which crime and violence flourish. But this requires what we did not see in Honduras - a government deeply committed to respect for human rights, with a vision of more broadly shared prosperity and a will to protect all Honduran citizens. The report concludes that carefully crafted international aid programs can help address these problems, but that, "political will from the Honduran government to protect and respect its citizenry must come first." Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2015. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Honduras-failing-to-protect-its-people.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Honduras Keywords: Crime (Honduras) Shelf Number: 135627 |
Author: Schunemann, Julia Title: Reform Without Ownership? Dilemmas in Supporting Security and Justice Sector Reform in Honduras Summary: Honduras simultaneously faces the recovery from a severe political crisis due to a coup d'etat in June 2009 as well as a sustained crisis of security and legitimacy. Since then, society has been ever more marked by polarisation and the political equilibrium is very fragile. Levels of violence are at an all-time high and organized crime, especially drug trafficking, is threatening the bases of state institutions and people's physical security. The country's socio-economic situation is dire and the global economic crisis has fuelled increasing levels of poverty and unemployment. Honduras' security and justice sector suffers from severe deficiencies. It remains largely inefficient and unable to safeguard security and the rule of law for its citizens. Criminal investigative units are plagued with serious problems of incompetence, corruption and progressive penetration by organised crime. The judiciary lacks independence and is subject to systematic political interference. Inter-institutional coordination is poor and flawed by a climate of mutual mistrust and rivalry over competencies. This report describes and analyses the EU's contribution to strengthening security and the rule of law in Honduras through a major security sector reform (SSR) programme earmarked with a budget of L44 million. The report underlines the crucial need for increased local ownership as a sine qua non condition if the EU's endeavours are to trigger sustainable institutional change and thus further human security in Honduras. The report also examines prospects for the creation of an international commission against impunity, following the example of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). The EU's Support Programme to the Security Sector (PASS) in Honduras meets local needs, is comprehensive in its approach and targeted at the relevant institutions. However, the current political climate of polarization and a government that is weak and lacking in legitimacy seriously compromises the programme's prospects for successful implementation. A solid political, legal and budgetary framework for reform is missing, as is local ownership. The EU and other donors eager to support security and justice sector reform in Honduras should use their joint weight to ensure basic conditions are met with regards to the political, legal and budgetary framework, thus preparing the ground for reasonable prospects for successful implementation and the sustainability of their activities. Details: Madrid: Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: IFP Security Cluster: Country Case Study: Honduras: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/020711honduras.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Honduras Keywords: Criminal Justice Reform Shelf Number: 136367 |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Gangs in Honduras Summary: In the last two decades, Honduras has seen a significant increase in gang membership, gang criminal activity, and gang-related violence. The uptick in violence has been particularly troubling. In 2014, Honduras was considered the most violent nation in the world that was not at war. Although high impunity rates and lack of reliable data make it difficult to assess how many of these murders are gang-related, it's clear that the gangs' use of violence -- against rivals, civilians, security forces and perceived transgressors within their own ranks -- has greatly contributed to these numbers. Among the areas hardest hit are the country's urban centers. Honduras' economic capital, San Pedro Sula, is, according to some, the world's most violent city, with a homicide rate of 142 for every 100,000 people. The political capital Tegucigalpa has a homicide rate of 81 per 100,000. The third largest city, La Ceiba, has a murder rate of 95 per 100,000. These are also the areas where the gangs, in particular the two most prominent, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and Barrio 18, have the greatest presence and influence. The emergence of hyper-violent street gangs happened relatively quickly in Honduras. In the late 1990s, following legislation in the United States that led to increased deportation of ex-convicts, numerous MS13 and Barrio 18 members arrived in the country. By the early 2000s, these two gangs, along with several local groups, had begun a bloody battle for territory -- and the extortion revenue and drug markets that goes with it -- that continues to this day. The government responded by passing so-called "iron fist" legislation and arresting thousands of suspected gang members. Instead of slowing the growth of gangs, however, the policy allowed them to consolidate their leadership within the prison system, expand their economic portfolios and make contact with other criminal organizations. This report covers the current state of gangs in Honduras. Specifically, it examines the history, geographic presence, structure and modus operandi of Barrio 18 and MS13 in the country. It also analyzes how the gangs may be developing into more sophisticated criminal organizations. It looks closely at examples that illustrate how some parts of these two gangs are winning the support of the local communities in which they operate. Finally, it gives an overview of some of the other street gangs operating in Honduras. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2015. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/HondurasGangs.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Honduras Keywords: Gang Violence Shelf Number: 137713 |
Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title: Situation of Human Rights in Honduras Summary: The report "Situation of Human Rights in Honduras", addresses the situation of human rights violations which result of high rates of violence, citizen insecurity and impunity. The report also provides recommendations in order to assist the State in strengthening its efforts to protect and guarantee human rights. The report indicates that the homicide rate in Honduras remains one of the highest in the region and the world, although the State reported numbers that indicate a decline in 2014. These levels of violence are a result of several factors, including the increased presence of organized crime and drug traffickers, an inadequate judicial response that fuels impunity, corruption, and high levels of poverty and inequality. "Violence and insecurity are serious problems that Honduran society faces with a major impact on the enjoyment and effective exercise of human rights in the country," said Commissioner Francisco Eguiguren, IACHR Rapporteur for Honduras. The report indicates that the high levels of violence faced by Honduran society have a particular impact on human rights defenders, indigenous peoples, women, children, adolescents and youth, LGBT persons, migrants, campesinos from the Bajo Aguan, journalists and media workers, and justice operators. The report also analyzes those still considered to be among the most serious problems that the Honduran prison system is facing. Official figures released in 2013 indicate that 80% of murders committed in Honduras go unpunished due to a lack of capacity of investigative bodies. During the visit, civil society organizations claimed that the prevailing levels of impunity in Honduras are even higher. Details: Washington, DC: IACHR, 2015. 230p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Honduras-en-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Honduras Keywords: Crime Rates Shelf Number: 138417 |
Author: Burt, Geoff Title: Deportation, Circular Migration and Organized Crime: Honduras Case Study Summary: This research report examines the impact of criminal deportation to Honduras on public safety in Canada. It focuses on two forms of transnational organized crime that provide potential, though distinct, connections between the two countries: the youth gangs known as the maras, and the more sophisticated transnational organized crime networks that oversee the hemispheric drug trade. In neither case does the evidence reveal direct links between criminal activity in Honduras and criminality in Canada. While criminal deportees from Canada may join local mara factions, they are unlikely to be recruited by the transnational networks that move drugs from South America into Canada. The relatively small numbers of criminal deportees from Canada, and the difficulty of returning once deported, further impede the development of such threats. As a result, the direct threat to Canadian public safety posed by offenders who have been deported to Honduras is minimal. The report additionally examines the pervasive violence and weak institutional context to which deportees return. The security and justice sectors of the Honduran government are clearly overwhelmed by the violent criminality afflicting the country, and suffer from serious corruption and dysfunction. Given the lack of targeted reintegration programs for criminal returnees, deportation from Canada and the United States likely exacerbates the country's insecurity. The report concludes with a number of possible policy recommendations by which Canada can reduce the harm that criminal deportation poses to Honduras, and strengthen state institutions so that they can prevent the presently insignificant threats posed to Canada by Honduran crime from growing in the future. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report: 2016-R006: Accessed May 4, 2016 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-r006/2016-r006-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Honduras Keywords: Deportation Shelf Number: 138914 |
Author: Cohan, Lorena M. Title: Honduras Cross-Sectoral Youth Violence Prevention Assessment: Final Report Summary: With 85.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012, Honduras has the highest homicide rate of any country in the world (IUDPAS, 2013a), making crime and violence one of the most complex challenges currently facing the Government of Honduras (GoH), as well as a key priority for USAID Honduras. Violence in Honduras predominantly affects male youth from poor urban areas, with 65 percent of homicides in Honduras occurring in 5 percent of municipalities and the vast majority of homicide victims being males (94 percent) - in particular male youth between 15 and 34 years of age (63 percent) (Observatorio de la Violencia, 2012). This report addresses the violence issue in Honduras by presenting key findings and recommendations from the Honduras Cross-Sectoral Youth Violence Prevention Assessment, carried out by Education Development Center, Inc. (EDC) in response to a request by USAID/Honduras within the context of the METAS Project. The ultimate objective of this assessment was to identify strategies to reduce youth violence in order to inform the future youth violence prevention strategy of USAID/Honduras and other stakeholders. METAS conducted the assessment between February and May 2013 to examine the causes and extent of youth violence in Honduras. This report presents information about the assessment; an understanding of the social context in which this work must be developed; findings, analysis, and a synthesis of programming recommendations derived from that analysis, along with extensive annex documents. The following objectives guided the research questions of the assessment: Objective 1: To develop a comprehensive understanding of the at-risk youth population in Honduras. Objective 2: To develop a comprehensive understanding of youth crime and violence in urban areas. Objective 3:hTo identify multi-sectoral strategic investment options for USAID that address contextual youth challenges within the parameters of the Central American Security Initiative, Goal 3 of USAID's Global Education Strategy. To identify the most promising youth violence prevention strategies, METAS' assessment team examined youth aspirations and assets; challenges faced by youth within at-risk communities to ascertain how these communities either support or impede youth aspirations and ways in which programs might build on such assets or address the challenges; potential modifications that could be made to existing youth programming; and recommendations for future programs that could potentially reduce youth violence. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013. 305p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2016 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K2H3.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras Keywords: At-risk Youth Shelf Number: 139795 |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Honduras Elites and Organized Crime Summary: Honduras is currently one of the most violent countries on the planet that is not at war. The violence is carried out by transnational criminal organizations, local drug trafficking groups, gangs and corrupt security forces, among other actors. Violence is the focal point for the international aid organizations, governments and multilaterals providing Honduras with assistance, and it is the central theme of media coverage inside and outside of of the country. There are good reasons for this focus. Violence disproportionately impacts people in poor and marginal areas and tends to remain concentrated in those communities, closing the circle on a vicious cycle that impoverished nations find hard to break. In addition, violence impedes economic development and disrupts lives across a wide socio-economic spectrum. It can lead to major demographic shifts and crises as large populations move to urban areas or try to migrate to other nations. It can undermine governance and democracy, and it can serve as a justification for repression and hardline security policies that divert resources away from much-needed social and economic programs, thus perpetuating the problem. Organized crime plays a role in this violence, but it is more like the gasoline than the engine: it provides an already corrupt system with the fuel it needs to run. That corrupt system is the focus of this study on Honduras. Its most visible manifestation is an inept and criminalized police force that a former security minister once called "air traffic control men" for drug flights coming into the country. Parts of this police force also work as custodians and assassins for criminal groups; rob drugs and resell them to the underworld; and, for a price, they can attack client's rivals and disrupt criminal investigations. But beneath this most obvious form of criminal connection to state officials is a more insidious brand of corruption. This is further from the headlines and much more difficult to tackle since it is embedded in the country's political, economic and social systems. It operates in a gray area, mixing legal and illegal entities, paper companies and campaign contributions, and sweeping its illicit acts under the rug using co-opted members of the justice system and security forces. What we are talking about, of course, is the elite connection to organized crime that this investigation exposes. The elites in Honduras are not like those in the rest of the region. The traditional, agro-export and industrial elites who rule in places like Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua are less prominent in Honduras, mostly because of the country's long history as an enclave economy dominated by multinational companies: the original Banana Republic. Instead, the country's most powerful economic elites have emerged from the service, banking, media, and telecommunications sectors. They are called transnational elites since many of them are first or second generation immigrants from the Middle East and Eastern Europe and depend on international business dealings to accumulate capital. Traditional, land-based elites are present in Honduras. But they have long been relegated to a second tier, forced to seek power through control of government posts, rather than using financial leverage. While the ruling elites in Honduras do not share the same origins or economic base as their counterparts elsewhere in the region, they do share their neighbors' penchant for employing the state for their own ends and systematically impoverishing it. Both the traditional and transnational elites have for years used the military and police to protect their personal land holdings and businesses. They have benefitted from the sale of public companies and lands, and they have enjoyed tax exonerations for their multitude of businesses. They have also pillaged its resources, and, as the government's importance to the economy has grown, relied on it to generate more capital. Their dependence on the state has opened the way for a third set of what we are calling bureaucratic elites, who have developed a power base of their own because of the government positions they occupy. Honduras, meanwhile, has become one of the poorest, most unequal and indebted countries in the world. Any attempts to change this system have been met with stern and often unified opposition from elites of all stripes. And attempts to exert more regulatory control over the activities of the elites are smothered before they begin. It is little surprise then that the country offers criminals, large and small, one of the most propitious environments from which to work. On one side, an ineffective justice system and corrupt security forces, long exploited by these elites, opens the way for large criminal groups to operate with impunity. On the other side, an impoverished populace - which sees and understands exactly how elites abuse a broken system - seeks to get its share by working directly with criminals in the illegal and legal enterprises these criminals operate. Crime, as it turns out, is one of the few forms of social mobility. It is within this gray area that the elites themselves also interact with organized crime. Far from being distant from illegal activities, the elites have long operated in this realm. From dealing in contraband goods and services to buying permission for their illegal dealings and "get-out-of-jail-free cards," those who do politics or business in Honduras understand that the laws governing the nation of eight million people are but a means to make money. Their connection to the underworld therefore is about societal, commercial and political interactions in the multiple spaces where business and politics happen in Honduras. The result is an organic relationship with organized crime that helps some elites reach the top and others stay there. Details: InsightCrime.org, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Honduras_Elites_Organized_Crime Year: 2016 Country: Honduras Keywords: Contraband Boods Shelf Number: 140111 |
Author: Korthuis, Aaron Title: The Central America Regional Security Initiative in Honduras Summary: In November 2013, Hondurans headed to the election polls for a second time since the 2009 coup d'etat that destabilized the country and left unchecked a problem that the country has long failed to address: violence and organized crime. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) latest homicide report, Honduras continues to struggle with the highest homicide rate in the world. The seriousness of the security situation has provoked travel warnings from the U.S. Department of State and infamy in the international press tied to the violence experienced in Honduran cities and the abuses perpetuated by state security forces. Over the past decade, drug trafficking through the country has surged, making it the "favoured northbound route for cocaine from South America" for many years. Given the country's historically weak law enforcement institutions, persistent problems with corruption, and poverty, as well as a continued U.S. appetite for cocaine, these problems are hardly a novelty - and present grave problems for the country's leaders. Unsurprisingly then, this problem was consistently featured in the leading presidential candidates' discourse and public debate, and was undoubtedly a major factor in the final outcome. National Party candidate and eventual victor, Juan Orlando Hernandez, called for a heavy-handed approach to security that relied on a newly created military police, while LIBRE candidate Xiomara Castr's voice resounded on public airwaves calling for Honduran soldiers to return to their barracks and their traditional role. These starkly divergent views stem from a Honduran population tired of years of violence, organized criminal activity, declining security, and increasingly accustomed to the military's involvement in traditional policing. Alarmingly, only 27 percent of Hondurans expressed any confidence in the civilian police in August 2013, while 73 percent disagreed with the idea that the military should remain in the barracks (and by extension, presumably refrain from involvement in policing efforts). Efforts to address burgeoning organized crime and violence and instigate reform of Honduras' security and justice institutions have consumed the country over the past few years and feature prominently in President Hernndezs plans. Yet, at best, these efforts have produced mixed results, and at worst have resulted in a depressingly stagnant landscape. The United States, through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), seeks to strengthen and improve Honduran initiatives through law enforcement cooperation, capacity building, and prevention programs. These programs persist amidst Honduras' difficult political environment and staggering problems, and success remains isolated, although hope remains that reform may finally gain momentum. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2014. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Honduras.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 144861 |
Author: Ransford, Charles Title: Report on the Cure Violence Model Adaptation in San Pedro Sula, Honduras Summary: San Pedro Sula, Honduras has had the highest levels of killing of any city around the world for several years. Violence in San Pedro is multi-faceted and has become normalized by those forced to live with it. The Cure Violence model to stopping violence is an epidemic control model that reduces violence by changing norms and behaviors and has been proven effective in the community setting. In 2012, Cure Violence conducted an extensive assessment of the violence in several potential program zones in San Pedro Sula and in April 2013 began implementing an adapted version of the model. In 2014, the first three zones implementing the model experienced a 73% reduction in shootings and killings compared to the same 9-month period in 2013. In the first 5 months of 2015, five program zones experienced an 88% reduction in shootings and killing, including one site that went 17 months without any shootings. Details: Chicago: Cure Violence, University of Illinois at Chicago, School of Public Health, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2016 at: http://cureviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Report-on-the-Cure-Violence-Adaptation-in-San-Pedro-Sul.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Honduras Keywords: Cure Violence Model Shelf Number: 140860 |
Author: Nowak, Matthias Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Honduras Summary: With 64 violent deaths per 100,000 people in 2015, Honduras is among the most violent countries in the world (Widmer and Pavesi, 2016a; 2016b). In the last five years, 81 per cent of homicides were committed with small arms, often in the gang and drug-related violence plaguing the country. With the costs of firearm-related deaths and injuries estimated at more than 3 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product in 2013 (Flores, 2016, p. 6), addressing illicit small arms flows is critical to improving Honduras's security and development prospects. In recent years, illicit arms flows have gained significant attention at the global level, culminating in September 2015 with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, more specifically, SDG Target 16.4, which commits states to 'significantly reduce illicit . . . arms flows' by 2030 (UNGA, 2015). As the Survey has pointed out, the UN’s proposed indicator for measuring progress towards achieving this target—Indicator 16.4.21 —can be complemented with a range of additional indicators (De Martino and Atwood, 2015). This Research Note —the second in a series of four on measuring illicit arms flows in selected countries—examines the challenges of monitoring illicit small arms flows in Honduras. After reviewing the main known sources of illicit arms in the country, it discusses three indicators that are relevant to illicit arms flows: firearms seizures, small arms prices on illicit markets, and firearms homicides. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Notes. no. 62: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-62.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Honduras Keywords: Drug-Related Violence Shelf Number: 140469 |
Author: Global Witness Title: Honduras: The Deadliest Place to Defend the Planet Summary: Sandwiched between Guatemala and Nicaragua on the Caribbean coast, Honduras is blanketed in forest and rich in valuable minerals. But the proceeds of this natural wealth are enjoyed by a very small section of society. Honduras has the highest levels of inequality in the whole of Latin America, with around six out of ten households in rural areas living in extreme poverty, on less than US$2.50 per day. This report documents shocking levels of violence and intimidation suffered by rural communities for taking a stand against the imposition of dams, mines, logging or agriculture on their land – projects that are controlled by rich and powerful elites, among them members of the political class. The root causes of these abuses are widespread corruption and the failure to properly consult those affected by these projects. Details: Global Witness, 2017. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/honduras-deadliest-country-world-environmental-activism/ Year: 2017 Country: Honduras Keywords: Environmental Crimes Shelf Number: 146985 |
Author: Global Witness Title: How many more? 2014's deadly environment: the killing and intimidation of environmental and land activists, with a spotlight on Honduras Summary: Each week at least two people are being killed for taking a stand against environmental destruction. Some are shot by police during protests, others gunned down by hired assassins. As companies go in search of new land to exploit, increasingly people are paying the ultimate price for standing in their way. We found that at least 116 environmental activists were murdered in 2014 - that's almost double the number of journalists killed in the same period. A shocking 40 % of victims were indigenous, with most people dying amid disputes over hydropower, mining and agri-business. Nearly three-quarters of the deaths we found information on were in Central and South America. Globally, it's likely that the true death toll is higher. Many of the murders we know about occurred in remote villages or deep within the jungle, where communities lack access to communications and the media. It's likely many more killings are escaping public records. Details: London: Global Witness, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2017 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/how-many-more/ Year: 2015 Country: Honduras Keywords: Environmental Crime Shelf Number: 145397 |
Author: Chayes, Sarah Title: When Corruption is the Operating System: The Case of Honduras Summary: In some five dozen countries worldwide, corruption can no longer be understood as merely the iniquitous doings of individuals. Rather, it is the operating system of sophisticated networks that cross sectoral and national boundaries in their drive to maximize returns for their members. Honduras offers a prime example of such intertwined, or "integrated," transnational kleptocratic networks. This case thus illustrates core features of the way apparently open or chaotic economies are in reality structured worldwide - and some of the dynamics that are driving climate change, persistent inequality, and spiraling conflict. THE HONDURAN KLEPTOCRATIC OS IN ACTION - In this example, the three interlocking spheres are roughly co-equal in psychological impact if not in amounts of captured revenue. They retain a degree of autonomy, and are often disrupted by internal rivalry. - This system's operations devastate the environment-though Honduras is not a "resource" country. Most threats to biodiversity derive from deliberate "development" policies-whose primary purpose is actually to funnel rents to network members. - Modern renewable energy, as well as hydropower, is captured by the network. The migrant crisis is also fueled by this brand of corruption. - Repression is carefully targeted for maximum psychological effect. An example was the March 2016 assassination of environmental and social justice activist Berta Caceres, which reverberated through like-minded communities. _ The kleptocracy benefits from significant external reinforcement, witting or unwitting, including not just military assistance, but much international development financing. A DIFFERENT "CHIP" - The first step to disabling the kleptocratic OS is to acknowledge it, and outsiders' role reinforcing it. Western policymakers should invest in the candid study of these networks and to corruption as an intentional operating system, and evaluate whether their inputs are, on balance, enabling or challenging these structures. - Environmental protection is part of an awakening indigenous worldview that provides an integrated, positive vision many find worth fighting for. Community groups are establishing their own networks, in which cultural and environmental revival is linked to labor and land rights and autonomous education. But these groups receive proportionately little support from donor governments and institutions. - Community-supported alternative development models exist. Members of such organizations-who have faced death to combat network-controlled dams-readily identify micro-dams that meet their approval. They have helped design and construct some; others contribute to local well-being. Development implementers should study such projects and apply their principles. - Lessons from Honduras are applicable worldwide. Engaged Honduran community groups have valuable insights not just into how development assistance can produce better results in Honduras, but into ways the West might retool its economy to reduce inequality while preserving and cultivating natural resources. Details: Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. 174p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Chayes_Corruption_Final_updated.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Honduras Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 146322 |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Firearms Trafficking in Honduras Summary: Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, and some 75 percent of these homicides are committed using guns. The world average is closer to 50 percent. Honduras is not alone in the region. Just over 60 percent of El Salvador"s homicides and 81 percent of homicides in Guatemala - Honduras' Northern Triangle neighbors - involve firearms. The circulation of guns does not necessarily lead to high homicides in all cases. Nicaragua has an abundance of weapons in circulation, but a homicide rate that is just one-sixth that of Honduras. However, in a country where organized crime and gangs are rampant and security forces are regularly accused of corruption, the availability of weapons certainly facilitates violence. This report attempts to track the sources of the weapons that are behind these homicides and that have made organized criminal groups and gangs such formidable forces in Honduras. It does this using various methods. First, it draws from the best information available on gun seizures in the country. This gave us an understanding of what types of weapons are in circulation in the black market, where they come from, and who is circulating them. Second, InSight Crime and our partner organization on this project, the Association for a More Just Society (Asociacion para una Sociedad mas Justa - ASJ) visited and interviewed representatives of the Honduran institutions responsible for procuring and selling weapons to the public, and managing the country's gun registry for civilians. This allowed us to assess the regulatory system and its ability to monitor the dynamics of the black market. Third, InSight Crime and ASJ interviewed various people who have taken part in the movement of illegal weapons and munitions. The cases they describe are illustrative of larger trends with regards to the illegal weapons trade in Honduras and the Northern Triangle as a whole. Fourth, InSight Crime and ASJ consulted with numerous Honduran and foreign officials, as well as civil society experts, who track the illegal weapons trade. These experts helped point us in the right direction in terms of trends and theories regarding the trade. Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2017. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 30, 2017 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2017/Firearms-Trafficking-Honduras.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Honduras Keywords: Firearms Trafficking Shelf Number: 146946 |
Author: Perez, Orlando J. Title: Crime Diminishes Political Support and Democratic Attitudes in Honduras Summary: Main Findings: Crime victimization is associated with lower presidential approval, and with less support for the political system There is no association between political support and levels of insecurity in Honduras Both crime victims and non‐victims, and those who feel insecure and secure, are just as likely to say that they support democracy as the best form of government However, victims of crime are more likely to say that a coup is justified in the case of high crime than non‐victims Details: Nashville, TN: Latin America Public Opinion Project, 2015. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: AmericasBarometer Insights: 2015 Number 125: 2015. Accessed February 22, 2018 at: https://dokupdf.com/queue/crime-diminishes-political-support-and-democratic-attitudes-in-honduras-_5a0278cfd64ab2b9bdbf779e_pdf?queue_id=-1 Year: 2015 Country: Honduras Keywords: Criminal Victimization Shelf Number: 149223 |
Author: Leidland, Elisabeth Title: Staying Alive: Understanding Violent Life Choices of the 'Pesetas' in Honduras Summary: Since the gang culture emerged in Honduras more than two decades ago, the official discourse has hold marginalized youth and gang members responsible for the prevalence of violence in the Honduran society. The portrayal of them as the main perpetrators of violence have led them to become the prime targets of repressive security measures, and ultimately allowed for their lived realities of victimization to be omitted from the official discourse, while the lived realities of the former gang members, the pesetas, have been silenced all together. This thesis goes beyond the general perception and examines the lived realities of marginalized youth, gang members, and pesetas. It shows how they in the course of their lifetime move along a continuum of violence, constantly shifting between being victims and perpetrators of violence. The study uses the concepts of 'dehumanization' and 'social death' to show how the structural constraints of having limited opportunities of a worthy life, and not being recognized as fully human affect the marginalized youth' choice to take a violent life chance. It reveals the interplay between their structural suffering and victimization, and their active choice to resist oppression and to claim a position and a voice in the society. This study shows that violence is an important characteristic in the construction of subjectivity, and the main mechanism to reclaim a sense of humanness and respect for marginalized youth. Furthermore, it illustrates how joining a gang can be an active choice to stay alive socially and physically by escaping social marginalization and family negligence, in addition to generating a meaningful life. As gang members, however, they are still as much subjected to being victims as perpetrators of violence, and while they are able to reclaim a sense of humanness, they continue to be dehumanized. Lastly, the study reveals that becoming a peseta is to return to the path of social death characterized by insecurity, marginality, and exclusion. Even when the pesetas have a desire to change, they are often forced to reenter the violent life as a mean to survive. The marginalized youth, gang members, and pesetas continuously move between a violent life chance and the social death in a constant struggle to stay alive. Details: As, NO: Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2016. 150p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2421717/Leidland_MDS_2016.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2016 Country: Honduras Keywords: Gang Violence Shelf Number: 150743 |
Author: CONAPREV Title: Diagnostico del Sistema Pentienciario en Honduras Summary: Security, respect for human rights and the delivery of justice are issues of particular concern currently in Honduras in the area penitentiary. Social exclusion, inequality and inequality are historical factors that explain the collapse of the system and the serious human rights violations that they are committed against those who are deprived of their liberty. The present diagnosis is made within the framework of the need that the Committee has National Prevention of Torture CONAPREV, the executing organ of the Mechanism National Institute for the Prevention of Torture (NPM, by Decree No. 136-2008), to update the knowledge of the penitentiary reality. For this, he hires the services professionals of an interdisciplinary team that deals with carrying out a process that Allow to achieve this purpose. The diagnosis was developed during the second semester of year 2011, realizing visits to 13 prisons, 2 psychiatric hospitals, 2 detention centers for minors, 1 care center for children at social risk and 2 detention centers with the purpose of interviewing the key actors and actors and knowing In addition, the space in which those deprived of liberty live. The consultant team appreciates the valuable collaboration of the different institutions participants in the whole process of this consultancy, as well as its implication and commitment in the creation of this diagnosis which has as its sole purpose to give know the findings and above all create recommendations with the purpose of advancing in a coordinated manner with other institutions in the search for human alternatives that contribute to diminish the condition of vulnerability in which the great majority of persons deprived of liberty. Details: Comite Nacional de Prevencion Contra la Tortura, Tratos Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2018 at: http://relapt.usta.edu.co/images/CONAPREV-Diagnostico-del-Sistema-Penitenciario-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Honduras Keywords: Correctional Institutions Shelf Number: 150829 |
Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title: Informe de la Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: sobre la situacion de las personas privadas de libertad en Honduras Summary: On February 14, 2012, it took place in the National Penitentiary of Comayagua a fire in which 362 people died and destroyed half from the cells of that penal establishment, a real tragedy of huge proportions. However, this is not an unpublished fact in Honduras, in May 2004, 107 inmates died due to a fire in the cell or bartoline No. 19 of the National Penitentiary of San Pedro Sula. These facts, in which less than a decade have lost 469 people who were in State custody, occur in the general context of a system penitentiary collapsed, which presents serious structural deficiencies and in which The fundamental rights of prisoners are systematically violated. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2013. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2018 at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/ppl/docs/pdf/honduras-ppl-2013esp.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras Keywords: Correctional Institutions Shelf Number: 150830 |
Author: Global Witness Title: Illegal Logging in the Rio Platano Biosphere: A Farce in Three Acts Summary: Honduras, a country rich in natural resources and cultural diversity, struggles against poverty and environmental degradation: it is the third poorest country in Latin America and the second poorest in Central America. Poverty is much more acute in a rural context, so forested areas largely coincide with the poorest ones. The country is well suited to forestry practices, and 41.5 percent of its territory is currently covered with forests. However, decades of agricultural colonisation and the expansion of cattle ranching have resulted in extensive deforestation and related environmental degradation, most notably the deterioration of water resources and soil erosion. In a country that is prone to hurricanes and flooding, environmental degradation worsens the impact of these natural disasters. Severe governance failure in the Honduran forest sector is threatening the country's largest protected area, the UNESCO-accredited Man and the Biosphere Reserve of Rio Platano (hereafter the Rio Platano Biosphere), and the people living in and around it. Corruption at the highest level and a complete lack of accountability have led to environmental destruction and undermined the rights of local people and their efforts towards sustainable forestry. This report makes the case for greater national and international efforts to strengthen forest governance and the rule of law. It is based on Global Witness' on-the-ground research, interviews with key actors and a review of existing official documents and other sources of information. It aims to: (i) document, expose and analyse this case, (ii) identify lessons that can be learned in Honduras and elsewhere and (iii) present a series of recommendations for the various parties involved, in particular the Institute of Forest Conservation and Development (ICF), which is the new Honduran forest authority created by the Forest Law approved on 13 September 2007. The Rio Platano Biosphere has a long history of illegal logging. This report, however, focuses on one particular case: the legalisation of so-called 'abandoned' timber in 2006-2007, and its links to state mismanagement. It illustrates how illegal logging is often not only tolerated, but also promoted, by the authorities in charge. As this report will describe in more detail: - In his inauguration speech on 27 January 2006, President Zelaya committed to eradicating illegal logging in the country, but just a few months later the Honduran forest authority at the time (AFECOHDEFOR) implemented a policy that achieved the opposite: it approved regulatory procedures to effectively legalise illegally-logged mahogany, and did so contravening the law and without any consultation or independent oversight. The implementation of these resolutions spurred a race to illegally log the Rio Platano Biosphere. - The policy was part of a carefully designed plan to launder illegal timber from the most important protected area in the country. - Two months later, the regulatory procedures were suspended as a result of pressure from civil society and an investigation carried out by the Special Environmental Public Prosecutor (FEMA). However, there remained a strong determination to legalise this timber and a new, more sophisticated plan, was rolled out. This included the establishment of contracts with local cooperatives and the subsequent auction of the timber so that the people who financed the illegal logging were able to buy that same timber, now apparently legal. - As a result, as much as 8,000 cubic metres of mahogany were illegally felled. More than 14.7 million lempiras (approximately USD$780,000) of public funds were indirectly delivered to well-known illegal timber traffickers. - Cooperatives at a local level suffered greatly from this experience. Illegal logging of mahogany decreased the value of their forests and jeopardised the opportunity to develop viable community forestry initiatives. Vested interests manipulated some of these organisations to launder illegal timber and in so doing undermined their credibility. The case presented here had dramatic consequences in the Honduran context. However, it should also be looked at within a broader context. What this report documents will unquestionably resonate in other areas around the world experiencing similar issues. What characterises such cases is the disparity between political rhetoric and the vested interests driving the actions of government institutions. Such poor governance goes unchecked in part due to the lack of a transparent and participatory process in the management of the forest resources. At a time when forests have taken centre stage in climate change negotiations, the need to tackle illegal logging and associated deforestation and degradation is more pressing than ever. Deforestation accounts for around 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions and addressing this problem is seen by many as the most cost effective way of reducing these harmful emissions. A post-Kyoto agreement could help to ensure that forests are left standing so that they can be used sustainably by the people living in and around them. Good governance in Honduras and elsewhere is an essential prerequisite for the protection and sustainable use of forests. This, coupled with addressing the drivers of deforestation and empowering forest dependent communities, should be the focus of any forest and climate strategy. Sustainable forest management could play a significant role in supporting the livelihoods of local populations and fighting poverty, while at the same time maintaining the ecological value of forests. Details: Washington, DC: Global Witness, 2009. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2018 at: file:///C:/Users/AuthUser/Downloads/illegal_logging_in_rio_platano_final_en_low_res.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Honduras Keywords: Abandoned Timber Shelf Number: 153347 |
Author: Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe Title: Crimen, Corrupcion y perdida del Monopolio de la Violencia en Honduras: Reflexiones y Apuntes de Viaje a San Pedro Sula, Choloma, El Progreso y la Ceiba (Crime, Corruption and loss of the Monopoly of Violence in Honduras: Reflections and Travel Notes to S Summary: During the period from May 21 to 30, 2017, I traveled with my colleague Eric Olson, associate director of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center, to the cities of San Pedro Sula, Choloma, El Progreso and La Ceiba to document the situation of violence and insecurity in these regions; analyze the operation of gangs and gangs, as well as their links to other criminal groups -including common crime and transnational organized crime; and evaluate the progress made in reducing violence by the authorities, as well as the role of civil society. For this, it was necessary to carry out an evaluation of the political, socioeconomic and general security situation in the country. Some of the cities visited are among the most violent, not only of Honduras, but of the entire Western Hemisphere. The high rates of homicide, extortion, drug trafficking and the control of a large part of the territory by the maras and gangs greatly hamper the harmonious development of the communities and constitute the main causes of internal forced displacement and the strong emigration towards other countries, especially the United States of America. As part of the visit, interviews were conducted with children, adolescents and young people at risk due to the presence of gangs and organized crime, government authorities and civil society organizations. We talked with members of the National Police; representatives of the judiciary; business leaders; volunteers and coordinators of community projects to prevent and eradicate violence; academics and specialists in issues of violence, security and organized crime; personnel working in prisons and individuals "deprived of liberty"; as well as with citizens who live and work in the aforementioned communities and who experience day by day the effects of insecurity, corruption, the absence of the rule of law and the concentration of public power. We visited two of the most violent regions of Honduras-and of our continent-located in the department of Corts: Choloma and the Rivera Hernndez sector in San Pedro Sula. Finally, a visit was made to the interior of the two penal centers of La Ceiba: the penal center in the English Quarter (for minor offenses) and the Penal Farm of El Porvenir. This report includes some reflections on the topics of our interest and is divided into two parts. The first part maintains a focus on children and youth, as well as efforts to prevent and reduce violence in high risk regions or strong presence of gangs and gangs. The second part analyzes fundamentally the issues of drug trafficking, corruption, the loss of the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and life in prisons. Both sections are developed in areas of high levels of insecurity, control of large territories by gangs and gangs, drug trafficking and lack of the rule of law. In the final part of the document the issues of migration, drugs and loss of control by the State are addressed, and finally a reflection is made on the problem that seems to be the main one in Honduras: the high levels of corruption in different areas of life in this country. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource (in Spanish): Accessed January 17, 2019 at: http://honduras-forum.ch/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/1706_informe_honduras_correa-cabrera_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Honduras Keywords: At-Risk Youth Shelf Number: 154210 |
Author: Dye, David R. Title: Police Reform in Honduras: The Role of the Special Purge and Transformation Commission Summary: On April 12, 2016, Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernandez swore in the members of the Special Commission for the Depuration (Purge) and Transformation of the Honduran National Police, whose mandate was to purge the Honduran National Police (HNP) force of corrupt and criminal elements. The appointment of the commission came a week after El Heraldo, a Honduran newspaper, published a report alleging that high-ranking officers of the HNP were implicated in the 2009 slaying of antidrug czar Arstides Gonzalez and the 2011 murder of Security Ministry adviser Alfredo Landaverde. Though the local news organization redacted the names of those presumed to be responsible for the killings, the New York Times soon made them public. They turned out to include five former directors-general of the HNP, three of whom supposedly participated directly in the crimes while the other two covered them up. Within a few weeks, at the Special Commission's behest, Honduras's security minister removed 6 of the 9 top-ranking figures in the HNP from their posts, followed shortly by 23 of 47 active duty police commissioners. This cleansing process (depuracion) would continue over the next two years, leading to the ouster of more than 5,000 total personnel from a police corps originally composed of an estimated 13,500 people. The scale of this purge - and the exit from the force of powerful officers regarded as notoriously corrupt and implicated in drug trafficking, money laundering, and murder - drew widespread international attention, including that of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which has three times invited the Special Commission's members to Washington to expound on their achievements and plans. In addition to presiding over the purge, the Special Commission has played an important role in a process of reforming and transforming the HNP. Although this role was not initially part of its mandate, the commission's efforts to clean house gave it political clout and the ability to newly energize reform efforts that had begun several years earlier but were making only fitful advances. Three years later, the conjoint result is that the HNP has a new leadership, organizational structure, and career pattern; its recruitment criteria have been stiffened; and police education is being revamped for the ostensible purpose of instilling an ethic of public service in the force. Culminating all the foregoing, the HNP is now committed to implementing a Honduran variant of community policing as its official model. For the HNP - a body that for years suffered opprobrium for illicit behavior and human rights violations on the part of some of its members, along with an abysmal drop in public confidence in its effectiveness and integrity - these developments are a surprising turn. Whether the HNP's reform can eventually be consolidated is a question that only the passage of time will answer. Generally speaking, fate has not been kind to police reform efforts in Latin America, many if not most of which have foundered due to the twists and turns of politics, resistance from within the police and other institutions, resource constraints, and other factors. There are no recipes for how to make police reform stick in difficult and hostile environments, of which Honduras is certainly one, and though reform has made some progress there, it is by no means irreversible. This Woodrow Wilson Center report examines the work of the Special Commission for the Depuration (Purge) and Transformation of the Honduran National Police, detailing its role, functioning, achievements, and shortcomings. It analyzes the commissions genesis and operation within three contexts. The first is a process of episodic reform of the police institution, which has been under way since 2013, and which has provided certain starting points for the commission's endeavors. The second is the development during the recent government of President Juan Orlando Hernandez of an overarching national and citizen-security apparatus, leading to the creation a national police model, of which the HNP is the largest but not the only component. The third is the president's overall political project, which has centered on a controversial reelection bid. These contexts are indispensable for understanding why the Special Commission was formed, who its members have been, how it has functioned, and the pattern of its successes and limitations. The legacy of the Special Commission, when its work concludes, will be variegated. In pushing reform forward, the commissioners have done more than their mandate originally stipulated, in part, because their mandate has been repeatedly extended by the Honduran legislature. These extensions have produced arguably positive results for the continuity of reform. However, the political and institutional dynamics in which the commission's members have found themselves enmeshed, while facilitating certain accomplishments, have also limited the impact of the commissions results. Their actions and a vigorous media presence have generated public expectations for their performance that have not all been able to be met, and criticisms from important sectors of society that cannot be ignored. By this point in the process, due to prior reform steps and the work of the Special Commission, the HNP arguably has the potential to develop into a democratic and professional police force. How much progress the institution makes along this road will depend on myriad factors, many of which are beyond the control of its leaders. By definition, the consolidation of a democratic police force in any country requires the surrounding political system to evolve a genuine separation and balancing of the state's powers, allowing the police institution to be subjected to the rule of law. The Honduran political system is evidently far from achieving this goal, and although it has recently been in flux, it does not exhibit a clear trend in that direction. For the time being, the question is whether the HNP can be consolidated as a reformed and professional police body. The answer will depend squarely on several key factors - the commitment of governmental and police leaders to continue developing the reforms made to date, restraint by those in power in using the reformed HNP for political purposes, the development of a strong and independent oversight mechanisms for the police, ongoing civil society involvement in overseeing the institution, and the continued support of international actors that have supported reform efforts in recent years. As this report shows, there are reasons to be both optimistic but also pessimistic about the ultimate fate of HNP reform. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2019. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed July 16, 2019 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lap_dye_police-english_final.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Honduras Keywords: Community Policing Shelf Number: 156908 |
Author: Martinez d'Aubuisson, Juan Jose Title: Where Chaos Reigns: Inside the Sula Prison Summary: In San Pedro Sula's jailhouse, chaos reigns. The inmates, trapped in their collective misery, battle for control over every inch of their tight quarters. Farm animals and guard dogs roam free and feed off scraps, which can include a human heart. Every day is visitors' day, and the economy bustles with everything from chicken stands to men who can build customized jail cells. Here you can find a party stocked with champagne and live music. But you can also find an inmate hacked to pieces. Those who guard these quarters are also those who get rich selling air-conditioned rooms, and those who pay the consequences if they get too greedy. That's how inmates live, on their own virtual island free from government interference, in the San Pedro Sula prison. Details: S.L.: InSight Crime, 2017. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2019 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/where-chaos-reigns-inside-the-san-pedro-sula-prison/ Year: 2017 Country: Honduras Keywords: Honduras Shelf Number: 156819 |