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nigeria
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528 total results foundAuthor: Hazen, Jennifer M. Title: Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: the Niger Delta in Perspective Summary: This study discusses a number of issues in Nigeria following its return to democracy in 1999; including insecurity, armed violence, and the proliferation of illicit small arms. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007 Source: Occasional Paper #20, Graduate Institute of International Studies Year: 2007 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Fear of Crime Shelf Number: 116490 |
Author: National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP) Title: Nigeria: Country Response on Trafficking in Persons Especially Children and Women (2002-2007) Summary: This report is an update version of earlier reports of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) projects and programs implemented in Nigeria from 2002 to 2006. It highlights the successes of the Nigerian government and identifies gaps in the response and offers recommendations to fill those gaps. This report also has information on Nigeria's status as a source, transit and destination country for trafficking in persons. Also considered are legislative and policy developments, constraints and challenges, and highlights good practices and lessons learned in the course of program implementation. Details: Abuja, Nigeria: NAPTIP, Geneva: UNICEF, 2008 Source: Year: 2008 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Female Victims Shelf Number: 115378 |
Author: Alemika, Etannibi EO Title: Criminal Victimization and Fear of Crime in Lagos Metropolis, Nigeria Summary: Criminal victimization has serious consequences for the citizens and society. Individual and societal aspirations for democracy, development, human rights, high standard of living are undermined by high level of criminal victimization. Nigeria has witnessed high rates of crime and victimization that have defied the measures, introduced by successive regimes, for its management during the past two decades. The problem of crime is most widespread and endemic in Lagos. This is most likely due to its being the most economically active and densely populated city in Nigeria. In spite of the crime problem in the country, there are no reliable statistics on the trend and pattern of crime and victimization. In order to bridge the data-gap, this study surveys the extent and pattern of victimization, fear of crime, perceptions of crime and the police among residents of Lagos Metropolis, Nigeria. Lagos was the capital of Nigeria from 19141 to 1991 when the capital of the Federation was moved to Abuja in the central area of the nation. The survey conducted in August 2004, covered Lagos metropolis. Data were obtained through multi-stage sampling design. The target population from which the sample was drawn were people who were 16 years or older in 14 Local Government Areas. Fieldwork was carried out by the staff of the Federal Office of Lagos with supervision by staff of CLEEN Foundation also based in Lagos, during the month of August 2004. In all, 2091 respondents were interviewed, with the following aims: to find out whether or not they were victims of crime during the past five years; to discover the extent and types of criminal victimization in Lagos metropolis; to find out the level of subjective feeling of safety as well as attitudes to crime and the police among the residents of Lagos. The findings of the study are summarized below. Extent of criminal victimization A substantial proportion of the respondents were victims of corruption and cheating in 2003. More than two-fifths of the respondents said they were victims of corruption, particularly demand for bribe by public officials. Also, 30% said they were cheated by various persons, groups and businesses during the year. Over a period of five years covered by the survey, theft and assault were the commonest form of victimization experienced by the respondents. The levels of victimization reported by the respondent for the past five years were as follow: - 1% of the households reported the murder of a member; - 6%; 5% and 23% of households with vehicle owners respectively reported robbery of automobile; theft of vehicle and theft of property from an automobile belonging to their members; - 15% of households with motorcycle and bicycle owners reported theft of cycles; - 9% and 6% of the households were victims of burglary and attempted burglary respectively; - 9% of the respondents reported being victims of robbery; - 25% were victims of theft; - 12% said they were assaulted; - 9% of the female respondents were victims of sexual violence. Spatial pattern of criminal victimization Criminal victimization varied across the Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Lagos metropolis, with the following pattern discernible from the analysis of the survey: - Murder was higher in Lagos Island, Mushin and Kosofe; - Automobile theft was highest in Lagos Island and Mainland; - Theft of property from car was widespread in all the LGAs but highest in Apapa and Mushin; - Incidence of burglary was highest in Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Lagos Island, Ifako-Ijaye and Shomolu; - Robbery was more prevalent in Lagos Island, Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Ojo, Agege, Apapa and Mushin; - Respondents in Oshodi-Isolo, Ajeromi-Ifelodun and Apapa reported higher levels of assault; - Female respondents in Ojo, Mushin, Oshodi-Isolo and Ajeromi-Ifelodun reported higher levels of sexual victimization; - In 2003, incidence of corruption, particularly extortion, was more prevalent in Lagos Island, Oshodi-Isolo, Mushin and Apapa. Perceptions of Crime and Safety in Community Robbery and murder were the crimes perceived as most prevalent in nearly all the LGAs. The two crimes were followed in respect of prevalence by theft, burglary. Majority of the respondents in all the LGAs, with the exception of Alimosho, reported decrease in crime level in their communities. However, while more than 70% of the respondents felt that crime decreased in their communities, majority of the respondents perceived increased level of crime in society. This apparent contradiction may be explained by the concentration of electronic and print media of mass communication with extensive coverage of criminal incidents in the state. More than 80% of respondents from all the LGAs (except AjeromiIfelodun with 56%) said that they felt safe walking in their neigbourhood after dark. Greater percentage of respondents felt safe at home after dark. However, nearly 70% were fearful of being a victim of any crime. Perception of Police Majority of the respondents had positive impression or perception of the police. More specifically: - 58% of the respondents said the police in their communities were doing a good job; - 53% agreed with the view that the police were helpful; - Positive perception or impression of the police was highest among respondents in Agege, Mainland, Mushin, Ikeja and lowest among respondents in Alimosho, Apapa, Kosofe, Surulere and Ajeromi-Ifelodun; Notwithstanding the generally positive perception of the police by the respondents, majority of them felt that police performance has declined over the past five years. Reactions to Crime Faced with high incidence and fear of crime, many communities and individuals took several measures to reduce their feeling of vulnerability and minimize risk of victimization. - 81% of the respondents said that vigilante existed in their communities, while 77% reported that the vigilantes were paid for their services; - Individuals introduced target hardening devices (fence, metal doors, locks, electronic devices) and employed security guards in order to minimize their risk of victimization. Police Community Relations Committee The provision for the establishment of Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) in police divisions was aimed at developing public-police partnership. About a third (34%) of the respondents said PCRC existed in their area, while 77% reported that they are aware of the role of PCRC. Details: Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundation, 2005. 35p. Source: CLEEN Foundation Monograph Series, No. 1: Accessed April 14, 2018 at: http://new.cleen.org/LAGOS%20CRIME%20SURVEY.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Crime Statistics Shelf Number: 117355 |
Author: Togonu-Bickersteth, Funmi Title: Survey of Child Trafficking in Asewele, Ondo State, Nigeria: Research Report Summary: This report describes the child trafficking phenomenon in Asewele, a transit labor camp that recruits children from Yakurr local government of Cross River State for labor activities in the Western states of Nigeria. Details: Geneva: ILO, 2005. 62p. Source: Year: 2005 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Child Labor (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 117306 |
Author: Open Society Institute Title: Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force Summary: Personnel of the Nigeria Police Force routinely carry out summary executions of persons accused or suspected of armed robbery and other offenses, rely on torture as a principal means of investigation, and maintain designated torture chambers, instruments, and personnel in most police stations. Nigeria's government has previously acknowledged this problem and promised to address it. The evidence in this report shows that far from doing so, police abuse has become quite entrenched and is now well accepted as perhaps the only tool of policing. Details: New York: Open Society Institute, 2010. 129p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Extrajudicial Executions Shelf Number: 118573 |
Author: Oruwari, Yomi Title: Youth in Urban Violence in Nigeria: A Case Study of Urban Gangs from Port Harcourt Summary: This study uses the incidence of violence attributable to urban gangs and cults among youths in the Port Harcourt, Nigeria, metropolitan region to explain the nature and effects of urban violence in Nigeria. The study had the following objectives: (1) To provide some explanation for the rising incidence of youth gang violence in Nigerian cities; (2) To examine the direction and adequacy of interventions by government and civil society; and (3) To use the findings as crucial learning points for the broader context of urban management in Nigeria. Details: Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California; Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace; Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Our Niger Delta, 2006. 21p. Source: Economies of Violence Working Papers; Working Paper no. 14 Year: 2006 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Gangs (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 118319 |
Author: Von Kemedi, Dimiear Title: Fuelling the Violence: Non-State Armed Actors (Militia, Cults, and Gangs) in the Niger Delta Summary: This working paper on the formation, organization, activities, rivalries and impact of non-state armed actors- militia, gangs and cult groups in the Niger Delta is intended to situate these groups in the intricate and often confusing canvass of factors that determine the increasingly upward spiral of violence in the Niger Delta. It will attempt a crude geographical mapping of these groups, locate their collective and individual origins as much as possible and highlight the factors that feed the growth of these groups. Finally the paper makes recommendations on how the activities of these groups may be contained and who needs to do what to that effect. Details: Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, university of California; Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace; Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Our Niger Delta, 2006. 24p. Source: Internet Resource; Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 10 Year: 2006 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Cults Shelf Number: 119297 |
Author: Guttschuss, Eric Title: "Everyone's in on the Game": Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force Summary: "This report documents the myriad forms of corruption within the Nigeria Police Force, including bribery and extortion by rank-and-file officers and embezzlement and other forms of abuse of office by senior officials. These criminal acts by police undermine the rule of law and severely impact the human rights of all Nigerians. The Nigeria Police Force has a long history of engaging in unprofessional, corrupt, and criminal conduct. While many Nigerian police officers conduct themselves in an exemplary manner, working in difficult and often dangerous conditions, corruption and abusive behavior remain endemic. For many Nigerians, members of the force are viewed more as predators than protectors. On a daily basis, countless ordinary citizens are accosted by armed police officers who demand bribes and commit human rights abuses against them as a means of extorting money. These abuses range from arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention to threats and acts of violence, including sexual assault, torture, and even extrajudicial killings. Police also routinely extort money from victims of crimes to initiate investigations and demand bribes from suspects to drop investigations. There continue to be numerous reports of high-level police officials embezzling staggering sums of public funds meant to cover basic police operations. Despite one landmark conviction of a former inspector general of police, impunity is the norm. Senior police officers also enforce a perverse system of “returns” in which rank-and-file officers are compelled to pay up the chain of command a share of the money they extort from the public. Government officials charged with police oversight, discipline, and reform have failed to root out the systemic corruption that is fueling many of the police abuses. “Everyone’s in on the Game” sets forth detailed recommendations to the Nigerian government, urging officials to follow through on police reform initiatives and hold accountable police officers of any rank implicated in extortion, embezzlement, or other serious crimes." Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 18, 2010 at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/08/17/everyone-s-game Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Bribery Shelf Number: 119626 |
Author: Asumi, Judith Burdin Title: Blood Oil in the Niger Delta Summary: The recent resumption of attacks against the oil industry in the Niger Delta and the resultant increase in oil prices have reminded the world that the unrest there is not a problemcfor Nigeria alone. Indeed, the business of bunkering illegalcoil, or blood oil, involves players far beyond the shores of Nigeria and will require an international effort to control it. Additionally, the broader issues of underdevelopment and overmilitarization of the Niger Delta, as well as the region’s lack of participation in the oil and gas industry, must be addressed before any lasting peace can be found. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 229: Accessed December 9, 2010 at: http://www.usip.org/files/blood_oil_nigerdelta.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Blood Oil Shelf Number: 120422 |
Author: Garuba, Dauda S. Title: Trans-Border Economic Crimes, Illegal Oil Bunkering and Economic Reforms in Nigeria Summary: This paper examines the phenomenon of economic crime across borders and its specific character of illegal oil bunkering in Nigeria vis-à-vis the country’s economic reform agenda. Among the questions the paper seeks to address are: What is the underlying linkage between trans-border economic crime and the phenomenon of globalization? What are its illegal oil bunkering characters? How are they reflected in Nigeria? To what extent has the economic reform agenda of the country addressed them? What is the way forward to dealing with its undermining impacts for the Nigerian physical and economic security? The paper is divided into six parts. The first part (an introduction), attempts to contextualize Nigeria’s economic reform within the rubrics of the unfinished political democratization agenda that started in the 1980s. The second part discusses trans-border economic crime within the context and linkage with the logic of globalization, while parts three and four attempt to locate Nigeria and the trans-border character of illegal oil bunkering in that linkage. Part five reviews the diverse attempts to reconnect Nigeria to prosperity via reforms, while the last part constructs way forward for the realization of the goal. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief Series, No. 15: Accessed February 8, 2011 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/194_GCST_Policy_Brief_15_-_Trans-Border_Economic_Crimes,_Illegal_Oil_Bunkering_and_Economic_Reforms_in_Nigeria.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Economic Crimes Shelf Number: 120720 |
Author: Osaghae, Eghosa E. Title: Youth Militias, Self Determination and Resource Control Struggles in the Niger-delta Region of Nigeria Summary: The Niger-delta region, Nigeria’s oil belt has been the site of a generalised ethnic and regional struggle for self-determination since 1998, the location of often violent confrontations between local ethnic communities and agents of the Nigerian state and oil companies involved in the extraction and exploitation of oil in area. What began as community agitation has undoubtedly undergone several transformations. The first profound transformation was the flowering of civil society, which mobilised a popular civil struggle. In the second, the agitation was extended from that against multinational oil companies (MNCs) to include the Nigerian state. The third transformation involved the elevation of the agitation from purely developmental issues to include the political demands such as federal restructuring, resource control and the resolution of the national question through a conference of ethnic nationalities. The current and fourth stage of the transformation has seen the entrance of youths, youth militancy and youth militias with volatile demands and ultimatums that has elevated the scale of confrontations and violence with the multinationals and the state. The youths presently spearhead and constitute the vanguard of Niger-delta conflict. They chart the course of methods, tactics and strategies and define the conflicts. They drive and run the conflicts and determine the very essence of its momentum, vitality, vocalisation and diction. The insurgency has involved diverse youth militias, well armed, fairly well trained and equipped, using largely speed boats and operating fairly freely in the swamps, creeks, estuaries, rivers and coastal areas of the region, who engage the Nigerian military and seize oil facilities, ships, barges, workers and equipment. Increasingly, the youth militancy has become criminalised, with the region being transformed into an arena of economic crimes, violence and wars between ethnic and communal groups. The present youth-led collective action in the Niger-delta draws inspiration from the 1966 declaration of a Niger-delta republic by a group of educated youths led by cadet sub inspector Isaac Adaka Boro that involved an armed insurrection against the Nigerian state and the seizing of oil facilities. The conflicts have witnessed massive deployments of the Nigerian Army, Navy and other security agencies and represent the most prolonged, extensive and intensive internal military action since the Nigerian civil war», with devastating negative impact on local and national security and stability, and on global economic growth. The negative impact of violence associated with youth-led self-determination struggles in the Niger-delta raises the need for an in-depth examination of the youth, militias and self-determination nexus in the Niger-delta. In other words, there is a need to understand the history, changing contexts and local and social processes and dynamics of the conflicts in the Niger-delta to guide policy-making. Who are the main parties to the conflict? What are their perceptions, values, attitudes and interests? What has been the role of civil society, gender, local elite, traditional governance structures in the prosecution, sustenance and management of the conflicts? How do youths perceive, formulate and respond to the resource control struggles? What social, economic, cultural and political processes conduce with youth responses and methods? What are the methods, strategies and consequences of youth engagement? What is the nature of state, corporate and international perceptions, responses and interventions? What are the efforts and results of conflict containment, management and peacemaking efforts and peacekeeping efforts? The objectives of the study are to examine: a) The resource struggles and conflicts in the Niger-delta region and the role of youths in it; b) The objectives, methods, strategies and conducts of youth engagement; c) The youth movements and militias and their confrontations with the Nigerian state, MNCs and other ethnic groups/communities; d) The results, ramifications and implications of the conflicts; and e) The interventions and policies, their effectiveness or otherwise and efforts at peacemaking. Details: Dakar, Senegal: : Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2011. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: CODESRIA Research Reports: No. 5: Accessed March 23, 2011 at: http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/CDP_Nigeria2.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Economic Crimes Shelf Number: 121102 |
Author: Nigeria Watch Title: Annual Report on Public Violence Summary: The main causes of death due to public violence are, in order of importance, accidents, crime, economic issues, political clashes, and ethno-religious fighting. -Nigerian security forces still contribute substantially to violence. The more they intervene, the bloodier the fighting. Yet violence is decreasing, a trend that obviously impacts on the number of killings by the security forces. Our findings challenge the common assumption according to which criminal and political violence is on the rise. Details: Paris: CEPED (Centre Population & Développement), 2008. 2 vols. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2011 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?html=7 Year: 2008 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Crime Statistics Shelf Number: 121383 |
Author: Albin-Lackey, Chris Title: Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Summary: This report analyzes the successes and failures of Nigeria’s most promising effort to fight high-level corruption: the country’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). At its best, the EFCC has given Nigerians rare hope that the powerful might be held to account for their crimes. But the institution has ultimately fallen short of its promise and needs a change of course. Corruption on Trial? describes how a variety of factors have damaged the EFCC’s reputation and undermined its ability to fight high-level corruption in Nigeria’s political system. Some of these factors are largely of the EFCC’s own making. Others — like crippling patterns of political interference in the institution’s work and a lack of support from other key anti-corruption institutions — are systemic and larger than the EFCC itself. Based on interviews with current and former EFCC officials, civil society activists, lawyers, judges, key government officials and others, this report shows how the EFCC has fallen short on many fronts, but also lays out an agenda for Nigeria’s government and the EFCC to quickly start to fix these problems. Nigeria’s international partners also have a role to play. Western governments, in particular, should apply both pressure and support to ensure that the EFCC is truly independent and strengthened. They must also stop their own jurisdictions from serving as havens for stolen funds and should help ensure that corrupt officials in Nigeria and beyond are held to account. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2011 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0811WebPostR.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Financial Crimes Shelf Number: 122686 |
Author: Amunwa, Ben Title: Counting the Cost: Corporations and Human Rights Abuses in the Niger Delta Summary: This report examines the role of Shell in human rights abuses committed by Nigerian government forces and other armed groups between 2000 and 2010. It provides eight case studies, places them in wider social and environmental context and evaluates the level of legal, reputational and operational risk the company faces. Each case illustrates different but related ways that Shell’s conduct has led to repression and conflict. All eight cases are from the ‘eastern division’ of Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta, where the company first struck oil in commercial quantities in 1956. As the largest operator in the Delta, Shell is the focus of this report. But the issues, conclusions and recommendations apply to other oil companies operating in the region. The past decade in the Delta has brought brutal government crackdowns, the rise of armed groups and a multiplicity of intense conflicts. While primary responsibility for human rights violations falls on the Nigerian government and other perpetrators, Shell has played an active role in fuelling conflict and violence in a variety of forms. This report finds that: Shell’s close relationship with the Nigerian military exposes the company to charges of complicity in the systematic killing and torture of local residents. Testimony and contracts seen by Platform implicate Shell in regularly assisting armed militants with lucrative payments. In one case from 2010, Shell is alleged to have transferred over $159,000 to a group credibly linked to militia violence. Shell’s poor community engagement has provided the “catalyst” for major disruption, including one incident that shut down a third of Shell’s daily oil production in August 2011. In the absence of proper supervision and controls, Shell contractors, including multinationals like Halliburton, Daewoo and Saipem, have replicated many of Shell’s mistakes. Shell’s conduct in the Delta has local and global implications. Basic company errors have exacerbated violent conflicts in which entire communities have been destroyed. Billions have been lost in revenues to the government and oil companies, sending shockwaves through the global economy. These are not new phenomena. In 2003, a leaked internal report denounced Shell for its active involvement in the Delta conflict. Then, as now, Shell pledged to improve. But Platform’s report finds that Shell has not taken the necessary steps to de-militarise its operations in the Delta, resolve longstanding grievances and respect the human rights of local communities. The eight cases in this report are the thin end of the wedge. Many further cases of human rights abuse are associated with Shell’s operations in the western, central and outer Delta regions, as well as with Chevron, Eni and other oil companies and private military and security contractors (PMSCs). Given the widespread and systematic nature of the problem, this report aims to provide a cross-section, not a comprehensive overview. Platform believes there are many ways to address this urgent issue and at the end of this report puts forward key recommendations to the Nigerian authorities, Shell, shareholder investors and the UK, US and Dutch governments. Details: London: Platform, 2011. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 18, 2011 at: http://platformlondon.org/nigeria/Counting_the_Cost.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Corporate Crime Shelf Number: 123042 |
Author: Krause, Jana Title: A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria Summary: Over the last decade, a political crisis in Jos, capital of Nigeria’s Plateau State, has developed into a widespread, protracted communal conflict. Up to 7,000 people have been killed since riots broke out in the city in late 2001, and ten years later a fragile calm in the city is kept only by the heavy presence of military and police forces. The tensions between ethnic groups have been exacerbated by a combination of conflict over the allocation of resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination, and contested land rights. The presence of well-organized armed groups in rural areas, the proliferation of weapons, and the sharp rise in gun fatalities within Jos all point to a risk of future large-scale violence. A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria—a new Working Paper from the Geneva Declaration Secretariat—examines the root causes of conflict in Jos, mapping the spread of violence. The report first outlines the historical background and socio-economic characteristics of Plateau State, and then examines the causes of the conflict, and local perceptions of the current situation. After considering the characteristics of urban and rural violence, the report offers an overview of violence prevention and peace-building efforts. A Deadly Cycle is based on field research carried out in Jos in November and December 2010, including interviews with local residents, community and religious leaders, local NGO staff, journalists, university researchers, ward heads, and local politicians. Details: Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed November 10, 2011 at: http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/regional-publications/GD-WP-Jos-deadly-cycle.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Ethnic Violence Shelf Number: 123307 |
Author: Alkholt, Aimar Title: Nigerian Criminal Networks; A Comparative Analysis Summary: Why is an African federation the home to one of the more dominating criminal networks operating globally? Nigeria is not well known for its high level of Internet-infrastructure. Still, it is in a class of its own when it comes to e-fraud or 419 spam mails. It is also prominent within the drug trade and the African-European trafficking network. By comparatively analysing other forms of Organized Crime against the Nigerian Brand, the thesis has tried to find the particulars of Nigerian Criminal Networks. The thesis found two particular indicators that stood out in the analysis: Social Networking and the 419 industry. Also, by looking at the level of integration between Nigerian politics and Criminal Networks and the argumentation used by agents within the Criminal Networks and the dynamics of the Nigerian E-fraud, this thesis argues that the same socio-cultural dynamics stemming from before the colonial period of the "great scramble" to present time, is the very same driving force behind Nigerian Criminal Networks today, forming an "Internet Economy of Affection". A general trend points in the direction that individuals growing up in the Nigerian federation seem to have a higher potential for social networking since their weak state gives them little protection in economic, welfare, security and educational spheres. They have to rely on the informal sector instead: the sphere of social networking. This may be one facet and first step toward the complex explanation how the dynamics of e-fraud, trafficking and drug-trade in Nigerian Criminal Networks, works at present. Details: Bergen, Norway: University of Bergen, Department of Administration and Organization Theory, 2010. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Criminal Networks Shelf Number: 123356 |
Author: Watts, Michael Title: Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict, Violence and Political Disorder in the Niger Delta Summary: The Niger delta has become the home of an oil insurgency (see Obi 2004): remotely detonated car bombs and highly sophisticated arms and equipment are the tools of the trade; over 250 foreign hostages have been abducted in the last fifteen months and close to 1000 Nigerian workers detained or held hostage on facilities; major and often spectacular attacks on and on and off shore facilities are endemic and can be perpetrated at will. Unlike the 1980s or 1990s, militants are willing and able to directly confront federal and state security forces. The vast cache of sophisticated arms are skillfully deployed in an environment - the mangrove creeks running for hundreds of miles along the Bight of Benin - in which the Nigerian security forces to quote the new Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan “cannot cope with the situation” (Daily Trust, February 27th 2007). According to a World Bank report (Jua 2007), over 600 people have been killed in the course of these conflicts -often engagements between militias and the joint military task forces - since 2000. Pipeline breaks due to vandalization and sabotage have almost doubled between 1999 and 2004 (from 497 to 895); product loss (in metric tons) due to pipeline ruptures have grown steadily from 179,000 to 396,000 metric tons over the same period (a figure roughly equal to four supertankers) [see STATOIL 2006: 25]. The direct assaults on oil installations and infrastructure cost the Nigerian government $6.8 billion losses in revenue between 1999-2004 but in the last three years the figure has increased dramatically (currently the conflicts cost Nigeria $60 million per day, roughly $4.4 billion per annum in damages and lost revenue (www.strategypage.com/qnd/nigeria/20070630.aspx). In May 2007 Nigeria drew upon $2.7 billion from its ‘domestic excess crude’ (a windfall profits account) to plug revenues shortfalls from oil deferment. President Obasanjo ordered the military in mid-2006 to adopt a ‘force for force’ policy in the delta in a vain effort to gain control of the creeks; in early 2007 the Nigerian navy had embarked upon its biggest sea maneuver in two decades deploying 13 warships, four helicopters and four boats to the Bight of Bonny to test ‘operational capability’. Yet the month of May 2007, according to a Norwegian consulting company BergenRiskSolutions (BergenRiskSolutions2007), witnessed the largest monthly tally of attacks since the appearance of a shadowy but militarily wellarmed insurgent group called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) eighteen months ago. Many of the oil-producing communities across the delta are torn apart by all manner of internal (for example Nembe or Finima) and inter-community (Ogoni-Andoni) conflicts or both (Soku-Kula-Oluasiri)3. There has certainly been no period since the first oil boom – palm oil in the nearly nineteenth century – in which the delta has been in such turmoil other than the civil war. The conflicts have an organic connection to oil but their genealogies are complex: in some cases communities fight over land and territorial disputes over oil bearing lands (Odiama); in some cases they are successional disputes, often of great historical depth, driven by the prospect of access to oil rents and company cash payments (Okrika) compounded by party politics; in other youth groups struggle among themselves or with elders over access to companies (Nembe); and in other cases they are sectional and communal, as ethnic communities in multi-ethnic settings, rural and urban, struggle over the establishment of electoral wards or local government councils to ensure they too can feed at the oil trough (Warri). The social forces are at once ethnic, generation, gender, class (chiefs, politicians), corporate and of course state (military and security). Conflicted communities across the oilfields entail complex configurations of such forces. They constitute a social field of violence in which the delta is now embroiled is a multi-headed hydra. Details: Berkeley, CA: Department of Geography, University of California, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 16: Accessed August 10, 2012 at: http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/16-Watts.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Natural Resources (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 125958 |
Author: Watts, Michael Title: Crude Politics: Life and Death on the Nigerian Oil Fields Summary: Nigeria is an oil-rich petro-state but its developmental record in one of catastrophic failure (Ahmad and Singh 2003). According to IMF, the $700 billion in oil revenues since 1960 have added almost nothing to the standard of living of the average Nigerian. Eighty-five per cent percent of oil revenues accrue to one percent of the population and a huge proportion of the country’s wealth – perhaps 40% or more, has been stolen. Over the last decade GDP per capita and life expectancy have, according to World Banks, both fallen. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2005), ranks Nigeria in terms of human development - a composite measure of life expectancy, income, and educational attainment – on par with Haiti and Congo. Why has such extraordinary oil wealth – and the developmental opportunities it affords - generated nothing more than violence, rage, disillusionment and catastrophically failed development? Why has the heart of the Nigerian petrostate degenerated into a zone of insurrection and how has the political nerve centre of the country, the Muslim north, come to be a breeding ground for radical Islamists? Both of these questions are related in complex ways to oil, to the fact that oil (and gas) saturates, provides the ether, the political, economic, cultural and ideological realities of contemporary Nigeria. Details: Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 2009. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 25: Accessed August 11, 2012 at: http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/Watts_25.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Natural Resources (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 125989 |
Author: Joab-Peterside, Sofiri Title: Green Governance: The Case of Akassa Community Forests Management And Development Plan Summary: For over a decade, there are raging development crises revolving around environmental degradation, legal regimes and institutional frameworks governing oil and other natural resources all of which jeopardize the region’s development. Policies regarding land tenure and resource access are of great significance for assuring the sustainable management and use of natural resources in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria where majority of the people still rely heavily on their natural resources to provide income, employment and livelihoods. Customary tenure systems remain the predominant means through which people manage and gain access to land and other natural resources. These systems are based on the values of the local people to the extent that these values confer legitimacy on the decision making process. The general characteristics of customary tenure systems include the inalienability of land so that families have secure and inheritable land holdings that cannot be traded freely on the market. Inhabitants of the Delta depend on natural resources for livelihood, thus their main economic activities are fishing and farming. This means much dependence on productivity of land and water. In context, natural resources refers to any material in its natural state that when extracted has economic value. This include not only timber, land, oil and gas, coal, minerals, lakes and submerged lands, but also features which supply human need and contribute to the health, welfare and benefit of a community(Odje, 2003). Consequently, demand for resource control in the area is not limited to and synonymous with only oil and gas. It includes the ability to control, develop, explore and sell any natural resource located in the region. Environmental problems in the Niger Delta are enormous and growing. Consequently, environmental concerns are serious issues that can yield substantial development dividend. Thus, there are emerging pressures for improved environmental management arising from public awareness of linkage between environmental issues and natural resource management. The belief among development practitioners is that improved community-driven natural resources management by decentralized institutional structures could contribute to better resource governance and long-term poverty reduction. A successful management regime must derive from consensus among key stake holders and contending community forces, because governance failures in natural resources can lead to conflict and ultimately to violence. Details: Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 2007. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper, no. 19: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/19-Joab-Peterside.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Forests Shelf Number: 126048 |
Author: Ojakorotu, Victor Title: Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria Summary: This book is a collection of excellent academic materials by experienced and renowned scholars who have critically analyzed the devastating age-long oil violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Beyond examining the origin and nature of the conflict, it also emphasizes the way forward for the Niger Delta, based on the various empirical studies by the contributors on the current developments in the region. Some of the chapters extensively interrogated the peace and development implications of President Yar‘Adua‘s amnesty policy on the Niger Delta since 2009. Although ‗subdued oil violence‘ has been around for several decades, the emergence of organized non-state armed groups in the 1990s has added a new and explosive dimension to the Delta imbroglio. Violent protests and the threat of outright rebellion against the state are now ubiquitous. Clearly, environmental activism and militancy are a direct response to the cumulative years of sustained environmental degradation, despoliation, hazards, impunity, human rights violations, repression, underdevelopment and outright neglect of the region by the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies. Since the Niger Delta conflict is not a one-sided issue but a complexity of many interrelated problems, this book will not only expose students, researchers, professionals and statesmen/policy makers to the current developments in the region, but it also provide answers to some pertinent contemporary questions concerning the ‗oil gift‘, which has become a curse to the host communities of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Details: Johannesburg: Monash University, 2010. 168p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2012 at http://www.iags.org/Niger_Delta_book.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Natural Resources (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 126278 |
Author: Onuoha, Freedom C. Title: Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as Microcosm Summary: The resurgence of pirate attacks in African waters is now a subject of serious concern to African states and indeed the international community. For the last decade, piracy in African waters is concentrated in three main regions, namely the Somali coast/the Gulf of Aden along the East African Coast; Nigeria’s territorial waters in West Africa; and the Mozambique Channel/Cape sea route in Southern Africa. Since 2007 when African waters overtook waters off Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Philippines – as the traditionally dangerous hotspots of global piracy, much of the international attention and efforts at countering piracy in Africa have been on Somali maritime piracy. This is understandably so, because piracy off the Somali coast accounts for more than half of pirate attacks recorded annually in Africa, if not globally. For instance, there were 439 piracy attacks worldwide in 2011, more than half of which were attributed to Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of Oman (Alessi, 2012). The spike in attacks prompted the deployment in 2008 of an ongoing international coalition of navies to fight Somali piracy. Yet violence at sea is also brewing in another African gulf: the Gulf of Guinea (GG). The increase in the number of attacks in 2011 in the GG and the fear that this would further increase in 2012 have prompted analysts to question whether foreign 3 navies will intervene to shore up maritime security in the region as they did in waters off the coast of Somalia (Baldauf, 2012). It is in this light that this article examines the dynamics of piracy in the GG region by highlighting, the trend in piracy in the region, contributing factors underlying the scourge, implications of piracy for the region and efforts being made to suppress violence at sea in the region. Details: Doha, Qatar: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2012. 12p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 1, 2012 at http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/6/12/201261294647291734Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Maritime Crime Shelf Number: 126543 |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence Summary: Since 2009, acts of violence by the Islamist armed group known as Boko Haram have been carried out across northern and central Nigeria with increasing sophistication and deadliness. Nigeria’s security forces have perpetrated serious human rights violations in their response – including enforced disappearance, extrajudicial executions, house burning and unlawful detention. at the same time, the Nigerian government has failed to adequately prevent or investigate the attacks or to bring perpetrators to justice. This cycle of attacks and counter-attacks has been marked by unlawful violence on both sides, with devastating consequences for the human rights of the people trapped in the middle. They live in considerable fear and insecurity, unprotected from attacks by Boko Haram and facing human rights violations at the hands of the very state security forces mandated with their protection. This report presents research gathered by Amnesty International during visits to Nigeria between February and July 2012. it details human rights abuses and violations in northern and central Nigeria and includes testimonies from survivors and victims’ families. The report sets out key recommendations for the Nigerian government to ensure that human rights violations are not perpetrated by its security forces in the name of national security. it urges the government of Nigeria to fulfil its duty to take measures to prevent and protect civilians from attack and to investigate all such crimes, and to bring to justice those responsible. Details: London: Amnesty International, 2012. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2012 at: http://allafrica.com/view/resource/main/main/id/00050475.html Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Extrajudicial Executions Shelf Number: 126877 |
Author: Brandt, Chris Title: Young People and the Police in Lagos Summary: The relationship between young people and the police has normally been characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility. However, in Nigeria, very little data has been collected regarding this seemingly acrimonious relationship. Given the current political and social dynamics in Nigeria, it’s important to better understand the attitudes young people and police hold towards each other. Today, the police often pay special attention to the activities of young people, largely because of the perceived increase in youth crime in recent years. Pressure from both the media and elites on the police to crack down on young delinquents has brought about increased contact between juveniles and the police and led to the use of more aggressive forms of intervention (Alder et.al, 1992). A natural consequence of these negative interactions is mutual tension and suspicion. The negative relationship has several unsettling consequences. Young people, feeling persecuted and targeted by the police, are less likely to report criminal activities or seek out help when they are in distress. The hostile relationship also contributes to increased criminal activity among juveniles ( Alemika and Chukwuma, 2001). Young people, viewing the police with little respect or legitimacy, feel emboldened to commit criminal acts. This study was conceived against the backdrop of the palpable dangers posed to citizen safety and public order by an adversarial relationship between young people and the police. It sets out to explore and empirically determine the nature of the relationship between youths and the police in Lagos State, to establish the factors that define it, and to provide recommendations for how to improve it. Details: Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundations, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2012 at: http://www.cleen.org/Young%20people%20and%20the%20police%20in%20Lagos%20State.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Juvenile Offenders Shelf Number: 127043 |
Author: Alemika, E.O Title: Criminal Victimization, Safety and Policing in Nigeria Summary: The significance of reliable data and statistics on the extent and pattern of crimes and victimization in a nation and its different constituent political administrative units is recognized by criminologists, criminal justice officials and criminal justice policy-makers. However, the production of accurate crime and victimization data has been characterized by many problems. Some of the problems of collection and production of accurate crime and victimization are inherent in the nature of criminal activities, including efforts by criminals to conceal their actions and evade detection and arrest, capacity and practices of criminal justice agencies (police, courts and prisons). Information on crimes and victimization are obtained from three different sources: official statistics produced by criminal justice agencies (police, courts, prosecutors, prisons, etc.); self-report surveys which collect information (through questionnaire and interviews) from individuals on their involvement in any criminal activities, usually during the preceding twelve months, and victim surveys which obtain information from individuals and households (through questionnaires and interviews) on their criminal victimization experience during the preceding twelve months. The three sources provide indicators of level of victimization and criminality and complement each other, though they do not fully resolve the problems of incomplete information on crime and victimization. Nigeria lacks reliable criminal statistical system as a result of several factors, including: a. Lack of appreciation of the significance of evidence-based policy, operations and practice; b. Neglect of collection, analysis and utilization of crime and victimization surveys as essential input to planning, operations and administration; c. Lack of necessary capacity for the collection, analysis, utilization, storage and retrieval of essential data and information. CLEEN Foundation pioneered the conduct of large scale national criminal victimization survey based on multi-stage cluster and proportionate sampling methods. The Foundation piloted criminal victimization survey in Lagos in 2004 and subsequently conducted national criminal victimization surveys in respect of 2005 and 2006. The findings of the 2005 and 2006 national criminal victimization surveys have been published as research monographs1. Another survey covering 2007-20092 was conducted in early 2010, the major findings of which are presented in chapter two of this book. The aim of this book is to provide a comparative analysis of the data collected through three rounds of national criminal victimization surveys in Nigeria. The chapters in the book analysed different themes and provided summary of findings and recommendations. Details: Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundations, 2011. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2012 at: http://www.cleen.org/Crime%20Victimization%20Safety%20and%20Policing%20in%20Nigeria.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 127119 |
Author: Collier, Paul Title: Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria Summary: Elections are now common in low-income societies. However, they are frequently flawed. We investigate a Nigerian election seriously marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on anti-violence campaigning. The campaign appealed to collective action through electoral participation, and worked through town meetings, popular theaters, and door-to-door distribution of materials. We find that the campaign reduced the intensity of violence, as measured by independent sources. We also observe an increase on voter turnout, and infer that the intimidation was dissociated from incumbents. These effects are accompanied by improved perceptions of security and empowerment to counteract violence. Details: Dublin: Department of Economics, trinity College Dublin, 2011. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://www.pedrovicente.org/violence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Electoral Politics Shelf Number: 127605 |
Author: Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria Title: Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria: Final Report Summary: Official debates about police reform in Nigeria and committees established by successive governments to facilitate such discussions and recommendations of measures for implementation have mostly been dominated by people with a security background who view such assignments as their exclusive preserve. As a result, their reports have often focussed on increasing policing capacity in the areas of personnel strength, materials for work and welfare; as though once these are right, the NPF will be super effective and efficient. While not belittling the significant difference a properly resourced NPF can make in addressing the safety and security challenges currently. Details: Lagos, Nigeria: Civil Society Panel, 2012. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Police Reform Shelf Number: 127737 |
Author: CLEEN Foundation Title: Operationalizing Intelligence-Led Policing in Nigeria Summary: Law enforcement agencies in various parts of the world are currently witnessing serious challenges from organized crimes, insurgencies and terrorism. In Nigeria, the crime situation is worrisome because every geo-political zone is witnessing various types of violent crimes and conflicts. In the South-South Zone, armed robbery, kidnapping, sabotage of petroleum production facilities by militant youths led by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) are prevalent. The South East and South West are noted for organized crimes including drug and human trafficking, armed robbery/banditry, kidnapping/ hostage-taking, pipeline vandalism, arms trafficking etc. Cutting across the three northern geo-political zones are the destabilizing issues of indigene/ settler internecine conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts and religious insurgency led by a group known as Jamâ’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lâdda’awatih wal-Jihad (popularly referred to as Boko Haram). The phenomenon of crime is so prevalent that almost everyone in Nigeria knows somebody who has been robbed or even killed in the most gruesome circumstances, in spite of unceasing war on crime waged by the nation’s police and security agencies. These challenges indicate that security personnel are yet to meet the expectations for quality services delivery particularly in preventing terror attacks and the activities of extremists, as well as being more pragmatic and innovative in response to numerous challenges posed by this problem to public safety and security in Nigeria. The 6th edition of the Policing Executive Forum was driven by these identified gaps within the polity and hence the theme “Operationalizing Intelligence-led policing in Nigeria”. Its overriding aim was to initiate discourse aimed at operationalizing Intelligence led Policing in Nigeria. Intelligence-led Policing as a concept extends beyond the institution of the Nigeria Police Force and embraces all security agencies involved in general provision of public safety and security. It is a process for systematically collecting, organizing, analyzing, and utilizing intelligence to guide law enforcement operations. Details: Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundation, 2012. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series. No 17; Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.cleen.org/Operationalizing%20Intelligence%20led-policing%20in%20Nigeria.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Intelligence-Led Policing Shelf Number: 128403 |
Author: Alemika, Etannibi E.O. Title: Criminal Victimization, Policing and Governance in Nigeria Summary: Crime victimization survey provides valuable information for understanding the extent, trend and pattern of crime victimization in a community or nation. It also provides data on the nature and perception of crime and disorder problems. Crime victimization surveys provide the government with information on citizens’ perception of the quality and problems of security, policing and governance. The principal aim of this survey is to generate reliable data on crime victimization, fear of crime, feeling of safety, policing and governance in Nigeria that can be used to develop and implement policies and strategies that will promote effective security and criminal justice administration in the country. Crime survey using a national representative sample was pioneered in Nigeria by CLEEN Foundation. This survey in 2011 is a continuation of previous rounds of crime victim survey for 2005, 2006, 2007- 2009; 2010 and published (Alemika, Igbo and Nnnorom 2006; Alemika and Chukwuma 2007; Alemika and Chukwuma 2011). Details: Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundation, 2013. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph series No. 18: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.cleen.org/Criminal%20Victimization.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Crime Statistics Shelf Number: 128404 |
Author: Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria Title: Final Report Summary: Official debates about police reform in Nigeria and committees established by successive governments to facilitate such discussions and recommendations of measures for implementation have mostly been dominated by people with a security background who view such assignments as their exclusive preserve. As a result, their reports have often focussed on increasing policing capacity in the areas of personnel strength, materials for work and welfare; as though once these are right, the NPF will be super effective and efficient. While not belittling the significant difference a properly resourced NPF can make in addressing the safety and security challenges currently confronting Nigeria, experience from other jurisdictions has shown that it requires more than this for the police to win the confidence of the people and be effective in carrying out their functions. Community support and participation are critical to improving police performance, and if the people are not consulted and their priorities factored into the reform process, their support for reform programs can not be guaranteed. 1 It was with this in mind, that when the Federal Government inaugurated another Committee on reform of the NPF in February 2012 and appeared to be following the same procedure as in the past, civil society groups working on police reform in Nigeria felt they should do more than send another round of memoranda. They decided to set up a parallel but complementary Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria (CSO Panel). The Panel used a variety of complementary methodological approaches in carrying out its functions. These were: review of extant literature, which helped it to properly situate its work and enrich its understanding of the issues at play; call for memoranda to enable members of the public who wanted to contribute to work of the Panel to send written presentations; organisation of public hearings in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria and the Federal Capital which provided an opportunity for members of the public to make presentations in person; bilateral interaction with key actors in the field; and a validation workshop where the key findings of the CSO Panel were presented to civil society representatives. The effective combination of these approaches enhanced the Panel’s appreciation of the issues involved in its work and placed it in a privileged position to offer the recommendations contained in this report. Details: Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria, 2012. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2013 at: http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Police Reform Shelf Number: 128425 |
Author: Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: In its latest report, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, the International Crisis Group examines the emergence, rise and evolution of a movement whose four-year insurgency has killed thousands, displaced close to a million, destroyed public infrastructure and weakened the country's already poor economy, particularly in the North East. The government's failure to provide security and basic services makes poor youth, in particular, an easy recruitment target for anti-state militias. As Boko Haram's network expands into Cameroon and Niger, a military response is not enough. Only deep political and socio-economic reform can ease the injustices that fuel the insurgency. The report's major findings and recommendations are: - Boko Haram's evolution since 2002 is strongly linked to failed governance, economic hardship, rising social inequality, corruption and impunity. Most Nigerians are poorer today than at independence in 1960. Poverty is most dire in the north, where Boko Haram, the latest of many northern fundamentalist movements, has tapped into Muslim revivalism and hopes to establish an Islamic state. - Since 2010, the group's campaign has grown, targeting not only security forces and politicians, but also civilians, traditional and religious leaders, public institutions, the UN presence and schools. It is more dispersed than ever, with many leaders in Cameroon and Niger, both of which are poorly equipped to address an armed Islamist threat. Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau, seems to have little control over its factions, including Ansaru, which focuses on foreign targets. - Insecurity in much of the north may also worsen political violence and undermine the credibility of the 2015 elections, further damaging government legitimacy. -Federal and state governments must end impunity by prosecuting crimes by security services, government officials and Boko Haram members alike, and urgently develop and implement a socio-economic intervention program for the North East region. - Civic education to halt politicisation of religions, effective development and anti-corruption efforts, and police who are seen as partners to citizens are all vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 216: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Homicides Shelf Number: 1132191 |
Author: Sodipo, Michael Olufemi Title: Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria Summary: Ongoing attacks by Boko Haram and other violent Islamist groups coupled with an at times arbitrary response by Nigerias security forces have contributed to a deteriorating security situation in the north. Increasingly frequent attacks and bombings also mask longer-running radicalization dynamics. A sustained approach targeting every stage of the radicalization spectrum, from addressing socioeconomic grievances, to cross-cultural peacebuilding initiatives, to rehabilitating radicalized members of violent Islamist groups, as well as a more measured use of force are needed to reverse this broader trend. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2013. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 26: Accessed May 7, 2014 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ASB-26-Aug-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 132281 |
Author: Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I) : The Jos Crisis Summary: This report, the first in a series that examines insecurity in three regions of Nigeria, explores the dynamics of the recurring violence in Plateau state predominantly as a settler indigene issue. It situates the violence within the historical evolution of this phenomenon in the Nigerian, Middle Belt and Jos contexts. The Jos crises mirror other parts of the country, but there is a specific local dimension with the indigenous groups ranged against the Hausa-Fulani. The latter is not only the most politically dominant ethnic group in the country; historically its relations with much of the Middle Belt have been characterised by tension arising from its attempts to subjugate and repress the BAA. The Hausa-Fulani are the only community that claims to be also indigene, which is why violence has not implicated other settler groups such as the Igbo, Urhobo and Yoruba, except as collateral victims. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 196: Accessed May 15, 2014 at: http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/33468/1/196-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-i-the-jos-crisis.pdf?1 Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Violence (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 132373 |
Author: Blanchard, Lauren Ploch Title: Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions Summary: Boko Haram, a violent Nigerian Islamist movement, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in recent years, drawing on a narrative of resentment and vengeance for state abuses to elicit recruits and sympathizers. The group's April 2014 abduction of almost 300 schoolgirls has drawn international attention, including from the Obama Administration and Members of Congress. Periodic attacks against foreign targets in the region and growing evidence of ties to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional terrorist network affiliated with Al Qaeda, have also raised the concern of U.S. policymakers. The State Department named several individuals linked to Boko Haram, including its leader, Abubakar Shekau, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists in 2012, and Boko Haram was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department in November 2013. The Obama Administration does not currently consider Boko Haram to be an affiliate of Al Qaeda. More than 4,000 people are estimated to have been killed in Boko Haram-related violence, making it one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. U.N. and Nigerian officials report that more than 6 million Nigerians have been affected by the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, and more than 300,000 have been displaced. The group has focused on a wide range of targets, but civilians in the impoverished, predominately Muslim northeast have borne the brunt of the violence. Nigeria's heavy-handed response to Boko Haram's insurgent and terrorist operations has also taken a toll on civilians and complicated U.S. efforts to pursue greater counterterrorism cooperation with the Nigerian government, in spite of shared concerns about Boko Haram and its ties to regional and international terrorist groups and operatives. Coordination on counterterrorism efforts has also been hampered at times by a lack of cooperation from Nigerian officials. U.S. policy toward Boko Haram reflects both the Administration's perception of the threat the group poses and the strategic importance of the U.S. relationship with Nigeria. At this point, Boko Haram appears to pose a threat primarily to stability in northern Nigeria, and potentially to surrounding areas in neighboring countries. Some of Boko Haram's attacks have targeted Christian communities in the north, threatening to fuel existing religious tensions in the country. The group also poses a threat to international targets, including Western citizens, in the region. The Nigerian government has struggled to respond to the growing threat posed by Boko Haram. Multiple factors have constrained the Nigerian security force response, notably security sector corruption and mismanagement. By many accounts, Nigerian troops are not adequately resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency. The government has been criticized in domestic and international press reports for what has been widely perceived as a slow response to the abduction of the schoolgirls in April, and to offers of international assistance in support of the investigation and possible rescue efforts. To date, it remains unclear to what extent Nigerian officials are cooperating with foreign advisors and experts, including those from the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 23p. Source: CRS Report: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2014 at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 132425 |
Author: Walker, Andrew Title: What Is Boko Haram? Summary: The group Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, known the world over as Boko Haram, is an extremist Islamic sect in Nigeria that has created havoc across the north of the country and in the capital, Abuja. Its violent attacks on government offices, the United Nations, and churches threaten to destabilize the country. A range of conflicting narratives has grown up around Boko Haram, and the group's origins, motivations, and future plans remain a matter of debate. This report addresses the questions stemming from these narratives and suggests how the group can be contained. The report is based on the author's extensive research and reporting on Boko Haram. In March 2011, he conducted an interview with a senior member of the group in the city of Maiduguri, Nigeria, the center of Boko Haram's area of influence. The report also draws on interviews with Nigerian journalists who have covered the group (and who asked to remain anonymous in this report) and on information provided to the author by other researchers working on Boko Haram. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 308: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 132605 |
Author: Olojo, Akinola Title: Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram Summary: Over the past decade, the northern region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites. These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This paper argues that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state. This paper therefore presents the case for a thorough examination of the factors that have inspired public support for Boko Haram and the trajectory of the group's mobilisation of various forms of support in northern Nigeria. This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general difficulty which research in the field of (counter-)terrorism encounters while trying to gather primary source data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zones of conflict. Nevertheless, the author of this paper has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through interviews and research reports. Two central questions at the core of this study include: To what extent do socio-economic issues such as poverty and underdevelopment among youths, the role of religion, and political interests explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram? Second, how can the existing leadership in Nigeria address the escalating crisis; and what role can institutional leadership at the local, national and regional levels play in addressing the problem? One of the theoretical considerations in this paper relates to the structural violence paradigm. Its suggestion of how economic deprivation, class discrimination and societal injustice prevent citizens from reaching their full potential helps to place in context the influence which socio-economic drivers exert on public support for Boko Haram. The awareness that a lack of economic, social and/or political development feeds into the structural factors conducive to terrorism is not new; it already played a prominent role in the first ever resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) on counter-terrorism in 1972 (GA Resolution 3034). In fact, the logic of the structural violence paradigm, as advocated by its chief proponent Johan Galtung, underscores how socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions act as indirect instigators of violence. Individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. The relevance of this can also be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being conceptualised within the framework of human security. As already noted, these issues collectively inform one of the central questions of this study primarily because of its causal link with the crisis context of northern Nigeria. While this is the case, the structural violence approach may very well lose some of its potency when evaluated based on the accounts of other country/conflict settings. Even in the Nigerian situation, and as this paper will further highlight, while structural violence helps to explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram, it nonetheless remains inadequate as a single factor instigating the crisis. Indeed, not every Boko Haram member that has engaged in violence is socio-economically deprived. At the same time, not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of terror perpetrated by the group. Therefore, this study acknowledges that there will always be nuances reflected in varying contexts both within and outside the Nigerian case study. After briefly tracing the course of Boko Haram's emergence as a group, this paper will shed light on the bearing which political and elite interests may have exerted on public support for Boko Haram. Subsequently, the socio-economic context of the crisis will be examined with a view to determining the degree to which it incites public support for Boko Haram. Beyond these issues are other intervening variables that are frequently at play within the Nigerian state. The fifth section will focus on the most important among these, probing the catalytic role of religion and how this has been exploited by the group in generating mass appeal in the north. The sixth part will explore the often assumed external dimension of Boko Haram's activities within the context of weapons, terrorist funding and foreign fighters. The concluding sections will underscore what is instructive about the lessons emerging from the undercurrents of public support for the group, while also reflecting on implications for the development of more robust and concerted counter-terrorism policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 20 p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 132671 |
Author: Onuoha, Freedom C. Title: Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? Summary: Summary - Since Nigeria's return to democracy in May 1999, armed nonstate groups have significantly undermined the country's internal security environment, largely using young men as foot soldiers. Among these groups, Boko Haram has grown to become a serious national, regional, and international concern. Estimates of the death toll from Boko Haram attacks since 2009 range as high as ten thousand fatalities. With Boko Haram and other groups seemingly gaining in strength, questions arise as to why young men join them in the first place and what the government and other actors can do to prevent it. - Surveys, interviews, and focus groups conducted in Nigeria in 2013 suggest that poverty,unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for activities ranging from errand running to suicide bombings. - To weaken the armed groups' abilities to radicalize and recruit young men, the Nigerian government at all levels, perhaps with support from interested international actors, could institute monitoring and regulation of religious preaching; strengthen education, job training, and job creation programs; design robust programs to aid destitute children; promote peace education; and embark on an anticorruption campaign. Addressing the conditions that make it possible for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 348: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: At-risk Youth Shelf Number: 132797 |
Author: CLEEN Foundation Title: Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria Summary: The violent activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, which draws its members largely from the youth, have underpinned growing concern over youth radicalization and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. Radicalisation as it is understood here entails the process by which an individual or group transits from a state of passive reception of revolutionary, militant or extremist views, ideas and beliefs to active pursuit of the ideals of such views, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving such intentions. It is such transition that underlies violent extremism or terrorism. Against this backdrop, this study examined the reason young Nigerians are inclined to being part of insurgent groups, particularly Boko Haram. The aim of the study was to provide a better understanding of the underlying drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria, and proffer alternative approaches to addressing the crisis. The specific objectives of the study were to: Provide an empirical understanding and assessment of the push and pull factors between youth, radicalisation and affiliation with insurgent groups in the northern part of Nigeria; Identify the patterns, prevalence and potential threats of youth radicalization to the security situation in Northern Nigeria; and Proffer actionable recommendations on how to tackle the root causes of the crisis. The study gathered evidence of the drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria through a combination of desk review of secondary materials such as media reports, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, and primary research involving the conduct of key informant interviews, administration of questionnaires and focus group discussions. Commissioned consultants and researchers conducted the field study in two towns in six states in Northern Nigeria - Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe - selected for the study. It found that ignorance of the true teachings of the religion (Islam) provides the most important source through which youths acquire radical or distorted views of religion, often propagated by roaming (independent) preachers. Furthermore, economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation by extremist or terrorist groups. The study also found that the excesses of security forces are not a 'major' factor in youth radicalisation, contrary to the popular assumption in some quarters. However, obvious shortcomings of security forces deployed in counter Boko Haram operations need to be urgently addressed by the appropriate authorities. In order to effectively respond to the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria, the study recommended, among others, better monitoring and regulation of religious preaching in Nigeria; creation of job opportunities for the youth; delivery of robust rehabilitation programmes for destitute children; expansion of access to quality education; and promotion of peace education. In view of some limitations encountered, the study concluded that there was still much to be done in unpacking the intricacies of youth radicalisation, particularly in relation to the specificities of each state where the phenomenon of radicalisation has and is taking place in Northern Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the utility of the study lies in the fact that it has taken the very important first step towards understanding the key drivers of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria through an empirical research. The distance it has not covered should inform further action on the part of government, civil society groups and academics in the quest to find the drivers of, and sustainable solutions to, growing radicalisation and extremism in Nigeria. Details: Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2014. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series, No. 20: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: At-risk Youth Shelf Number: 132802 |
Author: Nwalozie, Joel Chijioke Title: Armed Robbery In Nigeria - A Qualitative Study Of Young Male Robbers Summary: This is a Nigerian study, which initially aimed to examine armed robbery culture and the youth subculture. With the employment of subcultural theory, the study became intellectually unviable in explaining the primary data. A replacement was made by seeking recourse to anomie-strain theory and control theory to explain the data. Presently, the main aim of this study is to examine the involvement of youths in armed robbery. Specifically, the study will look at armed robbery from the point of view of offenders and the factors responsible for their crime. Armed robbery is a type of robbery aided by weapon(s) to threaten, force and deprive a person or persons of the right to private, public or corporate belongings. Since the end of the Nigeria civil war (1967-1970), the offence has become a problem in the country, occurring almost on a daily basis in the urban areas more than the rural. Armed robbery can take place in residential homes, commercial places, motorways and any other place the offenders may deem necessary to operate. The current criminal climate has made it possible for armed robbers to engage in interstate criminal operations as well. Methodologically, the research is qualitative, involving semi-structured face-to-face oral interviews (open-ended) with 20 armed robbers in prison custody in Nigeria. There is also an unstructured interview with 4 members of the criminal justice system in Nigeria. The analytical framework employed is interpretive phenomenology, to capture the holistic worldview of the offender sample. Secondary data comes from both the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigeria Prison Service records. Findings are presented under four systematic themes: family circumstances, economic motivations, life course engagement, and situational dynamics in carrying out a robbery. Data reveal the four most significant factors in the hierarchy of response (bad friends, money, poverty and corruption) that may account for the involvement of youths in armed robbery. Since the group of "bad friends" is the main catalyst responsible for the involvement of youths in armed robbery, the thesis concludes that this sample of respondents be regarded as a network of criminals who were strained by the unjust social structure in their native Nigeria. Besides, there is need for a Nigerian criminological theoretical framework that offers an in-depth explanation of crime in the Nigerian society. Details: Manchester, UK: School of Law, University of Manchester, 2011. 319p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 9, 2014 at: https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:155586&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Armed Robbery (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 133188 |
Author: Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict Title: "Who Will Care for Us?" - Grave Violations against Children in Northeastern Nigeria Summary: Conflict between the armed group Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), commonly known as Boko Haram, Nigerian security forces, and civilian self-defense militias, is ravaging Nigeria's fragile northeast. Over the last few years the level of violence and the scale of violations against children have worsened. While the abduction of over 200 girls from Chibok in Borno State has shed some light on these atrocities, much of the impact of the conflict on children is not well understood or addressed. Following a six-week research mission between March and May 2014, Watchlist found that parties to the conflict have subjected boys and girls to forced recruitment, attacks on their schools, killing and maiming, abductions, rape and sexual violence, and arbitrary detention. The humanitarian response has been slow, fragmented, and unable to meet the fast-growing needs of those affected by the conflict. The government of Nigeria, in collaboration with humanitarian, United Nations, and non-governmental actors, needs to take steps to strengthen data collection and programming to support children affected by conflict, to adopt operating procedures to manage children encountered in armed groups, and to expand and implement strategies to promote school safety and security. Details: New York: Watchlist for Children and Armed Conflict, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://watchlist.org/who-will-care-for-us-grave-violations-against-children-in-northeastern-nigeria/ Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Child Kidnapping Shelf Number: 133261 |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp". Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria Summary: In April 2014, the Islamist group Boko Haram abducted 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State, in Nigeria's northeast. The group has abducted more than 500 women and girls from Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States since 2009. Based field research in northeast Nigeria and Abuja, the capital city, including interviews with women and girls who escaped abduction or were freed from captivity, social workers, journalists, religious leaders, civil society workers, state and federal government officials, and witnesses of abductions, "Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp" documents how Boko Haram targets women and girls. The report highlights the harrowing experiences of some of the abducted women and girls, many of whom have endured physical and psychological abuse, forced conversions, coerced marriages, forced labor, sexual violence and rape. To ensure accountability, the report calls on Nigerian authorities to investigate and prosecute, based on international fair trial standards, those who committed serious crimes in violation of international law, including Boko Haram, members of the security forces and pro-government vigilante groups. In addition, the government should provide adequate measures to protect schools and the right to education, and ensure access to medical and mental health services to victims of abduction and other violence. The government should also ensure that hospitals and clinics treating civilian victims of Boko Haram atrocities are equipped with medical supplies to treat survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 30, 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1014web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Abduction Shelf Number: 133881 |
Author: Stakeholder Democracy Network Title: Communities not Criminals: Illegal Oil Refining in the Niger Delta Summary: An estimated 150,000 barrels of crude oil are stolen every day in Nigeria. The vast majority of this is sold internationally, but approximately 25% stays in the Niger Delta for refining and consumption. Illegal oil refining in the region comes with steep economic and social costs. Unless the problem is better understood and key drivers of the illegal economy are analyzed, the trade could come to undermine the stability of Nigeria's legal oil sector. Only five years ago, billions of dollars in oil revenue were effectively locked in because of instability and crime in the Niger Delta. The United Nations Environmental Program (UNDP) Environment Assessment of Ogoniland highlighted that in addition to poor pipeline maintenance by international oil companies, illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta is a major cause of environmental degradation. Whole communities have lost their traditional livelihoods as fisherman and farmers, as the effects of illegal refining, compounded by equipment failure, pollutes their water and land. The refining process may also pose serious health risks. The dangers notwithstanding, organized theft of crude oil and the illegal refining business it feeds also support the families, small businesses and social aspirations of many Niger Delta communities. Interviewees for this report described illegal oil refining as an entrepreneurial, free market response to local economic dysfunction, socioeconomic pressures, the Niger Delta's chronic fuel shortages and government's failure to deliver basic public services. The oil companies operating in the delta and the media regularly draw attention to this illicit industry, noting for instance that some illegal oil refining camps brazenly operate in broad daylight. In response, the military Joint Task Force (JTF), charged with patrolling on-shore oil fields, each year destroys thousands of illegal refineries. However, the set up costs are so low and returns so high that within weeks illegal refiners start up new camps. Some claim the problem is worsening, with suspicions that as the 2014/15 election gets closer, oil theft and the associated environmental damage it causes will get even worse. Evidence also suggests that rogue actors within the JTF actively participate in and profit from theft and illegal refining. This is the first ever study that explores how illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta operates and what is driving its rapid growth. The underlying research attempted to gain an in-depth quantitative and qualitative understanding of how the business works, and to analyze the political, economic and societal drivers, networks and impacts and nature of local oil refining. The findings of this report are based on 12 weeks of field research, undertaken over four months in early 2013. A team of researchers visited nine illegal refining operations across Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states. This was supplemented with 120 key informant interviews with oil companies, government representatives and members of civil society. To ensure the safety of those interviewed, identifies have been protected and this report does not ascribe any quotes to individuals. This is in keeping with SDN's operational research process which seeks to identify trends and solutions, without risks to those involved in the research process either as researchers or interviewees. Details: London: SDN, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2014 at: http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/uploads/SDN%20Publications/CommunitiesNotCriminals.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Illegal Markets Shelf Number: 133938 |
Author: Youth Rise Title: We Are People: The unintended consequences of the Nigerian drug law on the health and human rights of young people who use drugs Summary: Nigeria the most populous African nation has witnessed a surge in availability and consumption of illicit drugs in recent times. This is partly due to drug trafficking from Latin America and Asian countries through the region to the lucrative European and North American markets. Beyond trafficking, drugs like methamphetamine is now being produced in the country based on the discovery of about six clandestine laboratories between 2012 and 2013. Hence, the goal of eradicating drug from the society seems far away. Also in recent times, the call for drug policy reform globally and in many African countries have continued to gain momentum with the African Union Commission also lending its voice to the process. This is based on the increasing evidence of the failure of current drug control system that relies heavily on supply control and punishment for drug users without any record of reduction in availability and consumption of drugs but many reports of human rights violations linked to enforcing drug laws and policies. Young people constitute about 60 per cent of Nigeria Population. It is important to assess the country's drug control efforts and how they has impacted on the human rights, health and development of those who use drugs, especially young people. Data for this report was generated through interviews and consultation with young people who use drugs, drug law enforcement agents, magistrates, civil society organisations and young people in prison asylum. The report clearly showed Nigeria drug policy has been a reactive one to both internal and external pressures instead of being a proactive tool based on evidence of what works and what does not. There are systemic human rights abuses of young people who use drugs by both law enforcement agents and the society at large. Many of these abuse are unreported and have been 'normalized'. This include arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, being beaten, getting locked up without food for days, sexual harassment, rape, forced rehabilitation and so on. It was found that there are series of abuses going on within some drug rehabilitation centres including those operated by non-governmental institutions where severe torture is being used ostensibly to make people drug free. Unfortunately, most of these centres are not guided by any standard of practice and are also rarely monitored. There are also increased reports of injection drug use and HIV risk practices among young people. Regrettably, the public health response is limited due to the criminalisation of drug use. Evidence based programs such as opioid substitution therapy and needle syringe programs are unavailable. Only few programs specifically target this group of people with programs focusing on information sharing. The unintended consequences resulting from the implementation of the Nigerian drug law call for an urgent review, especially for the protection and holistic development of the youth population who have already initiated drug use. Details: London: Youth Rise, 2014. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2015 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/We-are-people-nigeria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction (Nigeria) Shelf Number: 134588 |
Author: Blattman, Christopher Title: Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence on Adult Noncognitive Investments in Liberia Summary: We show self control and self image are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged Liberian men and randomized half to eight weeks of group cognitive behavioral therapy, teaching self control skills and a noncriminal self-image. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash raised incomes and reduced crime in the short-run but effects dissipated within a year. Therapy increased self control and noncriminal values, and acts of crime and violence fell 20--50%. Therapy's impacts lasted at least a year when followed by cash, likely because cash reinforced behavioral changes via prolonged practice. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21204: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21204?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Shelf Number: 135781 |
Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: From Boko Haram to Ansaru: The Evolution of Nigerian Jihad Summary: Its orchestration of several major incidents - including the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from their school in Chibok in Borno State - has sparked national, regional and international responses. The character of these counter-operations, however, has relied overwhelmingly on a military approach unable to defeat a resilient Boko Haram. Nigeria's forceful approach reflects rash decision-making founded neither on a considered strategy nor a thorough understanding of the target group. Drawing on the wide-ranging body of existing literature, this report examines the evolution of Boko Haram from its inception to its modern iteration, deconstructing its supposed cohesive ideology and chain of command. Rather than a single unit, Boko Haram is best considered as falling along a spectrum, with an ideology as fluid and flexible as its relationships with similar jihadist groups, including Ansaru - a breakaway faction with perhaps a close relationship to the core. The report examines how the ideological narratives championed by the key leaders of Boko Haram have shaped the group's present-day structure and tactics and a military approach alone is insufficient to defeat the group. With a newly-elected government, Nigeria has the opportunity to address the Boko Haram threat effectively, but true success will rely on a solid understanding and appreciation of this elusive and resilient opponent. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201504_OP_From_Boko_Haram_to_Ansaru_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 136368 |
Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: Nigeria's Post-1999 Political Settlement and Violence Mitigation in the Niger Delta Summary: Almost fifteen years after transitioning to civilian-electoral rule, Nigeria is still wrestling with the legacy of a protracted period of military government and the 'resource curse' associated with its huge oil wealth. The 'Niger Delta question', as it is often referred to in Nigeria, is not close to resolution. The region has temporarily been pacified and oil production has gone up again, though it still falls short of Nigeria's full production potential. But the reintegration of former mid-ranking militant commanders and fighters is faltering and social unrest persists due to high youth unemployment and poverty. Large scale organised criminal activity continues, and violence could quickly re-erupt and send the Delta back to where it was before 2009 if no remedying action is taken by the Nigerian authorities and their international partners Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2013. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Evidence Report No. 5: Addressing and Mitigating Violence Programme: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2671/ER5%20Final%20Online.pdf?sequence=1&utm_source=idswebsite&utm_medium=download&utm_campaign=opendocs Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: At-Risk Youth Shelf Number: 136485 |
Author: International Labour Organization Title: Baseline Study on Forced Labour and Human Trafficking in Kwara, Kano, Cross River and Lagos States in Nigeria Summary: The Baseline study in the four states was part of a larger research project initiated by the Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour and Trafficking of ILO-Declaration. The overall objective of the study was generate multi-varied baseline data on forced labour and trafficking in persons. The data generated included the level or prevalence of forced labour and human trafficking in the four pilot states, their root causes and the cultural perceptions and attitudes of the rural and urban community members toward migration-motivated forced labour and human trafficking. Through the data analysis, an understanding of the nature, mechanisms and trends in human trafficking and forced labour was developed. In addition, the study sought to examine, analyse and explain how existing law and policies regulation migration and trafficking influence the movement of employment-motivated migrants. Details: Abuja, Nigeria: ILO, 2006. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-addis_ababa/---ilo-abuja/documents/publication/wcms_303654.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Forced Labour Shelf Number: 136488 |
Author: Katsouris, Christina Title: Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil Summary: This report analyses the international dimensions of Nigerian crude oil theft and explores what the international community could do about it. - Nigerian crude oil is being stolen on an industrial scale. Nigeria lost at least 100,000 barrels of oil per day, around 5% of total output, in the first quarter of 2013 to theft from its onshore and swamp operations alone. Some of what is stolen is exported. Proceeds are laundered through world financial centres and used to buy assets in and outside Nigeria, polluting markets and financial institutions overseas, and creating reputational, political and legal hazards. It could also compromise parts of the legitimate oil business. - Officials outside Nigeria are aware that the problem exists, and occasionally show some interest at high policy levels. But Nigeria's trade and diplomatic partners have taken no real action, and no stakeholder group inside the country has a record of sustained and serious engagement with the issue. The resulting lack of good intelligence means international actors cannot fully assess whether Nigerian oil theft harms their interests. - Nigeria's dynamic, overcrowded political economy drives competition for looted resources. Poor governance has encouraged violent opportunism around oil and opened doors for organized crime. Because Nigeria is the world's 13th largest oil producer - exports often topped two million barrels per day in 2012 - high rents are up for grabs. The report recommends the following four first steps for building a cross-border campaign against Nigerian oil theft: - Nigeria and its prospective partners should prioritize the gathering, analysis and sharing of intelligence. - Nigeria should consider taking other steps to build the confidence of partners. - Other states should begin cleaning up parts of the trade they know are being conducted within their borders. - Nigeria should articulate its own multi-point, multi-partner strategy for addressing oil theft. Details: London: Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 2013. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Maritime Crime Shelf Number: 131149 |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta Summary: Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances. With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting ("return to the creeks"). While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region. The Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, a special body mandated in 2008 to advance solutions to the region's multiple problems, proposed the amnesty program, whose implementation since 2009, coupled with concessions to former militant leaders, brought a semblance of peace and enabled oil production to regain pre-insurgency levels. However, the government has largely failed to carry out other recommendations that addressed the insurgency's root causes, including inadequate infrastructure, environmental pollution, local demands for a bigger share of oil revenues, widespread poverty and youth unemployment. Two agencies established to drive development, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), have floundered. Two others mandated to restore the oil-polluted environment (particularly in Ogoni Land) and curb or manage hundreds of oil spills yearly, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have been largely ineffective. The PIB, intended to improve oil and gas industry governance and possibly also create special funds for communities in petroleum-producing areas, has been stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament) since 2009. In sum, seven years after the technical committee's report, the conditions that sparked the insurgency could easily trigger a new phase of violent conflict. The outcome of the presidential election has also heightened tensions. While most people in the region acknowledge that Jonathan lost, some former militant leaders and groups accept Buhari only conditionally. For instance, the Niger Delta People's Salvation Front (NDPSF), the civil successor to the militant Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), claims Jonathan's ouster was the product of a conspiracy by northerners and the Yoruba from the South West against the Delta peoples and the South East. Apparently influenced by that view, some groups are resuming old demands, hardly heard during the Jonathan presidency, for regional autonomy or "self-determination". Local tensions generated by the polls also pose risks, particularly in Rivers state, where Governor Nyesom Wike (of ex-President Jonathan's People's Democratic Party, PDP) and ex-Governor Rotimi Amaechi (of President Buhari's All Progressives Congress, APC) are bitter foes. With many guns in unauthorised hands, politically motivated assassinations and kidnappings for ransom, already common, could increase. Policy and institutional changes are necessary but, if not prepared and implemented inclusively and transparently, could themselves trigger conflict. Buhari has declared that the amnesty program, which costs over $500 million per year, is due to end in December. He has terminated petroleum pipeline protection contracts that Jonathan awarded to companies owned by ex-militant leaders and the Yoruba ethnic militia, O'odua People's Congress (OPC), and may streamline the Delta's inefficient development-intervention agencies. He may also withdraw the PIB from parliament for revision. Some of this is desirable, even inevitable, but a number of former militant leaders and other entrenched interests threaten resistance and a possible return to violence. A perception that the government's actions are reversing the Delta's gains could aggravate local grievances and precipitate armed violence. At its peak in 2009, the insurgency in the Niger Delta was claiming an estimated 1,000 lives a year, had cut Nigeria's oil output by over 50 per cent and was costing the government close to four billion naira (nearly $19 million) per day in counter-insurgency operations. A resurgence of violence and increased oil-related crime in the Delta could seriously undermine national security and economic stability, which is already weighed down by the Boko Haram insurgency and dwindling oil revenues. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 231: Accessed September 30, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-re-visiting-the-niger-delta.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 136897 |
Author: Ribadu, Nuhu Title: Show Me the Money: Leveraging Anti-Money Laundering Tools to Fight Corruption in Nigeria. An Insider Story Summary: The Financial Action Task Force was created during the 1989 G-7 summit in Paris in response to growing concerns over money laundering. It is an intergovernmental body that develops policies and measures to prevent criminals from using the financial system. It studies money laundering and terrorism financing trends and techniques, develops and promotes adequate measures to fight these financial crimes, and monitors its 34 member countries' progress implementing these measures. In 1990, the task force published a plan of action to fight money laundering embodied in a set of 40 recommendations. These recommendations were revised in 1996, and again in 2003, to reflect the evolution of money laundering techniques. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF mandate was expanded to support the global fight against terrorism. In October 2001, the Task Force published another set of eight recommendations, dealing specifically with terrorism financing. Another recommendation was added in October 2004, completing what is now known as the FATF's 40+9 Recommendations. These recommendations cover the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulations, and international cooperation. They are meant to prevent financial institutions from becoming safe havens for criminal activities. In the late 1990s, the FATF cast its net beyond its members with an initiative seeking to identify major weaknesses in anti-money laundering systems worldwide. The idea was to encourage countries identified as weak links to implement international standards. In 2000 and 2001, the task force reviewed laws and regulations in 47 countries, selected on the basis of FATF members' experience. The review pitted rules and practices in these countries against 25 criteria. Of the 47 countries, 23 were found to be severely lacking and were declared non-cooperative. Nigeria was one of these 23 black sheep. In June 2001, following the lack of response to its letters, the FATF concluded that Nigeria was unwilling or unable to cooperate in the review of its system, and therefore should be blacklisted. The task force noted a lack of obligation from financial institutions to identify their clients or report suspicious transactions, inadequate criminalization of money laundering, incompetence or corruption within government, judicial or supervisory authorities, and an obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to requests. In 2002, the U.S. Treasury followed suit and issued an advisory warning to its financial institutions to use extra caution and scrutiny when dealing with transactions involving Nigeria. This was bad news for Nigeria. Being branded as non-cooperative meant that Western financial markets held up their noses. Financial institutions around the world, and particularly those in major financial centers, further scrutinized transactions involving Nigeria, resulting in crippling delays. Nigerian banks had trouble dealing with foreign counterparts. Nigerians wanting to do business abroad faced extra hurdles and were viewed with suspicion. Foreign banks were hesitant to grant letters of credit or loans to Nigerians. The country was becoming a financial pariah. Unlike the high echelons of government, which were blissfully unaware of the FATF decision for a while, local banks and businesses were directly affected and knew all about it. At the same time, Nigerian authorities were keen to obtain relief from the $30 billion in foreign debt owed to the Paris Club of creditors. In a country blessed with such mineral wealth, this crippling debt was another symptom of the mismanagement and corruption that had plagued Nigeria for decades. With the FATF frowning at Nigeria's financial practices and safeguards - or lack thereof - donors were unlikely to be in a debt-forgiving mood. Failure to correct course could result in escalating measures from the FATF. The original blacklisting meant that foreign financial institutions were advised to use extra caution when dealing with Nigeria. But continued failure to cooperate could result in FATF member countries adopting further countermeasures, which could ultimately result in the suspension of all financial transactions with Nigeria. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Showmethemoney.pdf?resourceurlname=Showmethemoney.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Corruption Shelf Number: 137739 |
Author: Cold-Ravnkilde, Signe Title: Boko Haram: From local grievances to violent insurgency Summary: It is estimated that Boko Haram has killed more than twenty thousand people since 2009, making it the world's deadliest terror organisation that threatens to destabilise not only Nigeria, but the entire region of the Sahel. Since the inauguration of a regional multi-national joint task force heavily supported by western international security actors, attacks in the affected neighbouring countries has increased remarkably. This suggests that more international and regional military responses might in fact fuel more attacks by Boko Haram. Rather than rephrasing decontextualised discourses of trans-Saharan terrorism, this new DIIS report by Signe Cold-Ravnkilde and Sine Plambech suggests that international support to the fight against Boko Haram should be based on a careful understanding of the complex local and regional dynamics of conflict. The report provides an overview of the situation and the historic development as well as suggesting a number of policy recommendations. -There is a dire need to ensure that the current military operations do not repeat the mistakes of the Nigerian security forces in 2013: human rights violation and economic sanctions that may transform a jihadist uprising into a people's revolt. - Gender norms and how men and women are affected by and take part in the insurgency both as combatants and protesters against Boko Haram should be taking into account in policy makers' response to the insurgency. -Insecurity in Nigeria and the affected neighbouring countries requires a comprehensive approach including socio-economic perspectives on contending local incitements to engage in illicit economic and terrorist activities. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DIIS_Report_21_Boko_Haram_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 137976 |
Author: International Alert Title: 'Bad Blood': Perceptions of children born of conflict-related sexual violence and women and girls associated with Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria Summary: This research found that girls and women kidnapped by Nigeria's insurgent group, Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-da'wa wal-Jihad (JAS), commonly known as Boko Haram, face mistrust and persecution upon their return to society. International Alert and UNICEF carried out the research in Borno in northeast Nigeria to understand the impact of communities' and authorities' perceptions of these women, girls and their children on safety, rehabilitation and reintegration opportunities. The report provides policy and programming recommendations to ensure that reintegration and relocation plans are conflict sensitive and support child protection and peace-building outcomes. Details: London: International Alert; Abuja, Nigeria, UNICEF Nigeria, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Nigeria_BadBlood_EN_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 137996 |
Author: Amnesty International Title: "If You See It, You Will Cry": Life and Death in Giwa Barracks Summary: Eleven children under the age of six, including four babies, are among 149 people who have died this year following their detention in horrendous conditions in the notorious Giwa barracks detention center in Maiduguri, Nigeria, Amnesty International reveals today. Evidence gathered through interviews with former detainees and eyewitnesses, supported by video and photos, shows many detainees may have died from disease, hunger, dehydration, and gunshots wounds. The briefing,'If you see it, you will cry': Life and death in Giwa barracks, also contains satellite imagery which corroborates witness testimonies. Details: London: AI, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2016 at: https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/if_you_see_it_you_will_cry.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Detention Centers Shelf Number: 139100 |
Author: Baba, Yahaya Tanko Title: Political Parties and Violence in Nigeria: The Case of Sokoto State (2007-2013) Summary: In this article I examine how political parties in Sokoto state, Nigeria, used violence in electoral processes from 2007 to 2013. Using Tilly and Tarrow's concept of contentious politics, the concept of neo-patrimonialism and Schlichte's model of armed groups, I find that violence mostly assumed the form of clashes between rival party youths. While party elites manipulate youths, religious and traditional institutions are also dragged into partisan politics by the elites. However, I also find that as a result of changes in party platforms, intraparty conflicts instigated large-scale interparty violence. In conclusion it can be said that party elites make use of violence as a tool for mobilization either to wrestle power from the governing party or to defend the status quo. Details: Bielefeld, Germany: Universitat Bielefeld, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence Research and Development Project - Papers - No. 10: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/baba.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Political Corruption Shelf Number: 139376 |
Author: Hamman-Obels, Princess Title: Social Mechanisms for Preventing and Controlling Violence: Voices from Two Neighborhoods in Abuja Summary: In this study I examine how social mechanisms work in the context of violence and crime prevention and control in Abuja, using a micro-sociological approach. I wanted to enhance understanding of local social mechanisms for direct violence control and prevention as well as social context factors that enable or disable the success of measures for violence control and prevention. I did this by comparing the everyday life of urban dwellers in Dutse Apo, a marginalized non-violent neighborhood and Durumi II, a marginalized violent neighborhood in Abuja based on primary source materials and field research that involved observations, interviews and a Focus Group discussion. The comparison between these two neighborhoods, which have similar socio-economic characteristics but different outcomes in terms of violence and crime, shows the importance of social institutions. My findings indicate that social institutions, such as social control and social capital in terms of neighborhood local leadership, socio-political interactions, ethnic association, belonging and community, are important mechanisms that influence (outbreaks of) violence as well as crime prevention and control. Details: Bielefeld, Germany: Universitat Bielefeld, 2015. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence Research and Development Project - Papers - No. 12: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/hamman-obels.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Crime Prevention Shelf Number: 139384 |
Author: Suchi, Plangshak Musa Title: Non-State Policing in Karu, North-Central Nigeria: Understanding the Basis for the Legitimacy of Vigilante Groups Summary: In this paper I analyze community members' perceptions of two vigilante groups in the Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State in North-Central Nigeria. The main aim is to contribute to our understanding the foundations of vigilante groups' legitimacy, as well as the specific factors that influence this legitimacy. Primary data was generated from in-depth interviews with community members, while the hybrid governance perspective provides the basis for discussion. In the study I found that, despite criticisms of some aspects of vigilante activities, most community members supported policing by vigilante groups and for two reasons. First, there's a feeling among community members that crime and insecurity are on the increase, and second, vigilantes were easily accessible and responded to distress calls rapidly. Apart from these two reasons, people also expressed the view that the state police was either ineffective in preventing crime or completely absent in the communities. Details: Bielefeld, Germany: Universitat Bielefeld, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence Research and Development Project - Papers - No. 14: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/docs/suchi.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Non-State Policing Shelf Number: 139385 |
Author: European Asylum Support Office Title: Nigeria: Sex trafficking of women Summary: Not all migration of Nigerian sex workers to Europe involves human trafficking. However, the present report focuses on the modus operandi of the trafficking of Nigerian women to Europe for the purpose of prostitution and on the situation of the victims of trafficking returned to Nigeria. To some extent, and insofar as it relates to the modus operandi of trafficking, the report looks into the situation of Nigerian trafficked women once they have reached Europe. The report does not examine the trafficking of Nigerian women within Nigeria, nor does it examine the trafficking of Nigerian women to non-European countries (Africa, Middle East, Central Asia). Moreover, the report does not purport to cover human trafficking for purposes not related to prostitution, such as domestic servitude and forced labour. While the underlying causes of human trafficking in Nigeria are outside the scope of this report, they are briefly touched upon in Chapter 1. Details: Brussels: EASO, 2015. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: EASO County of Origin Information Report: Accessed July 13, 2016 at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5631cf0a4.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Asylum Seekers Shelf Number: 139630 |
Author: Okolie-Osemene, James Title: Oil companies and lethal violence in Nigeria: Patterns, mapping and evolution (2006-2014) Summary: This study explores different aspects of fatal conflicts that involve oil companies such as Chevron Texaco, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), ExxonMobil, Shell, Total, indigenous companies, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Using both qualitative and quantitative data from the Nigeria Watch Project, the research enhances our understanding of the patterns and evolution of oil companies and lethal violence in the country between 2006 and 2014. Details: Ibadan: IFRA Nigeria, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria Working Paper Series, no. 44: Accessed July 27, 2016 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP14OkolieFinal.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Natural Resources Shelf Number: 139862 |
Author: Nwankwo, Ukoji Vitus Title: A Study of Crime Reporting in Nigeria Summary: In the 21st century, the internet has become a quicker platform through which crimes are reported to the public. Through the new media, Trent Online and Nigeria Watch have consistently updated their database and pages with reports on criminality across the country. While some of such criminal acts were non-violent, others were lethal. Findings show that armed robberies have become the dominant crimes in Nigeria, contributing about 50% of an overall 8516 deaths in 3, 840 fatal incidents between June 2006 and September, 2015 nationwide. Lagos, Rivers, Ogun, Benue and Imo states were reported as the most affected crime states. Findings also show more crime fatalities in the Southern part of Nigeria than in the North. This article there maintains that the inability of government to address most of the sources of crime explains why it has become difficult to nip in the bud. Details: Ibadan: Nigeria Watch Project, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2016 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/Ukoji2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Armed Robbery Shelf Number: 139887 |
Author: Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, ed. Title: Violence in Nigeria: A qualitative and quantitative analysis Summary: Most of the academic literature on violence in Nigeria is qualitative. It rarely relies on quantitative data because police crime statistics are not reliable, or not available, or not even published. Moreover, the training of Nigerian social scientists often focuses on qualitative, cultural, and political issues. There is thus a need to bridge the qualitative and quantitative approaches of conflict studies. This book represents an innovation and fills a gap in this regard. It is the first to introduce a discussion on such issues in a coherent manner, relying on a database that fills the lacunae in data from the security forces. The authors underline the necessity of a trend analysis to decipher the patterns and the complexity of violence in very different fields: from oil production to cattle breeding, radical Islam to motor accidents, land conflicts to witchcraft, and so on. In addition, they argue for empirical investigation and a complementary approach using both qualitative and quantitative data. The book is therefore organized into two parts, with a focus first on statistical studies, then on fieldwork. The book is a co-publication of the ASCL and IFRA (Institut Francais de Recherche en Afrique). Details: Leiden: African Studies Center, 2016. 218p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2016 at: http://www.ascleiden.nl/news/violence-nigeria-qualitative-and-quantitative-analysis Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Cattle Raiding Shelf Number: 139893 |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: "Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth Summary: Boko Haram, one of the world's deadliest armed groups, is waging an insurgency in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate. This violent conflict in Nigeria's Northeast has killed nearly 17,000 people since 2009, displaced nearly 2.2 million people, devastated thousands of communities, and slowed the economy. New Mercy Corps research investigates key motives for youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programming to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through this research, Mercy Corps spoke directly to the youth involved to learn why youth join or were vulnerable to forced recruitment into Boko Haram. We spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends of members, and community leaders. We found that in the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. Key Findings There is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member. Members we spoke to came from diverse backgrounds. Some had jobs, and others did not. Some had attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others had dropped out. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment. Almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining Boko Haram. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses; loans fueled their economic ambitions in an atmosphere of high inequality. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram are working. Youth who resisted joining shared a narrative of Boko Haram as a corrupt, greedy organization focused on enriching its leaders. These messages are being crafted by local religious and traditional leaders. Key Recommendations Build trust in government by addressing the needs of conflict-affected youth and communities. Prepare for comprehensive reintegration of former members. Amplify local counter-narratives that already work to prevent recruitment into Boko Haram. Develop opportunities for youth and government officials to improve communities together. Facilitate connections to role models and support family dialogue on violent extremism. Help youth achieve their ambitions, starting with increasing their access to financial and business services. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 139949 |
Author: Owasanoye, Bolaji, ed. Title: Street Children and the Juvenile Justice System in Lagos State Summary: The findings of research carried out between the la te eighties and early nineties indicate that three categories of Nigerian children spend m o re tim e on the streets than their peers. These are street working or working street children, that is, child ren who are on the streets to work and regularly return to their f a m ilies af ter work. These incl ude hawkers, scavengers, car-washers/watchers. Secondly, those who are in the streets only to play gam e s such as football. The dram atic success of young footballers in FIFA Under 17 W o rld Ch am pionship in China in 1985 and in Japan 1993 which were accom p anied by generous gifts by the Federal and State Governm e nts has led to an increase in the num bers of these children and in the intensity of street gam e s of ten resulting in inform al and partial street closure. Thirdly, st reet children defined as those who actually live on the streets and sleep under bridge s, and flyovers as well as in cul-de-sacs , uncom pleted/dilapidated buildings, abandoned vehicles and m a rket stalls. Although children who spend m u ch tim e on the street s are autom a tically exposed to various types of risks and hazards, depending on the socio-econom ic characteristics of neighbourhood in which streets are located, those who sleep on the streets have been identified as contending with grave problem s com p ared to the other two categories of children m e ntioned earlier. The physical, social and psychological problem s of street children are truly daunting. They lack basic resources with which to sustain healthy living. Consequently, they suffered from preventable skin and parasitic diseases. Moreover, the violent environm ent of the street in which they reside aid their adoption of self -protective m echanism s , which f u rther lead to their stigm a tization by the public. The findings of a survey of Area Boys and Girls in Lagos State in 1993 revealed that street children tend to be exploited by drug peddlers who insist that they m u st buy hard-drugs in order to rem a in in particular niches on the streets. Som e tim es th ey are required to pay dues to persons who claim to be their 'landlords'. Occasionally they ar e expected to render som e m e nial and indecent services to those violent 'landlords'. Street children have com e to know that there are no free spaces even on the streets. In spite of the m e ntioned problem s of street ch ildren, they have not received m u ch research let alone intervention attention. It is in view of th e relative neglect of street children that one is delighted that this book has been written. Details: Human Development Initiatives, 2004. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2016 at: http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC16855.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Homeless Youth Shelf Number: 130045 |
Author: Social Development Integrated Centre (Social Action) Title: Crude Business: Oil Theft, Communities and Poverty in Nigeria Summary: Based on field investigations in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States, this report by Social Action presents the cases of illegal artisanal refineries in the Niger Delta as a more recent manifestation of the historical problem of oil theft in Nigeria, which includes the looting of public revenues from the petroleum industry. The report shows that oil theft and the artisanal refining that it enables, are twin threats to legitimate civic engagement, environmental sustainability, and the physical health and livelihoods of its operators and the people living in the Niger Delta communities. With billions of dollars in lost public revenues, crude oil theft adversely affects the socio-economic well-being of the majority of Nigerians who still live in poverty and destitution. The report highlights the need to improve the governance of natural resources and makes concrete recommendations for the government, civil society groups and affected communities. Details: Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Social Development Integrated Centre, 2014. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: http://saction.org/books/Crude_Business_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Environmental Crimes Shelf Number: 140095 |
Author: Maehler, Annegret Title: Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta Summary: This paper studies the oil]violence link in the Niger Delta, systematically taking into consideration domestic and international contextual factors. The case study, which focuses on explaining the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s, confirms the differentiated interplay of resource]specific and non]resource]specific causal factors. With regard to the key contextual conditions responsible for violence, the results underline the basic relevance of cultural cleavages and political]institutional and socioeconomic weakness that existed even before the beginning of the "oil era." Oil has indirectly boosted the risk of violent conflicts through a further distortion of the national economy. Moreover, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle, in a twofold manner: firstly, through the easing of political repression and, secondly, through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, politicians and (international) businessmen in illegal oil theft helps to explain the perpetuation of the violent conflicts at a low level of intensity. Details: Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2010. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GIGA Working paper No. 120: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp120_maehler.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Natural Resources Shelf Number: 140097 |
Author: Emordi, Kingsley Emeka Title: Victims, villains or heroes? : the local community perception of oil bunkering in the Niger delta Summary: Grounded on a political ecology approach, this study sheds light on oil bunkering activity that is done by local militants in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Such oil bunkering is used as a euphemism for oil theft in Nigeria. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the perception of oil bunkering that is done by groups (militants) of the local communities of the Niger Delta. By collecting and comparing the narratives of the three actors linked to so-called illegal oil bunkering. The three actors are the locals of the Niger Delta, the Nigerian government and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs). Such Oil bunkering that is done by the local militants of the Niger Delta has dominated the local politics since the 1990s. Through narrative analysis I have identified three different stories from the three different actors. The government and the Multinational oil companies (MNOCs) operating in the Niger Delta perceives, such oil bunkering is seen as illegal activity that affects the nation's economy, as well as causing environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. However, oil have contributed enormously to the national economy since the inception of oil exploration in the Niger Delta. To many people, such as the government agencies and its allies, these growth have brought income opportunities and growth to the local communities of the Niger Delta. In contrast to the inhabitants of the Niger Delta such economic growth is yet to translate to economic development, and an appreciable increase in the standard of living. Despite being the goose that lays the golden egg. This is coupled with certain fundamental issues such as continuous neglect by state, political marginalization and the failure of state interventionist efforts at ameliorating the suffering of the inhabitants of the region. The consequence of this is reinforcing the option of resistance and violence, as against peaceful engagement with the state. This is manifested in the increasing violence and lawlessness epitomized by the incidence of kidnapping of oil workers, seizure of MNOCs oil facilities, destruction of oil installations, as well as oil bunkering which is the focus of this study. By using narrative analysis, I found that the local communities sees oil bunkering as an integral part of their protest against the state and the multinational companies operating in the Niger Delta. This is an approach within political ecology, and narrative analysis offers a way of obtaining a rich understanding of the main ways that locals of the Niger Delta experience and perceives oil bunkering. As well as the state and MNOCs approach towards the locals, by means of their presentations of relevant narratives. By doing this I also aim at contributing trend of political ecology to the Niger Delta region. The local communities of the Niger Delta have been 11 embroiled in resistance against the federal government and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs). Multilayered issues such as lack of control, participation, revenue allocation, resources control and more, institute the main grievances against the oil companies and the government. Cognizant of these issues, the state and MNOCs have not applied a more holistic approach, for this reason the local communities in the Niger Delta lost confidence in both the state and MNOCs. Hence these led to the issues the Niger Delta is facing today. Such Oil bunkering activities done by the local militants of the Niger Delta is a classic example of the perceived struggle and resistance of the Niger Delta militants over control of the natural resources in their region. The local's militants are indigenes of the Niger Delta, they represent the resistance group and they are the main figure in oil bunkering. This study carried a more in-depth analysis of the local communities' narratives on oil bunkering than other stakeholder's narratives. However, this study also presented extensive position of other actors narratives linked to oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. My reason for doing this is that, as a researcher for this study I find the local communities of the Niger Delta to constitute the most challenging task to understand. The locals are more challenging to understand, because my main interest is to understand the local's community's perceptions. Therefore deeper focus on these, whilst to understand the context of other narratives are pertinent to identify the narrative landscape to compare and contrast. This study further argues that oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta emerged due to grievances by the people of the Niger Delta, which is attributed to the failure of the state and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) to comply with the demands of the local community of the Niger Delta. This thesis further shows that, the current oil bunkering activities in Niger Delta have become a mixture of genuine grievance and greed as well as opportunism. Details: As, Norway: Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2015. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/293819 Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Offenses Against the Environment Shelf Number: 140143 |
Author: Conroy, Stone Title: Land Conflicts and Lethal Violence in Nigeria: Patterns, Mapping and Evolution (2006 - 2014) Summary: Nigeria is a country rife with conflict, and disputes over land issues c onstitute a significant number of conflict events and the violent deaths that result from them. Land issues vary from region to region, although there are some cross - cutting themes; pastoralists and farmers in the north and Middle Belt, clashes between com munities and oil companies in the south - south and south - east, and urban and peri - urban conflicts in major cities are all affected by politics, legal issues, and possibly, by climate change. This paper seeks to explore patterns and trends in land conflicts in Nigeria by exploring the existing literature and parsing through data provided by the Nigeria Watch database, a research project that monitors lethal violence, conflicts, and human security in Nigeria. The data is examined from June 1, 2006 when the pro ject started. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, 2014. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria Working Papers Series, No. 38: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/land-conflict-lethal-violence-nigeria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Homicides Shelf Number: 140159 |
Author: Adams, Adeola Title: Patterns and trend analysis of violence in oil production and oil distribution in Nigeria from 2006 to 2014 Summary: Most studies on oil-related violence in Nigeria have unwittingly concentrated research efforts on oil production in the Niger Delta region. An attempt is made in this paper to demonstrate that oil distribution contributes more to fatality than oil production in Nigeria. Using the Nigeria Watch database as the primary source of data, the paper asserts that although the aggregate death figures attributed to the oil sector are lower than cases like road accidents, crime, and political-cumreligious-motivated killing, the number of violent deaths recorded between June 2006 and May 2014 in relation to oil distribution is triple the number related to oil production. While oil distribution accounted for 4,575 deaths, oil production events led to about 1,550 deaths. In addition, oil distribution has more lethal impact on the country than oil distribution. Apart from Kebbi and Zamfara, all the states of the federation have witnessed at least one fatal incidence from oil distribution, whereas oil production cases occur mainly in Anambra, Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, and Imo. The reasons are not difficult to understand: oil production is restricted to a few states in the Niger Delta area, while oil distribution activities cover the whole nation. Moreover, oil production deals essentially with crude oil, which is less flammable than the highly inflammable refined products involved in oil distribution. And, of course, oil distribution has a strong link with road accidents, which are rated as one of the main contributors to fatalities in Nigeria. In the final analysis, to understand the pattern and dynamics of fatalities in the oil sector, more research efforts need to be devoted to oil distribution. Details: Chatillon Cedex, France: IFRA Nigeria, 2014. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, n36L Accessed September 30, 2016 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP8AdamV4Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Natural Resources Shelf Number: 140535 |
Author: Ojebode, A. Title: Explaining the Effectiveness of Community-Based Crime Prevention Practices in Ibadan, Nigeria Summary: The problem of ineffective policing still persists in post-colonial Africa and as a result, both donors and governments are seeking non-state alternatives or complements to the state apparatuses. These alternatives include private sector provision, donor-driven interventions and community-based or community-driven crime prevention practices. There is no shortage of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa and they come in a variety of forms and models: neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, religious and ethnic militias, and neighbourhood guards. However, the effectiveness of CBCP practices is still a subject of controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these practices. This study looks at the effectiveness of CBCP practices, considers possible reasons for their effectiveness or ineffectiveness, and on the basis of the research, makes some policy recommendations. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Working Paper 479: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12192/Wp479.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Crime Prevention Shelf Number: 147819 |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "Tell Me Where I Can Be Safe": The Impact of Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, Summary: On January 7, 2014, Nigeria’s former president, Goodluck Jonathan, signed the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill (SSMPA) into law. The notional purpose of the SSMPA is to prohibit marriage between persons of the same sex. In reality, its scope is much wider. The law forbids any cohabitation between same-sex sexual partners and bans any "public show of same sex amorous relationship." The SSMPA imposes a 10-year prison sentence on anyone who "registers, operates or participates in gay clubs, societies and organization" or "supports" the activities of such organizations. Punishments are severe, ranging from 10 to 14 years in prison. Such provisions build on existing legislation in Nigeria, but go much further: while the colonial-era criminal and penal codes outlawed sexual acts between members of the same sex, the SSMPA effectively criminalizes lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons based on sexual orientation and gender identity. This report documents the human rights impact of the SSMPA on LGBT individuals and its effects on the activities of non-governmental organizations that provide services to LGBT people. This followed consultations with Nigeria-based LGBT activists and groups, and mainstream human rights organizations. While existing legislation already criminalizes consensual same-sex conduct in Nigeria, the report found that the SSMPA, in many ways, officially authorizes abuses against LGBT people, effectively making a bad situation worse. The passage of the SSMPA was immediately followed by extensive media reports of high levels of violence, including mob attacks and extortion against LGBT people. Human rights groups and United Nations officials expressed grave concern about the scope the law, its vague provisions, and the severity of punishments. On February 5, 2014, following the passage of the SSMPA, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders in Africa noted with concern in a press release, "the increase in cases of physical violence, aggression, arbitrary detention and harassment of human rights defenders working on sexual minority issues." Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/nigeria1016_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Homophobia Shelf Number: 140832 |
Author: Ojebode, A. Title: Explaining the Effectiveness of Community-Based Crime Prevention Practices in Nigeria Summary: n this study, we ask: how effective are community-based crime prevention practices and what explains their effectiveness or ineffectiveness? There is no shortage of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa. They come in a variety of forms and models: neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, religious and ethnic militias, and neighbourhood guards. However, whereas the failure of the criminal justice system and formal crime prevention is hardly debatable, the effectiveness of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa is still a subject of controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these practices. We conceptualised effectiveness in terms of citizens’ perception of their safety and of the crime level in their community. We also included the extent to which they attribute these two to the CBCP in their communities. This measure has important limitations but given the problems of crime data sourcing and fidelity in Africa, we reluctantly left out official measures of crime rate reduction as an index of effectiveness of CBCP, focusing rather on the experiences and expressions of the citizens who daily bear the brunt of crimes. Details: Lima, Peru: ELLA (Evidence and Lessons from Latin America, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Regional Evidence Papers; Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://ella.practicalaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20160519-REP-IBADAN-Explaining-the-effectiveness-of-CBCP.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Community-Based Programs Shelf Number: 140863 |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Nigeria: 'You Have Signed Your Death Warrant': Torture and other ill treatment in the special anti-robbery squad (SARS) Summary: A Nigerian police unit set up to combat violent crime has instead been systematically torturing detainees in its custody as a means of extracting confessions and lucrative bribes, Amnesty International said in a report published today. In Nigeria: You have signed your death warrant, former detainees told Amnesty International they had been subjected to horrific torture methods, including hanging, starvation, beatings, shootings and mock executions, at the hands of corrupt officers from the feared Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). "A police unit created to protect the people has instead become a danger to society, torturing its victims with complete impunity while fomenting a toxic climate of fear and corruption," said Damian Ugwu, Amnesty International's Nigeria researcher. "Our research has uncovered a pattern of ruthless human rights violations where victims are arrested and tortured until they either make a 'confession' or pay officers a bribe to be released." Amnesty International has received reports from lawyers, human rights defenders and journalists and collected testimonies stating that some police officers in SARS regularly demand bribes, steal and extort money from criminal suspects and their families. "SARS officers are getting rich through their brutality. In Nigeria, it seems that torture is a lucrative business," said Ugwu. SARS detainees are held in a variety of locations, including a grim detention center in Abuja known as the 'Abattoir,' where Amnesty International found 130 detainees living in overcrowded cells. Amnesty International’s research shows that, in addition to its stated remit of tackling violent crime, SARS investigates civil matters and in some cases tortures detainees involved in contractual, business and even non-criminal disputes. Details: London: AI, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2016 at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_sars_report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Police Corruption Shelf Number: 146295 |
Author: Ogbozor, Ernest Title: Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria Summary: Informal security actors such as vigilantes play a variety of roles in African communities. Research has tended to focus on the negative impact of informal security providers, but these groups have an essential role in a community’s safety and security. This report provides an analysis of the informal security actors in the Nigerian states of Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano and in the capital city of Abuja. Summary Informal security actors such as vigilantes play a variety of roles in African communities. Research has tended to focus on the negative impacts of informal security providers, including the perpetration of human rights violations, rather than on the essential roles these groups play in a community’s safety and security. The study referenced in this report focused on Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano states in Nigeria. These states have long histories of ethnoreligious and political-related violence. A number of informal security actors are active in these states due to the high rate of violence. The study also considered Abuja because of the presence of informal security stakeholders in the nation’s capital city. In Nigeria, vigilantes have both positive and negative impacts. Abuses by vigilantes must be addressed formally and structurally while preserving the important role of vigilantes as protectors of their communities. Among the various informal security actors in Nigeria, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria is the oldest recognized actor. The group is perceived as playing an important role in providing critical policing services to Nigerians, particularly in rural communities. The roles and functions of vigilante groups include providing security, early warning alerts, and traffic control; gathering intelligence; settling disputes; and conducting community development activities. Most groups carry out security roles; some combine security functions with community development activities or enforcing religious rights. The operational structures and administrative procedures of informal security providers vary from one group to another; some groups have well-documented operational guidelines and administrative procedures, whereas others have no written operational manuals or administrative and financial systems. Most informal security providers have weak internal and external accountability systems. Internally, group leaders or village heads provide oversight of a group’s activities. External monitoring by official security agencies exists in some cases but is not formalized or enforced. Some informal policing groups have cordial relationships with formal security actors; however, there are no formal working agreements or memoranda of understanding with official security agencies. Many vigilante groups do not receive training on state laws or on how to operate as a security outfit in the country. Perceptions about the activities of informal security actors vary, but many residents within the communities interviewed prefer vigilante groups to the police. The police are often unavailable when they are needed in rural communities. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 391: Accessed November 10, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR391-Understanding-the-Informal-Security-Sector-in-Nigeria.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Community Safety Shelf Number: 141094 |
Author: Ogbozor, Ernest Title: Causes and Consequence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria Summary: The consequence of violent extremism on rural livelihoods has received less attention in academic literature. This paper addresses three fundamental questions: What are the socio-economic causes of terrorism and violent religious movements? What is the root cause of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria? And what are the consequences of Boko Haram's violence on rural livelihoods? Based on a review of the literature and current studies in Nigeria, this paper contends that violent extremism has a correlation with the socio-economic conditions in Northeast Nigeria, and there are direct and indirect impacts of extremism on rural livelihoods. The paper concludes with a suggestion of further studies on the drivers of violent extremism, and the rural livelihoods strategies for coping with extremist activities in Nigeria. Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: HiCN Working Paper 227: Accessed December 8, 2016 at: http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/HiCN-WP-227.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Extremists Groups Shelf Number: 148136 |
Author: Adetula, Victor A.O. Title: Nigeria's Response to Transnational Organised Crime and Jihadist Activities in West Africa Summary: Nigeria's status and role as a regional power continues to impact the entire West African sub-region. However the country is facing serious security challenges that are complicated by transnational threats which are associated with organised crime and the activities of jihadist movements. Threats to security linked to the activities of illegal migrants, smugglers, drug traffickers and human traffickers in West Africa have attracted considerable attention from scholars, policy makers and practitioners alike. As the activities of the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) also known as Boko Haram are spreading fast through the northern part of the country into a number of countries in West and Central Africa—notably Chad, Niger, and Cameroon—fears and anxiety have become more noticeable among stakeholders. Also, the challenge of piracy and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea threatens Nigeria's national security as well as regional stability. This study presents the role of Nigeria as a regional hegemon, and also discusses its response to transnational organised criminality and jihadist activities in the sub-region, highlighting Nigeria's official response as well as other interventions undertaken through bilateral and multilateral platforms. The study concludes that there is no controversy about the desirability of the Nigerian government to curb transnational organised crime and jihadist activities in the country. However, the complexities of strategies and modalities for effective curbing of transnational threats still requires in-depth and concerted efforts than have been given by stakeholders. One may argue that the prospects for effective control of cross-border crime in West Africa are positive. Both at bilateral and multilateral levels, Nigeria has shown commitment to working with other countries within the West African sub-region to address the menace of transnational criminality including smuggling, human trafficking and cross-border banditry. On the other hand, the over-subscription of Nigeria and some of its immediate neighbours to pseudo-nationalist policies hinder the implementation of broad-based regional strategies to address transnational threats. Thus the general apathy and lack of courage in official circles and among civil society organizations and other non-state actors in West Africa to organise across national frontiers and engage in security and development discourse, all have the tendency to limit the prospects of effective control of transnational criminality. The efforts of the Nigerian government at combating transnational organised crime and the spread of jihadist activities are yielding some gains. However, lack of political will, bad governance, and poorly equipped and motivated defence and security agencies coupled with other problems such as the porosity of the borders and noninvolvement of the people have continued to inhibit progress. Details: Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich Evert Stiftung, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper: No. X: Accessed February 7, 2017 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/11578.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Drug Trafficking Shelf Number: 140850 |
Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 141292 |
Author: Ewi, Martin Title: Money Talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram Summary: This policy brief is an overview of key findings from a study aimed at understanding violent extremism in northern Nigeria, and identifying factors that are key in Boko Haram recruitment and membership. This analysis contributes to knowledge about the political and socio-economic preferences of the individuals involved in the group. This policy brief highlights one of the major findings of the study, namely the perception that financial incentives, not religion, are a key motivator for individuals who join Boko Haram. Recommendations The following recommendations could assist the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram: 1 Promoting a common Nigerian identity that transcends ethnic, religious and geographic lines by reviewing school curricula and programmes to mainstream national identity. 2 Declare, but don't negotiate the terms of amnesty with Boko Haram: government should declare a blanket amnesty for low- and mid-level Boko Haram militants who may wish to give up arms. 3 Establishing a criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram militants and others who bear the greatest responsibility for the group’s atrocities. 4 Preventing and combating sources of radicalisation by working with local communities and religious leaders to identify strategies for dissuading vulnerable individuals from turning to violent extremism Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Police Brief 98: Accessed march 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 141293 |
Author: Salifu, Uyo Title: Boko Haram and violent extremism: Perspectives from peacebuilders Summary: The atrocities unleashed by Boko Haram since 2009 have affected millions of people in Nigeria and the region as a whole. This policy brief presents the results of a field-based study on peacebuilders' perspectives of the drivers of violent extremism; and the underlying socio-economic and political factors that influence individuals to join Boko Haram. The study reveals that peacebuilders consider religious dynamics as the most influential factor in individuals' decision to join the terrorist group. As such, the study reveals that peacebuilders' views regarding the drivers of violent extremism are often markedly different to those expressed by former Boko Haram members themselves. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 97: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 141318 |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: Boko Haram's rise and insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, often casting them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved. Seven years of war have caused gender-specific suffering. While men have disproportionally been killed, women are an overwhelming majority among the estimated 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North East. As former wives, slaves or fighters, many bear the stigma of association with the insurgents and are barred from reintroduction into their communities, in part because the lines between militant, sympathiser and forced accomplice are blurred. Although Boko Haram faces strong pushback, it remains capable of launching attacks and conducting multiple suicide bombings. Understanding how women experience the conflict, not only as victims but also as actors, needs to directly inform policies and programs to tackle the roots of the insurgency and strategies for curbing it, as well as facilitate women’s contribution to lasting peace. Since its emergence in 2002, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women in rhetoric and actions, partly because of the intense debate surrounding their role in society in the North East. Among other revivalist Islamic movements, the sect called for tighter restrictions on them in some areas of life but also promoted their access to Islamic education and offered financial empowerment. With patriarchy, poverty, corruption, early marriage and illiteracy long thwarting their life chances, some women saw an opportunity in Boko Haram to advance their freedoms or reduce their hardship. Many valued the religious and moral anchoring. Thereafter, Boko Haram began to abduct women and girls for both political and pragmatic ends, including to protest the arrest of female members and relatives of some leaders. The seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 was a much publicised spike in a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to hurt communities that opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as assets. By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight. As vigilante militia members, including with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), hundreds of women help security forces, particularly to frisk females at checkpoints, gather information and identify suspects, and also sometimes to fight Boko Haram. Others work in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and women’s associations or care privately for war victims. In some cases, the war has opened opportunities for women’s activism, illustrated by the establishment of several new women-led NGOs in Maiduguri and the Nigerian involvement in the Bring Back Our Girls international campaign. Boko Haram attacks, the military’s persecution of suspects and its strategy of emptying contested areas have forced over a million women and girls to flee homes. Some suspected supporters are in detention. Hundreds of thousands of females are in government camps where food is scarce and healthcare dismal; in unofficial camps, the situation can be even worse. Separated from husbands and sons conscripted or killed by Boko Haram or arrested by security forces, many women are now fully responsible for their families’ protection and economic wellbeing. Harsh treatment of IDPs in camps and detention centres could undermine military gains. If corruption in aid delivery and abuses persist, communities may harbour grievances that could lead them to reject state authority. Meanwhile, the stigma carried by women and girls known or suspected to have been Boko Haram members risks leaving them and their children isolated and alienated, generating new frustration and resistance of the kind that gave rise to Boko Haram. How gender dynamics play a part in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency should be a clear warning that women’s integration into decision-making processes at all levels is critical to a durable peace. Countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women's economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace. In the short term, reunification of families should be a priority. In the longer term, improvements and gender balance in accessing education, in both state schools and upgraded Quranic schools, is vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 242: Accessed march 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 141379 |
Author: Ryan, Mark Title: Risk Factors for External Human Trafficking in Nigerian and Indonesian Hotspots Summary: This study ultimately attempted to determine how useful quantitatively analysing secondary data is when studying human trafficking in individual countries. Two countries were chosen to analyse: Nigeria and Indonesia. Secondarily, the researcher tried to determine whether or not current human trafficking theory, which is based on international studies, can be applied when studying a nation individually. This study used content analysis to identify 'hotspo'’ areas of Nigeria and Indonesia. The researcher then used quantitative analyses of various secondary state-level data to search for risk factors that may be facilitating trafficking in these hotspot areas. In Nigeria, hotspot states were generally more developed and populated, less impoverished, and suffered from more crime. An explanation was offered for this, which said that Nigerian traffickers may be targeting highly populated and resourced areas because they provide better operation bases for their businesses. The crime culture of these areas may also allow the traffickers to operate more discretely. The researcher questioned if the nearly decade-long conflict in the highly prosperous Niger Delta was exacerbating trafficking in the area. Indonesian hotspots were characterized by large, dense, slowly growing populations. The proposed explanation for this result was that the hotspots were overpopulated and lacking in economic opportunities, creating a demand to emigrate of them and making residents vulnerable to traffickers. Indonesian problem areas were also found to have a higher proportion of females which was explained by the overwhelming amount of female victims trafficked from Indonesia. It was concluded that individual countries possess their own sets of risk factors which drive external trafficking. Based on this study, current trafficking theory should not be relied upon in analysing individual nations, but it can be helpful. The researcher determined that secondary data analysis of human trafficking is useful in creating a broad picture of the driving factors and generating research ideas. Details: Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska - Lincoln, 2013. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis presented at Fifth Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking 2013: Accessed March 27, 2017 at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=humtrafcon5 Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Human Trafficking Shelf Number: 144593 |
Author: Abodunrin, Hammed Title: A Survey of Violence-Related Deaths in Urue-Offong/Oruko and Udung Uko Local Government Areas in Akwa Ibom State (2006-2014) Summary: This paper highlights violent deaths in two local government areas (LGAs) in Nigeria: Urue Offong/Okubo and Udung Uko, both in Awka-Ibom State. Primary data collected using key informant interviews (KIIs), 40 copies of a questionnaire, and focus group discussions (FGDs) were analysed. The respondents considered their LGAs to be generally peaceful and blamed violent incidents on continual deprivation, youth agitation, and skirmishes experienced as part of everyday life. During the period under study (2006-2014), the main causes of violent deaths in Urue Offong/Okubo and Udung Uko were cult attacks, witchcraft, and motor accidents because of bad roads and inadequate education on traffic laws. Although the predominant religion of the area is Christianity, traditional beliefs still have a strong hold over the populace; and accusations of witchcraft sometimes resulted in the killing of persons considered to be a source of misfortune. The reasons for the non-coverage of violence by the national media in the two LGAs include the following: accessibility problems, fear of attack, lethargic attitude to volunteering information, dearth of published official records, and inadequate personnel. Other factors are the irregular salaries of journalists, the presence of many local tabloids, the poor infrastructural facilities, and illiteracy. Also worthy of note is that security operatives in the areas under review were insufficient and uncooperative in releasing information. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 53; Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP15Abodunrin-Dotun.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Cults Shelf Number: 144790 |
Author: Aduku, Emmanuel Baba Title: A Study of Violence-Related Deaths in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, And Yusufari Local Governement Areas of Yobe State Summary: Invisible violence exists in some rural areas in northern Nigeria. 'Invisible' here entails lack of available documented instances of fatal violence in such areas. Against this backdrop, the lack of data has prompted this study to unearth, document, and evaluate any occurrences of lethal violence in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, and Yusufari local government areas (LGAs) of Yobe State from 2006 to 2014. The specific objectives are to: Assess invisible violence in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, and Yusufari LGAs in Yobe State Identify the causes of lethal violence Document the series of fatal incidents through terrorism, ethno-religious conflicts, land disputes, and political clashes. The field research gathered evidence of the drivers of violence through desktop research and review of secondary materials such as media reports, Internet sources, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, combined with the administration of questionnaires and the conduct of unstructured interviews. According to the findings, the lack of data on fatal incidents in Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru, and Yusufari LGAs is not due to the lack of violence but to a host of issues such as the lack of infrastructure for the media. The study also discovered that, since 2012, the Boko Haram insurgency has become a significant cause of violent death. The majority of respondents (71%) saw their neighbourhoods as violent, and more than 96% were aware of the occurrence of fatal incidents in their communities in the previous 10 years. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no 55: Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/88-aduku-emmanuel-baba-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-karasuwa-machina-nguru-and-yusufari-local-governement-areas-of-yobe-state Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 144791 |
Author: Daniel, Makai Title: A Study of Violence-Related Deaths in Nafada Local Government Area of Gombe State and Auyo, Gagarawa, Gumel, Gwiwa, Kaugama and Yankwasi Local Government Areas of Jigawa State (2006-2014) Summary: Invisible violence exists in some rural areas in northern Nigeria. 'Invisible' here entails lack of available documented instances of fatal violence in such areas. Against this backdrop, the lack of data has prompted this study to unearth, document, and evaluate any occurrences of lethal violence in selected Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Gombe and Jigawa states from 2006 to 2014. The specific objectives are to: - Assess and document invisible violence in Gombe and Jigawa states. - Evaluate the categories of lethal violence that have occurred. - Document the series of lethal violence incidents through terrorism, ethno-religious conflicts, land disputes, inter- and intra-group and political conflicts. The field research gathered evidence of the drivers of invisible violence in northern Nigeria through desktop review of secondary materials such as media reports, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, combined with primary research involving the conduct of key informant interviews, administration of questionnaires, and focus group discussions (FGDs). According to the findings, the lack of data on fatal incidents in the focal communities results from the minimal occurrence of such violent activities. Yet economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to recruitment into violent activities by extremist groups or gangs. The high unemployment environment has caused youth involvement in the achaba (motor bike) business, leading to over-speeding and road traffic accidents. The study also found that the excesses of the security forces are not a major factor in youth involvement in violent activities, contrary to the popular assumption in some quarters. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2017 at: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no 46: Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/84-daniel-makai-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-nafada-local-government-area-of-gombe-state-and-auyo-gagarawa-gumel-gwiwa-kaugama-and-yankwasi-local-government-areas-of-jigawa-state-2006-2014 Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Extremists Groups Shelf Number: 144792 |
Author: Munir, A. Title: A Study of Violence-Related Deaths in Gudu, Gwadabawa and Illela Local Government Areas of Sokoto State, and Sakaba Local Government Area of Kebbi State (2006-2014) Summary: This paper highlights the outcome of a study on fatal incidents in four local government areas (LGAs) of northwestern Nigeria: Gwadabawa, Gudu, and Ilella LGAs in Sokoto State, and Sakaba LGA in Kebbi State. Data obtained from 1,083 questionnaires (out of 1,200) reveals that, since 2006, the year 2011 had the highest number of fatalities. Between 2006 and 2014, Gudu LGA recorded the highest number of fatalities and violent incidents, while Sakaba LGA had the lowest. For the period under review, the most frequent cause of fatal incidents was cattle grazing, followed by political clashes. Religion, which is often perceived as a major factor of conflict, contributed quite insignificantly to the overall level of violence in the four LGAs, with a few incidents involving the Yan Shi'a, the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood, and the Yan Izala movement. Finally, the study demonstrates that, just as in the urban centres of Sokoto and Kebbi, there are many fatal incidents in rural areas- yet these are unreported. Some explanations for this omission are discussed in relation to poor road infrastructure. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan, 2015. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no 47; Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/invisible-violence-project/85-munir-arshad-olojo-akinola-2015-a-study-of-violence-related-deaths-in-gudu-gwadabawa-and-illela-local-government-areas-of-sokoto-state-and-sakaba-local-government-area-of-kebbi-state-2006-2014 Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 144793 |
Author: International Alert Title: Out of the shadows Adopting a peacebuilding approach to the social effects of drug use in Nigeria Summary: his research looks at the prevalence of drug use in Nigeria. The study found that drug abuse is on the rise in the country, particularly among women and youth, and that it is considered to be a contributing factor in various forms of conflict. Drug users face stigma from their communities and options for treatment are limited. Respondents highlighted that powerful individuals in Nigerian society are involved in the drug trade and use drugs to disrupt rival campaigns during elections. The study also reveals that regulations covering potentially harmful prescription drugs, such as tramadol, Exol and codeine, are potentially insufficient. It also discusses how adopting a peacebuilding approach to the problem of drug use in Nigeria will require an institutional understanding that its impact is not solely limited to the fields of health and law enforcement. The study was conceptualised by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and carried out by International Alert. Details: London: International Alert, 2017. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 14, 2017 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nigeria_DrugUse_EN_2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Shelf Number: 144905 |
Author: Ofo, Nat Title: Effectiveness of Capital Punishment as Deterrence to Kidnapping in Nigeria Summary: The menace of kidnapping in Nigeria has become embarrassingly unstoppable. The situation has completely gone out of control. One approach that has gained some popularity in an attempt to curtail kidnapping incidents in the country is the amendment of the statute and the upgrading of kidnapping to a capital offence by the legislature in some States of the Federation. It is believed that by imposing capital punishment for the offence, people would be deterred from committing the offence. This paper reviews the crime of kidnapping, tracing the circumstances leading to its present rampancy. It also evaluates the effectiveness of death penalty as deterrence to crime. Relying on the continued, increased and sophisticated practice of armed robbery in the country in spite of its being made a capital offence since the 1970s, it concludes that imposing death penalty for the offence of kidnapping will not solve the problem. It further points out that the real solution to the problem lies in dealing with the root causes of the problem. Practical and effective solutions to the kidnapping saga in Nigeria were consequently proffered. Details: Okada, Edo State: Igbinedion University - College of Law, 2010. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646867 Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Capital Punishment Shelf Number: 131361 |
Author: Ichite, Christian Title: Land conflicts, population pressure and lethal violence in the Niger Delta (Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta), 2006-2014 Summary: This study relies on the Nigeria Watch database to assess the contributions of land and population pressures to overall lethal violence in the core Niger Delta states of Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta over an eightyear period (2006-2014). Disaggregated data on land issue-related violent deaths was obtained for each Local Government Area (LGA) of the four states under review. Population densities were computed based on the Nigeria 2006 Census and available or 'real' surface area. The study arrived at two main findings. First, casualties associated with land issues in the core Niger Delta states do not account for a significant contribution to overall lethal violence in the region, contrary to popular claims and declarations based on the unresearched impacts of the Land Use Act of 1978. Fatal land conflicts in Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta result significantly from inter-communal clashes, just as inter-communal clashes over political, religious, and ethnic issues also significantly account for deaths. Second, overall crude death rates (mortality) from multiple causes, including land issues, do not strictly conform to a relationship of direct proportionality with the spatial distribution of population densities within the region. Some LGAs with high population densities record low death rates, and vice versa. Moreover, intercommunal clashes also significantly account for most of the deaths from multiple causes in the LGAs, irrespective of the patterns of population density. The findings, by implication, attest to a deteriorating quality of human conditions and habitat in the Niger Delta, despite existing measures aimed at resolving conflicts in the region. They also make necessary a re-assessment of studies on the region. Such studies hitherto have often been based on simplistic applications of the Malthusian theoretical framework to the relationships between environmental degradation, population density, and lethal violence in the region. A reassessment would involve a renaissance of rigorous research into the causes and drivers of lethal violence in the region - in a disaggregated manner and based on systematic evidence. Such research increasingly requires a hybrid of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 48; Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP1Ichite.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Land Conflicts Shelf Number: 145818 |
Author: Jimoh, Akinsola Title: Maritime Piracy and Lethal Violence Offshore in Nigeria Summary: The Nigeria Watch (NW) dataset recorded 18,009 fatalities caused by violence in Nigeria's coastal states from 2006 to 2014. During the same period, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) dataset reported less than 20 deaths resulting directly from piracy attacks; however, the IMB does not record all fatal incidents at sea, near the shore, and in the creeks of the Niger Delta, such as gun attacks on oil offshore services and facilities, clashes among youth cult groups, and militant engagements with naval forces. There is indeed a link between onshore and offshore violence. The spatial distribution of fatalities confirms it. Hence coastal local governments in Lagos State - namely, Apapa, Badagry, and Eti-Osa - accounted for the highest number of offshore deaths, according to NW, among costal states in Nigeria during the period 2006-2014. As for the IMB data, it also shows that most piracy attacks occurred in locations around Lagos, especially at Apapa Port. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, , 2015. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 51; Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP2Jimoh.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Maritime Crime Shelf Number: 145819 |
Author: Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, ed. Title: Oil Curse, State instability, and violence in developing countries: theoretical lessons for Nigeria Summary: Oil production in Nigeria is often believed to bring economic failure, political instability, the inability to democratise, high levels of corruption, and violence in the form of rising crime, interstate wars, and internal conflicts. Such an assumption is quite prevalent amongst aid practitioners, journalists, activists, and some academics. Yet there are many exceptions in developing countries, and this paper empirically criticizes the 'resource curse' theory by focusing on the relationship between oil-producing states and war. It first examines contradictions and correlations that do not demonstrate causality. To escape economic determinism, it then suggests paying more attention to political contexts and historical timeframes, especially when authoritarian regimes existed before oil production. Sometimes, the oil rent can indeed exacerbate conflicts. But it is never a single cause. A quick reading of averages and correlations can be misleading in this regard. The conclusion thus calls for further qualitative investigation. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 32: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.ifre.http://www.ifre.fr/c/1849fr/c/1849 Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Natural Resources and Crime Shelf Number: 145820 |
Author: Olayoku, Philip A. Title: Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in Nigeria (2006-2014) Summary: Relying on the Nigeria Watch database from June 2006 to May 2014, this study analyses the root causes, dynamics, evolution, and politicisation of cattle grazing conflicts in Nigeria. After reviewing the historical, political, and socio-economic contexts, it identifies the key actors in lethal rural violence from cattle grazing as herdsmen, farmers, community members, vigilantes, security operatives, government officials, and, in rare cases, religious leaders. The study also highlights the intensity and the time frame of such violence. No cycles were identified. The North Central region appears to be the hotbed of these conflicts, though the problem remains spread across different parts of the country and occurs at different times of the year. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, 2014. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 34; Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/ifra-e-papers/article/olayoku-philip-a-2014-trends-and Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Cattle Shelf Number: 145821 |
Author: Olojo, Akinola Title: Muslims, Christians and Religious Violence in Nigeria: patterns and mapping (June 2006 - May 2014) Summary: The notion that religious violence in Nigeria is always characterised by conflicts between religions (Muslims versus Christians) is too simplistic. This study shows that between June 2006 and May 2014 the frequency of violent death incidents involving Islamic groups against Islamic groups is 60; a figure higher than 57, which is the frequency of violent death incidents involving Islamic groups against Christian groups or Churches within the same period. A second major point in this paper is that violence involving religious groups is not always caused by religious issues. This explains why the frequency of violent death incidents involving Islamic groups against Christian groups or Churches due to nonreligious issues is as high as 42 between June 2006 and May 2014. Thirdly, it remains inconclusive whether or not more Muslims than Christians (or vice versa) are killed because of violence in general in Nigeria. Finally, the western media frames violence in Nigeria as being mainly inter-religious while lethal incidents involving Islamic groups against Islamic groups are largely underreported. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, 2014. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP3OLOJOFinal.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Christian Groups Shelf Number: 146428 |
Author: Afeno, Super O. Title: Killings by the security forces in Nigeria: mapping and trend analysis (2006-2014) Summary: Over the years, the Nigerian army have been regularly deployed to assist the police in law enforcement and internal security operations. This practice results largely from the belief that the presence of the security forces is sufficient to guarantee internal security. Data from the Nigeria Watch database however indicates that the intervention of the security forces in violent incidents often exacerbates the situation. This study shows that between June 2006 and May 2014 the security forces have caused fatalities in 59% of the lethal incidents where they intervened. Secondly, the more the security forces intervene the more people are killed. This explains why from an annual average of 59% between June 2006 and May 2007, killings by the security forces peaked at 80% between June 2013 and May 2014. Thirdly, 58% of police intervention cause fatalities compare to 60% in the case of the army, an indication that killings by the police is more prevalent but the army cause more fatalities per incident. Lastly, killings by the security forces are more prevalent in the southern region, but cause more fatalities in the northern part of the country. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria; IFRA Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, n37: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/publications/e-papers/nigeria-watch-project/71-afeno-super-o-2014-killings-by-the-security-forces-in-nigeria-mapping-and-trend-analysis-2006-2014 Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Deadly Force Shelf Number: 145822 |
Author: Badejogbin, Oluwatoyin Akinwande Title: Sentencing Reforms in a Postcolonial Society: A Call for the Rationalisation of Sentencing Discretion in Nigeria, Drawing on South Africa and England Summary: Norval Morris' statement that '(n)o principled jurisprudence of sentencing will emerge before legislatures bring order to their penal statutes or before judges routinely provide reasons for the sentences they impose' aptly describes the range of sentencing problems in Nigeria. Although Nigeria attained self-rule in 1960, its criminal justice system remains hamstrung by the colonial mould in which it was framed, unable to respond to the evolving challenges of combating crime in the twenty-first century. The system's failure is acute in criminal sentencing, exacerbated by common law and sharia based penal systems that encourage excessive penalties, a Constitution that offers minimal protection to convicted offenders, and sentencers who exercise largely unfettered discretion. These factors, together with a narrow construction of the doctrine of separation of powers that precludes courts from subjecting statutory penalties to constitutional scrutiny, result in punitive and frequently disproportionate punishments in Nigeria. This thesis investigates measures to ensure that sentencers introduce proportionality to sentencing and refrain from imposing penalties that infringe constitutional rights. The investigation involves two stages of analysis. First, the thesis examines the socio-historical context in which the practice of punishment evolved in England, South Africa and Nigeria in order to unveil how evolving concepts about punishment regulate or fail to regulate penal severity. Secondly, the thesis examined the normative basis of sentencing in South Africa and Nigeria, both of which are constitutional democracies and former English colonies. The analysis leads to two critical findings. First, Nigeria lacks the rich tapestry of constitutional jurisprudence that South African Courts have developed around punishment. Secondly, neither South Africa nor Nigeria has a structured system for rationalising sentencing discretion, with the result that sentencing can lead to widely disparate and disproportionate outcomes in both countries. The thesis thus proposes that Nigeria adopts constitutional provisions that restrain penal severity, and that it harmonise its pluralistic penal system, scrutinise statutory penalties in the light of constitutional norms, and, drawing on practices in England, develop guidelines that enhance proportionality and parsimony in sentencing. Details: Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town, 2015. 381p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/19097/thesis_law_2015_badejogbin_oluwatoyin_akinwande.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Criminal Justice Reform Shelf Number: 145834 |
Author: Cohen, Corentin Title: Violence between and within political parties in Nigeria: statistics, structures and patterns (2006-2014) Summary: Acts of violence between or within political parties in Nigeria are usually associated with general elections and their spectacular death toll. This research uses statistical tools to analyse this violence during the 2006-2014 period. Patterns of political violence between the 2007 and 2011 general elections differ strongly. During the 2007 election, killings occurred mainly within parties or were linked to the campaign. During the 2011 elections, however, most casualties were reported after the announcement of the results. Nevertheless, it appears that killings related to general elections accounted for less than 50% of the total number of such fatalities as they were reported between 2006 and 2014. A large share of party violence is ignored, as it is mostly internal or with a low lethality rate. Arguably, violence is a means used by the political elite, rather than the people's choice to protest against fraud. Levels of violence vary between parties and between states. As the ruling party, the PDP is a central actor, involved in 97% of the casualties of party clashes. Over the period under study, some events are particularly distinctive because of their large number of casualties and their links to ethnic, religious, or economic tensions. Details: Ibadon, Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, n50; Accessed June 17, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP11Cohen.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Homicides Shelf Number: 146243 |
Author: Okanume, Joachin Uche Title: A Survey of Violence-Related Deaths in Aninri and Isi-Uzo Local Government Areas of Enugu State, 2006-2014 Summary: Based in the premises of the French Institute for Research in Africa on the campus of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria Watch is a database project that has monitored fatal incidents and human security in Nigeria since 1 June 2006. The database compiles violent deaths on a daily basis, including fatalities resulting from accidents. It relies on a thorough reading of the Nigerian press (15 dailies & weeklies) and reports from human rights organisations. The two main objectives are to identify dangerous areas and assess the evolution of violence in the country. However, violence is not always reported by the media, especially in remote rural areas that are difficult to access. Hence, in the last 8 years, Nigeria Watch has not recorded any report of fatal incidents in some of the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the Nigerian Federation. There are two possibilities: either these places were very peaceful, or they were not covered by the media. This series of surveys thus investigates 'invisible' violence. By 1 November 2014, there were still 23 LGAs with no report of fatal incidents in the Nigeria Watch database: Udung Uko and Urue-Offong/Oruko (Akwa Ibom), Kwaya Kusar (Borno), Nafada (Gombe), Auyo, Gagarawa, Kaugama and Yankwashi (Jigawa), Ingawa and Matazu (Katsina), Sakaba (Kebbi), Bassa, IgalamelaOdolu and Mopa-Muro (Kogi), Toto (Nassarawa), Ifedayo (Osun), Gudu and Gwadabaw (Sokoto), Ussa (Taraba), and Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru and Yunusari (Yobe). Details: Ibadan: IFRA Nigeria, 2015. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, No 41 : Accessed June 17, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP16OkanumeFinal.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Homicides Shelf Number: 146242 |
Author: Jesperson, Sasha Title: Conflict Obscuring Criminality: The Crime-Conflict Nexus in Nigeria Summary: Both conflict and organised crime are deeply entrenched in Nigeria. In 2015, the Global Terrorism Index listed Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group, with Fulani militants in the Middle Belt of Nigeria responsible for the 4th most fatalities globally. Although there has been a reduction in fatalities in 2016, new militant groups emerged in the Niger Delta region, making Nigeria home to three active conflicts. Conflict in all three regions is connected to economic and political grievances, which suggests that armed groups are strategic in nature, responding to the needs of civilians in their area of operation. Increasing literature on the strategic nature of criminal organisations and warring parties highlights a variety of criminal and political motives that evolve over time, adapting to changing situations in order to maximise opportunities. While armed groups in all three regions may engage in criminality to sustain their activities, there is no evidence that they are filling governance roles or supporting civilians in their regions. In parallel, the World Bank identified conflict and fragility as creating conducive conditions for organised crime. While in some countries, such as Afghanistan and Colombia, illicit and criminal economies are closely linked to insurgency and conflict, this is not the case for Nigeria. Despite several conflict-affected regions and a high concentration of organised crime entities, for the most part crime and conflict remain separate. The prevalence of corrupt officials and the entrenchment of organised crime means that conflict is not required as a cover to move illicit goods. The banking and transport infrastructure of major cities is more important and useful, whereas the three conflicts underway in Nigeria are in rural areas. But criminal activity continues to influence local conflict dynamics in all three regions. Despite claims of a linkage by Boko Haram's leadership, organised crime entities have little to do with the group aside from supplying illicit goods. But Boko Haram has created a profitable protection economy in northeastern Nigeria that is exploited by many other groups and individuals. Organised crime activities in the Niger Delta are largely driven by politicians who use militant groups to assist and provide plausible deniability. Militants in the Middle Belt continue to engage in cattle rustling in order to target their opponents. Aside from the Delta region, criminality is not linked to global illicit flows, but in all three regions criminal activities are fuelling conflict. Given this complexity, this case study seeks to understand how crime and conflict intersect in Nigeria, focusing on the insurgency of Boko Haram and the emergence of new militant groups in the Niger Delta. The aim is to assess the impact of global illicit flows on local conflict dynamics, while also considering how international actors can respond. The paper first engages with the nature of conflict in Nigeria and how it has evolved alongside, but separate from 'organised' crime. The forms and function of criminal activity in the two conflict-affected regions is then discussed, followed by an analysis of the impact of criminality on conflict and some recommendations on how international actors can respond. The analysis presented in this case study is based on extensive desk-based research and fieldwork conducted in Nigeria in November 2016. Local researchers conducted fieldwork in Maiduguri, Kano and Yobe, interviewing government representatives, NGOs, and community members. In Lagos and Abuja, interviews were conducted with journalists, researchers, security analysts, government representatives, NGOs, UN agencies and embassy officials. Although fieldwork was not conducted in the Niger Delta region, NGOs and experts were consulted either in Lagos or Abuja or via Skype. Details: Tokyo: University Nations University, 2017. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime-Conflict Nexus Series: No 4: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2455/Conflict-Obscuring-Criminality-The-Crime-Conflict-Nexus-in-Nigeria.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Cattle Rustling Shelf Number: 146323 |
Author: Stakeholder Democracy Network Title: Building Bridges: Community-Based Approaches to Tackle Pipeline Vandalism Summary: Pipeline vandalism cost the Nigerian Government, oil-companies and communities an estimated $14bn dollars in 2014. The failure of the Nigerian state to provide basic public services and security in the Niger Delta has resulted in a significant breakdown of the social contract. In the void that remains, international and national oil companies are often seen as a Government proxy, spending millions of dollars in their operating locations through various formal and informal Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and security instruments. However, these efforts are not perceived to have the communities' interests at heart, preferring to secure a short-term license to operate as opposed to a long-term legacy in the region. In addition, the "quick and easy cash" approach by oil-companies in response to threats by vandals has created an implicit incentive to "crack pipes", earn money and survive. In communities, the feeling of anger and demand for attention motivates vandals to interrupt pipelines at the expense of their environment and livelihoods, with many addicted to easy money from surveillance and clean-up contracts. Others vandalise to survive in the absence of other employment choices ignoring the long-term impact to their local environment and health. The environmental impact is immense with an estimated 51,500 hectares devastated by oil spills in 2014 as a direct consequence of pipeline vandalism. In the creeks, enormous sums of money are earned from the illicit trade of stolen oil, often settled through cash and arms deals, fuelling a "cold-war" between entrenched actors and the State. This threatens the fragile and purchased peace currently holding together the Niger Delta. As previous patronage networks strain after elections, and the means to gain access to oil-proceeds are mitigated, old militant tactics of pipeline vandalism, kidnap and organised crime may again emerge to illicit a response from Government and oil-companies. The communities that surround Nigeria's pipeline infrastructure will continue to demand for socio-economic development of the region and based on history, there has been no quicker way to get the Government and oil companies attention than by vandalising pipelines and halting production. The new Administration has a short window of opportunity to address these issues once and for all, riding on post-election feelings of optimism and hope washing across the Delta; perhaps one of the first times there has been marginal support for a President not from the region. However, should the new Administration not act quickly, rising agitation and reduced patronage flows may inflame feelings of anger, resentment and hopelessness, with various individuals and groups, heavily armed and very wealthy, threatening the security of the oil industry and national income. Our investigation confirmed that International Oil Company (IOC) pipelines have more incidences of vandalism than their National Oil Company (NOC) counterparts. This is due in part because IOC's still own the majority of pipeline infrastructure, but also due to historically high community expectations as a result of enormous budget allocations and the availability of formal and informal channels of "easy-money" into host communities for CSR related activities, clean up and surveillance contracts. Our research has identified examples of alternative community based models to tackle pipeline vandalism that have been trialled with some success giving a degree of confidence that change is possible and relationships can be fixed. A solution will need to take into account the successes, challenges and lessons learnt from current approaches to provide a clear direction towards a sustainable and collaborative approach to tackle the issue. This report encourages the incoming government to consider alternatives away from a sole-security response to pipeline vandalism. There is a need to review and reset the relationships between Government, oil-companies and communities as a first step to tackle pipeline vandalism, maintaining oil production whilst reinforcing peace in the Niger Delta. We believe efforts to reset relationships could lead to new social contract in the Niger Delta. A sustainable approach to tackle pipeline vandalism will develop local institutions and economies, increase employment and lift many out of poverty whilst reversing current incentives away from vandalism and towards pipeline and environmental protection. The relationship between communities, oil companies and Government has been broken for too long. Now is the time to fix it. Details: London: SDN, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2017 at: http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SDN-Building-Bridges-Community-Based-Approaches-to-Tackle-Pipeline-Vandalism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Illicit Trade Shelf Number: 146500 |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Killing at Will: Extrajudicial Executions and other unlawful killings by the police in Nigeria Summary: Hundreds of people are unlawfully killed by the police in Nigeria every year. Some people die because they fail to pay police officers a bribe. Others are killed because the police use excessive force during arrest. Some are simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Many of the victims are killed by police officers in extrajudicial executions. Once in custody and away from the public eye, some people are tortured to death in police stations; others disappear in custody. The police often claim that the victims were armed robbers or that they attempted to escape custody. Such claims are rarely challenged and very few of those who unlawfully kill are brought to justice. Inadequate legislation, failure to investigate and prosecute, and a widespread disregard for human rights and due process within the police force have bred a culture of impunity. Victims' families are left with no remedy and no justice. Most likely to be poor, the families cannot afford legal counsel. Those who complain are ignored; those who persist are harassed. The Nigerian government must act immediately to end all unlawful killings, brings perpetrators to justice and ensure that victims' families receive adequate reparation. Details: London: AI, 2009. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2017 at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR44/038/2009/en/ Year: 2009 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Deadly Force Shelf Number: 146701 |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Corruption in Nigeria. Bribery: public experience and response Summary: The problem of corruption is arguably one of the most significant global issues in the contemporary world. In the last three decades, in particular, international attention has been focused on the challenges of corruption though it has remained a serious and significant global issue throughout the millennia. Very recently, the international community has recognized its harmful impact by including a specific target to fight corruption in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Corruption is the bane of any progressive society. It stifles entrepreneurship, professionalism and erodes the values of hard work and honesty, and is one of the root causes of under-development in our society. Over the years we have seen the effect of corruption manifesting across all sectors of society with collusion across the public to private sectors to sports bodies and even civil society. Sadly, Nigeria as a country has experienced this menace for a long time but now appears to be tackling it head on. It is for this reason that the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) partnered with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to carry out this survey on the quality and integrity of public services in Nigeria, the result of which are published in this report. This work is timely, especially in view of the rising importance and use of data in Nigeria for evidence based policy and decision making. This study complements attempts at deploying the use of data and statistics in understanding the nature and magnitude of corruption in Nigeria. This will assist government and policy makers in making informed decisions on how best to fight the problem, and ultimately, offer us a better chance of reducing it to its barest minimum. This is the first comprehensive nationwide household survey on corruption to be conducted in Nigeria and in Africa at large. It covers all States of the Federation, including the Federal Capital Territory, and this report therefore provides very valuable and reliable information, which will no doubt support the national efforts in reducing the menace and blocking loopholes in our public services. While this is just the first step in the process of understanding corruption and tackling it, it is indeed a significant step and all Nigerians must be committed to seeing this process through to the end because of what is at stake for the future of our country. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 131p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/Nigeria/Corruption_Nigeria_2017_07_31_web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Bribery Shelf Number: 147140 |
Author: International Organization for Migration Title: Flow Monitoring Surveys: The Human Trafficking and Other Exploitative Practices Indication Survey: Analysis on Migrants and Refugees from Nigeria Travelling Along the Central Mediterranean Route Summary: This report contains an analysis of the responses provided by Nigerian migrants and refugees travelling along the Central Mediterranean Route and interviewed in Italy since June 2016 under IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix activities. Interviewed Nigerian nationals represent 16% of the total Central Mediterranean sample, which is composed of 10,771 respondents interviewed at around 50 different locations in the Italian regions of Sicily, Apulia, Lombardy, Liguria and Friuli Venezia Giulia. The report provides a comparative analyses of the profile and responses of Nigerian migrants and refugees interviewed in 2016 and in 2017. The first section gives an overview of the content of the survey, with a focus on the set of questions on individual and witnessed experiences of human trafficking and other exploitative practices. Section 2 presents the analysis on interviewees' responses to the human trafficking and other exploitative practices' indicators. The third section presents some baseline information on the sample to contextualize the reported experiences of human trafficking and other exploitative practices. The last section gives a wider look into methodology and data. Details: Geneva, SWIT: IOM, 2017. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2017 at: http://migration.iom.int/docs/Analysis_Flow_Monitoring_and_Human_Trafficking_Surveys_in_the_Mediterranean_and_Beyond_Nigerian_nationals.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Human Trafficking Shelf Number: 147235 |
Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: Elites, Oil and Violence Mitigation in the Niger Delta Summary: The crisis in the oil-rich Niger Delta in Nigeria is one of the world's forgotten conflicts in which thousands have been killed and the country's vital oil industry has suffered. In the past twenty years, environmental destruction, youth unemployment, poverty and organised crime (such as massive oil theft) have persisted or even increased. The federal government's brutal military intervention, ineffective development initiatives and a strategy of co-opting powerful militant group leaders with judicial and economic benefits have failed to address the causes and drivers of conflict. A bolder, longer-term approach to building lasting peace in the Niger Delta is urgently needed, in which Nigeria's elite and their international partners commit to building a pro-development political settlement through far-reaching governance reform Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2013. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Briefing Issue 35: Accessed September 27, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2623/PB%2335_Web.pdf?sequence=1&utm_source=idswebsite&utm_medium=download&utm_campaign=opendocs Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Conflict-Related Violence Shelf Number: 147479 |
Author: Nigeria Watch Title: Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2011) Summary: I The methodological challenges To measure the intensity of violence is quite complex. Its quantification comes up against three main difficulties. First, researchers have to define categories that do not always properly reflect the complexity of a society. Secondly, they have to agree on indicators that cannot be comprehensive. And eventually, they have to rely on sources that are often contested. I.1. Unrealizable categories: civilians and combatants; public and private violence; criminal politicians and politicized criminals In a country like Nigeria, several distinctions can be made to quantify and qualify violence. However, none of these categories meet all the requirements of a general understanding of the problem. To start with, one could try to distinguish between combatants and civilians in accordance with the international humanitarian law in armed conflicts. If we follow the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, we should then separate those who bear arms from those who do not take part in the hostilities. The problem is that we often don't have enough information to determine whether individuals fit such criteria. Moreover, many deaths that we record dot not result from conflicts, especially when it comes to accidents or one-sided violence. We should not overestimate the role of weapons in this regard. As the Cleen Foundation's National Crime Victimization Survey demonstrates, firearms were used in only 32% of the incidents reported by 10,036 Nigerians in October-December 2005. A second distinction has to do with political and/or criminal violence. Here again the lines are blurred. Freedom fighters and guerrillas are often disqualified by governments as terrorists or bandits, and politicians are frequently accused of criminal wrong-doing. Nigeria is no exception in this regard, but the confusion is highlighted by widespread corruption and common vocabulary that refers to officials as "godfathers" and members of a "mafia" (from Kaduna, Abeokuta, Langtang, or other cities). In practice, NigeriaWatch cannot and does not want to investigate violent incidents in order to qualify them as criminal or political. Hence many hostilities are recorded as both, depending on various points of view. The hypothesis is that the bias remains basically the same, so that we can still follow up trends. A third distinction relates to public and private violence. As NigeriaWatch focuses on deaths only, it did not plan to analyse all actions intended to cause destruction, pain, or suffering. But it aimed at dealing with so-called "public violence", i.e. violence that pertained to the affairs of all people, not just those of an individual person or a specific group. The problem was that this category was defined in opposition to the private domain, so it could not really be used except if we confined it to "mass violence" between collective groups or organisations. Take for instance a motor accident. Cars often belong to private persons. But if they are not properly maintained, a tyre can explode, provoke an accident and kill a pedestrian or another driver on a public road. Another example is a burglar who breaks into a private house and who shoots at the police while he escapes, killing a member of the public force. To consider these two cases as private or public, should we give priority to the place, the perpetrator or the victim? According to a spatial analysis, the car accident would be public, unlike the burglary. Yet in both events, the perpetrators are private persons. Regarding the burglary, however, the victim is a public agent. Of course, there is no good reason to dismiss perpetrators or victims to analyse only violence according to the place where it happens. In developing countries, the difficulty also pertains to the conflicts of interests of a corrupt ruling class that often straddles and deliberately confuses public and private money. There is no need here to elaborate further on the notion of state, public service and the res publica in Africa. Suffice it to say that NigeriaWatch had to give up trying to differentiate public and private violence. To remain coherent, however, we kept the same categories of causes, protagonists and types of conflict. Details: Nigeria Watch, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2017 at: http://nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report11(1).pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Crime Statistics Shelf Number: 140287 |
Author: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) Title: The Rosewood Racket: China's Billion Dollar Illegal Timber Trade and the Devastation of Nigeria's Forests Summary: Fueled by the exploding demand for rosewood furniture in China, the species Pterocarpus erinaceus - "kosso" - native to the West African forests, has most likely become the most traded tropical hardwood species in the world, despite its listing as a threatened species on CITES Appendix III (effective May 2016) and then II (effective January 2017). Amid an economic downturn resulting from falling crude oil prices, the sudden 350% growth in wood exports transformed Nigeria from net importer into a major African wood exporter, with this unprecedented felling devastating thousands of square kilometers of forest' Most of the billion of dollars' worth of wood exported by Nigeria over the past four years was illegal: harvested and/or exported in contravention of state and/or federal laws. The rosewood trade may have benefited the terrorist group Boko Haram. Evidence strongly indicates that over 1.4 million kosso logs, worth about US$300 million, were stopped by Chinese customs officials in 2016, then released in 2017, after Nigerian CITES authorities retrospectively issued approximately 4,000 permits. It appears that Mrs. Amina J. Mohammed, former Nigerian Minister of Environment, signed the CITES documents during her last days in office, just before she became the United Nations Deputy SecretaryGeneral. The retrospective issuance of thousands of CITES permits is reportedly the result of a grand corruption scheme that involves over a million dollars paid by influential Chinese and Nigerian businessmen to senior Nigerian officials, with the alleged help of Chinese consulate. The looting of forests throughout Nigeria is undermining the national effort to mitigate climate change and to fulfill the Sustainable Development Goals Details: London: EIA, 2017. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 30, 2017 at: https://content.eia-global.org/assets/2017/rosewood-racket/PDF/Rosewood+Racket+Report+(Low+Res).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Environmental Crime Shelf Number: 148591 |
Author: Abodunrin, Hammed Title: A Survey of Violence Related Deaths in Egbedore and Ifedayo Local Government of the State of Osun (2006-2014) Summary: Egbedore and Ifedayo local government areas (LGAs), like any other parts of the world, did not have complete immunity to violent conflicts and disasters that caused deaths. Though these areas are rural communities that did not attract media attention and have all happenings reported always, this does not mean that they had no share of violence leading to loss of lives between 2006 and 2014, the period under review. This paper focuses on these deaths, their causes, and the reasons such happenings were not reported by the national press. A non-probability sampling technique was adopted for this study, using both incidental and purposive sampling to source information from people who were accessible and based on the researcher's choice, for accuracy. In all, 40 copies of a questionnaire were administered to stakeholders in violence and disaster management, while two Focus Group Discussions were conducted with commercial drivers and motorcyclists in each of the LGAs. In addition, nine interviews were conducted among the community leaders in the study areas and journalists working in the state. These were complemented with relevant photographs. Secondary sources explored for the data used include records of the local governments, such as maps and souvenirs as well as their websites. Virtually all the respondents (100% in Egbedore and 88.9% in Ifedayo) considered the study areas nonviolent. However, nine and 13 violent deaths respectively were recorded in Egbedore and Ifedayo LGAs respectively during the period under review. Of these deaths, communal clashes and attacks over land disputes, police/transport union clashes, and personal attacks accounted for 22.2% in Egbedore and 30.8% in Ifedayo, whereas road accident deaths accounted for five (55.6%) in Egbedore and eight (61.5%) in Ifedayo. As revealed by the information gathered in the field, bad roads were responsible for the most of the accidents. For instance, Alagbede Hill, a particular spot along Ila-Ora road, recorded five of seven road crashes and six of the eight deaths caused by accidents in Ifedayo. Interviews conducted with journalists covering the State of Osun1 revealed that almost all media houses represented in the state had one reporter to cover 30 LGAs and one area council. A number of reasons were advanced for not covering the councils appropriately: there were claims of poor and irregular salaries - and hence an inability to make frequent visits to remote parts of the state-lack of community newspapers, bad roads and poor transportation services, and an uncooperative attitude from security operatives in releasing information. In addition, journalists pointed to different media house styles, which see some stories as not weighty enough to make national news. In light of all these factors, adequate coverage of events in rural Nigeria to make violent incidents in such areas visible can only be achieved through the use of community-based media, not only to report violence but to also to offering early warning services. Details: Ibadan, Nigeria: FRA Institute of African Studies , University of Ibadan, 2014. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no39: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP17AbodunrinV7Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Homicides Shelf Number: 148744 |
Author: Kuna, Mohammed J., ed. Title: Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria Summary: In the last decade, rural banditry and violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in Nigeria have been on the rise. This social conflict has traditionally consisted of disputes over natural resources and is often presented as a conflict between settlers and nomadic people. However, what began as conflict between pastoralists and farmers over land has recently developed into rural banditry with heavy human and economic cost, ranging from the sexual assault of women and girls, attacks on villages, to catte rustling, amongst others. The bandits traversing Benue, Plateau, Niger, Kwara, Nassarawa, Zamfara, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kebbi, Kano are involved in crimes such as armed robbery and kidnapping. There have also been reported cases of rural banditry in Delta, Enugu, Ondo, Oyo and Ebonyi states. Examining the root causes of rural banditry and social conflict requires an understanding of its historical trajectory, social contexts, development and the dynamics of the often conflictual, but also symbiotic relationship between two production systems (agricultural and pastoral) that not only depend on land and its related resources, but are also fundamentally different in important respects. It is against this backdrop that the researchers undertook a broad interrogation of the economic and social forces that might have triggered the current realities. The 10 chapters of this book focus on wide-ranging issues, including: cattle rustling; animal husbandry; transhumance; grazing reserves; herdsmen and farmers association; media and construction of popular narratives; social impact of the phenomenon; and women's livelihoods. The findings of the 10 reports reveal that factors which account for rural banditry and social conflicts include: ecological and climate change and consistent shift in the human and livestock population; expansion in non-agricultural use of land; weak state capacity and the provision of security; proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs); rise of criminality and insecurity in rural areas; and weakening or collapse of informal conflict resolution mechanisms. The reports also draw attention to the international dimensions of rural banditry and social conflicts, from the perspective of the rising incidences of cross-border crimes and how it impacts on the proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria. The book incorporates recommendations to policy makers and other relevant stakeholders that, if considered and implemented, may help mitigate and manage this challenging phenomenon. Details: CITECT Estate Abuja, Nigeria: Centre for Democracy and Development, Pastoral Resolve(PARE) and Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), 2015. 448p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2018 at: http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Rural-Banditry-Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Armed Robbery Shelf Number: 149014 |
Author: Nowak, Matthias Title: Handmade and Deadly: Craft Production of Small Arms in Nigeria Summary: Craft weapons production in Nigeria is under-researched, yet it is highly relevant for any future actions to counter small arms and light weapons proliferation. This Briefing Paper provides new research findings based on extensive fieldwork in four Nigerian states (Adamawa, Anambra, Benue, and Plateau). It reviews demand and supply factors that shape the craft market in Nigeria, finding that demand is driven by insecurity and conflict, but also by cultural and societal factors. Supply is mostly demand driven. The quality of the products and production methods varies greatly across the surveyed states. Craft production poses a significant challenge for the Nigerian state and will require a mix of holistic measures to regulate or deter it, ranging from improving security (and security perceptions) and the relationship between security providers and communities, to licensing, measures aimed at providing alternative livelihoods for craft producers, and a more comprehensive application of the relevant legal framework. Key findings About one-fifth (17 per cent) of civilian, rural weapons holders countrywide possess craft weapons and one-tenth in urban areas, according to preliminary findings from the National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS). Craft producers employ a range of blacksmithing techniques, and the type and quality of their weapons vary greatly, ranging from muzzle-loading 'Dane guns' to 9 mm semiautomatic pistols based on Beretta models, and to assault rifles and sub-machine guns. Break-action shotguns and pistols are the most popular craft weapons produced in surveyed states. Craft weapons are mostly purchased to protect and defend individuals and communities. Many producers are convinced that craft production is a form of community service in times of heightened insecurity. Craft weapons are frequently purchased because of their ease of access and reduced price, which is up to four times cheaper than their industrially produced counterparts. Craft weapons are often produced in clandestine workshops that safeguard blacksmiths' anonymity and safety. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2018. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed June 13, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Nigeria-craft-weapons.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Gun Violence Shelf Number: 150528 |
Author: International Organization for Migration Title: Youth Violence and the Challenges of Violent Extremism in Zinder Summary: This study analyzes the linkages between urban violence, resulting from informal youth groups in Zinder, and the challenges of violent extremism in this region bordered by Northern Nigeria. The study also identifies risk factors that can lead young people to violence, and gateways between youth delinquency and violent extremism in Zinder. It also evaluates youth's perception on violent extremist groups like Boko Haram, and the prevention measures that youths identify. Finally, the report draws recommendations to inform public policy at the national and local level, as well as programming on prevention of youth violence and violent extremism. Details: Geneva, SWIT: IOM, 2018. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 1, 2018 at: https://publications.iom.int/books/youth-violence-and-challenges-violent-extremism-zinder Year: 2018 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Boko Haram Shelf Number: 151001 |
Author: Owen, Oliver Title: The Nigeria police force: an institutional ethnography Summary: This thesis is an institutional ethnography of the Nigeria Police Force. It concentrates on evidence from 18 months of fieldwork in one particular police station, in the pseudonymised town of Dutsin Bature in central Nigeria, and draws comparative evidence from examples and locations elsewhere in Nigeria. The fieldwork evidence is also supported by analyses of public discourse, literature reviews, some formal interviews and historical research. The thesis aims to fill a gap in empirical scholarship by looking at policing in Nigeria primarily from the level of everyday practice, and deriving understandings of the ways the overall system works, rather than by taking normative structural approaches and basing suppositions of actual behaviour upon these. It also aims to document emic perspectives on policing in Nigeria, in contrast to most existing scholarship and public discourse which takes an external perspective, from which the voices and worldviews of police themselves are absent. The thesis situates this ethnography within three theoretical terrains. First, developing understandings of policing and public security in Africa, which have often neglected in-depth studies of formal police forces. Secondly, enlarging the ethnographic study of formal institutions in African states, to develop a closer understanding of what state systems are and how they function, beyond the overtly dysfunctionalist perspectives which have dominated recent scholarship. Thirdly, informing ongoing debates over state and society in Africa, problematising understandings which see these as separate entities instead of mutually constitutive, and drawing attention to the ways in which the two interpenetrate and together mould the public sphere. The thesis begins with a historical overview of the trajectory of formal policing in Nigeria, then examines public understandings and representations of policing, before moving inside the institutional boundaries, considering in turn the human composition of the police, training and character formation, the way police officers do their work in Dutsin Bature, Nigerian police officers' preoccupation with risk and the systemic effects of their efforts to mitigate it, and finally officers subjective perspectives on their work, their lived realities, and on Nigeria in an era of transition. These build together to suggest some conclusions pertinent to the theoretical perspectives. Details: Oxford, UK: St. Cross College, Oxford University, 2012. 380p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 23, 2018 at: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/catalog/uuid:e824783a-8ba0-4d96-8519-0ee2b2090fc8/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=Owen_thesis.pdf&type_of_work=Thesis Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Police Administration Shelf Number: 153066 |
Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: Nigeria: Potential Revenue Losses Associated with Trade Misinvoicing Summary: Analysis of trade misinvoicing in Nigeria in 2014 shows that the potential loss of revenue to the government was approximately $2.2 billion for the year, according to a new study by Global Financial Integrity. To put this figure in context, this amount represents four percent of total annual government revenue as reported to the International Monetary Fund. Put still another way, the estimated value gap of all imports and exports represents approximately 15 percent of the country's total trade. The report, titled Nigeria: Potential Revenue Losses Associated with Trade Misinvoicing, analyzes Nigeria's bilateral trade statistics for 2014 (the most recent year for which sufficient data are available) which are published by the United Nations Comtrade. The detailed breakdown of bilateral Nigerian trade flows in Comtrade allowed for the computation of trade value gaps that are the basis for trade misinvoicing estimates. Import gaps represent the difference between the value of goods Nigeria reports having imported from its partner countries and the corresponding export reports by Nigeria's trade partners. Export gaps represent the difference in value between what Nigeria reports as having exported and what its partners report as imported. The portion of revenue lost due to the misinvoicing of exports was $1.3 billion during the year which was related to a reduction in corporate income taxes. The portion of revenue lost due to the misinvoicing of imports was $880 million. This amount can be further divided into its component parts: uncollected VAT tax ($100 million), customs duties ($365 million), and corporate income tax ($415 million). Lost revenue due to misinvoiced exports was $1.3 billion for the year which is related to lower than expected corporate income and royalties. "The practice of trade misinvoicing has become normalized in many categories of international trade" according to GFI President Raymond Baker. "It is a major contributor to poverty, inequality, and insecurity in emerging market and developing economies. The social cost attendant to trade misinvoicing undermines sustainable growth in living standards and exacerbates inequities and social divisions, issues which are critical in Nigeria today." Examination of the underlying commodity groups which comprise Nigeria's global trade show that a large amount of lost revenue ($200 million) was related to import under-invoicing of just five product types. Those products and the related estimated revenue losses include: vehicles ($100 million), iron and steel products ($40 million), electrical machinery ($20 million), ceramics ($20 million), and aluminum products ($20 million). Lost revenue due to mispriced exports ($1.3 billion) may be related to the mineral fuels trade given this category of goods makes up over 90 percent of all exports. Trade misinvoicing occurs in four ways: under-invoicing of imports or exports, and over-invoicing of imports or exports. In the case of import under-invoicing fewer VAT taxes and customs duties are collected due to the lower valuation of goods. When import over-invoicing occurs (i.e. when companies pay more than would normally be expected for a product), corporate revenues are lower and therefore less income tax is paid. In export under-invoicing the exporting company collects less revenue than would be anticipated and therefore reports lower income. Thus, it pays less income tax. Corporate royalties are also lower. Total misinvoicing gaps related to imports can be broken down by under-invoicing ($2.4 billion) and over-invoicing ($1.9 billion). It should be noted that these figures represent the estimated value of the gap between what was reported by Nigeria and its trading partners. The loss in government revenue is a subset of these amounts and is based on VAT tax rates (5 percent), customs duties (15.2 percent), corporate income taxes (22.4 percent), and royalties (.2 percent) which are then applied to the value gap. Export misinvoicing gaps were a massive $5.9 billion for export under-invoicing and $5.6 billion for export over-invoicing. Lost corporate income taxes and royalties are then applied to export under-invoicing amounts to calculate lost government revenue. Details: Washington, DC: GFI, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2018 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Nigeria-Report-2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Corporate Crime Shelf Number: 153244 |
Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed. Title: Power, Elitism, and History: Analyzing Trends in Targeted Killings in Nigeria, 2000 to 2017 Summary: Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and largest economy, has attracted considerable policy and academic attention. Studies by Transparency International and others have revealed breathtaking levels of official corruption and graft in the country. Despite the attention paid to Nigeria, there is little information about the prevalence of targeted killings against individuals in the country - and the relationship between this phenomenon and corruption is not well understood. The lack of attention paid to targeted killings in Nigeria reflects a gap in the literature on political violence more generally. Zaryab Iqbal and Christopher Zorn lament in their paper 'The political consequences of assassination' that social scientists 'have paid relatively little attention to explaining assassination as a form of political violence, and even less to assessing its social and political consequences'. In Nigeria, where power is often personalized and the mechanisms to transfer power are often opaque and non-institutionalized, assassination and other types of targeted killings play a particularly important role, making the dearth of information on this type of violence all the more glaring. Reflecting on the country's history of targeted killings and assassinations, a 2009 op-ed published in news agency Sahara Reporters said, 'Obviously, Nigerians are accepting the situation as part and parcel of our day to day living, thus it is not unusual that when new about the assassination of a journalist, politician, businessman or just about any other Nigerian breaks on television or radio, people no longer cringe. We just shake our heads and move on.' The first step towards explaining a phenomenon lies in knowing its dimensions. To this end, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized crime created a dataset, Targeted Killings in Nigeria, 2000-2017, as a means of remedying these gaps. This data sought to document instances in which individuals were specifically targeted for violence. For the purposes of this report, the term 'targeted killings' is used to denote planned violence directed at an individual, which may not necessarily result in death. In this paper, 'targeted killing' therefore includes planned, fatal and non-fatal attacks on specifically targeted individuals. By analyzing newspaper reports from 2000 to 2017 using LexisNexis, and a small team of researchers and human coders, the Targeted Killings in Nigeria dataset has catalogued more than 1,650 targeted killings in Nigeria. Emerging from the dataset is the suggestion that criminality may be linked with targeted killings to a greater degree than with other forms of non-state, anti-state or violent organizations. Whereas the country's North East has been ravaged by Boko Haram, whose indiscriminate violence has claimed tens of thousands of lives, the region has seen comparatively few targeted killings. Conversely, the country's southern states, which are renowned for criminal activity, are where most targeted killings occur. The dataset suggests that the current configuration of power and authority in Nigeria, and particularly in the country's south, has resulted in staggering numbers of targeted killings, which require domestic and international policy attention. This report examines the patterns of targeted killings in Nigeria in an attempt to shed light on this oft-overlooked category of political violence, and to probe what historical, economic and social forces have contributed to the prevalence of this form of violence. The dataset also suggests that the country's return to democracy in 1999 did not herald an era of peace and stability, nor a shift away from criminality within the political sphere. The findings corroborate the idea that electoral freedom has been insufficient to comb through the tangled relationships between politicians, businessmen, criminals, civil servants, traditional leaders and the perpetration of violence. If this is the case, Nigeria is far from alone in experiencing a deeper entanglement of criminality with the state following the introduction or resumption of electoral freedom. Instances in which democratization has increased opportunities for criminal outfits have been noted elsewhere: in describing 'criminal politics', Nicholas Barnes notes that in many instances, 'the transition to democracy has also produced, not resolved, competitive state-building dynamics', offering as an example the development of the Russian mafia, whereby 'violent entrepreneurs - former military and public security officers - form(ed) their own criminal organizations and private protection firms that undermined the state's own monopoly of violence'. It is therefore entirely possible, though beyond the scope of this dataset, that the imperfect process of democratization, the shadowy workings of Nigerian political parties, and the demands of competition over votes in Nigeria may have contributed to the further entanglement of these various sectors and groups since the end of military rule in 1999. By documenting and assessing instances of targeted killings between 2000 and 2017, the Targeted Killings in Nigeria dataset is the first step towards assessing the prevalence and characteristics of targeted killings in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, and the data and findings lay a foundation for further study of criminality, corruption, governance and violence in modern Nigeria. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 18, 2018 at: https://globalinitiative.net/analyzing-trends-in-targeted-killings-in-nigeria/ Year: 2018 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Assassination Shelf Number: 154066 |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Final Independent Project Evaluation of the Support to the Justice Sector of Nigeria Summary: The concept of the 'Support to the Justice Sector of Nigeria' project NGAV18 (known hereafter as 'the Project') was identified, conceived and formulated by the European Union (EU), which also provided the majority of the funding. Within the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Nigeria, the EU had identified Governance and Human Rights as the second Focal Sector of intervention aimed at supporting governance improvements at state and local authority level, with the specific aim of enhancing the functioning of the judiciary, improving prison conditions and reducing the "laws delay". The EU and the Government of Nigeria (GoN) entrusted the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Country Office in Nigeria (CONIG) with the development and execution of the Project under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) programme. It had a fully pledged and costed budget of EUR L26,000,000 with an EU contribution of EUR 25,000,000 and UNODC co-funding with a EUR L1,000,000 contribution, out of which the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) is contributing US$ 887,910.84. UNICEF was UNODCs joint implementing partner. The 42 month Project officially began on the 27th December 2012 and was due to conclude on the 30th June 2016. An extension of the Project was agreed to 26th August 2017 and the budget reduced to EUR L19,076,309 to reflect the revised outputs and activities. Objectives -- The Project's stated overall objective was to "improve governance and compliance with the rule of law in Nigeria through improved effectiveness, accessibility, accountability, transparency and fairness of the justice system". The Project looked to achieve this overall objective through three initial outcomes: Outcome 1: to "improve coordination among justice sector institutions and their officials, as well as improve policies, plans and legislation in justice delivery, benefits the leadership and officials of the key justice institutions agencies". Outcome 2: to "enhance capabilities and improve facilities for effective functioning of the institutions and efficient administration of justice benefits the justice sector training institutions, Federal and States ministries of justice". Outcome 3: to "increase access to justice and respect for human rights. Especially for victims of crime, poor and disadvantaged persons, victims of human rights violations or abuses, women, children, persons with disability who come in conflict with the law, as well as the general vulnerable groups in Nigeria". Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 13, 2019 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2017/NGAV18_Final_UNODC_Evaluation_Report_November_2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Administration of Justice Shelf Number: 154943 |
Author: Alemika, Etannibi E.O. Title: The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on Poor Peoples Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in A2J Focal States in Nigeria Summary: The purpose of this study, therefore, was to provide documented evidence to inform programme development on the subject. It also fills the observed gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive understanding of the expectations, priorities and perceptions of people living in poverty in Nigeria with respect to safety and security in general and informal policing structures in particular. The research was undertaken in the four focal states of Access to Justice (A2J) in Nigeria: Benue, Ekiti, Enugu and Jigawa States. The methods of data collection used were a mixture of quantitative and qualitative, comprising interviews and focus group discussions. Debates about how to improve safety and security for urban communities and rural dwellers in Nigeria are beginning to pay increasing attention to informal policing structures (IPS), which are set up by people living in poverty in response to the apparent inability of the formal police to adequately protect them from crime. However, there is a dearth of literature on the types of informal policing structures that exist, the reasons and rationales underpinning their establishment, the nature of their activities and community perceptions of their work. Extant literature on IPS focuses often on documenting the experience of the victims of vigilantism (which is one typology of IPS) and examining the fidelity of their methods of operation to international human rights norms and standards. Hence, the hitherto ambivalence and uncertainties on the functions of the IPS and the role they could and should play in the poor peoples' quest for safety and security. The purpose of this study, therefore, was to provide documented evidence to inform programme development on the subject. It also fills the observed gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive understanding of the expectations, priorities and perceptions of people living in poverty in Nigeria with respect to safety and security in general and informal policing structures in particular. The research was undertaken in the four focal states of Access to Justice (A2J) in Nigeria: Benue, Ekiti, Enugu and Jigawa States. The methods of data collection used were a mixture of quantitative and qualitative, comprising interviews and focus group discussions. Caution is advised on the use of the findings of the study to generalize on perceptions of people in poverty on issues of safety, security and informal policing in the four states, given the small sample size studied and the exploratory nature of the research. However, the study provides substantial information and insights that have not been provided or analyzed elsewhere. Perceptions of Safety and Security -- The study found that the poor had capacity to identify and explain their safety and security concerns even though they might not be fluent in the language(s) used by policy makers. Their understanding of these concepts went beyond protection from criminal victimization as they saw safety and security as very vital to their ability to sustain their livelihoods as well as to the development of their communities as a whole. This was nicely articulated by a participant in the focus groups: Safety and security are very important in our communities ... It affects aspects of our health, family coexistence and our lives and properties... It affects everything! Without safety and security, everything would get spoilt. With the possible exception of Enugu State where the respondents feeling of safety was very low (36.6 %), the majority of respondents in Ekiti (96.6 %), Jigawa (81.7%) and Benue States (66.6%) felt safe. However, in spite of the relatively high level of feeling of safety and security in Ekiti, Jigawa and Benue States, a pervading fear of crime was reported in all the four states of study. Across the four states, at least three-fifth of the respondents expressed some fear of criminal victimization. However, the intensity of the fear varies across the states, with respondents from Enugu State being the most fearful (73.3 %). The responses of the participants in the study indicated that their priority safety and security concerns around which they expect assistance were: - Personal safety from criminals, especially armed robbers; - Protection from harm associated with political thuggery; - Prevention of violent conflicts; - Eradication of police corruption and brutality; and - Security of property from theft and destruction. Details: Lagos, Nigeria: Center for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), 2004. 362p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2019 at: http://new.cleen.org/Poor%20people%20and%20informal%20policing.1.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Citizen Safety Shelf Number: 154946 |
Author: Alemika, E.O Title: Crime and Public Safety in Nigeria Summary: Problems of crime and disorder cannot be prevented or solved without reliable information on their causes, incidence, prevalence and pattern. Crime victimization survey is one of the instruments for investigating the dynamics of crime in a society. In 2006, CLEEN Foundation, a Nigerian foremost not-for-profit Non-Governmental Organisation pioneered national crime victimization survey based on nationally representative sample. The survey covered experience of crime victimization within the country by Nigerian citizens in 2005. The present report is the sixth annual national crime survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation, and covered crime victimization in the year 2012. All the previous surveys were published and are accessible at the website of the Foundation (www.cleen.org). The current report analysed crime victimization for the year 2012. Several of the chapters compared the results for the year with those from the previous surveys. A unique feature of the present report is that the analysis consciously incorporated the development of the capacity of the staff of the Foundation in survey data analysis. Readers will discover that most of the chapters were written by the Staff of CLEEN Foundation. Therefore, as should be expected, there is discernible variation in the level and style of analysis and presentation across the chapters. Nonetheless, the decision to involve the staff in the analysis of the survey is necessary for capacity building and sustainability. There are three major approaches to the measurement of crime in society. These are official statistics, frequently derived from incidents reported to the police; victimisation and self-reported crime surveys. The three measures focus on different aspects of crime and are not alternatives but rather complementary sources. Criminology literature across the world consistently show that majority of crimes, especially minor violations, are not often reported to the police. The proportion of crimes reported to the police is determined by several factors, including, seriousness of the crime, perceived efficiency and responsiveness of the police force, relationship between the public and the police and accessibility of the police. Victimization and self reported crime surveys generate better picture of the incidence and prevalence of crimes. However, literature show that self-report survey tend to capture less serious crime more accurately than serious crimes, as perpetrators of serious crimes rarely admitted their act, if not caught. The reliability of victimization and self-report crime surveys may be affected by several factors, especially forgetfulness of events and reporting events that occurred outside a survey period. Law enforcement agencies and officials as well as scholars, policy makers should therefore avail themselves of the crime information available from the three sources. The report covered several areas investigated in the survey. Chapters analysed different aspects such as the incidence and pattern of crime victimization in 2012; domestic and sexual violence; informal policing; insurgency and terrorism, police crime and intelligence; corruption, road safety, and human rights. Readers will gain from reading the report. After reading it, policy makers and the leadership of the security agencies should be able to appreciate the value of crime and victimization surveys and take appropriate measures to institutionalise them to serve as complementary sources of information on crime, disorder, safety and policing that can be used to aid formulation and implementation of policies; law enforcement planning and operations. Details: Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundation, 2014. 205p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2019 at: http://new.cleen.org/Crime%20and%20Public%20Safety%20in%20Nigeria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Crime Database Shelf Number: 155002 |
Author: Anele, Kalu Kingsley Title: The Economic Effect of Piracy in Nigeria: An Overview of the Fishing Industry Summary: The fishing industry plays a crucial role in the economic development of Nigeria. Aside from providing revenue for the government, the fishing sector also provides employment for the teeming population in the coastal states in Nigeria, as well as being a rich source of food for the country. Thus, the challenges posed by piracy to the fishing industry, as well as other economic activities in Nigeria, must be reduced to the barest minimum in other to continue to benefit from this natural resource. With the aid of data, pictograms, conventions, United Nations Security Council resolutions, soft laws and opinions of writers, this paper examines piracy and its effects on the fishing industry in Nigeria. The paper further interrogates the causes, consequences and challenges in combating piracy in Nigeria with a view to proffering countermeasures to this maritime crime. The paper concludes by reiterating the fact that Nigeria must domesticate and implement relevant international instruments on maritime security and other related conventions, and make use of the instrumentality of regional cooperation in combating piracy in other to protect the fishing industry in the country. Details: s.l.: The Author, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2019 at: https://www.academia.edu/15605579/The_Economic_Effect_of_Piracy_in_Nigeria_An_Overview_of_the_Fishing_Industry Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Fishing Industry Shelf Number: 155025 |
Author: United Nations Children's Fund - UNICEF Title: The Economic Burden of Violence Against Children in Nigeria Summary: The 2014 National Survey on Violence Against Children in Nigeria (NVACS) indicates that violence in childhood makes men and women significantly more likely to engage in risky behaviours (i.e alcoholism, smoking, drugs abuse), experience negative health outcomes (like mental illnesses, Sexually Transmitted Infection's including HIV) or/and drop out from school. International research has also confirmed that violence of any kind experienced in childhood has a life-long negative impact on the individual's physical, psychological and cognitive development and consequently, affects entire communities and nations by diminishing their human capital. The fact that the human capital is considered the most critical capital in economic development, The Federal Government under the leadership of the Ministry of Budget and National Planning and in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development and UNICEF engaged a renowned scholar in this field, Professor Xiang Ming Fang, Professor of Health Economics at Georgia State University and previously Senior Health Economist with the Division of Violence Prevention at the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) to interrogate the economic burden of Violence Against Children in Nigeria, by estimating the size of the economic burden of VAC and to analyse the index causes using the Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY). The estimate calculates both the years of fully productive life lost to mortality and morbidity caused by VAC and the subsequent economic value of this loss of productivity. These estimations paint a clear picture of the significant impact that VAC has on Nigerian children, and the economic burden on the country as a whole. In summary, this report provides the evidence, especially the economic justification that is needed to prioritize child protection services, especially those that will lead to elimination of violence against children, recognizing the need to arrest the build-up of risks and vulnerabilities throughout the life cycle as associated with the adverse health, education and productivity effects of VAC. I therefore join other stakeholders that make a case that sufficient attention should be place on arresting the negative and avoidable build up that has serious economic cost, human capital development and lifelong impacts associated with VAC. With the current ranking of the country on the Global Human Capital Development Index there is no better opportunity than now to create a fiscal space for child protection especially to specific preventive Child Protection programmes and services. I recommend this report as it provides us with veritable answers to questions that must be asked before budgetary apportionment and expenditures is made. It is also well aligned to the strategic objectives set out in the Economic Recovery and Growth Plans, under "the investing in our people" pillar. We as a people must not only improve the lives of the present generation but also our future generations. Details: Abuja, Nigeria: Author, 2019. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2019 at: https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/media/2216/file Year: 2019 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Child Abuse and Neglect Shelf Number: 155621 |
Author: Hastie, Rachel Title: Lighting the Way: Lighting, Sanitation, and the Risk of Gender-Based Violence in Aburi Camp, Nigeria Summary: Humanitarian agencies strive to provide sanitation facilities which are safe, accessible and afford users privacy and dignity. Yet in reality, women in particular have many concerns which can prevent them from using the facilities, especially after dark. This report documents field research on whether sanitation lighting reduces risks of gender based violence in Aburi camp in Nigeria. It explores the perceived risks - including those relating to gender-based violence - and shares camp residents' views on what would make them feel safer using sanitation facilities. It is part of wider research, with studies also taking place in Iraq and Uganda. Details: S.L.: Oxfam, 2018. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2019 at: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620606/rr-lighting-the-way-research-nigeria-211218-en.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y Year: 2018 Country: Nigeria Keywords: Facility Security Shelf Number: 156151 |