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Date: April 26, 2024 Fri
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23 results foundAuthor: Stana, Richard M. Title: Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness Summary: This U.S. Border Patrol operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detention and apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. This report assesses (1) checkpoint performance and factors affecting performance, (2) checkpoint performance measures, (3) community impacts considered in checkpoint placement and design, and (4) the impact of checkpoint operations on nearby communities. The report recommends several actions to strengthen checkpoint design and staffing, and improve the measurement and reporting of checkpoint effectiveness, including community impact. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2009. 138p. Source: Internet Resource; GAO-09-824 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116244 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityContrabandIllegal Aliens |
Author: Haddal, Chad C. Title: Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol Summary: The United States Border Patrol (USBP) has a long and storied history as our nation’s first line of defense against unauthorized migration. Today, the USBP’s primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals along the border. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed the USBP within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the USBP forms a part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. During the last decade, the USBP has seen its budget and manpower more than triple. This expansion was the direct result of congressional concerns about illegal immigration and the agency’s adoption of “Prevention Through Deterrence” as its chief operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry. Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy. In addition to a workforce of over 20,000 agents, the USBP deploys vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, and many different technologies to defend the border. In the course of discharging its duties, the USBP patrols 8,000 miles of American international borders with Mexico and Canada and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. However, there are significant geographic, political, and immigration-related differences between the northern border with Canada and the Southwest border with Mexico. Accordingly, the USBP deploys a different mix of personnel and resources along the two borders. Due to the fact that approximately 98.7% of unauthorized migrant apprehensions by the USBP occur along the Southwest border, the USBP deploys over 85% of its agents there to deter illegal immigration. The northern border is more than two times longer than the Southwest border, and features far lower numbers of aliens attempting to enter illegally, but may be more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. As a consequence of this, the USBP has focused its northern border efforts on deploying technology and cooperating closely with Canadian authorities through the creation of International Border Enforcement Teams. Some issues for Congress to consider could include the slow rate of integration between the USBP’s biometric database of illegal aliens and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) biometric database of criminals and terrorists; the number of unauthorized aliens who die attempting to enter the country each year; the increasing attacks on Border Patrol agents, and the threat posed by terrorists along the sparsely defended northern border as well as the more porous Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: RL32562: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Shelf Number: 121027 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityContrabandDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrationSmuggling |
Author: Steward, Dwight Title: Don't Mind If I Take a Look, Do Ya? An Examination of Consent Searches and Contraband Hit Rates at Texas Traffic Stops Summary: With the passage of Texas Senate Bill 1074 (S.B. 1074) in 2001, law enforcement agencies must now annually report detailed statistics concerning the race of individuals who are stopped and searched in their jurisdictions. For this study, reports from 1,060 agencies were collected, with a focus on search and contraband data. Specifically, analyses were conducted of total search figures, consent search figures, and contraband figures to determine if racial disparities existed – if so, such would indicate the targeting of certain racial groups for selective enforcement. Particular attention was given to examining potential racial disparities in consent searches, thereby eliminating from the analysis searches which may be outside of an officer’s discretion. Analyses of search data – combined with contraband hit rate data – would also help gauge the efficiency and legitimacy of current police practices. The entire dataset collected for this study includes several million police-civilian contacts representing the majority of traffic stops in Texas. This report analyzes each contributing agency’s self-reported statistics, as well as the quality of the reports produced, in order to better inform policy leaders, law enforcement agencies, and community members as they address the problem and the perception of racial profiling. This is the largest set of racial profiling data that has ever been collected and analyzed, and it is the first inter-department review of contraband data collected by Texas law enforcement agencies. The goals of this report are three-fold: • Analyze the racial distribution of total searches, consent searches, and contraband hit rates in Texas using self-reported data submitted by police and sheriff’s departments. • Review the quality of the racial profiling data collected and reported by law enforcement agencies. • Recommend solutions to better analyze and monitor racial profiling figures and deter ineffective law enforcement practices. Key Findings include the following: (1) Texas law enforcement agencies continue to search Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos: approximately 2 out of 3 agencies reported searching Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos following a traffic stop. 66% of agencies searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos, while 69% of agencies searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos. (2) Of the agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates often, 7 out of 10 (71%) searched Blacks at least 50% more frequently than they searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Blacks. Of the agencies that searched Latinos at higher rates, 9 out of 10 (90%) searched Latinos at least 50% more frequently than they searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Latinos. (3) Consent searches – performed without any legal basis to search – contributed significantly to general search disparities: approximately 3 out of 5 agencies reported consent searching Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos following a traffic stop. 61% of agencies consent searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos, while 59% of agencies consent searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos. (4) Of the agencies that consent searched Blacks at higher rates often, 3 out of 4 (75%) consent searched Blacks at least 50% more frequently than they consent searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Blacks. Of the agencies that consent searched Latinos at higher rates, 3 out of 4 (74%) consent searched Latinos at least 50% more frequently than they consent searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Latinos. (5) Patterns of over-searching Blacks and Latinos are consistent. Approximately 3 out of 4 agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos also searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos (75%), while 3 out of 5 agencies that consent searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos also consent searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos (61%). (6) Of the agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates, 51% were likely to find contraband in the possession of Anglos at higher rates than Blacks – meaning Anglos and Blacks were equally likely to be found with contraband. Of the agencies that searched Latinos at higher rates, 58% were likely to find contraband in the possession of Anglos at higher rates than Latinos – meaning Anglos were slightly more likely than Latinos to be found with contraband. (7) Racial disparities in search rates appear to be growing. Approximately 3 out of 5 agencies reported searching Blacks or Latinos at higher rates in 2003 than 2002 (60%). Note: this figure includes agencies with any increase in rates for Blacks or Latinos from 2002 to 2003. (8) The vast majority of agencies provided no mitigating information or insight to explain disparate search rates between Anglos and minorities, nor did contraband hit rates suggest efficient law enforcement practices were being utilized. (9) Auditing of data is non-existent or unreliable. Over half of agencies did not report using any data auditing procedures or audio-video review to ensure against human errors, technical errors, or data falsification. (10) Imprecision in both data quality and reporting restricts the usefulness of analysis. Ultimately, the lack of a generally accepted uniform reporting standard limited the accuracy of analysis involved for some reports filed by law enforcement agencies. Initial findings show that Blacks and Latinos in Texas communities are more likely to be searched, though Anglos are equally likely or more likely to be found with contraband during searches. High minority search rates are particularly evident in the area of consent searches – where searches cannot be explained by outside factors such as probable cause or outstanding warrants. Without some explanation of mitigating factors by law enforcement agencies, this would indicate that police are not only engaging in race-based policing but are ineffectively and inefficiently utilizing law enforcement resources. Agencies should identify and authenticate legitimate law enforcement practices that may be contributing to racial disparities in their data. Furthermore, in the absence of an explanation for disparate search and contraband rates, law enforcement leadership and policy-makers should take steps to monitor and reduce race-based policing. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Criminal Justice Colition, 2005. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/publicsafety/racial_profiling_report_2005.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/publicsafety/racial_profiling_report_2005.pdf Shelf Number: 121457 Keywords: Consent SearchesContrabandIllegal GoodsPolice DiscretionRacial DisparitiesRacial Profiling (Texas)Search and SeizureTraffic Stops |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combatting Illicit Drugs: DEA and ICE Interagency Agreement Has Helped to Ensure Better Coordination of Drug Investigations Summary: The 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment stated that the availability of illicit drugs is increasing. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in the Department of Justice (DOJ), works with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to carry out drug enforcement efforts. DEA and ICE signed a 2009 Interagency Agreement (Agreement) that outlined the mechanisms to provide ICE with authority to investigate violations of controlled substances laws (i.e., cross-designation). The Agreement also required DEA and ICE to deconflict (e.g., coordinate to ensure officer safety and prevent duplicative work) counternarcotics investigations, among other things. GAO was asked to assess the Agreement's implementation. This report addresses the extent to which DEA and ICE have taken actions (1) to implement the Agreement's cross-designation, deconfliction, and information-sharing provisions and (2) to monitor implementation of the Agreement and make needed adjustments. GAO analyzed documents such as the 2009 Agreement, related interagency agreements, and directives to field offices. GAO also interviewed DEA and ICE Headquarters officials as well as management officials and first line supervisors in 8 of the 21 DEA and 8 of 26 ICE field offices, based on geographic dispersion. Though not generalizable to all DEA and ICE offices, the interviews provided insights. DEA and ICE have taken actions to fully implement the cross-designation and deconfliction provisions of the Agreement, and are finalizing efforts to complete the information-sharing provisions. The Agreement allows ICE to select an unlimited number of agents for cross-designation consideration by DEA. The agencies have implemented these cross-designation provisions through a revised process that (1) elevated the levels at which requests are exchanged between the agencies and (2) consolidated multiple requests into one list of ICE agents. This new process is more streamlined and has resulted in enhanced flexibility in maximizing investigative resources, according to ICE officials. Also, DEA and ICE implemented local deconfliction protocols and used a variety of mechanisms (e.g., local deconfliction centers) to deconflict investigations. Further, in May 2011 DEA and ICE convened the Headquarters Review Team (HRT), comprised of senior managers from both agencies, who are, among other things, to resolve deconfliction and coordination issues that cannot be resolved at lower levels because they require management decisions. DEA and ICE headquarters and field office management officials GAO interviewed generally reported that the implementation of the Agreement and local deconfliction protocols had generally improved deconfliction by (1) ensuring officer safety and (2) preventing one agency's law enforcement activity from compromising the other agency's ongoing investigation. ICE has also partially implemented the Agreement's information-sharing provisions by sharing required data with two DOJ organizations that target drug trafficking organizations, and taking steps to share its drug-related data with a DEA organization focused on disrupting drug trafficking by fall 2011. DEA and ICE have conducted ongoing monitoring of the Agreement's implementation through established processes (e.g., supervisory chains of command) and according to officials from these agencies, the HRT did not identify any systemic issues. Specifically, DEA and ICE headquarters officials routinely coordinated with each other and their respective field offices to monitor the Agreement's implementation. DEA and ICE headquarters officials also said that the May 2011 meeting of the HRT, which is to periodically review the Agreement's implementation, constituted a review of the Agreement and affirmed that there were no overarching or systemic issues of coordination or deconfliction requiring headquarters-level intervention. DEA and ICE provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-763: Accessed August 31, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11763.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11763.pdf Shelf Number: 122570 Keywords: ContrabandDrug EnforcementDrug Trafficking (U.S.)Narcotics |
Author: Aning, Kwesi Title: ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats Summary: West Africa’s relative stability following a period of violent and protracted conflicts in the 1990s is under increasing attack from a range of existing and emerging threats. The emergence or in some cases re-emergence of certain trends, namely armed sub-state groups, small arms flows and the narcotics trade could erode the stability that the region currently enjoys. Despite progress in consolidating democracy over the past two decades, a series of recent military coups has raised questions about the state of the democratic structures that are currently in place. More generally, much of the region is still waiting for a ‘democratic dividend’: despite the return to civilian rule and holding of periodic elections, the social and economic well being of the vast majority of people in the sub-region remain dire. The near simultaneous assassination’s of President Joao Bernado Vieira of Guinea Bissau and the country’s Chief of Staff, General Tagme Na Waie in 2008 was a glaring reminder of West Africa’s troubled past. Although a military takeover in Guinea (Conakry) was foreseen if and when the oft expected death of its long-term leader happened, the occurrence of a coup d’etat in December 2008, against the inept and incompetent regime following the death of President Lansana Conté, was nonetheless an unsettling development. There is no doubt that the re-emergence of coup d’etats is a manifestation of the weaknesses of the democratic systems that have been established; highlighting the need to ensure that democracy transcends the holding of periodic elections. At the heart of the problem is the growing abuse of power by civilian authorities. For instance, the issue of term limits has proved to be contentious as several civilians Heads of State have attempted to change their national constitutions to prolong their stay in power often in defiance of public opinion. Recent attempts by Niger’s President, Mamadu Tandja to change the country’s constitution to allow him a third term is a glaring manifestation of this troubling pattern. Meanwhile, the emergence of al-Qaeda affiliated groups, primarily in the Sahel constitutes a new form of transnational threat with wider global consequences. The activities of groups such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb pose serious security threats to countries in the Sahel and beyond. Organized crime is also running rampant in the region. Outsiders find it hard to distinguish between criminal groups that are engaged in smuggling contraband items including hard drugs, groups with terrorist links and those with a political agenda. Establishing the differences between these groups is one of the hardest challenges confronting national, regional and international actors in their efforts to combat the multiple threats to stability in West Africa. These developments, coming against the backdrop of the current global economic and financial crisis has placed tremendous pressure on national governments as they struggle to cope with the dire effects of the crises and responding to these threats. The challenges are compounded by the shifting priorities of donor countries, some of whom have been forced to scale back their assistance due to the impact of the financial meltdown on their national budgets. It is against this backdrop that this paper addresses three critical transnational challenges, referred to as the “triple threats” confronting West Africa: governance, drug trafficking and small arms and light weapons (SALW). The combined effect of these threats could undermine the security and stability of the entire sub-region. The paper argues that understanding the broad dynamics and impacts of poor governance, the proliferation of SALW and drug trafficking is critical to maintaining regional stability as a whole. Details: New York: New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2009. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2011 at: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/conflict/docs/bah_ecowas.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/conflict/docs/bah_ecowas.pdf Shelf Number: 122576 Keywords: ContrabandDrug Trafficking (West Africa)Organized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Title: Tunisia's Borders: Jihadism and Contraband Summary: Tunisia is embroiled in recurrent political crises whose origins in security concerns are ever more evident. While still of low-intensity, jihadi attacks are increasing at an alarming rate, fuelling the rumour mill, weakening the state and further polarising the political scene. The government coalition, dominated by the Islamist An-Nahda, and the secular opposition trade accusations, politicising questions of national security rather than addressing them. Meanwhile, the gap widens between a Tunisia of the borders - porous, rebellious, a focal point of jihadism and contraband and a Tunisia of the capital and coast that is concerned with the vulnerability of a hinterland it fears more than it understands. Beyond engaging in necessary efforts to resolve the immediate political crisis, actors from across the national spectrum should implement security but also socio-economic measures to reduce the permeability of the country's borders. The security vacuum that followed the 2010-2011 uprising against Ben Ali's regime - as well as the chaos generated by the war in Libya - largely explains the worrying increase in cross-border trafficking. Although contraband long has been the sole source of income for numerous residents of border provinces, the introduction of dangerous and lucrative goods is a source of heightened concern. Hard drugs as well as (for now) relatively small quantities of firearms and explosives regularly enter the country from Libya. Likewise, the northern half of the Tunisian-Algerian border is becoming an area of growing trafficking of cannabis and small arms. These trends are both increasing the jihadis' disruptive potential and intensifying corruption of border authorities. One ought neither exaggerate nor politicise these developments. Notably, and against conventional wisdom, military equipment from Libya has not overwhelmed the country. But nor should the threat be underestimated. The war in Libya undoubtedly has had security repercussions and armed groups in border areas have conducted attacks against members of the National Guard, army and police, posing a significant security challenge that the return of Tunisian fighters from Syria has amplified. By the same token, the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and of the Libyan war has provoked a reorganisation of contraband cartels (commercial at the Algerian border, tribal at the Libyan border), thereby weakening state control and paving the way for far more dangerous types of trafficking. Added to the mix is the fact that criminality and radical Islamism gradually are intermingling in the suburbs of major cities and in poor peripheral villages. Over time, the emergence of a so-called islamo-gangsterism could contribute to the rise of groups blending jihadism and organised crime within contraband networks operating at the borders - or, worse, to active cooperation between cartels and jihadis. Addressing border problems clearly requires beefing up security measures but these will not suffice on their own. Even with the most technically sophisticated border control mechanisms, residents of these areas - often organised in networks and counting among the country's poorest - will remain capable of enabling or preventing the transfer of goods and people. The more they feel economically and socially frustrated, the less they will be inclined to protect the country's territorial integrity in exchange for relative tolerance toward their own contraband activities. Weapons and drug trafficking as well as the movement of jihadi militants are thus hostage to informal negotiations between the informal economy's barons and state representatives. Since the fall of Ben Ali's regime, such understandings have been harder to reach. The result has been to dilute the effectiveness of security measures and diminish the availability of human intelligence that is critical to counter terrorist or jihadi threats. In an uncertain domestic and regional context, restoring trust among political parties, the state and residents of border areas is thus as crucial as intensifying military control in the most porous areas. In the long term, only minimal consensus among political forces on the country's future can enable a truly effective approach to the border question. On this front, at the time of writing, an end to the political crisis seems distant: discussions regarding formation of a new government; finalising a new constitution and new electoral law; and appointing a new electoral commission are faltering. Without a resolution of these issues, polarisation is likely to increase and the security situation to worsen, each camp accusing the other of exploiting terrorism for political ends. Overcoming the crisis of trust between the governing coalition and the opposition is thus essential to breaking this vicious cycle. Yet the current political impasse should not rule out some immediate progress on the security front. Working together to reinforce border controls, improving relations between the central authorities and residents of border areas as well as improving relations among Maghreb states: these are all tasks that only can be fully carried out once underlying political conflicts have been resolved but that, in the meantime, Tunisian actors can ill-afford to ignore or neglect. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Middle East and North Africa Report N148: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Tunisia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Shelf Number: 132473 Keywords: Border SecurityContrabandDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingJihadismOrganized Crime |
Author: Grant Thornton Title: Illicit Trade in Ireland: Uncovering the cost to the Irish economy Summary: Although frequently thought of as a victimless crime, illicit trade has a significant impact on the Irish economy. The objective of this report is to provide a detailed assessment of illicit trade in Ireland across a select number of sectors, namely fuel, tobacco, digital media and pharmaceuticals. With regard to each of these sectors, the report seeks to understand the impacts, identify key drivers behind these illicit trades, and where possible, quantifies the losses to the economy. Ultimately this report proposes an integrated approach to tackling the problem of illicit trade in Ireland. What is illicit trade? The most common definition of illicit trade is that used by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which covers many different areas that go beyond the scope of this report. These include money laundering, cash transaction, human trafficking and the trade in illegal drugs. Within the context of this report, the term "illicit trade" is more narrowly defined as: - Intellectual Property Crime (IPC); - Contraband; and - Illegal manufacturing. Importance of intellectual property It is widely accepted that the recognition of Intellectual Property ("IP") plays a vital role in promoting innovation and stimulating the economy in order to foster growth. Therefore, it is vital that appropriate legal recognition, public policies and enforcement is in place to ensure that IP and brands are protected. Illicit Trade in Ireland Despite the importance of IP rights and an increased emphasis on IP protection, significant levels of illicit trade remain in operation throughout the Irish economy. Illicit Trade in Ireland is not confined to a single industry but is present in a broad spectrum of activity across the Irish economy. The scale and scope of illicit trade in Ireland has resulted in significant losses to the Irish economy. The losses suffered include a number of important stakeholders such as right holders, retailers, consumers, the Government and the wider economy. Whilst almost every area of the general economy is subject to losses as a result of illicit trade, this report has narrowed its focus to a number of core areas which are having the most detrimental effect on the Irish economy. To address any problem, the first step should be to understand the problem and in this report we have attempted to do just this. The estimates that we have provided in this report show that illicit trade could be costing right holders as much as L547m per annum and the Irish Exchequer as much as L937m per annum. Details: Dublin: Retail Ireland, 2013. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2014 at: http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/jobsenterpriseandinnovation/Illicit-Trade-in-Ireland-report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Ireland URL: http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/jobsenterpriseandinnovation/Illicit-Trade-in-Ireland-report.pdf Shelf Number: 133069 Keywords: ContrabandCosts of CrimeCrime Against BusinessesFinancial CrimesIllegal ManufacturingIllicit TradeIntellectual Property TheftMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (Ireland)Retail Crime |
Author: International Tax and Investment Center Title: Asia-14: Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2013 Summary: This study is an update and expansion of our previous research, 'Asia-11 Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012'. In light of newly available data sources, it has been possible to extend the coverage to include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, resulting in full coverage of the 10 ASEAN member countries plus Australia, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and Taiwan. In 2013, 10.9% of cigarettes consumed in Asia-141 were illicit Total Consumption (legal and illicit) across the Asia-14 was an estimated 760.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. Of this, 10.9% or 82.8 billion cigarettes in Asia-14 were estimated to have been illicit. In ASEAN, Total Consumption was an estimated 608.2 billion cigarettes in 2013. Of this, 9.1% or 55.6 billion cigarettes were estimated to have been illicit. In 2013, the share of Illicit Consumption increased in 7 of the 11 markets that were part of the 'Asia-11 Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012' report Nearly three quarters of Illicit Consumption occurred in just three markets: Pakistan (22.8% Illicit), the Philippines (18.1%), and Vietnam (20.7%). In the 11 markets for which estimates are available for both 2012 and 2013 (i.e., the 'Asia-11'), Illicit Consumption is estimated to have increased by 20.1%, from 66.5 billion cigarettes to 79.9 billion cigarettes (an increase of 13.4 billion cigarettes). This was driven primarily by the rise in Illicit Consumption in the Philippines (by 12.7 billion cigarettes, an increase of 198%), underpinned by significant growth in Domestic Illicit Consumption. 7 markets (Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam) saw an increase in the share of Illicit Consumption in Total Consumption of cigarettes between 2012 and 2013. The steepest rise was again in the Philippines. However, Pakistan, and Singapore saw noticeable declines in the share of Illicit Consumption in 2013, the former a result of declining Domestic Illicit volumes, and the latter a consequence of a decline in Contraband. In both cases, however, the share of Illicit Consumption in Total Consumption remained much higher than the Asia-14 average. Domestic and Non Domestic Illicit both contributed to the rise in Illicit Consumption in Asia There was a 181.2% rise in Domestic Illicit Consumption in the Philippines (equal to 11.0 billion cigarettes). A small amount of Domestic Illicit was also identified in Indonesia in 2013. A number of markets saw a rise in Non-Domestic Illicit cigarettes in 2013. Consumption of Contraband cigarettes increased in Indonesia and Taiwan, while consumption of Counterfeit cigarettes rose sharply in the Philippines. There were increases in Non-Domestic Illicit of Unspecified Market Variant in Australia and Vietnam. Asia-14 government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption totalled US$ 3.9 billion in 2013 The tax loss associated with Illicit Consumption of cigarettes increased in 6 markets compared with 2012. In the 11 markets for which estimates are available for both 2012 and 2013, the estimated tax loss from Illicit Consumption increased from US$ 3.4 billion in 2012 to US$ 3.9 billion, an increase of 13.8%. The largest rise in tax loss in absolute terms was in the Philippines (497%). Australia and Indonesia also experienced a significant rise in estimated tax losses from Illicit Consumption. The government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption in the ASEAN region totalled US$ 2.1 billion in 2013. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2014. 220p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia-14%20Illicit%20Tobacco%20Indicator%202013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia-14%20Illicit%20Tobacco%20Indicator%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 134222 Keywords: CigarettesContrabandEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimesIllegal MarketsIllegal TobaccoIllicit Products (Asia)Illicit TobaccoTax Evasion |
Author: International Tax and Investment Center Title: Asia-11: Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012 Summary: In 2012, 9% of cigarettes consumed in Asia-11 were illicit Total Consumption (legal and illicit) across the Asia-111 markets covered in this report totalled an estimated 736.4 billion cigarettes in 2012, of which 9.0% or 66.5 billion cigarettes are estimated to have been illicit. This includes consumption of illicit imports and illicit products locally manufactured, such as under/non-declared products from local manufacturers. Illicit share was over 25% in five markets Brunei, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan all had estimated shares of illicit cigarettes in Total Consumption of over 25% in 2012. Illicit volumes were highest in Pakistan, Vietnam, and Malaysia In 2012, in both Vietnam and Pakistan, Illicit Consumption was over 20 billion cigarettes. In Malaysia the volume of illicit cigarettes was estimated at almost 8 billion. Domestic illicit cigarette volumes were highest in Pakistan and the Philippines In Pakistan and the Philippines, illicit cigarettes produced by local manufacturers and sold in the market without payment of taxes totalled an estimated 25 billion cigarettes in 2012. Asia-11 government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption totaled US$ 3.4 billion in 2012 The biggest tax losses in absolute terms occurred in Australia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2013. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia_11_Illicit_Tobacco_Indicator_2012.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia_11_Illicit_Tobacco_Indicator_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 133908 Keywords: Cigarettes ContrabandEconomic Crimes Financial Crimes Illegal Markets Illegal Tobacco Illicit Products (Asia) Illicit Tobacco Tax Evasion |
Author: International Tax and Investment Center Title: Asia-11: Illicit Tobacco Indicator: 2013 Update for the Philippines Summary: Excise rates on the majority of cigarettes in the Philippines (Low-tax tier) rose by 341% on 1st January 2013. Excise rates on brands in the Mid-tax tier increased by 231%, while "premium-price" brands (High-tax tier) saw an increase of 108% in excise rates. This tax increase has contributed to a 59% rise in the pack price of the most sold brands in both the "low-price" and "premium-price" segments. The price increase on the most sold brand in the "super-low price" segment was highest at 175%. Legal Domestic Sales dropped almost 16% in 2013 from a year earlier. However, this decline was almost fully offset by an increased level of Illicit Consumption. As a result, Total Consumption (legal and illicit) was only down 3% in 2013. There has been a sharp rise in Illicit Consumption from 5.9% in 2012 to an estimated 18.1% of Total Consumption or 19.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. This rise primarily relates to increased consumption of Domestic Illicit cigarettes, which has risen sharply from 5.6% of Total Consumption in 2012 to an estimated 16.3% of Total Consumption or 17.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. There has also been an 800% increase in the consumption of Counterfeit cigarettes, which accounted for 1.8% of Total Consumption or 1.8 billion cigarettes in 2013, compared to 0.2% of Total Consumption in 2012. The cigarette tax revenue loss (excise and VAT) has risen to PHP 15.6 billion in 2013, representing an increase of 497% compared to 2012. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2014. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/Media/Default/landing-pages/asia11/report-asia11-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Philippines URL: http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/Media/Default/landing-pages/asia11/report-asia11-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 134220 Keywords: Cigarettes (Philippines)ContrabandEconomic Crimes Financial Crimes Illegal Markets Illegal Tobacco Illicit Products Illicit Tobacco Tax Evasion |
Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband Summary: The report makes four main points that run counter to previous conceptions of crime-terror connectivity and the global illicit network. 1) Rather than operating in numerous smaller networks, the criminals and terrorists in our study are largely subsumed (98%) in a single network of 2,700 individuals with 15,000 relationships. Connectivity among actors within the illicit marketplace is relatively high. This should not be construed to say that the network is a cohesive organizational entity. Rather, the phenomenon observed and documented here is a self-organizing complex system built through social connections from the bottom up. 2) By most measures of connectivity, terrorists are more central than almost all other types of criminals, second only to narcotics smugglers. The transnational nature of some terrorist actors allows them to link disparate criminal groups. Importantly our study does not provide evidence that terrorists are shunned by criminal actors because of their ideological motivations. 3) The conventional wisdom that explains crime-terror connectivity as a product of failed or economically poor states is challenged here. Generally speaking, connectivity between terrorists and criminals is highest in resource-rich countries that have little incentive to support substate actors (comparative advantage theory) and resource-poor countries that are incentivized to support criminal or terrorist groups (augment state capabilities theory). 4) Despite the interest surrounding big data and data science, the results of data acquisition and utilization often falls short of their potential. A growing number of data sources and tools offer an opportunity to conduct analyses addressing global challenges like the crime-terror "nexus." Advancing this agenda requires asking questions in unique ways and pursuing creative approaches and partnerships to aggregating and analyzing data. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2014 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Shelf Number: 134009 Keywords: ContrabandCriminal NetworksIllicit GoodsSmugglingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2012-2013 Horizontal Evaluation of the Measures to Address Contraband Tobacco: Final Report Summary: This is the 2012-2013 Horizontal Evaluation of the Measures to Address Contraband Tobacco (MACT). Evaluation supports accountability to Parliament and Canadians by helping the Government of Canada to credibly report on the results achieved with resources invested in programs. Evaluation supports deputy heads in managing for results by informing them about whether their programs are producing the outcomes that they were designed to achieve, at an affordable cost; and, supports policy and program improvements by helping to identify lessons learned and best practices. What we examined The government announced the MACT in 2010, to help strengthen tobacco control, and advance initiatives aimed at reducing the availability and demand for contraband tobacco with a particular focus on organized crime activities. Time-limited funding of $17 million over three years was allocated to five federal departments/agencies for the following measures: - Royal Canadian Mounted Police - Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit - Contraband Tobacco Team in Cornwall, Ontario, for investigative purposes. - A dedicated liaison resource to increase awareness of the dangers of organized crime involvement in contraband tobacco. - Public Prosecution Service of Canada - Legal advice to the Contraband Tobacco Team and prosecution services. - Canada Border Services Agency - Contraband Tobacco Detector Dog Teams in the Vancouver International Mail Center and in the marine port of Montreal. - Research and develop new scientific methods to determine the origin of tobacco and to compare tobacco products to support law enforcement efforts to target criminal groups (herein refer to as the Laboratory). - Canada Revenue Agency - An advertising campaign aimed at increasing public awareness among young adults in Ontario and Quebec concerning the sale of contraband tobacco in financing criminal activities. - Public Safety Canada - Development and delivery of a performance measurement strategy, and to conduct a horizontal evaluation during the third-year. Funding approval requirements for this time-limited initiative specified that an evaluation be conducted in the third year of the Initiative. Over the past decade, the Government of Canada has introduced numerous initiatives to address tobacco control, including the Federal Tobacco Control Strategy (Health Canada) in 2001; the Contraband Tobacco Enforcement Strategy (the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) in 2008; the Task Force on Illicit Tobacco Products (Public Safety Canada) in 2008; and, most recently, the Anti-Contraband Tobacco Force (the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) in 2013 Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: 2014-05-29: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2013-hrzntl-vltn-msrs-cntrbnd-tbcc/2013-hrzntl-vltn-msrs-cntrbnd-tbcc-en.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2013-hrzntl-vltn-msrs-cntrbnd-tbcc/2013-hrzntl-vltn-msrs-cntrbnd-tbcc-en.pdf Shelf Number: 134498 Keywords: ContrabandIllegal CigarettesIllegal Tobacco (Canada)Organized CrimeTobacco Control |
Author: Furtick, Katie Title: The Effect of Cigarette Tax Rates on Illicit Trade: Lessons Learned in Canada Summary: U.S. President Barack Obama is proposing to raise the federal cigarette tax by nearly $1.00 per pack, hoping to bring in additional tax revenue to help fund universal preschool. Likewise, last year legislators in Massachusetts, Minnesota and New Hampshire put forth - and passed - proposals to increase their state's cigarette tax. Such proposals to increase cigarette or tobacco taxes are a politically expedient way to add to state or federal coffers while ostensibly reducing consumption. Since 2000, U.S. states have increased state cigarette tax rates more than 100 times and, generally, smoking prevalence in the U.S. has continued to decline, but is this decline caused by the increase in taxes? If so, what would happen to tobacco consumption if tax rates on cigarettes are cut? An understandably instinctive answer is that consumption would rise, as the price of cigarettes would presumably fall with the tax cut. However, this instinctive answer assumes that smokers purchase all of their cigarettes through legal means where the sale is taxed. In reality, this is not necessarily the case. Taxes have been shown to increase the size of black markets and to cause economic activity to move underground as price-sensitive individuals look for creative ways to evade taxation. Studies have shown that in the tobacco industry, consumers willingness to switch from smoking legally purchased cigarettes and tobacco to contraband products increases with tax hikes. Econometric analysis conducted by Jean-Francois Ouellet, Associate Professor of Marketing at HEC Montreal, and his co-authors Mariachiara Restuccia, Alexandre Tellier and Caroline Lacroix, found that each additional dollar in final applicable taxes raises the propensity to resort to consuming contraband cigarettes by 5.1 percent. This is consistent with the literature pertaining to counterfeit products - that for a product yielding the same benefit, consumers will typically consider a lower-priced option despite the fact that it is illegal. And where there is consumer demand for cheaper products, despite legality, there is profit incentive for players to provide those products on the black market. High cigarette taxes lead to inflated prices, which allow smugglers to profit from bringing cigarettes out of lower-taxed areas and re-selling them into higher-taxed jurisdictions. For instance, in the United States, cigarette prices differ from state to state depending on the states' cigarette tax regimes. Therefore, cigarettes sold in states with low tax rates can be bought and re-sold on the black market in states with high tax rates, yielding a profit for the seller. High taxes also increase the incentive for producing illegal cigarettes completely outside the tax regime. In this case, cigarettes are produced in illegal, unregulated factories and sold on the black market. The sum effect of these factors suggests that it is possible that rather than reducing cigarette consumption, high taxes might shift some consumption from the legal to the black market - that is, to smuggled and/or illegally produced cigarettes. The corollary of this is that tax cuts could drive out illicit trade without increasing overall cigarette consumption. Due to its dramatically varied cigarette taxation rates over the past two decades, Canada has witnessed first-hand the effects that taxes can have on illegal tobacco sales. It therefore provides an excellent case study of the effects of both increasing and decreasing such taxes. This policy brief begins with some background on tobacco taxes in Canadian history. It then analyzes how various changes in the law, both tax increases and cuts, have affected illicit trade, informing policy-makers on likely effects of taxation. Details: Los Angeles: Reason Foundation, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 113: Accessed April 7, 2015 at: http://reason.org/files/cigarette_tax_illicit_trade.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://reason.org/files/cigarette_tax_illicit_trade.pdf Shelf Number: 135178 Keywords: Black MarketCigarette SmugglingCigarette TaxesCigarettes (Canada)ContrabandIllegal ProductsTobacco |
Author: Cohen, Derek Title: Taking Contraband Without Taking Our Liberties: Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform in Texas Summary: In October of 2007, Roderick Daniels was traveling through Tenaha, Texas on US Route 59. Just outside of the city, he was pulled over for allegedly traveling 37 miles-per-hour in a 35 miles-per-hour zone. The officer then asked Mr. Daniels if he was carrying any cash. The very aim of the trip being to purchase a car, he revealed to the officer that he was carrying a substantial amount of cash; about $8,500. Little did Mr. Daniels know he was about to be become a textbook case of civil asset forfeiture abuse in Texas. The officer promptly placed Mr. Daniels under arrest and transported him to the jail. It was here that Daniels was given an ultimatum: sign pre-notarized documents agreeing to forfeit the money and jewelry found in his car, or be charged with money laundering. Scared and far from home, Mr. Daniels complied.1 Ron Henderson and Jennifer Boatright had a similar experience with the Tenaha Police on US Route 59. While traveling through the area with their two children, they were pulled over and questioned as to whether they were carrying cash. They, too, were looking to purchase a used car and were carrying over $6,000. The officers began searching the car, turning up no contraband. Neither officer issued a citation for the alleged offense - driving in a left-hand turn lane - and Ms. Boatright and Mr. Henderson were told that they could either sign the same documents relinquishing all ownership interest in the cash or face money laundering charges. In addition, they were told that challenging the charge would result in them being placed in custody with their two small children being placed in foster care. The couple signed over their property rather than face the dissolution of their family. Incidents such as these, while abhorrent, are not uncommon. In Tenaha alone, it is estimated that between 2006 and 2008 the police seized $3 million worth of property from motorists. Over 150 of these seizure cases are believed to be invalid.3 With only 923 residents and two sworn police officers,4 these enforcement actions represent a windfall to the Tenaha and Shelby County government and have the potential to underwrite a significant portion of their budget. Absent proper procedural safeguards, the practice of forfeiture is extremely susceptible to abuse. Unfortunately, Texas ranks amongst the worst in the nation in protecting its citizens from such abuses.5 It is easy for officials to cast too wide a net given Texas' broad statutes that contain few restrictions on civil asset forfeiture. Moreover, Texas also permits its state and local law enforcement authorities to be compensated for cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies in seizing property, thereby compromising state sovereignty by partially surrendering the police power that is a core state constitutional function. This report summarizes the practice of civil asset forfeiture nationally and in Texas specifically. The breadth of the practice is discussed, and avenues for reform are laid out. Abusive forfeiture practices are one of the most pernicious invasions of personal liberty perpetrated in this modern age. However, there are policies available that can blunt misuse of this power. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Public Policy Foundation, 2014. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: PP09-2014: Accessed April 15, 2015 at: http://old.texaspolicy.com/center/effective-justice/reports/taking-contraband-without-taking-our-liberties-civil-asset Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://old.texaspolicy.com/center/effective-justice/reports/taking-contraband-without-taking-our-liberties-civil-asset Shelf Number: 135218 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture (Texas)Civil Asset ForfeitureContraband |
Author: Paris, Jeffrey Jonathan Title: Crime, Contraband, and Property Rights: Explaining Variations in Violent Crime Rates Summary: Violent crime affects quality of life on an individual level and development on a national level (Kleiman, 2009), and could be the most important factor in determining whether many low and middle-income countries develop stable governments and implement effective economic policies. I propose a political and natural resource based explanation of the variation in crime rates in order to overcome the lack of connections between macro-level statistical data and causal mechanisms identified up to this point. My explanation involves the dynamics between state strength, property rights formation and enforcement, and the specific nature of criminal markets. When the state is weak crime rates usually increase due to the state's inability to enforce property rights, including the inability to control contraband markets (or adequately taxing legal markets), and the inability to effectively punish defectors. Property rights are established through a political bargaining process between actors that generally depends on the capacity for violence of interested parties (DeSoto, 2000; Umbeck, 1981). Well-defined and enforced property rights reduce transaction costs, and therefore reduce levels of violence (Anderson and Hill, 2003). The specific properties of markets, including the resources they are based on, can shape the market environment, including legality, and affect the resulting "institutions of extraction" (Snyder, 2006, 952). Lootable resources make property rights harder to enforce and interact with the state's ability to provide the rule of law, especially in the case of prohibitions. Illicit markets engender violence because normal business disputes are often settled with violence (Kleiman, 1993, 104-107, 115). My hypotheses examine the relationship between the production of lootable products, while controlling for other factors commonly attributed to crime. My analysis suggests that, all else being equal, the production of lootable resources increases crime rates, while the enforcement of property rights, whether by a state, non-state actor, or community, reduces violent crime rates. To test my hypotheses I use a mix of statistical analysis, case studies based on archival research, and structured interviews. Cross-national data was collected through archival research and existing databases, spanning over seventy countries and fifty years. Local level data comes from fieldwork in Colombia, and includes quantitative data for every municipality in Colombia over a span of nine years, and qualitative data for several regions critical to testing my hypotheses. Details: Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 2012. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/08t0s726 Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/08t0s726 Shelf Number: 136779 Keywords: ContrabandCrime RatesIllicit MarketsLootingProperty RightsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Cohen, Derek Title: Asset Forfeiture by Texas Law Enforcement Summary: While the abstract debate on civil asset forfeiture remains hotly contested in Texas, two elements often omitted are from the discussion is "how much," and "where" the practice takes place. Unfortunately, delineating civil forfeiture from that which occurs pursuant to a criminal conviction is impossible under current reporting law. Still, insight into the volume and location of forfeitures is telling. It reveals where the practice may be overused, establishing a reliance on the proceeds of the legally dubious practice. Further, it also shows where and when standardized per-capita localities are aggressively pursuing more forfeiture, regardless of size. This report aims to demonstrate spatial patterns of forfeiture in raw and per-capita terms, and highlight potential misconceptions and problem areas. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Public Policy Foundation, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Perspective: Accessed April 13, 2016 at: http://www.texaspolicy.com/library/doclib/PP-Asset-Forfeiture-by-Texas-Law-Enforcement.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.texaspolicy.com/library/doclib/PP-Asset-Forfeiture-by-Texas-Law-Enforcement.pdf Shelf Number: 138651 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture (Texas) Civil Asset Forfeiture Contraband |
Author: Ochola, Gumbi Vincent Title: The effect of contraband smuggling on rehabilitation of inmates in Kenya: the case of Kamiti maximum prison Summary: The main mission of Kamiti Maximum prison is to rehabilitate its inmates in order to make good citizens once they are out of the facility. Contraband on the other hand finds their way into the prison via different means hence posing a great challenge to the process of rehabilitation. The aim of this study therefore was to find out how the contraband are smuggled into prison, why inmates use contraband and to examine the effect of contraband on inmates‟ rehabilitation. This qualitative research among 36 Prison Officers and 70 inmates examined the effect and use of contraband. It is clear that there are several routes of entry and reasons why inmates use contraband. This study has shown that the most popular routes of entry is through members of staff, during social visits and contraband thrown over perimeter walls of the prison at 25%, 19% and 17% respectively. Majority of inmates (63%) use contraband as a form of currency to make prison life more comfortable and maintain own contraband use. This study also reveals the negative effect associated with contraband use including an increase in insecurity, namely bullying, violence and withdrawal. It is essential that prisons provide adequate detoxification to reduce withdrawal symptoms and alleviate their need to import or purchase illegal drugs. Prisons must increase their efforts to reduce supply. This will reduce opportunistic use, and with it the risk of prisoners developing ‟jail habits‟ in custody. Devising a policy for tackling contraband in prison is prudent for major contribution in reducing criminal behaviour in prison as well as offences outside prisons. Finally it is essential to recognise that increased security has significant effects; it can disorganise and eliminate contraband supply routes. Details: Nairobi City, Kenya: Kenyatta University, 2015. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/handle/123456789/13790 Year: 2015 Country: Kenya URL: http://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/handle/123456789/13790 Shelf Number: 140115 Keywords: ContrabandPrison ContrabandPrisoner RehabilitationSmuggling |
Author: Galemba, Rebecca B. Title: Cultures of Contraband: Contesting Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala Border Summary: Driving from Frontera Comalapa, Chiapas, Mexico to the communities on the Mexico-Guatemala border where I planned to live and conduct fieldwork from September 2006- September 2007, I drove through several rural farms, towns, and winding roads. Upon reaching the Pan-American Highway is a makeshift police station, a small concrete building labeled, PFP (Policia Federal Preventiva, or Federal Preventative Police). Outside a police car was stationed as traffic whizzed by. Shortly before entering the border communities, there is also a military base. The Mexican government installed this base in the late 1990s during the Zapatista conflict to monitor resistance, despite the fact that the Zapatistas had little presence in the Comalapa region. The military currently uses the base to erect road blockades to inspect for contraband, illegal migrants, illicit drugs, and illegal firearms. There were almost always blockades on Fridays so that soldiers could inspect vehicles returning from market day at the official border crossing at La Mesilla, Guatemala and Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, Mexico. I had originally intended to conduct research at the Mexico-Guatemala border to study the contrasts between policies that simultaneously advocated an "open" border for free trade and a militarized border to comply with Washington's security demands to stem the northward flow of illicit drugs, crime, and undocumented migrants (Benitez Manaut 2003; Pickard, CIEPAC 2007). Despite the increased presence of the Mexican military and police forces2 in the region, border residents agreed that since the late 1990s they experienced less official border surveillance. Instead, residents allude to a booming industry of cross-border contraband in everyday goods, as well as undocumented migrants, arms, and drugs. I realized that my original interest in undocumented migration formed part of a larger picture of historical and cross-border flows of people, goods, and information. Studying border flows from the ground-up revealed a border region that was not just simultaneously "open" to goods and "closed" to people as I had anticipated, but full of various contingent and conflicting openings and enclosures. When I interviewed a Mexican customs inspector at Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, he lamented, "In this region illegality governs. It is what distinguishes this region [from other customs inspections posts]." This inspector had worked in multiple customs ports throughout Mexico, but seemed to resign and adapt himself to this aspect of "illegality," referring to it as part of the "regional culture." Despite stricter laws and Mexico's modernization of the official border crossing and customs inspections in the late 1990s, he told me that most commerce in the region occurred in clandestine crossings. This dissertation examines the multiple meanings of illegality and how notions of illegality permeate, and at times govern, social, political, and economic life at the Mexico-Guatemala border. A 2006 article in El Financiero, labeled the Mexico-Guatemala border "a paradise for contraband...[stating that] the problem, which is little spoken about, is that illegality dominates everything at the border." By focusing on the residents of a clandestine border pathway on the Mexico-Guatemala border, I problematize the concept of "illegality," arguing that the social and economic relations engendered by illegal practices often generate new forms of law, economy, and moral norms. While legal and illegal practices may blur in everyday interactions (Nordstrom 2007), I examine how residents distinguish and organize the heterogeneity of these practices in order to situate illegality within the larger political and moral economy. By examining the daily relations between border residents, state and federal agents, farmers, formal-sector companies, and smugglers, I illustrate how illegality produces and reconstitutes gendered, ethnic, and class inflected subjectivities. Details: Providence, RI: Brown University, 2009. 364p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Shelf Number: 130138 Keywords: Border SecurityContrabandDrug TraffickingIllegal FirearmsIllegal MigrantsIllicit DrugsTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime and the Impact on the Private Sector: The Hidden Battalions Summary: his paper is based on a detailed review of the scale and nature of organised crime's infiltration of the private sector. These findings are a 'call to arms' for the international private and public sectors to transform their co-operation and teamwork. We have adopted a practical definition of organized crime as that which is carried out by a group of people, suspected of serious criminal offences, over a prolonged period, motivated by profit or power. In our analysis of six major private sector industries, six specific forms of organised crime stood out as either having material impact on the private sector, or using the private sector as facilitators. Money laundering is the process of making dirty money look clean. One estimate puts it at 2% of global GDP - c.$1.5 trillion. Money-laundering is an 'enabling crime', facilitating organized crime (as well as terrorism) with social and economic costs. Asset misappropriation refers to stealing from businesses. For example, cargo thefts cost as much as $30 billion in losses each year worldwide. Counterfeiting and contraband, whilst thought of as being a consumer goods crime, is rife in a broad range of sectors, in particular technology products and pharmaceuticals, to devastating effect. It is estimated by OECD at $461billion, or 2.5% of world trade. Fraud and extortion remain strongly present in the financial, construction and real estate industries. In construction extortion could account for of 20-30 per cent of lost project value. Human trafficking. High volume, low skilled labour enterprises such as construction and building, have the highest penetration of trafficking incidence in the private sector. Cyber Crime. Hacking attacks cost the average American firm $15.4 million per year over. In 2015 68,000 URLs containing child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) images were hosted online on 1,991 domains. The reputational impact means major tech companies apply significant collaborative resources to weeding out criminal, terrorist and CSEA activity. Finding#1: The Scale and Impact of Crime in the Private Sector is Truly Staggering. A conservative estimate of the value of organized crime was $3.6-$4.8 trillion, in 2015/2016, 7% of global GDP. The broader impact of organized crime is difficult to assess as it is multi-dimensional, and shared across the private, public sector, and society itself. The impact on the private sector only - in terms of revenue loss - is estimated at c$130 billion. The Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) calculated the financial cost of terrorism at over $52 billion in 2014. A conservative estimate of total transnational organized crime is $870 billion a year. This is more than six times the amount of official development assistance and close to 7% of the world's exports of merchandise Finding #2 Private sectors are either facilitators or targets. Crimes are either done 'to' private sector organisations, or 'through' them. Sectors are either the targets of fraud or asset theft themselves, particularly in construction, consumer goods ($460 billion counterfeit goods), and financial card fraud, or they facilitate crime unwittingly, through use of technology networks by fraudsters to target victims, e.g. the real estate sector laundering dirty funds or the transport industry moving illicit goods. Regulation varies between the 'victim' and 'enabling' industries. Laws are in place to criminalise the use of the private sector for technology or money laundering crime. The victim industries, however, often are reliant on existing laws around theft, or copyright infringement, which are not tailored to the activities of TOC groups and tend to have lower penalties for infringement. Finding #3 Organized crime's impact on the private sector is growing not shrinking. Counterfeit goods have risen from $250 billion to $461 billion in the last 8 years. Asset theft in the transport and logistics theft rose by over 90% 2015 to 2016. There is a sense that regulation is not working: money laundering seizures equated to 0.2% of all laundered funds in one study; and after the dark web's Silk Road was taken down, many sites sprung up to take on and indeed grow the trade. Finding #4 Direct impact of Crime Disproportionately felt in the global south. Sweatshops flourish in South Asia; trafficking of labour and sex workers originates predominantly in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe; corruption in natural resources damages production in Africa and the Caucasus; technology fraud is driven from eastern and southern Europe, West Africa and the Middle East. Whereas in developed economies counterfeit drugs may comprise less than 0.2 percent of the market developing markets are often beset by 30% fakes, as a UNODC report showed for anti-malarial drugs in Africa. Globalization is increasing the 'attack surface' for TOC groups. The abuse of the often weaker regulatory regimes in the Global South by TOC groups further increases the risk for the private sector operating in these areas. Finding #5 Responses re confrontational rather than collaborative. There are very few examples of successful public and private sector co-operation against TOC groups. Private sector organisations complain that communication with the law enforcement sector is one-way and that the regulatory reporting burden, designed to combat crime, can act as a deterrent to co-operation. Tangible results have been seen when industries take the lead on disrupting the work of TOC groups, such as TAPA the Transported Asset Protection Association Details: Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed December 7, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Shelf Number: 148755 Keywords: Cargo TheftContrabandCounterfeit GoodsCybercrimeExtortionHuman TraffickingIllicit TradeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePrivate SectorStolen PropertyTheft of Goods |
Author: Ball, Rachel Title: Total Control: Ending the routine strip searching of women in Victoria's prisons Summary: - The HRLC calls on the Victorian Government to immediately end the harmful and out-dated practice of routinely strip searching women in prison. The Victorian Government should enact laws to prohibit strip searches except in circumstances of absolute necessity, based on intelligence of contraband, and as a measure of last resort. Where searches are needed, strip searches should be replaced with modern, effective and non-degrading search practices, like using scanners and metal detectors. Harm caused by strip searches - Strip searches are degrading, humiliating and traumatising for women. Routine strip searching is particularly harmful given a majority of women in prison are survivors of family and/or sexual violence. These searches can undermine women's dignity, recovery and rehabilitation efforts. - In the vast majority of cases, strip searches are conducted on women who are awaiting trial or sentence, or are serving short sentences for non-violent crimes. There are currently just over 500 women in prison in Victoria and more than 40 per cent are on remand, awaiting trial or sentence. Most women prisoners are detained for less than 12 months. The Victorian Government last year described women prisoners as largely 'low risk'. Flawed rationale for strip searches - The HRLC examined six months of strip search records from Victorian women's prisons. In over 6,200 strip searches, only seven items of contraband were discovered: four related to tobacco products, one to chewing gum and one unidentified object (one further search was 'inconclusive'). No weapons or illicit drugs were found. This means for every one thousand strip searches conducted, one item of low level contraband was found. - There is a critical need to stop drugs and weapons entering prisons. However, routine strip do not achieve this objective. On the contrary, because strip searches undermine respectful relationships between prisoners and guards, there is suggestion that strip searches contribute to a tenser, less stable prison environment. Human rights implications - Routine strip searches violate rights to privacy, humane treatment in detention and freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, all of which are protected by the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Charter). - In a report released last week, the Victorian Ombudsman found that routine strip searching of women is not a reasonable and demonstrably justified limitation of women's rights under the Charter and recommended the practice be stopped. Alternative approaches and best practice - There are effective, modern and non-invasive alternatives to strip searches - for example by making greater use of safe scanning technologies (such as those used in the ACT, UK and USA). - Because of the harm that strip searching causes, both the ACT and the UK reformed their laws to ensure strip searching only occurs were there are reasonable grounds to suspect contraband and other search options have been tried. The ACT is considered to be leading Australia in terms of strip search policy and practice. Details: Melbourne: Human Rights Law Centre, 2017. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 18, 2018 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/580025f66b8f5b2dabbe4291/t/5a287bb50d9297f066fd588d/1512602586016/TC+Report_Online.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/580025f66b8f5b2dabbe4291/t/5a287bb50d9297f066fd588d/1512602586016/TC+Report_Online.pdf Shelf Number: 148853 Keywords: ContrabandFemale Inmates Female Prisoners Human Rights Abuses Women Prisoners |
Author: Cruz-Rivera, Luis Jose Title: Preventing Contraband Cellular Phone Use in Prisons: A Technical Response to NTIA Summary: Overview From correctional facilities within the United States (U.S) and throughout the world to homeland defense and scenarios taking place on battlefields, illicit cellular phone use and unauthorized mobile data systems access is impacting mission safety at many levels. As evidenced by recent congressional activities and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) Notice of Inquiry (NOI) regarding technical solutions to detect and prevent illegal use of cellular phones in correctional facilities, this problem is a growing threat to the security of our nation and its citizens. Too often, solution are designed to control threats, such as the growing cellular contraband problem and other major safety concerns, focus on the technology component , and fails to consider the appropriate combination of skills, processes, and technologies to enable a comprehensive solution. In the case of contraband of cell phone use within correctional facilities, the solution lays in the architecture, addressing and combating the root cause of the problem. The effective use of technology can combine intelligence gathering with analysis to support the security mission. Effective operating scenario knowledge, decision-making capabilities, and goal attainment need to ultimately control and deny this contraband issue. Commercial off the shelf (COTS) standalone systems do not offer a complete and satisfactory solution to the contraband cell phone challenge detailed in the NTIA request. Consideration of unified operational requirements, concepts of operations and functional requirements must be applied to the selection of available systems or development of an effective system of systems appropriate to address the mission space. This facilitates the deployment of an intelligent architecture for centralized and regional environments alike with a comprehensive affordable solution. The commercial market space has recognized this disparity and as the NTIA NOI identifies several point solutions or technologies have been developed within the current regulatory environment to address the known cellular contraband issues. For the purposes of this paper these solutions fall into two general categories - active radio-frequency (RF) systems and passive RF systems. While there are hybrid scenarios (a solution using both active and passive RF), this document will focus only on the solutions that fall into the active RF category and the passive RF category; hybrid solutions are excluded from this analysis. Furthermore, this document intends to elucidate a comprehensive approach for managing the operational data needs of several layers of the U.S. Government and other key stakeholders affected by illicit use of cellular phones in prisons. This document will discuss the two solution types and provide details regarding several technology and deployment considerations to address the architecture of the solution. Figure 1 depicts the two mission areas in which all of the possible solutions fall - contraband-based solutions and intelligence-based solutions. The contraband-based solution addresses the short-term need for denial by jamming or detection and monitoring for manual control. The intelligence-based solution provides varying capabilities of C3I (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) interface and allows stakeholder operations to address criminal or other activities of interest within stakeholder jurisdictions. This capability can bridge other additional security needs to the solution, thus enabling the correctional community to utilize data sharing with law enforcement and judicial stakeholders to maintain a holistic view of criminal network communications and contraband management activities within the target locations. The level of metadata attainable in these transactions provides a large data-mining capability, which can interface with other operating scenario data sources and provide a new appreciation for connection networks. Within the scope considered by NTIA, solutions to this problem will serve the following primary stakeholders: - Prisons and correctional institutions that want the technology to solve the problem - Commercial operators who have paid millions and in some cases billions of dollars for spectrum and equipment and do not want their coverage of valid users impacted - The general public who wants a solution to stop the criminal activities but without impact to their use of devices on the outside of the correctional institution location Other stakeholders include: - State and local law enforcement agencies requiring increased insight and awareness of activities linked with illicit communications - Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data fusion centers, Department of Justice (DOJ), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other law enforcement (LE) entities - Government and industry associations responsible for overseeing the use of spectrum and wireless technology that want a solution that can operate within the boundaries of the law and regulations The opportunity to solve this problem using technology addresses a broad market segment, which also needs to coexist with other security efforts and data-sharing initiatives among the stakeholders. Strategic acquisition and integration work will be critical to deploying a given solution in order to avoid reengineering of design due to technology fluctuations, obsolescence, and total cost of ownership. If a rigorous solution development process is not followed, correctional institutions run the risk of committing and expending unnecessary resources and funds resulting to system implementation defects, technical capability gaps, and system suitability inadequacies within a constantly changing wireless environment. Details: Fairfax, VA: ManTech International Corporation, 2010. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2019 at: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/mantech_response_to_ntia_inquiry_v1.01.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/mantech_response_to_ntia_inquiry_v1.01.pdf Shelf Number: 154226 Keywords: Cell PhonesContrabandCorrectional FacilitiesIllicit Cellular Phone UseMobile Data Systems AccessPrison ContrabandPrisoner Misconduct |
Author: KPMG Title: Stella Report: A Survey of the illicit cigarette market in the EU Summary: Philip Morris International Inc. (PMI) (PM) today renewed its call for continued action against illicit tobacco trade following the release of a new report produced by KPMG, which provides a stark reminder of the negative challenges and financial costs associated with illicit trade. The independent KPMG "Stella Report," commissioned by PMI, reveals that in 2018 the black market for cigarettes in the European Union (EU) cost governments a total of 10 billion euros in lost tax revenues and was equivalent in size to the total legal cigarette sales in the U.K., Austria and Denmark combined. Overall illicit cigarette consumption levels remained stable compared to last year; however, the report found a more than 30 percent increase in counterfeit consumption-the largest amount recorded to date. "Beyond damaging government revenues, harming legitimate businessesincluding our own-and fueling crime in local communities, the availability of cheap, unregulated cigarettes on the black market undermines efforts to reduce smoking prevalence and prevent youth from smoking," said Alvise Giustiniani, PMI's vice president illicit trade prevention. "For PMI to have impact in our drive to unsmoke the world, we must sustain our combined efforts to eliminate illicit cigarette trade, while ensuring responsible access to better alternatives for the men and women who would otherwise continue to smoke." According to the report, in 2018, illicit cigarette consumption-i.e., the consumption of counterfeit and contraband cigarettes-in the E.U. was estimated at 8.6 percent of total consumption, representing 43.6 billion cigarettes. Other findings include: Counterfeit was the only category to show year-on-year volume growth in 2018, while contraband, illicit whites and other illicit product volumes declined. Half of the countries included in the report saw an increase in counterfeit consumption. The largest counterfeit cigarette volumes were reported in Greece (1.5 billion cigarettes) and the U.K. (0.9 billion cigarettes). Non-E.U. countries remain the largest source of illicit cigarettes consumed in the E.U.; however, the report found a reduced incidence of illicit cigarette consumption in E.U. Eastern border countries, suggesting that law enforcement activities in those areas are bearing fruit. Consumption of legal non-domestic cigarettes grew by 10 percent in 2018, indicating that consumers purchased lower-priced products when traveling, rather than using the illicit market. Illicit trade is a complex issue, damages many sectors, negatively impacts societies and respects neither borders nor laws. No one government or single industry can address this problem on its own; everyone has a role to play. To combat the flow of illicit goods, PMI invests in strict controls for its supply chain and supports regulations such as the FCTC Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco and the recently enacted tracking and tracing provisions under the EU Tobacco Products Directive. Furthermore, PMI continues to work with private and public actors alike to help advance the global anti-illicit trade efforts, including through PMI IMPACT, a global initiative supporting third-party projects against illegal trade and related crimes. Details: London: Author, 2019. v.p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2019 at: https://marketing.kpmg.co.uk/stella/Project%20Stella_Exec_Summary.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Europe URL: https://marketing.kpmg.co.uk/stella/Project%20Stella_Exec_Summary.pdf Shelf Number: 156732 Keywords: Black Markets Cigarettes ContrabandCounterfeit Cigarettes Counterfeit Goods Illicit Cigarettes Illicit Tobacco Illicit trade Shadow Economy Tax Evasion |
Author: KPMG Title: Eurasian Economic Union Illicit Cigarette Report Summary: Key findings: Illicit cigarette consumption has grown rapidly in the Eurasian Economic Union from 2015 to 2018 - Illicit cigarette consumption rose from 0.6% to 6.8% of total consumption in the past 4 years, representing over 20bn cigarettes in 2018 - Had these cigarettes been sold legally in 2018, an additional 68bn RUB would have been collected in taxes (VAT & Excise) across the Eurasian Economic Union in 2018, with 99% of the taxes lost from Russia - A large proportion of the growth occurred in the Russian Federation, where non-domestic cigarette consumption increased from 0.7% to 8.7% of consumption, of which 90% was illicit. Widening price differences between countries and free movement of goods and people are two possible drivers behind the growth in illicit cigarette consumption - The price differences (in particular between Belarus and Russia) have increased by over 40%, making cigarettes from Belarus more affordable(с) - In addition, the establishment of the EEU (in 2015) enabled free movement of goods and people, reducing customs inspections between countries and removing limits on goods imported for personal consumption - The 8 billion Belarusian labelled cigarettes identified in Russia were not supported by the number of travellers buying for their own personal consumption, indicating that a high volume of cigarettes are contraband. Furthermore the seizures of millions of Belarusian labelled cigarettes in Russia indicated that these cigarettes are transported by criminal networks. Distributors of illicit cigarettes have grown to exploit the price differences, reduced affordability and the lack of personal allowance quotas when travelling between EEU countries, especially from Belarus to Russia - Belarus is the primary source of illicit cigarettes, with almost 8 billion of the 20 billion illicit cigarettes identified in this study coming from Belarusian trademark-owned manufacturers, whilst production capacity was reported at 29 billion cigarettes(4) which is not supported by domestic consumption (estimated at 16 billion) - Belarusian labelled cigarettes were identified across Russia, indicating that they are being purchased by consumers who are not travelling across the Belarusian border - In addition, 47% of C&C identified had no identifiable origin including counterfeit, illicit whites and cigarettes with suspicious Russian tax stamps, which have had no taxes paid in any jurisdiction. Some may be illegally manufactured inside Russia - Illicit cigarette smuggling has been shown to help enable Organised Criminal Groups (OCGs), using similar networks to sell other products and its rapid growth in EEU is unlikely to be any different, as profits can be high whilst penalties remain low. Throughout the report, our analysis has focussed on the following categories of cigarette consumption: Legal domestic consumption - Cigarettes legally purchased and consumed within the country of study, based on In Market Sales data provided by the tobacco industry Non-domestic legal (ND(L)) - ND(L) represents cigarettes which are purchased in another country but legally consumed in the country of study, through cross-border or tourism purchases. This represents 0.8% of total consumption in the EEU Illicit consumption - divided into three components: - Illicit Whites: Cigarettes that are usually manufactured in one country/market but which the evidence suggests have been smuggled across borders during their transit to the destination market under review where they have limited or no legal distribution and are sold without payment of tax - Contraband (Other): Cigarettes where the tax was paid legally in one country, but the cigarettes were taken to another country and re-sold without any applicable tax, mainly when the excise tax regimes in the source country are lower than the destination country. Many of these cigarettes originated from an EEU country and whilst they were legally transported (due to no legal personal allowance limits) they were then re-sold illegally - Counterfeit: Cigarettes that deliberately copy a legally traded brand, deceiving consumers who believe that they are purchasing this brand. Counterfeit was only identified by participating trademark owners in the Empty Pack Survey - Russian suspicious tax stamps: Cigarettes where further analysis has revealed that the packs may have been sold without the payment of tax, despite bearing domestic labelling Details: London: Author, 2019. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2019 at: https://www.stopillegal.com/docs/default-source/external-docs/eea-illicit-cigarette-report-2018-english.pdf?Status=Temp&sfvrsn=ab4677d7_2 Year: 2019 Country: Europe URL: https://www.stopillegal.com/docs/default-source/external-docs/eea-illicit-cigarette-report-2018-english.pdf?Status=Temp&sfvrsn=ab4677d7_2 Shelf Number: 156923 Keywords: AsiaCigarettes ContrabandCounterfeit Cigarettes Counterfeit Goods EuropeIllicit Cigarettes Illicit Markets Illicit Trade Organized Crime Tax Evasion Tobacco |