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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:03 pm
niger
Time: 8:03 pm
niger
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34 total results foundAuthor: Bachir, Talfi Idrissa Title: Arrest and Pre-trial Detention in Niger: A review of domestic legislation Summary: Police detention is a measure that allows an officer of the criminal investigation department of the police 'to detain one or more persons', either 'for purposes of investigation' or because there 'is sufficient reliable and consistent evidence against the person to justify pressing charges'. The period of detention may not exceed 48 hours, unless expressly extended. The purpose of pre-trial detention therefore is to prevent a person suspected of having committed or attempting to commit an offence from fleeing and/or disposing of evidence, or from influencing witnesses. Given that this constitutes a deprivation of liberty, pre-trial detention may create risks for the infringement of a range of fundamental human rights. Therefore, those held in custody require guarantees that their rights will be protected, and that their detention is indeed a temporary measure. This review examines the legal framework relating to the use of arrest and pre-trial detention by the police in Niger. A detailed review of the current domestic legislative regime is provided, and this is supported by a review of how this relates to the international framework. Details: Mowbray, South Africa: African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: APCOF Policy Paper no. 6: Accessed October 28, 2013 at: http://www.apcof.org/files/3597_Pretrial_Detention_Niger.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Niger Keywords: Arrest and Apprehension Shelf Number: 131498 |
Author: Stakeholder Democracy Network Title: Does Violence Pay? Review of Niger Delta Community Perceptions on Conflict, Militancy and Change. Summary: The Niger Delta was violently thrust on the attention of the world during its 2005 -2009 militancy crisis. This conflict reduced oil production by two thirds costing Nigeria over $15 billion a year in lost revenue. Weekly kidnappings, pipeline attacks and militarisation of the region made for newsworthy stories, whilst the population continued to face the challenges of poor governance, limited service delivery and environmental devastation. This newsworthy violence and militancy turned attention away from an on-going low intensity local conflict fuelled by inter and intra community conflicts over oil related contracts, political contracts and political control. The Niger Delta Amnesty process ended the militant attacks and ensured that oil production has returned to pre-crisis levels. However, the underlying issues driving conflict and tensions in the region remain and there are regular examples of intra community violence as community representatives fight over the spoils of contracts from oil majors and the government. These local conflict dynamics are reinforced by the absence of the state and functional service delivery, which escalate the short term focus of those fighting for survival. These local tensions are further compounded by the challenges placed on traditional livelihoods via the widespread environmental devastation caused by oil spills as a result of oil major equipment failure and third party sabotage for oil theft. There are thus four main pillars of tensions and potential violence in the Niger Delta: 1 Militancy/end of amnesty 2 Contract tensions 3 Pollution 4 Service Delivery These interrelated challenges reinforce and drive each other to provide a potentially catastrophic mix in the run up to the 2015 election cycle. Any intervention to reduce the threat of violence in the Niger Delta region will need to recognise this interrelated nature of these national regional and local tensions and ensure it reduces pressure and creates opportunities for transformation across and within each pillar. Details: London: SDN,2014. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2014 at: http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/uploads/SDN%20Publications/election%202011/DOES%20VIOLENCE%20PAY_%20V3.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Niger Keywords: Natural Resources Shelf Number: 134006 |
Author: Molenaar, Fransje Title: Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Niger Summary: This report outlines some of the dilemmas that the human smuggling industry poses for policy makers addressing irregular migration flows in Niger. Through a detailed focus on the manifestation of the relationship between human smugglers and state authorities on the ground, and between state authorities and former rebels more generally, this report shows that the development of human smuggling networks reinforces prevailing patterns of collusion between armed and/or criminal actors, state security forces and political elites. Any attempt to address irregular migration through securitised measures should take into account that security forces, local authorities and even national political elites are tied to the smuggling industry in direct and indirect ways. They are not neutral actors, and any attempt to treat them as such could result in heightened conflict risk and/or the instrumental use of policy instruments to take out competitors. Policy makers should also recognise that the issue of irregular migration is tied to broader issues of good governance and rule of law. Policies targeting migration should therefore form part of a broader package of measures combatting state fragility and insecurity. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2017. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/irregular_migration_and_human_smuggling_networks_in_niger.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Niger Keywords: Criminal Networks Shelf Number: 141313 |
Author: de Tessieres, Savannah Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Niger Summary: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Niger—the first in a new series of Briefing Papers — examines the measurement of illicit arms flows in Niger in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16. Based on field research conducted in Niger, the Briefing Paper maps the national and international bodies that collect data relevant to monitoring the evolution of illicit arms flows in and through Niger. It also discusses the relevance of Indicator 16.4.2 and suggests ways to improve the monitoring of progress towards the achievement of SDG Target 16.4 in Niger, and more widely in Africa. The Paper is the third in a series of four publications on measuring illicit arms flows in selected countries. Key findings: Niger's security forces seize weapons and ammunition and keep useful records. The quality of data collection varies greatly between institutions, however, and a central, national database of seizure-related information is crucially lacking. Though Niger is primarily a transit route for weapons circulating in the region, measuring illicit arms flows in the country is key to understanding the evolution of trafficking trends in the wider region In the absence of comprehensive data on arms seizures in Niger, other indicators should also be used, including the fluctuation in materiel pricing and reports on the use of firearms in acts of violence. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed March 21, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP1-Niger.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Niger Keywords: Firearms Trafficking Shelf Number: 144533 |
Author: McCullough, Aoife Title: Understanding trajectories of radicalisation in Agadez Summary: This research aimed to examine how trajectories of radicalisation happen in Niger. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is implementing the Niger Community Cohesion Initiative (NCCI) in three areas in Niger: Agadez, Tillaberi and Diffa. An integral component of this programme involves identifying and working with youth 'at risk' of radicalisation and extremism. When thinking about a 'trajectory of radicalisation', an assessment of risk commonly plays a prominent part. This is because the most common image of radicalisation is that of linear progression. According to this perspective, certain risk factors make people vulnerable to ever-narrowing and increasingly extreme beliefs and ideologies, which then leads to support for or participation in violent extremism. Scholarship on radicalisation indicates that linearity may not be a useful way to understand trajectories of radicalisation. The literature shows that following radical ideologies does not necessarily mean that someone supports violence. Despite the lack of evidence supporting the idea that people who adopt extreme beliefs and ideologies are more likely to participate in violent extremism, the notion of the inevitable and linear progression from certain beliefs to violence remains strong. To understand progressions in beliefs, which actions actors are prepared to take to support their beliefs, and how OTI's strategy ought to respond, research was carried out in Agadez in northern Niger in October 2016. In this study, radicalisation was imagined as a dynamic process where individual and structural factors interact to produce the potential for radicalisation and violent extremism. 'Structural factors' are defined as systems of socioeconomic stratification (that is, how wealth and power are distributed), and other patterns in the relations between groups, such as how citizens relate to the state. Relations between large social groups are constantly changing, but narratives about the 'other' can establish a particular dynamic. For this reason, we examined not only the relationships between different social groups in the Agadez region but also the narratives that are produced and consumed to understand how these dynamics may evolve. To test the possibility that individual factors can predispose people to adopting radical beliefs and supporting violent extremism, we examined individual factors commonly assumed by Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programmes in Niger to be associated with vulnerability to radicalisation and violent extremism. These factors included age (youth), ethnicity, (un) employment, education level, degree of debt, and degree of exposure to other societies. As this is a qualitative, rather than a representative study, we can speak only about the links or their absence among the people we interviewed. To identify interviewees, researchers followed networks of influence in groups that were thought to include people who would be sympathetic to, or support, radical causes. Using such a network-based approach is useful in seeking to understand how members of defined networks influence what each believes and what type of thinking is disseminated. The networks were selected based on consultation with CVE actors and researchers in Niger and included Touareg ex-rebels, a Salafist movement (Izala), traffickers/transporters of migrants, traders (particularly those trading with Libya), youth groups (fadas) with unemployed members, civil society activists and prisoners. A Sufist network was also followed to enable comparisons with the Salafist network. We also explored what local people understood as 'radicalisation' and 'violent extremism'. Scholarship on the link between violence and beliefs is rapidly developing. For example, the perception that one's culture is under threat can narrow beliefs towards more extreme viewpoints. In the Sahel, contrasts are often drawn between what are seen as Western/secular/democratic and Islamic systems of government, with many perceiving the Western system as dominant. In the Agadez region, we sought to understand different viewpoints in relation to the concept of a 'just society', Western governance system in comparison with an Islamic system of governance and whether certain beliefs were associated with more extreme viewpoints. In the Agadez region, as in any society, there are movements that challenge the status quo by offering an alternative vision of an ideal society. Such movements could thus be called radical. Currently, the best-organized and most proactive radical movement in Agadez is the Izala religious movement, which seeks to avoid innovation in the practice of Islam and promotes a vision of society based on sharia. Details: London: Overseas Development Institute, 2017. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11404.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Niger Keywords: Radical Groups Shelf Number: 146098 |
Author: Pellerin, Mathieu Title: Beyond the 'Wild West': The Gold Rush in Northern Niger Summary: This Briefing Paper examines how the gold rush in northern Niger has affected the security, political, and socio-economic dynamics of this sensitive region. The first part discusses the mechanics of the gold rush, which started in 2014: the nature of the mining sites, the various participants, and the (limited) role of the state in the region. The second part focuses on the effects of the gold rush on northern Niger: increased local wealth and new elites on the one hand, more banditry and arms trafficking on the other. It notes, however, that there is little evidence of gold mining providing material or financial support to extremist groups. And while the wealth of some miners and local business people who transport miners and supply them with necessities increased, the local economic upturn did not spread to the national economy. The paper concludes that future mining will need to industrialize to access deposits deeper underground, now that surface gold deposits are largely exhausted. This change may result in increased socio-economic and security instability, both in northern Niger and in the wider region. Details: Geneva: SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Niger-Gold.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Niger Keywords: Arms Trafficking Shelf Number: 148778 |
Author: de Tessieres, Savannah Title: At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger Summary: Key findings Terrorism At the crossroads of the region's most violent conflicts, Niger has served as a primary transit point for armed criminal and terrorist groups operating in the various conflict theatres that surround it. Everything from people, weapons, and low-tech communications pass through Niger's borders, providing a rich source of intelligence that is critical to understanding the nature of cross-border relationships and networks of trafficking and terrorist groups. Niger presents a privileged arena in which to observe the array of terrorist dynamics across the Sahel, and to take action against them. The country has become a major partner in counter-terrorism strategies for regional and western powers. Relatively spared by the threat of terrorism until 2015, the increase in terrorist attacks in Niger since then, first by Boko Haram and then by AQIM-related groups or splinter cells, run in parallel with the enhanced engagement of the Nigerien authorities against terrorism in the region, including MNJTF, MINUSMA, and G5 Sahel efforts. While the north of the country is particularly affected by armed banditry, the south has suffered the bulk of terrorist attacks. In 2016, Boko Haram was responsible for perpetrating 80 per cent of the terrorist attacks carried out on Nigerien soil, but 2017 saw a surge in deadly attacks against security positions near the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali by AQIM- and IS-related groups based in Mali. Sahelian terrorist groups find Niger a fertile recruiting ground and exploit long-standing community divisions, which are in turn exacerbated by increasing insecurity. Arms trafficking Niger has served as a key transit route for weapons heading to conflict zones in the region, but the deterioration of the country's security situation has resulted in an increase in the domestic demand for weapons, particularly for small arms and ammunition. Arms seized from terrorists or en route to terrorist groups in Niger over the past five years include explosives, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and associated ammunition (including MANPADS, mortar rounds, and machine guns). Vehicles were also seized. Terrorist groups operating in Niger, including those based in Mali and Nigeria, have been obtaining materiel from a variety of sources-including from national stockpiles in the region-following the collapse of state control over arsenals, as in Libya or northern Mali, attacks against security positions, or diversion in countries such as Niger or Nigeria. Ammunition held by terrorist groups, other armed actors, and civilians is very similar, indicating common sources of illicit ammunition, including past rebellions and national stockpiles from Niger and neighbouring countries. However, it does vary between the regions: while chains of transfers in the north originate mainly from Libya and Mali, materiel in the south-east comes mainly from Chad and Nigeria. While Libya continues to be a source for illicit weapons in Niger, including converted blank'firing handguns, trafficking from Libya has declined significantly since 2014 due to the depletion of Qaddafi's SALW stockpiles, national demand reinvigorated in light of renewed conflict in Libya, and increased levels of surveillance and counteraction in Niger with the deployment of Operation Barkhane. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Niger Keywords: Arms Trafficking Shelf Number: 149854 |