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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:14 pm
Time: 9:14 pm
Results for confidential sources
1 results foundAuthor: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Management and Oversight of its Confidential Source Program Summary: The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Confidential Source Program. The OIG initiated the audit as a result of the OIG's receipt and review of numerous allegations regarding the DEA's handling and use of confidential sources. This audit report specifically focuses on our examination of the DEA's confidential source policies and their consistency with Department-level standards for law enforcement components, review of the DEA's oversight of certain high-level confidential sources and high-risk activities involving confidential sources, and evaluation of the DEA's administration of death and disability benefits to confidential sources. Our audit work thus far has been seriously delayed by numerous instances of uncooperativeness from the DEA, including attempts to prohibit the OIG's observation of confidential source file reviews and delays, for months at a time, in providing the OIG with requested confidential source information and documentation. In each instance, the matters were resolved only after the Inspector General elevated them to the DEA Administrator. As a result, over 1 year after we initiated this review, the OIG only has been able to conduct a limited review of the DEA's Confidential Source Program. Nevertheless, we have uncovered several significant issues related to the DEA's management of its Confidential Source Program that we believe require the prompt attention of DOJ and DEA leadership, as identified in this report. We will continue to audit the DEA's Confidential Source Program to more fully assess the DEA's management and oversight of its confidential sources. The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants (AG Guidelines) provide guidance to all Justice Law Enforcement Agencies(JLEA), including the DEA, related to establishing, approving, utilizing, and evaluating confidential sources. Compliance with the AG Guidelines is important for JLEAs to manage confidential sources appropriately and to mitigate the risks involved with using confidential sources in federal investigations. However, instead of implementing the AG Guidelines verbatim as a separate policy, the DEA chose to incorporate provisions from the AG Guidelines into its preexisting policy - the DEA Special Agents Manual - and the DEA stated that manual successfully captured the essence of the AG Guidelines. The Criminal Division's leadership approved the DEA policy in January 2004. We found that the Criminal Division's 2004 approval of the DEA policy allowed the DEA to have a policy that differed in several significant respects from the AG Guidelines' requirements. We believe this has resulted in areas in which the DEA is not fully addressing the concerns underlying the AG Guidelines and, as a result, the DEA’s Confidential Source Program lacks sufficient oversight and lacks consistency with the rules governing other DOJ law enforcement components. The DEA's differing policies have resulted in DEA personnel being able to use high-risk individuals as confidential sources without the level of review as would otherwise be required by the AG Guidelines for high-level and privileged or media-affiliated sources. These categories include individuals who are part of drug trafficking organization leadership, as well as individuals who are lawyers, doctors, or journalists. The AG Guidelines provide a special approval distinction for these individuals because the use of them as confidential sources poses an increased risk to the public and DEA and creates potential legal implications for DOJ. The exemption of the DEA from these requirements results in a relative lack of DEA and DOJ oversight, and in our view should be revisited by the DEA and DOJ. We similarly found that the DEA policies and practices are not in line with the AG Guidelines' requirements for reviewing, approving, and revoking confidential sources’ authorization to conduct Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA). The effects of inadequate oversight of OIA may not only prove to be detrimental to DEA operations and liability, but also could create unforeseen consequences. For instance, confidential sources may engage in illegal activity that has not been adequately considered, or may overstep their boundaries with a mistaken belief that the DEA sanctions any illegal activities in which they participate. This is another area that should be revisited by the DEA and DOJ. Moreover, we found that although the DEA's policy includes a provision that generally follows the AG Guidelines requirement for evaluating the use of long-term confidential sources, sources in use for 6 or more consecutive years, the DEA was not adhering to its policy and conducted inadequate and untimely reviews of these sources. In fact, over a 9-year period, DEA documentation indicates that the DEA spent minimal time meeting to determine the appropriateness of the continued use of long term sources. While a more detailed review was done in 2012, and then even more in 2014 (when we observed some of the process) in total we found that the DEA utilized over 240 confidential sources without rigorous review and, in most instances, without the same Departmental concurrence required for other JLEAs. This created a significant risk that improper relationships between government handlers and sources could be allowed to continue over many years, potentially resulting in the divulging of sensitive information or other adverse consequences for the government. In some cases, the DEA continued to use, for up to 6 years without any DOJ intervention, individuals who were involved in unauthorized illegal activities and who were under investigation by federal entities. We also identified that the DEA's confidential source policies do not include any specific mention of recruiting, establishing, or using sources who are also subject to regulation by the DEA because they have a DEA-provided controlled substance registration number. DOJ guidance emphasizes the need for controls to ensure that no licensee is led to believe that the continued validity of their license is in any way predicated on their status as a source. This was an issue we highlighted in our report on the Bureau of the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Operation Fast and Furious, where ATF was obtaining information in connection with its criminal investigations from individuals who were also Federal Firearm Licensees. We believe that a clearly stated policy is necessary to provide DEA Special Agents with sufficient information to understand all of the implications of these relationships' Finally, we learned that the DEA was providing Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) benefits to confidential sources, yet had not established a process or any controls regarding the awarding of them. We estimated that, in just the 1-year period from July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014, the DEA paid 17 confidential sources or their dependents FECA benefits totaling approximately $1.034 million. The DEA lacked a process for thoroughly reviewing FECA claims for confidential sources or determining eligibility for these benefits. In addition, the DEA did not oversee and ensure that the established pay rate for these sources was proper and inappropriately continued using and paying confidential sources who were also receiving full disability payments through FECA. We also found that the DEA had not adequately considered the implications of awarding such benefits on the disclosure obligations of federal prosecutors, and had not consulted the Department about the issue. Details: Washington, DC: DOJ, 2016. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 16-33: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1528.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1528.pdf Shelf Number: 140529 Keywords: Confidential SourcesDrug Enforcement AdministrationInformants |