Centenial Celebration

Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.

Date: March 29, 2024 Fri

Time: 5:23 am

mali

Results for mali

89 total results found

23 non-duplicate results found.

Author: Sidibé, Kalilou

Title: Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Summary: The three principle and intertwining security threats in the North of Mali are trafficking (drugs, arms, cigarettes, cars, etc.), rebellious uprisings and terrorist activity. Any attempts at maintaining law and order are undermined by the fragility of state structures, and the lack of equipment and infrastructure for the armed forces. These threats also weaken the socioeconomic fabric of local communities and Malian national and territorial unity. The Malian government endeavours to address these challenges by adopting and implementing security and anti-terrorism policies, as well as social and economic development programmes. External partners support the Malian government in its efforts through a variety of joint anti-terrorism and development policies aiming to strengthen the state’s operational capacity in the region. Furthermore, local communities work alongside state actors in the development and securitisation of Northern Mali by employing traditional conflict-management mechanisms (intercommunity and interclan solidarity systems). This strategy builds strong links that considerably reduce the risk of open conflict and contributes to the establishment of a multilevel shared governance system.

Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2012. 108p.

Source: Internet Resource: Research Report Vol. 2012, No. 77: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Mali

Keywords: Anti-Terrorism Policies

Shelf Number: 126041


Author: Reitano, Tuesday

Title: Check Your Blind Spot: Confronting Criminal Spoilers in the Sahel

Summary: Western governments focus heavily on the presence of Islamist extremists in the Sahel and have provided technical assistance in an attempt to strengthen the capacity of the security sectors and justice systems in the countries of the region to hold them back. But the preoccupation with West Africa’s war on terror has meant that the destabilising impact of organised crime has been consistently underestimated, if not ignored altogether. As rebuilding begins in Mali, all signs point to the same oversight happening again. Organised crime is not the primary driver of the current conflict in Mali, but any effort to stabilise or resolve this conflict should explicitly take the presence of organised crime, illicit resource flows and criminal networks into account.

Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. 4p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 39: Accessed March 22, 2013 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No39Sahel_14Mar2013V2.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mali

Keywords: Criminal Networks

Shelf Number: 128073


Author: Sarrouh, Layal T.E.

Title: Where Are They?: The situation of children and armed conflict in Mali

Summary: Three months after the start of the current conflict in Mali, which began in January 2012, the non-state armed groups the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, with assistance from Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), captured the three northern regions in Mali: Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou. Ideological differences led to clashes amongst the four armed groups, and by July 2012, Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO were in control of most of the captured territory, and were enforcing their own severe interpretation of Sharia on the remaining population through threat of force. In December 2012, the United Nations (UN) Security Council authorized the establishment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to assist the Government of Mali reclaim control over its territory. However, on 10 January 2013, Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO began advancing south towards the capital, Bamako, prompting the launch of a French-led military intervention and the hurried deployment of AFISMA. As a result, the armed groups retreated into the surrounding areas and desert, shifting the conflict to asymmetric warfare. In late April 2013, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a UN-led peacekeeping force for Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), expected to begin 1 July 2013. The conflict has led to the displacement of nearly 475,000 Malians: 300,783 of them internally displaced. Given the dearth of information on the conflict’s effect on children, Watchlist undertook two missions to Mali in November-December 2012 and in February-March 2013, to research grave violations, notably: the recruitment or use of children, killing and maiming, attacks on schools, and rape and sexual violence; as well as the response in place to protect children. The title of the report, “Where are they?” refers to multiple layers of the findings: It asks where are the recruited children, many of whom seemingly disappeared with the retreat of the armed groups; it refers to the number of children against whom grave violations are being committed, unknown due to the lack of data and monitoring; and finally, it asks where is the international community, specifically the child protection actors with the expertise and knowledge for responding to conflicts of this nature. Where are they all?

Details: Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict, 2013. 58p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2013 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Watchlist%20Where%20are%20they.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mali

Keywords: Child Abuse and Neglect

Shelf Number: 129416


Author: Carvalho, Gustavo de

Title: Building the capacity of the Malian police. Why MINUSMA needs to think outside the box

Summary: The goals of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are to support the re-establishment of state authority throughout Mali and to stabilise key areas, especially in the north. Rebuilding the Malian security sector is one of the core pillars of the mission's mandate. However, the mission is rapidly falling out of favour with Malians, particularly due to its inability to deploy in the north of the country. This policy brief recommends how the capacity-building aspect of the police component of MINUSMA can be strengthened.

Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 8p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 69: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief69.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mali

Keywords: Police Reform

Shelf Number: 134227


Author: Reitano, Tuesday

Title: Fixing a fractured state? Breaking the cycles of crime, corruption and governance in Mali and the Sahel

Summary: The international community has reiterated its commitment to supporting the government to rebuild the fractured state of Mali. Despite formidable investments in sponsoring the electoral process, reinforcing the security sector and convening the ongoing peace process, the complex and interwoven challenges of chronic poverty, insurgencies, criminal economies, widespread corruption and impunity and extremist groups have created fissures in the state that are an increasing challenge to resolve. Within this environment, the requirements of international assistance have arguably failed to provide the right incentives to create the foundation for genuine democratic governance, investing in state institutions, promoting the rule of law and providing sustainable development across the population. Achieving this objective will require a far more nuanced and engaged response, which draws together political, security and development objectives in a holistic manner, targeted at insulating the democratic process both from criminal flows and clientalist politics. This report provides a thorough analysis of the antecedents of the crisis and charts the evolution of the political economy and ideologies driving illicit trade and instability. The report concludes by proposes a new conceptual framework for policy-makers seeking to strengthen the foundation of democracy and development in Mali.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2015. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Fixing%20a%20Fractured%20State%20-%20April%202015.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Mali

Keywords: Corruption

Shelf Number: 136027


Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Title: Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future

Summary: Stretched out along the Sahelian band are some of the poorest and most fragile countries on earth with human security challenges that transcend borders: climate change, regional food crises, rapid population growth, weak governments, endemic corruption, internal conflict and violent extremism. The Sahel has always been a land of commercial exchanges where communities depend on trade strategies with their closest neighbors for economic development and survival. Economies in the Sahel are quintessentially regional, with strong connections to markets both in sub-Saharan Africa to the south and North Africa to the north. Many populations in the Sahel rely on mobility as a livelihood strategy, forming the basis of both nomadic and pastoralist communities. Arms, consumer goods, and people flow freely due to weak state structures overlaid by closely connected communities and networks that span the area between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Long and porous borders, low population density, and the challenges of surveillance in this vast space have made the Sahel region vulnerable to organized crime and illicit trafficking. Land-locked at the heart of this zone of fragility is Mali, with the Sahelian band cutting across the middle of her territory. With an estimated population of 12.7 million, a life expectancy of 51 years, and a ranking on the Human Development Index of 182 out of 186,3 the citizens of the Malian state are some of the most vulnerable in the world. Illicit trafficking has defined the nature of the political crisis in Mali in the immediate past. Yet the nature of how trafficking interacted with local political, social and economic dynamics is poorly understood. A better comprehension of these dynamics is essential to designing an effective response to illicit trafficking and organized crime in the region. This paper relies on interviews with key protagonists and those involved in the illicit economy. Its goal is to review the evolution of illicit trafficking in Mali, from its trading roots to its current form today. In doing so, the study seeks to examine the way in which trafficking has entrenched itself into the Malian ethnography, and to understand the socio-cultural and economic dynamics driving and protecting the trade. In parallel, the paper attempts to understand the way in which the illicit economy has engaged with the political and state-building process, and to anticipate its likely impact in the current peacebuilding framework. Section II provides a brief contextual summary of recent political developments and the research methodology. Sections III and IV consider the evolution and impact of illicit trafficking in Mali on instability in greater detail. Section V proposes some recommendations on how to better respond to illicit trafficking within the framework of governance and development of Mali.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime, 2014. 26p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Organized%20Crime%20and%20Illicit%20Trafficking%20in%20Mali%20-%20Jan%202014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mali

Keywords: Criminal Networks

Shelf Number: 136075


Author: Briscoe, Ivan

Title: Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali

Summary: Mali's descent into a war of secession at the start of 2012 was a conflict foretold. Yet what followed proved radically distinct from the country's three previous episodes of insurgency in its vast, impoverished and arid north. Radical Islamists seized control of the main urban centres of northern Mali, displacing the Tuareg rebels with whom they had struck a working relationship. In the capital, Bamako, a military coup led by an unknown and low-ranking army captain overthrew a president who had been in power for a decade. An uneasy stand-off came into being: Mali's debilitated military guarded the frontiers to the south, while Islamist hardliners and criminals meted out their own version of sharia justice across the north. As is well known, the decomposition of Malian state authority was finally halted early in 2013. Faced with an Islamist advance to the south, French military forces embarked on a lightning intervention that scattered the extremists and reasserted control over the north. Since then, the pace of Mali's post-conflict recovery and stabilization has been astonishing: a UN peacekeeping mission and a host of bilateral and EU programmes have been put into place; a new president and a new National Assembly have been elected; peace talks with the more moderate armed groups, though stuttering, are under way. But as the national government and the international community leave behind the heat of the crisis, it is now incumbent on them to understand what caused such a perilous tailspin to start in Mali, so as to prevent it from reoccurring. As in other countries of West Africa and the Sahel, transnational organized crime has played a prominent role in the affairs of Mali over the past two decades, above all in the north. Drug trafficking, including large consignments of high-value cocaine from Latin America, as well as kidnapping rackets led by Islamist terror groups operating freely across the borders of the Sahel, are both widely regarded as playing key roles in fomenting the instability, unrest and violence that climaxed in 2012. However, the depiction of a crime-terror nexus in Mali, whereby criminal profits feed insurgent arms and recruitment, does not do justice to the multi-faceted role played by illicit activity across the country. This paper is an attempt to marshal all the available evidence, along with the insights provided by experts in Mali, so as to understand the relations that were forged prior to 2012 between criminal enterprises, communities, political and social elites, armed groups, the Malian state and neighbouring countries. On the basis of recent developments, the paper seeks to outline the likely adaptations that the main illicit networks will now make, and to draw out some recommendations as to how best to temper the criminality and violence that menace Mali's post-conflict transition. At the heart of this analysis is an account of how Mali was both the victim of the displacement of drug-trafficking routes and armed jihadist activity from other countries, and a deeply complicit partner in profiting from the incoming wave of illicit trade and Islamist terror. Behind this willing complicity lay the particular vulnerabilities of Malian state and society. Government in Bamako, the country's capital, had by 2006 replaced direct authority over the north with sporadic, ham-fisted interference. Chronic competition between the north's many ethnic, caste and clan groups offered numerous possibilities for the political elite in Bamako to find useful allies to do its bidding. However, these social fissures were also fodder for the designs of other, newer parties: nearby states such as Algeria and Libya, criminal organizations seeking to traffic drugs, and radical armed groups. The resulting transactions between supranational forces and local ethnic or tribal factions were to set Mali on the way to the fourth, and arguably the most threatening, insurgency of its post-colonial history. But Mali's war was not merely the product of radicalized and internationalized disaffection in the north. The conflict also threw a harsh light on the degradation of the state itself. A model for democratic virtue in Africa, half of whose budget was financed by foreign donors, Mali re-emerged after its coup as a state that had been afflicted by multiple vices. Illicit practices had become rampant across the public sector, corroding popular faith in politicians; Mali's celebrated elections had in fact received some of the lowest turnouts in the democratic world. Moreover, the day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism formed a permissive soil on which an all-powerful presidency could nurture the construction of a shadow state. The greatest drug trafficking scandal of Malian history, the Air Cocaine case of 2009, suggests that official complicity in the criminal business had penetrated the highest echelons of power. Mali has now set the course for a recovery of legitimate and accountable state authority. Its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has backed a clean sweep of the judicial system and a Truth Commission on violence in the north. Captain Sanogo, the coup leader, is in jail, along with his accomplices. Key Islamist leaders and narco-traffickers have been scattered or neutered, as have the masterminds of the shadow state. From the information available, it would seem that major illicit trafficking across the north has also diminished in scale. However, it is far too soon to proclaim an end to the crisis. Occasional terrorist attacks and ethnic skirmishes remain a constant headache for local people and UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the pre-war illicit networks are never far away: clearing corruption from the public sector is set to be a long and arduous haul, while illicit networks in political life are destined to regroup and reconfigure, as they have in many other criminalized environments, notably in Latin America. Nearby countries such as Niger and Libya have quickly emerged as staging posts in the Saharan and Sahelian criminal economy. As Mali negotiates its post-conflict recovery, the focus must be directed at ways to reduce the systemic threat from criminal business while avoiding the sorts of blind repressive policies that have engineered insurgencies in Afghanistan, or terrible bloodshed in Mexico. This paper outlines a number of approaches that should lie at the heart of such a balanced, conflict-sensitive strategy towards crime. A robust and inclusive political settlement for the north is critical, though for this to work attention must now focus on how decentralized or autonomous regional authorities can be supervised without the risk of meddling from Bamako. Provision of security and security reform must be imbued with realism as to what can be achieved with the institutions available, and should be shaped by an emphasis on intelligence-led policing that seeks to sever the most dangerous criminal linkages to power-brokers. Counter-terrorism must also be wise to the intermediation of criminal figures, and to the armed networks that illicit businessmen have cultivated. And lastly, it remains imperative that renascent Mali attacks the roots of the shadow state, and is backed by an international community willing to abandon its hunger for fixers in the state and short-term solutions.

Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, the Clingendael Institute, 2014. 65p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed October 30, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mali

Keywords: Counter-Terrorism

Shelf Number: 137180


Author: Goff, Diana

Title: A Crisis of Confidence, Competence and Capacity: Programming Advice for Strengthening Mali's Penal Chain

Summary: This report analyses the organisation and performance of the penal process in Mali. Its aim is to provide advice on how this process could be strengthened in ways that would enable it to act as a unifying element in Mali's development by holding state and citizens accountable to the same standards of conduct. Despite the shortcomings of a number of top-down reform efforts in the past, there seems to have been little variation or innovation in how the many challenges that plague the penal chain in Mali have been addressed programmatically. It is for this reason that the report examines a number of recent innovations in development programming such as 'Thinking and Working Politically', the 'Theory of Change' concept and 'Systems Complexity', in addition to an in-depth analysis of the state of justice in Mali. It uses the resulting insights to develop elements of an innovative program to strengthen Mali's penal chain. This offers a basis for further discussions between Malian and international stakeholders. Key elements are to work on the basis of bottom-up, pilot-type programmes that enable learning and scaling, to focus on local improvements in the accessibility and quality of criminal justice, to also work collaboratively with 'customary justice' actors and civil society representatives - beyond the usual local state representatives of the penal process and to monitor programme implementation jointly on the basis of behavioural change on the part of Malian stakeholders.

Details: New York: International Development Law Organization (IDLO); The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), 2015. 60p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/IDLO%20CRU%20report%20A%20crisis%20of%20confidence%2C%20competence%20and%20capacity_0.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Mali

Keywords: Correctional Institutions

Shelf Number: 138431


Author: Maiga, Ibrahim

Title: Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the labels

Summary: The number of armed groups in Mali has increased steadily since the 2012 crisis, although a large swathe of the northern part of the country still remains beyond the control of the national authorities. The armed groups were established either just ahead of or in reaction to peace talks, and their demands often seem to be based on community or individual interests. This report offers an explanation for the delays in the peace process, particularly before the June 2015 Agreement was reached, and the difficulties encountered in implementing that agreement.

Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2016 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Mali

Keywords: Terrorism

Shelf Number: 139665


Author: Strazzari, Francesco

Title: Azawad and the rights of passage: The role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali

Summary: Over the past decade the displacement of narcotics supply lines has placed the remote and marginalised Sahara-Sahel region on the international drug route to the European market. Border control has become of primary importance, and an essential part of understanding the dynamics of competing political claims and armed movements. Secessionist, jihadist and statist political projects in northern Mali must now be interpreted in the light of dynamics of protection and extraction. In particular, the customary system of the droits de passage (rights of passage) has been transformed by the leap in scale and nature of traditional desert contraband. New actors have arisen, while others have been sidelined as various groups contend for the protection of illicit trade. This report explores the micro-level processes by which illicit economies have reshaped political and armed mobilisation. It explores the ways Tuareg traditions and grievances have been reconfigured under the influence of new illicit revenues. It also examines the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, a jihadist splinter group that took control of the city of Gao in 2012 when it aligned with business figures seeking to wrest control over trafficking from rival Tuareg groups. In this context, both nationalism and jihadism tend to mask acute social tensions in the region.

Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2015. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_Azawad_Dec2014.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Mali

Keywords: Contraband

Shelf Number: 139816


Author: Musilli, Pietro

Title: The Lawless Roads: An Overview of Turbulence Across the Sahel

Summary: The political, economic and social crises that stretch across Africa's Sahel region are connected via trade routes that were established centuries ago. The Sahel is now the main area of conflict and desperate poverty on the continent, but with implications for countries thousands of miles away. For example, the conflict in Mali is undermining stability in oil- and gas-rich Nigeria and Algeria, respectively. The lack of jobs, education and health services is drawing more young people into a criminal-political economy. The links between drug lords and kidnappers, on the one hand, and opportunistic politicians and jihadists, on the other, mean that the proceeds of crime have become an important political resource. Civic leaders and independent activists in Mali say political dialogue and widely agreed reforms are necessary if this worsening social breakdown is to be stopped. They warn that attempts by the political class in Bamako, encouraged by Western governments, to organise a quick-fix election could reverse some of the tentative progress in recent months and prolong the conflict.

Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2013. 9p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e2cc78a2ce149944b9a35b4ce42759b9.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mali

Keywords: Drug Trafficking

Shelf Number: 139819


Author: Institute for Security Studies

Title: Mali's Young 'Jihadists': Fuelled by faith or circumstance?

Summary: Unemployed, idle and fanatical - this is how young people in the ranks of the armed jihadist groups in Mali are portrayed. However, there is little empirical data to support this characterisation. Little research has been done in the Malian context where the young people involved in these groups have been interviewed directly, to assess the role that both religion and unemployment play in the emergence of this phenomenon that allegedly affects young people the most. Based on interviews with more than 60 previously involved youths, this policy brief questions the conventional wisdom on an important issue that is crucial to stability in Mali and the security of its neighbours.

Details: Pretoria, South Africa: ISS, 2016. 8p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 89: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/policybrief89-eng.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Mali

Keywords: At-risk Youth

Shelf Number: 140260


Author: Schipper, Irene

Title: Gold from children's hands: Use of child-mined gold by the electronics sector

Summary: The electronics industry is the third largest user of gold for the production of mobile phones, computers and other consumer electronics. However, the sector is not taking any steps to eradicate child labour from gold mining, while the probability is high that this gold ends up in their products. This, despite the fact that the sector has proven to be capable to set up and lead initiatives that concern the far end of their production chain, as is the case with conflict minerals. The researchers studied the magnitude and seriousness of child labour in artisanal gold mining. They also sought to establish the relation between gold mining, including supply chain linkages, with the electronics sector. To this end, a field study in Mali examined the conditions of child workers at the artisanal gold mining sites. Consequences of child labour in Mali Twenty percent of all miners in Mali are children. These children are sent to mining sites by their families for economic reasons. In Mali, girls generally start from the age of 8, while boys start later, at around 12 years of age. They work long hours alongside their adult colleagues doing heavy and dangerous work, like transporting ore on their heads or backs, or washing the ore. This leads to a variety of health problems, like respiratory and pulmonary disease, skeletal injuries and various eye and skin conditions. But it also affects their development and thwarts their future as they drop out of school. The gold supply chain The report shows that, in several cases, gold from artisanal mines in Africa where child labour is documented has ended up at leading gold refineries located in Switzerland. The local supply chain of artisanal gold in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali starts with an on-site buyer who sells to a local trader, who in turn, sells to a local exporter. From here, it is exported to the gold refiners in Switzerland, either directly or through international gold traders. But the gold can also reach Swiss refiners by another route, through the process of mixing illicit gold (from artisanal mining) into the formal trade channels. This often requires smuggling, falsification of documents (classifying the gold as scrap), and over-reporting of legal production. The Swiss refiners like Valcambi and Metalor, but also others, operate as the interface between end-users and gold suppliers. The role of electronics companies The amount of gold used by the electronics sector annually is about 279 tonnes, with a value of ten billion euro. This makes the sector, after the jewellery industry and the financial sector, the biggest purchaser of gold in the world and a powerful player. While consumer electronics manufacturers indicated that they do not accept child labour, they are not taking effective measures to eliminate child labour from the gold mining industry, or to ensure that they do not use gold that is extracted with child labour.

Details: Amsterdam: Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), 2015. 102p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2016 at: https://www.somo.nl/gold-from-childrens-hands/

Year: 2015

Country: Mali

Keywords: Child Labor

Shelf Number: 123449


Author: Lindell, Magdalena Tham

Title: Transnational Threats for Peace and Security in the Sahel: Consequences in Mali

Summary: This report reviews the three main transnational security threats present in the Sahel: violent separatism, armed Islamism and transnational organised crime. The analysis shows that these three phenomena form a complex nexus that led to the collapse of state control in northern Mali in 2012 and that now complicates the re-establishment of state authority and contributes to insecurity in the wider region. The complex connections between the threats lead to the conclusion that a broad approach is necessary, as it is impossible to counteract the threats separately. As the threats are transnational in nature, the solution to the situation in Mali must be equally transnational, involving not just the neighbouring states but also states in the extended region, as well as the international community. The underlying problems that led to the rise of separatism, armed Islamism and organised crime in northern Mali can be traced back to social exposure and lack of human security. The solution is therefore dependent on the creation of a new social contract between the Malian state and its citizens that builds on inclusion. In the short-term perspective, immediate improvements in service delivery, the establishment of security and an end to the culture of impunity are important components in creating trust in state institutions.

Details: Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2014. 52p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/?query=security+in+the+sahel&fv=36

Year: 2014

Country: Mali

Keywords: Islam

Shelf Number: 146120


Author: Kuhne, Winrich

Title: West Africa and the Sahel in the Grip of Organized Crime and International Terrorism – What Perspectives for Mali after the Elections?

Summary: On July 28, 2013, Mali held its first presidential election after the military coup in March 2012 and the end of the war in the North. In the first round, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, a former prime minister, received 39.2 % of the votes cast. Soumaila Cissé, a former finance minister, came in second with 19.4 %. Altogether 27 candidates competed for the presidency. In accordance with the constitution a second round took place on August 11 between the two leading candidates Keita and Cisse. In this round, Keita was elected as Mali's new president with a majority of 77.6 %. His opponent received 22.3 %. Accepting his clear defeat he already congratulated Keita for his victory before the final results came out. There is no doubt that the election of a new president has given Mali a chance for a new start. However, Mali had such a chance twice before but dismally failed. This paper argues that the structural causes for these past failures are still present today. Indeed, they have become even more worrisome and difficult to tackle. This is in particular true with regard to the key issues for stability in Mali: the interaction between the Tuareg conflict and the governability of the North on the one hand and the penetration of West Africa and the Sahel by increasingly symbiotic networks of organized crime and international terrorism on the other hand.

Details: Baltimore, MD: School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, 2013. 10p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Briefing: Accessed November 15, 2016 at: http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Winrich_Kuehne_Aug_2013_ENG.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mali

Keywords: Criminal Networks

Shelf Number: 141164


Author: International Alert

Title: Organised Crime in Mali: Why It Matters for a Peaceful Transition from Conflict

Summary: Inadequate governance, institutional fragility and widespread insecurity are both consequences and causes of the expansion of criminal activities. The impact of their proliferation is key to understanding the current - and endemic - instability affecting Mali. Yet, to date, there is little indication that policy strategies put forward by the Malian government, as well as by its international partners, are learning from the past to engage with the issue of organised crime as a threat to peace and security. This policy brief aims to help address this gap. Understanding how crime impacts on the achievement of development goals, on conflict risks, and on mounting fragility and safety threats is indeed crucial for building long-lasting and sustainable peace in Mali.

Details: London: International Alert, 2016. 5p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali_OrganisedCrime_EN_2016.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Mali

Keywords: Criminal Networks

Shelf Number: 145090


Author: Farooghi, Mana

Title: Sustainable approaches to organised crime in Mali and the Sahil

Summary: Although the ongoing crisis in Mali had diverse local proximate causes and triggers, analysts and policy-makers agree on a core set of causes that exacerbated latent inter- and intracommunity tensions leading to open conflict: a failure of governance and functional democracy, corruption of the state, lack of development and service delivery both in the north and the south, unresolved issues of political and economic marginalisation and rebellion, lack of civilian trust in law enforcement forces, weak border security and the settling in the north of "extremist" groups, a free flow of weapons following the Libya crisis, and finally organised crime i.e. illicit trade and its alleged links to terrorism. While most of these causes are being addressed in the current peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts, the latter seems to fall through the cracks. Although organised crime is mentioned as a key factor of instability by Malian and international actors, alongside terrorist networks and usually in direct relation to them, in practice, only counter-terrorism programmes are being unfolded, and the issue of addressing criminal flows is a peripheral issue in negotiations around future governance agreements. It appears that development actors simply are not ready or equipped to tackle the impact of crime on peace and development. While some cooperation and development institutions consider the issue of crime outside of their mandate, others are increasingly aware of its socio-economic root causes and impact and are willing to adapt their programming, but simply don't have the experience and toolbox to do so, and thus, in many cases, caution outweighs impetus as state complicity and corruption seem to be core issues at stake. Nevertheless, rebuilding Mali without directly tackling this issue in collaboration with Malian state and non-state actors is precarious, and likely to ensure that the triggers for instability that prompted the previous round of the Mali conflict remain in place. Although efforts to negotiate with selected armed groups, restore security, deliver justice and reconciliation and improve service delivery are worthy, they will prove unable to prevent another crisis if they fail to address underlying structures, cultures and institutions that promote violent conflict. As many analysts and practitioners point out, no alternative livelihood project has so far been able to compete with the high-profit margins offered by trafficking, kidnapping or banditry. Failing to understand the contextual socio-economic dynamics at stake in a region where the informal and illicit economies are intricately woven in family, cultural and livelihood strategies, will not only undermine efforts towards a sustainable peace but potentially harm existing endogenous resilience mechanisms and further destabilise the region. Furthermore, as long as armed groups remain well-resourced by illicit funds, they will have little incentive to engage in efforts towards peacebuilding and central state consolidation. International Alert, in collaboration with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, held a dialogue meeting in Bamako on 14-15 October, where Malian government and civil society representatives, multilateral organisations and bilateral institutions exchanged their analysis and definitions of organised crime in Mali and the Sahel and started exploring collaborative approaches to tackling organised crime in a sustainable way.

Details: Based on Highlights from roundtable discussion held at the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye, on 14 and 15 October 2014. 9p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2017 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali_SustainableApproachesOrganisedCrime_EN_2014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mali

Keywords: Corruption

Shelf Number: 145016


Author: Gberie, Lansana

Title: Crime, Violence, and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea

Summary: Key Findings • There has been a general increase in drug trafficking in West Africa. Regional institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States have made some effort to counter the impact of drug transit and consumption in the region, but this has had a limited effect in Guinea and Mali. • Guinea and Mali, along with the rest of the region, are reportedly experiencing increased local consumption of illicit drugs, which poses challenges related to treatment, harm reduction, security, and human rights. • In both Guinea and Mali, drug traffickers have exploited widespread poverty and corruption to co-opt government officials, military and law enforcement officers, and political and traditional leaders into an opportunistic network that underpins a very profitable criminal enterprise. • Both countries have experienced serious political turmoil that has brought to light the role drug trafficking has played in provoking internal unrest and coups d'état. • Mali, which experienced a major international intervention following a 2012 coup as well as Tuareg and Islamist uprisings in its northern regions, has passed numerous counter-narcotics measures into law. Generally punitive in approach, their implementation and enforcement have been lacking. • Guinea has proven to be highly resistant to changing its domestic counter-narcotics policies, most likely due to the penetration of drug traffickers in state institutions. Policy Recommendations • Both countries should adopt the recommendations made by a 2014 report by the West Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD), Not Just for Transit: Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa, which emphasized decriminalizing some degree of drug use and possession for personal use. • Mali is likely to support the approach proposed by the WACD at the 2016 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016), while Guinea has thus far taken no position on the UNGASS 2016 treaty review process.

Details: Washington, DC: Brookings, 2016. 17p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Gberie-Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Mali

Keywords: Counternarcotics

Shelf Number: 146977


Author: Molenaar, Fransje

Title: Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali

Summary: In 2016, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 migrants transited through Mali on their way to Algeria and Libya. One major dilemma facing policy makers that want to stop irregular migration through Mali is that state authorities are either complicit in migration, such as by providing migrants free passage in exchange for a toll at roadblocks or by issuing false passports, or that they lack the effective presence and/or capacity to counter human smuggling. This problem is particularly salient in the north, where armed groups have taken over territorial control and offer protection to, and feed off, the human smuggling industry. At the time of writing, a solution to the internal conflict appears to lie in the distant future, meaning that addressing the issue of irregular migration remains one of the lowest priorities on the government’s agenda. Regaining political stability is its number one concern.

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2017. 36p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/irregular_migration_and_human_smuggling_networks_in_mali.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Mali

Keywords: Criminal Networks

Shelf Number: 141312


Author: Goff, Diana

Title: Under the microscope: Customary justice systems in northern Mali

Summary: The people of Mali use many types of justice mechanisms, both connected to and further disassociated from the state, to resolve their conflicts. This has led to the creation of a diverse justice ecology that includes both what are often described as 'formal' actors - such as state appointed lawyers and judges - and 'customary' actors - such as qadis, imans, village chiefs, family heads and elders. Because the state lacks a large presence in northern Mali, customary justice systems are the dominant actors in the justice sector, but until recently little attention focused on how these mechanisms work and perform. This online report reveals heretofore undocumented information about the customary justice systems in northern Mali, which we gathered from 108 interviews across the regions of Gao, Mopti and Tombouctou. This information can be utilised by national and international stakeholders who see further engagement with these systems as an essential part of a multi-pronged effort to bring peace to Mali in the wake of the 2012 crisis. The report's main findings are sevenfold: 1) as each locality has its own traditions, each will require a context specific approach; 2) where interviewees specified that certain capacity building or change initiatives would be welcome, it is advantageous to build on this existing momentum for change; 3) justice gaps identified by interviewees are ripe areas for engagement; 4) ensuring fair treatment of vulnerable groups will likely require the use of interventions such as quotas, the creation of competing mechanisms, and community debate on whether biased treatment aligns with the core values of the local customary mechanisms; 5) it would be beneficial to help the customary and formal justice systems create a more coherent system for working together through facilitating dialogue between the groups at the local or national level; 6) a follow-up study targeting the youth population, which this study was not able to effectively reach, would be helpful to ensure their buy-in for the future use of these mechanisms; and 7) some recommendations made by the interviewees will need to be addressed by a sector-wide approach in order to be effectively addressed.

Details: The Hague: Clingendael, 2017. 50p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/under_the_microscope_customary_justice_systems_in_northern_mali.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Mali

Keywords: Criminal Justice Systems

Shelf Number: 146766


Author: Ursu, Anca-Elena

Title: Between ideals and needs: is Malian customary justice incompatible with international human rights standards?

Summary: Providing access to justice is a fundamental component of any functioning legal system and enabling such access is a state obligation under international human rights law. In the case of Mali, where the state has never been the primary justice provider, customary justice mechanisms are central to the provision of justice for the majority of the population. However, some policy debates juxtapose oversimplified pictures of customary justice systems with the ideals of Western justice systems. This brief will argue that efforts to improve access to justice should not be driven by assumptions that customary justice systems are incompatible with international human rights standards. These efforts should rather be led by the needs of local communities and individuals and aimed at addressing the challenges faced by customary justice systems. The brief makes recommendations for policy makers and practitioners who aspire to support customary systems in overcoming their weaknesses and to remedy the profound need for justice in Mali.

Details: The Hague: Clingendael (the Netherlands Institute of International Relations), 2018. 10p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Policy Brief, 2018. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/PB_Malian_customary_justice_international_human_rights_standards.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Mali

Keywords: Customary Justice

Shelf Number: 149815


Author: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism

Title: Action Agenda on Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali: Gaps, Challenges and Action Plans for the Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali

Summary: he violent conflict in Mali, initiated in 2012, is complex and continuously evolving: the groups involved include terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mouvement pour l'Unicite and le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, its affiliate Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Al Mourabitoune. As the number of extremist detainees has increased due to the country's situation, it is important to consider issues that come along with this: how to deal with violent extremists when they are in prison? What different actors can play a role during this detention time? As most of the detainees will eventually be released, it is also important to take into consideration challenges linked to re-integration. This Action Agenda aims to address a number of these issues by outlining four Action Areas that currently deserve the attention of both national and international actors in order to efficiently deal with problems associated with detaining Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs). In August 2016, UNICRI conducted an assessment mission in Mali to present its programme on Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, developed within the framework of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The presentation was addressed to key national and international stakeholders and aimed to ensure their engagement. From September 2016 onwards, ICCT and UNICRI joined their efforts in Mali on Reintegration and Rehabilitation (R&R) of violent extremists. Three trainings have been jointly organised so far: first, a training on the psychological aspects of violent extremism for prison staff in the Central Prison of Bamako (December 2016); second, a training for religious leaders on radicalisation (April 2017); and third, a training on risk assessment with a special focus on violent extremism for personnel of the National Prison Administration, DNAPES (August 2017). These training workshops have been designed in close consultation with national authorities and international partners, such as the Justice and Correction Section of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA/JCS). Throughout the needs assessment mission and training workshops, and in consultation with different actors on the ground, ICCT and UNICRI have identified four target areas that deserve the attention of both national and international actors, namely (1) increasing awareness of the causes and consequences of violent extremism in the Malian context, (2) intake and risk assessment of violent extremist offenders, (3) empowerment of youth leaders, and (4) disengagement of VEOs through vocational training and engagement of communities through dialogue sessions in prison. These areas will be further discussed below, outlining specific actions recommended to increase capacity building, intensify inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and design and implement an R&R program, all using research to ensure that actions are tailored to local needs and guided by an evidence-based approach. This Action Agenda is composed of three sections: the first briefly discusses the background of the conflict in Mali as well as some of the issues faced in Mali with regards to VEOs in prison. The second section describes the four Action Areas and outlines proposed activities to address concerns and needs identified by ICCT and UNICRI throughout the initiatives implemented by both organisations so far. Finally, next steps and recommendations will be discussed.

Details: The Hague: ICCT, 2018. 21p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mali-Action-Agenda-2.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Mali

Keywords: Extremists

Shelf Number: 150408


Author: Human Rights Watch

Title: "We Used to Be Brothers": Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali

Summary: Over 200 civilians have been killed and dozens of villages burned in communal violence in Mali's central Mopti region during 2018. The violence has also led to widespread displacement, hunger, and looting of livestock. The majority of victims are ethnic Peuhl targeted by Dogon and Bambara self-defense groups for their alleged support of armed Islamists. Since 2015, Islamist armed groups have increased their presence in central Mali, where they have executed perceived government supporters and committed other abuses. Their recruitment of local Peuhl residents has inflamed tensions among the Peuhl, Bambara, and Dogon ethnic groups, spawning the growth of the often-abusive self-defense militias. Easy access to firearms and the weak presence of state security forces have contributed to the militarization of the self-defense groups, exacerbating existing communal tensions. "We Used To Be Brothers," documents massacres, attacks on villages, and retaliatory killings of Peuhl, Dogon, and Bambara civilians in central Mali in 2018. It recommends that Mali's government investigate and prosecute the killings and other abuses, step up security force patrols to protect vulnerable populations, and ensure the security forces respond to the violence quickly and impartially. The report urges Mali's international partners to support the government to hold those implicated in communal violence accountable.

Details: New York: HRW, 2018.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 23, 2019 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/mali1218_web.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Mali

Keywords: Communal Violence

Shelf Number: 154380