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Date: April 25, 2024 Thu
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14 results foundAuthor: Blickman, Tom Title: Countering Illicit and Unregulated Money Flows: Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Financial Regulation Summary: In July 1989, the leaders of the economic powers assembled at the G7 Paris summit decided to establish a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to counter money laundering as an effective strategy against drug trafficking by criminal ‘cartels’. Here began an international anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Since then it has expanded its scope to fight transnational organized crime and counter the financing of terrorism. During that time other illicit or unregulated money flows have appeared on the international agenda as well. Today, tax evasion and avoidance, flight capital, transfer pricing and mispricing, and the proceeds of grand corruption are seen as perhaps more detrimental obstacles to good governance and the stability and integrity of the financial system. Other international bodies were tasked to tackle these ‘public bads’. Tackling tax evasion is still in its infancy, and there is a growing awareness that the AML regime is not working as well as intended. Experts still ponder how to implement one that works. Tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) were identified as facilitating these unregulated and illicit money flows. The 2007-2008 credit crisis made only too clear the major systemic risk for all global finance posed by the secrecy provided by tax havens and OFCs. They were used to circumvent prudential regulatory requirements for banks and other financial institutions and hide substantial risks from onshore regulators. After twenty years of failed efforts, the G20 (having supplanted the G7) has again pledged to bring illicit and harmful unregulated money flows under control. This briefing looks at previous attempts to do so and the difficulties encountered along the way. Can the G20 succeed or is it merely following the same path that led to inadequate measures? What are the lessons to be learned and are bolder initiatives required? In brief, the paper concludes that current initiatives have reached their sale-by date and that a bolder initiative is required at the UN level, moving from recommendations to obligations, and fully engaging developing nations, at present left out in the current ‘club’-oriented process. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime and Globalisation Debate Papers: Accessed February 10, 2011 at: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Countering%20illicit%20and%20unregulated%20money%20flows.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Countering%20illicit%20and%20unregulated%20money%20flows.pdf Shelf Number: 118152 Keywords: CartelsFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTax Evasion |
Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010 Summary: Since the 1990s, Mexico has experienced a persistent public security crisis involving high rates of violent crime and increased violence among organized crime syndicates involved in drug trafficking and other illicit activities. In recent years, this violence has become so severe that officials in Mexico and the United States have expressed uncertainty about the Mexican state's ability to withstand the effects of this violence. Indeed, 2010 was the worst year on record for such violence, and was marked a sharp increase in politically targeted violence that included numerous assassinations and kidnappings of public officials. Until recently, there has been little detailed data or analysis available to gauge Mexico's drug related violence. Until January 2011, the Mexican government released only sporadic and unsystematic data on drug violence, and tracking by media sources produced widely varying estimates. In the absence of reliable information, sensationalistic reporting and government statements contributed to considerable confusion and hyperbole about the nature of Mexico's current security crisis. Fortunately, in recent months, greater public scrutiny and pressure on Mexican authorities resulted in a wealth of new data on Mexico's drug violence. This report builds on previous research by the Trans-Border Institute's Justice in Mexico Project (www.justiceinmexico.org), compiling much of this new data and analysis to provide a more complete picture of Mexico's drug war and the challenges it presents to both Mexico and the United States. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, 2011. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/2011-tbi-drugviolence2.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/2011-tbi-drugviolence2.pdf Shelf Number: 120749 Keywords: AssassinationsCartelsDrug TraffickingHomicidesKidnappingsOrganized CrimeViolent Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Killebrew, Bob Title: Security Through Partnership: Fighting Transnational Cartels in the Western Hemisphere Summary: The most dangerous threat to the United States and its allies in the Western Hemisphere is the growth of powerful transnational criminal organizations that threaten law, order and governance in Mexico and the seven states of Central America. Over 35,000 Mexicans have died in drug-related violence since 2006 when Mexican President Felipe Calderón began to crack down on the cartels; in 2010 more than 3,100 have died in Ciudad Juarez alone. In neighboring Guatemala, the government declared an official “state of siege” along its northern border with Mexico to permit its military to fight the los Zetas cartel. Unfortunately, efforts to counter cartels and drug trafficking have largely failed thus far. Worsening violence and instability in the region threaten U.S. national security interests and demand a stronger response. To address this threat, the United States and its partners in the region should look to Colombia for guidance and assistance. Colombia has fought similar threats with some success and is emerging from three decades of crisis fueled by drug trafficking organizations and violent cartels. While Colombia will face many challenges for some time to come, it is increasingly secure, democratic and able to help its neighbors. The United States and its partners throughout the Western Hemisphere stand the best chance of securing the region against the most dangerous cartels by attacking them together. A regional security framework such as the “Mesoamerican Security Corridor,” proposed by the U.S. Department of State, offers a new opportunity to link U.S. and Colombian assistance and counternarcotics programs in Mexico to address challenges in the Central American states to Mexico’s south. Such a regional security framework will be necessary to defeat the cartels and reinstitute the rule of law and justice. A key element of the framework should be greater synergies between major U.S. security assistance programs including the Mérida Initiative, Plan Colombia and nascent bilateral Colombian-Mexican cooperation. Details: Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 7, 2011 at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Partnership_KillebrewIrvine.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Partnership_KillebrewIrvine.pdf Shelf Number: 121268 Keywords: CartelsDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimeTransnational Crime |
Author: Miller, Nathan H. Title: Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement Summary: The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning game-theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a twenty year span. Reduced-form statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. Direct estimation of the model, via the method of moments, yields a 59 percent lower cartel formation rate and a 62 percent higher cartel detection rate due to leniency. The results have implications for market e±ciency and criminal enforcement. Details: Berkeley, CA: University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics, 2007. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2011 at: Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 121396 Keywords: AmnestyCartelsOrganized Crime |
Author: Brown, Matthew M. Title: Engaging the Borderlands: Options for the Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations Summary: The security of the U.S.-Mexican border is an issue of considerable interest for both countries. The North American Free Trade Agreement has created a web of symbiotic links between the two countries. Unfortunately, this has also presented opportunities for illegal transit. These opportunities are increasingly exploited by Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) whose actions are destabilizing Mexico and increasingly penetrating into the United States. Increasing levels of violence, intimidation, and influence have rapidly become intolerable, demanding a government response. While widespread use of the U.S. military remains an option, the costs both economic and operational, make the use an unviable one. Rather a mixed approach of U.S. and Mexican capacity building and economic assistance is a preferred alternative. The increased capacity of U.S. and Mexican security and law enforcement organizations will over time disrupt, then dismantle the Mexican DTOs. Simultaneously, economic assistance aimed at developing impoverished Mexican regions will both legitimize the Mexican government while marginalizing the influx of narco-dollars. This combined approach provides stability to the region, increases cooperation between neighboring governments, and fosters further legitimate economic growth in the region. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2010. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2011 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136619&coll=limited Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136619&coll=limited Shelf Number: 121487 Keywords: Border SecurityCartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime |
Author: Texas Border Security Council Title: Texas Border Security Council Report to Governor Rick Perry Summary: During the 80th Texas State Legislative Session, Governor Perry requested that the Texas Legislature appropriate $100 million to support border security operations along the 1,254 miles of Texas/Mexico Border. The 80th Texas State Legislature allocated $110 million for border security and created the Border Security Council through Senate Bill 11. The Council was formed to make recommendations to the Governor on reporting requirements, performance standards and audit measures for the use of state funds appropriated for border security, and to advise the Governor on the allocation of discretionary state homeland security funds. The Border Security Council held a series of five public hearings in the fall of 2007 and received testimony from business owners, law enforcement officers, local elected officials and private citizens. Throughout their five public hearings and three open meetings, the Border Security Council found the following: General Findings: Powerful and ruthless Mexican crime cartels dominate the U.S. drug and human smuggling business, and they use former military commandos and transnational gangs to support their operations on both sides of the border. The citizens who live in the smuggling corridors along the border suffer the daily consequences of smuggling-related violence, burglary, vandalism, and trespassing. Drug and human smuggling organizations victimize illegal aliens in search of economic opportunities in the U.S. A porous Texas/Mexico border threatens every region in the state and the nation. An unsecured border provides potential terrorists and their supporters an opportunity into enter the U.S. undetected. The federal government has not yet sufficiently staffed and equipped the Border Patrol to secure the Texas/Mexico border between the ports of entry. Border Security operations require substantial coordination, hard work and sacrifice by dedicated local and state law enforcement officers, Customs and Border Protection and other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard. The Council found that an exceptional level of coordination and cooperation among the local, state, and federal law enforcement community is essential for success. The federal government has not sufficiently staffed and equipped the Office of Field Operations at the ports of entry to prevent smuggling at the ports of entry, nor have they provided for the secure and efficient movement of people and commodities to and from Mexico. Until the federal government is able to secure the border, the State of Texas has an obligation to work closely with its local and federal partners to acquire and maintain operational control of the Texas/Mexico border. The Texas Border Security Strategy established by Governor Perry in February 2006, has been successful in reducing crime and enhancing border security. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Border Security Council, 2008. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 26, 2011 at: http://governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/Border-Security-Report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/Border-Security-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 121497 Keywords: Border Security (Texas/Mexico)CartelsDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensSmuggling |
Author: van Kooten, G. Cornelis Title: Protecting the African Elephant: A Dynamic Bioeconomic Model of Ivory Trade Summary: International trade in ivory is banned in order to protect the African elephant. The trade ban is supported by some range states, because it is seen as an effective means for protecting a 'flagship' species, but is opposed by states, mainly in southern Africa, because populations exceed the carrying capacity of local ecosystems. Issues concerning the ivory trade ban are addressed in this paper using a dynamic partial-equilibrium trade model that consists of four ivory exporting regions and a single demand region. Results indicate that a trade ban might not be successful in maintaining elephant populations, even if it leads to a stigma effect that reduces demand and increases the marginal costs of marketing ivory. Results suggest that the species will survive only if non-market values are taken into account. Surprisingly, however, the interaction between tourism benefits and marginal compensation from rich countries can lead to the demise of elephants in some regions where this would not be the case otherwise. Finally, elephant populations are even projected to crash if range states can operate an effective quota scheme, even one that excludes poaching. In the final analysis, however, free trade in ivory and effective institutions that translate numbers of elephants into monetary payments may be the best hope for the elephant. Details: Selected paper presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings at Long Beach, CA, July 23-26, 2006. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2011 at: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/21206/1/sp06va02.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Africa URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/21206/1/sp06va02.pdf Shelf Number: 121690 Keywords: CartelsIllegal TradeIvoryPoachingWildlife Crime |
Author: Manwaring, Max G. Title: A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies Summary: This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states—and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Shelf Number: 121700 Keywords: CartelsOrganized CrimePrivate Armies (Mexico)PrivatizationSecurityTerrorismViolence |
Author: Danelo, David J. Title: Toward a U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: The Geopolitics of Northern Mexico and the Implications for U.S. Policy Summary: Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006, Mexico’s drug war has taken over 30,000 lives, destabilized the U.S.-Mexico border, and become a security crisis for the North American continent. Two years ago, a December 2008 Pentagon report warned about the strategic consequences for the United States of a rapid collapse of two nations: Pakistan and Mexico. “The Mexican possibility might seem less likely,” said the report, “but the government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault by drug cartels.” Any sudden collapse would require a U.S. response “based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.” This scenario has not come to pass, and a full scale collapse of Mexico remains unlikely. That said, Mexico’s security situation has direct consequences in the United States. Along the U.S.-Mexico border, coalitions of sheriffs, agents, activists and concerned citizens have rallied to increase public awareness. According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, Mexican drug cartels maintain distribution networks in 295 U.S. cities through brutal gang activity. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has joined a chorus of policy analysts and terrorism experts by referring to Mexico’s drug war as a “criminal insurgency.” In recent visits to Mexico, both President Barack Obama and the Secretary of State have acknowledged U.S. responsibility to reduce drug demand and invest in “partnership.” As the joint response to the 2009 H1N1 flu virus by U.S. and Mexican health officials illustrated, United States and Mexico policy responses are inextricably linked. Beyond Mexico City’s federal government, which does not appear in imminent danger of collapse, the United States should be most concerned about conditions in the six northern Mexican states. Because of the current structure of the U.S. and Mexican economies, security in the Mexican states bordering the United States represents an enduring U.S. strategic interest. Averaging $320-340 billion, Mexico and China annually alternate as America’s second largest trading partner. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was ratified in 1994, the Mexican states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California have tripled in population. The 50 km free trade zone—extending on both sides of the border—represents the partnership that has fused the economies of both nations together. Given the degree of economic, cultural and physical connectivity, the ten states along the U.S.-Mexico frontier should be treated in many ways as a “Border Nation” when developing national security policy. The term “Border Nation” describes the region where U.S. government institutions can—and should—focus capacity building efforts, which will make a broader increase of stability more likely throughout Mexico. The Border Nation approach advocated in this monograph will produce better solutions for two reasons. First, analyzing both the U.S. southwest and northern Mexico as a separate region acknowledges the enduring economic connectivity between northern Mexico and the United States. While post-NAFTA economic growth has made the six northern states the most prosperous in Mexico, persistent violence has mortgaged these gains to drug cartels. Second, and most important, a Border Nation concept encourages U.S. officials to use an enduring geopolitical framework to develop partnerships that extend beyond diplomatic courtesies and translate into on-the-ground actions. In order to develop a practical strategic framework for partnership with Mexico in defeating the threats of the drug-fuelled criminal insurgency—which this monograph refers to as “land piracy”—the U.S. government must achieve a greater understanding of the local and regional dynamics of the six Mexican border states. Although the Merida Initiative represents a step forward in developing a viable strategic partnership, this agreement does not present operational or tactical solutions. Unless a better understanding of this area is achieved, and unless specific prescriptions are developed, the security situation throughout Mexico is unlikely to improve. This project has studied security, economic and political trends in northern Mexico and the U.S. southwest in order to develop a strategy for actions the U.S. government can take at the federal level to best support state and local security partnerships between the four U.S. and six Mexican border states to defend and deter the violence and address enduring security issues on both sides of the border. David Danelo has spent extensive time on the ground in Mexico researching conditions in the six northern Mexican states and examining methods for increasing local partnerships between U.S. and Mexican authorities. His field research frames the recommended changes in U.S. policy. No relationship in the Western Hemisphere is fraught with more geopolitical complexity than the one between Mexico and the United States. The two nations are both partners and competitors. Given the economic, social and cultural rivalries, security partnerships between the United States and Mexico have been difficult to create. Failure to build capacity and structure partnerships will enhance the strength of drug cartels and fuel instability and violence. The purpose of this project is to examine the one region—Border Nation—where an enduring security partnership is most vital to long term stability on the North American continent. Details: Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2012 at http://www.fpri.org/pubs/201102.danelo.geopoliticsofnorthernmexico.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.fpri.org/pubs/201102.danelo.geopoliticsofnorthernmexico.pdf Shelf Number: 124096 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.) (Mexico)CartelsCriminal Justice PolicyDrug Trafficking |
Author: Dickenson, Matthew Title: Leadership Transitions and Violence in Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations, 2006-2010 Summary: Since President Felipe Calderon took office, over 34,000 murders have been tied to drug tracking organizations (DTO's) in Mexico. In response, the Mexican government -- with assistance from the US -- has targeted DTO leaders for removal. This study identifies 25 leadership removals between 2006 and 2010, and analyzes subsequent changes in drug-related murders using auto-regressive distributed lag (ADL) regression (OLS) models in a monthly time series of 11 states. Persistence dynamics for longer-term effects are also analyzed. Leadership removals generally precede increases in violence. However, the predicted effects of removal differ by the leadership role that the individual performed. Killing leaders is followed by more violence than capturing them. There is no significant change in levels of drug trafficking, as proxied by seizures and retail prices. Public opinion is increasingly dissatisfied with the Calderon administration's approach. Together, these results suggest the ineffectiveness of DTO leadership targeting. Details: Unpublished paper, 2012. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001405 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001405 Shelf Number: 124854 Keywords: CartelsDrug TraffickingDrugs and Violence (Mexico)Homicides |
Author: Molzahn, Cory Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011 Summary: This is the third annual report by the Trans-Border Institute (TBI) on drug violence in Mexico. As with previous reports, the purpose of this study is to examine the available data, specific patterns, contributing factors, and policy recommendations related to growing toll of the drug war in Mexico. The report draws from the extensive research and analysis of the TBI Justice in Mexico Project (www. justiceinmexico.org), which in the past year has benefited from the generous financial support of The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, The Tinker Foundation, and the Open Society Initiative. This report was also informed by conferences and workshops hosted by Brown University in April 2011, the United Nations Social Science Research Council in June 2011, Stanford University in October 2011, and the Guggenheim Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson Center in December 2011. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2012 at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/2012-tbi-drugviolence.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/2012-tbi-drugviolence.pdf Shelf Number: 126086 Keywords: AssassinationsCartelsDrug TraffickingHomicidesKidnappingsOrganized CrimeViolent Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Garay-Salamanca, Luis Jorge Title: Illicit Networks Reconfiguring States: Social Network Analysis of Colombian and Mexican Cases Summary: People have often thought that as a rule, criminal gangs confront the State. We have this preconceived notion of the State as a homogeneous entity acting as a block to guarantee law enforcement, and of organized crime, such as drug trafficking, seeking ways to get away with breaking the law. In achieving these two objectives, violence ensues: the State resorts to coercion, and organized crime resorts to bribery, kidnapping, murder, or terrorism. However, research carried out during recent years shows that the history of the relationship between the State and organized crime is not always one of confrontation. Indeed, in some cases the latter has been able to infiltrate and to co-opt some State institutions in order to achieve its unlawful objectives. On the other hand, government officials and politicians, in many cases, get along well with organized crime, taking advantage of its criminal power in order to obtain egoistic, exclusive and morally unlawful benefits to the detriment of public interests. It has been reported around the world that policemen infiltrate gangs, criminal gangs bribe government officials to obtain privileged information, and government officials reach secret agreements with gangs of outlaws. However, the social situations analyzed in this book go beyond the classic stories of bribed policemen, infiltrated gangs, or egoistic government officials. This book analyzes cases in which the State has been infiltrated and manipulated, sometimes resulting from alliances between the organized crime and lawful officials and organizations. These alliances can be observed even at high decision-making levels, affecting the structure and operation of institutions. In previous books, the concept of Co-opted State Reconfiguration (CStR) has been introduced to describe situations in which unlawful groups reach agreements with authorities in order to infiltrate State institutions. This concept was also useful to describe situations in which lawful organizations, such as political movements, groups of individuals as landowners, government officials and politicians, establish alliances with unlawful groups to take advantage of their criminal and violent potential. In both cases, the objective is to manipulate and use legitimate institutions in order to obtain unlawful benefits, or obtain lawful benefits that are socially questionable. In both cases the result goes beyond the economic framework, encompassing objectives of political, criminal, judicial and cultural manipulation, and to gain social legitimacy. The CStR has been defined as a more developed and complex process of State Capture (StC), since in the traditional StC lawful economic groups manipulate law making in order to attain exclusive economic benefits. Against this backdrop, the objective of this book is to go deeper into the conceptual, methodological, and empirical issues of the State Capture (StC) and Co-opted State Reconfiguration (CStR). To fulfill this objective, a conceptual and empirical analysis of specific cases of organized crime in Colombia and Mexico will be made. A methodology identifying when a social situation may be defined as either traditional or systemic corruption, StC or CStR, will be presented, developed, and applied. This methodology will also be used to infer the institutional scope, or the degree of damage that a criminal organization may impinge on informal and formal State institutions. Therefore, the StC and CStR will be the guiding concepts throughout the book. The empirical issues will be developed through the social network analysis (SNA), in which alliances such as the above mentioned are found. The first network analyzed is a Mexican cartel, well known for its extreme violent actions throughout the past decade. The second network analyzed is related to an unlawful paramilitary group operating in a Colombian province called Casanare. This province has been favored for more than two decades with huge amounts of public resources coming from oil royalties. However, most of the province’s budget has been misspent, stolen, or appropriated by lawful agents and outlawed organizations, and diverted for purposes other than providing for the social needs of a poor and backward population. The third network is related to five Colombian provinces in the Atlantic Coast of Colombia: Sucre, Córdoba, Cesar, Atlántico, and Magdalena. In these provinces, the United Self–Defense Forces of Colombia [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC], the most powerful unlawful paramilitary group that has ever existed in the recent Colombian history, consolidated its unified command at the end of the nineties. This group, with its increase of de facto power, combined violent actions, drug trafficking, and corruption in order to grab large portions of public budget, manipulate elections, and ultimately, get elected to the Colombian Congress. These actions were carried out with the purpose of promoting law making that favors its interests and achieving social legitimacy at the same time. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Metodo Foundation, 2010. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_f5aa311ed5854d24b2d823f0176e593c.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_f5aa311ed5854d24b2d823f0176e593c.pdf Shelf Number: 141201 Keywords: CartelsCriminal NetworksCriminal ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeSocial Network Analysis |
Author: University of Texas School of Law. Human Rights Clinic Title: Summary: he Human Rights Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law, in cooperation with the Centro Diocesano para los Derechos Humanos Fray Juan de Larios from Coahuila, Mexico, has compiled a report based on analyzed witness testimonies from three U.S. federal trials. Between 2013 and 2016, Zeta members were put on trial in Austin, San Antonio, and Del Rio for crimes of homicide, conspiracy to import drugs and weapons, and money laundering. These trials brought new information to light and corroborated information that has already been documented about Zeta operations and human rights abuses. First-hand testimonies of ex-Zeta cartel members and victims provide a more comprehensive understanding of the dire situation in Coahuila and offer a glimpse into the Zeta structure, members, and nexus with state officials and institutions. After reviewing the witness testimonies, the Clinic has determined two major findings: (1) the Zeta cartel committed numerous human rights abuses in Coahuila with impunity; (2) public institutions and officials played a role, by actions or omissions, in the commission of these abuses. Testimonies describe the nature and degree of Zeta influence over state and municipal officials and institutions. The Zetas paid bribes and integrated police officers into their hierarchy to ensure the cartel would be able to continue their illicit operations without resistance. However, the Zetas did not only influence low level state or municipal police; witnesses described a level of Zeta control which extended to city police chiefs, state and federal prosecutors, state prisons, sectors of the federal police and the Mexican army, and state politicians. Multiple witnesses described bribery payments of millions of dollars to Humberto Moreira and Ruben Moreira, the former and current governors of Coahuila, in exchange for complete control of the state. According to the testimonies, the Zetas' influence over Coahuila government operations at all levels allowed them to conduct their business throughout the state with impunity and often with direct assistance from state officials and police officers. The report also documents the human rights abuses discussed in the witness testimonies, including the large-scale disappearances and killings in March and April of 2011, during what is known as the Piedras Negras and Allende Massacres. These crimes were perpetrated in response to information that three former Zeta operatives had begun to cooperate with U.S. authorities. In retaliation, the Zetas kidnapped, killed, and disappeared over 300 people who they believed to be associated with the former Zeta operatives. According to witnesses, this brutality was not unique to these massacres. The report documents a pattern of kidnappings, killings, torture and disappearance, targeting anyone whom the Zetas believed posed a threat to their illicit operations. In order to exercise control, Zetas also targeted innocent civilians who were completely unconnected to the cartel. Witnesses described the callous manner in which the Zetas stripped victims of their humanity, killed, and disposed of their bodies. The Zetas maintained a tight grip on Coahuila through violence and intimidation tactics such as death threats and through the forced recruitment of Coahuila residents, including the recruitment of minors. It is also clear from the testimonies that witnesses were being threatened even when members of the Zetas were already in custody in the United States. The testimonies also highlight the transnational nature of drug trafficking and the violence associated with this. In particular, witnesses discussed how weapons purchased in the United States were imported to Mexico and drugs produced in Mexico were trafficked into the U.S. Zeta operations extend to various cities in the United States, including San Antonio, Houston, Austin, Eagle Pass, Chicago and Atlanta, as well as to other states, such as New Mexico, California, and Oklahoma. The Zetas supported this transnational operation through a large network of businesses, which they used to launder money and fuel their operations in the trafficking of people, guns, and drugs. The Zetas owned ranches, race tracks, and breeding facilities in the U.S. and Mexico as a part of an elaborate horse racing scheme. Aside from owning properties connected to the horse racing scheme, the Zetas also exploited numerous businesses in Mexico, such as stores, casinos, restaurants, gyms, and carwashes. These enterprises were used as safe houses, as meeting points for drug and money trafficking operations, or instruments of the money laundering operations. Witnesses explained how the Zetas paid bribes and contributed to the campaigns of governors and political candidates to secure the free continuation of their illegal operations. These bribes also ensured that Zeta-owned companies received government contracts and building permits. Further, as has been made clear from the three analyzed trials, the U.S. government possesses valuable information regarding killings, disappearances, threats, and other violations perpetrated by the Zetas. Witness testimonies and the investigations carried out for these trials include key information, such as the location where disappearances and murders occurred. This indicates that the U.S. government may currently have undisclosed information that could lead to the clarification of murders and disappearances perpetrated in Mexico. However, witnesses made clear that the Mexican state has not conducted investigations into these murders, even when the U.S. government has directly shared vital information. Mexican State officials have willfully refused to pursue justice despite having knowledge of countless human rights abuses carried out by members of the Zeta cartel. Both the Zetas and the State are responsible for the violence in Coahuila. At best, the State turned a blind eye to the widespread corruption and grave human rights abuses committed by the Zetas in Coahuila, and at worst, directly participated in the perpetration of these abuses. Details: Austin: University of Texas School of law, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/11/2017-HRC-coahuilareport-EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/11/2017-HRC-coahuilareport-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 151321 Keywords: CartelsHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesMexican CartelsViolenceViolent CrimeZetas |
Author: Cortes, Nancy G. Title: The Drug War and the Resurgence of Mexico's Heroin Summary: Heroin, the main driver of drug abuse concerns in the 1960s and 1970s, is once again recapturing the government's attention. Since 2007, both consumption and availability of heroin seem to follow an upward trend. According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), past year heroin users increased by 82.6 percent between 2007 and 2013. Furthermore, data on U.S. drug heroin seizures shows a 375 percent increase between 2007 and 2012. The recent increase in heroin consumption is often associated with the consumption of opioid prescription drugs and the government's efforts to make prescription drugs more difficult to use or obtain. However, another factor that must be taken into consideration is the change in drug supply networks seen in recent years, particularly the ongoing evolution of Mexican drug trafficking networks triggered by the implementation of counterdrug strategies. Throughout his term, former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) made combatting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) the top priority of his administration. As the government cracked down on large DTOs, violence in Mexico began to dramatically increase in 2008 and peaked in 2011. The implementation of counter-drug strategies, such as the removal of kingpins, led to the fracturing of large DTOs and the proliferation of smaller criminal organizations. Coinciding with the war on drugs was a significant decline in the availability of cocaine, a trend that according to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began in 2006.3 Moreover, between 2006 and 2010, cocaine consumption in the United States decreased by approximately 45 percent. The substantial decline of cocaine supply and consumption could be interpreted as a major accomplishment of the war on drugs, but the increase in heroin consumption calls into question its overall success. In this light, the success of the war on drugs appears inconclusive. This paper examines the factors that contributed to the increase in heroin consumption in the United States by focusing on the role played by foreign drug supply networks. Based on a careful review of recent events and the available data on heroin and cocaine trafficking, I argue that the breaking down of cartels that resulted from the war on drugs led to the weakening of cocaine supply networks and the proliferation of smaller criminal organizations that are more adept to participate in the heroin trade. The paper is organized as follows. First, the association between heroin and opioid prescription drugs is briefly discussed. Second, evidence supporting an increase in heroin availability and consumption following the decline in cocaine availability and the implementation of counter-drug measures in 2006 is presented. Third, the restructuring of the Mexican drug trade comprised by fragmentation, decentralization, and diversification is discussed. Fourth, the structure of the U.S. heroin market is outlined. Fifth, the traffic of Mexican heroin is examined from cultivation through distribution. Sixth, an analysis of the trends and available evidence is provided. Lastly, the paper concludes. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: JUSTICE IN MEXICO WORKING PAPER SERIES Volume 14, Number 2: Accessed May 9, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/151206_CORTES_NANCY_DrugeWarMexicosHeroinTrade_FINAL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/151206_CORTES_NANCY_DrugeWarMexicosHeroinTrade_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 155731 Keywords: CartelsDrug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug War Drug-Related Violence Heroin Opioids Prescription Drug Abuse War on Drugs |