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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:14 pm
Time: 9:14 pm
Results for airports
2 results foundAuthor: Bart, Elias Title: Screening and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues for Congress Summary: The October 2010 discovery of two explosive devices being prepared for loading on U.S.-bound all-cargo aircraft overseas has heightened concerns over the potential use of air cargo shipments to bomb passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The incidents have renewed policy debate over air cargo security measures and have prompted some policymakers to call for comprehensive screening of all air cargo, including shipments that travel on all-cargo aircraft. U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo have focused on two main perceived threats: the bombing of a passenger airliner carrying cargo and the hijacking of a large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target such as a major population center, critical infrastructure, or a critical national security asset. With respect to protecting passenger airliners from explosives placed in cargo, policy debate has focused on whether risk-based targeting strategies and methods should be used to identify those shipments requiring additional scrutiny or whether all or most shipments should be subject to more intensive physical screening. While the air cargo industry and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have argued for the implementation of risk-based approaches, Congress mandated 100% screening of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft using approved methods by August 2010 (see P.L. 110-53). While 100% of domestic air cargo now undergoes physical screening in compliance with this mandate, not all inbound international cargo shipments carried on passenger airplanes are scrutinized in this manner. TSA is working with international air cargo operators to increase the share of cargo placed on passenger flights that is screened, but 100% screening may not be achieved until August 2013. In the interim, TSA, along with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and international partners, is relying on risk-based targeting to increase screening of air cargo, particularly shipments deemed to be high risk. Amid renewed congressional interest on air cargo security, a number of policy issues may arise regarding • the desirability of risk-based strategies as alternatives to 100% cargo screening and inspection; • the adequacy of off-airport screening under the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) in conjunction with various supply chain and air cargo facility security measures; • the costs and benefits of requiring blast resistant cargo containers to protect aircraft from in-flight explosions in cargo holds; • the desirability of having air cargo screened by employees of private firms rather than TSA and CBP employees; and • cooperative efforts with international partners and stakeholders to improve the security of international air cargo operations. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: R41515: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41515.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41515.pdf Shelf Number: 123242 Keywords: Air CargoAirportsCargo SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Australia. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Title: Inquiry Into the Adequacy of Aviation and Maritime Security Measures to Combat Serious and Organised Crime Summary: On 14 September 2009, the then Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission (PJC-ACC) initiated an inquiry into the adequacy of aviation and maritime security measures to combat serious and organised crime. The terms of reference required the committee to examine the effectiveness of current administrative and law enforcement arrangements to protect Australia's borders from serious and organised criminal activity. In particular the committee examined: (a) the methods used by serious and organised criminal groups to infiltrate Australia's airports and ports, and the extent of infiltration; (b) the range of criminal activity currently occurring at Australia's airports and ports, including but not limited to: •the importation of illicit drugs, firearms, and prohibited items; •tariff avoidance; •people trafficking and people smuggling; •money laundering; and •air cargo and maritime cargo theft; (c) the effectiveness of the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC)and Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) schemes; includingthe process of issuing ASICs and MSICs, the monitoring of cards issuedand the storage of, and sharing of, ASIC and MSIC information between appropriate law enforcement agencies; (d) the current administrative and law enforcement arrangements and information and intelligence sharing measures to manage the risk of serious and organised criminal activity at Australia's airports and ports; and (e) the findings of the Australian Crime Commission's special intelligence operations into Crime in the Transport Sector and Illegal Maritime Importation and Movement Methodologies. Details: Canberra: Parliamentary Joint Cmomittee on Law Enforcement, 2011. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2012 at: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=le_ctte/aviation_maritime/report/index.htm Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=le_ctte/aviation_maritime/report/index.htm Shelf Number: 126228 Keywords: AirportsAviation SecurityBorder SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime Crime (Australia)Organized Crime |