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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
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Results for cell phones
10 results foundAuthor: U.S. Department of Commerce Title: Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless Technology Solutions Summary: The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) submits this report in response to a direction from Congress in December 2009 that NTIA, in coordination with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), develop a plan to investigate and evaluate wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies that might be used to prevent contraband cell phone use by prison inmates. NTIA has identified and evaluated several technology solutions for this report that can be used in a prison environment, including jamming, managed access, and detection techniques. In the preparation of this report, NTIA sought input from the FCC, NIJ, and BOP regarding their efforts to combat contraband cell phone use. The Administration believes that contraband cell phone use by prison inmates to carry out criminal enterprises is intolerable and demands an effective solution. Prison officials should have access to technology to disrupt prison cell phone use in a manner that protects nearby public safety and Federal Government spectrum users from harmful disruption of vital services, and preserves the rights of law-abiding citizens to enjoy the benefits of the public airwaves without interference. To obtain public input on these issues to assist in developing this report, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) in May 2010 soliciting comment on a series of detailed questions to help identify, clarify, and characterize these solutions. NTIA received comments from forty-six sources. In addition to providing input regarding the three technologies identified in the NOI, commenters identified additional technologies for consideration. Working in coordination with its Institute for Telecommunication Sciences, NTIA performed both laboratory and field measurements on a selected jammer. NTIA subsequently analyzed the results of those measurements to determine, as far as possible, the potential impact of that jammer on other authorized radio operations. This report discusses the characteristics and capabilities of the various technologies and considers the potential interference effects that they may have on authorized radio services, including commercial wireless, public safety communications, and 9-1-1 calls. Three possible wireless technology solutions were identified in the NOI that commenters further expounded upon: jamming, managed access, and detection. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/ContrabandCellPhoneReport_December2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/ContrabandCellPhoneReport_December2010.pdf Shelf Number: 121018 Keywords: Cell PhonesPrison Contraband |
Author: Great Britain. Comptroller and Auditor General Title: Mobile Technology in Policing Summary: A programme to equip frontline police officers with mobile devices, such as BlackBerrys and personal data assistants, has achieved a basic level of benefits. However, as the benefits for most forces do not extend beyond this basic level, then value for money has not yet been achieved from the £80 million of expenditure. According to the National Audit Office, while in many forces mobile devices enable officers to spend more time out of their stations, cash savings have been limited and only one in five forces have used the devices effectively to improve their business and operational processes. The business case for the Mobile Information Programme, funded by the Home Office and managed by the National Policing Improvement Agency under the direction of a programme board, focused upon the swift delivery of mobile devices and, by December 2010, around 41,000 had been rolled out, considerably ahead of schedule. Although, in reality, the Agency cannot mandate forces and has little control over each force's investment decision, not enough consideration was given to how forces would use the mobile technology, how much local spending was required or how realistic were the announced deadlines. The programme has not yet added the ability to check fingerprints to its mobile information devices. The programme has on average increased the visibility of police officers to the public and officers spend more time out of the station, an estimated 18 minutes a shift, although there is considerable variation. While the Mobile Information Programme did not explicitly set out to deliver cashable savings, these should have followed from objectives to reduce bureaucracy, increase efficiency and contribute to better policing. Of the 32 forces responding to an NAO survey, only ten claimed some form of cashable savings and these are relatively minor. However, some forces are predicting greater savings in the future, for example, by reducing control room costs. In some instances, process improvement aligned with the use of mobile technology is improving efficiency and reducing bureaucracy. Officers are using their devices to complete and submit crime and intelligence reports and less time is spent obtaining information from control rooms over their radios. However, 22 forces responding to the survey cited drawbacks with mobile technology projects. According to today's report, the experience of implementing mobile technology reinforces the challenge of achieving convergence of ICT across 43 police forces, each with bespoke systems supporting individual business processes. Details: London: The Stationary Office, 2012. 40p. Source: HC 1765 Session 2010-2012: Internet Resource: Accessed March 2, 2012 at http://www.nao.org.uk//idoc.ashx?docId=851b1f0c-f88d-43b1-b743-41d1ef055892&version=-1 Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nao.org.uk//idoc.ashx?docId=851b1f0c-f88d-43b1-b743-41d1ef055892&version=-1 Shelf Number: 124366 Keywords: Cell PhonesEvaluative StudiesPolice Technology (U.K.) |
Author: California. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Office of Inspector General Title: Special Report: Inmate Cell Phone Use Endangers Prison Security and Public Safety Summary: According to numerous California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) officials, the possession of cell phones and electronic communication devices by California’s inmates is one of the most significant problems facing the Department today. Therefore, in February 2009, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) began a review into the proliferation of contraband cell phones in California prisons and how their use puts Department staff, inmates, and the general public at risk. During 2006, correctional officers seized approximately 261 cell phones in the state’s prisons and camps. However, by 2008, that number increased ten-fold to 2,811 with no end in sight. Inmates’ access to cell phone technology facilitates their ability to communicate amongst themselves and their associates outside of prison, to plan prison assaults, plot prison escapes, and orchestrate a myriad of other illegal activity. In addition, these devices can provide an inmate unrestricted and unmonitored access to the Internet, whereby they can communicate with unsuspecting victims, including minors. According to the Department, inmates are paying those involved in smuggling cell phones into California prisons between $500 and $1,000 per phone. There are currently no criminal consequences for the introduction or possession of cell phones in prison, making this activity merely an administrative violation. Furthermore, current security entrance procedures provide ample opportunities for staff and visitors to bring contraband into prison facilities without fear of discovery. Therefore, the introduction of cell phones into state prisons is a low risk, high reward endeavor. In addition to staff, other conduits for smuggling cell phones include visitors, outside accomplices, minimum support facility inmates working outside perimeter fences, and contracted employees. In an effort to combat this growing threat, the Department is supporting legislation making it a crime to introduce or possess cell phones in California’s prisons. Unfortunately, previous efforts to pass similar legislation have failed. In addition, technology that detects or jams cell phone signals is commercially available but potentially expensive and would require federal authorization to place into use. Other detection methods that have been used or are now in sporadic use, such as hands-on searches, metal detectors, and x-ray equipment, are more labor intensive and would require an increase in staffing and funding. Details: Sacramento: Office of the Inspector General, 2009. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2012 at: http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/BOI/Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate%20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/BOI/Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate%20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf Shelf Number: 125321 Keywords: Cell PhonesInmatesPrison ContrabandPrisonersPrisons (California) |
Author: Prendergast, John Title: Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in the World Summary: The time has come to expose a sinister reality: Our insatiable demand for electronics products such as cell phones and laptops is helping fuel waves of sexual violence in a place that most of us will never go, affecting people most of us will never meet. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the scene of the deadliest conflict globally since World War II. There are few other conflicts in the world where the link between our consumer appetites and mass human suffering is so direct. This reality is not the result of an elaborate cover-up, either. Most electronic companies and consumers genuinely do not appreciate the complex chain of events that ties widespread sexual violence in Congo with the minerals that power our cell phones, laptops, mp3 players, video games, and digital cameras. But now that we are beginning to understand these linkages, we need to do all we can to expose them and bring this deadly war fuelled by “conflict minerals” to an end. As a start, the Enough Project has worked with other like-minded groups to create a conflict minerals pledge that commits electronics companies to ensure their products are conflict-free. We are initiating a consumer campaign aimed at encouraging the users of these electronics products to let the biggest companies know that it matters to us that our purchases don’t prolong this ongoing tragedy. Details: Washington, DC: The Enough Project, 2009. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: October 7, 2012 at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Can%20Your%20Hear%20Congo%20Now.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Can%20Your%20Hear%20Congo%20Now.pdf Shelf Number: 126635 Keywords: Armed ConflictCell PhonesConflict Minerals (DRC)RapeSexual Violence |
Author: Mancini, Francesco, ed. Title: New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict Summary: There are now 6 billion cell phone subscriptions in the world, and one third of the world’s population is online. These numbers are growing rapidly, particularly in the developing world, and they demonstrate an unparalleled level of global interconnectivity. They also point to the unprecedented amount of data that we are generating while using new information and communication technologies (ICTs): in 2012 alone, humans generated more data than over the course of their entire history. This report explores the ways in which ICTs and the data they generate can assist international actors, governments, and civil society organizations to more effectively prevent violence and conflict. It examines the contributions that cell phones, social media, crowdsourcing, crisis mapping, blogging, and big data analytics can make to short-term efforts to forestall crises and to long-term initiatives to address the root causes of violence. Five case studies assess the use of such tools in a variety of regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America) experiencing different types of violence (criminal violence, election-related violence, armed conflict, shortterm crisis) in different political contexts (restrictive and collaborative governments). The cases demonstrate clearly that employing new technologies for conflict prevention can produce very different results depending on the context in which they are applied and whether or not those using the technology take that context into account. This is particularly true in light of the dramatic changes underway in the landscapes of violence and conflict on a global level. As such, instead of focusing on supply-driven technical fixes, those undertaking prevention initiatives should let the context inform what kind of technology is needed and what kind of approach will work best. With this in mind, lessons and insights from across the cases point to seven promising steps for strengthening prevention efforts that involve new technologies. 1. Even if you crowd-source your hammer, not every problem is a nail. New technologies have the potential to make huge contributions to violence- and conflictprevention efforts, but they are not a panacea for holistic solutions. International organizations and governments should examine all the tools at their disposal for preventing conflict, and civil society organizations should not be blinkered by their particular thematic focus. 2. Consider the context. The cases show that socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors will all influence whether technology can have a positive impact, which technology would be appropriate, and how technologies could or should be combined. International organizations and governments should make needs assessments and feasibility studies that address these factors standard practice. Civil society organizations should also include such needs assessments or conflict and peace assessments in their proposals when seeking funding from donors. 3. Do no harm. Failure to consider the possible knock-on effects of applying a specific technology can lead to fatal outcomes in violent settings. Spoilers also leverage new technologies to incite violence, promote conflict, and perpetrate crimes. As such, a conflict-sensitive approach remains vital from conception to completion of any initiative involving new technologies. As part of project design and implementation, every actor should identify possible spoilers, conduct a cost-benefit analysis that incorporates levels of risk, develop mechanisms to mitigate risks, and create contingency plans. 4. Integrate local input throughout, and don’t reinvent the wheel. Examples abound where an absence of local input meant there was a lack of buy-in from the affected communities, project financing was unsustainable, the credibility of the information collected was questionable, or there was duplication of work. Once a project is underway, continual consultation with and involvement of the affected community is vital. In general, the application of new technological tools to prevention efforts at the local level works best when integrated into existing civil society initiatives. 5. Use technology to help information flow horizontally more than vertically. Horizontal citizen-to-citizen ICT initiatives can help to connect more “warners” and “responders” more quickly and closer to the crisis. They can also contribute to communities’ resilience in the long term. International organizations should consider supporting spontaneous microinitiatives in this area, provide funding to develop local capacity, improve connectivity between different initiatives, and help the sharing of best practices. Civil society organizations should identify and reward skilled individuals and groups in local communities who can adopt new technologies for preventing violence and conflict. 6. Establish consensus regarding ownership, use, and sharing of information. New technologies make it possible for international organizations and government agencies to acquire more information and more granular information to inform prevention efforts. International organizations, governments, and civil society actors should establish consensus around questions of privacy, access, and use of digital data in any given initiative. This will make prevention efforts more legitimate in the eyes of the affected communities, and ultimately more effective. 7. Foster partnerships for better results. There are indications that prevention initiatives that drew on the complementary strengths of international donors, governments, the private sector, and civil society proved more effective. International organizations and governments are well placed to foster such partnerships and should invest in doing so for more promising results. Given the frequent paralysis at national and international levels when it comes to preventing conflict, the empowerment of individuals to participate in conflict-prevention initiatives in their own communities and societies may be one of the most significant innovations created by advances in technology. This is particularly true when it comes to bridging the persistent gulf between warning and response. Much more research is needed to assess how ICT can be used to generate action at the local level, as well as to inform or warn. In the long run, however, the most effective approach to using new technologies for conflict prevention may well be the one needed in prevention more broadly: one that successfully balances both grassroots, decentralized efforts and the more rationalized and coordinated activities of governments and international organizations. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2013. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2013 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf Shelf Number: 128347 Keywords: Cell PhonesCrime PreventionTechnology and CrimeViolence Prevention (International)Violent Crime |
Author: Lenhart, Amanda Title: Teens and Sexting: How and why minor teens are sending sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude images via text messaging Summary: In a nationally representative survey of those ages 12-17 conducted on landline and cell phones, the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project found:• 4% of cell-owning teens ages 12-17 say they have sent sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude images of themselves to someone else via text messaging• 15% of cell-owning teens ages 12-17 say they have received sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude images of someone they know via text messaging on their cell phone.• Older teens are much more likely to send and receive these images; 8% of 17-year-olds with cell phones have sent a sexually provocative image by text and 30% have received a nude or nearly nude image on their phone.• The teens who pay their own phone bills are more likely to send “sexts”: 17% of teens who pay for all of the costs associated with their cell phones send sexually suggestive images via text; just 3% of teens who do not pay for, or only pay for a portion of the cost of the cell phone send these images.• Our focus groups revealed that there are three main scenarios for sexting: 1) exchange of images solely between two romantic partners; 2) exchanges between partners that are shared with others outside the relationship and 3) exchanges between people who are not yet in a relationship, but where at least one person hopes to be. Details: Washington, DC: Pew Internet & American Life Project, Pew Research Center, 2009. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2013 at: http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting.pdf Shelf Number: 128924 Keywords: Cell PhonesElectronic Mail SystemsSexting (U.S.)Teenagers, Sexual Behavior |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Reducing Mobile Phone Theft and Improving Security. Paper 2 Summary: In September 2014 the Home Office and the Behavioural Insights Team published the joint paper: Reducing Mobile Phone Theft and Improving Security1. That paper used data from Crime Surveys (Crime Survey for England and Wales) conducted between 2005/06 and 2012/13, together with data from the Metropolitan Police about the theft of mobile phones in London between August 2012 and January 2014, to set out a detailed picture of how and when mobile phones are stolen and the types of phone most likely to be stolen. It also included the first Mobile Phone Theft Ratio. When we published that material, we were conscious that the picture it presented might well have changed following the widespread introduction of device based solutions by manufacturers from September 2013 onwards. They were introduced to help reduce mobile phone theft. This paper provides an updated picture of mobile phone theft, including an updated Mobile Phone Theft Ratio, to provide a more contemporary picture capturing the impact that the security features introduced by manufacturers have had on levels of theft. Our findings show: - there has been a fall in levels of mobile phone theft since the introduction of device based solutions such as Apple iOS7 and Samsung Reactivation Lock; - there has been a fall in the proportion of mobile phone thefts across all age groups and genders, except for 22-24 year old males; - 18-21 year old females remain the most vulnerable to mobile phone theft; and - methods such as pick-pocketing and snatch theft, followed by theft of unattended items such as leaving a mobile phone on a bar or restaurant table, are the most common methods used by criminals. Details: London: Home Office, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/509855/PRINT-6-1946-HO-Reducing_Mobile_Phone_Theft_and_Improving_Security_March....pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/509855/PRINT-6-1946-HO-Reducing_Mobile_Phone_Theft_and_Improving_Security_March....pdf Shelf Number: 138426 Keywords: Cell PhonesCrime PreventionMobile PhonesPick-PocketingStolen PropertyTheft |
Author: Grommon, Eric Title: A Case Study of Mississippi State Penitentiary’s Managed Access Technology Summary: Contraband cell phone use in a corrections facility is an ongoing challenge for corrections agencies. There are numerous anecdotes of contraband cell phones being used to conduct criminal activities from inside a prison. Physical searches of inmates and correctional staff are limited in their scope; contraband policies and legal punishments possess deterrent value, but the effect of such approaches are not well known; and technologies to jam cell phone signals are in violation of U.S. law and Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulations. Recently, managed access technology has emerged as another approach to affect contraband cell phone use. This technology allows completion of authorized calls placed from approved phone numbers (numbers which have been vetted and entered into a database) while, conversely blocking calls to/from devices or numbers which have not been pre-approved; a process often referred to as “white-listing”. The promise of this technology as an effective means to combat contraband cell phones has influenced correctional procurement decisions across the country. Yet, many unknowns exist with respect to its capability, functionality, and actual impact on contraband cell phone use. The present research seeks to inform these gaps and provide corrections administrators and policy-makers with information describing managed access technology, its deployment, and relevant data on cell phone transmissions captured by a managed access system. A case study approach was used to learn about the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ (MDOC) procurement and deployment processes used when they implemented managed access technology at the Mississippi State Penitentiary (MSP). A series of interviews and teleconferences, in addition to the secondary analysis of managed access system data, were employed to generate a fundamental understanding of managed access technology operations, identify challenges and lessons learned, and develop a baseline of contraband cell phone activity. This assessment is not an evaluation of the operational efficacy of managed access technology. More specifically, the present study does not seek to quantify potential vulnerabilities or manipulations of managed access systems. Such an evaluation would be insightful, but is beyond the scope of the present study. The present study identified the following challenges associated with deployment and operations of managed access technology: 1. Managed access has to be routinely “managed”. This task requires a significant labor commitment from the host agency, in addition to ensuring that personnel have appropriate technical skills. 2. Managed access requires an effective self-monitoring capability. 3. The system must be designed to prevent illegal access to cellular signals originating outside the corrections facility, and procedures must be developed to address legitimate calls that are blocked by the system. 4. The signal strength of managed access system must be strong enough to cover areas in the facility while ensuring emissions do not exceed authorized levels or exceed authorized coverage areas. 5. Coordination is required with carriers and local public safety answering points to ensure proper handling of 9-1-1 calls. 6. Technology upgrades by cellular carriers can significantly reduce system effectiveness; close coordination with the carriers is critical for effective system operations. 7. The managed access system and associated physical infrastructure may be vulnerable to weather conditions. 8. Inmates may attempt to sabotage system infrastructure. To address these challenges, and based on our observations, we note the following practices employed by MDOC: 1. Work with and educate representatives from the legislative community, the Executive Branch, and advocacy groups to advocate changes to existing laws and policies governing contraband cell phones. 2. Establish cooperative partnerships with cellular carriers. 3. Cross-reference captured phone call information with existing pre-approved list of inmate land-line numbers. 4. Treat managed access as part of a layered approach for counter-measures beyond traditional search capabilities. 5. Use managed access to eliminate inmate use of cellphone technology as a way to circumvent mandatory monitoring of inmate conversations, a condition of use associated with landline based authorized Inmate Calling Systems (ICS). 6. Use managed access to create a general deterrent to impact contraband cell phone market value. 7. Create a housing unit for contraband cell phone violators within MSP at Parchman. 8. Correctional facilities must harden managed access system hardware and associated infrastructure to prevent damage, system failure, and system inefficiencies from both inclement weather and premediated attacks by prisoners. Despite these challenges, managed access technology does appear to detect and terminate a large number of cell phone transmissions. Details: Rome, NY: Engility Corporation, 2015. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250262.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250262.pdf Shelf Number: 140843 Keywords: Cell PhonesCorrectional Administration Prison Contraband |
Author: Cruz-Rivera, Luis Jose Title: Preventing Contraband Cellular Phone Use in Prisons: A Technical Response to NTIA Summary: Overview From correctional facilities within the United States (U.S) and throughout the world to homeland defense and scenarios taking place on battlefields, illicit cellular phone use and unauthorized mobile data systems access is impacting mission safety at many levels. As evidenced by recent congressional activities and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) Notice of Inquiry (NOI) regarding technical solutions to detect and prevent illegal use of cellular phones in correctional facilities, this problem is a growing threat to the security of our nation and its citizens. Too often, solution are designed to control threats, such as the growing cellular contraband problem and other major safety concerns, focus on the technology component , and fails to consider the appropriate combination of skills, processes, and technologies to enable a comprehensive solution. In the case of contraband of cell phone use within correctional facilities, the solution lays in the architecture, addressing and combating the root cause of the problem. The effective use of technology can combine intelligence gathering with analysis to support the security mission. Effective operating scenario knowledge, decision-making capabilities, and goal attainment need to ultimately control and deny this contraband issue. Commercial off the shelf (COTS) standalone systems do not offer a complete and satisfactory solution to the contraband cell phone challenge detailed in the NTIA request. Consideration of unified operational requirements, concepts of operations and functional requirements must be applied to the selection of available systems or development of an effective system of systems appropriate to address the mission space. This facilitates the deployment of an intelligent architecture for centralized and regional environments alike with a comprehensive affordable solution. The commercial market space has recognized this disparity and as the NTIA NOI identifies several point solutions or technologies have been developed within the current regulatory environment to address the known cellular contraband issues. For the purposes of this paper these solutions fall into two general categories - active radio-frequency (RF) systems and passive RF systems. While there are hybrid scenarios (a solution using both active and passive RF), this document will focus only on the solutions that fall into the active RF category and the passive RF category; hybrid solutions are excluded from this analysis. Furthermore, this document intends to elucidate a comprehensive approach for managing the operational data needs of several layers of the U.S. Government and other key stakeholders affected by illicit use of cellular phones in prisons. This document will discuss the two solution types and provide details regarding several technology and deployment considerations to address the architecture of the solution. Figure 1 depicts the two mission areas in which all of the possible solutions fall - contraband-based solutions and intelligence-based solutions. The contraband-based solution addresses the short-term need for denial by jamming or detection and monitoring for manual control. The intelligence-based solution provides varying capabilities of C3I (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) interface and allows stakeholder operations to address criminal or other activities of interest within stakeholder jurisdictions. This capability can bridge other additional security needs to the solution, thus enabling the correctional community to utilize data sharing with law enforcement and judicial stakeholders to maintain a holistic view of criminal network communications and contraband management activities within the target locations. The level of metadata attainable in these transactions provides a large data-mining capability, which can interface with other operating scenario data sources and provide a new appreciation for connection networks. Within the scope considered by NTIA, solutions to this problem will serve the following primary stakeholders: - Prisons and correctional institutions that want the technology to solve the problem - Commercial operators who have paid millions and in some cases billions of dollars for spectrum and equipment and do not want their coverage of valid users impacted - The general public who wants a solution to stop the criminal activities but without impact to their use of devices on the outside of the correctional institution location Other stakeholders include: - State and local law enforcement agencies requiring increased insight and awareness of activities linked with illicit communications - Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data fusion centers, Department of Justice (DOJ), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other law enforcement (LE) entities - Government and industry associations responsible for overseeing the use of spectrum and wireless technology that want a solution that can operate within the boundaries of the law and regulations The opportunity to solve this problem using technology addresses a broad market segment, which also needs to coexist with other security efforts and data-sharing initiatives among the stakeholders. Strategic acquisition and integration work will be critical to deploying a given solution in order to avoid reengineering of design due to technology fluctuations, obsolescence, and total cost of ownership. If a rigorous solution development process is not followed, correctional institutions run the risk of committing and expending unnecessary resources and funds resulting to system implementation defects, technical capability gaps, and system suitability inadequacies within a constantly changing wireless environment. Details: Fairfax, VA: ManTech International Corporation, 2010. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2019 at: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/mantech_response_to_ntia_inquiry_v1.01.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/mantech_response_to_ntia_inquiry_v1.01.pdf Shelf Number: 154226 Keywords: Cell PhonesContrabandCorrectional FacilitiesIllicit Cellular Phone UseMobile Data Systems AccessPrison ContrabandPrisoner Misconduct |
Author: Carter, William A. Title: Low-Hanging Fruit: Evidence-Based Solutions to the Digital Evidence Challenge Summary: Executive Summary The growth of digital technologies and the rise of mobile computing over the past decade have created new opportunities and new challenges for law enforcement. On one hand, the proliferation of digital communications, digital storage devices, and ubiquitous connectivity has made more information available than ever before on the movements, conversations, and behavior of people. On the other hand, rapidly changing technologies, shifts in terms of who controls the data, adoption of sophisticated anonymity and obfuscation tools, and jurisdictional uncertainty create new and critical challenges for the detection, surveillance, and attribution of criminal activity. In fact, survey findings indicate that law enforcement officials across federal, state, and local entities encounter difficulties in effectively accessing, analyzing, and utilizing digital evidence in over one-third of their cases that involve digital evidence - a problem that is likely to grow over time absent national attention to this problem. The purpose of this report is to focus attention on a range of too-often neglected challenges and opportunities faced by law enforcement as they seek to access and use digital evidence in their cases. Recently, most of the discussions have focused on encryption: to what extent, and in what circumstances, if any, should one be compelled to facilitate access to encrypted communications or otherwise inaccessible devices? But the obstacles posed by encryption are just one aspect of the challenge in accessing digital evidence, albeit an important one. In many investigations, a range of data is potentially accessible to law enforcement pursuant to lawful means. For a variety of reasons, however, law enforcement officials often face significant obstacles in being able to access, decipher, or otherwise use that data, even when they have the legal authority to do so. Our survey of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials suggests that challenges in accessing data from service providers - much of which is not encrypted - is the biggest problem that they currently face in terms of their ability to use digital evidence in their cases. Specifically, the inability to effectively identify which service providers have access to relevant data was ranked as the number-one obstacle in being able to effectively use digital evidence in particular cases. Difficulties in obtaining sought-after data from these providers was ranked as a close second. These challenges ranked significantly higher than any other challenges - including challenges associated with accessing data from devices or interpreting the data that has been obtained. This is an issue that has received relatively little attention and resources, and certainly not enough compared to the need. The sole federal entity with an explicit mission to facilitate more efficient cooperation between law enforcement and industry - the National Domestic Communications Assistance Center (NDCAC) - has a budget of $11.4 million, spread among several different programs designed to distribute knowledge about service providers policies and products, develop and share technical tools, and train law enforcement on new services and technologies, among other initiatives. Another important digital evidence training center - the National Computer Forensic Institute, run by the Secret Service - has to fight each year for adequate appropriations. This year it was awarded $18.9 million, enough for it to train approximately 1,200 students. If fully funded, it could train over 3,000 students per year. An array of federal and state training centers, crime labs, and other efforts have been developed to help fill the gaps, but they are able to fill only a fraction of the need. Meanwhile, there is no central entity responsible for monitoring these efforts, taking stock of the demand, and filling the gaps. Nor is there any central entity responsible for the range of other, related policy concerns that have emerged and will undoubtedly continue to do so. The good news is that these are problems that can be solved, or at the very least much better managed than they are now. This will require a national commitment, adequate resourcing, and a shift in policy. The costs are moderate and the payoffs likely large. To fill these needs, this report calls for a new National Digital Evidence Policy, to be spearheaded by a National Digital Evidence Office that will have the responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the many efforts to fill the gaps. This office should, among other things, work with federal, state, and local law enforcement to track trends and challenges, and work with the other existing entities and individuals focused on these issues to improve law enforcement access to digital evidence, consistent with civil liberties. It should, for example, facilitate improved cooperation with service providers and help disseminate knowledge and analytical tools that can assist law enforcement in deciphering data that has been disclosed. And it should promote greater transparency about the nation's digital evidence policies and programs, ensure that new initiatives are being conducted in a manner consistent with privacy and civil liberties, and make recommendations with respect to new legal authorities and policy changes that are needed or being pursued. The report further calls for the authorization and adequate resourcing of NDCAC or an equivalent entity to serve as a training and technical support center within this new office. Building on NDCAC's current mission, this support center would conduct and develop both in-person and online trainings; collect and disseminate knowledge about provider policies and products; educate law enforcement about how to submit lawful and appropriately tailored requests for data; develop and maintain technical tools for analyzing lawfully obtained digital evidence; and disseminate these tools to appropriately trained law enforcement personnel around the country. Put simply, the current model - pursuant to which each and every office is largely expected to develop and maintain its own expertise - is not sustainable. Even with an extraordinary increase in funding and training, it is not practical or possible for every one of the thousands of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies across the country to have, within their own department, adequate access to all of the resources and expertise needed. In fact, more than half of those surveyed stated that they lacked sufficient internal resources to handle digital evidence - a problem that is likely to grow as more and more information becomes digitalized. It is possible, however, to effectively train agents and other relevant officials as to when expert advice or technical assistance is needed and where to go to seek it - so long as the training and expert assistance is widely available. In support of these efforts, the report also calls for the creation of an expert advisory board, comprised of experts from law enforcement, industry, and members of civil society, to advise the National Digital Evidence Office in a consultative role. This will facilitate better policies with broad multi-stakeholder support, foster the kinds of conversations and interactions needed to build trust (if not agreement) between parties, ensure a full range of perspectives are considered, and provide a venue for providers and other outside voices to raise concerns and/or push for policy changes. Importantly, any workable solution will require renewed efforts by both law enforcement and the private companies that manage and hold data of interest. This report thus calls on tech companies that manage, store, and have access to data to do more as well. Specifically, the tech companies should commit to maintaining up-to-date law enforcement guidance, and better educating law enforcement on how their systems work and the kinds of data available, so as to avoid situations in which law enforcement has to guess what to ask for. This will in turn facilitate the submission of better and more tailored data requests from law enforcement, thereby eliminating a major source of concern on both sides of the process. The report further calls on providers to maintain, and, if applicable, develop, online mechanisms through which law enforcement can make lawful requests for data; to commit to fast response times for emergency requests; and to ensure that there is a human being for law enforcement to speak with in the event of emergency. Providers should also commit to continued transparency about the nature and volume of requests, to challenge what they perceive to be overbroad or unlawful demands for data that they might receive, and to report trends of concern to the National Digital Evidence Office, via input to the expert advisory board or otherwise. None of this is meant to replace the excellent work already underway in parts of the Department of Justice, across federal and district attorneys' offices, at federal and state crime labs, and in various other centers of excellence around the country. Nor is it meant to displace the efforts already underway by providers that have developed online portals to facilitate law enforcement access, make guides available to law enforcement, provide trainings, and engage in transparency reporting regarding law enforcement requests for data. But both survey results and interviews suggest that there is more to be done. A National Digital Evidence Office would build on, elevate the prominence of, and ensure adequate resourcing for the successful initiatives already underway, and also help to ensure that training and technical assistance is provided not just to those that already receive it, but across the many federal, state, and local offices where the need arises. Continued and increased engagement by tech companies would help ensure that law enforcement knows where to go to request particular data, the range of data available, and how to appropriately tailor their requests. Moreover, there is a clear need for best practices and industry standards that new entrants to the market and smaller-scale providers can adopt as well. Some of these steps will take longer to achieve. It will, no doubt, take some time and effort to authorize and set up a new National Digital Evidence Office. But there are a number of steps that can and should be taken immediately. The Department of Justice can and should set up an internal national digital evidence coordinating body to fill the important policy and oversight needs. Congress can and should adequately resource NDCAC to serve the training and technical roles that already fall within its mission. The many excellent training centers that already exist should also be fully funded and should expand their mission to reach a wider set of students and address a wider set of issues. Providers can and should also take voluntary steps to better facilitate access and tailored requests, consistent with the law and the need to protect privacy and civil liberties. The remainder of the report draws on survey results and a broad range of interviews to provide a detailed accounting and analysis of the four key areas of this report's focus: resource constraints, training programs, cooperation with service providers, and related legal and policy issues. Part II provides a detailed set of recommendations; part III provides conclusions. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2019 at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/low-hanging-fruit-evidence-based-solutions-digital-evidence-challenge Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180724_Carter_Digital_Evidence_FINAL.pdf?IwEUbeNl2632hDj.KIuMqJ_x0RBR_HI4 Shelf Number: 154224 Keywords: Cell PhonesDigital CommunicationsDigital EvidenceDigital TechnologiesEncryptionLaw EnforcementSmartphones |