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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:24 pm
Time: 12:24 pm
Results for cheating
5 results foundAuthor: New South Wales. Law Reform Commission Title: Cheating at Gambling Summary: This Report follows on from our consultation paper, Cheating at Gambling (CP12), in which we identified the inadequacy of existing criminal laws to deal with cheating at gambling. Since the release of CP12, there has been a remarkable number of instances of match-fixing internationally. There has also arisen an acceptance of the need for an urgent and unified response to the problem. Most relevantly, in Australia, the Coalition of Major Professional and Participation Sports (COMPPS) has released the Report of its Anti-Corruption Working Party; a National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport was announced following a meeting of the Australian Sports Ministers; and the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General has agreed to establish a Standing Council of Law and Justice working group to develop a proposal and timetable for a nationally consistent approach to criminal offences relating to match-fixing. Sports betting has become a major industry in Australia. Cheating at sports betting, including by match-fixing, undermines the integrity of the sports in question, can involve significant fraud, and has the potential to cause disruption to a significant economic activity. Details: Sydney: NSW Law Reform Commission, 2011. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Report 130: Accessed September 12, 2011 at: http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ll_lrc.nsf/vwFiles/R130.pdf/$file/R130.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ll_lrc.nsf/vwFiles/R130.pdf/$file/R130.pdf Shelf Number: 122719 Keywords: CheatingGamblingIllegal GamblingSports Betting |
Author: Butler, Jeffrey V. Title: Trust and Cheating Summary: When we take a cab we may feel cheated if the driver takes an unnecessarily long route despite the lack of a contract or promise to take the shortest possible path. Is our decision to take the cab affected by our belief that we may end up feeling cheated? Is the behavior of the driver affected by his beliefs about what we consider cheating? We address these questions in the context of a trust game by asking participants directly about their notions of cheating. We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique – the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it. Details: Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 53p. Source: NBER Working Paper Series, No. 18509: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2012 at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509.pdf?new_window=1 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509.pdf?new_window=1 Shelf Number: 127217 Keywords: Cheating |
Author: Schroeder, Kari Britt Title: Local norms of cheating and the cultural evolution of crime and punishment: a study of two urban neighborhoods Summary: The prevalence of antisocial behavior varies across time and place. The likelihood of committing such behavior is affected by, and also affects, the local social environment. To further our understanding of this dynamic process, we conducted two studies of antisocial behavior, punishment, and social norms. These studies took place in two neighborhoods in Newcastle Upon Tyne, England. According to a previous study, Neighborhood A enjoys relatively low frequencies of antisocial behavior and crime and high levels of social capital. In contrast, Neighborhood B is characterized by relatively high frequencies of antisocial behavior and crime and low levels of social capital. In Study 1, we used an economic game to assess neighborhood differences in theft, third-party punishment (3PP) of theft, and expectation of 3PP. Participants also reported their perceived neighborhood frequency of cooperative norm violation ("cheating"). Participants in Neighborhood B thought that their neighbors commonly cheat but did not condone cheating. They stole more money from their neighbors in the game, and were less punitive of those who did, than the residents of Neighborhood A. Perceived cheating was positively associated with theft, negatively associated with the expectation of 3PP, and central to the neighborhood difference. Lower trust in one's neighbors and a greater subjective value of the monetary cost of punishment contributed to the reduced punishment observed in Neighborhood B. In Study 2, we examined the causality of cooperative norm violation on expectation of 3PP with a norms manipulation. Residents in Neighborhood B who were informed that cheating is locally uncommon were more expectant of 3PP. In sum, our results provide support for three potentially simultaneous positive feedback mechanisms by which the perception that others are behaving antisocially can lead to further antisocial behavior: (1) motivation to avoid being suckered, (2) decreased punishment of antisocial behavior, and (3) decreased expectation of punishment of antisocial behavior. Consideration of these mechanisms and of norm-psychology will help us to understand how neighborhoods can descend into an antisocial culture and get stuck there. Details: PeerJ 2:e450; DOI 10.7717/peerj.450. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: https://peerj.com/articles/450.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://peerj.com/articles/450.pdf Shelf Number: 134072 Keywords: Antisocial Behavior (U.K.)CheatingNeighborhoods and CrimePunishmentSocial CapitalStealingTheftUrban Areas |
Author: Cohn, Alain Title: Bad Boys: How Criminal Identity Salience Affects Rule Violation Summary: We conducted an experiment with 182 inmates from a maximum security prison to analyze the impact of criminal identity salience on cheating. The results show that inmates cheat more when we exogenously render their criminal identity more salient. This effect is specific to individuals who have a criminal identity, because an additional placebo experiment shows that regular citizens do not become more dishonest in response to crime-related reminders. Moreover, our experimental measure of cheating correlates with inmates' offenses against in-prison regulation. Together, these findings suggest that criminal identity salience plays a crucial role in rule violating behavior. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 5363: Accessed July 17, 2015 at: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19160882 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19160882 Shelf Number: 136098 Keywords: CheatingDishonestyIllegal BehaviorPrisoners |
Author: Jetter, Michael Title: Good Girl, Bad Boy: Corrupt Behavior in Professional Tennis Summary: This paper identifies matches on the male and female professional tennis tours in which one player faces a high payoff from being "on the bubble" of direct entry into one of the lucrative Grand Slam tournaments, while their opposition does not. Analyzing over 378,000 matches provides strong evidence for corrupt behavior on the men's tour, as bubble players are substantially more likely to beat better ranked opponents when a win is desperately needed. However, we find no such evidence on the women's tour. These results prevail throughout a series of extensions and robustness checks, highlighting gender differences regarding corrupt and unethical behavior, but also concerning collusion. We especially find evidence for collusion once monetary incentives are further increased. Finally, the market for sports betting does not seem to be aware of this phenomenon, suggesting a market imperfection and further confirming our suspicion of irregular activities in men's tennis. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2015. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8824: Accessed September 14, 2016 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp8824.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp8824.pdf Shelf Number: 147865 Keywords: AthleticsCheatingSporting EventsSports Betting |