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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:10 pm
Time: 12:10 pm
Results for civil liberties
4 results foundAuthor: Metropolitan Police Authority. Civil Liberties Panel Title: Protecting the Innocent: The London Experience of DNA and the National DNA Database Summary: The MPA Civil Liberties Panel, which reports to the MPA Full Authority, was set up as a part of Met Forward, the MPA’s strategic plan. It was established as a means of improving public confidence in policing and ensuring the MPS maintains public trust. The use of DNA in policing is arguably one of the biggest advances in crime investigation since fingerprinting was first used in the early 20th Century. DNA is also highly emotive; it is personal and unique to an individual and when taken allows a significant amount of information to be known about a person. This means the public need to be confident that the police and the government use DNA and DNA records in a way that respects their fundamental right to privacy and protects their civil liberties. With this in mind, the panel have chosen to focus only on DNA that is taken from an individual by the police, for the purposes of investigating crime, including the operation of the DNA Database. Therefore, this review is not concerned with DNA that is obtained from crime scenes (for example, traces of DNA have been found on cigarette butts which have helped secure a conviction for murder). The panel does not dispute the need to take and retain DNA taken from a crime scene in order to assist with the investigation and identification of suspects, nor does it have concerns about the manner in which this is done and processed. The Panel prioritised ‘DNA’ because of the following: • The UK has a higher percentage (8.4%) of its population on a DNA database compared to anywhere else in the world. On 31st July 2010, the estimated total number of individuals retained on the DNA Database was 5.1 million. • The DNA Database contains the DNA profiles of all those convicted for a recordable offence since 1996. However, a change in legislation in 2001 allowed for the retention of DNA on arrest. The DNA Database currently holds all DNA profiles indefinitely, irrespective of whether they have been convicted of committing an offence. Approximately 1 million people or 1 in 5 of those on the DNA database have not been convicted of any offence. • 16% of DNA profiles on the DNA Database are from non-white ethnic groups. The 2001 census identified that 7.9% of the UK population comprised of non white ethnic groups4. Ethnicity monitoring in relation to the DNA Database is based on police ethnic appearance codes (please see Glossary for details) which require the police officer to make their own judgement of an individual’s ethnic appearance on the basis of 6 categories. This differs to the self defined ethnicity codes (please see Glossary for details) used throughout the criminal justice system. A total of 118,990 DNA samples were taken by the Metropolitan Police during 2009/10. There are no records held centrally regarding the total number of DNA samples taken by UK police forces in 2009/10. Of the DNA samples taken by the MPS in 2009/10: • 50% of these samples were taken from white people (71% of London’s population is white6); 49% were taken from black and Asian ethnic groups7 (23% of London’s population comprises of black and Asian ethnic groups). The largest age group represented was 25-44yrs old (45%). Nearly 20% of samples were taken from young people aged 10-17. Public concerns have been raised about the disproportionate representation of some groups and communities on the DNA Database. In December 2008 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in the case of S & Marper v The United Kingdom that indefinite retention of DNA profiles and samples on the National DNA Database was in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to respect for private and family life. The government has recently introduced the Protection of Freedoms Bill which sets out to balance civil liberties and the protection of the public, and in doing so address the issues outlined above. A recent decision by the Supreme Court echoes the ECHR decision in the case of S & Marper. Her Majesty’s Inspectorates for both the Police and the Prison Service are also conducting joint inspections of police custody facilities as part of a six year programme commencing in 2008. Some of the inspections undertaken across England and Wales, including a number of MPS boroughs in London have exposed deficiencies in relation to the management and storage of DNA within custody, including DNA samples not being correctly processed and labelled and on one occasion, DNA samples being stored alongside foodstuffs. The overarching purpose of this review is to ensure that DNA is managed and handled appropriately by the MPS with the necessary safeguards in place in order to strengthen public confidence. Our review has focused on the experience of Londoners, including many who have had their DNA taken by police. Our report provides an illustration of what happens to DNA when it is taken by police from an individual, through to its inclusion on the National DNA Database. As part of our review we examined this whole process in detail, focusing on the impact on individuals and on specific groups, on their perceptions, fears and concerns. Details: London: MPA, 2011. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2011 at: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/committees/mpa/110630-04-appendix01.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/committees/mpa/110630-04-appendix01.pdf Shelf Number: 122726 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCriminal InvestigationsDNA TypingPolicing (U.K.)Public Opinion |
Author: Cortright, David Title: Friend not Foe: Civil Society and the Struggle against Violent Extremism - A report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame Summary: Repressive counterterrorism measures (CTMs) have led to an erosion of civil liberties and human rights in many countries. The repercussions have been felt keenly by civil society groups, especially in the global South. Overly restrictive security policies have contributed to a climate of suspicion toward nongovernmental groups, particularly those that challenge social exclusion and unequal power relations. Many of the organizations that work against extremism by promoting human rights and development are themselves being labeled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to operate. Counterterrorism measures include a wide range of policies with differing impacts, which can be loosely characterized as the good, the bad, and the ugly. In the bad and ugly categories are CTMs that overemphasize security and distort development priorities, and that lead to extrajudicial killings, greater state repression, and increased human rights abuse. Repressive counterterrorism measures constrain the operational capacity of civil society actors and impede the work of groups promoting rights-based development. On the positive side are cooperative nonmilitary measures that enhance the capacity of governments to thwart terrorist attacks. Also in the good category are policies that encourage support for sustainable development and the defense of human rights, as recommended in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006. The evaluation of particular policies should be based on the degree to which they contribute to genuine security and democratic governance, while also upholding the rule of law and protecting the work of those striving to defend human rights, promote development, and resolve conflict. The recent trend toward the use of development funding for security-related programs has stirred controversy among development agencies and civil society actors. In the United States a growing percentage of development funding is being channeled through the Pentagon or integrated with military operations. Development advocates recognize the connections that exist between development and security, but they oppose the diversion of development funding to serve the security interests of governments in the global North. The integrity and autonomy of development and human rights activities must be respected as ends in themselves, not as means to other purposes. International policies to prevent the financing of terrorism have adversely affected nonprofit charities and have created a chilling effect in the donor community. Transnational Islamic NGOs have experienced particular difficulties in fulfilling the almsgiving obligation of the zakaat. In several countries, governments have adopted legislation and regulations curbing remittances and imposing conditions on foreign funding. Such restrictions have made it more difficult to finance independent humanitarian assistance, development, and conflict mediation activities. In response to the repressive pressures and restrictions that have been imposed on civil society groups and their supporters, NGOs have established a set of core principles, based on international legal conventions, for protecting the operational and political space of civil society groups. These are: the right to entry, defined as the freedom to associate and form organizations; the right to operate without unwanted state interference; the right to free expression; the right to communicate and cooperate freely internally and externally; the right to seek and secure resources; and the right to have these freedoms protected by the state. States have a duty under international law to assure all citizens the full range of human and civil rights, including freedoms of association and expression. Through their efforts for development and human rights, civil society groups are working to dry up the wells of extremism from which violence springs. Civil society organizations address political grievances, socio-economic injustices, and power imbalances that are among the roots causes of armed conflict. This work is not labeled counterterrorism, nor should it be, but it is exactly what is needed to counter violent extremism. International policymakers must recognize and protect this vital civil society mission and take action to eliminate counterproductive CTMs. In the global struggle against terrorism civil society groups should be welcomed as friends, not hounded as foes. Details: Goshen, IN: Fourth Freedom Forum, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 2, 2012 at http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/KROC_FriendFoe_CivilSocietyAgainstViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/KROC_FriendFoe_CivilSocietyAgainstViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 124351 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCounterterrorismHuman RightsViolent Extremism |
Author: The Constitution Project Title: Recommendations for Fusion Centers: Preserving Privacy & Civil Liberties while Protecting Against Crime & Terrorism Summary: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the federal and state governments embarked on a far-ranging effort to detect and defend against potential terrorist threats. One of the central components of this effort has been the creation of a network of state and regionally-based fusion centers that share information among law enforcement and some intelligence agencies. Today at least 77 fusion centers are active in the United States. While these state entities have received substantial support from Congress and the Executive Branch, their roles and missions vary widely and are still being developed. Run properly, fusion centers could play an important role in addressing terrorist and other criminal threats. Yet fusion centers can also pose serious risks to civil liberties, including rights of free speech, free assembly, freedom of religion, racial and religious equality, privacy, and the right to be free from unnecessary government intrusion. Several fusion centers have issued bulletins that characterize a wide variety of religious and political groups as threats to national security. In some instances, state law enforcement agencies that funnel information to fusion centers have improperly monitored and infiltrated anti-war and environmental organizations. Moreover, the manner in which fusion centers amass and distribute personal information raises the concern that they are keeping files—perhaps containing information that is sensitive or concerns constitutionally protected activities—on people in the United States without proper justification. For these reasons, we, the members of The Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee endorsing this report, have undertaken this examination of fusion centers, and offer a set of recommendations to assist policymakers to ensure that fusion centers operate effectively while respecting civil liberties and constitutional values. Part II of this report provides an overview of the structure of fusion centers and the institutional framework within which they operate. Parts III, IV and V identify specific concerns raised by fusion center data collection, data storage and use, and accountability and governance mechanisms. Part VI outlines our specific recommendations for reforms that address civil liberties concerns. We hope that these recommendations will facilitate the development of sound rules and best practices to ensure respect for constitutional rights and values. Indeed, fusion centers themselves seek concrete guidance on the practical application of constitutional principles to daily threat assessment. We also hope that they will encourage further consideration of the proper role and mission of fusion centers within the nation’s law enforcement and anti-terrorism framework. Details: Washington, DC: The Constitution Project, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2012 at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Shelf Number: 126403 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCriminal IntelligenceFusion CentersInformation SharingPrivacyTerrorism |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: Restricting or Abolishing Cash: An Effective Instrument for Fighting the Shadow Economy, Crime and Terrorism? Summary: This paper has four goals: First, the use of cash as a possible driving factor of the shadow economy is investigated. Second, the use of cash in crime, here especially in corruption, is also econometrically investigated. The influence is somewhat larger than on the shadow economy, but it is certainly not a decisive factor for bribery activities. Some figures about organized crime are also shown; the importance of cash is diminishing. Third, some remarks about terrorism are made and here a cash limit doesn't prevent terrorism. Fourth, some remarks are made about the restriction or abolishment of cash on civil liberties, with the result that this will extremely limit them. The conclusion of this paper is that cash has a minor influence on the shadow economy, crime and terrorism, but potentially a major influence on civil liberties. Details: Paper presented at International Cash Conference 2017 - War on Cash: Is there a Future for Cash? 25 - 27 April 2017, Island of Mainau, Germany. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2017 at: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf Shelf Number: 147226 Keywords: BriberyCivil LibertiesCorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeProceeds of CrimeShadow EconomyTerrorist Financing |