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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri

Time: 11:46 am

Results for corruption

175 results found

Author: June, Raymond

Title: A User's Guide to Measuring Corruption

Summary: This book is targeted at national stakeholders, donors and international actors involved in corruption measurement and anti-corruption programming. It explains the strengths and limitations of different measurement approaches, and provides practical guidance on how to use the indicators and data generated by corruption measurement tools to identify entry points for anti-corruption programming.

Details: Oslo, Norway: United Nations Development Programme, Oslo Governance Centre, 2008

Source: Global Integrity

Year: 2008

Country: Norway

URL:

Shelf Number: 114393

Keywords:
Corruption

Author: Lanyi, Anthony, ed.

Title: An Anticorruption Reader: Supplemental Sources on Transparency, Accountability, Prevention, Enforcement and Education

Summary: This resource collects and summarizes key books and articles on corruption and anticorruption programs.

Details: College Park, MD: IRIS Center, 2005

Source: Prepared for review by the United States Agency for International Development

Year: 2005

Country: United States

URL:

Shelf Number: 114645

Keywords:
Corruption

Author: Roos, Mari-Ann

Title: Analysis of the Criminal Justice System of Albania: Report by the Fair Trial Development Project

Summary: This analysis of the criminal justice system of Albania addresses the following issues: rights during pre-trial detention; rights to an effective defense; two case studies (Revenge for Albania Justice Case and a corruption case); domestic violence and the criminal justice system; transparency and access to information; and efficient trails and witness issues.

Details: Tirana, Albania: OSCE, 2006. 245p.

Source: Internet Resource

Year: 2006

Country: Albania

URL:

Shelf Number: 111760

Keywords:
Corruption
Domestic Violence
Due Process
Pretrial Detention
Trials

Author: Wyler, Liana

Title: International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. Policy

Summary: This report focuses on the international trade in terrestrial fauna, largely excluding trade in illegal plants, including timber, and fish and how it relates to U.S. Policy

Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008, 50p.

Source: Internet Source

Year: 2008

Country: United States

URL:

Shelf Number: 115335

Keywords:
Corruption
Environmental Crime
Law Enforcement
Wildlife Crimes

Author: New York (State). Office of the State Inspector General

Title: Investigation of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor

Summary: This report asserts that the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor has failed in its duty at the Port of New York and New Jersey by allowing numerous abuses of authority in hiring, supervision and fiscal oversight. It details the licensing of a convicted felon, misuse of federal Homeland Security funds and the failure to issue a single permanent license to harbor companies for more than a decade.

Details: Albany: New York State Office of the Inspector General, 2009. 60p.

Source:

Year: 2009

Country: United States

URL:

Shelf Number: 116191

Keywords:
Corruption
Misconduct in Office

Author: Haggard, Stephan

Title: Economic Crime and Punishment in North Korea

Summary: The penal system has played a central role in the North Korean government's response to the country's profound economic and social changes. As the informal market economy has expanded, so have the scope of economic crimes. Two refugee surveys - one conducted in China, one in South Korea - document that the regime disproportionately targets politically suspect groups, particularly those involved in market-oriented economic activities. Levels of violence and deprivation do not appear to differ substantially between the infamous political prison camps, penitentiaries for felons, and labor camps used to incarcerate individuals for a growing number of eocnomic crimes. Such a system may also reflect ulterior motives. High levels of discretion with respect to arrest and sentencing and very high costs of detention, arrest, and incarceration encourage bribery; the more arbitrary and painful the experience with the penal system, the easier it is for officials to extort money for avoiding it. These characteristics not only promote regime maintenance through intimidation, but may facilitate predatory corruption as well.

Details: Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010. 24p.

Source: Working Paper Series; WP 10-2

Year: 2010

Country: Korea, North

URL:

Shelf Number: 118527

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Economic Crimes (North Korea)
Penal System (North Korea)
Punishment (North Korea)

Author: Martinez, Angelica Duran

Title: Organized Crime, the State and Democracy: The Cases of Central America and the Caribbean

Summary: Over a decade on from the end of the civil wars that devastated the region, large parts of Central America are once again afflicted by chronic violence. This time, however, the principal culprits are narco-traffickers and criminal networks, undermining state structures through corruption and clandestine links to political parties, judges and law enforcement officials. In the Caribbean, meanwhile, a flourishing drug trade has brought wealth, but at the cost of rising homicide rates and grave damage to democratic institutions. Based on a two-day conference of experts held in early 2007 in New York, this report explores new thinking on the ills afflicting the region - including the highly controversial mara gangs - and how the international community might help remedy the problems of crime and corruption without undermining the fragile states that are the essential building blocks of any long-term solution.

Details: Madrid: FRIDE (Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior), 2007. 16p.

Source: Internet Resource

Year: 2007

Country: Central America

URL:

Shelf Number: 118677

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Gangs
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (Central America, Caribbean)
Narcotics
Organized Crime

Author: World Bank

Title: Stolen Asset Recovery (STAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan

Summary: The theft of public assets from developing countries is a huge and serious problem. While the traditional focus of the international development community has been on addressing corruption and weak governance within developing countries themselves, this approach ignores the other side of the equation: stolen assets are often hidden in the financial center of developed countries; bribes to public officials from developing countries often originate from multinational corporations; and the intermediary services provided by lawyers, accountants, and company formation agents, which could be used to launder or hide the proceeds of asset theft by developing country rulers, are often located in developed country financial centers. The STAR Initiative is an integral part of the World Bank Group's strategy which recognizes the need to help developing countries recover stolen assets. This action plan presented in this report responds to feedback received from consultations with developed and developing countries, as well as lessons from the experience of Nigeria, Peru, and the Philippines.

Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank; Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007. 48p.

Source: Internet Resource

Year: 2007

Country: International

URL:

Shelf Number: 119268

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Stolen Asset Recovery

Author: Farah, Douglas

Title: Ecuador at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerillas and the Citizens' Revolution

Summary: The chaning internatl situation in colombia and the expanding influence of the Mexican drug cartels, have helped Ecuador become an important and growing center of operation for transnational organized criminal gangs. This poses a significant threat not only to the Ecuadoran state but all of America and the United States.

Details: Alexandria, VA: International ssessment and Strategy Center, 2010. 77p.

Source: Internet Resource

Year: 2010

Country: Ecuador

URL:

Shelf Number: 117666

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Gangs (Ecuador)
Organized Crime (Ecuador)

Author: Gounev, Philip

Title: Examining the Links Between Organised Crime and Corruption

Summary: This report presents an analysis of the links between organised crime and corruption. The main objectives of the study were to identify: 1) causes and factors that engender corruption by organised crime (including white-collar criminals) within the public and private sectors; 2) the scope and the impact of that corruption on society and institutions; 3) organised crime’s main corruption schemes, the areas or risks they create, and the related differences amongst European Union (EU) Member States (MS); 4) best practices in prevention and countering corruption linked to organised crime; and 5) framework for a future assessment of trends in the link between organised crime and corruption, as well as corresponding counter measures.

Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2010. 335p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2010 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/report_csd_/report_csd_en.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/report_csd_/report_csd_en.pdf

Shelf Number: 119676

Keywords:
Corruption
Organized Crime
White Collar Crime

Author: Keller, Dennis E.

Title: U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap

Summary: Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, but it is a task for which the U.S. Government is the least prepared and capable. The establishment of an effective police force is critical to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation’s security forces. But the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state. Because hesitation in addressing such problems causes delays in forming and training new police forces, and, even worse, emboldens corrupt and abusive locals who enable insurgents, terrorist groups, and organized criminal networks, the U.S. military must be prepared to support stability operations at regional level and below by assessing, advising, and even training police units until such time as civilian police trainers and mentors arrive on the ground. Army doctrine emphasizes the importance of community-focused civilian police forces during stability operations and suggests that clear separation of police and military roles is essential to successful rebuilding. Doctrine also recognizes that military forces may have to perform police functions during the initial response. But history is replete with examples of local police becoming targets of opportunity for insurgencies; having trained, operationally ready police is always important and no more so than in current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. At one time, the U.S. Government had a better institutional response than it does now. From 1954 to 1974, first the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), and then its successor organization, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), established in 1961, presented balanced programs providing technical advice, training, and equipment for civil and paramilitary police organizations. In 1963, USAID established the International Police Academy in Washington, DC, to train foreign police officers. At its peak, the USAID arm had 590 permanent employees, to include staff at the International Police Academy, and advisors in 52 countries at different times. This academy graduated over 5,000 students from 77 countries until it was closed because of congressional fears that the program approved, advocated, or taught torture techniques that had damaged the image of the United States. Thus, legislation was passed that prohibited foreign assistance funds for training and financial support of law enforcement forces within or outside the United States. The reluctance to be associated with local police continues to haunt U.S. Government efforts to train police of fragile and failed states to this day. As a result, the U.S. Government continues to lack the capacity for timely deployment of civilian police trainers in the early phases of stability operations. Using military personnel to train and advise civilian police is being justifiably criticized. Military personnel, even military police, are not prepared to train and advise civilian police in most tasks. Instead, their training is skewed toward the higher end stability policing tasks such as riot control, convoy security, motorized patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and weapons training. The emphasis on such tasks makes it more difficult to transition to community-based policing. A clear delineation needs to be established between stability policing and community-based policing, with phased transitions as appropriate. Focusing only on the technical skills must cease, while instruction in such normative principles as responsiveness to the community, accountability to the rule of law, defense of human rights, and transparency to scrutiny from the outside, must be institutionalized. Such an adjustment will result in an organizational culture that abjures abuse. Such success will require embedding of quality advisors for a significant period of time, though even then expectations must be kept realistic.

Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 57p.

Source: Internet Resource: PKSOI Paper: Accessed September 7, 2010: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1013

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1013

Shelf Number: 119757

Keywords:
Corruption
Military
Organized Crime
Police Reform
Police Training
Policing

Author: Allais, Carol

Title: Tsireledzani: Understanding the Dimensions of Human Trafficking in Southern Africa

Summary: This report provides the first comprehensive assessment of human trafficking in South Africa. This research study was conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) on behalf of the ‘Programme of Assistance to the South African Government to Prevent, React to Human Trafficking and Provide Support to Victims of Crime’. The programme of assistance forms part of South Africa’s National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking through prevention, response and support for victims, known as TSIRELEDZANI. The programme of assistance is being implemented by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and is co-funded by the South African Government and the European Union (EU). The overall objective of South Africa’s National Strategy on Human Trafficking is to ensure full compliance with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (hereafter, ‘Palermo Protocol’), which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Compliance includes developing comprehensive legislation underpinned by a victim-centred empowerment approach, taking full account of the Victim’s Charter1 as well as relevant South African legislation. The specific purposes of the Tsireledzani Programme are to: (a) contribute to compliance with the Palermo Protocol requirements, (b) increase capacity to deal with trafficking, and (c) enhance inter-sectoral coordination and cooperation. Tsireledzani is being implemented by the Sexual Offences and Community Affairs (SOCA) Unit of the NPA over a three-year period (2008-2010). The present study addresses Result 1 of the programme of assistance to the South African government: DEEPENED KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF TRAFFICKING, and presents findings on human trafficking in South Africa obtained from research undertaken from December 2008 to March 2010. The objectives of the study were to: 1. Identify trafficking trends in order to develop appropriate responses; 2. Identify national legislative measures, policy frameworks and women’s and children’s rights instruments; 3. Analyse counter-trafficking responses regarding human trafficking in the SADC region and other countries with comparative features; 4. Identify the profile of the victims and characteristics and motives of the agents in human trafficking; 5. Identify the purposes for human trafficking and the key driving factors; 6. Identify socio-economic aspects of the demand and cultural values and practices influencing human trafficking; 7. Identify the interrelation between human trafficking and migration relation issues in the context of globalization; 8. Identify the linkage between organised crime networks and corruption, and human trafficking; 9. Identify indicators for a national Trafficking Information Management System ; 10. Make recommendations on the outcome of the above results.

Details: Pretoria: National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, 2010. 206p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2010 at: http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Document-3562.phtml

Year: 2010

Country: South Africa

URL: http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Document-3562.phtml

Shelf Number: 119766

Keywords:
Child Prostitution
Corruption
Forced Labor
Human Trafficking
Illegal Trade
Organized Crime
Wildlife Conservation
Wildlife Crime (Asia-Pacific)
Wildlife Smuggling

Author: Haugaard, Lisa

Title: Far Worse than Watergate: Widening Scandal Regarding Colombia's Intelligence Agency

Summary: This report reveals the inside story about a wiretapping scandal in Colombia. It documents how the Colombian government’s intelligence agency not only spied upon major players in Colombia’s democracy—from Supreme Court and Constitutional Court judges to presidential candidates, from journalists and publishers to human rights defenders, unions and faith-based organizations, from international organizations to U.S. and European human rights groups—but also carried out dirty tricks, and even death threats, to undermine their legitimate, democratic activities.

Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Working Group Education Fund; U.S. Office on Colombia; Center for International Policy; Washington Office on Latin America, 2010. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2010 at:

Year: 2010

Country: Colombia

URL:

Shelf Number: 119841

Keywords:
Corruption
Surveillance
Wiretaps

Author: Lauria, Carlos

Title: Silence of Death in Mexico's Press: Crime, Violence, and Corruption Are Destroying the Country's Journalism

Summary: The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) research has identified Mexico as one of the deadliest countries in the world for the press and one of the worst nations in solving crimes against journalists. CPJ researchers have traveled the breadth of the country over the course of four years, interviewing dozens of journalists about the dangers of their work and the devastating self-censorship that has resulted from anti-press violence. CPJ delegations have met with high-ranking Mexican officials, including President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, to discuss the grave problem of impunity in attacks on the press. This report examines the murders of 22 journalists and three media support workers, along with the disappearances of seven journalists, during the Calderón presidency, which began in December 2006. The report identifies systemic law enforcement failures and offers potential solutions.

Details: New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 2010. 43p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2010 at: http://cpj.org/reports/cpj_mexico_english.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Mexico

URL: http://cpj.org/reports/cpj_mexico_english.pdf

Shelf Number: 119874

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Violence
Homicide
Journalists
Murders

Author: Briscoe, Ivan

Title: A State of Siege: Elites, Criminal Networks and Institutional Reform in Guatemala

Summary: The scale and severity of the challenges facing the Guatemala state have been underlined by events over the past year. Humanitarian crises and a continuing wave of violent crime, exacerbated by the penetration in Guatemalan territory of Mexican cartels, have multiplied the demands on public authorities. The government of President Alvara Colom, a self-declared social democrat, has vowed to fight poverty and clean up the security and judicial systems. To a significant extent, the country is still locked into the terms of the informal political and economic settlement that lay beneath the formal peace process ending the country's civil war in 1996. Whereas the peace accords promised rural development, a stronger and wealthier public sector, and a dismantling of the structures of counter-insurgency, the post-conflict reality fell under a different paradigm. Criminal groups, involving former military officers, acting state officials, criminal entrepreneurs and gang members, extended their influence. This paper, which forms part of the broader Clingendael research programme into post-conflict and fragile states, aims to unpick these constrains on governance in Guatemala, and also points to the emerging trends that are now altering the country's internal balance of power. In particular, the election of Colom in 2007 and the creation in the same year of the UN Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) are landmark events that appear to have undermined the post-conflict settlement. However, recent setbacks, including the paralysis of key policy initiatives - such as tax reform - and repeated acts of corruption in the security forces and the judicial system have raised questions over whether reform of the state is possible, and how it is to be carried out.

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2010. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2010 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100913_cru_publication_ibriscoe.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Guatemala

URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100913_cru_publication_ibriscoe.pdf

Shelf Number: 119873

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Criminal Violence
Gangs
Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Title: An Asessment of Transnational Organized Crime in Central Asia

Summary: Transnational organized crime in Central Asia represents a serious threat to the region inhibiting the emergence of stable societies. This report provides an overview of the scope of the problem of transnational organized crime in Central Asia. The report identifies trafficking in drugs, human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption as the principle and most serious crimes in the Central Asian region. It provides an analytical framework based on causal factors as well as on facilitating and inhibiting factors. Acknowledging the difficulties and limitations associated with research on organized crime in Central Asia, the report is a synthesis of information from a multitude of sources. It includes information provided by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan together with data and information drawn from secondary literature, expert opinions and other sources. An analysis of organized crime in Central Asia must take into account historical, political, social and economic developments in the region. Most states in Central Asia are in a transitional period and are characterized by developing, but still relatively low levels of effective governance. Gaps in governmental capacity and voids created by weak and ineffective state institutions are a strong contributing factor in the proliferation of organized criminal activities. Moreover, cultural, religious and ethnic differences are exploited by organized criminals to achieve their objectives and to facilitate the spread of organized crime. Organized crime, therefore, must be seen as a consequence of the interplay between these various elements. The report discusses the specific structures and modes of operation of the Central Asian criminal groups. It highlights the diversity of those groups and the tendency towards more flexible network organizations. Various types of activities in which criminal groups are engaged are explored in the report, with drug trafficking presenting the most serious problem. With three of the Central Asian states, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, sharing borders with Afghanistan, the largest producer of illicit opiates in the world, Central Asia is an important transit zone for illicit drugs. A consequence of the drug trafficking has been a major increase in drug abuse in the region. However, it is not the only form of criminal activity associated with organized crime in the region. Organized crime activity includes significant—and in some cases growing—incidents of trafficking in human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption.

Details: New York: UNODC, 2007. 57p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf

Year: 2007

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf

Shelf Number: 116541

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Fraud
Human Trafficking
Organized Crime
Trafficking in Firearms

Author:

Title: Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy

Summary: Police reform in Afghanistan is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, but such increased efforts are still yet to be matched by significant improvements in police effectiveness and public confidence. Too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police to fight the insurgency rather than crime. Corruption and political appointments are derailing attempts to professionalise the force. The government and the international community need to reinforce the International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB) as the central forum for prioritising efforts and drive forward with much greater unity of effort. Tangible steps such as appointing a career police commissioner and establishing community liaison boards will build professionalism and wider outreach. A national police force able to uphold the rule of law is crucial to state-building and would help tackle the root causes of alienation that drive the insurgency.

Details: Kabur/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008. 19p.

Source: Internet Resource: Asia Briefing No. 85: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ICG_Afghanistan_Policing_StillSearchingForStrategy.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: Afghanistan

URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ICG_Afghanistan_Policing_StillSearchingForStrategy.pdf

Shelf Number: 119911

Keywords:
Corruption
Police Reform
Policing

Author: Jamaica. Ministry of National Security

Title: A New Era of Policing in Jamaica: Transforming the JCF. The Report of the JCF Strategic Review Panel

Summary: The pattern and high incidence of criminality in Jamaica over recent years has sparked profound concern at the local, national and international levels. Current trends in violent crime reflect deep-rooted social problems and a lack of social cohesion. General public distrust of the police and incidences of police corruption have created an uneasy distance between the police and citizens. This hinders investigative efforts as many persons are afraid or unwilling to come forward as witnesses and a majority of serious crimes remain unsolved or unreported. The security situation and ineffective security governance arrangements undermine Jamaica’s ability to establish and maintain a viable economy that can sustain acceptable levels of well-being for the majority of its citizens. Finally, it is widely believed that the security situation is deteriorating and that decisive action is required to turn the situation around quickly and fundamentally. It is against this backdrop that, in mid 2007, the Ministry of National Security (MNS) commissioned a strategic review of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). A strategic review panel, comprising domestic and international experts, was established for this purpose. Our mandate was to create a new vision for security governance within Jamaica. As part of this, we were to review the governance, management structures, key infrastructure, standards and performance of the JCF and make appropriate recommendations for reform. The major objectives in accomplishing this included: • enhancement of accountability mechanisms governing the operations of the JCF; • the development of recommendations to ensure professionalism, efficiency and enhanced competence of the entire organisation; • establishment of appropriate standards in recruitment, training and professional development to ensure adherence to internationally accepted best practices; • improvement of public confidence in policing; • review of the legislative and administrative framework governing the JCF, including the Jamaica Constabulary Force Act. Our task was to develop a set of proposals that would enable the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) to meet its responsibilities towards ensuring a safe and secure Jamaica through a properly governed, professional and accountable police service working in partnership with other elements of government and civil society. Our approach involved reviewing available documentation and literature relating to JCF performance, together with a series of public consultations and discussions with stakeholders from the JCF, the Government and civil society. The consultations were intended to provide the perspectives and views of citizens and stakeholders with regards to their experience of the police and policing reform. These were supplemented by four targeted reviews commissioned to examine the legislation and policy framework supporting police governance, as well as the JCF management structure. We also reflected upon the six previous reviews of the JCF conducted over the last two decades and the efforts made by the JCF during that period to achieve a fundamental move towards becoming a modern police service. This report sets out an integrated suite of recommendations that if implemented in a coordinated fashion, will bring about this fundamental reform and enable the Government to meet is responsibility for a safe and secure Jamaica.

Details: Kingston, Jamaica: Ministry of National Security, 2008. 87p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 11, 2010 at: http://www.mns.org.jm/picture_library/pdfs/JCF%20Strategic%20Review%202008.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: Jamaica

URL: http://www.mns.org.jm/picture_library/pdfs/JCF%20Strategic%20Review%202008.pdf

Shelf Number: 119923

Keywords:
Community Policing
Corruption
Police Reform
Policing

Author: McGuire, Peter L.

Title: Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa: A Governance Challenge

Summary: West Africa is one of the most impoverished, underdeveloped, and instability prone regions in the world. Many of the nation-states in the region are empirically weak: they lack the capacity to deliver public goods and services to their citizens, do not claim effective control over their territories, are marked by high levels of official corruption, and are plagued by political instability and violent conflict. Since 2004 the region has faced an unprecedented surge in illicit narcotics (primarily cocaine) trafficking, raising fears within the international community that foreign (largely South American) trafficking groups would engender escalated corruption and violence across the region. This paper examines the effect that the surge in narcotics trafficking has had on governance and security in the region, paying particular attention to the experience of Guinea-Bissau and neighboring Republic of Guinea (Guinea-Conakry), two West African states that have been particularly affected by the illicit trade. The central argument presented is that narcotics trafficking is only one facet of the overall challenge of state weakness and fragility in the region. The profound weakness of many West African states has enabled foreign trafficking groups to develop West Africa into an entrepôt for cocaine destined for the large and profitable European market, sometimes with the active facilitation of high-level state actors. Thus, simply implementing counter-narcotics initiatives in the region will have a limited impact without a long-term commitment to strengthening state capacity, improving political transparency and accountability, and tackling poverty alleviation and underdevelopment. Without addressing the root issues that allowed for the penetration of trafficking groups into the states of the region in the first place, West Africa will remain susceptible to similar situations in the future, undermining the region’s nascent progress in the realms of governance, security, and development.

Details: Boston: Boston University, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, 2010. 40p.

Source: Internet Resource: The Pardee Papers, No. 9: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2010/03/Pardee_Paper-9-Narcotics-Trafficking.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2010/03/Pardee_Paper-9-Narcotics-Trafficking.pdf

Shelf Number: 119953

Keywords:
Cocaine
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Narcotics
Organized Crime
Poverty

Author: Leijonmarck, Erik

Title: The Role of Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan's Ethnic Crisis

Summary: On October 10, Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections. According to reports, the elections were surprisingly free and fair. Unfortunately, the problem of state criminalization remains. The new government will face a tough task when dealing with this problem. The conflict that erupted in June in southern Kyrgyzstan is generally seen as being driven by external factors, such as Islamic radicals exploiting socio-economic grievances and the extreme politicization of ethnicity and identity. Although these are important factors, the role of organized crime in the outbreak of ethnic conflict should not be overlooked. Behind the conflict lies the interplay between external and domestic factors as well as the link between regional/local organized crime and the corrupt family politics of former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2010. 3p.

Source: Internet Resoruce: Policy Brief, No. 39: Accessed November 1, 2010 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_leijonmarck-asyrankulova_the-role-of-organized-crime.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Kyrgyzstan

URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_leijonmarck-asyrankulova_the-role-of-organized-crime.pdf

Shelf Number: 120148

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime
State Crime

Author: Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond

Title: Challenges in Dealing with Politically Exposed Persons

Summary: Politically exposed persons (PEPs) are individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions. PEPs are potential targets for bribes due to their prominent position in public life. They have a higher risk of corruption due to their access to state accounts and funds. A review of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-style regional bodies' mutual evaluation reports reveals that a significant number of jurisdictions are found to be either non-compliant or partially-compliant with the FATF recommendation on PEPs. Corrupt PEPs may exploit the regulatory difference between jurisdictions to facilitate the laundering of corruption proceeds and/or illegally diverted government, supranational or aid funds. To combat money laundering risks posed by PEPs, there is a need for ongoing monitoring of risks by regulated entities. This paper also outlines three policy implications, namely: deciding whether to include domestic public office holders in existing PEP definitions; deciding when to terminate PEP status; and deciding whether to extend PEP monitoring to individuals holding important positions in the private sector, that is, financially exposed persons.

Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 6p.

Source: Internet Resource: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 386: Accessed November 3, 2010 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/D/3/6/%7BD36F2729-AFC4-48CC-8A3C-2C81FCDCE5A3%7Dtandi386.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/D/3/6/%7BD36F2729-AFC4-48CC-8A3C-2C81FCDCE5A3%7Dtandi386.pdf

Shelf Number: 120173

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering

Author: International Council on Human Rights Policy

Title: Integrating Human Rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Challenges, Possibilities and Opportunities

Summary: A taboo subject until the early 1990s, corruption is now under the spotlight and recognised as one of the biggest obstacles to development. Anti-corruption laws have been enacted, treaties like the United Nations Convention against Corruption have been negotiated and ratified and new anti-corruption bodies are springing up. Citizens across the world publicly protest against corruption. Corrupt acts are sometimes brought out of the shadows and prosecuted, and on occasion, those responsible are punished. These are tangible achievements. Nevertheless, persistent corruption continues to flourish in many environments to the severe detriment of many millions of people. Against this background, many anti-corruption organisations are examining and revising their strategies in a search for more effective solutions. This report contributes to that quest, outlining how the use of a human rights framework can strengthen anti-corruption work at the national and local level. Which human rights principles and tools could most improve the impact of anti-corruption programmes? How can we harness the power of human rights to protect those most vulnerable to corruption? Where might human rights and anti-corruption programmes be in conflict? This report shows how human rights and anti-corruption practitioners can unite efforts and effectively collaborate in the struggle to root out entrenched corruption.

Details: Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2010. 82p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2010 at: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/58/131b_report.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/58/131b_report.pdf

Shelf Number: 120272

Keywords:
Corruption
Human Rights

Author: Wyler, Liana Sun

Title: Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance

Summary: Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government’s credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress. Major programs include the following: • State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections System Support Program (CSSP); • U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) formal and informal ROL stabilization programs (RLS); • Justice Department’s (DOJ’s) Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, which, with State Department funds, provides legal mentoring and training; and • Defense Department’s (DOD’s) operational support through Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), as well as through Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF-435). It is difficult to identify all the programs, activities, and actors involved in ROL in Afghanistan, in part because of the continued evolution of U.S. strategy and interagency coordination for supporting the Afghan justice sector. Among the most recent shifts in strategy, U.S. efforts are increasingly resourced by a surge in civilian personnel at the provincial and district levels. To align with counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives, the U.S. government is emphasizing not only ministerial-level institution-building, but also projects to improve local-level access to justice, including projects to support informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Policy coordination among U.S. civilian and military entities involved in ROL efforts in Afghanistan also continues to change—including, most recently, the establishment of an Ambassador-led Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (CDROLLE) directorate at the U.S. Embassy, a Generalled Rule of Law Field Force (ROLFF) under the CJIATF-435, as well as an Interagency Planning and Implementation Team (IPIT) to coordinate all civilian and military ROL activities in Afghanistan. Future shifts in policy approaches may also occur as policymakers seek to address growing concerns regarding Afghan corruption. Observers debate whether or to what extent the increased U.S. commitment to and resources for ROL efforts in Afghanistan will help the U.S. government reach its ultimate goal of developing a stable, capable, and legitimate Afghan government. Many would argue that the challenges in Afghanistan to ROL development and justice sector reform remain substantial and many factors undermine prospects for success. Chief among these are ongoing allegations of severe corruption at all levels of the Afghan government, lack of overall security and stability, limited Afghan government capacity, the existence of competing justice mechanisms, and the persistence of traditional attitudes that perpetuate the perception that well-connected Afghans can avoid facing prosecution and conviction. These debates will likely continue in the 112th Congress, as Members remain concerned with all aspects of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, including authorizing and appropriating ROL-related programs and assistance, as well as conducting oversight on policy implementation and effectiveness.

Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2010. 44p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report for Congress R41484: Accessed December 3, 2010 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41484.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Afghanistan

URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41484.pdf

Shelf Number: 120367

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Justice Systems (Afghanistan)
Rule of Law

Author: Campos, Nauro F.

Title: Whither Corruption? A Quantitative Survey of the Literature on Corruption and Growth

Summary: Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of economic growth? This paper uses metaanalysis techniques to systematically evaluate the evidence addressing this question. It uses a data set comprising 460 estimates of the effect of corruption on growth from 41 empirical studies. The main factors explaining the variation in these estimates are whether the model accounts for institutions and trade openness (both are found to deflate the negative effect of corruption), authors' affiliation (academics systematically report less negative impacts), and use of fixed-effects. We also find that publication bias, albeit somewhat acute, does not eliminate the genuine negative effect of corruption on economic growth.

Details: Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2010. 30p.

Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 5334: Accessed December 3, 2010 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp5334.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp5334.pdf

Shelf Number: 120368

Keywords:
Corruption
Economics

Author: Fan, C. Simon

Title: Embezzlement Versus Bribery

Summary: Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the state budget-embezzling or misspending funds-or they can demand extra payments from citizens in return for services-bribery. In many circumstances, embezzlement is less distortionary than bribery. We analyze the tradeoff for governments in deciding how strictly to monitor and punish these two kinds of bureaucratic misbehavior. When bribery is more costly to economic development, governments may tolerate some embezzlement in order to reduce the extent of bribery-even though embezzlement is generally easier to detect. Embezzlement serves as a parallel to the "efficiency wage." This logic appears to hold in China, where misappropriation of public funds by officials appears to be ubiquitous.

Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. 38p.

Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series; Working Paper 16542: Accessed December 3, 2010 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16542.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16542.pdf

Shelf Number: 120372

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Economics and Crime
Embezzlement

Author: KPMG

Title: Fraud and Misconduct Survey 2010: Australia and New Zealand

Summary: KPMG's ninth biennial Fraud and Misconduct Survey 2010, Australia and New Zealand looks into the extent and nature of fraud in the public and private sector – how much was stolen, who stole it, how they stole it and how to prevent them stealing it again. Key findings include the following: The total cost of fraud is increasing: $345.4 million was lost to fraud compared to $301.1 million two years ago. Yet respondents believed that only a third of total losses are being detected. We could be looking at the tip of an iceberg; The value per fraud is increasing: The number of separate frauds reported fell when compared with the 2008 survey, yet the average fraud rose from $1.5 million in 2008 to $3 million in 2010; Who did it: 65 percent of major frauds are committed by people already working in the organisation who usually act alone. The main motivator for fraud was greed and lifestyle.

Details: Sydney(?): KPMG, 2010. 43p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2010 at: http://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Fraud-Survey/Documents/Fraud-and-Misconduct-Survey-2010.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Fraud-Survey/Documents/Fraud-and-Misconduct-Survey-2010.pdf

Shelf Number: 120388

Keywords:
Corporate Crime
Corruption
Fraud (Australia and New Zealand)

Author: Independent Commission Against Corruption

Title: Report on Investigation Into the Introduction of Contraband Into the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre, Silverwater

Summary: This report deals with an investigation by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (the Commission) concerning the introduction of contraband into the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre (MRRC) located at the Silverwater Correctional Complex. The MRRC can accommodate approximately 900 inmates, most of whom are on remand (i.e. not yet sentenced). On 25 August 2003 the Department of Corrective Services (DCS) informed the Commission of allegations that a custodial officer employed at the MRRC was taking contraband into the gaol. Initial enquiries by the Commission confirmed that the officer was Shayne Alan Hughes, then a Correctional Officer First Class. The Commission conducted an investigation which focussed on the conduct of Mr Hughes in relation to the introduction of contraband into the MRRC. On 11 December 2003 Commission officers met with police officers attached to the Corrective Services Investigation Unit (CSIU) and advised them that Mr Hughes was likely to attempt to bring contraband into the MRRC on the following day. Mr Hughes was apprehended after he had entered the MRRC and was searched. A quantity of steroid tablets and a mobile telephone were found hidden in his underpants. Hughes was interviewed by CSIU officers and then by Commission officers. He denied receiving any financial benefit for taking contraband into the gaol apart from free entry into nightclubs and drugs. In hearings before the Commission, Mr Hughes admitted taking mobile telephones and drugs into the MRRC and also made admissions concerning his involvement in other criminal activity, some of which had arisen from his association with a particular inmate. He also admitted receiving cash payments relating to these activities, including the sum of $1,000 on the day before he was apprehended. Findings are made in Chapter 5 of this report that Mr Hughes had dealings with an inmate and his family between April 2003 and December 2003 and took a considerable amount of contraband into the MRRC over that period, for which he received the sum of $5,000. Findings are also made that he received an additional sum of $1,000 on 11 December 2003 in return for taking contraband into the MRRC and that he attempted to take the contraband into the Centre on 12 December 2003. These findings of fact have been used as the basis for findings of corrupt conduct. Mr Hughes was charged on 12 December 2003 with three offences under the Summary Offences Act 1988 in relation to taking contraband into the gaol and with the unlawful possession of a prescribed substance (the steroids). After further enquiries he was also charged with corruptly receiving a benefit of $1,000 on 11 December 2003 contrary to section 249B(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. He has since pleaded guilty to those charges and is currently serving a term of imprisonment.A number of recommendations are made in Chapter 6 of this report to assist DCS to improve the effectiveness of procedures designed to minimise the entry of contraband into correctional centres.

Details: Sydney: Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2004. 35p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2010 at: http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/publications-and-resources/investigations-publications

Year: 2004

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/publications-and-resources/investigations-publications

Shelf Number: 120423

Keywords:
Corrections Officers
Corruption
Prison Contraband

Author:

Title: Reforming Pakistan's Criminal Justice System

Summary: Pakistan’s dysfunctional criminal justice system poses serious risks for domestic, regional and international security; the federal and provincial governments must make its reform a top priority. Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines Pakistan’s criminal justice sector and urges the government to take immediate action for reform. Investigators are poorly trained, prosecutors fail to build strong cases that stand up in court, and there is a lack of access to basic data and modern tools. Moreover, corruption, intimidation and external interference, including by the military’s intelligence agencies, compromise cases before they even come to court. As a result, domestic stability is undermined, and the public’s confidence in the law is weakened. “Pakistan’s police, and indeed the whole criminal justice system, still largely functions on the imperative of maintaining public order rather than tackling 21st century crime”, says Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group’s South Asia Project Director. Given the absence of scientific evidence collection methods and credible witness protection programs, police and prosecutors rely mostly on confessions by the accused, which are inadmissible in court. Militants and other major criminals are regularly released on bail, or their trials persist for years even as they plan operations from prison. Even terrorism cases produce few convictions. The low conviction rate, between 5 and 10 per cent at best, may be unsurprising in a system so resistant to reform, but it has troubling consequences. When prosecutors fail to get convictions in major cases such as the June 2008 Danish embassy bombing, the September 2008 Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad, and the March 2009 attack on a police academy in Lahore, public confidence in the state’s ability to respond to terrorism is dramatically weakened. Of course, criminal justice cannot be isolated from the broader challenges of the democratic transition. The repeated suspension of the constitution by military regimes, followed by extensive reforms to centralise power and to strengthen their civilian allies, notably the religious right, have undermined constitutionalism and the rule of law. Pakistan’s federal government and provincial governments must revoke discriminatory laws, amend the Criminal Procedure Code to establish a robust witness protection program, recast the Anti-Terrorism Act and repeal parallel court systems. The police’s investigative capacity must be strengthened, external interference in investigations prevented and a comprehensive review conducted to assess gaps in personnel, training and resource needs. Policymakers and judges should not give in to populist quick fixes that only limit the justice system’s capacity to enforce the law. “The state largely derives its authority from the public’s confidence in police to maintain security, and the courts to deliver justice”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “The international community can help shore up an increasingly fragile Pakistan by shifting the focus of its security assistance away from the military and toward civilian law enforcement agencies and criminal prosecution”.

Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 44p.

Source: Internet Resource: Asia Reprot No. 196: Accessed December 13, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/196%20Reforming%20Pakistans%20Criminal%20Justice%20System.ashx

Year: 2010

Country: United States

URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/196%20Reforming%20Pakistans%20Criminal%20Justice%20System.ashx

Shelf Number: 120449

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Justice Systems (Pakistan)

Author: Peters, Gretchen

Title: Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan

Summary: Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents enormous challenges and also potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population‐centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Within a realm of poor governance and widespread state corruption, anti‐state actors engage in and protect organized crime—mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping—both to raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustainable licit economy. Militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized, how funds flow through their command chains and how they interact—and sometimes fight — with each other. There is no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier, have simultaneously contributed to a widening sense of anger and frustration among local communities. Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderate Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better protecting local communities who are the main victims of it.

Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010. 98p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Afghanistan

URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf

Shelf Number: 120547

Keywords:
Corruption
Insurgents
Organized Crime
Terrorism (Afghanistan, Pakistan)
Terrorists

Author:

Title: Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic

Summary: In the diamond mines of the Central African Republic (CAR), extreme poverty and armed conflict put thousands of lives in danger. President Franacois Boziza keeps tight control of the diamond sector to enrich and empower his own ethnic group but does little to alleviate the poverty that drives informal miners to dig in perilous conditions. Stringent export taxes incentivise smuggling that the mining authorities are too few and too corrupt to stop. These factors combined - a parasitic state, poverty and largely unchecked crime - over jealous factions to launch rebellions and enable armed groups to collect new recruits and profit from mining and selling diamonds illegally. To ensure diamonds fuel development not bloodshed, root and branch reform of the sector must become a core priority of the country's peacebuilding strategy. Nature scattered diamonds liberally over the CAR, but since colonial times foreign entrepreneurs and grasping regimes have benefited from the precious stones more than the Central African people. Mining companies have repeatedly tried to extract diamonds on an industrial scale and largely failed because the deposits are alluvial, spread thinly across two large river systems. Instead, an estimated 80,000-100,000 mostly unlicensed miners dig with picks and shovels for daily rations and the chance of striking it lucky. Middlemen, mostly West Africans, buy at meagre prices and sell at a profit to exporting companies. The government lacks both the institutional capacity to govern this dispersed, transient production chain and the will to invest diamond revenues in the long-term growth of mining communities. Chronic state fragility has ingrained in the political elite a winner-takes-all political culture and a preference for short-term gain. The French ransacked their colony of its natural resources, and successive rulers have treated power as licence to loot. Jean-Badel Bokassa, the CAR's one-time "emperor", created a monopoly on diamond exports, and his personal gifts to French President Giscard d'Estaing, intended to seal their friendship, became symbols of imperial excess. Ange-Falix Patassa saw nothing wrong in using his presidency to pursue business interests and openly ran his own diamond mining company. Boziza is more circumspect. His regime maintains tight control of mining revenues by means of a strict legal and fiscal framework and centralised, opaque management. Since Boziza came to power in 2003, industrial diamond mining companies have almost all left, in part because the authorities' high demands erode potential profits. Informal artisanal mining carries on apace, but the government's closure in 2008 of most diamond exporting companies - a ruse to better control the market - severely cut investment in the production chain, cost many miners their jobs and helped cause a spike in infant malnutrition. Expensive licences and corrupt mining police make it harder for miners to escape the poverty trap. A 12 per cent tax on diamond exports, the highest in the region, makes smuggling worthwhile and fosters illicit trading networks that deprive the state of much needed revenue. The government's refusal to distribute national wealth fairly has led jealous individuals and disenfranchised groups to take up arms for a bigger slice of the cake. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces damocratiques pour le rassemblement, UFDR), more ethnic militia than rebel group, has signed a peace agreement but still mines diamonds in the north east and sells them on the black market. Poor miners joined its ranks to improve their lot, and though taking power is no longer a prospect, diamond profits are a strong incentive not to disarm. Meanwhile, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix, CPJP), the most active rebellion, preys on miners and traders in the east. This insecurity, largely banditry under a rebel flag, severely restricts economic activity, inhibits the holding there of elections set for 23 January 2011 and puts civilian lives at great risk. Reform of the diamond sector is a crucial element, alongside wider governance and conflict resolution measures, for improving the living conditions of miners and their families, boosting the state's scant domestic revenues and helping break the cycle of armed conflict. The government needs first to improve governance of the mining sector, which is a question more of political will than capacity. Only when Boziza has shown commitment to instituting more democratic control of mining revenues and enhancing transparency in management processes should international partners support mining authorities in the capital and mining zones. The reform strategy should prioritise artisanal above industrial mining, which has less direct impact on mining communities, aim to reduce incentives for smuggling and tighten controls to stop armed groups profiting from diamonds.

Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 31p.

Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 167: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.ashx

Year: 2010

Country: Central African Republic

URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.ashx

Shelf Number: 120551

Keywords:
Corruption
Diamond Smuggling (Africa)
Mining
Poverty
Violence

Author: Hubschle, Annette, compiler

Title: Organised Crime in Southern Africa: First Annual Review

Summary: In 2005 representatives of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Secretariat of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) discussed the lack of reliable information and research on organised crime and how it impacted on law enforcement in southern Africa. The lack of credible homegrown research data ultimately led to the conceptualisation of a joint research project between the Cape Town-based ISS Organised Crime and Money Laundering Programme and SARPCCO. The Enhancing Regional Responses Against Organised Crime (EROC) Project commenced in January 2008 and concludes in December 2010. The objectives of the research are to: Provide in-depth information on contemporary organised criminal activities in the sub-region to policy and decision makers; Analyse the transnational dynamics of organised criminal groups and networks; Determine whether, and to what extent, links exist between organised crime and terrorism; Consider and document the role that corruption plays in organised crime; and Evaluate the capacity and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in the sub-region to overcome organised crime. This report comprises the research findings of the first year of data collection (2008) for the EROC project. It is the first of three such reports that will be published by the ISS in collaboration with SARPCCO. It looks at selected organised criminal activities and observed levels of prevalence in 12 southern African countries. Research questions, methodologies, limitations and ethical considerations are discussed in detail. Due to the lack of statistical and quantitative data, the report relies mostly on qualitative methodologies. Representatives of law enforcement agencies, government departments and para-statals, civil society, business and professional associations, academics, prisoners, former gang members and members of the broader communities whose lives have been affected by organised crime, were consulted in one-on-one interviews, focus groups, observations and workshops. A team of field researchers led by a research coordinator collected the data presented and analysed in this report. The research was informed by a working definition of organised crime which was jointly developed by the heads of criminal investigation departments in southern Africa and the research team. The report shows that the more serious forms of crime in terms of the monetary value involved or the potential harm they cause have a transnational dimension, both in terms of being committed by people of varying nationalities and in terms of affecting more than one country. It has been established that organised crime in most countries is underpinned by corruption, which is either a facilitating activity or an organised criminal activity in its own right. The geo-political and economic environments of individual countries amplifies the significance of specific criminal activities, the commonest forms of which have been identified as stock theft, theft/hijacking of motor vehicles, cultivation of marijuana and a broad spectrum of economic crimes. Further, the research has shown that although economic crimes may not be as prevalent as other forms of crime, statistically their impact on the society and the economy are far reaching. Furthermore, the effectiveness of law enforcement against organised crime has been put in the spotlight.

Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2010. 101p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: South Africa

URL: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf

Shelf Number: 120675

Keywords:
Corruption
Counterfeit Goods
Drug Markets
Financial Crimes
Human Trafficking
Money Laundering
Offenses Against the Environment
Organized Crime (South Africa)
Poaching
Smuggling
Stolen Motor Vehicles
Wildlife Crime

Author: Kar, Dev

Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006

Summary: This report shows that the developing world is losing an increasing amount of money through illicit capital flight each year. Moreover, the value of the illicit flows surpasses the amount of Official Development Assistance entering those countries by an order of magnitude. "Illicit financial flows siphon revenue out of poor countries, robbing them of much-needed assets and forestalling economic development,” said GFI director Raymond Baker. “These new figures reveal that illicit financial flows outpace Official Development Assistance by a ratio of nearly 10 to 1. This is critical to understanding global poverty and developing effective poverty alleviation and economic development strategies,” Baker said. Primary findings of the report include: Total capital flight exiting the developing world may be as much as $1 trillion dollars per year; Measured against the flow of Official Development Assistance in 2006 poor countries, in aggregate, are losing close to $10 dollars for every $1 dollar they receive in aid; The volume of capital flight from developing countries is increasing at an average of 18.5% a year. Over the five-year period of this study, illicit financial flows grew at the fastest pace in the Middle East and North Africa region (49.4 percent) followed by Europe (25.4 percent), Asia (15.7 percent), and the Western Hemisphere (2.8 percent). Illicit financial flows from Africa actually declined (-2.9 percent) but this decline is more the result of incomplete data than supportive economic or political factors. Illicit financial flows refer to money that is illegal in its origin, transfer or use and reflect the proceeds of corruption, crime and tax evasion. Corporate avoidance of customs duties, VAT and income taxes constitute an estimated 60% of the total outflow. The study utilized multiple economic models which were combined and “tested” to determine the most reliable estimates. The findings were based on macroeconomic trade and external debt data maintained by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2008. 45p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/executive%20-%20final%20version%201-5-09.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: International

URL: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/executive%20-%20final%20version%201-5-09.pdf

Shelf Number: 120746

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Illicit Financial Flows
Tax Evasion

Author: Kar, Dev

Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2009, Update with a Focus on Asia

Summary: The report, “Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2009,” finds that approximately $6.5 trillion was removed from the developing world from 2000 through 2008. The report also examines illicit flows from Asia, which produced the largest portion of total outflows and makes projections for 2009. The report ranks countries according to magnitude of outflows with China ranking 1 ($2.18 trillion), Russia 2 ($427 billion), Mexico 3 ($416 billion), Saudi Arabia 4 ($302 billion), and Malaysia 5 ($291 billion). The report also shows the annual outflows for each country and breaks outflows down into two categories of drivers: trade mispricing and “other,” which includes kickbacks, bribes, embezzlement, and other forms of official corruption. The report also looks at the impact of the global economic recession—on both magnitudes and trends in illicit outflows, it makes policy recommendations, and it projects outflows for 2009 (for which complete data is not yet available).

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2011. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/IFF2010/gfi_iff_update_report-web.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/IFF2010/gfi_iff_update_report-web.pdf

Shelf Number: 120748

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Illicit Financial Flows
Money Laundering
Tax Evasion

Author: Dugard, Jackie

Title: From Low Intensity War to Mafia War: Taxi Violence in South Africa (1987 - 2000)

Summary: This report presents the results of a case study of South Africa's 'taxi wars', a series of violent conflicts that have marked the largely black-owned and black-operated minibus taxi industry since its deregulation in 1987. Prior to 1994, these taxi wars were relatively few in number and were predominantly linked to state-orchestrated violence. Since then, however, taxi violence has become more widespread, decentralised and criminal in character. Behind this shift are changes in the organisation of the taxi industry that broadly reflect the evolving relationship between state and society in post-apartheid South Africa. This report sets out an historical overview of the taxi phenomenon during the period 1987-2000. It focuses on the development of the taxi industry and its associated violence in the late-apartheid era, up to the present day. Case material is drawn from an in-depth longitudinal study of taxi violence in the Cape Peninsula area, but the research findings reflect taxi violence more generally. The generalised findings can be summarised as follows: • Taxi violence has its roots in the policies of deregulation and destabilisation pursued by the apartheid regime during the late 1980s and early 1990s. • As the state's control over the economy and society has weakened in the course of South Africa's transition, taxi associations have developed as informal agents of regulation, protection and extortion. • Violent taxi associations called 'mother bodies' have been allowed to develop and expand virtually unchecked by the authorities. These organisations are behind most of the violence that has come to be associated with the industry. Mother bodies have used their considerable firepower and weight to resist recent government attempts to re-regulate the taxi industry and they are symptomatic of more generalised rising levels of organised crime in post-apartheid South Africa. • Official corruption and collusion are major factors contributing to the continuation of taxi violence. In particular, the ownership of taxis by police and other government personnel directly aids criminality in the industry and exacerbates attempts to resolve the violence. Beyond providing an historical overview of the genesis of, and reasons for, taxi violence, this report also details the latest developments in the government's ongoing attempt to curb taxi violence; namely its plans to restructure the industry in terms of a recapitalisation programme that envisages replacing the existing taxi fleet of 16-seater vehicles with new, yet-to-be manufactured 18- and 35-seater vehicles, and which discusses the potential impact of such developments in this volatile yet necessary sector.

Details: Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2001. 46p.

Source: Internet Resource: Violence and Transitions Series, Vol. 4: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/taxiviolence/fromlowintensity.pdf

Year: 2001

Country: South Africa

URL: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/taxiviolence/fromlowintensity.pdf

Shelf Number: 121023

Keywords:
Corruption
Organized Crime
Taxi Violence (South Africa)
Violent Crime

Author: Lambsdorff, Johann Graf

Title: Deterrence and Constrained Enforcement – Alternative Regimes to Deal with Bribery

Summary: This paper provides interesting insights into deterence of bribery by investigating how bribe transactions are enforced. It integrates insights from a Law and Economics perspective with transaction cost analysis. The author develops a game-theoretic approach to show that, irrespective of whether a rational choice or a behavioral approach is employed, increasing penalties and the risks of detection is not always advisable. Penalties can have a perverse effect by helping corrupt actors create the bonds that are needed for enforcing their deal. It argues that governments may deter bribery either by high penalties and risks of detection, potentially supported by leniency given to those who report their infraction. Another approach can be amplifying the risk of opportunism, aggravating the difficulties of enforcing a bribe transaction. This should involve a low probability of detection and allowing offenders to keep their ill-gotten gains.

Details: Passau, Germany: Universitat Passau, 2010. 39p.

Source: Internet Resource: Passauer Diskussionspapiere, no. v-60-10: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.wiwi.uni-passau.de/fileadmin/dokumente/lehrstuehle/wilhelm/Working_Papers_PDF/Disk_60_Deterrence_and_Constrained_Enforcement.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-passau.de/fileadmin/dokumente/lehrstuehle/wilhelm/Working_Papers_PDF/Disk_60_Deterrence_and_Constrained_Enforcement.pdf

Shelf Number: 121041

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Whistleblowing

Author: Greenberg, Theodore S.

Title: Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture

Summary: Non-Conviction Based (NCB) asset forfeiture is a powerful tool for recovering the proceeds of corruption, particularly in cases where the proceeds have been transferred abroad. Because it provides for the restraint, seizure, and forfeiture of tainted assets without the need for a criminal conviction, it can be the best option when the wrongdoer is dead, has fled the jurisdiction, is immune from prosecution, or is too powerful to prosecute — all common in cases of grand corruption. A growing number of jurisdictions have established a system to allow NCB forfeiture, and it has been recommended as a tool for asset recovery at regional and multilateral levels. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) urges countries to consider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow NCB asset forfeiture in cases in which “the offender cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or absence or in other appropriate cases.” With this increased focus on the issue, there is a corresponding need for a practical tool that jurisdictions contemplating NCB forfeiture legislation can use. Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture is that practical tool. It is the first book of its kind on the subject and the first knowledge publication under the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative. A collaborative effort of practitioners of forfeiture and NCB forfeiture, Stolen Asset Recovery identifies the key concepts—legal, operational, and practical —that an NCB asset forfeiture system should encompass to be eff ective in recovering stolen assets. Thirty-six key concepts are explored through practical experiences, examples from cases, and excerpts from NCB asset forfeiture legislation.

Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009. 284p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2011 at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/web_ressources/IBRDWB_Guidassetrecovery.pdf

Year: 2009

Country: International

URL: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/web_ressources/IBRDWB_Guidassetrecovery.pdf

Shelf Number: 121252

Keywords:
Asset Forfeiture
Corruption
Money Laundering

Author: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners

Title: 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse

Summary: "The ACFE's 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse is based on data compiled from a study of 1,843 cases of occupational fraud that occurred worldwide between January 2008 and December 2009. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated those cases. The fraud cases in our study came from 106 nations — with more than 40% of cases occurring in countries outside the United States — providing a truly global view into the plague of occupational fraud. In our 2010 Report, we have, for the first time ever, widened our study to include cases from countries outside the United States. This expansion allows us to more fully explore the truly global nature of occupational fraud and provides an enhanced view into the severity and impact of these crimes. Additionally, we are able to compare the anti-fraud measures taken by organizations worldwide in order to give fraud fighters everywhere the most applicable and useful information to help them in their fraud prevention and detection efforts."

Details: Austin, TX: ACFE, 2011. 83p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2011 at:

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL:

Shelf Number: 121325

Keywords:
Commercial Crimes
Corruption
Fraud and Abuse

Author: Kar, Dev

Title: Illicit Financial Flows from the Least Developed Countries: 1990–2008

Summary: This paper explores the scale and composition of illicit financial flows from the 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Illicit financial flows involve the cross-border transfer of the proceeds of corruption, trade in contraband goods, criminal activities and tax evasion. In recent years, considerable interest has arisen over the extent to which such flows may have a detrimental impact on development and governance in both developed and developing countries alike. This issue has been recognised by the UN as important for development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Illicit capital flight, where it occurs, is a major hindrance to the mobilisation of domestic resources for development. In many cases, it significantly reduces the volume of resources available for investment in the MDGs and productive capacities. Through the United Nations, the international community has committed to strengthen national and multilateral efforts to address it. As the deadline for achievement of the MDGs draws closer, it is vital understand more about the nature of this problem and to explore possible policy solutions, especially for those countries furthest off-track towards the MDGs. The study’s indicative results find that illicit financial flows from the LDCs have increased from US$9.7 billion in 1990 to US$26.3 billion in 2008 implying an inflation-adjusted rate of increase of 6.2 percent per annum. Conservative (lower-bound) estimates indicate that illicit flows have increased from US$7.9 billion in 1990 to US$20.2 billion in 2008. The top ten exporters of illicit capital account for 63 percent of total outflows from the LDCs while the top 20 account for nearly 83 percent. Trade mispricing accounts for the bulk (65-70 percent) of illicit outflows from the LDCs, and the propensity for mispricing has increased along with increasing external trade. Empirical research on illicit flows indicates that there are three types of factors driving illicit flows—macroeconomic, structural, and governance-related. The ratio of illicit outflows to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averages about 4.8 percent but there is wide variation among LDCs. Of the top 10 countries with the highest illicit flows to GDP ratio, four are small island countries, two are landlocked, and four are neither. In some LDCs, losses through illicit capital flows outpace monies received in official development assistance (ODA). Estimating illicit flows from some LDCs is problematic because the underlying macroeconomic or partner-country trade data are either non-existent or spotty due to widespread on-going or recent conflict and/or weak statistical capacity. Complete macroeconomic and partner-country trade data were available for 34 LDCs, while 11 report partial data to the IMF and 3 are nonreporters. The report thus presents an estimate of illicit flows from some of the non-reporting and partially reporting countries based on the assumption that illicit flows from these countries are in the same proportion to GDP as are outflows from other reporting LDCs with complete data. The results of this study are indicative but demonstrate a clear need for further research in this area given the scale of the development challenges which currently face the Least Developed Countries and the need to ‘think outside the box’ and find innovative development solutions. The paper presents a number of useful measures LDCs may wish to consider to curtail the generation and transmission of illicit financial flows. The international community must also play its part. However, even where policy measures are well designed and targeted, lasting improvements in this area can only be achieved when there is the sufficient political will and leadership to tackle corruption and some of the root causes of illicit financial flows. For the Least Developed Countries, policy recommendations include measures to address trade mispricing through for instance systematic customs reform and the adoption of transfer pricing regulations with commensurate increase in enforcement capacity. The implementation of specialised software which helps governments to identify possible incidences of transfer pricing may also be useful to some governments. Measures to reform the tax base through the progressive strengthening and widening of the tax base in order to reduce dependence on indirect taxes which are more difficult to manage and have built-in incentives for tax evasion may also be beneficial. Ultimately tax is the most sustainable source of finance for development and the long-term goal of poor countries must be to replace foreign aid dependency with tax self-sufficiency. However taxation reform must be seen as equitable and fair and must not unduly burden the poorest. The international community must also support LDCs’ efforts to curtail the illicit outflow of capital. This includes specific measures to support LDCs to improve the systematic exchange of tax information between governments on non-resident individuals and corporations while the adoption of globally consistent regulations for transfer pricing could encourage multinational companies to modify their behaviour towards more transparency and accountability. The UN’s Model Income Tax Treaty refers to the importance of automatic exchange of information between national tax authorities in different jurisdictions. In order to stem tax avoidance by multinational corporations, the international community could support the development of an international accounting standard requiring that all multi-national corporations report sales, profits, and taxes paid in all jurisdictions in their audited annual reports and tax returns.

Details: New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2011. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.gfip.org/

Shelf Number: 121767

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Illicit Trade
Money Laundering
Tax Evasion

Author: Ingram, Matthew C.

Title: Justiciabarómetro: Survey of Judges, Prosecutors, and Public Defenders in Nine Mexican States

Summary: The Justiciabarómetro: Judicial Survey is a timely study of the judges, prosecutors, and public defenders that operate Mexico’s criminal justice system. The study’s results shed new light on both the current state of the administration of justice in Mexico and the sources of support for and resistance to the sweeping judicial reforms initiated by the administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderón in 2008. Among the key findings are the following: • General satisfaction with compensation, but frustration with workload varies: Judges, prosecutors, and public defenders appear to be generally satisfied with the levels of compensation they receive, though frustration with salary and workload vary by state. • Experience and merit drives professional advancement, but some see politics: Most respondents agreed that experience and training are a primary basis for employment and promotion, a significant portion of respondents feel that political contacts also play a role. • Despite respect for legality, some tolerance of unlawful behavior for justice: Regarding lawful behavior, there was widespread agreement that “illegal conduct” is unacceptable, even if no one gets hurt. However, one in four respondents —28.2%— were willing to tolerate occasional illegalities in the pursuit of justice. • Judges and defenders tend to see prosecutors as lacking in competency and integrity: While all respondents tended to have a high opinion of the professional competency and integrity of judges and public defenders, prosecutors were viewed as less competent and trustworthy by their colleagues in other professions. • Public defenders are more critical of procedure efficiency and perceive more violations of due process than judges and prosecutors: There were significant differences judges and prosecutors, on the one hand, and public defenders, on the other regarding the efficiency of the criminal justice system. Also, judges and prosecutors tend to believe that violations of due process —such as forced confessions— are very rare or never used, while public defenders are much more likely to disagree. • New judicial reforms seen by some ineffective, a result of foreign influence, and unlikely to reduce crime. Respondents were split on the effectiveness and efficiency of Mexico’s traditional criminal justice system, on whether that system was deliberately discredited to make way for the 2008 judicial reform, on whether foreign interests were behind the new judicial system, and whether judicial reform will reduce criminality. • Even so, new criminal procedures are generally well regarded, especially in states still awaiting reform. Still, the provisions included in the 2008 reforms —introducing oral, adversarial criminal procedures— were well regarded, particularly in states where they had not yet taken effect; the most significant reservations tended to register among respondents from states that had already adopted the reforms for some time. Many respondents are optimistic that it will improve efficiency and reduce corruption in the judicial system.

Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, 2011. 136p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/justiciabarometro-judicial-survey.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Mexico

URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/justiciabarometro-judicial-survey.pdf

Shelf Number: 121865

Keywords:
Administration of Justice
Corruption
Courts
Criminal Justice Systems (Mexico)
Judges
Prosecutors
Public Defenders

Author: Ingram, Matthew C.

Title: Assessing Mexico's Judicial Reform: Views of Judges, Prosecutors, and Public Defenders

Summary: Assessing Judicial Reform in Mexico highlights the findings of a recent Justiciabarómetro survey of 276 judges, prosecutors, and public defenders working in Mexico’s criminal justice system from October to December 2010. The full report is available at www. justiceinmexico.org. This special report summarizes respondants’ attitudes regarding the workings of the Mexican criminal justice system, as well as the sweeping judicial reforms approved by Mexico’s Congress in 2008. Among the key findings highlighted in this report are the following: • Frustration with workload varies by state and profession: Judges, prosecutors, and public defenders appear to be generally satisfied with the levels of compensation they receive, though frustration with salary and workload vary by state. • General support for the traditional Mexican legal system remains strong: More than half of the respondents —especially judges— indicated that Mexico’s traditional inquisitorial system was both efficient and effective, and at least a third feel that the traditional system was disparaged by a deliberate, negative campaign designed to promote a shift to the new adversarial system. • Public defenders are more critical of the traditional system than others: There were significant differences between judges and prosecutors, on the one hand, and public defenders, on the other, regarding the efficiency of the criminal justice system. Also, judges and prosecutors tend to believe that violations of due process —such as forced confessions— are very rare or never used, while public defenders are more likely to strongly disagree. • There is significant skepticism about recent judicial reforms. Our findings suggest that there lingering concerns about reform efforts, above all among those who are currently attempting to work within the new oral, adversarial system. Respondents were split on whether judicial reform will reduce criminality, and a significant proportion feel that the reforms were the result of pressure by foreign governments and organizations. • Even so, there is hope that recent reforms will improve the justice system. Despite the concerns we find, the provisions included in the 2008 reforms —introducing oral, adversarial criminal procedures— were generally well regarded, particularly in states where they had not yet taken effect. While there are significant reservations in states that have already adopted the reforms for some time, many respondents are optimistic that they will ultimately help to improve efficiency and reduce corruption in the judicial system.

Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, 2011. 38p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tbi-assessing-judicial-reform1.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Mexico

URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tbi-assessing-judicial-reform1.pdf

Shelf Number: 121866

Keywords:
Administration of Justice
Corruption
Courts
Criminal Justice Systems (Mexico)
Judges
Judicial Reform
Prosecutors
Public Defenders

Author: Queensland. Crime and Misconduct Commission

Title: Regulating Prostitution: A Follow-Up Review of the Prostitution Act 1999

Summary: This 2011 review aimed to update the picture of the prostitution environment in Queensland, by finding out: (1) which recommendations from the CMC’s previous review have been implemented and what their effect has been what changes, if any, have occurred in the achievement of the Act’s underlying principles since the last review; and (2) what new and emerging issues are facing the industry in Queensland, and in comparable jurisdictions, which could affect the achievement of these principles. The review found that the position in Queensland has remained relatively stable, and that the legislative objectives are generally being achieved. It identified that licensed brothels: have minimal impact on community amenity show no evidence of corruption and organised crime (other than illegal prostitution) have access to exit and retraining programs for sex workers who may wish to leave the industry provide a safe workplace and a healthy environment in which to carry out prostitution. However, as a result of the review, the CMC called on the government to action two previous recommendations, which although supported are yet to be fully implemented. They relate to the establishment of an inter-agency Ministerial Advisory Committee to address issues facing Queensland’s prostitution industry, and a tightening of the legislation linked to advertising to prevent illegal operators masquerading as legal enterprises.

Details: Brisbane: Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2011. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 30, 2011 at: http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/content/15385001309241014238.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/content/15385001309241014238.pdf

Shelf Number: 121952

Keywords:
Corruption
Organized Crime
Prostitution (Australia)
Sex Work

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Title: Organized Crime and its Threat to Security: Tackling a Disturbing Consequence of Drug Control

Summary: Over time, international controls have limited the number of people who take illicit drugs to a small fraction of the world’s adult population, much smaller than those who use other addictive substances, like tobacco and alcohol. This undeniable success has also had a dramatic unintended consequence: a criminal market of staggering proportions. If unattended, this criminal market will offset the many benefits of drug control. In fact, the crime and corruption associated with the drug trade are providing strong evidence to a vocal minority of pro-drug lobbyists to argue that the cure is worse than the disease, and that drug legalization is the solution. This would be an historical mistake, one which United Nations Member States are not willing to make. The reason is straightforward: there is no need to choose between health (drug control) and security (crime prevention). They are complementary, and not contradictory commitments. Yet, because drug trafficking enriches criminals, destroys communities and even threatens nations, it has to be dealt with urgently and forcefully. Policy change is required against crime, not in favour of drugs. This paper focuses on three requirements, as a way to map the road ahead. The need for an integrated strategy. Crime control measures must integrate all elements of the drug chain: supply, trade and demand. So far governments have mostly pursued disjointed interventions that have displaced the problem (from one country to another and/or from one substance to another); have addressed only some aspects (fighting illicit crops, instead of mass poverty); or have used a sledge-hammer instead of a more appropriate chisel (criminalizing addiction, instead of treating addicts). Also measures have been incoherently applied over time (with uneven political commitment), and over space (without the coordination promoted by international agreements). For example, the UN legal instrument against Organized Crime and its protocol on Fire Arms provide platforms for joint, rapid-impact action: yet, they not been implemented in a way robust enough to impact the drug trade. As a result, a number of countries now face a crime situation largely caused by their own choice. This is bad enough. Worse is the fact that, quite often their vulnerable neighbours pay an even greater price. The need for community resistance. Drugs infect especially certain segments of society. Ghettos, even entire regions controlled by crime cartels, are breeding grounds of both drug supply (trafficking) and demand (addiction). Exploitation, instability, even terrorism are their direct cause and consequence. Yet, like addiction, violence can be cured: it is indeed possible to regain control of places that today are hospitable only to anti-social behaviours. The challenge is to re-integrate marginalized segments of society and draw them into, rather than push them out of the law. From the Andes to South East Asia, this has been done with farmers who have been assisted to switch from illicit to licit crops – despite the war conditions surrounding them. From Europe to Australia this has been done with addicts who have been helped to abandon their drug dependence – despite largely adverse social settings. The world over, drug farmers and drug addicts have benefited from targeted assistance: why not duplicate this winning model in the heart of ghettos and in areas out-of-control? Why do states abandon masses of unemployed, illiterate youth that face no other option than a day of money, notoriety and death as foot-soldiers in rag-tag armies of mafias and rebels? The need for a shared commitment. The drug trade not only infects people in so many lands. It also corrupts governments, together with business and finance. Nations need to strengthen integrity in governance (public and private) and resistance to drug cartels, armed with war chests worth billions of dollars. This is not happening. Money laundering is rampant and practically unopposed: honest citizens, seeing the expensive cars, yachts and mansions of untouchable mafias and their cronies, wonder why proceeds of crime are not seized. The internet supplies drugs, arms, even people and their organs, on-line. One of humanity’s biggest capital assets, the web, when perversely used is turned into a weapon by criminals and terrorists. Surprisingly, calls for international agreements against cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism remain unanswered. Even existing international legal instruments are not adequately applied, their rules of engagement not yet agreed upon years after their entry into force. In fact, the Conferences of the Parties for the implementation of the UN Conventions against Corruption and against Organized Crime have repetitively failed to deliver – focussed on processes rather than on the substance of fighting organized crime. The drug control conventions – so effective in reducing the health impact of illicit substances – are under attack for a collateral damage the founding fathers could not anticipate: the emergence of drug cartels powerful enough to affect politics and business. This may be an unintended consequence of the drug conventions: above all, it is the inescapable result of inadequate implementation of existing crime control agreements and unwillingness to develop new ones, despite the sacrifice – often the ultimate sacrifice – of law enforcement officers. The overall context has weakened further the respect for human rights. Although drugs and crime kill, societies should not kill because of them. There cannot be disagreement on this. Yet, under the (no doubt emotional) pressure of a concerned public opinion, efforts to preserve public health (by controlling drugs) and to maintain public order (by preventing crime) are not always conducted with respect for the rights of other human beings. Still worse, when the law is not observed, when drug mafias challenge the state, when vast income inequalities are the result of crime rather than honest work, the call is inevitable: an eye for an eye. Governments must oppose this frightening cycle.

Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2009. 22p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 21, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/CND_09ED_final%20paper.pdf

Year: 2009

Country: International

URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/CND_09ED_final%20paper.pdf

Shelf Number: 122134

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Control Policies
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force

Title: Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption

Summary: This typology originates from a practitioners‘ understanding that the fight against corruption is inextricably intertwined with that against money laundering; that the stolen assets of a corrupt public official are useless unless they are placed, layered, and integrated into the global financial network in a manner that does not raise suspicion. In some ways, a public official (known as a politically exposed person, or ―PEP) who gathers vast sums of money through corrupt means is far more vulnerable than some other criminals. A narcotics trafficker may reliably depend on being able to remain anonymous with his vast amount of money; a public official begins to draw unwanted attention as soon as he is associated with significant sums from unknown sources. Thus, the corrupt PEP‘s vulnerability presents an opportunity for those authorities engaged in both anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and anti-corruption (AC) enforcement. This typology differs from other such typologies previously produced by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) because it draws from publicly available work undertaken by experts. The body of work the project team analyzed represents deep AML expertise possessed by individuals and organisations around the globe. Indeed, the objective was to understand these works to draw conclusions from them. Broadly stated, the goal was to stand on the shoulders of others in order to better understand corruption, its mechanisms and vulnerabilities, through an AML/CFT lens. Part of the mandate of the Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) is to identify new threats and vulnerabilities and conduct research on money laundering and terrorist financing methods and techniques. FATF typology reports typically reveal, describe, and explain the nature of ML/TF methods and threats, thus increasing global awareness and opportunities for earlier detection. In light of its mandate, the project team focused only on the methods used to launder the proceeds of corruption. It does not attempt to describe the methods by which bribery and other corruption are effectuated, concealed, or discovered; such a discussion would be outside of the scope of this paper. While there may be no internationally recognised legal definition of corruption, it is most commonly functionally defined as the use of public office for private gain. The United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and the Council of Europe Conventions establish the offences for a range of corrupt behaviour. The conventions define international standards on the criminalisation of corruption by prescribing specific offences rather than through a generic definition or offense of corruption. The offenses can range from petty or systemic corruption, in which public officials or employees receive money to perform (or refrain from performing) official acts, to ―grand corruption, in which those at the political, decision-making levels of government use their office to enrich themselves, their families, and their associates. Because of time and resource limitations involved in this project, the project team restricted itself to an analysis of grand corruption. While there is no precise threshold -- by official rank or otherwise -- to distinguish grand from systemic corruption, the positions of the PEPs involved in the cases in our report ranged from senior legislators to governors to prime ministers and presidents. All of the cases examined involved behaviour that would constitute offenses falling under any of the relevant international AC conventions, as well as the generic definition described above. Where possible, the case studies identified the type of corrupt act from which the proceeds had been derived. The types of corruption involved bribe taking and kickbacks, of both foreign and domestic officials, but also embezzlement (in which money rightly belonging to the State was siphoned for personal use through a variety of means), extortion (in which the public official uses the threat of official power to receive money) and self dealing (in which the corrupt PEP has a personal financial interest in acts and decisions he makes in his official capacity).

Details: Paris: FATF, 2011. 54p.

Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 5, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf

Shelf Number: 122313

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Political Offenses
Terrorism

Author: Fric, Pavol

Title: Crossing the Thin Llue Line: An international annual review of anti-corruption strategies in the police. 2001 edition.

Summary: No matter what form it takes, corruption inside the police force poses one of the gravest dangers to the democratic functioning of society. The police should be an institution that protects citizens and society from those who snub law and order. However, due to the nature of the work performed by police officers (24/7 direct contact with both the public and the criminal underworld), they are prime targets for those who want to break the law and avoid prosecution. And when, instead of following the rule of law, police officers themselves break the law or lure other citizens into doing so, their actions create many problems, eroding the public’s faith in the rule of law, justice, and democratic institutions. Unfortunately, the amount of empirical information available on the corruption of police officers and the measures undertaken in order to fight this threat is rather limited. We are uncertain whether to blame this on a lack of interest among independent researchers in the field, or on the proverbial "blue wall of silence" from police officers. Nevertheless, this lacuna has led us to the idea of launching an annual review to re-evaluate the anti-corruption strategies within police forces world-wide. We believe that, by making such information publicly available, "crossing the thin blue line" will become more difficult. This year's review consists of the results of experts' investigations and case studies opinionated by distinguished experts. The first part of this study discusses in general outlines the anti-corruption strategies employed by selected countries, the possible factors influencing the choice of the strategies undertaken and the effectiveness of the specific measures used in the fight against police corruption. Countries' profiles, including detailed information about anti-corruption strategies applied in 25 countries and information about specific examples of corrupt behaviour by police officers, are presented in the second part of the study. The third part is conceptualised as an expansion of the survey's results. We have asked a distinguished international circle of experts in the field to offer their opinion on the case studies written by a investigative journalist familiar with police corruption. These experts' task was to map out an effective strategy or elements of a strategy that would help to diminish or minimise the occurrence of corrupt behaviour.

Details: Prague: Transparency International, 2001. 105p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2011 at: http://old.transparency.cz/pdf/crossing.pdf

Year: 2001

Country: International

URL: http://old.transparency.cz/pdf/crossing.pdf

Shelf Number: 122355

Keywords:
Blue Wall of Silence
Corruption
Police Corruption
Police Ethics
Police Misconduct

Author: Osterhaus, Anja

Title: Alternative to Silence: Whistleblower Protection in 10 European Countries

Summary: Whistleblowers play a vital role in exposing corruption, fraud and mismanagement and in preventing disasters that arise from negligence or wrongdoing. Prominent whistleblowers revealed the cover-up of SARS and other dangerous diseases that threatened millions of people in China; they disclosed corruption and nepotism in the European Commission and helped to avoid environmental hazards in the US. In most known cases, whistleblowers expose themselves to high personal risks in order to protect the public good. When speaking out against their bosses, colleagues, business partners or clients, they risk their jobs, their income and security. Nevertheless, rather than being heard and praised for their courage, most whistleblowers face indifference or mistrust and their reports are not properly investigated. They often end up in years of legal litigation, fighting for their own rights or for the case they have disclosed to be adequately investigated. The result can be health problems, depression and early retirement. At the same time, the value and importance of whistleblowing in the fight against corruption is increasingly recognised. International conventions commit the signatory countries to implementing appropriate legislation, and an increasing number of governments is willing to put related regulations in place. Ever more companies, public bodies and non-profit organisations put whistleblowing mechanisms in place for effective risk management and to ensure safe and accountable workplaces. Legal frameworks can be essential in supporting this practice, provided they ensure full protection of the whistleblower as well as adequate and independent follow-up to the disclosure. Given that whistleblowers are in most cases insiders who are the first to detect wrongdoing, functioning internal whistleblowing systems are excellent tools for effective risk management in organisations. With the aim of contributing to more effective whistleblowing frameworks and protection mechanisms in the European Union, this report assesses whistleblowing legislation, policies and practice in 10 European countries. In this report, the concept of whistleblowing is defined as ‘the disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action’. The report builds on in-depth research carried out in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. In addition, it takes existing whistleblowing legislation and best practice into account. The report identifies weaknesses, opportunities and entry points to introduce stronger and more effective whistleblowing mechanisms in these countries.

Details: Berlin: Transparency International, 2009. 48p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 12, 2011 at: http://www.transparency.lt/new/images/alternative_to_silence_whistleblower_protection.pdf

Year: 2009

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.transparency.lt/new/images/alternative_to_silence_whistleblower_protection.pdf

Shelf Number: 122378

Keywords:
Corruption
Fraud
Whistleblowing (Europe)
Witness Protection

Author: de Willebois, Emile van der Does

Title: The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It

Summary: Corruption is estimated to be at least a $40 billion dollar a year business. Every day, funds destined for schools, healthcare, and infrastructure in the world’s most fragile economies are siphoned off and stashed away in the world’s financial centers and tax havens. Corruption, like a disease, is eating away at the foundation of people’s faith in government. It undermines the stability and security of nations. So it is a development challenge in more ways than one: it directly affects development assistance, but it also undermines the preconditions for growth and equity. This report, The Puppet Masters, deals with the corporate and financial structures that form the building blocks of hidden money trails. In particular, it focuses on the ease with which corrupt actors hide their interests behind a corporate veil and the difficulties investigators face in trying to lift that veil. It serves as a powerful reminder that recovering the proceeds of corruption is a collective responsibility that involves both the public and private sector. Law enforcement and prosecution cannot go after stolen assets, confiscate and then return them if they are hidden behind the corporate veil. All financial centers and developed countries have committed, through the UN Convention against Corruption and international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards, to improving the transparency of legal entities and other arrangements. This StAR report provides evidence of how far we still have to go to make these commitments a reality. Narrowing the gap between stated commitments and practice on the ground has a direct impact on actual recovery of assets.

Details: Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2011. 284p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Puppet%20Masters%20Report.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Puppet%20Masters%20Report.pdf

Shelf Number: 123150

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Political Corruption
Stolen Assets

Author: Bag, Parimal Kanti

Title: Betting in the Shadow of Match-Fixing

Summary: Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the `lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing. When match-fixing occurs, it often involves bribery of only the strong team. The theoretical analysis is intended to address the problem of growing incidence of betting related corruption in world sports including cricket, horse races, tennis, soccer, basketball, wrestling, snooker, etc.

Details: Norwich, UK: University of East Anglia AEP Discussion Papers in Economics, 2010. 57p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2011 at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/uea/aepppr/2010_11.html

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://ideas.repec.org/p/uea/aepppr/2010_11.html

Shelf Number: 123246

Keywords:
Bookies
Bribery
Corruption
Gambling
Sports Betting

Author: D'Amato, Alessio

Title: Bureaucrats vs the Mafia: Corruption, Extortion and Illegal Waste Disposal

Summary: We develop a simple model where an economic agent chooses the level of legal and illegal disposal. Illegal disposal implies corruption of a bureaucrat in charge of waste management. In the absence of a criminal organization, illegal disposal is performed by the agent, who is subject to enforcement and bribes the bureaucrat. At the opposite, in the presence of a criminal organization, illegal disposal is performed by the mafia, which requires an extortion rate from the agent and bribes the public official; in this latter case no enforcement on the agent is possible. The environmental authority sets the enforcement e¤ort as well as the waste tax rate. In our setting the waste tax rate can be either budget balancing or optimally dened. Results suggest that the presence of the mafia leads to a larger illegal disposal and a larger economic activity. Enforcement is always smaller in the presence of the mafia under the optimal tax rate, while the results are ambiguous under a budget balancing tax rate. Interestingly, the optimal tax rate implies smaller incentives for the criminal organization to enter the market, and welfare might be higher when the mafia is present.

Details: Unpublished paper: 2011. 16p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/EAERE/2011/434/Corruption_Mafia_Waste_EAERE2011.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/EAERE/2011/434/Corruption_Mafia_Waste_EAERE2011.pdf

Shelf Number: 123602

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Extortion
Organized Crime
Waste Management

Author: Horowitz, Carl F.

Title: Union Corruption in America: Still a Growth Industry

Summary: Back in the summer of 1999 the National Institute for Labor Relations Research (NILRR) published a monograph by this author entitled, Union Corruption: Why It Happens, How to Combat It. Drawn primarily from newspapers, magazines and government reports, the study described various patterns of corruption within unions. Replete with juicy anecdotes of embezzlement, extortion, and on due occasion, murder, it concluded with a discussion of the potential ways through which unions could be made to adhere to legal conduct. While unions have made some progress in ridding their ranks of their criminal element, the reality is that their officials, under pressure from the government, have had little choice in such instances but to clean up their operations. This new monograph focuses exclusively on several high-profile cases that have emerged since its predecessor's publication. Yet it retains the 1999 edition's thesis that American trade unionism is shot through with a culture of intimidation. That is, people within unions who steal often show a willingness to threaten and terrorize members who are aware of theft and might come forward to report it. Corruption and criminal violence are to a large extent by-products of our longstanding system of exclusive representation and forced-dues collection by unions. They are further exacerbated by insufficient enforcement of union financial reporting standards. Any long-term strategy to eliminate, or at least radically reduce, union corruption depends heavily on preventing unions from interfering with the rights and wishes of individual workers.

Details: Springfield, VA: National Institute for Labor Relations Research, 2004. 84p.

Source: Internet Resosurce: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://www.nilrr.org/files/Horowitz.pdf

Year: 2004

Country: United States

URL: http://www.nilrr.org/files/Horowitz.pdf

Shelf Number: 123604

Keywords:
Corruption
Labor Unions
Organized Crime

Author: Bricker, Kristin

Title: Military Justice and Impunity in Mexico’s Drug War

Summary: Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s military deployment to combat the country’s war on drugs has been strongly criticized by international human rights groups. During Calderón’s administration, over 47,337 people have been killed and thousands of human rights complaints have been filed against the military. The Inter- American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has issued several binding rulings that obligate Mexico to strip the military of its jurisdiction to investigate and try soldiers accused of violating civilians’ human rights. On July 12, 2011, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled that Congress must reform the Code of Military Justice so that human rights abuse cases always fall under civilian jurisdiction. The Arce Initiative, brought forward by Senator René Arce from Mexico’s opposition party, is the only proposed reform that complies with the IACtHR rulings and international human rights law. The Merida Initiative, a US aid package designed to assist in the fight against the war on drugs, places too much emphasis on the military and law enforcement, and needs to be revised. Civilian rule of law in Mexico can be strengthened by donor governments who are willing to help implement measures to increase transparency, combat corruption and rampant human rights abuses, and ease the transition to an accusatorial oral justice system.

Details: Waterloo, ONT: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2011. 15p.

Source: Internet Resource: SSR Issue Papers: No. 3: Accessed January 19, 2012 at: http://mafiaandco.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/military-justice-and-impunity-in-mexico_s-drug-war.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Mexico

URL: http://mafiaandco.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/military-justice-and-impunity-in-mexico_s-drug-war.pdf

Shelf Number: 123665

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking (Mexico)
Human Rights
War on Drugs

Author: Hechler, Hannes

Title: Can UNCAC address grand corruption? A political economy analysis of the UN Convention against Corruption and its implementation in three countries

Summary: The political economies of many developing countries are characterised by varying degrees of patronage and state capture, a reality that has far-reaching implications for measures addressing corruption. Political strategies in such contexts often include maintaining political and economic power through personalised relations and seeking to influence political decisions for the benefit of an individual or group. Gaining and retaining power within these systems is a resource-intensive process, and corruption is a common way to sustain extensive power networks. This report asks whether this insight has found its way into one of the most important current anticorruption instruments, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Analysis of the Convention itself and implementation efforts in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Kenya suggest that UNCAC is only partly suited to address the political nature of corruption, especially if not complemented by further reform measures.

Details: Norway: U4/CMI Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2011. 86p.

Source: U4 Report: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.u4.no/publications/can-uncac-address-grand-corruption/downloadasset/2222

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/can-uncac-address-grand-corruption/downloadasset/2222

Shelf Number: 123885

Keywords:
Bangladesh
Corruption
Indonesia
Kenya
Legislation
United Nations

Author: DeBacker, Jason

Title: Importing Corruption Culture from Overseas: Evidence from Corporate Tax Evasion in the United States

Summary: This paper studies how cultural norms and enforcement policies influence illicit corporate activities. Using confidential IRS audit data, we show that corporations with owners from countries with higher corruption norms engage in higher amounts of tax evasion in the U.S. This effect is strong for small corporations and decreases as the size of the corporation increases. In the mid-2000s, the United States implemented several enforcement measures which significantly increased tax compliance. However, we find that these enforcement efforts were less effective in reducing tax evasion by corporations whose owners are from countries with higher corruption norms. This suggests that cultural norms can be a challenge to legal enforcement.

Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. 47p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2012 at: http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2011/CCf11/DeBacker_Heim_Tran.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: United States

URL: http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2011/CCf11/DeBacker_Heim_Tran.pdf

Shelf Number: 123920

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Tax Evasion (U.S.)
White Collar Crime

Author: Yikona, Stuart

Title: Ill-gotten Money and the Economy: Experiences from Malawi and Namibia

Summary: Over the last 20 years, the international community has significantly stepped up its efforts to prevent, detect, and deter money flows related to criminal activities and terrorism financing. Since the early 2000s, this drive has extended to developing countries, with most of them introducing anti-money laundering (AML) policies. The primary driver behind this is law enforcement; these policies are aimed at detecting and tracing flows of ill-gotten money, which would enable authorities to fight and prevent crime and recover assets of crime, corruption, and tax evasion. Insufficient attention has been paid to the economic side of ill-gotten money and the efforts to combat such flows, particularly in developing countries. Why is it critical for them, and what is the case for combating the flows of ill-gotten money in countries severely constrained by a lack of resources and limited technical capacity to implement a full AML-framework? Moreover, why are ill-gotten proceeds relevant to the issue of economic development? What is the magnitude of the ill-gotten money flows from activities that generate such flows? Added to this are concerns that anti-money laundering policies may at times actually jeopardize certain development objectives, such as access to finance for poor people. The core objective of this study is to introduce economics into the international debate about anti-money laundering, and to introduce the idea of the usefulness and effectiveness of such policies. We also hope that we might be able to bridge the gap between the law enforcement and economist communities. Indeed, the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) on conflict, security, and development provides us with a critical framework to think through the link between organized crime and development from an economic perspective. The study focuses on two developing countries: Malawi, a low-income country, and Namibia, a middle-income country. The central questions asked are: Why are “proceeds of crime” relevant for economic development? Do “proceeds of crime” and related policy responses help or harm economic development? One critical step in such analysis is to obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of the domestic or cross-border sources of ill-gotten money in a country: how it is recycled through the economy and across its borders or spent and invested. Only then is it possible to discuss the economic effects of the circulation and allocation of ill-gotten money in developing countries and the economic impact of the underlying activities. While not intended to be exhaustive or definitive, this study is meant to contribute to a better understanding and quantification of the issues relevant to the proceeds of crime and economic development. For practical and operational purposes, and to be grounded in country specifics, this study only focuses on Malawi and Namibia. However, it is hoped that the approach developed in this study will be useful to other developing-country governments in identifying the main sources and magnitude of the flows of ill-gotten money, and the main recycling patterns and their effects on the economy. Such a framework will help governments in developing countries to systematically analyze the potential impact of AML and design and prioritize AML policies. The findings presented in this study are based on an extensive literature research; World Bank discussions with numerous public- and private-sector officials and representatives of the Governments of Malawi and Namibia during a Bank mission in November 2010; and workshops conducted in both countries in February 2011 to obtain feedback on the preliminary findings. In conducting this study, the team adopted an interactive approach. This was critical because mobilization of local expertise is essential not only in establishing a complete picture of current and future AML challenges, but also in designing policy considerations that subsequently are widely supported.

Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2012. 114p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2012 at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/10/31/000386194_20111031015900/Rendered/PDF/651760PUB0EPI100money09780821388877.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Africa

URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/10/31/000386194_20111031015900/Rendered/PDF/651760PUB0EPI100money09780821388877.pdf

Shelf Number: 124132

Keywords:
Corruption
Economic Development
Economics and Crime
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering (Malawi, Namibia)
Organized Crime
Proceeds of crime
Tax Evasion

Author: Standing, Andre

Title: Making Transparency Work in Africa's Marine Fisheries

Summary: Global problems facing the marine fisheries sector, including overfishing and the marginalization of the small-scale sector, are leading to increased international awareness of the need to improve transparency in fisheries governance. This Issue paper considers the situation in Africa, where access to information on commercial fisheries and related investments, including foreign aid for fisheries development and marine conservation, are generally lacking. It suggests improving transparency may lead to important gains, such as reducing corruption, improving the effectiveness of aid, and combating illegal fishing. However, the extent to which transparency can make a difference in these areas depends on a number of conditions, including the strength of mediating organisations, the strength of accountability mechanisms, and whether there are robust means to allow for ‘principal-led’ transparency. The paper reflects on the value of establishing a dedicated transparency initiative for marine fisheries inspired by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue 2011:11) 35 p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2012 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/making-transparency-work-in-africa-s-marine-fisheries/

Year: 0

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/making-transparency-work-in-africa-s-marine-fisheries/

Shelf Number: 124320

Keywords:
Corruption
Fisheries
Illegal Fishing
Natural Resources
Wildlife Crime

Author: Reed, Quentin

Title: Squeezing a Balloon? Challenging the Nexus Between Organised Crime and Corruption

Summary: Corruption and organised crime are of great concern to the international community: while the first is regarded as one of the greatest barriers to development, the second is seen as a key threat to international security and stability. In this context, corruption is best understood as the way in which organised crime infiltrates the state. Corruption is one of the primary enabling activities of organised crime, it makes possible and/or facilitate the conduct of this type of criminal activities. This U4 Issue argues that understanding the connections between both phenomena requires a deeper analysis of the relationships between organised criminals and public officials at different levels of the state. First, international standards and conventional wisdom tend to embrace a limited range of the possible policies that may be employed to tackle organised crime and the corruption, and are heavily oriented towards criminal law and enforcement. Second, policies to tackle both problems are usually developed without applying sound principles of policy‑making. The author argues for the development of policies based on proper analysis of the specific context, breaking down the problem into clear components, identifying their causes, and selecting specific and appropriate measures to address each component or causal factor. In particular, the author suggests there is a pressing need to correct the current bias towards criminal law enforcement solutions.

Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue 2009:7) 38 p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2012 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/squeezing-a-balloon-challenging-the-nexus-between-organised-crime-and-corruption-2/

Year: 0

Country: International

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/squeezing-a-balloon-challenging-the-nexus-between-organised-crime-and-corruption-2/

Shelf Number: 124322

Keywords:
Corruption
Organized Crime

Author: Doctors Without Borders - Medecins Sans Frontieres

Title: Syria: Medicine as a Weapon of Persecution

Summary: These 15 testimonies from injured people and doctors from across Syria were collected by Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) staff between January 30 and February 6, 2012. MSF is not authorized to operate inside Syria at present and thus is unable to fully verify the information collected here. However, given the recurring nature, the consistency, and the severity of the acts described in the testimonies, MSF has decided to make them public. For security reasons, names and locations have been withheld. The testimonies reveal the following:  Casualties such as multiple fractures, gunshot wounds, and electric shocks that strongly suggest a concerted program of violence and torture;  The merciless persecution and repression of the injured and their caregivers;  The pursuit of doctors at risk of arrest and torture for treating wounded civilians;  The monitoring of hospitals by security forces, in order to arrest and torture the wounded;  The resulting need for many to seek medical care provided illegally in makeshift facilities, including private homes;  The lack of even basic medical supplies, including drugs, anesthetics, blood bags, and sutures in places where patients do receive care.

Details: New York: Doctors Without Borders (MSF), 2012. 18p.

Source: Press Dossier: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2012 at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2012/In-Syria-Medicine-as-a-Weapon-of-Persecution.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Syria

URL: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2012/In-Syria-Medicine-as-a-Weapon-of-Persecution.pdf

Shelf Number: 124378

Keywords:
Corruption
Medical Care (Syria)
Torture
Victimization

Author: Kenny, Charles

Title: A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption: Bias, Speed Money and "Grand Theft Infrastructure"

Summary: A number of recent survey articles express hope that new data from enterprise surveys would shed new light on corruption complementing the corruption perception index by Transparency International. The paper explores this using the World Bank's Enterprise Survey data globally and not just the data on Eastern Europe and Central Asia that have been used before. The authors find that in general the Enterprise Survey data provide aggregate views on corruption that are similar to the corruption perception index. However, massive differences exist for key countries, such as China and India. This suggests that idiosyncratic, country-specific biases are at work in one or both data sources. The authors use the Enterprise Survey data and relate them to measures of bureaucratic complexity from the World Bank's Doing Business data, finding that more red tape is associated with higher corruption. The data are also consistent with the view that bribe payments reduce the burden of red tape. Finally, the paper looks at corruption in infrastructure. It has been suggested that the natural monopoly characteristics of infrastructure provide the lever to extract bribes. However, based on data on price-cost gaps, the authors find that infrastructure ventures in power and water typically charge prices below cost in developing economies, not anywhere near monopoly prices. Furthermore, the Enterprise Surveys do not suggest that infrastructure-related bribe payments are more significant than those, for example, related to tax payments or various forms of licensing. Existing sources on bribery surrounding specific projects suggest that the value of bribe payments may not be the biggest problem but the choice of uneconomic and inefficient projects. If infrastructure ventures were entirely dependent on revenue from user fees, they could not afford to pursue inefficient projects, thus reducing the cost of corrupt activity to society. Monopoly pricing would be better than the typical current pricing policy.

Details: Washington, DC: Finance, Economics and Urban Development, Sustainable Development Network, The World Bank, 2011. 27p.

Source: Policy Research Working Paper 5889, no. WSP5889: Internet Resource: Accessed March 11, 2012 at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/11/28/000158349_20111128083654/Rendered/PDF/WPS5889.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/11/28/000158349_20111128083654/Rendered/PDF/WPS5889.pdf

Shelf Number: 124466

Keywords:
Corruption

Author: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

Title: Without fear or favour: A review of police relationships

Summary: This year's extensive scrutiny of how the police handled the phone hacking affair has understandably led to concerns about police integrity and corruption. Police checking systems and processes have identified a small number of other high profile cases which include allegations of inappropriate police relationships – some involving senior officers. These cases either have been or are being dealt with properly, but amplify concerns about police corruption and have the potential to undermine public trust in the Service. The subject of police integrity has received wide coverage recently but HMIC did not undertake this review with any preconception of the likely findings. Rather, we have been guided by the evidence available to us and have assessed it carefully before coming to our conclusions and making our recommendations. As part of the review we asked the public about the extent and nature of police integrity and corruption. The majority do not think corruption is common and trust the police to tell the truth. However, about a third of those surveyed think there is some problem with corruption. The public also told us that they associate integrity with being treated fairly; the Service must, therefore, be absolutely transparent not only in being fair but also in being seen to be fair. Concerns that inappropriate police relationships represent endemic failings in police integrity are not borne out by the evidence available to HMIC. However, this review does not give the Police Service a clean bill of health. We found few forces and authorities had these issues on their radar. In addition, understanding of boundaries, checking mechanisms, governance and oversight in police relationships with others (including the media) varies hugely across the Service. Our benchmarking exercise suggests that few organisations have resolved these issues well for the modern world (in terms of managing controls around integrity issues). However, the Police Service needs to do so in order to safeguard their impartiality and, as importantly, the perception of their impartiality. HMIC is concerned that the lack of controls in some areas, which are not always considered by the police as „corruption‟, can allow a slippery slope to develop in relationships which leaves forces and authorities unsighted and vulnerable to significant risk. One such risk area is the potential for misuse of corporate purchasing and credit cards (of which we estimate there are 2,700 in circulation across England and Wales, in addition to the 2,712 owned by the MPS): the public rightly expects the Police Service to make best use of the public money it receives, and to put effective controls in place to ensure that it is spent appropriately and that the maximum value is derived from it (especially in a period of austerity). Other examples of risk areas include the lack of clarity around the acceptance of gifts and hospitality; and around conflicts of interest, tax and other legal implications of police officers and staff having second jobs or other business interests. A key factor in meeting the challenges to police integrity lies in the quality of the leaders of the Service: not only in ensuring that systems and processes are in HMIC (2011) Without fear or favour: A review of police relationships 6 place and work effectively to provide appropriate checks and balances, but importantly in the example they set through their own behaviours in reinforcing high standards of conduct, thus promoting integrity. The Service cannot afford to be complacent and we look to senior leaders in the Service to show that they understand the importance of acting quickly and effectively to further strengthen integrity and to give the public cause to have high levels of confidence that the police will act without fear or favour in delivering a responsive and accountable service. Governance matters enormously in reinforcing these issues. We intend to revisit the matters highlighted in this report by October 2012. Police authorities have a role in ensuring that the work to address the issues raised in the report is expedited as a matter of urgency. Incoming Police and Crime Commissioners, as a key part of their role, will need to assure themselves that forces have embedded integrity considerations in all that they do, supported by effective checks and balances. They would be assisted in this if these checks and balances were consistent throughout England and Wales.

Details: London: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), 2011. 71p

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 11, 2012 at http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/a-review-of-police-relationships-20111213.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/a-review-of-police-relationships-20111213.pdf

Shelf Number: 124467

Keywords:
Corruption
Police Administration
Police Behavior
Police-Community Relations
Public Opinion

Author: Goncalves, Marilyne Pereira

Title: Justice for Forests: Improving Criminal Justice Efforts to Combat Illegal Logging

Summary: Every two seconds, across the world, an area of forest the size of a football field is clear-cut by illegal loggers. In some countries, up to 90 percent of all the logging taking place is illegal. Estimates suggest that this criminal activity generates approximately US$10–15 billion annually worldwide—funds that are unregulated, untaxed, and often remain in the hands of organized criminal gangs. Thus far, domestic and international efforts to curb forest crimes have focused on preventative actions, but they have had little or no significant impact. While prevention is an essential part of enforcement efforts to tackle illegal logging, it has not halted the rapid disappearance of the world’s old-growth trees. New ideas and strategies are needed to preserve what is left of forests. This paper suggests that current practice be combined with a more targeted, punitive approach, through more effective use of the criminal justice system. It argues that the criminal justice system should form an integral part of any balanced and organized strategy for fighting forest crime. This strategy should include initiatives to enhance the efficiency of criminal justice in combating illegal logging—that is, the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of cases, as well as the confiscation of the proceeds of criminal activity. These initiatives should be deployed in parallel with preventive programs, and the two approaches should complement and reinforce each other. The criminal justice system has been used in the fight against illegal logging, but only in very sporadic instances and in limited and ineffective ways. Moreover, in those few cases, it has tended to target low-level criminals whose involvement in illegal logging is due to poverty. As such, it has created no real deterrent and has encouraged skeptics to further discount the relevance of criminal justice methods. Large-scale illegal operations are carried out by sophisticated criminal networks, and law enforcement actions need to be focused on the “masterminds” behind these networks—and the highlevel corrupt officials who enable and protect them. Pursuing these important targets through the criminal justice system will require creativity and a clear focus on those criminal justice rules and procedures that prove most effective. The objective of this paper is to inform policy makers and forestry and law enforcement actors how they can use the criminal justice system in fighting illegal logging. It seeks to mobilize them to take action and address the various criminal acts involved in illegal logging operations. The paper puts forward practical suggestions that can be implemented to achieve a tangible improvement in this fight. Rather than focusing on a single element of the criminal justice system, it provides a broad overview of the topic. Future papers may provide an opportunity to flesh out further detail. Because the role of the criminal system in fighting illegal logging has thus far been minimal, there are few documented successes, and little data to explain why the criminal justice system has not been more widely used in this context. To find new ideas as to how the criminal justice system can be used against illegal loggers, this paper therefore draws on experience gained from dealing with other types of crime (money laundering, corruption, and so forth). The policy and operational recommendations made in this paper are based on legal and operational frameworks that are already in place in almost every country in the world. By making good use of these existing frameworks, we can take an important step towards ensuring the preservation and the sustainable management of the world’s forests. Policy recommendations include: Develop an integrated criminal justice strategy for illegal logging that adopts and implements clear and comprehensive policies; Improve domestic cooperation; Enlist the private sector; Engage civil society actors; and Include criminal justice as part of development assistance programs to combat illegal logging. Operational recommendations include: Work together; Attack corruption; Proactively target vulnerabilities and significant offenders; Consider all applicable offenses—not just regulatory environmental offenses; Follow the money; Employ all available criminal tools to address these complex crimes; and Improve international cooperation.

Details: Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2012. 56p.

Source: World Bank Study R67: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2012 at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Illegal_Logging.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Illegal_Logging.pdf

Shelf Number: 124631

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Justice Policy
Environmental Crime
Illegal Logging
Offences Against the Environment

Author: Bauhr, Monika

Title: Why Pay Bribes? Collective Action and Anticorruption Efforts

Summary: This paper suggests that the effectiveness of current anticorruption policy suffers from a focus on the scale of the corruption problem instead of type of corruption that is to be fought. I make a distinction between need and greed corruption. Contrary to the most commonly used distinctions this distinction focuses on the basic motivation for paying a bribe, and whether the bribe is used to gain services that citizens are legally entitled to or not. Greed corruption is used to gain advantages that citizens are not legally entitled to, build on collusion rather than extortion and can thereby remain invisible and unobtrusive. In greed corruption societies the costs of corruption are divided between a large number of actors and the negative effects of corruption on economic and democratic performance are delayed and diffuse. I subsequently use this distinction to develop three propositions about the relationship between corruption and institutional trust, and the effects of anticorruption policy. Using both cross country data and a case study of a low corruption context, I suggests a) That greed corruption can coexist with high institutional trust, and that it thereby may not follow the expected, and often confirmed, negative relationship between corruption and institutional trust b) That greed corruption may not produce civic engagement against corruption and c) That increased transparency may not produce the expected benefits in low need corruption contexts, since it can disproportionally alter expectations about the entrenchment of corruption in a society. In other words, the paper suggest that the balance between need and greed corruption in a society determines the effectiveness of traditional policy measures derived from the logic of principal agent theory, such as societal accountability and transparency, and that the relevance of collective action theory to understand the effects of anticorruption efforts can be extended to contexts where the overall level of corruption is low.

Details: Gothenburg, Sweden: QOG - The Quality of Government Institute, Univerity of Gothenburg, 2011. 23p.

Source: Internet Resource: QoG Working Paper Series 2011:18: Accessed April 6, 2012 at: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1357/1357856_2011_18_bauhr_nasiritousi.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1357/1357856_2011_18_bauhr_nasiritousi.pdf

Shelf Number: 124855

Keywords:
Bribes
Corruption

Author: Hervieu, Benoit

Title: Organized Crime Muscling in on the Media

Summary: A total of 141 journalists and media workers were killed during the decade of the 2000s in attacks and reprisals blamed on criminal groups. Mafias and cartels today pose the biggest threat to media freedom worldwide. A transnational phenomenon, organized crime is more than the occasional bloody shoot-out or colourful crime story in the local paper. It is a powerful parallel economy with enormous influence over the legal economy, one the media have a great deal of difficulty in covering. Its elusiveness and inaccessibility to the media make it an even greater threat, both to the safety of journalists and to the fourth estate’s investigative ability. "Organized crime” is the generic label that the post-Cold War world has given to these new predators of journalism. Mafias, cartels, warlords recycled as traffickers, paramilitaries running rackets, separatist groups that traffic and extort to fund themselves – they have replaced the world’s remaining dictatorial regimes as the biggest source of physical danger to journalists. From newspapers to TV news, from crime reports to yellow press, the media seem to be reduced to counting the number of dead, including the dead within their own ranks. While organized crime often overlaps with a violent criminality consisting of rackets, kidnapping and murder, it is the expression of an economic and geopolitical reality that the media usually do not reflect, a reality that does not admit analysis of the types of criminal organizations involved, the way they operate and their ramifications. This dimension of organized crime, which is completely beyond the scope of the 24-hour news cycle, also includes its impact on the “legal world” and its various components, including the media. Far from wanting to overthrow the political, economic and media bases of societies, organized crime has every interest in participating in them and using them. This fundamental fact suggests that the media are vulnerable not just as victims but also as actors or cogs of a parallel system for which they can serve as information and public relations outlets.

Details: Paris: Reporters Without Borders, Undated. 10p.

Source: Inquiry Report: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/organized_crime.pdf

Year: 0

Country: International

URL: http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/organized_crime.pdf

Shelf Number: 125209

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Violence
Journalists
Organized Crime
Victims of Violence

Author: Newell, Josh

Title: Plundering Russia's Far Eastern Taiga: Illegal Logging, Corruption and Trade

Summary: In the past year, Russia has come under increased scrutiny for widespread corruption within its government and private sector. Capital flight, spotlighted by the 1999 scandal at the Bank of New York, has crippled Russia’s economic development. At the same time, Russia’s economic welfare – especially in the vast regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East – has been based on its exploitation of natural resources. Timber, fish, oil, and gold have been the backbone of Russia’s industrial development during the twentieth century. In the last decade, as Russia has struggled through economic reforms, “mafias” that control these resources in Siberia and the Russian Far East gained power and wealth, while Russia’s industrial sectors stagnated. Responding to a deepening economic crisis and the rules of the international market economy, regional governments across Siberia and the Russian Far East have facilitated large-scale extraction and export of natural resources in order to generate short-term, hard currency revenues. Private companies – both Russian and foreign – have moved quickly to obtain concessions of timber, minerals, and oil and gas at bargain prices. And the Russian President’s shocking decision (in May, 2000) to dissolve the Committee on Ecology and the Federal Forest Service, transfering their functions to the Ministry of Natural Resources, was the latest alarming demonstration of efforts by the industrial lobby to remove the last obstacles to uncontrolled, predatory exploitation of Russia’s forest resources. The Siberian taiga includes many of the world’s last forest frontiers – large, intact forest and wildland ecosystems that are under threat of exploitation. Representing more than half of the world’s coniferous forests, the Siberian taiga is vitally important for several reasons. Levels of biological diversity within the taiga are globally significant, and taiga forests store huge amounts of carbon which would otherwise exacerbate current levels of global warming. Despite growing interest worldwide in the conservation of Siberian and Russian Far Eastern forests, illegal logging and trade practices have also continued to increase. Responding to concerns about growing corruption in Russia and its relation to the exploitation of natural resources, the Vladivostok-based Bureau for Public Regional Campaigning, Tokyo-based Friends of the Earth – Japan, and California-based Pacific Environment undertook an investigation to show the extent of illegal logging and trade in the region. In the last stage, Greenpeace Russia took an active role in the work and provided substantial support to the authors and a significant amount of fresh information. This report provides the results of the investigation, along with specific recommendations for correcting those practices.

Details: Vladivostok, Russia: Bureau for Regional Oriental Campaigns, Oakland, CA: Friends of the Earth–Japan, Tokyo, Japan and Pacific Environment & Resources Center,, 2000.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2012 at: http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/plundering.pdf

Year: 2000

Country: Russia

URL: http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/plundering.pdf

Shelf Number: 125305

Keywords:
Corruption
Illegal Logging (Russia)
Offenses Against the Environment

Author: Global Witness

Title: Forest Carbon, Cash & Crime: The Risk of Criminal Engagement in REDD+

Summary: Corruption in the forest sector has until now been overwhelmingly linked to logging, both illegal and legal, which in many countries has led to significant depletion of valuable tropical forests. But today incentive mechanisms such as REDD+, intended to compensate governments, communities or other groups in developing countries for reducing forest loss, are beginning to change the face of corruption in the sector. While corruption and illegality in logging continue to be a significant international problem, the potential for future REDD+ earnings is bringing about new corrupt practices, starting with cases of land grabs. REDD+ is also likely to lead to new forms of corruption not previously seen in the forest sector, such as questionable carbon accounting and manipulation of forest carbon measurements. The recognition of ‘carbon’ as a commodity to be measured and paid for creates a number of new opportunities for corrupt activities, since forest “carbon” is an intangible asset that is difficult to measure and relies on complex calculations that can be manipulated. Alongside the familiar risks of criminal activity encountered with such large financial flows – for example fraud, bribery and tax evasion – REDD+ poses some specific risks. These include increased illegal logging, linked to law enforcement capacities being stretched by the need to police additional forest protection efforts, illegal land grabbing, the theft and misappropriation of REDD+ funds, the manipulation of carbon measurements to exaggerate results and increase payments, and poor regulation of carbon markets. With the right national and international frameworks, plus sufficient funding, REDD+ is an unprecedented opportunity to address climate change, as well as protect natural forest ecosystems and biodiversity and deliver development benefits, especially for forest communities. Governance is key to the effective implementation and delivery of the intended outcomes of REDD+ - from international to grass roots level. A well-designed governance system is also needed to address the substantial risks of corruption and criminal involvement that are posed by REDD+. Significant sums of money are involved: the REDD+ mechanism is expected to require an estimated US$17- 33 billion every year, equivalent to up to a quarter of OECD aid flows in 2010,1 much of which will be pumped into forest-rich developing countries.2 Some of this money is already being paid out for preparation and pilot activities. For the most part, however, these forest-rich countries suffer from weak regulation and governance. More than 80% of countries currently receiving REDD+ funds fall into the bottom half of countries assessed for Control of Corruption by the World Bank. Past attempts to tackle forest loss in these countries have mostly failed, undermined by policy failures, perverse incentives and corruption. Given the large sums of money involved, there is also a substantial risk that criminal elements, including state actors, will undermine REDD+ and prevent it from achieving its overall objectives. So far there is also a serious funding gap. Only US$5 billion has been pledged by rich countries3 and it is unclear where the rest will come from. Welldesigned national REDD+ programmes with proper safeguards and measures to minimise corruption risks will encourage better REDD+ projects and instil confidence in those who provide funding that REDD+ is worth investing in. To address these risks, this paper calls for clear and effective safeguards to ensure transparent financial flows, improvements to governance throughout national REDD+ processes, and for donors to provide financial and technical support to recipient countries to improve governance as preparation for REDD+. Similarly, donors should consider other ways that existing aid programmes can be used to ensure appropriate REDD+ implementation. Immediate and sustained investment in building governance capacity will help ensure that REDD+ funds, once flowing, have a much better chance of reaching where they are needed and achieving genuine results for the climate. Further, law enforcement agencies, both national and international, should be encouraged to contribute their expertise to

Details: Holborn, UK: Global Witness, 2001. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2012 at: http://www.salvaleforeste.it/en/reports/file/806.html?start=600

Year: 2001

Country: International

URL: http://www.salvaleforeste.it/en/reports/file/806.html?start=600

Shelf Number: 125313

Keywords:
Corruption
Forest Management
Illegal Logging
Offenses Against the Environment

Author: FERN

Title: Exporting Destruction: Export Credits, Illegal Logging and Deforestation

Summary: Exporting Destruction is the conclusion of research that included fieldwork in China, desk studies, and a new financial review, all commissioned to shine a light on the role that export credit agencies (ECAs) play in financing global deforestation. Through detailed case studies and historical research, FERN has been able to produce a set of policy recommendations that would, if implemented effectively, bring export credits in line with other publicly-funded institutions and reduce their potential for negative social and environmental impacts. The paper suggests that while the primary, if not sole, remit of ECAs is to promote their country’s domestic industries in competitive and risky environments, particularly in poor emerging markets, the huge amounts of money involved mean that they also have an important effect on policies and actions in the countries in which they support projects. To put their size in context, ECAs underwrite around US$100 billion annually in medium and long-term credits and guarantees, compared with, for example, multilateral development banks, which have a combined total of US$60 billion in loans per year. ECA involvement in activities that have fuelled unsustainable, and often illegal, deforestation in a number of countries has been documented since the mid 1990s. Evidence in this paper, gathered from community groups around the world, suggests that a number continue to be centrally involved in the sector. Their significance is primarily the result of their 'door opening' public finance status, as well as their focus on countries that are a high-risk for commercial operators, usually those which also lack the institutional governance to regulate their industries effectively. Direct ECA support for logging or timber trading is minimal because they are not particularly capital-intensive sectors, but significant support from ECAs has been instrumental in aiding the infrastructure and pulp and paper sectors for the last fifteen years, particularly for controversial expansion projects in Indonesia. FERN’s report shows that this support was, and continues to be, ‘blind’, not taking environmental or social issues into account or investigating whether operators’ prospectus documents were based on realistic assessments of the nature or ownership of the forest resource. This lack of ‘ground-truth’ in assessing projects is shown to be one of the core problems of ECAs. Although taxpayers fund them, their remit is often limited to economic considerations, and they are not currently subject to the binding environmental, social, human rights or transparency standards by which other public sector agencies are governed. The case studies clearly show that this has led to increased illegal logging, corruption and the opening of previously isolated forests. Indeed, experience highlighted in the studies suggest that no ECAs have the relevant procedures in place to identify and address the flawed operating and expansion model that much of the pulp and paper sector has followed. What’s more, by aiming for very low-transaction costs, most ECAs have little internal capacity for assessing the environmental or social impacts of the operations the help to finance. This report calls on Governments to urgently address the negative impact that ECA-supported operators have internationally, particularly in sensitive sectors such as forestry, and to develop safeguards that would ensure that the operations of export credit agencies do not serve to undermine international commitments to sustainable development and good governance in some of the poorest countries in the world. Such policies should draw on those already in place in most multilateral banks and some of the largest commercial ones, and be resourced and monitored to an extent which ensures diligent implementation. More specific details on what these policies should look like in the forest sector and how ECAs could be brought into line with two decades of their national governments commitments to tackle illegal logging and unsustainable deforestation can be found in Chapter 7.

Details: Moreton in Marsh, UK: FERN, 2008. 41p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2012 at: http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/FERNexportingdestruction.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: International

URL: http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/FERNexportingdestruction.pdf

Shelf Number: 125314

Keywords:
Corruption
Forest Management
Illegal Logging
Offenses Against the Environment

Author: Gibbons, Cara

Title: Corruption, Impunity, Silence: The WAR on Mexico’s Journalists

Summary: Sixty-six Mexican journalists have been killed since 20001, at least 34 since President Calderón launched a “war on drugs” after taking office at the end of 2006. During that time, the government’s highly militarized campaigns, particularly in the northern border states, have created staggering levels of violence and an atmosphere in which working journalists face constant threats and vicious, often lethal, attacks. Few of these crimes are investigated properly, much less prosecuted, despite successive administrations’ promises to end the country’s shameful record of impunity. Instead, the government has beguiled international observers and its own citizens with meretricious reforms that do little to halt a grave and worsening human rights crisis. In these extraordinary circumstances, Mexico’s journalists have also contended with laws that limit freedom of expression and muzzle their attempts to expose corruption at both local and state levels. Consequently, accurate reporting on the drug war has become all but impossible. Yet, faced with this crisis, the Mexican government has dithered over reforms that could protect reporters, while prosecuting citizen journalists who run afoul of the country’s labyrinthine communications legislation. This report examines why Mexico has failed to confront the sources of its internal corruption. It also looks at the state’s failure to defend Mexico’s journalists from the extreme violence they face at the hands of drug trafficking organizations and corrupt state agents who carry out the most brazen assaults on free and open communication with almost complete impunity. It finds that Mexico is breaching its binding international human rights obligations, including the right to life and the right to freedom of expression.

Details: Toronto: PEN Canada; Toronto: International Himan Rights Program, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 2011. 54p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2012 at: http://www.utorontoihrp.com/index.php/resources/working-group-reports/cat_view/10-working-group-and-clinic-reports/28-corruption-impunity-silence-the-war-on-mexicos-journalists

Year: 2011

Country: Mexico

URL: http://www.utorontoihrp.com/index.php/resources/working-group-reports/cat_view/10-working-group-and-clinic-reports/28-corruption-impunity-silence-the-war-on-mexicos-journalists

Shelf Number: 125341

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Violence
Homicides
Human Rights
Journalists (Mexico)
Media

Author: Briscoe, Ivan

Title: Crime and error: why we urgently need a new approach to illicit trafficking in fragile states

Summary: Transnational organized crime has boomed in some of the poorest and most fragile countries in the world, prompting the international community into renewed efforts to devise a response. So far, however, the results have not been impressive. Murder rates remain stubbornly high along the cocaine highways of Central America, West African crime expands unabated, and in Central Asia, the trade route for heroin from Afghanistan remains under the control of armed groups and opaque political interests. This brief seeks to explain the fundamental errors and misconceptions which ensure that the fight against global crime, while scoring ever more arrests and interdictions, has failed to make headway against trafficking through fragile states. Although progress has been made in understanding how security and justice systems work, Western donors still need to confront the endemic weaknesses of institution-building, the extraordinary allure of the global criminal economy, and the ways that politicians and business systematically collude with traffickers. The brief concludes by listing a series of new policy areas that could underpin a new approach. Above all, these emphasize reducing the receptivity of fragile states to criminal enterprise, staunching violence, and ensuring the gradual build-up of trust, probity and clean business.

Details: The Hague, The Netherlands: The Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2012. 6p.

Source: CRU Policy Brief #23: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2012 at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CRU_CrimeandError.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CRU_CrimeandError.pdf

Shelf Number: 125329

Keywords:
Corruption
Organized Crime
Trafficking
Transnational Crime
Violence

Author: Hartl, Jennifer Ann

Title: Human Trafficking in the Russian Federation: An Examination of the Anti-Trafficking Efforts of the Federal Government, Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Organization for Migration

Summary: The buying and selling of human beings for the purpose of exploiting their labor seems, to most people, a distant and archaic practice that disappeared in the mid–19th century. The trans-Atlantic slave trade and the infamous Middle Passage are phenomena studied in history courses, as though they were secured firmly in the past. To be sure, the ‘peculiar institution’ of the legal trade in human beings did end during the 19th century; the legal ownership of slaves in the United States ended when the Emancipation Proclamation was issued in 1863. Yet, the illegal trade in humans has continued and, today, illegal modern slavery exists on every continent in the world. It is sustained by global traffic of men, women, and children, which is financed and operated by international organized crime networks in some cases and unscrupulous individuals – including friends and family members of the enslaved – in others. The trafficking of human beings for the exploitation of their labor in the Russian Federation is the focus this paper. Specifically, this paper examines human trafficking operations in Russia and the efforts of the Russian government, non-governmental organizations, and the International Organization for Migration to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers, and provide assistance to survivors of trafficking. To put this into context, I first discuss the problem of human trafficking on a global scale, particularly focusing on the nature of human trafficking as a global issue as well explaining the differences between human trafficking and human smuggling. I then consider the root causes of human trafficking including both push and pull factors which sustain the business of trafficking in persons. I acknowledge the problem of conducting data and research on human trafficking, particularly methodological challenges, and the need for better data on human trafficking. My in-depth study of human trafficking in the Russian Federation includes discussions of the main forms of trafficking, health issues related to human trafficking, trafficking and the shadow economy, and the relationships between trafficking, corruption, and organized crime. I evaluate the anti-trafficking efforts in Russia by the Federal Government, non-governmental organizations, and the International Organization for Migration. Following and evaluation of anti-trafficking efforts in Russia, I will discuss recommendations for future anti-trafficking policy.

Details: Iowa City: University of Iowa, 2010. 71p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 26, 2012 at: http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1867&context=etd

Year: 2010

Country: Russia

URL: http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1867&context=etd

Shelf Number: 125407

Keywords:
Corruption
Forced Labor
Human Trafficking (Russian Federation)
Organized Crime
Sexual Exploitation

Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation

Title: Fighting Terror Through Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism

Summary: East Africa and the Horn face a number of transnational security threats, including terrorism, transnational crime, and piracy. In recent years, particularly following the July 2010 attacks in Kampala, al-Shabaab has been increasingly viewed as a threat not only to Somalia, but to the greater subregion. Tourism has declined and shipping costs have risen due to the threat of piracy from Somalia. Lawless pockets where government reach is weak, together with rampant corruption, have turned the region into a major transit point for black market financial flows and various forms of illicit trafficking. Terrorism and transnational crime increasingly threaten security in the subregion of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Because of their transnational nature, no individual IGAD member state will single-handedly be able to deal effectively with these threats. As the IGAD Security Strategy adopted in December 2010 makes clear, effective cooperation will be crucial to winning the struggle against terrorism and to ensuring that other forms of transnational crime do not similarly jeopardize the IGAD subregion’s growth, prosperity, and stability.

Details: New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2012. 76p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2012 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/TaskForce_Report_May2012.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/TaskForce_Report_May2012.pdf

Shelf Number: 125426

Keywords:
Corruption
Piracy
Terrorism
Trafficking
Transnational Crime

Author: Delacote, Philippe

Title: Systemic Corruption, Scale Effects and Forest Harvesting

Summary: This paper explores the influence of scale effects and corruption on forest harvesting. Policy-maker and bureaucratic corruption are considered sequentially. Overall, the corrupt policy maker chooses a less stringent forest policy. Moreover, this permissive forest policy partly enhances bureaucratic corruption. This paper therefore partially supports the idea of systemic corruption. Finally, it appears that a larger number of lobbying firms tends to increase this effect.

Details: Nancy, France: INRA, 2008. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2012 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016780

Year: 2008

Country: International

URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016780

Shelf Number: 126020

Keywords:
Corruption
Forest Management

Author: Findley, Michael

Title: Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers' and Terrorist Financiers' Access to Shell Companies

Summary: For criminals moving large sums of dirty money internationally, there is no better device than an untraceable shell company. This paper reports the results of an experiment soliciting offers for these prohibited anonymous shell corporations. Our research team impersonated a variety of low- and high-risk customers, including would-be money launderers, corrupt officials, and terrorist financiers when requesting the anonymous companies. Evidence is drawn from more than 7,400 email solicitations to more than 3,700 Corporate Service Providers that make and sell shell companies in 182 countries. The experiment allows us to test whether international rules are actually effective when they mandate that those selling shell companies must collect identity documents from their customers. Shell companies that cannot be traced back to their real owners are one of the most common means for laundering money, giving and receiving bribes, busting sanctions, evading taxes, and financing terrorism. The results provide the most complete and robust test of the effectiveness of international rules banning untraceable, anonymous shell companies. Furthermore, because the exercise took the form of a randomized experiment, it also provides unique insight into what causes those who sell shell companies to either comply with or violate international rules requiring them to collect identity documents from customers. Just as the random assignment to control (placebo) and treatment groups in drug trials isolates the effect of a new drug, so too the random assignment of low-risk “placebo” emails and different high-risk “treatment” emails isolated the effects of different kinds of risk on the likelihood of (a) being offered a shell company, and (b) being required to provide proof of identity. Key findings include:1 1. Overall, international rules that those forming shell companies must collect proof of customers’ identity are ineffective. Nearly half (48 percent) of all replies received did not ask for proper identification, and 22 percent did not ask for any identity documents at all to form a shell company. 5. Informing providers of the rules they should be following made them no more likely to do so, even when penalties for non-compliance were mentioned. In contrast, when customers offered to pay providers a premium to flout international rules, the rate of demand for certified identity documentation fell precipitously compared to the placebo.

Details: Nathan, Qld: Griffith University, 2012. 29p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2012 at: http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/454625/Global-Shell-Games_CGPPcover_Jersey.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/454625/Global-Shell-Games_CGPPcover_Jersey.pdf

Shelf Number: 126495

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Organized Crime
Terrorist Financing

Author: Shimabukuro, Jon O.

Title: Whistleblower Protections Under Federal Law: An Overview

Summary: Legal protections for employees who report illegal misconduct by their employers have increased dramatically since the late 1970s when such protections were first adopted for federal employees in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Since that time, with the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Congress has expanded such protections for federal employees. Congress has also established whistleblower protections for individuals in certain private-sector employment through the adoption of whistleblower provisions in at least 18 federal statutes. Among these statutes is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). In general, claims for relief under the 18 federal statutes follow a similar pattern. Complaints are typically filed with the Secretary of Labor, and an investigation is conducted. Following the investigation, an order is issued by the Secretary, and a party aggrieved by the order is generally permitted to appeal the Secretary’s order to a federal court. However, because 18 different statutes are involved in prescribing whistleblower protections, some notable differences exist. For example, under the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1987, individuals employed by defense contractors who engage in whistleblowing activities file complaints with the Inspector General rather than the Secretary of Labor. Under some of the statutes, including the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, the Secretary’s preliminary order will become a final order if no objections are filed within a prescribed time period. This report provides an overview of key aspects of the 18 selected federal statutes applicable to individuals in certain private-sector industries. It focuses on the protections provided to employees who believe they have been subject to retaliation, rather than on how or where alleged misconduct should be disclosed. In addition, the report also includes an overview of the Whistleblower Protection Act. While state law may also provide whistleblower protections for employees, this report focuses only on the aforementioned federal statutory provisions.

Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 25p.

Source: Internet Resource: R42727: Accessed October 1, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42727.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: United States

URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42727.pdf

Shelf Number: 126532

Keywords:
Corruption
Fraud
Whistleblowing (U.S.)
Witness Protection

Author: Lonsdale, Mark V.

Title: Criminal Activity in an Insurgent Environment and Counterinsurgency

Summary: This paper looks at the criminal component of insurgency in Afghanistan and the inseparable influences of history, geography, culture, governance, and security. It also addresses the closely related issues of the on-going insurgency, terrorism, corruption, and deficiencies in government and military counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Beginning as a focused study of criminal activity in an insurgent environment, this paper grew to include a broader discussion of modern insurgency, terrorism, Islamic militancy, and traditionalist resistance, and how these have been perpetuated by ill-conceived and poorly executed counterinsurgency policies and practices. The reemergence, growth, and continued activity of these various militant groups also had to be viewed in context with the lack of security in Afghanistan, weak governance, slow progress in political, judicial and social reforms, and the often counterproductive effects of U.S. and NATO military operations. Glaring deficiencies in these processes, compounded by an ad hoc approach to counterinsurgency and half-hearted efforts by some donor nations, have fueled the insurgency while facilitating widespread corruption and criminal activity. With the above in mind, this paper addresses a number of questions: 1. What is the current criminal environment in Afghanistan and how have criminal networks and insurgents benefited from the instability? 2. Are the Taliban the only active insurgents or does the insurgency involve traditionalists, nationalists, and malcontents? 3. Is there a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign and has it been successful to date? 4. Why are conventional military forces unsuited to counterinsurgency? 5. Why are the U.S. efforts handicapped by an institutionalized conventional big-war mindset and a resistance to change? 6. Why are the token ISAF forces from several NATO troop-donors largely ineffective? 7. How is the counterinsurgency campaign hindered by a shortage of competent Foreign Service officers and civil-political advisors? 8. Why does the Coalition continue to tolerate rampant corruption and incompetence in the Afghan government and ministries? 9. Are narcotics funding the insurgency and why are the U.S. counter-narcotics policies unacceptable to their NATO allies? 10. How do the Afghans view the U.S. and Coalition forces, the Karzai government, local officials, and the national police? 11. What is the way forward for Afghanistan? 12. With all that we have learned from recent history, how should the counterinsurgency campaign be prosecuted in Afghanistan? Counterinsurgency requires patience, determination, innovation, an acceptance of risk, coupled to a long-term commitment, supported by adequate funding, the appropriate resources, and an unconventional mindset. Unfortunately, while built and trained for full-spectrum attrition and maneuver warfare, conventional brigade combat teams (BCT) are not structured, manned, or equipped for unconventional COIN operations. Nor can they effectively identify, target, and attack criminal-insurgent enterprises. The non-kinetic components of the COIN effort are further hindered by timid civilian administrations, as seen with several NATO contributors and the State Department’s lack of commitment, resources, and competent Foreign Service officers. This paper takes the reader through the full range of criminal and insurgent activities occurring on the ground in Afghanistan; points out deficiencies in current governance, security and military operations; and then offers suggestions on how to better prepare military units, national security forces, and civilian authorities for counterinsurgency and security sector reform.

Details: Paris: Department de Recherche sur les Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines Universite Pantheon-Assas, Paris II, 2008. 184p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 15, 2012 at: http://www.drmcc.org/IMG/pdf/COIN_MCC_Lonsdale_18_AUG_2008-2.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: Afghanistan

URL: http://www.drmcc.org/IMG/pdf/COIN_MCC_Lonsdale_18_AUG_2008-2.pdf

Shelf Number: 126729

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Violence (Afghanistan)
Insurgency
Military Groups
Terrorism

Author: Ayling, Julie

Title: What Sustains Wildlife Crime? Rhino Horn Trading and the Resilience of Criminal Networks

Summary: The problem of illegal trading in wildlife is a long-standing one. Humans have always regarded other sentient and non-sentient species as resources and tradeable commodities, frequently resulting in negative effects for biodiversity. However, the illegal trade in wildlife is increasingly meeting with resistance from states and the international community in the form of law enforcement and regulatory initiatives. So why does it persist? What makes the criminal networks involved in it resilient? In this paper I consider the networks involved in the illegal trade in rhinoceros horn that is currently posing an existential threat to most rhino species. The paper considers possible sources of these networks' resilience, both internal and external, and the implications for how the trade could be tackled.

Details: Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 2012. 22P.

Source: Transnational Environmental Crime Project, Working Paper 2/2012: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2012 at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152776

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152776

Shelf Number: 126857

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Illegal Trade
Ivory
Organized Crime
Rhinos
Transnational Crime
Wildlife Crime
Wildlife Trade

Author: Sekgwama, Jackson John

Title: Recommendations for Making Anti-Poaching Programs more Effective in the Southern African Region Through the Analysis of Key Variables Impacting upon the Poaching of Elephants in Botswana

Summary: The escalation of poaching in Botswana forced the leadership to deploy its military in addressing this problem. The use of the military in the fight of poaching experienced multiple challenges both at operational and tactical level. The military was deployed in this campaign as a quasi-political decision, thought to be a quick remedy to the poaching dilemma in Botswana. The quasi-political aspect has omitted creation of a national strategy that could comprehensively address the poaching dillema in Botswana and the southern African region, especially that most of the poachers originated from outside the country. Although on one hand it could be argued that the BDF is positively addressing the poaching problem, on the other, it could also be argued that the lack of a clear policy on anti-poaching has hampered the mission. The inefficiency of these campaigns is demonstrated by continued poaching activities in Botswana. This experience has resulted in the realization that Botswana needs to rethink and redefine its national strategy on anti-poaching in order to increase the effectiveness of the intervention means and ways. The national instruments of power need to be comprehensively integrated, synchronized, and harmonized with a view to provide unity of effort in the operational environment to achieve the end state. Once developed, Botswana then needs to work with its neighbors (Zambia and Zimbabwe) in order to ensure that its strategy is effective.

Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012. 108p.

Source: Internet Resource: Master's Essay: Accessed November 27, 2012 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562969

Year: 2012

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562969

Shelf Number: 127011

Keywords:
Animal Poaching (Botswana, Africa)
Corruption
Elephants
Socio-Economic Conditions
Wildlife Crime

Author: Center for the Study of Democracy

Title: Reinstating the Duty-Free Trade at Bulgarian Land Borders: Potential Setback in the Fight Against Organized Crime and Corruption

Summary: Since the early 1990s the duty-free shops along Bulgaria’s land-border crossings were used as a channel for illegal import of excise goods (cigarettes, alcohol and petrol). With the increase of excise and VAT taxes in the second-half of the 1990s, the risk of alcohol and cigarettes smuggling increased rapidly. The duty-free shops gradually evolved into one of the main channels for the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, and fuel. At that period, duty free operators existed without a legal regulation but only with a licensing permit from the Minister of Finance. The smuggling was tacitly tolerated from the highest political level.

Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2012. 4p.

Source: CSD Policy Brief No. 32: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2012 at http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=20861

Year: 2012

Country: Bulgaria

URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=20861

Shelf Number: 127105

Keywords:
Border Control
Border Security
Corruption
Organized Crime
Smuggling

Author: Alemika, E.O

Title: Criminal Victimization, Safety and Policing in Nigeria

Summary: The significance of reliable data and statistics on the extent and pattern of crimes and victimization in a nation and its different constituent political administrative units is recognized by criminologists, criminal justice officials and criminal justice policy-makers. However, the production of accurate crime and victimization data has been characterized by many problems. Some of the problems of collection and production of accurate crime and victimization are inherent in the nature of criminal activities, including efforts by criminals to conceal their actions and evade detection and arrest, capacity and practices of criminal justice agencies (police, courts and prisons). Information on crimes and victimization are obtained from three different sources: official statistics produced by criminal justice agencies (police, courts, prosecutors, prisons, etc.); self-report surveys which collect information (through questionnaire and interviews) from individuals on their involvement in any criminal activities, usually during the preceding twelve months, and victim surveys which obtain information from individuals and households (through questionnaires and interviews) on their criminal victimization experience during the preceding twelve months. The three sources provide indicators of level of victimization and criminality and complement each other, though they do not fully resolve the problems of incomplete information on crime and victimization. Nigeria lacks reliable criminal statistical system as a result of several factors, including: a. Lack of appreciation of the significance of evidence-based policy, operations and practice; b. Neglect of collection, analysis and utilization of crime and victimization surveys as essential input to planning, operations and administration; c. Lack of necessary capacity for the collection, analysis, utilization, storage and retrieval of essential data and information. CLEEN Foundation pioneered the conduct of large scale national criminal victimization survey based on multi-stage cluster and proportionate sampling methods. The Foundation piloted criminal victimization survey in Lagos in 2004 and subsequently conducted national criminal victimization surveys in respect of 2005 and 2006. The findings of the 2005 and 2006 national criminal victimization surveys have been published as research monographs1. Another survey covering 2007-20092 was conducted in early 2010, the major findings of which are presented in chapter two of this book. The aim of this book is to provide a comparative analysis of the data collected through three rounds of national criminal victimization surveys in Nigeria. The chapters in the book analysed different themes and provided summary of findings and recommendations.

Details: Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundations, 2011. 148p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2012 at: http://www.cleen.org/Crime%20Victimization%20Safety%20and%20Policing%20in%20Nigeria.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Nigeria

URL: http://www.cleen.org/Crime%20Victimization%20Safety%20and%20Policing%20in%20Nigeria.pdf

Shelf Number: 127119

Keywords:
Corruption
Crime Rates
Crime Statistics
Victimization Surve (Lagos, Nigeria)

Author: National Immigration Forum

Title: Misbehavior at the Border: Are Those Who Control Immigration Out of Control Themselves?

Summary: This paper looks at corruption and misconduct documented within the Border Patrol and its parent agency, Customs and Border Protection. With rapid growth, high turnover and a high new agent to experienced agent ration, there are questions about the adequacy of training and supervision. Another problem stems from the fact that the Inspector General’s office, which investigates many complaints against CBP agents, has not been properly resourced to keep pace with its workload.

Details: Washington, DC: National Immigration Forum, 2012. 6p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2012/CBP_Misconduct.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: United States

URL: http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2012/CBP_Misconduct.pdf

Shelf Number: 127270

Keywords:
Border Security
Corruption
Customs Agencies
Immigration Enforcement
Police Misconduct

Author: Muzila, Lindy

Title: On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to Fight Corruption

Summary: Developing countries lose an estimated US$20–40 billion each year through bribery, misappropriation of funds, and other corrupt practices. Often, the most visible manifestation of corruption is the enrichment of a corrupt public official. Despite such visibility, prosecuting corruption can be very problematic, particularly when it requires proving the offer or acceptance of a bribe. Even when the corruption is established in a court of law, linking the proceeds of the crime to the offense in order to recover assets is a complex endeavor. In response, some countries looking to strengthen their overall arsenal against corruption have criminalized illicit enrichment. In its Article 20, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) recommends, but does not mandate, States Parties to adopt illicit enrichment as a criminal offense, defining the same as an intentional and “significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.” The illicit enrichment offense has spurred significant debates involving due processes of law. Others question how jurisdictions are actually using the offense. Finally, many jurisdictions that serve as financial centers do not recognize illicit enrichment as an offense, so tracing and recovering assets through mutual legal assistance is further complicated in illicit enrichment prosecutions. Against this background, this study provides policy makers, prosecutors, and other practitioners with a better understanding of the features of illicit enrichment. It draws on the preparatory work of international conventions, reviews of existing domestic provisions, and the jurisprudence on illicit enrichment. It is the StAR Initiative’s hope that the study will inform the work of decision makers considering adopting an illicit enrichment offense, and assist those implementing illicit enrichment to do so in a way that contributes to effective prosecution, confiscation, and asset recovery.

Details:

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2013 at: http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/on_the_take-_criminalizing_illicit_enrichment_to_fight_corruption.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/on_the_take-_criminalizing_illicit_enrichment_to_fight_corruption.pdf

Shelf Number: 127477

Keywords:
Asset Recovery
Bribery
Bribes
Corruption

Author: Kar, Dev

Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2001-2010

Summary: The developing world lost US$859 billion in illicit outflows in 2010, an increase of 11% over 2009. The capital outflows stem from crime, corruption, tax evasion, and other illicit activity. The report finds that illicit financial flows. From 2001 to 2010, developing countries lost US$5.86 trillion to illicit outflows. Conservatively estimated, illicit financial flows have increased in every region of developing countries. Real growth of illicit flows by regions over study period is as follows: •Africa 23.8 percent, •Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 26.3 percent, •developing Europe 3.6 percent, •Asia 7.8 percent, and •Western Hemisphere 2.7 percent. Top 10 countries with the highest measured cumulative illicit financial outflows between 2001 and 2010 were: 1.China: US$2.74 trillion 2.Mexico: US$476 billion 3.Malaysia: US$285 billon 4.Saudi Arabia: US$210 billion 5.Russia: US$152 billion 6.Philippines: US$138 billion 7.Nigeria: US$129 billion 8.India: US$123 billion 9.Indonesia: US$109 billion 10.United Arab Emirates: US$107 billion.

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2012.

Source: Internet Resource: accessed February 7, 2013 at: http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html

Shelf Number: 127521

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Organized Crime
Tax Evasion

Author: Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia

Title: The Bolivia Country Program 2010-2015. Capacity Building in Response to Drugs, Organized Crime, Terrorism, Corruption, and Economic Crime Threats in Bolivia

Summary: Bolivia is located in the center of South America and shares borders with Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru. Extending across 1,098,581 km (424,160 sq miles), it has an estimated population of 10 million inhabitants (2009), 66% of whom live in urban areas. According to the Constitution, Bolivia is a Social, Unitary State of Plurinational Communitarian Law, free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized and with autonomies. It was founded on political, economic, judicial, cultural and linguistic plurality and pluralism, within the integrative process of the country. In 2005, approximately 59% of the population was living without their basic needs satisfied, and 37% lived in extreme poverty. In 2007, the estimated per capita income was US $1,363 a year. The life expectancy rate is 63 years, while the infant mortality rate for this same period was defined at 61 for every 1000 live births. After a long period characterized by political instability and social conflicts, in 2005 indigenous leader Evo Morales was elected President of what is now the Plurinational State of Bolivia, marking the beginning of a period of profound political and socioeconomic change. A Constitutional Assembly was summoned to enact these changes, and at the end of 2008 a new constitutional text was approved, which enabled all institutional structures to be adapted to the new ethno-cultural and regional plurality of the country. The New Political State Constitution incorporates important advances and changes in citizen rights, gender, natural resources and administration of justice. The Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has shifted from a neoliberal development model to a mixed economy, where the State plays a greater role in the economy. In so doing, the State has taken control of the principal source of income in the country: hydrocarbons, namely natural gas, and is promoting other important industrial development projects in the fields of metallurgy, construction, food and paper. The surplus generated from natural gas exportation to neighboring countries contributes to income redistribution policies, in addition to boosting the national petroleum company. In this way, the past few years have witnessed the creation of wealth redistribution mechanisms aimed at reversing the existing conditions of poverty and inequality, such as the Dignity Payment for senior citizens, the Juancito Pinto Bond for the student population and the Juana Azurduy Bond for pregnant women. The principal macroeconomic indicators show that the Bolivian economy has improved. From 2006-2009, the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.8%, the inflation was 0.3% at the end of this period and the fiscal surplus was 2.5% of the GDP. Private foreign inversion recovered in 2006, at US $278 million, topping off at US $370 million in 2008. Exportations in 2008 reached US $4,846 million, resulting in a positive trade balance of US $1,223 million. In 2009 the external public debt increased to US $2,583 million, following an important reduction in previous years. These indicators show a generally positive economic performance within a framework of both internal and external macroeconomic stability, providing greater strength to the Bolivian State´s fight against poverty. The Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, encouraged by the U.N., is making important efforts to reach the Millennium Goals. Bolivia has been declared the third country in the region free of illiteracy, with the backing of UNESCO. Likewise, gender gaps in primary education and infant and maternal mortality rates have been reduced, and basic sanitary services have reached a considerable proportion of the rural population. In Bolivia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been working since the end of the 1980s on alternative development projects in coca growing regions, including the construction of infrastructure for social and productive uses, improving agricultural production, encouraging forestry and agroforestry development, promoting the microbusiness sector and job skills training. The UNODC also implemented drug prevention programs within the educational system, as well as strengthening the government entities related to controlling drug use and related crimes, including the implementation of informational systems for monitoring coca plantations, alternative development and illegal drug use. Technical cooperation activities have been reduced in the past few years, from an annual portfolio of US $5.4 million in 2002 to US $1.6 million in 2009. As a result, in April of 2009, the UNODC representative finalized his/her mission in the country and decided to reduce office personnel, as the reduced volume of activities no longer justified a Representation Office in Bolivia. As of June of 2009, development program activities were administered with the aid of the Latin America and the Caribbean Unit (LACU/DO) of UNODC, based in Vienna. In June of 2009, the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia requested that the Executive Director of the UNODC maintain Office Representation status in the country and continue providing technical assistance. They also asked the European Commission to reinforce the UNODC´s financial cooperation program in the country. In response to this request, the UNODC sent a programming mission headed by the Head of the Latin American and the Caribbean Unit to the country in October of 2009. The objectives of the mission were: i) Prepare a Country Program 2010- 2015 document in direct collaboration with State institutions and international organizations; ii) Exchange criteria with the Government authorities of the Plurinational State of Bolivia about the reestablishment of an active/functional Office of Representation; and iii) Support the implementation of the profile of projects currently in process. In order for the Country Program to be prepared with accurate information, the agenda of the mission included a workshop with participants from governmental institutions and international organizations. The participants analyzed the current status of the fight against drugs, organized crime and corruption. They also identified priority areas where the UNODC could provide technical assistance. Sixty three representatives of 12 different State institutions working in drug and crime prevention were present at the workshop, as well as 19 counterparts from international organizations. The workshop´s success was a result of the participants´ interest in the topic, the high level of discussion generated and the quality of proposals which were produced. This UNODC Bolivia Country Program (2010-2015) reflects the primary conclusions and recommendations which came out of the workshop, as well as information obtained in interviews with the participating institutions.

Details: La Paz, Bolivia: Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2010.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/bolivia//proyectos_bolivia/The_UNODC_Bolivia_Country_Program_2010-2015.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Bolivia

URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/bolivia//proyectos_bolivia/The_UNODC_Bolivia_Country_Program_2010-2015.pdf

Shelf Number: 127529

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Abuse and Crime
Drug Trafficking (Bolivia)
Economic Crime
Organized Crime
Terrorism

Author: Kar, Dev

Title: Russia: Illicit Financial Flows and the Role of the Underground Economy

Summary: This study presents estimates of various types of capital flows to and from post-Soviet Russia. We argue that while netting out is a valid concept related to licit flows, illicit flows in both directions should be added in order to assess their adverse impact on the economy. Simultaneous equation modeling shows that total illicit flows both drive and are driven by underground economic activities. The latter is used as a proxy for the state of overall governance in Russia, which continues to be a serious issue. We suggest a range of domestic and international policy measures to curtail the cross-border transmission of illicit financial flows to and from Russia.

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2013. 84p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://russia.gfintegrity.org/Russia_Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_the_Role_of_the_Underground_Economy-HighRes.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Russia

URL: http://russia.gfintegrity.org/Russia_Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_the_Role_of_the_Underground_Economy-HighRes.pdf

Shelf Number: 127632

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crime
Money Laundering (Russia)
Underground Economy

Author: Great Britain. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary

Title: Revisiting Police Relationships: Progress Report

Summary: In 2011, we published Without Fear or Favour, which looked at instances of undue influence, inappropriate contractual arrangements and other abuses of power in police relationships with the media and other parties. While we found no evidence of endemic corruption in police relationships, we did not issue a clean bill of health. This revisit found that, while forces have made some progress, particularly around putting in place processes and policies to manage threats to integrity, more needs to be done.

Details: London: HMIC, 2012. 41p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 1, 2013 at: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/revisiting-police-relationships.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/revisiting-police-relationships.pdf

Shelf Number: 127742

Keywords:
Corruption
Police Administration
Police Behavior (U.K.)
Police Misconduct
Police-Community Relations
Public Opinion

Author: Ugur, Menmet

Title: Evidence on the Economic Growth Impacts of Corruption in Low-Income Countries and Beyond: Systematic Review

Summary: Corruption is a symptom and an outcome of institutional weakness, with potentially adverse effects on a country’s economic performance. In the last two decades, a wide range of scholars, policy-makers and practitioners have expressed concerns that corruption has gone hand-in-hand with extensive liberalisation reforms and led to poor economic outcomes, including slow growth and high levels of growth volatility. This systematic review aims to provide comparable, reliable and verifiable estimates of the effect of corruption on economic growth by controlling for study heterogeneity in terms of growth measures, data sources and country groupings. Our objectives are to address the impact of corruption on economic growth theoretically and empirically with a view to: (a) providing a narrative synthesis of the types of corruption and the causal links between corruption and growth; (b) providing a meta-synthesis of the empirical evidence on the direct and indirect effects of corruption on growth; and (c) mapping the narrative synthesis with the meta-analysis in order to derive policy conclusions and indicate potential avenues for further research. The review focuses on the growth impacts of corruption in low-income countries (LICs), but we also provide evidence for a larger set of countries for comparative purposes.

Details: London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London, 2011. 140p.

Source: Internet Resource: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/SystematicReviews/Corruption_impact_2011_Ugur_report.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/SystematicReviews/Corruption_impact_2011_Ugur_report.pdf

Shelf Number: 127961

Keywords:
Corruption
Economic Growth
Economics of Crime

Author: Søreide, Tina

Title: Certified Integrity? Forest Certification and Anti-Corruption

Summary: Forest certification schemes regulate forest exploitation and trade across many countries. In the absence of a multilateral agreement on limiting deforestation, they provide rules to balance the social, economic and ecological values of forest resources. Expansion of these schemes into tropical countries that display poor governance and high levels of corruption has raised questions about these schemes’ performance in such contexts. Referring to the case of the Forest Stewardship Council – a global forestry certification system – the authors looked at whether forest certification schemes can address corruption issues. While forest certification is not primarily geared towards detecting and preventing corruption, they may have some anti-corruption effects in countries where corruption is sporadic but not systemic. This is due to their role in documenting forest management practices and applying third-party monitoring.

Details: Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2013. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issue, January 2013, No. 1: Accessed March 22, 2013: http://www.u4.no/publications/certified-integrity-forest-certification-and-anti-corruption/

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/certified-integrity-forest-certification-and-anti-corruption/

Shelf Number: 128070

Keywords:
Corruption
Forest Certification
Forestry Conservation
Illegal Logging
Natural Resources Management

Author: Button, Mark

Title: Measuring Fraud in Overseas Aid: Options and Method

Summary: This report seeks to identify and select an appropriate methodology to measure fraud losses in the different modalities of aid. It explores the experience of other countries, donors and multilateral bodies in measuring fraud in overseas aid and discovers little evidence that bilateral donors, multilateral agencies or UK NGOs use Fraud Loss Measurement Techniques (FLM) to assess fraud levels in their overseas aid budgets. Some governments and multilateral agencies find it useful to have large sampling exercises to collect measures of wider losses due to what they call ‘Improper Payments’ or some similar term. Reported figures vary widely from organisation to organisation and over time: e.g. the total estimated Improper Payments rate for USAID was reported as 0.85% in 2008 and 0.28% for 2009; but the estimated financial impact of irregularities on the budget of the European Anti Fraud Office OLAF rose from 1.13% in 2009 to 1.27% 2010. FLM-type exercises are used by government agencies such as the DWP, HMRC, the NHS and Medicare in the US. Again there is considerable variation between agencies and types of expenditure: the DWP estimated fraud rate varied from 0.0% for pensions to 4.1% for jobseekers allowance; the HMRC estimated a total ‘direct tax gap’ for 2009 at 5.8%; a recent NHS study highlighted a fraud loss rate of 4.7% for a medical locum agency’s invoicing: and the US Medicare reported 7.6% ‘Improper Payments’ in 2009. This report examines the potential for FLM exercises applied to the complex and challenging environment of overseas aid and aid modalities. It shows that FLM approaches, being rare in this context, would be difficult and expensive to apply to a bilateral donor complete budget. However, the report argues that there are elements of the a bilateral budget where FLM can be undertaken and with the development of fraud resilience checks and a fraud loss model much greater understanding of the risk of fraud in different contexts can be gauged. As a result the report concludes on the need to: • Recognise that FLM and the broader development of counter fraud capacity are a form of aid. • Reject attempts to measure total fraud in a ‘super measure’ on all the bilateral donor budget as this is too complex and expensive to achieve. • Seek to use FLM to measure fraud where this is practicable. Work should be focussed upon: the bilateral donor Administration, Direct Purchasing, Developing Countries’ government departments and NGOs receiving aid from the donor. • Carry out further work to: develop resilience checks for the overseas aid fraud context and to create models for predicting range of likely fraud losses. The report also notes the need for a political lead from the top of the bilateral aid donor that enhancing the resilience to fraud should be a condition of aid to governments and international agencies and that multilateral organisations should also move towards enhancing the resilience to fraud as a condition of their aid to countries and to NGOs. The report makes the following recommendations that Bilateral aid agencies: 1. Consider FLM and the broader development of counter fraud capacity as a form of aid. 2. Reject attempts to measure total fraud in its budget as this is too complex and expensive to achieve. 3. Seek to use FLM to measure fraud. These should be focussed upon: – Administration; – Direct Purchasing; – Countries’ government departments and NGOs receiving aid (number depending upon budget). 4. Carry out further work to: – Develop resilience check for overseas aid fraud context; – Create model for predicting range of likely fraud losses.

Details: Portsmouth, UK: University of Portsmouth, Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, 2012. 47p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/misc_gov/60908-DFID_FINAL_REPORT_March2012post_david.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/misc_gov/60908-DFID_FINAL_REPORT_March2012post_david.pdf

Shelf Number: 128859

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Fraud

Author: Atha, Roberto J.

Title: Transitions to Peace: Effects on Internal Security Forces in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala

Summary: This thesis examines the effect of transitions to peace in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala on internal security forces. It reveals how the influence of the military affected the implementation of internal security reforms, influencing the professionalism and effectiveness of police forces in the fight against violence and gangs today. The research shows Sandinista influence allowed Nicaragua to maintain an experienced core of security personnel that has confronted the present challenges more effectively. Reforms in El Salvador yielded a new, highly restructured and reduced security force of which only one-fifth some policing experience, reducing the short-term effectiveness of the force in the fight against insecurity, but increasing the probability for long term consolidation of a professional and effective police institution. In Guatemala, the transitions resulted in the creation of a new police force mostly manned by former security personnel, perpetuating the corruption that permeated the force prior to the transitions--a fact reflected in the high levels of crime in the country today. The thesis proposes that the effect of the transitions on the current forces is a pivotal factor on their effectiveness, and must be addressed in order to improve security for citizens and democracy.

Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. 83p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493659

Year: 2008

Country: Central America

URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493659

Shelf Number: 129139

Keywords:
Community Policing
Corruption
Gangs
Violence (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala)

Author: Lundin, Lars-Erie

Title: Perils of the Drug Trade: Implications and Challenges of Central Asia's "Northern Route"

Summary: The international trade in Afghan drugs is one of the most significant transnational threats emanating from Central Asia. Exacerbated by weak border management, corruption, and lack of income-generating alternatives, the “Northern Route” is a scourge not only for the Central Asian states but also Russia and Europe, undermining a vision of a Eurasian community based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as posing attendant health risks. International efforts have so far failed to adequately come to grips with the problem. It is clear that there is no quick fix and that hope rests in a mixture of instruments, not least promoting long-term socio-economic development in the region, stemming pervasive corruption, engaging in human rights dialogues, as well as promoting more effective international cooperation—in particular involving Russia.

Details: Stockholm, Sweden: The Institute for Security and Development Policy , 2013. 3p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Review No. 125: Accessed July 8, 2013 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-lundin-vankaathoven-central-asia-northern-route.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-lundin-vankaathoven-central-asia-northern-route.pdf

Shelf Number: 129275

Keywords:
Border Security
Corruption
Drug Trafficking (Asia)
Drug-Related Violence

Author: Lopez, Julie

Title: Organized Crime and Insecurity in Belize

Summary: In this working paper, López offers an in-depth look at the security landscape in Belize, a country too often ignored in regional policy discussions, but one which faces criminal challenges similar to those of its larger Central American neighbors. Combining policy analysis and journalistic accounts based on her recent stint in Belize, López examines the political, social, geographical, and institutional factors that have contributed to Belize’s role as a transit point in the international drug trade. She also discusses the rise of other illicit enterprises, including arms trafficking and human smuggling and looks at the impact of growing gang activity. Finally, López analyzes national policy alternatives being explored in Belize, such as marijuana decriminalization and a state-sponsored gang truce, and the particular challenges the country faces in integrating into the Central American regional security framework.

Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, 2013. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed July 13, 2013 at: http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9014_Belize_Lopez_Paper_FINAL.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Belize

URL: http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9014_Belize_Lopez_Paper_FINAL.pdf

Shelf Number: 129393

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Homicides
Organized Crime (Belize)
Violent Crime

Author: Rusev, Atanas

Title: Human Trafficking, Border Security and Related Corruption in the EU

Summary: Trafficking in human beings (THB), as a transnational crime, involves movement of people across borders. In this regard, border control authorities are expected to play an important role in preventing and curbing this phenomenon. Border guards are identified as key actors in fight against trafficking in human beings both in the new Directive 2011/36/EU and the associated EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings. The role of border guards in combating trafficking, is largely seen as in the role of "first responder" as part of the National Referral Mechanisms in identification of victims of trafficking, as well as for the identification and apprehension of traffickers within border control procedures. The growing commitment on the EU policy level for prevention of, and fighting against, trafficking of human beings, has also led to recognition of the issue as an important priority to border control authorities of all Member States as well. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) has already recognised THB as one of its priorities and has developed a training manual for border guards related to THB and a handbook for Border Control Authorities on good practices to counter THB. This paper Human Trafficking, Border Security and Related Corruption in the EU, by Atanas Rusev of the Center for Study of Democracy in Bulgaria, investigates the much under-researched aspect of corruption and human trafficking. Rusev explores this topic vis-a-vis border authorities and connected corruption to facilitate, inter alia, THB and how this corruption can be related to the corporate sector and enter into the highest political spheres.

Details: Brussels: DCAF, 2013. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: Migration and the Security Sector Paper Series: Accessed January 31, 2014 at: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Human-Trafficking-Border-Security-and-Related-Corruption-in-the-EU

Year: 2013

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Human-Trafficking-Border-Security-and-Related-Corruption-in-the-EU

Shelf Number: 131833

Keywords:
Border Security
Corruption
Human Trafficking

Author: Reisman, Lainie

Title: Assessment of Crime and Violence in Mozambique and Recommendations for Violence Prevention and Reduction

Summary: This report is an assessment of crime and violence in Mozambique undertaken between August 2011 and March 2012. The objective of the assessment was to provide a broad overview of the crime and violence situation in Mozambique and help inform future programming decisions there for OSISA and the OSF CVPI. It was written on the basis of key stakeholder interviews and analysis of existing data. Given the complexity of issues surrounding crime and violence, the report attempts to highlight major initiatives in a variety of sectors and is meant to inform debate and programme design. Section 1 of the assessment introduces the report and presents the methodology. Section 2 focuses on the Background and Context of crime and violence in Mozambique. After a brief history, the emphasis is on crime and violence data and analysis. As the report argues, reliable data is hard to obtain, but recent victimization surveys indicate that Mozambique is significant in that rates of victimization are particularly high, while rates of reporting crime to the police are particularly low. This phenomena is likely linked to issues around a lack of trust in the police services and perceived corruption. Armed robberies are the major reported crime concern for most Mozambicans, although levels of domestic violence and child abuse are also estimated to be extremely high. Maputo City, Maputo Province, and Sofala are the provinces with the highest levels of reported crime. Following the analysis on crime and violence data, the section ends with a summary of the Mozambican legal and policy framework, which is considered to be well developed � although clearly lacking in full implementation. Section 3 analyses the major drivers of crime and violence in Mozambique and includes a detailed analysis on inequality, urbanization, corruption, organized crime, centralization, lack of opportunities for youth, victimization of women and children, high numbers of street dwellers, culture of violence, weak criminal justice system, prevalence of HIV/AIDS, rise in vigilantism, damaging customary practices and local beliefs, and trafficking along the coastlines and land corridors. While none of these factors in isolation cause crime and violence, all contribute to the challenges faced by Mozambique. Section 4 of the assessment report highlights the key actors in crime and violence prevention. Government agencies (including MDI, MDN, PRM, MINJUS, MINED, MISAU, MMAS), key donors, non-governmental organizations, and research and academia organizations are included and their relevant initiatives and interventions presented. For ease of analysis, the NGO sector is broken down into four areas, namely 1) women victimization organizations, 2) children victimization organizations, 3) governance, human rights, and community development organizations, and 4) peace, security, and conflict prevention organizations. The assessment notes the particular emphasis placed on women and children victimization by almost all of the key actors, although also notes an absence of support for unemployed and out-of-school youth. Section 5 of the assessment highlights promising prevention initiatives in Mozambique undertaken by key stakeholders. Innovative programs range from local level interventions to national government programmes. Section 6 analyses some of the key challenges to crime and violence prevention in Mozambique including: 1) Lack of opportunities for youth, 2) Marginalized role of local government, 3) Lack of engagement of the private sector, 4) Limited research and knowledge sharing on crime and violence prevention, 5) Absence of debate on security sector reform, 6) Parenting and early childhood development not prioritized, 7) Religious sector not fully engaged, 8) Poor support for displaced people, and 9) Disconnect between national policies and programs and local realities. The final Section 7 of the report makes a series of recommendations for Open Society, largely directed towards a community based focus, the importance of knowledge generation, building off of Brazilian expertise, providing opportunities for marginalized youth, and engaging new sectors in the crime and violence prevention debate. The assessment report is also accompanied by a community case study, which analyses crime and violence issues in two communities, Magoanine �C� and Feroviario das Mahotas. The case study, which was conducted by FOMICRES, provides an important point of reflection and highlights the juxtaposition between the national level policy and programs and the realities on the ground in marginalized communities.

Details: Washington, DC: Open Society Foundations Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative; Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2012. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2014 at: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/cvpi_mozambique_report_-_final_english.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Mozambique

URL: http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/cvpi_mozambique_report_-_final_english.pdf

Shelf Number: 131892

Keywords:
Corruption
Crime Prevention
Crime Statistics
Organized Crime
Robbery
Victimization
Violence
Violent Crime

Author: Eventon, Ross

Title: Eyes Wide Shut: Corruption and Drug-Related Violence in Rosario

Summary: Drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon in the Argentinian city of Rosario. Since the 1990s, and largely under the public radar, the distribution of illicit drugs in the poor, peripheral neighbourhoods of the city has been managed by family-run gangs and small-time dealers; poverty and social marginalisation have facilitated the trade; young gang members, known as soldados, have fought over territory; local demand for illegal drugs has provided the engine; illicit profits have been laundered in collaboration with local lawyers and financial advisors; and corruption among the police and local officials has ensured that the main traffickers, while their identities are widely known, can operate with few concerns other than threats from rivals. This last element appears to explain why, until the issue was forced into the public domain, there had been a conspicuous lack of political concern with drug trafficking in the city. The change came on New Year's Day 2012. That day, three community activists were shot and killed in the Villa Moreno neighbourhood by gang members who mistook them for rivals. The killings were not unique, but the victims were: unlike the usual casualties, the activists had a movement behind them. Their deaths led to local demonstrations and calls for action. The press and local officials were suddenly impelled to pay attention to drug trafficking and related violence. Since then, a spate of official investigations has deepened public understanding of the nature of the drug trade in the city. They have also provided further evidence of the complicity of the security forces and the negligence of the state that have long been known to facilitate trafficking. Recommendations - Maintain the focus on the leadership of the most powerful and violent gangs, including following the money trail, and reverse the trend where simply increasing the number of security forces in violent areas is considered a sufficient policy response. - Re-focus the judiciary away from a two-tiered approach: recognize underage gang members as a vulnerable population, and that confronting the culture of violence will require special initiatives. - Root out corruption in the local and provincial security forces, recognise the way the state's approach facilitates this complicity, and produce more reliable statistics to better inform policymakers.

Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2013. 16p.

Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Series on Drug Markets and Violence, Nr 1: Accessed May 10, 2014 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv1.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Argentina

URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv1.pdf

Shelf Number: 132314

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Drug-Related Violence
Gangs
Homicides
Illegal Drugs
Poverty
Violent Crime

Author: University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne

Title: Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport

Summary: The University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne and the International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS) today released the ground-breaking results of a two-year research programme into sport corruption. It includes startling figures on the scale and scope of the sport-betting market, which is identified as the primary purpose for match-fixing. The report also provides detailed analysis of current efforts to combat corruption and presents guiding principles including practical steps that can be taken by sport, governments and betting. According to the Sorbonne-ICSS Report - 'Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport' - the manipulation of sport competition and betting threatens all countries and regions, with football and cricket the sports most under siege. Other sports affected include: tennis, basketball, badminton and motor racing. The report states that the most manipulated competitions are at a national level but highlights that the 'fixing' of competition and betting is instigated at a transnational level. Size of sport betting market The report shows that manipulation takes place in the context of a growing sports economy, which now accounts for 2% of the global GDP, with a transnational sports-betting market of estimated wagers worth between $200 - 500 billion, more than 80% of which is illegal. The findings reveal: - Asia and Europe represents 85% of the total legal and illegal market - Europe makes up 49% of the legal market, whilst Asia makes up 53% of the illegal market - Legal sports betting currently delivers only $4 billion of official tax revenues for countries - More than 8,000 legal operators offer sports betting - 80% are in territories with a low rate of tax and few inspections. - The number of illegal operators is impossible even to estimate The advent of the internet has led to an unprecedented expansion of sport betting offers, with online betting now representing 30% of the global market. The sports betting market has been transformed into a multi-billion dollar industry with betting exchanges, live betting, betting on more low-profile events and derivative betting formulas, as well as higher return rates for bettors. Significantly though, the evolution of the betting regulatory models hasn't kept up, with authorities often ill-equipped to deal with the illegal and under-regulated betting, together with the related issues of manipulation and money laundering.

Details: Dohar, Qatar: International Centre for Sport Security, 2014. 129p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2014 at: http://www.theicss.org/sport-integrity-forum/

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.theicss.org/sport-integrity-forum/

Shelf Number: 132453

Keywords:
Corruption
Gambling
Illegal markets
Money Laundering
Organized Crime
Sporting Events
Sports Betting

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Title: Unholy Alliances: Organized Crime in Southern Africa

Summary: This report is drawn from a seminar in March 2014, hosted by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. The seminar brought together 20 experts from think tanks, NGOs, independent journalists, academia and the private sector who are working on organized crime in the countries of Southern Africa. Under Chatham House rules, the participants shared their experience and insights through a series of case studies and discussion over two days. The objective of the meeting was to serve as a platform to better understand and assess the way that organized crime is engaging with governance, democracy, statehood, human security and development. By bringing together policymakers, practitioners and analysts dealing with these challenges, the Global Initiative hopes to develop a working network among relevant actors and share information that, in turn, can translate into more effective strategies to combat transnational organized crime in the region, or potentially more broadly. The meeting was the first such effort by the Global Initiative and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation to examine the organized crime challenges of a specific region, and part of a vision to host similar regional meetings across Africa and in other zones of fragility. While the experiences, trajectories and contexts of each country, and the prevalent organized crime flows and structures with which it is grappling are different, a number of key themes emerged over the course of the meeting. Evolution of organized crime in post-colonial Africa: Participants noted that while organized crime and corruption have been a feature of statehood in Africa before and since decolonisation, the scope and scale of the problem are now at unprecedented levels. Efforts to promote stability, state consolidation and development all require dealing explicitly with organized crime and its impacts. Defining organized crime in Africa: Longstanding controversies of the relevance of organized crime to the African context have stymied an effective understanding of the significant growth of the phenomenon on the continent. Analytical tools that focus excessively on using seizure data to capture the extent and nature of criminal flows have overlooked the ways in which organized crime impacts on citizens and the state, which is essential in an African context. There remains a dearth of tools and resources available to assess, prioritise and address key issues, and while organized crime continues to evolve, our capacity for analysis, policymaking and program design lag behind.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: The Initiative, 2014. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2014 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Unholy%20Alliances%20-%20Organized%20Crime%20in%20Southern%20Africa%20-%20June%202014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Unholy%20Alliances%20-%20Organized%20Crime%20in%20Southern%20Africa%20-%20June%202014.pdf

Shelf Number: 132634

Keywords:
Corruption
Organized Crime (Africa)

Author: Rowe, Elizabeth

Title: Organised Crime and Public Sector Corruption: A crime scripts analysis of tactical displacement risks

Summary: Organised crime in Australia has received increased attention over the last decade, with the enactment of legislation and the development of other interventions that have sought to control this serious criminal phenomenon. Although the success of such interventions in reducing organised crime is yet to be subject to detailed evaluation, prior research has identified certain risks associated with policy responses that could, arguably, also lead to counterproductive consequences (Guerette & Bowers 2009; Smith, Wolanin & Worthington 2003). One consequence of enhanced legislation and/or law enforcement approaches developed to combat organised crime is so-called 'tactical crime displacement', namely that criminals may modify their tactics in order to circumvent the effects of new legislation or increased law enforcement activity, thus allowing them to continue to offend with a reduced risk of detection or criminal justice action taking place. One particular risk of tactical crime displacement is the potential for organised crime groups to focus more on forming corrupt relationships with public officials in order to obtain information that minimises the risk of detection and prosecution. This paper illustrates how organised criminal groups can alter their patterns of offending by inducing public officials into corruptly disclosing information relevant to the facilitation of further criminal activity. This process of corruption is explained using the notion of 'crime scripts', as developed by Cornish (1994), and applied in the context of organised crime. Following an analysis of the crime scripts used by organised criminals in relation to the corruption of public servants in selected cases in Australia, various situational crime prevention solutions based on Ekblom's (2011) 5Is approach to crime prevention are explored as potential ways in which to minimise risks of this nature.

Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2013. 7p.

Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 444: Accessed Jhttp://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi444.pdfuly 16, 2014 at:

Year: 2013

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi444.pdf

Shelf Number: 132693

Keywords:
Corruption
Crime Displacement
Crime Prevention
Crime Scripts
Organized Crime (Australia)
Situational Crime Prevention

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2013

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's 2013 Game Changers, where we have sought to highlight some of the year's most important and illustrative trends in the development of organized crime in the Americas. This year has been a year of contradictions. Large criminal groups that seemed untouchable appear to be on the ropes. Others waded through complicated peace and truce processes with incredible patience. Some of the more notable of these processes were initiated by the criminal groups themselves. At the same time, some dynamics in the underworld remained true to form and some new, ugly criminal economies have surged because of these dynamics. Amidst it all, weak states continued to face challenges from below and above, sometimes from those who simply feel they have no choice but to fight criminal groups on their own. These past 12 months could be termed the year of the negotiations. In Colombia, rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued their historic talks with the Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos. By many accounts, these talks are moving along well, but there is concern that even if the FARC leadership signs a deal, parts of the organization will desert and enter the criminal economy. In El Salvador, the truce between the country's two largest gangs showed severe signs of fraying, if not rupturing completely. Homicides surged at the end of the year, as the presidential campaign shifted into full gear. While the mediators claimed the candidates had sought gang support for their campaigns, the country's security minister sought to undermine the truce via public and private channels. Meanwhile, a few more lasting criminal "pacts" emerged, brokered, it appeared, by the criminals themselves. In Medellin, Colombia, remnants of the old guard, known as the Oficina de Envigado, brokered a cease fire with the now surging Urabenos criminal organization, bringing homicides to their lowest levels in 30 years. In Juarez and Tijuana, Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel's apparent dominance over those trafficking corridors led to equally dramatic drops in homicide rates and other criminal acts, such as car-jackings. The emergence of the Urabenos as the singular, monolithic criminal organization to survive the government's assault on the so-called Criminal Bands or "Bandas Criminales" (BACRIM) may be the biggest development in Latin America's underworld. The Urabenos have developed a sophisticated criminal model, which includes a huge variety of revenue streams. They appear to have overcome the loss of numerous top leaders and have an understanding of when to fight and when to make friends, as noted above. However, the Urabenos, and other groups like them, have also ushered in a new era of drug consumption in the region. The consumers are no longer just in Europe, the United States and Asia. They are in small cities and even rural areas throughout the region. They are poor; they are middle class; and they are the elite. And they are getting their drugs from the local criminal groups who are servicing the larger ones, like the Urabenos, throughout the distribution chain. From Brazil and Argentina, to Costa Rica and Mexico, this new, local criminal economy appears to be at the heart of much of the region's violence. It is this violence that pushed civilians to take up arms in places like Guerrero and Michoacan, two embattled Mexican states where so-called "self-defense" groups have surged to try to replace an inept, corrupted and co-opted state. These groups appear to have a wide range of backgrounds: from the poor peasant farmers to the sophisticated rival criminal groups. Yet, the government seems powerless to deal with them, to the point where many authorities have willingly allowed them to break the law in order to ensure others do not. A similar tension between maintaining the law and ensuring justice is also on the minds of the Bolivians as they try to keep some portions of their coca crop in the legal sphere and eliminate those deemed illegal. The challenge is monumental and, as we have seen this year, virtually impossible. Meanwhile, Bolivia's neighbor Peru, is coming to grips with the fact that it is the largest coca producing country in the world. That reality, which is a return to the 1990s status quo, has meant an influx of foreign criminal groups. Finally, for the second straight year, we need to note what is happening in Honduras. The country continues to open its doors to foreign criminal organizations, even while its homegrown groups continue to gain power. This includes one known as the Cachiros, which the US Treasury Department said had accumulated up to $800 million in assets, or roughly five percent of the country's GDP. A newly elected government, which takes power in January, seems to have little idea of how to combat these organizations, much less the resources.

Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2013. 141p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: South America

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf

Shelf Number: 132877

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Gangs
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Kar, Dev

Title: Brazil: Capital Flight, Illicit Flows, and Macroeconomic Crises, 1960-2012

Summary: This September 2014 study from Global Financial Integrity found that more than US$400 billion flowed illegally out of Brazil between 1960 and 2012-draining domestic resources, driving the underground economy, exacerbating inequality, and facilitating crime and corruption. The Brazilian economy lost at least US$401.6 billion in illicit financial outflows from 1960 to 2012. These outflows represent the proceeds of crime, corruption, and tax evasion, and have serious negative consequences for Brazil. Outflows were found to drain resources from the Brazilian economy, to drive the underground economy, and to exacerbate inequality. Furthermore, the report found that illicit outflows are growing. Annual average illicit outflows increased from US$310 million in the 1960s to US$14.7 billion in the first decade of the twenty first century before jumping to US$33.7 billion over the last three years of the study, 2010-2012. On average, Brazil's illicit outflows are equivalent to 1.5% of the country's official GDP.

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2014. 44p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2014 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/country-case-study-brazil/

Year: 2014

Country: Brazil

URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/country-case-study-brazil/

Shelf Number: 133183

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes (Brazil)
Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime
Tax Evasion
Underground Economy

Author: Gray, Larissa

Title: Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery

Summary: Corruption has a devastating impact on developing and transition countries, with estimates of $20 billion to $40 billion per year stolen by public officials, a figure equivalent to 20 to 40 percent of official development assistance flows. The return of the proceeds of corruption - asset recovery - can have a significant development impact. Returns can be used directly for development purposes, such as improvements in the health and education sectors and reintegration of displaced persons, with additional benefits of improved international cooperation and enhanced capacity of law enforcement and financial management officials. This StAR-OECD publication reports on how OECD countries are performing on asset recovery. Drawing on data collected between 2006 and 2012, the report provides recommendations and good practices and suggests specific actions for development agencies. Few and Far is primarily intended to support the anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts of developed and developing jurisdictions, with a particular focus on actions for development agencies. In addition, civil society organizations engaged in governance and development issues may wish to use these findings and recommendations in their reports and advocacy efforts.

Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 96p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/few_and_far_the_hard_facts_on_stolen_asset_recovery.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/few_and_far_the_hard_facts_on_stolen_asset_recovery.pdf

Shelf Number: 133288

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Stolen Assets
White-Collar Crimes

Author: Wolfe, Simon

Title: Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries: Priorities for Action

Summary: Background The G20 countries committed in 2010 and 2012 to put in place adequate measures to protect whistleblowers, and to provide them with safe, reliable avenues to report fraud, corruption and other wrongdoing. While much has been achieved as a result of the G20 commitment, on the whole much remains to be done to meet this important goal. Many G20 countries' whistleblower protection laws continue to fail to meet international standards, and fall significantly short of best practice. Lacking strong legal protections, government and corporate employees who report wrongdoing to their managers or to regulators can face dismissal, harassment and other forms of retribution. With employees deterred from coming forward, government and corporate misconduct can be perpetuated. Serious wrongdoing such as corruption, fraud, financial malpractice, public health threats, unsafe consumer products and environmental damage can persist without remedy. Objective This report analyses the current state of whistleblower protection rules in each of the G20 countries, applying to the identification of wrongdoing in both the public and private sectors. It is the first independent evaluation of G20 countries' whistleblowing laws for both the private and public sectors, having been researched by an international team of experts drawn from civil society and academia. While G20 countries do self-reporting on implementation, to date this reporting has been "broad brush", and tends towards a more flattering and less useful picture of progress than may really be the case. By contrast, this report uses recognised principles to provide a more in-depth picture of the state of progress, and whether a case for continued high-level cooperation remains. Each country's laws were assessed against a set of 14 criteria (see Table below), developed from five internationally recognised sets of whistleblower principles for best legislative practice. The report is based on a public consultation draft released in June 2014. Earlier draft findings and the consultation draft were distributed to a wide range of experts and whistleblowing-related NGOs in G20 countries. The consultation draft was also submitted to all G20 governments for comment, through the T20 (Think20) engagement group and the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. This report only analyses the content of laws related to whistleblower protection in each country. This written law is only part of what is necessary to ensure those who reveal wrongdoing are protected in practice, with actual implementation of any law representing a different and ongoing challenge for G20 countries. We stress that positive assessment of the presence and comprehensiveness of legal provisions in this report is not a measure of the extent or quality of actual whistleblower protection in any country. Further, in countries with lower scores, there may be cultural or other norms that in fact indirectly assist in practical protection of whistleblowers.

Details: Blueprint for Free Speech, 2014. 76p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf

Shelf Number: 133609

Keywords:
Corporate Crime
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Fraud
Whistleblower Law and Legislation
Whistleblower Protection
Whistleblowers (International)

Author: Halliday, Terence

Title: Global Surveillance of Dirty Money: Assessing Assessments of Regimes to Control Money-Laundering and Combat the Financing of Terrorism.

Summary: The International Monetary Fund's (IMF, Fund) program on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) has been integrally involved in the global system for AML/CFT in coordination with other key players, particularly the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). AML/CFT assessments, whether by the Fund or other assessor bodies, contribute to the key Fund activities of surveillance, financial support and technical assistance in support of domestic and international financial stability. These evaluations are taken seriously by both assessors and assessed. It is timely to evaluate the IMF's involvement in the AML/CFT system and to reconsider relevant aspects of the FATF standards, methodologies and practices more generally. The Center on Law and Globalization (CLG) obtained agreement from the IMF to conduct an independent critical analysis of IMF Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) during the 3rd round with the intent that the appraisal of past practices might inform advances in IMF and FATF methodologies and practices. Findings of the study are based on extensive interviews at the IMF and the FATF, detailed analysis of documents, close examination of four IMF assessments, site visits to three countries, and review of related literatures. This study finds that the IMF has contributed significantly to efforts that will improve the standards and methodology for assessing AML/CFT systems worldwide. The IMF has shown an openness to independent investigation of its practices; a willingness to ask baseline questions about the objectives and efficacy of AML/CFT regimes; a commitment to experimentation in assessment techniques; an impetus to clarify AML/CFT goals and objectives; leadership in the drive for assessments to appraise whether effective outcomes have resulted from implementation of standards; an investment in highly-qualified experienced assessment teams; undertaken initiatives to find new forms of valid and reliable data; intentions to forge tighter linkages between specific AML/CFT tools and targeted problems in financial systems, e.g., tax evasion, corruption; and effectiveness in raising donor moneys to invest in technical assistance to countries in need of reforms.

Details: Chicago: The Center on Law and Globalization (CLG), 2014. 61p.

Source: Internet Resource: accessed November 10, 2014 at: http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20Money%201.30.2014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20Money%201.30.2014.pdf

Shelf Number: 134007

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Tax Evation
Terrorist Financing

Author: Stanley, Karlyn D.

Title: Business Bribery Risk Assessment

Summary: Corruption is a major problem that can inhibit global business investment, especially in emerging markets; however, businesses operating overseas have inadequate tools for assessing business bribery risk and their potential risk of violating various anti-corruption laws. This report introduces a new index, the TRACE Matrix, for business bribery risk assessment that we believe has advantages over existing alternatives. The TRACE Matrix provides a quick and useful guide for businesses operating overseas that is based on a conceptual model of bribery risk and supported by data specific to firms. The objective of this index is to help firms assess the propensity for government bribery and its associated business risk and to provide data to inform compliance processes. We have developed a business bribery risk methodology using existing, publicly available cross-country data about risk factors, drawing on diverse data sources focused on business information. We have aggregated the data to provide a composite score for each country based on distinct categories of risk, much like a health index score that combines the key factors important to health (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate). Although countries are ranked by their composite scores, it is also possible to view the results for the different factors included in the composite score and identify the key drivers of that score. This allows firms to adjust their risk assessment and compliance practices to better suit country-specific conditions.

Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 75p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR839/RAND_RR839.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR839/RAND_RR839.pdf

Shelf Number: 134500

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Crimes Against Businesses
Risk Assessment

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office

Title: Whistleblower Protection; Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOJ's Handling of FBI Retaliation Complaints

Summary: The Department of Justice (DOJ) closed 44 of the 62 (71 percent) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whistleblower retaliation complaints we reviewed within 1 year, took up to 4 years to close 15 complaints, and took up to 10.6 years to close the remaining 3. DOJ terminated 55 of the 62 complaints (89 percent) and awarded corrective action for 3. (Complainants withdrew 4.) We found that DOJ terminated many (48 of 62) complaints we reviewed because they did not meet certain regulatory requirements. For example, DOJ terminated at least 17 complaints in part because a disclosure was made to someone in the employee's chain of command or management, such as a supervisor, who was not one of the nine high-level FBI or DOJ entities designated under DOJ regulations to receive such disclosures. Unlike employees of other executive branch agencies, FBI employees do not have a process to seek corrective action if they experience retaliation based on a disclosure of wrongdoing to their supervisors or others in their chain of command who are not designated officials. This difference is due, in part, to DOJ's decisions about how to implement the statute governing FBI whistleblowers. In 2014, DOJ reviewed its regulations and, in an effort to balance competing priorities, recommended adding more senior officials in FBI field offices to the list of designated entities, but did not recommend adding all supervisors. DOJ cited a number of reasons for this, including concerns about the additional resources and time needed to handle a possible increase in complaints if DOJ added supervisors. However, DOJ is already taking other steps to improve the efficiency of the complaint process. More importantly, dismissing retaliation complaints made to an employee's supervisor or someone in that person's chain of command leaves some FBI whistleblowers - such as the 17 complainants we identified - without protection from retaliation. By dismissing potentially legitimate complaints in this way, DOJ could deny some whistleblowers access to recourse, permit retaliatory activity to go uninvestigated, and create a chilling effect for future whistleblowers. We also found that DOJ and FBI guidance is not always clear that FBI employees reporting alleged wrongdoing to a supervisor or someone in their chain of command may not be a protected disclosure. Ensuring that guidance always clearly explains to whom an FBI employee can report wrongdoing will help FBI whistleblowers ensure that they are fully protected from retaliation. DOJ took from 2 to 10.6 years to resolve the 4 complaints we reviewed that DOJ adjudicated, and DOJ did not provide complainants with estimates of when to expect DOJ decisions throughout the complaint process. Providing such estimates would enhance accountability to complainants and provide additional assurance about DOJ management's commitment to improve efficiency. Further, DOJ offices responsible for investigating whistleblower retaliation complaints have not consistently complied with certain regulatory requirements, such as obtaining complainants' approvals for extensions of time. One investigating office does not track investigators' compliance with specific regulatory requirements and does not have a formal oversight mechanism to do so. Effectively monitoring investigators' compliance with such requirements could help assure complainants that their cases are making progress and that they have the information they need to determine next steps for their complaints. Why GAO Did This Study Whistleblowers help safeguard the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse - however, they also risk retaliation by their employers. For example, in 2002, a former FBI agent alleged she suffered retaliation after disclosing that colleagues had stolen items from Ground Zero following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. DOJ found in her favor over 10 years after she reported the retaliation. GAO was asked to review DOJ's process for handling such complaints. GAO examined (1) the time DOJ took to resolve FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints, (2) the extent to which DOJ took steps to resolve complaints more quickly, and (3) the extent to which DOJ complied with certain regulatory reporting requirements. GAO reviewed all DOJ case files for FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints DOJ closed from 2009 to 2013, and interviewed whistleblower attorneys, advocates, and government officials about the complaint process. The interview results are not generalizable. What GAO Recommends Congress may wish to consider whether FBI whistleblowers should have means to seek corrective action if retaliated against for disclosures to supervisors, among others. Further, GAO recommends that DOJ clarify guidance to clearly convey to whom employees can make protected disclosures, provide complainants with estimated complaint decision timeframes, and develop an oversight mechanism to monitor regulatory compliance. DOJ and the Office of the Inspector General concurred with GAO's recommendations.

Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 72p.

Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-112: Accessed February 25, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668055.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: United States

URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668055.pdf

Shelf Number: 134671

Keywords:
Corruption
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fraud
Whistleblowing (U.S.

Author: Kenyon, Will

Title: Diagnosing Bribery Risk: Guidance for the conduct of effective bribery risk assessment

Summary: Transparency International's guidance provides specific, practical advice based on real-life experience on how to conduct an effective bribery risk assessment. Identifying and evaluating bribery risk is essential to the design and implementation of an effective anti-bribery programme. It's fundamentally a management responsibility, supported by compliance, internal audit and other functions as appropriate. Law enforcement agencies and regulators around the world have made it clear that bribery risk assessment is the foundation of an anti-bribery programme. In the UK, risk assessment is one of the six principles enshrined in the Ministry of Justice Guidance and is also a focus of the thematic reviews carried out by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (now the Financial Conduct Authority or FCA). Furthermore, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) in the US have recently published their resource guide The Transparency International guide includes: - 10 good practice principles for bribery risk assessment - A risk assessment template - with an illustrated documented example - Bribery risk assessment process check list

Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2013. 60p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/678-diagnosing-bribery-risk

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/678-diagnosing-bribery-risk

Shelf Number: 135138

Keywords:
Bribes (U.K.)
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Risk assessment

Author: Messick, Richard E.

Title: Corruption risks in the criminal justice chain and tools for assessment

Summary: This U4 issue paper provides policymakers in developing nations, their citizens, and U4's partners in the donor community with an overview of where corruption is most likely to arise in the investigation, prosecution, trial, and incarceration stages of the criminal justice process. Each chapter focuses on a specific stage, providing a summary of the principal decision makers involved, the tasks they perform, the most common types of corruption risk, the tools available to assess the risks, and, where sufficient experience exists, an evaluation of the usefulness of these assessment tools. While some basic risk management approaches are noted, the emphasis is on analysis and assessment of problems. Much of what is known about corruption at the different stages of the criminal justice system comes from developed country experiences. In many cases, however, the drivers of corruption are the same across all countries. In using the available set of tools to assess corruption risks in criminal trials and appeals, the greatest challenge for practitioners is finding the relevant parts of general assessment tools that assess the particular corruption risks. The paper concludes with an appeal for integrated corruption risk assessment tools and accessible reporting. Only a sector-wide lens will allow identification of the linkages and dependencies within the criminal justice chain, providing a basis for targeted reform efforts and a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.

Details: Bergen, Norway: CHR. Michelsen Institute, Anti-corruption Resource Centre, 2014. 51p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-risks-in-the-criminal-justice-chain-and-tools-for-assessment/

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-risks-in-the-criminal-justice-chain-and-tools-for-assessment/

Shelf Number: 135402

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Investigation
Risk Assessment

Author: Passas, Nikos

Title: Financial intermediaries - Anti-money laundering allies in cash-based societies?

Summary: Many informal cash-based economies run parallel financial systems that are very different to the Western banking concept. Such countries are perceived to have a high risk of money laundering. Looking at Afghanistan, Somalia, and India - where anti-money laundering efforts have yielded mixed results - this paper draws lessons from the operations of financial intermediaries. These countries are considered high risk not only for money laundering and terrorism financing, but also for corruption and political and legal concerns. The issues at hand - risk assessments for remittances, strategies of engaging on the ground, resource management, and alternatives to the existing financial networks - are also valid for other cash-based, low-income societies. In fact, informal remittance channels may provide opportunities to strengthen regulatory and governance capacities.

Details: Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2015. 30p.

Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issue, April 2015, no. 10: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/financial-intermediaries-anti-money-laundering-allies-in-cash-based-societies/

Year: 2015

Country: Afghanistan

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/financial-intermediaries-anti-money-laundering-allies-in-cash-based-societies/

Shelf Number: 135403

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Risk Assessment
Terrorist Financing

Author: Dufwenberg, Martin

Title: Legalizing Bribe Giving

Summary: A model of "harassment bribes," paid for services one is entitled to, is developed to analyze the proposal to legalize paying these bribes while increasing fines on accepting them. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. Costs of verifying reports make the scheme more effective against larger bribes and where institutions' quality is higher. A modified scheme, where immunity is conditional on reporting, addresses some key objections. The mechanism works better against more distortionary forms of corruption than harassment bribes, provided monetary rewards can compensate bribers for losing the object of the corrupt exchange. Results highlight strong complementarities with policies aimed at improving independence and accountability of law enforcers.

Details: Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR, 2013. 35p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 13: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/igi/igierp/515.html

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/igi/igierp/515.html

Shelf Number: 135426

Keywords:
Bribes
Corruption
Whistleblowing

Author: Dimant, Eugen

Title: A Crook is a Crook ... But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption

Summary: This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination-country corruption levels. Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984-2008, we explore different channels through which corruption might migrate. We employ different estimation methods using Fixed Effects (FE) and Tobit regressions in order to validate our findings. Moreover, we also address the issue of endogeneity by using the Difference-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Independent of the econometric methodology, we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country's corruption level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the socio-economic implications associated with migration flows

Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, 2014. 42p.

Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper no. 5032: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2518956

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2518956

Shelf Number: 135433

Keywords:
Corruption
Immigrants and Crime
Immigration

Author: Kar, Dev

Title: Illicit Financial Flows to and from the Philippines: A Study in Dynamic Simulation, 1960-2011

Summary: This study presents a model of the drivers and dynamics of illicit financial flows to and from the Philippines over the period 1960-2011. Illicit flows through unrecorded balance of payments leakages and trade misinvoicing differ from broad capital flight which also includes flows of "normal" or legitimate capital. The larger implication is that models of capital flight that net out a mix of licit and illicit capital are fundamentally flawed. While legitimate capital flows that are recorded can be netted out, flows that are illicit in both directions cannot as the net result would be conceptually equivalent to net crime, an absurd concept. Hence, we argue that traditional models of capital flight understate the problem facing developing countries and they fail to acknowledge the adverse impact that flows in both directions have on them. In contrast, the narrower focus on illicit flows permits an analysis of inflows and outflows, which are treated as separate but interacting transactions that impact both the official and underground economies. Thereby the study affords a fuller understanding of how illicit flows impact a developing country. Starting with a structural equations model the estimation strategy culminates in a vector error correction procedure that yields four salient findings. First, there exists a clear link between illicit inflows and outflows with the latter possibly financing the former. Second, illicit financial inflows drive the underground economy and hamper tax collection. Third, illicit outflows of about US$4.5 billion per annum on average deplete the country's domestic savings, which could hamper sustainable economic growth in the long run. Finally, illicit flows have on average cost the government US$1.5 billion per year in lost tax revenues over the period of 2001-2011. The loss in revenues, representing about 37 percent of the social benefits budget of the consolidated state and local governments in 2011, is significant.

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2014. 56p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-to-and-from-the-Philippines-Final-Report.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Philippines

URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-to-and-from-the-Philippines-Final-Report.pdf

Shelf Number: 131843

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crime
Money Laundering
Tax Evasion
White Collar Crime

Author: Wyatt, Tanya

Title: Corruption and wildlife trafficking

Summary: Wildlife trafficking is a growing global concern. It takes place in all regions of the world with those nations with high biodiversity being the source and the consumers of the wildlife as well as transit areas and hubs for smuggled wildlife. It is a significant contributor to biodiversity loss and species extinction. Many if not most developing nations are rich in biodiversity and therefore must contend with wildlife trafficking. It is a critical concern for these nations' environment and economies. It has been documented that corruption is an essential component in the facilitation and perpetration of the illegal wildlife trade, but a comprehensive study into the scale, scope and structure has yet to be undertaken. This U4 Issue paper conducts a meta-study regarding corruption's role in wildlife trafficking from the available literature, interviews with experts and a case study of Vietnam in an attempt to highlight concerns for bilateral donors in regards to conservation, environment and law enforcement programmes.

Details: Bergen, NO: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2015. 48p.

Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issue no. 11: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-wildlife-trafficking/

Year: 2015

Country: Vietnam

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-wildlife-trafficking/

Shelf Number: 136038

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Money Laundering
Trafficking in Wildlife
Wild Animal Trade
Wildlife Crimes

Author: Ross, Cameron

Title: It's All About Money: Crime in the Caribbean and Its Impact on Canada

Summary: For most Canadians, the Caribbean is a place to take an idyllic break from winter. Sandy beaches and warm temperatures lure Canadians to the islands. Interaction with the local population is mostly limited to those who work in hotels and bars. What actually happens in the local communities is generally lost on the average Canadian. Appreciating the large Caribbean diaspora in Toronto and Montreal, the connections are dynamic between those sun-baked Caribbean communities and Canadian society. While those linkages are generally positive, there are disturbing trends in crime in the Caribbean. Herculean efforts are being made by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the regional Caribbean Development Bank to build regional capacity in governance and criminal justice systems. There is, however, a lack of political will by some Caribbean leaders to implement recommendations that would greatly improve citizen security and national institutions. Scholarly and professional studies have made recommendations for the security sector that are achievable, but the political will in many countries has been lagging. The Caribbean drug trade has long held the spotlight, but money laundering is increasingly a concern, especially with evidence of linkages between terrorist groups resident in Central America and Venezuela, which have close proximity to the Caribbean Windward Islands. Post-9/11 financial tools, utilized under the U.S. Patriot Act, have been effective in dealing with rogue governments, corrupt officials, and transnational criminal gangs. However, the use of the Internet for financial transactions and the emergence of digital currencies have made regulatory control challenging. This is significant considering the Canadian tourism, banking, and resource development in the region that have caused steady flows of Canadians, money and expertise to the Caribbean. This paper reviews Caribbean crime and its trends and impacts on Canada, money-laundering trends, and highlights policies that could be reinforced to better curb these trends. Crime is a societal problem for which solutions are found within communities. This applies equally to the Caribbean and to Canada. It is in Canada's best interest to accelerate efforts to aid the region, especially in the area of citizen security and reforms of the criminal justice system. Multi-lateral programs aimed at building regional capacities in governance and criminal justice systems are the areas in which Canada can play an important role. The creation of a Canada-Caribbean institute would go a long way in conducting scholarly graduate-level research in fields of security-sector reform.

Details: Calgary: University of Calgary, School of Public Policy, 2014. 23p.

Source: SPP Research Papers, Vol. 7, issue 19: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/ross-caribbeancrime.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Caribbean

URL: http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/ross-caribbeancrime.pdf

Shelf Number: 136072

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Money Laundering
Terrorism

Author: Fraschini, Giorgio

Title: Illicit Assets Recovery in Italy.

Summary: Transparency International Italy (TI -It), in collaboration with the Chamber of Commerce of Naples, presents today, February 27th, the report "ILLICIT ASSETS RECOVERY IN ITALY - Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation" at the Chamber of Commerce in Naples. The report is the result of a research carried out within the European project "Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches" ( www.confiscation.eu), commissioned and funded by the European Commission. Transparency International Italy participates in the project along with two other national chapters of Transparency International: Transparency International Romania and Bulgaria. The cooperation among European partners is even more important now in light of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament two days ago in order to facilitate the confiscation proceedings and the cooperation among national authorities of EU Member States. The Italian report digs into our illicit assets confiscation system, through a detailed analysis of the legislation, interviews and statistics. It investigates the weaknesses of the system and also promotes practical recommendations. Considering the urgency of fighting corruption in Italy, confiscation of assets coming from illegal activities, such as corruption, becomes crucial, because it has both a punitive and preventive value. "Italian legislation reflects this duality, which is almost a unique worldwide: Italy has in fact both a criminal and preventive system of confiscation" - researchers Chiara Putaturo and Giorgio Fraschini say - "The strong precautionary power of confiscation lies mainly in the re-use of assets for social purposes. If properly implemented , it has a high educational and exemplary value for the entire community". Maria Teresa Brassiolo, Past President of Transparency International Italy, highlights one of the main risks: "Unfortunately, most confiscated companies are not efficiently managed. This must to be solved immediately. The weakness or the closure of legal businesses can create a strong negative image of a context where criminal organisations can run their activities and create jobs, hiding the dark side of illegality, such as tax evasion, labour and insurance violations. Criminals, at the same time benefit, without paying, from infrastructure , schools, hospitals, which are finanaced by citizens and legal firms". TI-It offers a list of recommendations: - A consolidated act of law on confiscation - Speeding up judicial and assignment procedures - Strengthening of the National Agency for the administration and the assignment of the goods seized and confiscated from criminal organizations - Computerising the system - Immediate availability of funds recovered through the sale of movable assets to support the effective management of immovable assets and companies - allocation and efficient use of resources of the Justice Unique Fund for the management of seized companies, too - Involvement of expert with managerial skills - Implementation of the support units at the Prefectures - Establishment of a monitoring system

Details: Naples: Transparency International Italia, 2013. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches" project report: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-IT_en_Illicit_Assets_Recovery_in_Italy.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Italy

URL: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-IT_en_Illicit_Assets_Recovery_in_Italy.pdf

Shelf Number: 136290

Keywords:
Asset Forfeiture
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Organized Crime

Author: Gaspar, Roger

Title: Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan: Counter-narcotics enforcement

Summary: This project was a three year plan to create small interagency mobile law enforcement groups called MOBITs based in south Kyrgyzstan to increase resources in the difficult border region with Tajikistan to interdict drug trafficking into the country. The concept included certain key ideas: interagency composition to enhance the cooperation between agencies and as a counter corruption component, special vetting and bonus payments to ensure a high level of integrity within the teams and training in special investigation techniques to expand their capacity for operations. The teams were also intended to participate in enhanced intelligence collection and analysis, improve the qualitative and quantitative information and knowledge within Kyrgyzstan on the extent of various types of crime and to engage in collaboration with law enforcement agencies of neighbouring and other countries. How they were to do this was poorly addressed. The teams were provided with vehicles, a separate base and advanced strongholds in the difficult border areas and the project implied a flexible rapid deployment when required and the ability to initiate operations from their own information sources. It appears to have been assumed that the provision of a correctly trained and resourced team was sufficient to achieve a new level of impact against drug trafficking and organised crime but a lack of development of information sources undermined the concept. The formal objectives were: Objective 1: Improve national interdiction results and investigative capacity Output 1 - establishment of joint mobile interdiction teams Output 2 - Enhancement of intelligence analysis/investigative capacity of the joint mobile interdiction teams Objective 2: Ensure integrity and sustainability of joint mobile interdiction teams Output 1 - system in place for the constant monitoring of integrity of mobile teams Output 2 - Mechanism for self-sustainability of joint mobile interdiction teams under development The project commenced in late 2007 after some procedural delays and concluded at the end of 2010. The initial host agency for the MOBIT teams was the Drug Control Agency and under their aegis and that of this project, four teams were constructed, based in Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan with advanced strongholds in Alay, Aidarken and Batken. Equipment and training was funded or provided the donor or CENTCOM on a bi-lateral basis. Initial results of interdiction were slow and at the mid term review in 2009, concern was expressed over performance levels. No issues were, however, raised over integrity. In late 2009, the then President, President Bakiyev abolished the DCA (the host agency) and transferred the MOBIT resources into the Ministry of Interior. As the independence of the Units had been an important aspect of the project and was thus compromised, the project was suspended at the request of the donor. In March, 2010, MOBITs were formally moved into the newly created Chief Department on Counter Drug Trafficking of the Ministry of the Interior and a request for the reinstatement of the project was accepted. Subsequently in August, 2010, President Otunbaeva established the new State Service on Drug Control and the MOBIT resources were to be moved from the MoI to the SSDC. This process of movement was slow and indeed some resources are not yet recovered. Following a further project revision, support was continued until the closure of the project at the end of December, 2010. The impact of the changes in host agency means that at the end of the project, there were no active MOBIT teams. The SSDC is, however, in the process of reconstructing the teams and approximately one third of the personnel have now been inducted. It is no fault of the project that the host agencies were changed. The implication for the evaluation is that most key interlocutors were no longer available and that the evaluation had to proceed by taking stock of what had been achieved under the DCA and MoI and what is planned under the SSDC. The evaluation found justification for the concept of interagency mobile teams that had been specially vetted and secured against corruption and the need for arrangements for a counter narcotics team to operate in the restricted border area. However, the value of confining such a special team to interdictions within the border area is not supported. Such a team is unique within Kyrgyzstan and can have a broader value. In this context it is interesting to note that while under DCA control, they were deployed, inter alia, on controlled deliveries indicating that they were at least from time to time operating in a broader role. The concerns over performance identified at the mid year review in 2009 are valid. MOBIT teams recovered only 6.6% of the total annual national heroin seizures in 2008, 7.7% in 2009 and 19.4% in the first seven months of 2010. Overall, seizures for the whole country fell between 2008 and 2010. This is a disappointing performance in the context of the project objectives for improving national interdiction results and in relation to the MOBITS is considered to be linked to the disappointing outcome of the aspirations of this project to enhance the intelligence and analysis ability of the teams. The objective to enhance the intelligence and analysis ability is entirely in the right direction. Drug trafficking is a highly skilled clandestine activity with few visible opportunities for law enforcement. Investments in the development of new sources of information, dedicated analysts and active management are essential to provide the opportunities for skilled teams such as MOBITs. However, the MOBIT teams are small units, their training has concentrated on special investigative techniques and it is doubtful if they had the capacity for developing the kind of enhanced intelligence collection and analysis envisaged in the project document. This was something better intended for development with the host agency - in which the MOBIT teams should obviously participate. Without better sources of information, it is difficult to see how the MOBIT teams could deliver the higher level of interdiction expected and whilst this was not articulated, it is assumed the principle behind the project concept was that there was either ample information waiting to be acted upon or once the threat of corruption was removed, there would be no shortage of information from which the MOBITs could benefit. Whether this is a correct deduction of the thinking at the time of the project concept, the reality has been that insufficient information appears to be available to lift the MOBIT teams to a new level of performance. Since the SSDC is currently rebuilding the MOBITs as envisaged in the project document, this will be an issue to be addressed.

Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 60p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/kgz_i75_establishment_of_interagency_law_enforcement_mobile_groups_in_kyrgyzstan_rev.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Kyrgyzstan

URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/kgz_i75_establishment_of_interagency_law_enforcement_mobile_groups_in_kyrgyzstan_rev.pdf

Shelf Number: 136346

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Enforcement
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Title: Organized Crime: A Cross-Cutting Threat to Sustainable Development

Summary: The international community has become increasingly aware of the extent to which organised crime serves as a spoiler of sustainable development. This realisation has been enshrined in a number of seminal reports. In 2005, the report of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, "In Larger Freedom," which identified the challenges preventing the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), highlighted organised crime as one of the principle threats to peace and security in the 21st century. The 2010 "Keeping the Promise" report of the Secretary-General recognised that in order to achieve the MDGs, there would need to be capacity to respond specifically to organised crime. The World Development Report 2011 concluded that both conflict and organised crime have the same detrimental effect on development, resulting in 20% less development performance. As such, combatting organised crime and promoting greater economic and social resilience to its most deleterious impacts has become an integral part of the 2012 "Action Agenda" of the Secretary-General, as a priority for achieving a stable world. While organised crime is not a new phenomenon, the spread, impact and forms of organised crime in the modern world are unprecedented. The effects of organised crime are being felt in fragile and developed nations alike, and in many parts of the world, organised crime creates the very conditions that allow it to thrive, resulting in a self-perpetuating cycle of insecurity and diverted development. In fragile states and in situations of peacebuilding and state consolidation, organised crime is an increasing threat. In a number of theatres, criminal groups and illicit flows have been proven to fund conflict and perpetuate violence and insecurity. It is widely recognised, for example, that illicit trafficking and organised crime played a pivotal role in reducing the credibility of the government and financing armed groups that prompted the collapse of the state in Mali in 2011. More recently in Libya, organised crime and the armed groups that perpetrate it are having a decisive impact on the country's development, undermining transitions to stability, obstructing the functioning of central state institutions, holding the democratic process hostage, disenfranchising citizens and increasing the insecurity and life chances of communities. Organised crime and related corruption have been seen to reach up to the highest levels of government and the state, impacting stability, governance, development and the rule of law. Even in what are considered strong and prospering states, organised crime has a serious corrosive effect. A number of recent studies in Africa, for example, have demonstrated that while much of the continent is admired for its active civil society and free media, there is a very real danger of internal decay as organised crime and the associated corruption undermine state institutions. Weaknesses in public and private structures can result in the diversion of resources away from critical infrastructure and governmental services, including the provision of health, education and social welfare. Poverty and inequality are associated with increases in organised crime, not least in relation to human trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit goods, the production of illicit crops, and everyday extortion and bribery. Prominent examples of these insidious relationships are visible in Central and South America; South, West and North Africa; and areas of Eastern Europe, where a combination of drug cartels, transnational gangs, money laundering entities and public entities are colluding with critical effects on human security and development. Moreover, there is a growing body of anecdotal evidence of the myriad ways organised crime negatively impacts the environment, such as by destroying biodiversity, threatening key species, or reducing the sustainability of ecosystems. In dealing with fisheries and marine ecosystems, addressing the problem of large-scale illegal fishing has become more urgent than other research priorities. In fields like sustainable forestry, a substantial proportion of development assistance is being diverted through illegal logging. Drug trafficking has also been a cause of deforestation of large portions of the Amazon and the Isthmus of Panama.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: The Initiative, 2015. 96p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Organized%20Crime%20as%20a%20Cross-Cutting%20Threat%20to%20Development%20-%20January%202015.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Organized%20Crime%20as%20a%20Cross-Cutting%20Threat%20to%20Development%20-%20January%202015.pdf

Shelf Number: 136348

Keywords:
Corruption
Illicit Goods
Offenses Against the Environment
Organized Crime
Poverty
Sustainable Development

Author: Downs, Fiona

Title: Rule of law and environmental justice in the forests: The challenge of 'strong law enforcement' in corrupt conditions

Summary: Widespread illegal forest activities have contributed to deforestation, forest degradation, economic losses to nations and injustices for forest communities in many countries. Promoting rule of law, particularly through 'strengthening law enforcement', is an important part of improving forest management and ensuring justice for forest dependent communities. This includes strengthening police and the courts to better detect and punish illegal forest activities. However, available evidence has shown that strong law enforcement activities often fail to address broader systems of illegal activities and can lead to further injustices. Corruption is one reason for these failures and is the focus of this U4 Issue Paper, which draws lessons from Cameroon and Indonesia. Efforts to strengthen law enforcement in the forests need to consider how corruption may interfere with successful detection and suppression of illegal activities. If they are to be successful, programmes promoting forest law enforcement in corrupt contexts also need to be sensitive to how they are implemented, with particular focus on the rights of forest dependent communities.

Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2013. 32 p.

Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issues, 2013, no. 6: Accessed August 24, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/rule-of-law-and-environmental-justice-in-the-forests-the-challenge-of-strong-law-enforcement-in-corrupt-conditions/

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/rule-of-law-and-environmental-justice-in-the-forests-the-challenge-of-strong-law-enforcement-in-corrupt-conditions/

Shelf Number: 136562

Keywords:
Corruption
Forest Law Enforcement
Forests
Illegal Logging
Offenses Against the Environment

Author: Fontana, Alessandra

Title: Making development assistance work at home: DfID's approach to clamping down on international bribery and money laundering in the UK

Summary: Corruption will remain a profitable crime in developing countries as long as counterparts in rich countries are willing to hide stolen resources. Working to improve governance in poor countries will only address part of the issues. To disrupt the mechanisms that enable illicit outflows, the UK Department for International Development is funding the City of London Police, the Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecution Service to increase investigations on money laundered by senior political figures in the UK. In 4 years, millions of pounds have been frozen and repatriated - indicating a shift in thinking in what counts as development work in a world with global patterns of corruption.

Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelson Institute, Anti- Corruption Resource Centre, 2011. 13p.

Source: Internet Resource: U$ Practice Insight, 2011:5: Accessed August 25, 2015 at; http://www.u4.no/publications/making-development-assistance-work-at-home-dfid-s-approach-to-clamping-down-on-international-bribery-and-money-laundering-in-the-uk/

Year: 2011

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/making-development-assistance-work-at-home-dfid-s-approach-to-clamping-down-on-international-bribery-and-money-laundering-in-the-uk/

Shelf Number: 136581

Keywords:
Asset Forfeitures
Bribery
Corruption
Money Laundering
Organized Crime

Author: Simpson, Dick

Title: Chicago and Illinois, Leading the Pack in Corruption

Summary: For a century and a half, public corruption has been a shameful aspect of both Illinois and Chicago politics. The Governor's mansion and Chicago City Council Chambers have long been the epicenters of public corruption. The extent and pervasiveness of bribery, fraud, stealing from the taxpayers, and illegal patronage have made the city and state national leaders of corruption. Our notorious reputations have provided fodder for scores of comedians and late night talk show hosts. But corruption is a serious problem that hurts all citizens who put their trust - and tax dollars - in the hands of politicians who abuse the power they are given. New public corruption conviction data from the U.S. Department of Justice shows the Chicago metropolitan region has been the most corrupt area in the country since 1976. In addition, the data reveal that Illinois is the third most corrupt state in the nation. The latest information, just released by the Justice Department, provides new evidence of the need for reforms to reduce rampant corruption in Chicago and Illinois. Since 1970, four Illinois governors have been convicted of corruption. Yet only seven men have held this office in this time, meaning more than half of the state's governors have been convicted in the past forty-two years. Otto Kerner, who served from 1961 until his resignation in 1968 to accept a federal judgeship, was convicted in 1973 of mail fraud, bribery, perjury, and income tax evasion while governor. Dan Walker, who served from 1973 - 1977, was convicted in 1987 of obtaining fraudulent loans for the business he operated after he left office. George Ryan, who served from 1999 - 2003, was found guilty in 2006 of racketeering, conspiracy and numerous other charges. Many of the charges were part of a huge scandal, later called "Licenses for Bribes," which resulted in the conviction of more than 40 state workers and private citizens. The scandal involved unqualified truck drivers receiving licenses in exchange for bribes that would ultimately end up in Ryan's campaign fund. The scandal came to light when a recipient of one of these licenses crashed in to a van and killed six children. But perhaps the most famous of all Illinois corrupt officials is Rod Blagojevich, who served from 2003 until his impeachment in 2009. Blagojevich was ultimately convicted in 2011 of trying to sell the U.S. Senate seat vacated by Barack Obama. Other charges included his attempting to shake down Children's Memorial Hospital for a campaign contribution in return for funding and his trying to extort a racetrack owner. Not to be outdone, the City of Chicago has seen its share of convicted officials. The first conviction of Chicago aldermen and Cook County Commissioners for accepting bribes to rig a crooked contract occurred in1869. Since 1973, 31 more aldermen have been convicted of corruption. Approximately 100 aldermen have served since then, which is a conviction rate of about one-third. In 1973 and 1974, four aldermen were convicted of bribery, income tax evasion and mail fraud in a scandal involving zoning changes. In the 1980s, three aldermen pleaded guilty or were found guilty in Operation Incubator, a major FBI investigation into Chicago corruption. The convictions included bribery, racketeering, extortion, mail fraud and tax evasion. Less than 10 years later, seven more aldermen were convicted as part of Operation Silver Shovel, another major FBI investigation into corruption in Chicago in the 1990s. Between 1996 and 1999 these seven were convicted of bribery, money laundering, fraud and tax evasion.

Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science and the Illinois Integrity Initiative of the University of Illinois� Institute for Government and Public Affairs, 2012. 17p.

Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report No. 5: Accessed August 27, 2015 at: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/leadingthepack.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Year: 2012

Country: United States

URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/leadingthepack.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Shelf Number: 136601

Keywords:
Bribes
Corruption
Extortion
Racketeering
Tax Evasion

Author: Gradel, Thomas J.

Title: Corruption in Cook County: Anti-Corruption Report Number 3

Summary: Cook County government has been a dark pool of political corruption for more than 140 years. The first public corruption scandal occurred in 1869 when a number of Cook County Commissioners accepted bribes to approve a fraudulent contract to paint city hall.1 During the last several decades, Cook County has been a center of corruption with scandals emerging in many different units of county government. By chronicling the cases we hope to call attention to the need for meaningful reform. When county government such as Cook County Clerk David Orr's office or Assessor James Houlihan's office do undertake meaningful reform, others sink back into the mire. Public or political corruption occurs when government officials use their public office for private gain or benefit. In Cook County government this includes outright bribes as well as campaign contributions made by individuals or corporations in exchange for jobs, inflated contracts or political favors. It includes ghost payroll jobs in which individuals get a paycheck but do no work. With an annual budget of more than $3 billion-dishonest public servants find many different ways to profit illegally. The purpose of this report is to summarize the many different forms of corruption and to recommend basic reforms that need to be enacted to clean up Cook County government. This report provides a roster of nearly 150 convicted Cook County politicians and government officials along with descriptions of each of their illegal schemes. It includes private citizens and businessmen who were also convicted in connection with public corruption scandals. There are eight individuals named who are under investigation or have been indicted but not yet convicted. Most of the information came through a careful search of newspaper articles and public records since 1970. The actual total of corrupt officials and their cohorts may be greater than the number we have listed. We are still working to document the many other grafters, crooks and cheats who work for the county or receive county contracts. Criminal convictions are just the tip of the iceberg in Cook County. For each corrupt official who is convicted-there may be dozens more who are involved in the same or similar schemes but escape prosecution. The pattern of political corruption in county government is widespread and not confined to a single unit of government. This report documents graft and corruption in the Cook County Board President's office, his Office of Employment and Training, the Highway Department and in the offices of the sheriff, assessor and treasurer as well as the Clerk of the Circuit Court. It details outright theft and bribery, as well as endemic patronage, nepotism, and cronyism. An especially egregious example was Judge Thomas J. Maloney. He was convicted in Operation Gambat of accepting thousands of dollars in bribes to fix felony cases including murder trials. Another outrageous example was Marie D'Amico convicted in Operation Haunted Hall of having three no-work jobs. D'Amico is the daughter of Alderman Tony Laurino and wife of then Deputy Commissioner of Chicago's Department of Streets and Sanitation John D'Amico, who did 2 years in federal prison for his involvement in the ghost payroll scheme. Finally, in addition to systemic corruption, county government is infested with conflicts of interest that often result in contracts being awarded to the friends, family and political cronies of public officials. These are not cases involving outright bribery but in Chicago parlance, they are evidence of the "culture of clout" and result in hiring unqualified candidates and awarding contracts with "theft written between the lines." It is a pattern of pervasive corruption and a culture of deceit that must be changed if county government is to provide honest, transparent, efficient and effective government to taxpayers at a cost we can afford.

Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science and the Better Government Association, 2010. 33p.

Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report no. 3: Accessed August 27, 2015 at: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber3.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Year: 2010

Country: United States

URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber3.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Shelf Number: 136603

Keywords:
Bribes
Corruption
Patronage
Political Corruption

Author: Gradel, Thomas J.

Title: The Depth of Corruption in Illinois: Anti-Corruption Report Number 2

Summary: Public corruption in Illinois has a long history dating from the first scandal involving Chicago aldermen and Cook County commissioners in the 1860s. At that time they participated in a crooked contract to paint city hall. Today, nearly a century and a half later, crooked contracts still cost the taxpayers millions of dollars a year and crooked politicians still go to jail. As we continue our study of public corruption, we have discovered that our original findings underestimated the level of corruption in recent years. We now know that more than 1500 individuals have been convicted of myriad forms of public corruption since 1970. Based upon the testimony before the Illinois Reform Commission and our own research, we now believe that the cost of corruption, or "corruption tax," for the Chicago and Illinois taxpayer is at least $500 million a year. This is based upon testimony before the commission that about 5% of state government contracts are given out to political cronies and campaign contributors and on our own tallies of the costs of the major scandals over the last four decades. In our last report we provided a detailed analysis of the 30 aldermen and former aldermen convicted of public corruption since 1970. In this report we describe some of the major scandals of the last four decades, a timeline of more than 375 convicted individuals at all levels of government, and a further analysis of some of the costs of corruption which have caused us to revise our estimate of the corruption tax. The details of these scandals and their costs are included in the appendices of this report. Our research on all aspects of corruption is continuing. But we provide this update to support the report of the Illinois Reform Commission and to contribute to the ongoing debate in the state legislature. Only comprehensive reforms can lessen the level of corruption in Chicago and Illinois, currently the capitals of corruption in the United States. Given the high cost of corruption, we cannot hope to adopt a prudent city, county, or state budget without reform. Otherwise we will continue to pay too much for government services; we will keep honest businesses from locating here; and we will slow economic recovery from the current recession. Citizens will continue to distrust government at all levels and consider tax increases unfair. Here are a few examples of some of the costs of corruption in a selection of major scandals. The costs of the Jon Burge police brutality scandal has already reached $33.2 million dollars and counting; the Governor Rod Blagojevich related scandals called "Board Games" have already cost taxpayers $22. million; the Governor George Ryan driver licenses scandals were $4.9 million; the ghost payroll scandals in "Haunted Hall" were $3 million; the "Incubator" bribery cases involving Chicago aldermen have cost more than $239,000; and bribery cases with building inspectors more than $23,000. These costs do not include tens of millions of dollars for investigating, prosecuting, and imprisoning these various public criminals. Since there have been 1500 convictions since 1970 for bribery, tax evasion, lying to the FBI, and obstructing justice, the costs of corruption have been enormous. Curbing public corruption is the first step in reestablishing trust and pride in our government. We support the reforms recommended by Governor Quinn's Illinois Reform Commission Proposals. Any hope of curing the "culture of corruption" or the "Chicago Way" which has prevailed since the 1860s requires a comprehensive program of mutually reinforcing reforms. These must include a mix of corruption prevention and enforcement measures along with public involvement and education. To pass these reforms and to implement them requires the development of a broad coalition of support. In this regard the recent Joyce Foundation public opinion poll shows more than 60% of Illinois residents name corruption as one of their top concerns (even more than the economy or jobs). And the survey reveals that more than 70% favor a number of specific reforms, such as limiting the campaign money that legislative leaders can contribute to other legislative candidates. These findings indicate that there is a greater possibility now - at this moment, as President Obama would say -- to build a broad coalition around a comprehensive reform program than ever before in the past half century. Efforts at reform should occur in all units of government and should move forward quickly while the level of public support, following the impeachment and removal of former Governor Rod Blagojevich, is at such a high level.

Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science, 2009. 66p.

Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report No. 2: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber2.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Year: 2009

Country: United States

URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/anti-corruptionreportnumber2.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Shelf Number: 136604

Keywords:
Bribes
Corruption
Political Corruption
Tax Evasion

Author: Qosaj-Mustafa, Ariana

Title: Strengthening Rule of Law in Kosovo: The Fight Against Corruption and Organised Crime

Summary: Since its declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo has undergone a number of state-building processes. In strengthening its capability and legitimacy towards citizens, it has been failing to meet up with societal expectations, particularly in ensuring rule of law governance. Fragile states struggle with development, weak economic investments and face difficulties in their democratic performances. In order to build a resilient state for its citizens, states should undertake continuous check efforts and evaluations to measure the level of their performance. In this regard, KIPRED has analysed Kosovo's current response to organised crime and corruption, in order to support the process of building a resilient state for its citizens. The past United Nations administration (UNMIK) failed to offer Kosovo's citizens an administration that prioritised respect for the rule of law. In the post-independent Kosovo there are increasing calls by civil society, media and international community players that Kosovo should strengthen its rule of law performance in order to strengthen its capability and legitimacy. Societal expectations in particular have been rising with the recent developments in the investigation of organised crime and corruption in Kosovo. The raising of expectations has come as a consequence of almost 10 years of hesitation by the UN mission to investigate and fight organised crime and corruption leading to the impunity of criminals. The UN justified its failure to fight organised crime and corruption because of the pressures exercised by powerful foreign countries in order to preserve 'peace and stability' in Kosovo. In addition, the recent investigations kicked off by the EULEX Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and their declarations on the hunt against 'big fishes' further increased social expectations and support for their acts. These actions also spurred debates around the will and the capacities of the mission and of Kosovo authorities to end almost 10 years of impunity in fighting organised crime and corruption. KIPRED has undertaken this analysis in order to evaluate the current response of Kosovo's authorities and the EU Rule of Law Mission towards organised crime and corruption in ensuring full respect for rule of law in Kosovo. At this crucial phase of its state building process, Kosovo will need to seriously show that it will tackle the problems of organised crime and corruption. This all has to happen in order to ensure full respect for rule of law that will remain as one of key priorities for a Kosovo aiming European Union accession in the coming years. This policy paper looked at the level of current response by analysing the regulation and enforcement capacities existing in Kosovo' judicial, prosecutorial and police services to investigate and fight organised crime and corruption. It closely looked at the executive government response and support provided to judicial, prosecutorial and police services. It does not evaluate the administrative capacities to fight corruption in depth but rather focuses on the judicial and prosecutorial capacities. The paper also identifies main challenges and proposes practical ways forward in overcoming the gaps identified.

Details: Prishtina, Kosovo: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED, 2010. 35p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper 2010/8: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/Strengthening_Rule_of_Law_in_Kosovo-_The_Fight_Against_Corruption_and_Organised_Crime_602831.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/Strengthening_Rule_of_Law_in_Kosovo-_The_Fight_Against_Corruption_and_Organised_Crime_602831.pdf

Shelf Number: 136606

Keywords:
Corruption
Kosovo
Organised Crime

Author: Litina, Anastasia

Title: Corruption and Tax Evasion: Reflections on Greek Tragedy

Summary: We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into. We address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents: citizens and politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes. Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. We show that multiple self-fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities, indicating that "corruption" may corrupt. Furthermore, we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. Instead, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium.

Details: Athens: Back of Greece, Economic Analysis and Research Department, 2015. 47p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 193: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper2015193.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Greece

URL: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper2015193.pdf

Shelf Number: 136614

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Political Corruption
Tax Evasion

Author: Turner, Duilia Mora

Title: Violent crime in post-civil war Guatemala: causes and policy implications

Summary: Guatemala is one of the most violent countries in Latin America, and thus the world. The primary purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question: what factors explain the rise of violent crime in post-civil war Guatemala? The secondary focus of this thesis is to identify the transnational implications of Guatemala's violence for U.S. policy. Guatemala's critical security environment requires the identification of causal relationships and potential corrective actions. This thesis hypothesizes that the causes of violent crime in post-conflict Guatemala are the combination of weak institutional performance and social factors. Determining that Guatemala is not a consolidated democracy, this thesis concludes that a flawed judicial system, inadequate police reform, and weak civil control over the armed forces have a direct causal effect on violent crime in Guatemala. Furthermore, an analysis of social factors demonstrates that these are not causal in nature but rather influential elements in the occurrence of violence.

Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 131p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 9, 2015 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45266/15Mar_Turner_Duilia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Year: 2015

Country: Guatemala

URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45266/15Mar_Turner_Duilia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Shelf Number: 136711

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Gang-Related Violence
Violence
Violent Crime

Author: Spanjers, Joseph

Title: Illicit Financial flows and Development Indices: 2008-2012

Summary: This June 2015 report, the latest in a series by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), highlights the outsized impact that illicit financial flows have on the world's poorest economies. The study looks at illicit financial flows from some of the world's poorest nations and compares those values to some traditional indicators of development-including GDP, total trade, foreign direct investment, public expenditures on education and health services, and total tax revenue, among others-over the period 2008-2012. The report also produces several scatter plots in which illicit flows values for all developing and emerging market nations are compared to key trade indicators and various development indices, such as human development, inequality, and poverty, to determine if correlations exist between the two. By two different measures of poverty, the study reveals a positive correlation between higher levels of poverty and larger illicit outflows. That is, countries with higher levels of illicit financial flows (relative to GDP) tend to struggle with higher levels of poverty.

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2015. 56p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-and-Development-Indices-2008-2012.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Illicit-Financial-Flows-and-Development-Indices-2008-2012.pdf

Shelf Number: 136786

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crime
Money Laundering
Poverty
Tax Evasion
White Collar Crime

Author: Voorhout, Jill Coster van

Title: Curbing Illicit Financial Flows: The Post-2015 Agenda and International Human Rights Law

Summary: Corruption, which was identified as a cross-cutting theme in our Institute's program of work for 2013, is not only a problem in its own right but also part of the "larger" issue of illicit financial flows (IFFs). Simply put, IFFs deprive governments in both developed and developing countries of resources that might otherwise be invested in public goods such as health, agriculture, infrastructure, and education. IFFs concern both illicit money and in- and outflows of money, and corruption is both their cause and consequence. Corruption often "generates" the illicit money, which also can stem from fraud or trafficking of persons, drugs, weapons, or other illegal goods. In addition, abuse of entrusted power for private gain - as corruption is commonly defined - often lures in in- and outflows of money - for instance, when illegal money is laundered to leave via the regular financial system or when local authorities negotiate tax concessions and incentives for (foreign) investment for states, companies, or individuals. Often corruption and IFFs are mutually reinforcing, and have a negative spiraling effect on a country's economy, weakens governance, and affects the rule of law. For example, illegal money fuels the commission of further crimes and the potential for in- and outflows of capital, whether legally or illegally "earned", poses opportunities for corruption and other illegal acts. Therefore, we include corruption under the definition of IFFs but exclude the legal practice of tax avoidance (as opposed to tax evasion, which is illegal per se). A comprehensive approach is taken to IFFs at the intersection of peace, security and justice, by combining perspectives of conflict prevention, rule of law, and global governance. The result is two policy recommendations: (i) to incorporate the rule of law in the post-2015 agenda, also under draft goal 12e aimed at tackling IFFs, and (ii) to use human rights obligations and responsibilities to curb IFFs. These recommendations are made to three audiences: (a) policymakers, who work at the national and international level and through multilateral institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (b) business representatives, who can contribute both positively and negatively to IFFs and their control, and (c) "facilitators" of IFFS such as lawyers and accountants. Our ultimate aim with these recommendations is to encourage post-2015 funding by a coalition of public-private and state-nonstate financiers, and promote human rights obligations for states and responsibilities for businesses, including law and accountancy firms, and "facilitators" of IFFS.

Details: The Hague: The Hague Institute for Global Justice, 2014. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 8: Accessed September 21, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/financial-crime/global/Hague%20Institute%20for%20Global%20Justice%20-%20Curbing%20Illicit%20Financial%20Flows%20Post%202015%20-%20May%202014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/financial-crime/global/Hague%20Institute%20for%20Global%20Justice%20-%20Curbing%20Illicit%20Financial%20Flows%20Post%202015%20-%20May%202014.pdf

Shelf Number: 136840

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering

Author: Ayogu, Melvin D.

Title: Illicit Financial Flows and Stolen Assets Value Recovery

Summary: Value recovery of stolen assets is both an enforcement of anti-money laundering laws and a potent weapon against corruption. When obtainable, it represents society's credible commitment to ensure that "crimes do not pay." We explore these linkages by reviewing international experiences on the implementation of value recovery. Lessons suggest country-level studies that are more likely to strengthen local initiatives, leading to regional strategies capable of improving negotiations for assistance and cooperation at the global level.

Details: Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute, 2014. 34p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 364: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP364.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP364.pdf

Shelf Number: 149108

Keywords:
Asset Forfeiture
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering

Author: Ayogu, Melvin D.

Title: Governance and Illicit Financial Flows

Summary: Insofar that it corrodes governance, engendering opportunistic crimes, grand corruption lies at the core of the problem of illicit financial flows. We identify at least two likely antagonistic circles in the illicit flow process - a virtuous circle and a vicious circle - both rooted in one common factor, namely, the strategic complementarity between corruption and governance. Also, we consider the scope of global governance architecture in encouraging banks to "do the crime, pay the fine, and do no time." Given this structure, the observed, rampant impudence of banks' participation in illicit financial flows is understandable and society would not be shocked should global mega-banks increasingly resemble a police establishment run by ex-convicts. Curbing illicit flows in such a circumstance would be daunting. Therefore, civil society must live up to its civic responsibilities by displacing the vicious cycle first through creating the right incentives for politicians to identify negatively with illicit financial flows.

Details: Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute, 2014. 38p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 366: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP366.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP366.pdf

Shelf Number: 137229

Keywords:
Asset Forfeiture
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering

Author: Transparency International UK

Title: Combating Money Laundering and Recovered Looted Gains: Raising the UK's Game

Summary: As an anti-corruption body, Transparency International UK (TI-UK) is concerned with preventing money laundering since the facility to launder the proceeds of corruption gives rise to the commission of bribery and corruption offences in the first place. TI helped international banks to establish the Wolfsburg Principles (the global anti-money laundering guidelines for private banking) in 2000. Reports by TI-UK in 2003 and 2004 focused on corruption and money laundering in the UK and the regulation of trust and company service providers, respectively. This report focuses on the following main areas: - Strengthening the UK's defences against dirty money with particular emphasis on improving due diligence by financial and other institutions and organisations required to conduct due diligence on Politically Exposed Persons; - Criminal and civil mechanisms for the recovery of assets that are the proceeds of corruption; and - Bolstering the efforts of the UK's law enforcement agencies and improving the UK's ability to help developing countries in identifying and recovering stolen assets through more efficient processes and procedures.

Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2015. 72p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game

Year: 2015

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game

Shelf Number: 137766

Keywords:
Asset Forfeiture
Corruption
Money Laundering
Proceeds of Crime

Author: Transparency International UK

Title: Gold Rush: Investment visas and corrupt capital flows into the UK

Summary: In this report "Gold rush: Investment visas and corrupt capital flows into the UK" Transparency International UK highlights how the UK's Tier 1 Investor scheme can be vulnerable as a tool to launder the proceeds of corruption from around the world. In particular, it is highly likely that substantial amounts of corrupt wealth stolen from China and Russia have been laundered into the UK through the UK's 'golden' visa programme. In return for $2m of qualifying investments, a foreign investor can receive a UK golden visa and, after five years, permanent residency in the UK. Our analysis shows that, out of 3,048 golden visas granted by the UK since the scheme began in 2008, 60% have been awarded to Chinese and Russian nationals. The Tier 1 Investor scheme is open to abuse through the lack of effective, up-front and transparent checks on Tier 1 Investor visa applicants by the UK authorities. If illicit money has entered the UK economy through the golden visa scheme, there are also widespread doubts as to whether the UK's system of anti-money laundering checks can be relied on to ensure that suspicions of money laundering of corrupt wealth are reported and acted upon in an effective manner. According to the Government's own assessment, the UK's anti-money laundering system has significant weaknesses in its supervisory structure and in terms of the level of compliance and reporting standards across relevant private sectors. To help prevent corrupt wealth from entering the UK through the golden visa scheme, we recommend that the UK Government: -Establish greater integrity and transparency in the Tier 1 Investor visa scheme -Improve mechanisms for international cooperation to identify and recover corrupt assets -Improve law enforcement capacity and the effectiveness of AML supervision in the UK

Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2015. 25p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/1347-gold-rush-investment-visas-and-corrupt-capital-flows-into-the-uk

Year: 2015

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/1347-gold-rush-investment-visas-and-corrupt-capital-flows-into-the-uk

Shelf Number: 137767

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Illegal Assets
Money Laundering

Author: Asian Development Bank

Title: Denying Safe Haven to the Corrupt and the Proceeds of Corruption

Summary: International cooperation among law enforcement agencies and prosecutorial authorities is a key in the fight against corruption. Corrupt officials hide and launder bribes and embezzled funds in foreign jurisdictions. Bribers often keep secret slush funds in banks abroad and launder the proceeds of their crimes internationally. Mutual legal assistance and extradition in corruption cases to gather evidence and bring fugitives to justice has become critical. States need to work together to use these tools more effectively. At present, international judicial cooperation is insufficient. This book captures the legal and practical challenges of mutual legal assistance and extradition, as well as solutions for improvement, discussed during a March 2006 training seminar in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Experts from 26 Asia-Pacific countries and countries party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention attended this ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific seminar on "Enhancing Asia-Pacific Cooperation on Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition, and the Recovery and Return of the Proceeds of Corruption".

Details: Manila: ADB/OECD, 2006. 167p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 16, 2015 at: http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/37574816.pdf

Year: 2006

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/37574816.pdf

Shelf Number: 137285

Keywords:
Corruption
Embezzlement
Proceeds of Crime

Author: Dougherty, Michael L.

Title: By the Gun or by the Bribe: Firm Size, Environmental Governance and Corruption Among Mining Companies in Guatemala

Summary: This U4 Issue discusses the corruption risks faced by mining companies in Guatemala, with a particular focus on the risks faced by small, "junior" mining companies primarily engaged in exploration. Several factors make such companies highly prone to engaging in corrupt behavior, especially when operating in weak institutional contexts: the highly competitive nature of the mining industry, the risky dynamics of the exploration stage, and the specific characteristics of junior companies - their short operational timelines, low reputational risks, highly mobile and flexible nature, and reliance on fickle venture capital. Additionally, public environmental governance, and in particularly the approval of the environmental impact assessment, represents a moment of acute vulnerability to corruption, particularly for junior companies. In order to mitigate corruption risks among junior mining companies, donor agencies should help to build community capacity to monitor mining operations, build central state government capacity for environmental governance, work with countries to improve the rigor for environmental impact assessment processes, increase the visibility and reputational risks for junior companies, and build cultures of compliance in junior companies' countries of origin as well as within companies.

Details: Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2015. 30p.

Source: Internet Resource: Chr. Michelsen Institute, U4 Issue Paper 2015:17 : Accessed December 3, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2668030

Year: 2015

Country: Guatemala

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2668030

Shelf Number: 137438

Keywords:
Bribes
Corruption
Mining Industry
Offenses Against the Environment

Author: Sundstrom, Aksel

Title: Understanding Illegality and Corruption in Forest Management: A Literature Review

Summary: This review synthesizes the literature studying illegality and government corruption in forest mangement. After discussing the theoretical connections between different types of corruption and illegal forest-related activities it describes the major trends in previous studies, examining cross-national patterns as well as local in-depth studies. Both theory and available empirical findings pro-vide a straightforward suggestion: Bribery is indeed a "door opener" for illegal activities to take place in forest management. It then discusses the implications for conservation, focusing first on international protection schemes such as the REDD+ and second on efforts to reduce illegality and bribery in forest management. Key aspects to consider in the discussion on how to design monitoring institutions of forest regulations are how to involve actors without the incentive to engage in bribery and how to make use of new technologies that may publicize illegal behavior in distant localities. The review concludes by discussing avenues for future research.

Details: Goteborg: University of Gothenburg, QOG The Quality of Government Institute, 2016. 39p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series 2016:1: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1558/1558576_2016_1_sundstrom.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: United States

URL: http://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1558/1558576_2016_1_sundstrom.pdf

Shelf Number: 137736

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Deforestations
Forest Management
Forests
Illegal Logging
Offenses Against the Environment

Author: Ribadu, Nuhu

Title: Show Me the Money: Leveraging Anti-Money Laundering Tools to Fight Corruption in Nigeria. An Insider Story

Summary: The Financial Action Task Force was created during the 1989 G-7 summit in Paris in response to growing concerns over money laundering. It is an intergovernmental body that develops policies and measures to prevent criminals from using the financial system. It studies money laundering and terrorism financing trends and techniques, develops and promotes adequate measures to fight these financial crimes, and monitors its 34 member countries' progress implementing these measures. In 1990, the task force published a plan of action to fight money laundering embodied in a set of 40 recommendations. These recommendations were revised in 1996, and again in 2003, to reflect the evolution of money laundering techniques. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF mandate was expanded to support the global fight against terrorism. In October 2001, the Task Force published another set of eight recommendations, dealing specifically with terrorism financing. Another recommendation was added in October 2004, completing what is now known as the FATF's 40+9 Recommendations. These recommendations cover the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulations, and international cooperation. They are meant to prevent financial institutions from becoming safe havens for criminal activities. In the late 1990s, the FATF cast its net beyond its members with an initiative seeking to identify major weaknesses in anti-money laundering systems worldwide. The idea was to encourage countries identified as weak links to implement international standards. In 2000 and 2001, the task force reviewed laws and regulations in 47 countries, selected on the basis of FATF members' experience. The review pitted rules and practices in these countries against 25 criteria. Of the 47 countries, 23 were found to be severely lacking and were declared non-cooperative. Nigeria was one of these 23 black sheep. In June 2001, following the lack of response to its letters, the FATF concluded that Nigeria was unwilling or unable to cooperate in the review of its system, and therefore should be blacklisted. The task force noted a lack of obligation from financial institutions to identify their clients or report suspicious transactions, inadequate criminalization of money laundering, incompetence or corruption within government, judicial or supervisory authorities, and an obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to requests. In 2002, the U.S. Treasury followed suit and issued an advisory warning to its financial institutions to use extra caution and scrutiny when dealing with transactions involving Nigeria. This was bad news for Nigeria. Being branded as non-cooperative meant that Western financial markets held up their noses. Financial institutions around the world, and particularly those in major financial centers, further scrutinized transactions involving Nigeria, resulting in crippling delays. Nigerian banks had trouble dealing with foreign counterparts. Nigerians wanting to do business abroad faced extra hurdles and were viewed with suspicion. Foreign banks were hesitant to grant letters of credit or loans to Nigerians. The country was becoming a financial pariah. Unlike the high echelons of government, which were blissfully unaware of the FATF decision for a while, local banks and businesses were directly affected and knew all about it. At the same time, Nigerian authorities were keen to obtain relief from the $30 billion in foreign debt owed to the Paris Club of creditors. In a country blessed with such mineral wealth, this crippling debt was another symptom of the mismanagement and corruption that had plagued Nigeria for decades. With the FATF frowning at Nigeria's financial practices and safeguards - or lack thereof - donors were unlikely to be in a debt-forgiving mood. Failure to correct course could result in escalating measures from the FATF. The original blacklisting meant that foreign financial institutions were advised to use extra caution when dealing with Nigeria. But continued failure to cooperate could result in FATF member countries adopting further countermeasures, which could ultimately result in the suspension of all financial transactions with Nigeria.

Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010. 76p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Showmethemoney.pdf?resourceurlname=Showmethemoney.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Nigeria

URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Showmethemoney.pdf?resourceurlname=Showmethemoney.pdf

Shelf Number: 137739

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Proceeds of Crime
Terrorist Financing

Author: Financial Action Task Force

Title: Specific Risk Factors in Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption: Assistance to Reporting Institutions

Summary: 1. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, the first FATF Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) effort in the area of corruption, discussed the interrelationship between corruption and money laundering, discovered the most common methods used to launder the proceeds of corruption, and highlighted the vulnerabilities leading to an increased risk of corruption-related money laundering. It listed some of the most significant grand corruption cases and created a useful historical understanding and reference point for further work in understanding the interrelationships between corruption and money laundering. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption ultimately concluded that significant acts of corruption are fruitless without the politically exposed person (PEP) involved having a secondary capability to move and disguise the proceeds of his crime. 2. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption identified areas in which future work could be done, including gaining an understanding of the correlation between certain risk factors and corruption. It also concluded that while effective anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CTF) systems can assist in the detection of the proceeds of corruption and prevent the perpetrators of corruption-related offences from enjoying the proceeds of corruption, historically, reporting institutions have not been effective in detecting corruption-related proceeds. This has occurred for a number of reasons, including that in a number of instances, reporting institutions have failed to engage in appropriate customer identification or otherwise failed to apply AML/CFT controls effectively. In some instances, they were actually complicit, and sometimes willfully blind, in the laundering of funds. 3. This paper is written to assist reporting institutions - those financial and non-financial institutions that have a legal obligation to file suspicious transaction reports, or otherwise engage in AML/CFT due diligence - to better analyse and better understand specific risk factors that may assist them in identifying situations posing a heightened risk of corruption-related money laundering risk. It seeks to answer the question: Are there specific types of business relationships, customers, or products which should lead a reporting institution to pay particular attention to the risk of corruption-related money laundering? As with all FATF typology projects, we seek to answer the question by looking to reported cases to see if we can detect commonalities. In addition, we draw on the industry's and academia's best thinking about risk, as reflected in the published literature, to determine what situations truly represent risk. 4. Within the FATF standards3, Recommendation 12 requires a reporting entity to have in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP. It must also take specific measures, in addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures for business relationships, with foreign PEPs: senior management approval for establishing (or continuing) business relationships, take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth or funds, and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring. For domestic PEPs and persons entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation, reporting institutions are required to apply the specific enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures set out in Recommendation 12 where there is a higher-risk business relationship. This scrutiny stands at the forefront of the effort to detect and deter the laundering of proceeds of corruption and is certainly necessary. The premise behind the effort is clear: customers in these categories can pose an inherently high risk for money laundering. 5. Understanding risk within the Recommendation 12 context is important for two reasons: First, Recommendation 12 requires a reporting entity to have "appropriate" risk management systems in place to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner is a foreign PEP, and take "reasonable measures" to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or an individual entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation. To gauge whether a system is "appropriate," or whether "reasonable measures" have been taken, requires an assessment of risk. Second, understanding risk is important after identifying domestic PEPs or relevant individuals from international organisations, in order to assess what level of EDD is necessary. 6. Moreover, experience teaches us that combating corruption-related money laundering must be more than simply ensuring that PEPs receive an appropriate level of scrutiny. Rather, an effective AML scheme requires an assessment of corruption-related risk and protecting against the laundering of corruption proceeds across the spectrum of customers and business relationships, regardless of whether a FATF-defined PEP is involved. 7. Such an approach acknowledges the realities of the methods of laundering the proceeds of corruption. It is a rare case (although not unheard of) for a PEP to enter a financial institution and deposit (or transfer) significant amounts of suspicious money; such action would likely create unacceptable risks to the PEP of detection by reporting institutions. Instead, as Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption noted, corrupt PEPs will take great pains to disguise the identity and the source of the funds in order to place corrupt money in the financial system without suspicion. PEPs use corporate vehicles, sophisticated gatekeepers, cash, and countries with weak money laundering controls to disguise their funds. Their corrupt transactions will often involve an intermediary of some kind, (including family members and close associates), whether within the PEP's jurisdiction or beyond. In some cases, corrupt PEPs will also try to control the mechanisms of detection and regulation within their home jurisdiction to "game the system" in order to disguise the proceeds before the money gets to another jurisdiction. In such cases, implementation of Recommendation 12 by other jurisdictions is necessary, but is not sufficient to detect and deter the movement of corrupt proceeds.

Details: Paris: FATF, 2012. 48p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf

Shelf Number: 137796

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Proceeds of Crime
Terrorist Financing

Author: International Crisis Group

Title: Crutch to Catalyst? The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala

Summary: Guatemala - one of Latin America's most violent, unequal and impoverished countries - is enjoying a rare moment of opportunity. A new president, Jimmy Morales, bolstered by a landslide victory, has taken office promising to end corruption. The old political elite is in disarray. Emboldened citizens are pressing for reforms to make justice more effective and government more transparent. Behind these changes is a unique multilateral experiment, the UN-sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), whose investigators work with national prosecutors to dismantle criminal networks within the state. CICIG is not a permanent fix, however. Guatemala will lose its opportunity unless national leaders assume the fight against impunity as their own, approve stalled justice and security sector reforms and muster the financial resources to strengthen domestic institutions. CICIG began operations in 2007 to investigate clandestine security groups that continued to operate within the state following the 1996 accords that ended 36 years of intermittent armed conflict. Such groups still undermine the state, though their main goal now is economic power, not elimination of political opponents. International support and financing guarantee the commission's independence, though it operates under Guatemalan laws. Unlike traditional capacity-building efforts, it not only trains, but also works side by side with national prosecutors and police, providing them with the necessary technical expertise and political autonomy to hold powerful suspects accountable before the law. CICIG has promoted and helped implement legislation to create a witness protection program, tighten gun controls, establish rules for court-ordered wiretaps and asset forfeiture and institute high-risk courts for the trial of particularly dangerous defendants. At the same time, it has carried out complex, high-profile probes that resulted in charges against a former president for embezzlement, an ex-minister and other top security officials for extrajudicial executions and dozens of additional officials and suspected drug traffickers for fraud, illicit association and homicide. The commission has faced significant setbacks and limitations, however. Some high-profile cases have ended in acquittal. Key reforms, such as a judicial career law, have stalled in Congress. While it has helped strengthen certain specialised prosecutorial units, the public prosecutor's office remains overstretched, even absent, in much of the country. Other institutions essential for combatting impunity - notably the civilian police and judiciary - are still weak, vulnerable to corruption and largely unaccountable. The most dramatic blows it has delivered against impunity came in 2015 with the arrest of almost 200 officials for corruption, including a multi-million dollar scheme to defraud customs. Working with national prosecutors, CICIG collected and analysed massive amounts of evidence. The evidentiary trail, according to prosecutors, led to President Otto Perez Molina, who resigned (though denying any criminal activity) and now awaits trial in a military prison. Much of CICIG's recent success is due to the determination and persistence of its current commissioner, Ivan Velasquez, a jurist known for uncovering the links between politicians and paramilitary structures in his native Colombia. CICIG cannot function, however, without the close collaboration and support of Guatemalan prosecutors. Very different attorneys general - Claudia Paz y Paz, a former human rights activist, and Thelma Aldana, a veteran jurist - have shown the independence and courage to pursue complex, controversial cases against powerful suspects. A crucial ingredient is popular support. Both the commission and public prosecutors enjoy wide approval among citizens exhausted by violent crime and corruption. The investigations spawned a broad civic movement for justice reform and government transparency. In a country long polarised by ideological, economic and ethnic differences, the anti-corruption crusade has at least temporarily united groups ranging from business associations to labour unions, urban professionals to indigenous leaders. Anger over government fraud holds this movement together, rather than any clear agenda for change. Elected leaders should channel discontent into positive action by initiating a national debate on the reforms needed to strengthen justice and encourage accountability. Morales, a former television comedian, campaigned as the anti-politician. He has yet to put forward a clear reform program, including new legislation to guarantee the independence of judges and prosecutors, toughen campaign-financing laws and create honest, professional civilian police. Moreover, a weak, underfunded state needs to enact fiscal and tax reforms so that its justice institutions have the resources needed to pay good salaries, provide decent working conditions and extend their coverage across the country. CICIG's mandate ends in September 2017, though the president wisely has proposed extending it. International assistance cannot last indefinitely, however. The commission is Guatemala's best opportunity for genuine justice reform, and it should not be wasted, but the government must start planning for its departure by fortifying its own capacity to fight crime and corruption.

Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 56: Accessed March 2, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/056-crutch-to-catalyst-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala

Year: 2016

Country: Guatemala

URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/056-crutch-to-catalyst-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala

Shelf Number: 138031

Keywords:
Corruption
Poverty
Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime
Violence
Violent Crime

Author: Hafner, Marco

Title: The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Organised Crime and Corruption: Annex II - Corruption

Summary: Corruption is a phenomenon with significant negative consequences for the EU and its Member States. This research paper uses a mix of methodologies to quantify the overall costs of corruption in the EU in economic, social and political terms. The findings, based on new analysis, suggest that corruption costs the EU between L179bn and L990bn in GDP terms on an annual basis. Current anti-corruption measures relevant to Member States and the EU as a whole are described and their effectiveness in reducing the levels of, and opportunities for, corruption are assessed. Eight potential areas for EU action are identified that might address the barriers to the effectiveness of current measures. The costs of non-Europe are calculated in relation to two of these, as well as in relation to the implementation of recently created EU laws.

Details: Brussels: European Parliament Research Survey, 2016. 157p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_STU(2016)579319_EN.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_STU(2016)579319_EN.pdf

Shelf Number: 138412

Keywords:
Corruption
Costs of Corruption
Economic Crimes
Fraud

Author: Queensland Organised Crime Commission of Inquiry

Title: Report

Summary: The Commission commenced on 1 May 2015, by Commissions of Inquiry Order (No. 1) 2015, to make inquiry into the extent and nature of organised crime in Queensland and its economic and societal impacts. The otherwise very broad nature of such an inquiry was somewhat narrowed by the Terms of Reference within the Order in Council, which focused the Commission on four key areas: - the major illicit drug and/or precursor markets - online child sex offending, including the child exploitation material market - financial crimes, primarily investment/financial market fraud and financial data theft - the relationship between organised crime and corruption in Queensland. The Commission was also required to investigate the extent to which organised crime groups use various enabling mechanisms or services: in particular, money laundering, cyber and technology-enabled crime, identity crime, professional facilitators, violence and extortion. In carrying out the Inquiry, the Commission was to examine the adequacy and appropriateness of current responses to organised crime by law enforcement, intelligence, and prosecution agencies, as well as the adequacy of legislation and of the resources available to such agencies. The six-month timeframe given for the Inquiry was limited, given the areas required to be examined.

Details: Sydney: The Commission, 2015. 578p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://www.organisedcrimeinquiry.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/935/QOCCI15287-ORGANISED-CRIME-INQUIRY_Final_Report.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Australia

URL: https://www.organisedcrimeinquiry.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/935/QOCCI15287-ORGANISED-CRIME-INQUIRY_Final_Report.pdf

Shelf Number: 138491

Keywords:
Child Sexual Exploitation
Corruption
Cybercrime
Drug Markets
Drug Trafficking
Financial Crimes
Identity Theft
Money Laundering
Motorcycle Gangs
Organized Crime

Author: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Title: Tracking Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Commitments. A Progress Report and Recommendations for Action

Summary: At the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana in 2008, more than 1 700 participants from governments, aid agencies and civil society organizations came together to review progress on the Paris Declaration and to define the steps forward to further improve aid effectiveness. One result was the Accra Agenda for Action, in which donor countries committed themselves to fight corruption, in particular to "take steps in their own countries to combat corruption by individuals or corporations and to track, freeze, and recover illegally acquired assets." This declaration created momentum in the international fight against corruption, addressing a facet that had hitherto been largely neglected by the international development community, but which has important repercussions worldwide. Vast sums of financial assets are stolen from developing countries and hidden in financial centers around the world - money that could provide education, food or health services to the poor. Estimates reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and, although, there is some disagreement about these figures, it is clear that they probably exceed the level of official development assistance by a significant margin. Those stolen assets can be returned to their lawful owners and used for development programs, sending a clear message to corrupt political leaders that OECD countries are prepared to take action against corrupt practices at home. This publication reviews the compliance of 30 OECD donor countries with the anti-corruption commitments they made in Accra. It assesses progress in combating corruption and in tracking and recovering illegal assets to inform decision-makers of progress at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which will be held in Busan in November 2011. The report shows that four countries - Australia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States - have repatriated a total of USD $ 227 million to foreign jurisdictions between 2006 and 2009, with another two countries - France and Luxembourg - having frozen assets pending a court decision. Assets frozen total slightly over USD $ 1.2 billion. The findings of the report highlight the need to develop a concrete follow-up action plan in Busan, as most countries have not yet taken sufficient steps to translate the commitments they made in Accra into policies generating concrete results. However, positive examples show that, with strong political leadership and institutional mechanisms in place, important results can be achieved in the fight against corruption and asset recovery.

Details: OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2011. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Anti-corruption-and-Asset-Recovery-commitments-%28Accra%29.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Anti-corruption-and-Asset-Recovery-commitments-%28Accra%29.pdf

Shelf Number: 138496

Keywords:
Asset Forfeiture
Corruption
Financial Crime
Proceeds of Crime

Author: Bybee, Ashley Neese

Title: Narco State or Failed State? Narcotics and Politics in Guinea-Bissau

Summary: Drug-funded insurgencies in Latin America and more recently in Afghanistan have prompted the use of the term "Narco-State" to describe those countries that have fallen victim to drug cultivation, narco-corruption, trafficking and related activities. In around 2005, West Africa emerged as a major transit hub for Latin American Drug Trafficking Organizations transporting cocaine to Western Europe, prompting many observers to label several countries in the region as the world's newest "Narco-States." The absence of a standard definition for a "Narco-State," however, has compelled many to question the purpose of this designation, asking not only "what is a Narco-State" but "so what?" Moreover, the vulnerability of Transit States - i.e. states through which drugs are transported - to these pressures adds another interesting dimension, begging the question "can Transit States also succumb to the pressures of an illicit drug trade without cultivating drugs within their borders?" and "to what extent?" Lastly, the latest trend of drug traffickers to exploit weak and failed states, such as Guinea-Bissau and its neighbors in West Africa, adds yet another layer of unanswered questions such as "how do the impacts of drug trafficking differ in states with various degrees of institutional strength and capacity?" Using Guinea-Bissau as the primary case study and comparing it with the experiences of four other geographically, economically, and institutionally diverse Transit States, this research seeks to clarify the impacts that the drug trade has on weak and failing states, and how - if at all - those states can become destabilized by this phenomenon.

Details: Washington, DC: George Mason University, 2011. 450p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April, 2, 2016 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/6618/BYBEE%20Signed%20Dissertation%20Failed%20State%20or%20Narco%20State%20Politics%20and%20Narcotics%20in%20Guinea%20Bissau.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Year: 2011

Country: Guinea-Bissau

URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/6618/BYBEE%20Signed%20Dissertation%20Failed%20State%20or%20Narco%20State%20Politics%20and%20Narcotics%20in%20Guinea%20Bissau.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Shelf Number: 138529

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Trafficking
Drug Trafficking Control
Illicit Trade

Author: Verite

Title: An Exploratory Study on the Role of Corruption in International Labor Migration

Summary: In the 2013 white paper, "Corruption and Labor Trafficking in Global Supply Chains," Verite detailed how fraud, corruption, bribery, and other illegal practices are common features of the international recruitment of migrant workers. The myriad official approvals, documents, and associated fees - foreign worker quotas, job order attestations, exit and guest worker visas, medical certifications, police clearances, work permits etc. - required to deploy a migrant worker from one country to another mean the opportunities and incentives for employers and their recruitment agents to bribe civil servants have become a structural feature of the international labor migration process. Since recruitment agents and employers ultimately transfer most, if not all, of the upfront costs of employment to foreign migrant workers, both of these forms of recruitment-related corruption directly contribute to the excessive and illegal fee burdens frequently faced by migrant workers. In this way corruption is a significant contributing element to migrant worker vulnerability to debt bondage, human trafficking, and forced labor. Further, Verite and others have pointed out that the corrupt activities all too common in migrant worker recruitment also create potential legal risk for companies under origin and destination country laws as well as extraterritorial anti-corruption statutes such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the UK Bribery Act (UKBA). Because multinationals can be liable for the acts of their foreign subsidiaries, franchisees, joint venture entities, and even suppliers that use third party employment agencies under a number of legal theories including traditional agency principles, the risk arises where corrupt payments result in a direct or indirect benefit to an employer - an improper advantage - through cheap migrant labor or the avoidance of the upfront costs of employment. Ironically, these many procedures and requirements that are so vulnerable to corruption were often put in place to protect workers and ensure regular process in the highly complex governance of international migration. The governments' responsibilities to protect the labor and human rights for migrants and to regulate a growing, dynamic private recruitment sector are not in question. Nor is the fact that legitimate private labor recruiters can play an important role in connecting workers with much-needed jobs; indeed, good recruiters are seeking to reform and reinvent the system. There is a flurry of efforts underway by governments, unions, civil society organizations, recruiters, employers, and international institutions like the ILO and IOM to reform the systems in place. Yet, even as reform efforts proceed apace, as this report outlines, "pay-to-play" kickback commissions and other corruption payments are all too common in the migration process; understanding the nature and extent of those payments is vital to reforming the process. Indeed, the lack of deep knowledge of the role of corruption in the process is a very real threat to the success of reform efforts. With new policies and procedures being proposed or enacted every month in countries around the world, it is vital that deeper understanding is achieved of the nature and extent of corruption. Corruption occurs for many reasons and eliminating controls and processes because corruption is attached to them is by no means the proper approach. Reform efforts themselves will generate unintended consequences in terms of corruption risk and new costs and threats to migrants. Hence, much humility and patience are called for as a wide range of institutions globally promote new models to protect workers.

Details: Amherst, MA: Verite, 2016. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: https://www.verite.org/sites/default/files/images/Verite-Report-Intl-Labour-Recruitment_0.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: https://www.verite.org/sites/default/files/images/Verite-Report-Intl-Labour-Recruitment_0.pdf

Shelf Number: 138606

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Debt Bondage
Forced Labor
Human Trafficking
Migrant Workers
Migrants

Author: Katsarova, Ivana

Title: Match-fixing: Issues and policy responses

Summary: As sport has grown increasingly popular worldwide, it has become a greater target for individuals and groups of people wishing to take advantage of its lucrative aspects. A conservative Interpol estimate for the period 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013 indicates that match-fixing - i.e. the manipulation of results of sporting contests, or elements within a game - has been reported in over 70 countries across six continents, for football alone. Globalisation has further aggravated the phenomenon, with transnational criminal organisations taking advantage of changes in regulations, and flaws in legal and judicial systems. Various sports have been affected by match-fixing, even though most cases occur in cricket, football, and tennis. Contests are not always rigged by individual players or referees; some cases involve coaches, club managers, and more unexpectedly, maintenance staff. Match-fixing is often linked to gambling, with criminal networks exploiting unregulated gambling markets, notably in Asia. In the EU, the Framework Decisions on combatting corruption and the fight against organised crime underpin the operational work carried out by Europol and Eurojust. However, their provisions are still insufficiently well enacted by EU countries. The impact of international legal instruments, such as the United Nations and Council of Europe conventions, is also limited, since their provisions are not mandatory. In this context, the International Olympic Committee, due to its political, social and sporting authority, appears as a key factor in the continuing fight against manipulation in sport.

Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 10p.

Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580891/EPRS_BRI(2016)580891_EN.pdf at:

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580891/EPRS_BRI(2016)580891_EN.pdf

Shelf Number: 138607

Keywords:
Corruption
Gambling
Organized Crime
Sporting Events
Sports Betting

Author: Goodrich, Steve

Title: Paradise Lost: Ending the Uk's role as a safe haven for corrupt individuals, their allies and assets

Summary: Paradise Lost is a thorough analysis of the UK's role in global corruption, outlining the multitude of ways in which the UK is enabling corrupt individuals to enjoy luxury lifestyles and cleanse their reputations. This includes: -The ability to buy UK property anonymously through foreign companies. -The UK's Overseas Territories offering secretive company ownership -Lack of powers for law enforcement to seize stolen assets. -Role of UK based accountants, lawyers, estate agents and other "professional enablers" in making it easy for corrupt individuals to hide their cash. -An anti-money laundering system that is easy to bypass in order to launder money with impunity. Key recommendations include: -Ensure the UK's Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies introduce centralised public registers of beneficial ownership, and ensure corrupt individuals cannot buy UK property with impunity. -Act on unexplained wealth by increasing the capabilities of the UK's asset recovery regime to seize corrupt funds. -Fix the flaws in the UK's anti-money laundering regime - overhauling the supervision of the rules, and prosecuting complicit professional enablers. The Panama Papers and the UK's complicity: -Of the 214,000 corporate entities exposed, over half were registered in the British Virgin Islands. -Our research showed 36,000 properties in London are owned by companies registered in offshore jurisdictions. -The UK was the second most popular place for the Mossack Fonseca firm to operate. According to the ICIJ, Mossack Fonseca worked with 1,924 UK professional enablers to set up companies, foundations and trusts for customers.

Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2016. 16p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2016 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/paradise-lost/

Year: 2016

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/paradise-lost/

Shelf Number: 138652

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial crimes
Money Laundering

Author: Heggstad, Kari

Title: How Banks Assist Capital Flight from Africa: A Literature Review

Summary: Systematic studies of the banking sector's involvement in facilitating capital flight from developing countries are limited. This paper was commissioned by Norad's Anti-Corruption Project (ANKOR) for the purpose of summarising key lessons from the existing literature and to identifying knowledge gaps. It focuses on capital flight from Africa and how much needed public finances are hidden abroad. The study is a desk study, based on a review of library and online literature databases and reports and documentation from national and international organisations. The material reviewed does not provide the information necessary to draw firm conclusions as to what constitutes "best practice" in providing donor support for better regulation of banks and financial institutions in Africa. The term "best practice" itself is unclear and depends much on the environment within which finance institutions work. The review shows that banks should not be disregarded as passive players when analysing capital flight. Banks play an active role in facilitating capital flight from Africa. However, to improve the regulation of the banking and finance sectors, there is a need for more detailed knowledge on how banks actually operate as facilitators and the mechanisms applied.

Details: Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2010. 33p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2016 at: http://www.cmi.no/file/?972

Year: 2010

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.cmi.no/file/?972

Shelf Number: 138905

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Tax Evasion

Author: Andvig, Jens Chr.

Title: Public procurement and organized crime - illustrated with examples from Bulgaria, Italy and Norway

Summary: The paper provides an exposition of the formulation of public procurement and privatization mechanisms and how they may be influenced by organized crime units. It argues that in order to understand how organized crime may become influential in procurement it is important in some societies to both understand the actual workings of their governance processes and the allocation of public assets. To this end, a number of possibilities are outlined using examples from Bulgaria, Italy and Norway.

Details: Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2012. 36p.

Source: Internet Resource: NUPI Working Paper 813: Accessed May 18, 2016 at: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/277541/NUPI-WP--813-Andvig.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Year: 2012

Country: Europe

URL: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/277541/NUPI-WP--813-Andvig.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Shelf Number: 139076

Keywords:
Corruption
Organized Crime
Shadow Economy

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2015.

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Game Changers 2015, where we highlight the year's most important trends in organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. This year saw some potentially game changing developments related to government corruption, organized crime, and rising pressure to alter alliances between members of the state and criminal groups. It also saw important shifts in the criminal world, in particular related to street gangs and the realignment of large criminal enterprises. From Mexico to Brazil and numerous places in between, officials came under fire for establishing mafia-like schemes that defrauded their citizens and ensured impunity for government officials connected to criminal groups. The long-term results of the widespread outcry from multilateral bodies, non-governmental organizations, private sector, political organizations, and religious and civic groups designed to disrupt these criminal networks are not yet clear, but the short-term impact has been profound. In August, Guatemala's President Otto Perez Molina resigned. This came just three months after Guatemala's Vice President Roxana Baldetti resigned. The two were accused of running a massive customs fraud scheme, which has been a mainstay of a criminal network run by current and ex-military officials for decades. Perez and Baldetti's departures came after the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), working with the Attorney General's Office, began revealing a spate of corruption cases. These investigations touched the highest levels of congress, as well as government purveyors such as the social security institute and mayors' offices. All of these had set up criminal networks to embezzle money from the government coffers. The public outcry that followed hastened the officials' departures. In Mexico, the power and popularity of President Enrique Pena Nieto's government has eroded in large part due to its handling of several major security crises, some of which spilled over from 2014. These events include the disappearance and likely murder of 43 students at the hands of a criminal group with deep ties to the local government and police; the apparent massacre of at least 22 suspected criminals by the Mexican army; and the dramatic escape of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman from a high security prison in June. Outside investigators from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) pilloried Mexico's Attorney General's Office for the numerous gaps, inconsistencies, and improbable explanations about what happened to the student teachers. In October, the government's own Human Rights Commission confirmed that the army extra-judicially executed at least 15 of the 22 suspected criminals in the so-called Tlatlaya massacre. And in September, the government arrested 13 officials - including the former head of the prison system - for allegedly assisting Guzman's flight to freedom via a one kilometer tunnel that ran from underneath the shower in his jail cell to a small farmhouse.

Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2015. 162p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: South America

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf

Shelf Number: 140254

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (South America)
Gangs
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Jashari, Dalina

Title: Challenges of Local Government Units in the Fight Against Corruption: An Assessment of the Anti-Corruption System in 20 Municipalities of Albania

Summary: This Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) report assesses the current capacities and preparedness of local-government units (LGUs) in the fight against corruption and identification of current capacities and knowledge of CSOs as regards their contribution to good governance at local level. The first section provides an overview of the country's legal framework, which sets the vision and regulates the fight against corruption at local level. Two other sections of this report provide an outline of the availability of instruments established by 20 targeted municipalities to fight corruption and increase/enable citizens' participation in decision-making. In addition, in terms of human and management resources, these sections assess the needs of both LGUs and local CSOs to improve their efforts to combat corruption at the local level. The report was published in the framework of the "CIVILISC � Civil Society Instruments against Corruption" Project, which aims to empower and develop capacities of civil society in small/medium municipalities to promote good governance and fight corruption. This assessment concludes the first phase of the project and contributes to its subsequent capacity development phase as it lays the foundations for designing the relevant, evidence-based and effective CSO capacity development. The data and information obtained in the assessment will also set the baseline for future continuous monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption efforts undertaken by the LGUs.

Details: Tirana, Albania: Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2016. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/LGU-Anticorruption-English.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Albania

URL: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/LGU-Anticorruption-English.pdf

Shelf Number: 140363

Keywords:
Corruption
Political Corruption

Author: Partnership Africa Canada

Title: Reap What You Sow: Greed and Corruption in Zimbabwe's Marange Diamond Fields

Summary: The Marange diamond fields of eastern Zimbabwe could be the country's salvation. Often described as the biggest diamond discovery of a generation, Marange has undoubtedly put Zimbabwe on the diamond map. Managed right, it could have been the transformational vehicle through which the country turns around its failing economic fortunes, while also serving as an example to other African countries blessed with mineral riches. But since its discovery in 2006, Marange's potential has been overshadowed by violence, smuggling, corruption, and most of all, lost opportunity. The chief custodian of Marange is Obert Mpofu, the country's Minister of Mines. For individuals or companies wanting to secure a mining concession to exploit a slice of Marange's riches, it is ostensibly Minister Mpofu that they need to convince of the merits of their application. After President Robert Mugabe, whose office is vested with the ultimate authority over the country's natural resources, Mpofu is in theory the gatekeeper and arbiter of everything to do with Marange. In practice, however, he has deferred many of these responsibilities to the country's military chiefs. His ministerial duties also require that he serve the public good and best interests of the Zimbabwean people by responsibly managing Marange. But on his watch, the world has seen perhaps the biggest single plunder of diamonds since Cecil Rhodes. Conservative estimates place the theft of Marange goods at almost $2 billion since 2008. Far from defending the best interests of Zimbabwe, Minister Mpofu has presided over a ministry that has awarded concessions to dubious individuals with no prior mining experience, often under very questionable terms or circumstances. Due diligence of miners has been an afterthought. As Minister he has solicited and approved applications from members of Zimbabwe's security forces, including those implicated in human rights abuses in Marange. There is little consistency in how concessions are awarded, other than to ensure the details of any deal are opaque and as far beyond the scrutiny of government ministers and the public as possible. The scale of illegality is mind blowing. One confidential geologist report cited by the August 2010 Kimberley Process Review Mission to Zimbabwe claimed "in excess of 10,000,000 carats have been removed by artisanal effort over the last three years" - an amount worth almost $600,000,000 at today's depressed prices. The Review Mission also estimated illegal mining at 60,000 carats a month, ranking the illicit Marange trade at between 7th and 10th in overall world diamond production. Hundreds of millions of dollars owed to Zimbabwe's Treasury have been lost in both illegal and legal trades. Determining the actual amount is impossible, but in February 2011 fiscal update the Finance Minister Tendai Biti complained US$300 million collected by Zimbabwean Minerals Development Corporation (ZMDC) and the Mineral Marketing Commission of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) - two parastatals under Mpofu's remit - had not arrived in state coffers.

Details: Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2012, 36p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2016 at: http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/Reap_What_You_Sow-eng-Nov2012.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Zimbabwe

URL: http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/Reap_What_You_Sow-eng-Nov2012.pdf

Shelf Number: 145375

Keywords:
Corruption
Diamonds
Environmental Crimes
Illegal Mining
Illegal Trade
Natural Resources

Author: Lembovska, Magdalena

Title: The Citizens' Opinion of the Police Force: The Results of Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Macedonia

Summary: The police are the most trusted institution in Macedonia with almost 60% of the respondents stating that they mostly or completely trust it. Still, nearly one-quarter of the population do not trust the police at all. In general, women tend to trust them more than men, whereas males are the demographic group with least confidence in this institution. Citizens are also divided among the ethnic lines. Ethnic Macedonians generally express more positive views than ethnic Albanians, particularly concerning the question of trust. Moreover, the level of trust is the highest among the public sector employees, followed by pensioners and those working in the private sector. The students' and unemployed citizens' level of trust is much lower. Macedonian citizens have a positive perception of police officers, describing them mainly using positive words/adjectives, and with female police officers scoring slightly better. However, negative perceptions prevail in many aspects of the work of the police. For instance, the most popular belief about the employment process within the police is that candidates are selected via political connections or by pulling strings with relatives or friends. Moreover, the police force is rather seen as operating as means for protection of the interests or particular groups than as a service of the citizens. In line with this finding, more than half of the citizens believe that politicians do have an influence on the operating work of the police force. Apart from the police, only education and healthcare received positive trust assessments by more than half of the respondents, while least trusted institutions are the judiciary, the Anti-corruption Agency, the prosecutors’ offices and the Parliament. Moreover, all institutions except non-governmental organisations are considered by more than half of the respondents to have widespread corruption. The most widespread corruption is perceived to be found in the judiciary, followed by the prosecutors’ offices, commercial inspectorates and the customs. Compared to other institutions, the police is positioned somewhere in the middle. Breaking down the results to specific police units, the traffic police is considered to be the most corrupt, followed by the Minister’s closest associates and the border police. The least corrupt are believed to be police officers responsible for public law and order. On a positive note, it is encouraging to see that 76% of the Macedonian citizens would be willing to report a case of corruption in the police (being asked for a bribe), even if they were required to reveal their personal data. This is in line with the popular belief that motivating citizens to report corrupt police officers is the most necessary action for preventing corruption. Other suggested measures are: increasing the salaries of police officers, strict sanctioning of offenders and more frequent punishing of corrupt police officials. The internal control unit, responsible for addressing corruption within the police, is not the citizens' first choice for reporting a case. Most of the citizens would report it to the local police station or the chief of the station. Similarly, the institution that should be the first to fight corruption in the police force is considered to be the police force itself through the control of the police, by the minister of interior, or the police officers themselves. On the other side, citizens mainly agreed that the primary role of the NGOs in the fight against corruption should be collaborating with the state.

Details: Skopje, Macedonia: Analytica, 2016. 46p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 28, 2016 at: http://www.analyticamk.org/images/2016/08/31/Macedonia_-_The_Citizens_Opinion_of_Police_Force_2016-3_d0989.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Macedonia

URL: http://www.analyticamk.org/images/2016/08/31/Macedonia_-_The_Citizens_Opinion_of_Police_Force_2016-3_d0989.pdf

Shelf Number: 140873

Keywords:
Corruption
Police Accountability
Police Effectiveness
Police Legitimacy
Policing
Public Opinion

Author: Kane-Berman, John

Title: Going Off the Rails: The Slide Towards the Lawless South African State

Summary: South Africa is widely recognised as a lawless country. It is also a country run by a government which has itself become increasingly lawless. This is so despite all the commitments to legality set out in the Constitution. Not only is the post-apartheid South Africa founded upon the principle of legality, but courts whose independence is guaranteed are vested with the power to ensure that these principles are upheld. Prosecuting authorities are enjoined to exercise their functions "without fear, favour, or prejudice". The same duty is laid upon other institutions established by the Constitution, among them the public protector and the auditor general. Everyone is endowed with the right to "equal protection and benefit of the law". We are all also entitled to "administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair". Unlike the old South Africa – no doubt because of it – the new Rechtsstaat was one where the rule of law would be supreme, power would be limited, and the courts would have the final say. This edifice, and these ideals, are under threat. Lawlessness on the part of the state and those who run it is on the increase. The culprits run from the president down to clerks of the court, from directors general to immigration officials, from municipal managers to prison warders, from police generals to police constables, from cabinet ministers to petty bureaucrats. Lawlessness ranges from protecting the criminal, to hounding the innocent, to crushing the poor. It runs from the unconstitutional to the outright criminal, from the brazen and defiant to the negligent or ignorant. It embraces slamming down the telephone on judges as well as victimising traffic policemen who flag down celebrities. It ranges from violations of parliamentary procedure, to breaches of the Public Finance Management Act, to outright skulduggery and corruption. Its victims include taxpayers who get fleeced, mining companies whose licence applications are unlawfully denied, suppliers who do not get paid for their services, and motorists who are forced off the road by reckless government drivers. The victims also include prisoners denied medical treatment, refugees forced to pay bribes, hawkers whose goods are unlawfully confiscated, and poor people unlawfully evicted from shacks which are then unlawfully demolished. Some people are unlawfully appointed, some unlawfully dismissed, some both. Others are unlawfully denied appointment or promotion. A criminal record is no bar to appointment or promotion, even in agencies designed to combat crime. Physical torture seems to be pervasive. Perpetrators of crime often get away with it. Some victims are able to seek redress in the courts, others suffer in silence. Many cases of lawlessness are reported in the newspapers, but they are probably the tip of quite a large iceberg. The courts are the ultimate guarantors of our rights and of legality but they are insulted, their orders are sometimes ignored, and their decisions are frequently taken on endless appeals. Sometimes instead of bowing to the courts and the law, the government seeks – unlawfully – to change the law. Statutory organisations designed to apply the law are deliberately undermined, while watchdogs and whistle-blowers seeking to uphold the law are subjected to intimidation. Lawlessness predates President Jacob Zuma's assumption of power in 2009, but it has intensified during his rule as more and more people and institutions follow his example and the examples of those who condone his behaviour.

Details: Johannesburg: IRR (South African Institute of Race Relations), 2016. 46p.

Source: Internet Resource: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/65454_going_off_the_rails_02.11.2016_.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: South Africa

URL: http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/65454_going_off_the_rails_02.11.2016_.pdf

Shelf Number: 144997

Keywords:
Administration of Justice
Corruption
Crime
Criminal Justice Administration
Criminal Justice Systems
Lawlessness

Author: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Research Directorate

Title: Gangs in El Salvador and the Situation of Witnesses of Crime and Corruption

Summary: The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) is involved in an ongoing capacity's building initiative carried out jointly by the United States, Mexico, Canada and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Under this initiative, which seeks to enhance asylum systems in the Americas, the IRB, in conjunction with its partners, conducted an information-gathering mission to El Salvador. During the mission, IRB officials held meetings with experts and representatives from relevant governmental, non-governmental, academic and research-focused organizations, as well as with journalists. The purpose of the mission to El Salvador was to gather information related to state efforts to combat crime; the structure of criminal gangs, their areas of operation, activities and recruitment practices; the situation of gender-based and domestic violence against women; the situation of LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and/or intersex) people; and the efficacy of the police and judiciary to provide recourse to victims of crime, to investigate and to prosecute crimes.

Details: Ottawa: The Board, 2016. 29p.

Source: Internet Resource: El Salvador: Information Gathering Mission Report - Part 1: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/NdpCnd/Pages/Salvador-2016P1.aspx

Year: 2016

Country: El Salvador

URL: http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/NdpCnd/Pages/Salvador-2016P1.aspx

Shelf Number: 146285

Keywords:
Corruption
Gang-Related Violence
Gangs
Homicides
Youth Gangs

Author: Huff, Amber

Title: Violence and Violence Reduction Efforts in Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Ivory Coast: Insights and Lessons towards Achieving SDG 16

Summary: The 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development states that, ‘repeated cycles of organized criminal violence and civil conflict that threaten development locally and regionally and are responsible for much of the global deficit in meeting the Millennium Development Goals’ (World Bank 2011: 46). As a result, peace and security emerged as a ‘core concern’ in the development of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda (Werner 2015: 348), and a remarkable high-level consensus has emerged on the basic elements of an approach to reduce violence across contexts. These include: (1) the need to create legitimate institutions, often through efforts to craft political settlements; (2) strengthening access to justice; (3) extending economic opportunities and employment, especially for young people; and (4) fostering societal resilience, through institutions as well as by considering the sustainability of interventions (Lind, Mitchell and Rohwerder 2016). Flowing from these ideas, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 aims to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels' by meeting targets that range from reduction of violence and related death rates everywhere, to reducing corruption and bribery in all their forms, ending all forms of legal discrimination and developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions (UNDP 2016a).

Details: Brighton, UK:: Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 95p.

Source: Internet Resource: Addressing and Mitigating Violence, Evidence Report No. 210: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12656/ER210_ViolenceandViolenceReductionEffortsinKenyaUgandaGhanaandIvoryCoast.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Year: 2016

Country: Africa

URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12656/ER210_ViolenceandViolenceReductionEffortsinKenyaUgandaGhanaandIvoryCoast.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Shelf Number: 147957

Keywords:
Bribery
Conflict-Related Violence
Corruption
Homicides
Violence
Violence Prevention
Violent Crime

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2016.

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's GameChangers 2016, where we highlight the most important trends in organized crime in the Americas. This year we put a spotlight on crime and corruption among the region's political elites, while reporting on government struggles to corral criminality fueled by street gangs, drug cartels and Marxist rebels alike. Top government officials spent much of the year fending off accusations of corruption and organized crime with varying degrees of success. At the center of the storm was Brazil, where government deals led to bribes and kickbacks that over time reached into the billions of dollars. The top casualty of the scandal was Dilma Rousseff who, ironically, was ousted from the presidency for misuse of funds, not corruption. In reality, it is her Worker's Party that more resembles a criminal organization than she does. Like a mafia, the party collected and distributed money to keep the wheels of political power moving and laundered that money through elaborate schemes involving construction companies and offshore accounts. Rousseff's mentor, the celebrated former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was charged with what appeared to be the type of routine payments all Brazilian politicians and ex-politicians get from the movement of state contracts. Indeed, those who ousted Rousseff are facing similar corruption allegations, illustrating just how institutionalized the problem appears to be. Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro is facing down a different type of crisis, one that includes an economic emergency, widespread corruption and rising crime rates at home, and an increasing number of current and ex-officials charged with drug trafficking abroad. The US government's case against the first lady's "Narco Nephews" got most of the headlines, but numerous other former military officials are revealing to US investigators just what the Venezuelan government looks like from the inside. It is a not a pretty picture, and Maduro's domestic and international issues appear to be pushing him into tighter alliances with the criminal elements in his government. Guatemala's Attorney General's Office and its United Nations-backed appendage, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), continued to arrest and charge more suspects from the mafia state established under former President Otto Pérez Molina, his Vice President Roxana Baldetti and their Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota - PP). The most startling and revealing case was one they termed the "cooptación del estado," or the "Cooptation of the State," a scheme involving numerous campaign contributors whose return on investment was guaranteed once the PP took power in 2012. Among those arrested for the Cooptation of the State case was former Interior Minister Mauricio López Bonilla. Once a staunch US counter-drug ally and hero from that country's civil war, López Bonilla is also being investigated for his multiple shady deals with drug traffickers such as Marllory Chacón Rossell, to whom he provided a government protection service even after she was accused of money laundering by the US Treasury Department; and with Byron Lima, a former army captain who was killed in jail amidst a public squabble with the former interior minister. Potential corruption and organized crime cases continue to shake the foundations of Guatemala, including one that connects a now extradited drug trafficker to the current vice president and a corruption scandal connected to the current president's son and his brother.

Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2016. 55p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2017 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: South America

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf

Shelf Number: 140596

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (South America)
Gangs
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Farooghi, Mana

Title: Sustainable approaches to organised crime in Mali and the Sahil

Summary: Although the ongoing crisis in Mali had diverse local proximate causes and triggers, analysts and policy-makers agree on a core set of causes that exacerbated latent inter- and intracommunity tensions leading to open conflict: a failure of governance and functional democracy, corruption of the state, lack of development and service delivery both in the north and the south, unresolved issues of political and economic marginalisation and rebellion, lack of civilian trust in law enforcement forces, weak border security and the settling in the north of "extremist" groups, a free flow of weapons following the Libya crisis, and finally organised crime i.e. illicit trade and its alleged links to terrorism. While most of these causes are being addressed in the current peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts, the latter seems to fall through the cracks. Although organised crime is mentioned as a key factor of instability by Malian and international actors, alongside terrorist networks and usually in direct relation to them, in practice, only counter-terrorism programmes are being unfolded, and the issue of addressing criminal flows is a peripheral issue in negotiations around future governance agreements. It appears that development actors simply are not ready or equipped to tackle the impact of crime on peace and development. While some cooperation and development institutions consider the issue of crime outside of their mandate, others are increasingly aware of its socio-economic root causes and impact and are willing to adapt their programming, but simply don't have the experience and toolbox to do so, and thus, in many cases, caution outweighs impetus as state complicity and corruption seem to be core issues at stake. Nevertheless, rebuilding Mali without directly tackling this issue in collaboration with Malian state and non-state actors is precarious, and likely to ensure that the triggers for instability that prompted the previous round of the Mali conflict remain in place. Although efforts to negotiate with selected armed groups, restore security, deliver justice and reconciliation and improve service delivery are worthy, they will prove unable to prevent another crisis if they fail to address underlying structures, cultures and institutions that promote violent conflict. As many analysts and practitioners point out, no alternative livelihood project has so far been able to compete with the high-profit margins offered by trafficking, kidnapping or banditry. Failing to understand the contextual socio-economic dynamics at stake in a region where the informal and illicit economies are intricately woven in family, cultural and livelihood strategies, will not only undermine efforts towards a sustainable peace but potentially harm existing endogenous resilience mechanisms and further destabilise the region. Furthermore, as long as armed groups remain well-resourced by illicit funds, they will have little incentive to engage in efforts towards peacebuilding and central state consolidation. International Alert, in collaboration with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, held a dialogue meeting in Bamako on 14-15 October, where Malian government and civil society representatives, multilateral organisations and bilateral institutions exchanged their analysis and definitions of organised crime in Mali and the Sahel and started exploring collaborative approaches to tackling organised crime in a sustainable way.

Details: Based on Highlights from roundtable discussion held at the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye, on 14 and 15 October 2014. 9p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2017 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali_SustainableApproachesOrganisedCrime_EN_2014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mali

URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali_SustainableApproachesOrganisedCrime_EN_2014.pdf

Shelf Number: 145016

Keywords:
Corruption
Illicit Trade
Organized Crime

Author: Korwin, Sebastian

Title: REDD+ and Corruption Risks for Africa's Forests: Case Studies from Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Summary: The link between corruption and deforestation and forest degradation has been almost universally recognised. Today, corruption continues to threaten new climate initiatives like Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). This report provides the summarised findings of corruption risk assessments (CRAs) in four African countries: Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In each CRA, stakeholders, who include representatives from governments, academia, the judiciary, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), the media, international organisations and private sector, were selected to participate based on their experience in the forest sector.

Details: Berlin: Transparency International, 2016. 58p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/redd_and_corruption_risks_for_africas_forests_case_studies_from_cameroon_gh

Year: 2016

Country: Africa

URL:

Shelf Number: 141178

Keywords:
Corruption
Deforestation
Environmental Crimes
Forests
Illegal Logging
Offenses Against the Environment

Author: Appleby, Gabrielle

Title: A Federal Anti-Corruption Agency for Australia?

Summary: Effective institutions to prevent, detect, expose and remedy official corruption are vital at all levels of government. Under Articles 6 and 36 of the UN Convention Against Corruption (2004), governments including Australia's have committed to ensuring they have 'a body or bodies or persons specialised' in combatting corruption, through prevention and enforcement. A crucial question for Australia's national integrity system is what shape these institutions should take at a federal level, moving forward. The question is made natural by Australia's long history of specialist anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) at State level, including the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW ICAC) (1988), Queensland Crime & Corruption Commission (1991), WA Corruption & Crime Commission (1992), Tasmanian Integrity Commission (2010), Victorian Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC, 2012) and SA Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (SA ICAC, 2012). However, the question is also more complex than might first appear. Despite their important achievements, State integrity systems including these agencies are confronting their own problems, including: - Variable and inconsistent legal definitions of official corruption; - Questions over whether ACA's efforts are properly prioritised, proactive and coordinated with other agencies; - Concerns over the action taken to deal properly with individuals who engage in or benefit from corrupt conduct, once exposed; - Debates over whether ACAs have the right powers, sufficient resources and necessary independence from government; and - The adequacy of accountability, oversight and performance assurance

Details: Brisbane: Griffith University; Transnational International Australia, 2017. 39p.

Source: Internet Resource: Discussion paper no.1 - Strengthening Australia’s national integrity system: priorities for reform: Accessed March 23, 2017 at: http://transparency.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Griffith-University-TIA-Discussion-Paper-A-Federal-ICAC-Integrity-of-Purpose-March-2017.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Australia

URL: http://transparency.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Griffith-University-TIA-Discussion-Paper-A-Federal-ICAC-Integrity-of-Purpose-March-2017.pdf

Shelf Number: 144546

Keywords:
Anti-Corruption
Corruption
Political Corruption

Author: Shentov, Ognian

Title: Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe

Summary: The current report, prepared by the Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) – the largest indigenous good governance initiative in SEE – makes an important contribution to the regional approach to anticorruption. It provides a civil society view of the state of corruption and comes in the wake of the 2014 SELDI comprehensive assessment of the various aspects of the legal and institutional anticorruption environments of nine SEE countries. In 2016, SELDI followed up on these assessments with an update of corruption monitoring and a special focus on state capture in the energy sector and the corruption– hidden economy nexus. The report underscores the need for broader political action for reform, which seems blocked or narrowing across the region. Inside pressure for such action has been suffocated by economic necessity and/or ethnic divisions, and the ossification of political and economic establishments. Outside pressure, delivered mostly by the European Union, has been seen as wanting in relation to the size of the problems in the past couple of years due to a succession of internal and external crises. In none of the countries in the region has there been a clear and sustained policy breakthrough in anticorruption, although efforts to deliver technical solutions and to improve the functioning of the law enforcement institutions, mostly with support from the EU, have continued and even intensified in some cases. This has led to further slow decline in administrative corruption levels but at the expense of waning public support for reforms and of declining trust in national and European institutions. SELDI's Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) – its analytical tool for measuring corruption – has identified three trends in the dynamics of corruption in the region: • Since the early 2000s when SELDI started its monitoring the overall levels of corruption in the SEE countries have gone down, and the public has become more demanding of good governance. • Yet, progress has been slow and erratic, and corruption continues to be both a major preoccupation for the general public and a common occurrence in the civil service and senior government. Specifically, in the 2014 – 2016 period corruption pressure – the primary quantitative indicator for the levels of corruption in a country – has relapsed in some countries, but the overall improvement in the region was negligible. • The combination of stubbornly high rates of rent-seeking from corrupt officials and rising expectations for good governance related mostly to EU accession aspirations in SEE have shaped negatively public expectations about potential corruption pressure. More than half of the population of the SELDI countries believe it is likely to have to give a bribe to an official to get things done. This indicates that the restoration of trust in institutions would be much more difficult than the mere reduction in the levels of administrative corruption. As a result, public trust in the feasibility of policy responses to corruption – a critical ally to successful anticorruption reforms – which reflects the share of the population who believe in the anticorruption efforts of their governments has stayed below the 50% threshold in 2016 for all SEE countries but Montenegro and Turkey. This further exacerbates the unwillingness of politicians to engage in anticorruption policies, and shows the need for a broad-based social movement to sustain an anticorruption focus. The overall conclusion from the 2016 round of the SELDI CMS is that the policies which target corrupt behaviour at administrative level and those seeking to change trust in government need to be pursued in concert. If not complemented by strengthened public demand for integrity in government and sustained improvement in economic well-being, stricter enforcement of penal measures cannot have a sustainable effect. Law enforcement would likely be seen either as useless repression when targeting lower government levels alone or as political witch-hunt when intermittently directed at higher levels. Conversely, intensifying awareness-building measures would only fuel cynicism and resignation in the public if it is not accompanied by visible efforts for cracking down on (high-level) rent-seeking officials

Details: Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI); Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 82p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 24, 2017 at: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf

Shelf Number: 144577

Keywords:
Anticorruption
Corruption
Economic Crime
Financial Crimes
Fraud
Hidden Economy
Political Corruption

Author: Anderson, Helen

Title: Phoenix Activity: Recommendations on Detection, Disruption and Enforcement

Summary: Phoenix activity occurs where the business of a failed company is transferred to a second (typically newly incorporated) company and the second company's controllers are the same as the first company's controllers. Phoenix activity can be legal as well as illegal. Phoenix activity is illegal where the controllers' intention is to shift assets from the predecessor company to the successor company to avoid liabilities such as unsecured debts, employee entitlements, taxes, adverse court judgments and fines. Phoenix activity has become a significant concern for governments because of the number of individuals promoting illegal phoenix activity, the significant loss of tax revenue it causes, and the recognition of the potentially devastating impact it has on creditors and employees. This report is the third by the authors dealing with phoenix activity. The first report examines the various historical attempts to define phoenix activity and identifies five categories of phoenix activity ranging from legitimate business rescue to complex illegal phoenix activity and provides examples of each. The second report captures all available data relating to the incidence, cost and enforcement of laws dealing with illegal phoenix activity. In this report, the authors propose reforms aimed at better detection, disruption, punishment and deterrence of illegal phoenix activity.

Details: Melbourne, AUS: Melbourne Law School, 2017. 162p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924277

Year: 2017

Country: Australia

URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924277

Shelf Number: 145806

Keywords:
Business Crimes
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Tax Evasion

Author: Williams, Aled

Title: At the extremes: Corruption in natural resource management revisited

Summary: Natural resource sectors are undergoing profound changes. Resources are being extracted in more remote locations within corruption-prone developing countries than was previously the case; there is an increased proliferation of actors involved in resource extraction; and a marked shift towards renewable energy, conservation and climate change projects in developing countries. Formulating generic anti-corruption policy prescriptions for the wide range of heavily contextualised corruption challenges natural resource sectors face is unlikely to help. This U4 Brief offers instead modest advice for advancing solutions through development cooperation, with a focus on analytical methods, project management approaches, and tracking evidence for effectiveness.

Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue 2016:4), 2016. 6p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2017 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/at-the-extremes-corruption-in-natural-resource-management-revisited/

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/at-the-extremes-corruption-in-natural-resource-management-revisited/

Shelf Number: 145993

Keywords:
Corruption
Natural Resources
Resource Curse
Theft of Natural Resources

Author: Chayes, Sarah

Title: When Corruption is the Operating System: The Case of Honduras

Summary: In some five dozen countries worldwide, corruption can no longer be understood as merely the iniquitous doings of individuals. Rather, it is the operating system of sophisticated networks that cross sectoral and national boundaries in their drive to maximize returns for their members. Honduras offers a prime example of such intertwined, or "integrated," transnational kleptocratic networks. This case thus illustrates core features of the way apparently open or chaotic economies are in reality structured worldwide - and some of the dynamics that are driving climate change, persistent inequality, and spiraling conflict. THE HONDURAN KLEPTOCRATIC OS IN ACTION - In this example, the three interlocking spheres are roughly co-equal in psychological impact if not in amounts of captured revenue. They retain a degree of autonomy, and are often disrupted by internal rivalry. - This system's operations devastate the environment-though Honduras is not a "resource" country. Most threats to biodiversity derive from deliberate "development" policies-whose primary purpose is actually to funnel rents to network members. - Modern renewable energy, as well as hydropower, is captured by the network. The migrant crisis is also fueled by this brand of corruption. - Repression is carefully targeted for maximum psychological effect. An example was the March 2016 assassination of environmental and social justice activist Berta Caceres, which reverberated through like-minded communities. _ The kleptocracy benefits from significant external reinforcement, witting or unwitting, including not just military assistance, but much international development financing. A DIFFERENT "CHIP" - The first step to disabling the kleptocratic OS is to acknowledge it, and outsiders' role reinforcing it. Western policymakers should invest in the candid study of these networks and to corruption as an intentional operating system, and evaluate whether their inputs are, on balance, enabling or challenging these structures. - Environmental protection is part of an awakening indigenous worldview that provides an integrated, positive vision many find worth fighting for. Community groups are establishing their own networks, in which cultural and environmental revival is linked to labor and land rights and autonomous education. But these groups receive proportionately little support from donor governments and institutions. - Community-supported alternative development models exist. Members of such organizations-who have faced death to combat network-controlled dams-readily identify micro-dams that meet their approval. They have helped design and construct some; others contribute to local well-being. Development implementers should study such projects and apply their principles. - Lessons from Honduras are applicable worldwide. Engaged Honduran community groups have valuable insights not just into how development assistance can produce better results in Honduras, but into ways the West might retool its economy to reduce inequality while preserving and cultivating natural resources.

Details: Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. 174p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Chayes_Corruption_Final_updated.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Honduras

URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Chayes_Corruption_Final_updated.pdf

Shelf Number: 146322

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Environmental Crimes
Natural Resources
Offenses Against The Environment

Author: Schneider, Friedrich

Title: Restricting or Abolishing Cash: An Effective Instrument for Fighting the Shadow Economy, Crime and Terrorism?

Summary: This paper has four goals: First, the use of cash as a possible driving factor of the shadow economy is investigated. Second, the use of cash in crime, here especially in corruption, is also econometrically investigated. The influence is somewhat larger than on the shadow economy, but it is certainly not a decisive factor for bribery activities. Some figures about organized crime are also shown; the importance of cash is diminishing. Third, some remarks about terrorism are made and here a cash limit doesn't prevent terrorism. Fourth, some remarks are made about the restriction or abolishment of cash on civil liberties, with the result that this will extremely limit them. The conclusion of this paper is that cash has a minor influence on the shadow economy, crime and terrorism, but potentially a major influence on civil liberties.

Details: Paper presented at International Cash Conference 2017 - War on Cash: Is there a Future for Cash? 25 - 27 April 2017, Island of Mainau, Germany. 39p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2017 at: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf

Shelf Number: 147226

Keywords:
Bribery
Civil Liberties
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering
Organized Crime
Proceeds of Crime
Shadow Economy
Terrorist Financing

Author: Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission

Title: Operation Tone: Special report concerning drug use and associated corrupt conduct involving Ambulance Victoria paramedics

Summary: The Victorian community places great trust in paramedics. Paramedics are often among the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency and are responsible for treating and stabilising patients. They have access to an array of powerful, prescription medications that they can administer (in accordance with clinical guidelines) depending on a patient's needs and circumstances. Victorians rightfully expect that paramedics will demonstrate professionalism and expertise in carrying out their duty of care to patients. This report concerns an investigation by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) into allegations that Ambulance Victoria (AV) paramedics engaged in serious corrupt conduct, namely the theft, trafficking and use of drugs of dependence, and misappropriation of AV equipment. Many paramedics are exemplars of their profession. However, Operation Tone has identified a culture of illicit drug use and misappropriation of AV equipment by individuals and among certain groups, particularly in the Barwon South West region. Based on evidence obtained during the investigation, IBAC believes it is probable that this conduct occurs beyond that identified in this investigation. Illicit drug use by paramedics is concerning on several fronts: - Illicit drug use, possession and trafficking are criminal offences and contravene the Code of Conduct for Victorian Public Sector Employees and the AV Workplace Conduct Policy. A paramedic who procures and uses illicit drugs is, by definition, engaging in criminal conduct. - The use of drugs of dependence undermines the safety of the Victorian community. It is imperative that a paramedic's judgement and performance not be impaired by illicit drugs, particularly when they are dealing with patients. The use of drugs of dependence also poses a safety risk for individual users and their AV colleagues. Since 2012, fentanyl or morphine have been involved in three paramedic deaths in Victoria. - The use of drugs of dependence erodes public confidence in AV. AV has proactively responded to the vulnerabilities identified in Operation Tone. When IBAC commenced its investigation in November 2015, AV's capacity to identify and expose at-risk paramedics was initially limited. During IBAC's investigation, AV introduced new policies and practices to minimise opportunities for the possession, use and misappropriation of drugs of dependence. New AV policies and practices also limit the opportunity for misappropriation of AV equipment. AV has advised it accepts the content of this report and the recommendations made. AV also advised it has continued to implement initiatives to address illicit drug use and misuse of drugs of dependence since the completion of IBAC's investigation. During Operation Tone, one paramedic was terminated and eight paramedics resigned while under investigation. Six paramedics retained their employment with a formal warning; of these, five were relocated to different regions for varying periods, were enrolled in an ethics counselling course, and precluded from development opportunities for 12 months. Following the IBAC investigation, one witness pleaded guilty in the Geelong Magistrates. Court to breaching a confidentiality nottice and misleading IBAC, and was fined $5000.

Details: Melbourne: The Commission, 2017. 38p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2017 at: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/operation-tone-special-report-september-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Year: 2017

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/operation-tone-special-report-september-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Shelf Number: 148138

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Abuse
Drug Trafficking
Employee Misconduct
Illicit Drug Use
Prescription Drug Abuse

Author: Hunter, Marcena

Title: Follow the Money: The Philippines

Summary: In artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM), a sector that employs approximately 15 million people around the world, mercury is often used to help extract gold from mined ore. Although inexpensive and relatively effective in extracting gold from ore, mercury emissions and releases can cause serious harm to people and the environment when handled unsafely. Recognising the threat, a call for global action was initiated in 2009 which culminated in the adoption of the Minamata Convention in 2013. The Convention mandates a reduction, and elimination, if possible, of mercury usage around the world, including in ASGM. As of this writing, the 50th instrument of ratification has been submitted to the Minamata Secretariat and the Convention will enter into force on Aug. 16, 2017. Signatories to the Convention include many gold-mining countries, including Mongolia and the Philippines. While ASGM is a significant global sector, the vast majority of ASGM is informal (and/or illicit) and unregulated, i.e. operating without the required licenses or legal approval. Pervasive informality is a result of several factors, including: onerous licensing requirements that create a barrier to entry for many miners; a lack of clarity in legal texts governing artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM); insufficient or inaccessible legally mandated mining areas; a lack of awareness of legal requirements amongst miners; and miners' inability to access administrative capitals. This omnipresent informality can prevent miners from accessing necessary resources such as trainings and legitimate forms of credit; render them vulnerable to bribery and extortion attempts (particularly by police and other government officials); and drive them to work in dangerous locations that are less accessible to law enforcement. Experience has shown that options to introduce and maintain environmental compliance through pure voluntary compliance ("formalization-free") are unlikely to see long-term success. Specifically, with regard to mercury usage by ASGM, the informality of much of the sector can impede the delivery of non-mercury technology, trainings and the distribution of information materials to miners and processors, thus creating a knowledge vacuum in the sector about the dangers of mercury. It can also prevent authorities from adequately policing the use of mercury in mining communities and processing regions, and controlling its distribution. Financial flows, in particular illicit financial flows (IFFs), play an integral role in perpetuating informality (as well as illegality) in the ASGM sector. IFFs are defined as "money illegally earned, transferred or used" and can flow into and out of ASGM operations. The informality of much of the sector is often appealing to illicit financiers, as it helps to keep illicit activities and related profits, such as gold smuggling, tax evasion and money laundering, hidden from governments. Thus, wide-scale formalisation of ASGM is arguably not something such financiers would want to see occur, nor would they be likely to advocate in the mines they help to finance. In addition, the lack of access to formal financing means informal or illicit financing options are often the only options available to artisanal and small-scale miners (ASMers), making investment a low-risk, high-profit venture for illicit financiers. Moreover, IFFs are often reinvested back into the sector and community, with buyers providing economic benefits to local populations outside of mining, further perpetuating informality and contributing to a sense of legitimacy around informal ASGM practices and associated financial flows.8 Consequently, financial flows can significantly contribute to a self-reinforcing cycle of informality (and illegality in some instances), which can be difficult to break without a nuanced understanding of the financial flows linked to ASGM and their impacts on mining communities and local populations. The formalisation of ASGM and the elimination of mercury usage go hand-in-hand. Building a better understanding of financial flows and their impact on ASGM is therefore vital. Recognizing the need for a greater understanding of gold-related financial flows to strengthen international responses, the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (Global Initiative) and Levin Sources established the GIFF Project in 2015 to provide greater insight into this issue and to develop solutions that will improve efforts to formalize the ASGM sector globally. UNIDO has become a strong partner and advocate of the GIFF Project and advocating for a better understanding of financial flows linked to ASGM

Details: Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2017. 52p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 5, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/philippines-report-_20.11.17_low.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Philippines

URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/philippines-report-_20.11.17_low.pdf

Shelf Number: 148700

Keywords:
Corruption
Environmental Crimes
Financial Crimes
Gold Mining
Illicit Gold
Money Laundering
Organized Crime

Author: Transparency International

Title: Hiding in Plain Sight: How UK companies are used to launder the proceeds of corruption

Summary: In April 2016 the Panama Papers - a major leak of 11.5 million files from a Panamanian law firm - gave a unique insight into the secretive global corporate networks that help to facilitate corruption. The Paradise Papers - the latest expose on the offshore world, covering 13.4 million files - continue to shine a light on how opaque structures conceal the identities of individuals as well as the origin of their wealth. These scandals highlight the importance of anonymous 'shell' companies to these schemes, as well as the individuals and businesses which create complex networks of these corporate vehicles to aid high-end financial crime. Much attention has been paid to Mossack Fonseca and Appleby - the firms at the centre of these two scandals - which have helped to set-up and manage hundreds of thousands of companies. However, the UK was the second most popular destination for intermediaries and middlemen used by Mossack Fonseca to create and maintain this network, and it is easy to see why. The UK is home to a thriving company formation industry and is a hub for professional corporate services. It is also one of the easiest places in the world to start a company, making it attractive to legitimate and illegitimate business alike. Costing as little as $12 and taking around 15 minutes to complete the forms, UK companies can be created on a large scale for a fraction of the price of those registered in other financial centres. UK companies also carry a veneer of legitimacy due to the country's well established global status. Alongside a range of corporate vehicles, the UK's company formation industry also offers a variety of services, from so-called 'nominee directors' and mailing addresses - giving companies a layer of secrecy - to offshore bank accounts allowing access to the global financial system. Often there will be no trail whatsoever to indicate who sold companies which then go on to be misused. These factors have contributed to the UK featuring as a central location in which to set-up companies for laundering illicit wealth. Using open-source analysis, we have identified 51 major money laundering schemes made possible by the use of UK companies. Financially these scandals could amount to $80 billion or more in illicit wealth, with some of them threatening the financial stability of whole economies. The human damage inflicted on the victims of these crimes is still being counted. By analysing the Trust and Company Service Provider (TCSP) sector and past money laundering cases we have found that, far from being the first line of defence against money laundering, some of these businesses have either been unwitting accomplices or complicit enablers for financial crime. Central to government's recent efforts to tackle money laundering has been introducing public access to information about who really controls companies incorporated in the UK. This constitutes real progress and has put the UK at the forefront of global corporate transparency. Yet this threatens to be undermined by three key issues we have identified during our research into the TCSP sector: Insufficient controls on company formation: there are practically no barriers to UK companies being incorporated by money launderers and no way of tracing their use after they have been established. Lack of checks on the UK company register: Companies House has neither the power nor the resources it needs to ensure the integrity of the UK company register, allowing inaccurate and misleading information being submitted by those wishing to hide illicit activity. Inadequate anti-money laundering (AML) supervision: the UK's patchwork of AML supervisors is not providing a credible deterrent to money laundering failings, which is allowing poor levels of compliance within the TCSP sector covered by the UK's Money Laundering Regulations (MLR). There is also a whole industry of overseas professionals setting-up and managing UK companies who are subject to little or no AML supervision. In this paper we have sought to analyse the potential nature, scale and impact of these problems by looking at the available evidence of what is going wrong. What we have found is that light-touch regulation is coming at a cost, both to the UK's international reputation as a responsible place to do business, and in countries like Ukraine and Azerbaijan who suffer from rampant corruption facilitated by UK companies. We have proposed ten recommendations in three themes that, if implemented, could help end the use of UK companies in laundering corrupt wealth and ensure the UK remains a world leader when it comes to corporate transparency.

Details: London: Transparency International, 2017. 51p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2018 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/hiding-in-plain-sight/#.WmNkMKinHcs

Year: 2017

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/hiding-in-plain-sight/#.WmNkMKinHcs

Shelf Number: 148889

Keywords:
Corporate Crime
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Money Laundering

Author: Global Witness

Title: Catch me if you can: Exxon's complicity in Liberian oil sector corruption and how its Washington lobbyists fight to keep oil deals secret

Summary: This is a story of bribery, suspected secret shareholders, and an audacious attempt by oil giant Exxon to bypass US anti-corruption laws. It is a story of how the American company - headed by Rex Tillerson - appears to have turned a blind eye to earlier corruption when buying an oil license in the impoverished West African country of Liberia. Finally, this is a story of how the US can help end corruption by requiring that oil companies report in detail what they pay to governments. Our key findings include evidence that Exxon: Knew its purchase might enrich former Liberian politicians who were likely behind the block Structured the deal in a way it hoped would bypass US anti-corruption laws Knew Liberia's corrupt oil agency had previously bribed officials to approve oil deals, including the very block it wanted to buy But this isn't just a story about Exxon and Liberia. It's also about how Exxon - along with others in the oil industry - has repeatedly attacked the US anti-corruption and oil transparency law that makes it possible for us to uncover deals done in this notoriously corrupt and opaque oil and gas sector.

Details: London: Global Witness, 2018. 38p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2018 at: Accessed March 29, 2018 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/catch-me-if-you-can-exxon-complicit-corrupt-liberian-oil-sector/

Year: 2018

Country: Liberia

URL:

Shelf Number: 149606

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption
Oil Industry
White Collar Crime

Author: Haugaard, Lisa

Title: Between a Wall and a Dangerous Place: The Intersection of Human Rights, Public Security, Corruption & Migration in Honduras and El Salvador

Summary: In January 2018, the Trump Administration made the decision to terminate in 18 months the special immigration protections, Temporary Protected Status, which allowed some 200,000 Salvadoran men and women to work and live legally in the United States, following natural disasters affecting their country. In May 2018, the administration will determine the fate of some 57,000 Hondurans under the same program. Salvadorans and Hondurans in the United States are also dramatically affected by other new restrictions and uncertainties on immigration policies, including the termination of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (the DACA program) for the young people known as the Dreamers-some 50,000 of whom are from these two countries. Hondurans and Salvadorans fleeing violence today and seeking refuge in the United States face increased difficulties in accessing protections at the border and applying for asylum. Back in their home countries, gang violence and organized crime grimly affect Hondurans' and Salvadorans' daily lives and force them to go into hiding or leave their homes. Their governments' failures to adequately protect their citizens, and indeed, state security forces pursuing hardline strategies that put people, especially young men, at risk, add to the harsh facts of life in El Salvador and Honduras. Women face additional risks from gangs and from domestic violence, and LGBTI persons face violence motivated by societal prejudice-including from police. To this dangerous mix is added another trauma in Honduras: following a disputed presidential election, state violence against protestors left over two dozen people dead and President Juan Orlando Hernandez's government is moving to close space for citizens to defend their rights. This report is a series of blog posts written from October 2017 through March 2018 about the dangers and challenges faced by Honduran and Salvadoran citizens in their home countries, even as the Trump Administration moves to deport more Honduran- and Salvadoran-born people in the United States back to home countries they may no longer know and restrict protections to those fleeing. The series, based on interviews with activists, government officials, journalists, humanitarian workers, diplomats, and academics, shows how the dangers that propel children, teenagers, women, and men from those countries to seek refuge in the United States, Mexico, and elsewhere have not ended.

Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Working Group Education Fund, 2018. 48p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2018 at: http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Between_a_Wall_and_a_Dangerous_Place_LAWGEF_web.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Latin America

URL: http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Between_a_Wall_and_a_Dangerous_Place_LAWGEF_web.pdf

Shelf Number: 149747

Keywords:
Corruption
Gangs
Human Rights
Immigration
Organized Crime
Public Security
Violent Crime

Author: African Union Commission. Department of Economic Affairs

Title: Mobilisation of Domestic Resources: Fighting against Corruption and Illicit Financial Flows

Summary: Illicit financial flows and corruption have long been at the centre of discussions on development in Africa, particularly due to the existence of a wide consensus on their negative impacts on development financing in Africa. It is now so widespread that Africa loses USD 50 billion annually. However, this figure is well below reality due to the difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics, and the secretive nature of such funds. The African Union's initiative to dedicate the year 2018 to combatting corruption under the theme "Winning the Fight against Corruption: A Sustainable Path for Africa's Transformation" is eloquent proof of the willingness of the African Union to combat poor financial governance, which affects the Continent's inclusive socio-economic development of the, as illicit financial flows are obstacles to productive investments, resulting in distortions in allocations of budgetary resources, and systematically increasing inequalities. The mobilization of adequate resources is essential in order for Africa to emerge from its weak economic conditions, and increase the level of development of its populations. Indeed, after two decades (80s and 90s) of weak growth with a nearly zero average, Africa has experienced strong economic growth, despite the recent downturn observed with the decline in commodity prices. The average growth rate has been around 5% since 2000, with considerable heterogeneity in growth patterns between countries, at a time when other regions have experienced a decline or stagnation in their economic activity. However, this growth has not substantially reduced poverty and inequality or led to job creation. The processes for industrialization, economic diversification and the modernization of agriculture have also been very limited. Despite progress made, more than 50% of the African population is living on less than USD 1.9/day, that is, about 389 million people (World Bank, 2016). In terms of income distribution, six of the top ten most unequal countries in the world were located in Africa, particularly in Southern Africa, with a GINI coefficient increasing from 0.42 to 0.46 between 2000 and 2010 (African Development Bank, 2012). Africa's infrastructure needs range from USD 130 to 170 billion per year (Authorized Economic Operator, 2018). On the basis of these findings and in view of the current limited budgetary resources and the scarcity of development aid, African countries should explore options for mobilizing domestic resources to finance productive activities, generate growth and mitigate the increasing social demands as a result of the continuing unprecedented population growth. This should start with the recovery of funds lost through illicit financial flows to invest in the social sectors (education, health, social safety nets, etc.) in order to rapidly harness the demographic dividend, and to place the Continent on the path to rapid, inclusive and sustainable growth. The African Union could address the issue at political level by putting in place a common continental strategy on which national strategies will be anchored, and by advocating for the strengthening of international cooperation in combatting tax evasion, money laundering, crime, corruption, false invoicing and mispricing of imported or exported goods practices. This paper takes stock of illicit financial flows and corruption in Africa, with a detailed presentation at regional and country levels. It is structured as follows: the first part essentially discusses the importance of domestic resource mobilization, and combatting corruption and illicit financial flows (IFFs) to ensure the sustainable development of Africa. The second part takes stock of the IFFs in Africa based on data provided by the organization, Global Financial Integrity (GFI). The third part addresses the issue of corruption and financial mismanagement in Africa, and the last part proposes recommendations

Details: African Union (Addis Ababa ), 2018. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2018 at: http://iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/paper_2018_mobilization_of_domestic_resources_fighting_against_corruption_iff_english_0.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: http://iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/paper_2018_mobilization_of_domestic_resources_fighting_against_corruption_iff_english_0.pdf

Shelf Number: 149884

Keywords:
Corruption
Financial Crimes
Illicit Financial Flows
Money Laundering
Tax Evasion

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers 2017: What to Watch for in 2018

Summary: Organized crime thrives amid political corruption and uncertainty. There will be plenty of this in Latin America in 2018, helping organized crime deepen its roots across the region over the course of the year. This is the moment when we draw on our extensive research and experience to make our predictions for the coming year. And the panorama for 2018 is one of the bleakest that InSight Crime has faced in our nine years of studying criminal phenomena in Latin America and the Caribbean. Tackling organized crime requires stable governments with purpose, strategy, strong security forces, healthy democracy and transparency, along with international cooperation. These currently seem in short supply around the region. Political chaos, infighting and upheaval ensure that attention is occupied on survival and manipulation of democracy, not with tackling organized crime. State legitimacy has come into question in certain nations in the region, as political leaders are investigated for corruption or manipulation of power. Embattled political leaders will often cut backroom deals with criminal elements to ensure their survival. Moreover, several countries will see important elections in the coming year, contributing to political instability. Political Hangovers From 2017 As we wrote in our introduction to this GameChangers, 2017 saw corruption take hold at high levels in governments across the region. So we enter 2018 with several political hangovers, where we believe corruption will assume a still stronger grip: Venezuela, where the last fig leaf of democracy has fallen and a corrupt regime is entrenching itself in power. As oil revenue dries up, the government may further criminalize to survive. The disintegration of the Venezuelan state and its total corruption has far-reaching regional implications for criminal dynamics. These are most immediately impacting on neighbors like Colombia, Brazil and Caribbean nations (Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba and the Dominican Republic foremost among them), but the effects are spreading further afield. Honduras, where the re-election of President Juan Orlando Hernandez has been disputed amid claims of fraud and corruption. This has further undermined his already battered legitimacy. This Northern Triangle nation is of extraordinary importance for drugs moving from South America to the United States. Peru, which saw President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski narrowly avoid being removed from power amid accusations of corruption. He survived only by pardoning former President Alberto Fujimori, who was jailed for human rights abuses. The Fujimori family control one of the most powerful factions in Congress. Kuczynski has been fatally weakened and discredited. We expect to see major underworld activities such as cocaine, timber and gold trafficking strengthened as a result. Bolivia's president, Evo Morales, has manipulated the constitution and looks set to perpetuate himself in office by standing for a fourth term. Most checks on his power now seem to have been stripped away, even as the country plays a central role in South America's drug trade. Ecuador has seen its vice president removed after a conviction for corruption, while President Lenin Moreno find himself locked in a political war with former President Rafael Correa. Organized crime is far down the president's list of priorities, despite that the fact that we believe the port of Guayaquil to be one of the major departure points for cocaine shipments across the globe. Presidential Elections in 2018 To further feed the political uncertainty, there are elections in six important nations, which mean that political attention will be utterly focused on these and not on the fight against organized crime. Brazil has a president with around five percent approval rating universally seen as corrupt. The favorite to win this election, Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, was convicted in July of accepting bribes from an engineering firm in exchange for public works contracts. Colombia, the world's foremost producer of cocaine, is struggling to implement a peace agreement with Marxist rebels and prevent a recycling of criminal actors. The enemies of peace seem stronger than its friends as the candidates line up. Costa Rica, sat astride the Central America route for cocaine heading towards the United States, has seen transnational organized crime take root and feed national criminal structures. Mexico has seen violence reach new heights and its current president, Enrique Peea Nieto, has provided few new strategies to tackle homicides or the organized crime that feeds them. New leadership is desperately needed, but no matter who wins the July elections no real changes in strategy are expected until the end of the year, when a new president will take office. Paraguay, South America's most prolific producer of marijuana already has a president associated with criminal activity in the form of cigarette smuggling. With Brazilian criminal groups projecting themselves into this landlocked nation, clear leadership is needed to contain rampant criminal activity. Venezuela is due to have presidential elections, but with President Nicolas Maduro now operating a dictatorship, there are no guarantees these will be held, much less that any real change will occur. Economic collapse is more likely to produce change than political challenge. Even in Cuba, dominated by the Castro brothers since 1959, change is coming as Raul Castro has promised to step down in 2018. And Nicaragua's president Daniel Ortega, in power since 2007, is tightening his grip on the levers of power and undermining democracy. Not since the days of the Cold War have democracy and good governance been under such threat in Latin America. These conditions have in part been created by organized crime and the corruption it feeds. And organized crime will continue to profit from the chaos. Cooperation is also key to fighting transnational organized crime and for good or ill, the United States has often provided coherency and leadership in the war on drugs and organized crime. That leadership is gone along with much US credibility in the region. All this simply gives yet more room for criminals to maneuver. More 'Plata' Than 'Plomo' There is another aspect of organized crime worth mentioning when we look to 2018. While corruption has always been one of the primary tools for organized crime, its flip side has been intimidation and violence. Pablo Escobar used to famously offer his victims two choices: "plata" ("silver," a bribe) or "plomo" ("lead," a bullet). What is becoming clear to the most sophisticated criminals is that bribery now gets you a lot further, a lot quicker, than violence. The expanding corruption scandals are evidence of this. While Mexico, Venezuela and much of the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras register epidemic levels of homicides, Colombia is bucking the trend. Even as cocaine exports reach record levels, along with internal drug consumption, with other booming illegal economies such as gold mining and extortion, murders are falling. While this is in part due to the de-escalation of the civil conflict with the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC), the other major factor is the development of a Pax Mafiosa. The first "mafia peace" was forged in Medellin, the capital of the cocaine trade, and expanded from there across the country. This means that our mission of exposing organized crime is getting harder here in our home base of Colombia. The criminal history of Latin America has been driven by criminal entrepreneurs, principally in the forms of the drug cartels. This is not the case in Africa, where criminal activity is often managed by elements within government. As Latin organized crime continues to fragment, and corruption becomes the preferred method of doing illicit business, Latin America may begin to look more like Africa. Criminality may not only be protected at the highest levels of government but perhaps run by these elements. This is a phenomena we have studied closely in our "Elites and Organized Crime" investigations. We will dedicate yet more resources to these kinds of investigations as we believe they point the way forward in terms of criminal evolution. SEE ALSO: InDepth Coverage of Elites and Organized Crime Transnational organized crime is the most agile business on the planet and adapts to changing conditions much faster than governments. When those governments become weakened, undermined and corrupted by transnational crime groups, the already uneven playing field become yet further skewed. This year is likely to be a year of further criminal entrenchment in the region, of further corruption of high levels of government or even state capture. Be ready, because we need to pay very close attention, if we are to see the hand of organized crime amid the political chaos

Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2018. 60p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: South America

URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf

Shelf Number: 150738

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (South America)
Gangs
Homicides
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Merkle, Ortrun

Title: A Gender Perspective on Corruption Encountered during Forced and Irregular Migration

Summary: Policymakers are starting to pay more attention to the links between migration and corruption. This study explores a specific area of these links, by examining the ways in which corruption affects the migration journeys of women - be they regular, irregular, forced or voluntary. It does so by looking at experiences of corruption in countries of origin, transit and destination. The analysis is based on desk research and interviews with stakeholders and migrants conducted between April and May 2017. We find that corruption comes into play whenever legal options for migration are limited, and this seems to be a constant throughout all stages of the migration process of several migrant groups. While both men and women encounter corruption during the various stages of the migration process, this study finds that women are especially vulnerable to atypical forms of corruption, including sexual extortion ('sextortion') when their financial capital is limited. Women travelling alone are particularly vulnerable to different forms of corruption and sexual exploitation, which can have negative consequences on their short-, medium- and long-term mental and physical health. The report concludes that sextortion, which occurs at the intersection of sexual violence and corruption must be clearly defined as a form of corruption and a criminal offence. The report continues with policy recommendations for the country of origin, transit and destination both in the realm of anti-corruption as well as women's empowerment and concludes with suggestions for further research.

Details: Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 2017. 63p.p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 22, 2018 at: https://i.unu.edu/media/migration.unu.edu/attachment/4665/A-Gender-Perspective-on-Corruption-Encountered-during-Forced-and-Irregular-Migration.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: https://i.unu.edu/media/migration.unu.edu/attachment/4665/A-Gender-Perspective-on-Corruption-Encountered-during-Forced-and-Irregular-Migration.pdf

Shelf Number: 153038

Keywords:
Corruption
Migrants
Migration
Refugees
Sexual Exploitation
Sexual Violence
Violence Against Women

Author: Global Witness

Title: Rocky Road: How Legal Failings and Vested Interests Behind Peru's Purus Highway Threaten the Amazon and its People

Summary: The Peruvian Amazon contains the fourth largest area of tropical forest on Earth and is one of a handful of regions where over 50 percent of forest cover is still undisturbed. Peru has seen impressive economic growth in the last decade, with GDP increasing on average six percent a year, as it follows a commodities led development path. The boom in resource exploitation has put Peru's environmental and social laws under the spotlight. One of the biggest threats to the Peruvian Amazon and indigenous peoples' territories comes from impacts associated with major infrastructure projects. According to one estimate, 91 percent of Peru's current 68 million hectares (ha) of tropical forest will be degraded or deforested within 30 years if all current plans for infrastructure and resource use across the country go ahead. Global Witness investigated one of these proposed infrastructure projects: a highway that would stretch approximately 270 km between Puerto Esperanza and Inapari in the Amazon regions of Ucayali and Madre de Dios. The highway would cut through the Alto Purus National Park (the largest in Peru), the Purus Community Reserve and the Madre de Dios Territorial Reserve, violating Peru's laws on protected areas in the process. Similar projects like the recently completed Southern Interoceanic Highway have facilitated the expansion of logging and gold mining, causing widespread environmental and social harm. The area most affected by the plans is the isolated province of Purus in Ucayali Department. Purus harbours the richest area of mahogany left in Peru and perhaps the whole continent. It is also home to some of the last indigenous groups living 'in voluntary isolation' who have chosen not to have contact with the outside world. A parliamentary bill, no.1035/2011-CR (referred to in this document as 'the highway bill'), has been passed for debate in Peru's congress to declare the highway project 'of national interest priority' in an effort by its promoters to secure official approval and state funds for its construction. The controversial plan has divided local and national opinion, and has drawn criticism that it is riding roughshod over environmental laws and the rights of indigenous peoples. This report examines a range of factors that Global Witness believes may be unduly influencing the decision-making around the highway project, including alleged corruption and possible conflicts of interest.

Details: London: Global Witness, 2013. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2018 at: https://www.illegal-logging.info/content/rocky-road-how-legal-failings-and-vested-interests-behind-perus-purus-highway-threaten

Year: 2013

Country: Peru

URL: https://www.illegal-logging.info/sites/files/chlogging/uploads/GWAmazon2013.pdf

Shelf Number: 153346

Keywords:
Corruption
Environmental crime
Illegal logging

Author: Global Witness

Title: Illegal Logging in the Rio Platano Biosphere: A Farce in Three Acts

Summary: Honduras, a country rich in natural resources and cultural diversity, struggles against poverty and environmental degradation: it is the third poorest country in Latin America and the second poorest in Central America. Poverty is much more acute in a rural context, so forested areas largely coincide with the poorest ones. The country is well suited to forestry practices, and 41.5 percent of its territory is currently covered with forests. However, decades of agricultural colonisation and the expansion of cattle ranching have resulted in extensive deforestation and related environmental degradation, most notably the deterioration of water resources and soil erosion. In a country that is prone to hurricanes and flooding, environmental degradation worsens the impact of these natural disasters. Severe governance failure in the Honduran forest sector is threatening the country's largest protected area, the UNESCO-accredited Man and the Biosphere Reserve of Rio Platano (hereafter the Rio Platano Biosphere), and the people living in and around it. Corruption at the highest level and a complete lack of accountability have led to environmental destruction and undermined the rights of local people and their efforts towards sustainable forestry. This report makes the case for greater national and international efforts to strengthen forest governance and the rule of law. It is based on Global Witness' on-the-ground research, interviews with key actors and a review of existing official documents and other sources of information. It aims to: (i) document, expose and analyse this case, (ii) identify lessons that can be learned in Honduras and elsewhere and (iii) present a series of recommendations for the various parties involved, in particular the Institute of Forest Conservation and Development (ICF), which is the new Honduran forest authority created by the Forest Law approved on 13 September 2007. The Rio Platano Biosphere has a long history of illegal logging. This report, however, focuses on one particular case: the legalisation of so-called 'abandoned' timber in 2006-2007, and its links to state mismanagement. It illustrates how illegal logging is often not only tolerated, but also promoted, by the authorities in charge. As this report will describe in more detail: - In his inauguration speech on 27 January 2006, President Zelaya committed to eradicating illegal logging in the country, but just a few months later the Honduran forest authority at the time (AFECOHDEFOR) implemented a policy that achieved the opposite: it approved regulatory procedures to effectively legalise illegally-logged mahogany, and did so contravening the law and without any consultation or independent oversight. The implementation of these resolutions spurred a race to illegally log the Rio Platano Biosphere. - The policy was part of a carefully designed plan to launder illegal timber from the most important protected area in the country. - Two months later, the regulatory procedures were suspended as a result of pressure from civil society and an investigation carried out by the Special Environmental Public Prosecutor (FEMA). However, there remained a strong determination to legalise this timber and a new, more sophisticated plan, was rolled out. This included the establishment of contracts with local cooperatives and the subsequent auction of the timber so that the people who financed the illegal logging were able to buy that same timber, now apparently legal. - As a result, as much as 8,000 cubic metres of mahogany were illegally felled. More than 14.7 million lempiras (approximately USD$780,000) of public funds were indirectly delivered to well-known illegal timber traffickers. - Cooperatives at a local level suffered greatly from this experience. Illegal logging of mahogany decreased the value of their forests and jeopardised the opportunity to develop viable community forestry initiatives. Vested interests manipulated some of these organisations to launder illegal timber and in so doing undermined their credibility. The case presented here had dramatic consequences in the Honduran context. However, it should also be looked at within a broader context. What this report documents will unquestionably resonate in other areas around the world experiencing similar issues. What characterises such cases is the disparity between political rhetoric and the vested interests driving the actions of government institutions. Such poor governance goes unchecked in part due to the lack of a transparent and participatory process in the management of the forest resources. At a time when forests have taken centre stage in climate change negotiations, the need to tackle illegal logging and associated deforestation and degradation is more pressing than ever. Deforestation accounts for around 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions and addressing this problem is seen by many as the most cost effective way of reducing these harmful emissions. A post-Kyoto agreement could help to ensure that forests are left standing so that they can be used sustainably by the people living in and around them. Good governance in Honduras and elsewhere is an essential prerequisite for the protection and sustainable use of forests. This, coupled with addressing the drivers of deforestation and empowering forest dependent communities, should be the focus of any forest and climate strategy. Sustainable forest management could play a significant role in supporting the livelihoods of local populations and fighting poverty, while at the same time maintaining the ecological value of forests.

Details: Washington, DC: Global Witness, 2009. 40p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2018 at: file:///C:/Users/AuthUser/Downloads/illegal_logging_in_rio_platano_final_en_low_res.pdf

Year: 2009

Country: Honduras

URL: file:///C:/Users/AuthUser/Downloads/illegal_logging_in_rio_platano_final_en_low_res.pdf

Shelf Number: 153347

Keywords:
Abandoned Timber
Corruption
Environmental Crime
Forest Governance
Good Governance
Illegal Logging
Illegal Timber Traffickers
Mahogony
Rule of law
Timber smuggling
Timber theft

Author: Reitano, Tuesday

Title: Mind the Moratorium: Ending Criminality and Corruption in Africa's Logging Sector

Summary: Logging moratoria - or bans on the felling, transportation and export of forest and wood products - have been widely used in Africa as a means of preventing the degradation of natural forests, often with considerable support from the international community. However, their impact has almost universally fallen far short of expectations. Violations range from the questionable issuance of exceptions and the sale of concessions despite there being a ban in place, to continued illicit and artisanal logging. Evidence suggests that moratoria are increasingly being used to allow influential political and business elites to consolidate control over the logging sector in their own favour, rather than for their stated development objectives. This brief argues that it is time for a sharp reconsideration of the value of moratoria as a tool for forest governance in Africa.

Details: ENACT Programme, 2018. 15p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 25, 2018 at: https://enactafrica.org/research/policy-briefs/mind-the-moratorium-ending-criminality-and-corruption-in-africas-logging-sector

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/15-10-18-logging-policy-beirf.pdf

Shelf Number: 153025

Keywords:
Corruption
Environmental Crime
Forest Governance
Forest Products
Forestry Sector
Illegal Logging
Illicit Trade
Logging Moratoria
Timber Harvesting
Timber Theft

Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed.

Title: Power, Elitism, and History: Analyzing Trends in Targeted Killings in Nigeria, 2000 to 2017

Summary: Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and largest economy, has attracted considerable policy and academic attention. Studies by Transparency International and others have revealed breathtaking levels of official corruption and graft in the country. Despite the attention paid to Nigeria, there is little information about the prevalence of targeted killings against individuals in the country - and the relationship between this phenomenon and corruption is not well understood. The lack of attention paid to targeted killings in Nigeria reflects a gap in the literature on political violence more generally. Zaryab Iqbal and Christopher Zorn lament in their paper 'The political consequences of assassination' that social scientists 'have paid relatively little attention to explaining assassination as a form of political violence, and even less to assessing its social and political consequences'. In Nigeria, where power is often personalized and the mechanisms to transfer power are often opaque and non-institutionalized, assassination and other types of targeted killings play a particularly important role, making the dearth of information on this type of violence all the more glaring. Reflecting on the country's history of targeted killings and assassinations, a 2009 op-ed published in news agency Sahara Reporters said, 'Obviously, Nigerians are accepting the situation as part and parcel of our day to day living, thus it is not unusual that when new about the assassination of a journalist, politician, businessman or just about any other Nigerian breaks on television or radio, people no longer cringe. We just shake our heads and move on.' The first step towards explaining a phenomenon lies in knowing its dimensions. To this end, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized crime created a dataset, Targeted Killings in Nigeria, 2000-2017, as a means of remedying these gaps. This data sought to document instances in which individuals were specifically targeted for violence. For the purposes of this report, the term 'targeted killings' is used to denote planned violence directed at an individual, which may not necessarily result in death. In this paper, 'targeted killing' therefore includes planned, fatal and non-fatal attacks on specifically targeted individuals. By analyzing newspaper reports from 2000 to 2017 using LexisNexis, and a small team of researchers and human coders, the Targeted Killings in Nigeria dataset has catalogued more than 1,650 targeted killings in Nigeria. Emerging from the dataset is the suggestion that criminality may be linked with targeted killings to a greater degree than with other forms of non-state, anti-state or violent organizations. Whereas the country's North East has been ravaged by Boko Haram, whose indiscriminate violence has claimed tens of thousands of lives, the region has seen comparatively few targeted killings. Conversely, the country's southern states, which are renowned for criminal activity, are where most targeted killings occur. The dataset suggests that the current configuration of power and authority in Nigeria, and particularly in the country's south, has resulted in staggering numbers of targeted killings, which require domestic and international policy attention. This report examines the patterns of targeted killings in Nigeria in an attempt to shed light on this oft-overlooked category of political violence, and to probe what historical, economic and social forces have contributed to the prevalence of this form of violence. The dataset also suggests that the country's return to democracy in 1999 did not herald an era of peace and stability, nor a shift away from criminality within the political sphere. The findings corroborate the idea that electoral freedom has been insufficient to comb through the tangled relationships between politicians, businessmen, criminals, civil servants, traditional leaders and the perpetration of violence. If this is the case, Nigeria is far from alone in experiencing a deeper entanglement of criminality with the state following the introduction or resumption of electoral freedom. Instances in which democratization has increased opportunities for criminal outfits have been noted elsewhere: in describing 'criminal politics', Nicholas Barnes notes that in many instances, 'the transition to democracy has also produced, not resolved, competitive state-building dynamics', offering as an example the development of the Russian mafia, whereby 'violent entrepreneurs - former military and public security officers - form(ed) their own criminal organizations and private protection firms that undermined the state's own monopoly of violence'. It is therefore entirely possible, though beyond the scope of this dataset, that the imperfect process of democratization, the shadowy workings of Nigerian political parties, and the demands of competition over votes in Nigeria may have contributed to the further entanglement of these various sectors and groups since the end of military rule in 1999. By documenting and assessing instances of targeted killings between 2000 and 2017, the Targeted Killings in Nigeria dataset is the first step towards assessing the prevalence and characteristics of targeted killings in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, and the data and findings lay a foundation for further study of criminality, corruption, governance and violence in modern Nigeria.

Details: Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 39p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 18, 2018 at: https://globalinitiative.net/analyzing-trends-in-targeted-killings-in-nigeria/

Year: 2018

Country: Nigeria

URL: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/TGIATOC-Targeted-Kilings-in-Nigeria-Report-1975-web.pdf

Shelf Number: 154066

Keywords:
Assassination
Corruption
Graft
Killings
Nigeria
Organized Crime
Political Violence
Targeted Killings

Author: Kroll

Title: Anti-Bribery and Corruption Benchmarking Report - 2018. Converging Third Party Risks: Regulation, Reputation, and Information

Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In today's global, hyper-connected economy, we find anti-bribery and corruption programs in the midst of an evolution that is driven by converging organizational risks and priorities. Regulatory mandates, critical reputational factors, and data security issues are increasingly intertwined as compliance teams strive to protect their organizations from ABC risks. The common thread running through all these risks is the high volume of direct and indirect third parties that partner with and supply services to organizations. Forty-five percent of respondents work with at least 1,000 third parties per year, a six percentage point increase over the 2017 Report. Individually, regulatory, reputational, and data security risks are persistent challenges that compliance and ethics professionals know very well. The convergence of these risks is driving greater collaboration between the organization's compliance and information security teams, which can make for stronger, more compliant anti-bribery and corruption programs. Leadership engagement, always a key and essential contributor to program effectiveness, is especially critical for ensuring enterprise-wide support for compliance efforts. Doing business ethically and maintaining an up-to-date anti-bribery and corruption program is not just about avoiding the pitfalls of reputational or legal risk. Investors are finding that a focus on ethical business dealings can translate into rewarding financial outcomes. By way of example, the publicly traded companies among Ethisphere's 2018 World's Most Ethical Companies ("Honorees") outperformed U.S. Large Cap Indices by 4.88 percent over the last three years, demonstrating that ethics and performance are well-suited companions and valued in the marketplace. Despite the increased focus and engagement of organizational resources on compliance efforts, a staggering 93 percent of respondents believe their ABC risks will remain the same or worsen in 2018. Those who expect greater ABC risks attribute the rise to increased enforcement of existing regulations, followed closely by new regulations. Given these expanding regulatory pressures, a holistic, multidisciplinary approach may hold the key to sustainable improvements in the future. Some key findings from our study include: ABC PROGRAMS: ONGOING CHALLENGES Overall, the results of this year's survey were consistent with those in our last report; namely, that third party risks - particularly reputational issues - were of greatest concern to respondents. In a shift from last year, however, respondents singled out increased enforcement of existing regulations along with the prospect of new regulations as the top reasons why they expect their anti-bribery and corruption risks to grow in 2018. A significant percentage of respondents continue to worry that they are not prepared to address the risks that their third parties present. Indeed, 58 percent of respondents uncovered legal, ethical, or compliance issues with a third party after initial due diligence. Most often, organizations' due diligence practices - such as ongoing and active monitoring - are responsible for bringing these issues to light. However, in a growing number of cases, third parties are self-disclosing infractions, a clear reflection of changing cultural and regulatory trends, including heightened concerns over personal liability. Risk-based segmentation, ongoing monitoring that incorporates regular data refresh, and periodic program evaluations have emerged as best-practice features of effective anti-bribery and corruption programs. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE RISKS ON THE RISE The most notable year-over-year change in survey responses was the increased concern over opaque ownership structures, which rose this year to become the third most common reason why third parties are failing to meet an organization's standards. However, current mitigation efforts have not translated into confidence for compliance teams: less than a quarter of respondents reported that they are very comfortable with their ability to effectively address the risks associated with beneficial ownership. A global expansion of regulatory mandates that demand attention to ownership is driving much of the greater focus on the matter. Broader societal expectations, however, are also playing a critical role; the potential for significant, long-lasting reputational damage has made the effort to track ownership an imperative. ABC AFTER ONBOARDING: ONGOING MONITORING AND DATA REFRESH In the fast-changing global marketplace, organizations cannot expect that a third party's risk profile and/or ownership will remain static after initial on-boarding due diligence. In fact, regulatory guidance has made ongoing monitoring an expectation for an effective and engaged anti-bribery and corruption program. However, there is no clear mandate as to what monitoring should entail or how often it should be done. To be expected - and consistent with prior data -respondents reported a number of different approaches to monitoring. This year, however, we introduced the topic of third party data refresh into our survey and found many organizations using the practice to one degree or another. Refreshing baseline information on their third-party universe can help ensure organizations are conducting diligence or other monitoring practices corresponding with the actual risk presented by their third parties. With anti-bribery and corruption programs increasingly driven by technology, data integrity is a growing factor in risk mitigation and defense. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Virtually the same percentage of respondents reported their organizations had engaged in M and A activity in 2017 as did in the prior year (62 percent and 67 percent, respectively). However, M and A continues to challenge compliance professionals from an anti-bribery and corruption perspective. The data shows that respondents are still not consistently meeting regulatory guidance, which expects organizations to thoroughly understand who they are acquiring. Similar to last year, respondents report collecting less information on the third parties of their transaction targets than on direct third parties. In a more positive development, Kroll experts have noted that some organizations, particularly those looking to be acquired, are turning this exercise into a competitive advantage. "Clean-up" work on their own third-party universe or supply chains can help make target companies more attractive to buyers and accelerate the transaction process. NEW RESOURCES EMERGE AS ABC AND ENTERPRISE RISKS CONVERGE A convergence of risk factors - specifically regulatory, reputational, and data security - is driving home the realization that greater collaboration and support from resources across the enterprise can help anti-bribery and corruption programs better mitigate risks. Increasingly stringent data privacy laws - including the imminent adoption of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - are making information - gathering on third parties a minefield. Across all survey respondents, 85 percent described themselves as somewhat or very concerned about data security risks. Meanwhile, mobile technology and applications such as WhatsApp and WeChat are creating internal vulnerabilities. Growing collaboration between compliance and information security/technology teams is proving instrumental in making due diligence efforts compliant and comprehensive. Overall, ABC programs are receiving greater investments from their organizations; however, nearly half of this year's respondents (47 percent) feel they need more resources. Measuring the effectiveness of programs can be the key to ensuring appropriate funding levels. Indeed, the survey data shows a link between program measurement and high levels of leadership engagement, which plays a critical role in anti-bribery and corruption program effectiveness. Beyond regulatory compliance, leaders are aiming to safeguard brands and organizational reputations.

Details: New York: 2018. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.kroll.com/en-us/abc-report

Year: 2018

Country: International

URL: https://1okg7q3ipr08ql7es2x3ip4634-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Kroll_2018_ABC_Report_Digital.pdf

Shelf Number: 154046

Keywords:
ABC Programs
Anti-Bribery
Bribery
Bribes
Corruption
Crimes Against Businesses
Financial Crimes
Fraud
General Data Protection Regulation
Security Risks

Author: Pattison, Deborah

Title: Safeguarding Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Whistleblower Protections and Tips Hotlines in Special-Purpose and Local Governments

Summary: Savvy and opportunistic fraudsters increasingly target smaller governmental organizations. Insufficient transparency and disjointed accountability over controls nurture the hidden nature of occupational fraud and allow wrongdoing to escalate during decades of routine operations. Criminal sentencings confirm local government and education officials misusing their positions and placing their own interests above those of their communities. Both primary case studies - a municipal crime in the City of Dixon, Illinois and corruption inside Roslyn, New York's Union Free School District - illustrate how embezzling more than $65 million remained undetected over thirty years until tip disclosure. The extension of unmerited trust created insufficient segregation of duties among employees and low monitoring left public resources vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption. The project holds ternary importance for risk management since one-third of small entities experience fraud, traditional external auditing identifies fraud in less than five percent of instances, and receiving anonymous tips through reporting hotlines improves detection by up to 20% and reduces losses (ACFE, 2016). The project examined stakeholder speak-up strategies including whistleblower protections and tips hotline (WP&TH) initiatives to understand how organizational context, willful blindness, information access, and citizen engagement affect local government�s focus on fraud detection and remediation. Case studies show WP&TH initiatives to be financially and operationally superior in identifying risk and promoting transparency in small local governments. Third-party, 24/7 call centers and anonymous, two-way dialog web/text are underutilized tools for recognizing fraud precursors and stopping them before they aggregate, escalate, or become institutional norm.

Details: New York, NY: Utica College, 2017. 134p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019 at: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1985001622.html?FMT=ABS

Year: 2017

Country: United States

URL: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1985001622.html?FMT=AI

Shelf Number: 154134

Keywords:
Abuse of Authority
Accountability
Corruption
Embezzlement
Fraud
Risk Management
Tips Hotline
Waste
Whistleblower

Author: Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa

Title: Typologies Report on Laundering the Proceeds of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in West Africa

Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I Drug trafficking is the largest source of illicit funds globally. This is largely due to the wide gap between production cost and the final price the consumer pays, especially in Western Europe and North America. For the trafficker, profit is the motive and is largely determined by the risk they are willing to take to deliver the drugs to the highest paying consumer. Locally, massive cannabis cultivation and consumption has been a source of major concern in the not only because of the illegal money it generates but also due to the associated health hazards. In recent years, West Africa has been targeted by drug traffickers from Latin America with large consignment of cocaine which is warehoused in the region and mostly shipped in small quantities to Europe and other destinations using local couriers. The problem has attracted attention at the highest level in the region as well as globally. There are ongoing regional initiatives to address the problem. II As a contribution to that initiative, and in order to have a good understanding of the relationship between money laundering and drug trafficking in the region, this typologies exercise was conducted. The study analyses various facets of the legal and enforcement environment of AML and Drug trafficking in ECOWAS member States. It looked at the vulnerabilities of the region and why West Africa has become a target for drug traffickers. It also looked at the techniques, methods, mechanisms and instruments used by drug traffickers to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking by reviewing relevant case studies and identifying typologies. III Twelve out of fifteen ECOWAS countries were involved in the study. One expert was identified in each of the 12 countries who helped to administer the two questionnaires developed for the study and produced a country report. A typologies workshop was held where country reports were reviewed, including case studies. IV The findings of the study indicates that drug traffickers employ complex means to launder money generated from drug trafficking including the use of lawyers, bureau de change, trade, cash couriers,, front companies, purchase of real estate, etc. V With regard to legal framework, most of the AML laws are quite recent compared to the drug trafficking laws. In some countries, the penalty for drug offences is not proportionate and dissuasive. There is general lack of effectiveness with regard to the enforcement of AML laws across board. Capacity to carry out effective AML investigation is generally low and many ML predicate offences are not investigated for ML. The domination of the informal sector and cash transaction of the economy of the region are obstacles to effective enforcement/implementation of AML measures. The disparity in AML capacity among member States is a source of concern and need to be urgently addressed. VI A number of recommendations were made which, if implemented will help to improve the overall implementation of AML measures both at the member States and at the regional levels. Summary of Findings VII The following is the summary of the major findings of the exercise: A. All countries in West Africa are extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking and related money laundering. The vulnerability is related to geographical, political, legal, institutional, economic and social factors. The large sea coast is either partly or completely unmanned in most parts of the region. Generally, inland borders are porous and not effectively manned across the region. B. Most of the countries have AML laws that were enacted not more than 4 years earlier, and the necessary infrastructure and human capacity to support the execution of the law are still being put in place. In a number of the countries, this process has been stalled by lack of resources. C. The trafficking tends to concentrate in countries with unstable political, social and economical situation and weak controls (legal, enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial). D. The laundering of the money generated from drug trafficking tend to be carried out in stable countries with relatively fair economy in the region where cash dominates transactions and is difficult for authorities to monitor cash inflows and outflows, as well as some in countries outside the region (largely countries where the heads of the networks operate from and the countries of some of the drug couriers from outside of the region). E. Corruption appears to play an important part in the cross-border movement of proceeds of crime as cash or when converted into goods. F. The general lack of capacity to interdict illicit drugs especially cocaine and heroin, makes money laundering almost inevitable due to the prevailing opportunities for money laundering in the informal sector. G. There is general lack of capacity for money laundering investigation in most of the countries coupled with the fact that money laundering investigation has not been fully integrated in drug trafficking investigation in most of the countries. Investigating money laundering during drug investigation does not appear to be a top priority as indicated by the apparent absence of asset seizure and confiscation despite convictions obtained of drug traffickers in most of the countries and the significant drug seizures made. H. Coordination between the investigating agencies and FIUs during drug trafficking related money laundering investigation is very week. The trust factor remains an important element in this lack of coordination. I. Over emphasis of money laundering through the formal financial system undermines overall AML/CFT efforts especially in West Africa where the cash dominated informal sector is the preferred channel for laundering the proceeds of crime, including drug trafficking. J. Reporting entities do not appear to be providing STRs commensurate with the level of the drug trafficking problems in most of the countries. This may be as a result of lack of expertise in ML risk analysis or lack of interest in providing such information. K. Most of the FIUs do not have sufficient analytical expertise to detect drug trafficking related money laundering. Emphasis appears to be placed more on corruption related ML by the FIUs. L. Cross border information sharing both in the control of drug trafficking and related money laundering is virtually absent except where there is a public incidence that affect countries.

Details: Dakar, Senegal: GIABA, 2010. 82p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 14, 2019 at: https://www.giaba.org/media/f/118_final-drugs-typologies-report-dev071811---english.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Africa

URL: https://www.giaba.org/media/f/118_final-drugs-typologies-report-dev071811---english.pdf

Shelf Number: 154138

Keywords:
Anti-Money Laundering
Cocaine
Corruption
Drug Traffickers
Drug Trafficking
Drug Typologies
ECOWAS
FIU
Illicit Drugs
Money Laundering
West Africa

Author: International Crisis Group

Title: Fire and Ice: Conflict and Drugs in Myanmar's Shan State

Summary: Myanmar's Shan State has emerged as one of the largest global centres for the production of crystal methamphetamine ("ice"). Large quantities of the drug, with a street value of tens of billions of dollars, are seized each year in Myanmar, neighbouring countries and across the Asia-Pacific. Production takes place in safe havens in Shan State held by militias and other paramilitary units allied with the Myanmar military, as well as in enclaves controlled by non-state armed groups. The trade in ice, along with amphetamine tablets and heroin, has become so large and profitable that it dwarfs the formal economy of Shan State, lies at the heart of its political economy, fuels criminality and corruption and hinders efforts to end the state's long-running ethnic conflicts. Myanmar's government should stop prosecuting users and small-scale sellers and work with its neighbours to disrupt the major networks and groups profiting from the trade. The military should better constrain pro-government militias and paramilitaries involved in the drugs trade, with an eye to their eventual demobilisation. The growing drugs trade in Shan State is in part a legacy of the area's ethnic conflicts. For decades, the Myanmar military has struck ceasefire deals with armed groups and established pro-government militias. Such groups act semi-autonomously and enjoy considerable leeway to pursue criminal activities. Indeed, conditions in parts of Shan State are ideal for large-scale drug production, which requires a kind of predictable insecurity: production facilities can be hidden from law enforcement and other prying eyes but insulated from disruptive violence. Tackling the drug trade presents a complex policy challenge involving security, law enforcement, political and public health aspects. But if the drugs trade is partly a symptom of Shan State's conflicts, it is also an obstacle to sustainably ending them. The trade, which now dwarfs legitimate business activities, creates a political economy inimical to peace and security. It generates revenue for armed groups of all stripes. Militias and other armed actors that control areas of production and trafficking routes have a disincentive to demobilise, given that weapons, territorial control and the absence of state institutions are essential to those revenues. The trade attracts transnational criminal groups and requires bribing officials for protection, support or to turn a blind eye, which allows a culture of payoffs and graft to flourish and adds to the grievances of ethnic minority communities that underpin the seventy-year old civil war. Myanmar's military, which has ultimate authority over militias and paramilitaries and profits from their activities, can only justify the existence of such groups in the context of the broader ethnic conflict in the state - so the military also has less incentive to end that conflict. Tackling the drug trade presents a complex policy challenge involving security, law enforcement, political and public health aspects. An integrated approach that addresses all of these areas will be needed to effectively address it: - Myanmar's government should redouble its drug control efforts, ending prosecutions of small-time dealers and users and refocusing on organised crime and corruption associated with the trade. The president should instruct and empower the Anti-Corruption Commission to prioritise this. - At the community level, the government should focus more on education and harm reduction, in line with its February 2018 National Drug Control Policy. It should work with relevant donors and international agencies to invest in education and harm reduction initiatives geared specifically toward the particular dangers of crystal meth use. Although crystal meth is currently not widely used in Myanmar, that is likely to change given the huge scale of production. - Myanmar's military should rethink the conflict management approaches it has employed for decades. In particular, it should exert greater control over - and ultimately disarm and disband - allied militias and paramilitary forces that are among the key players in the drug business. The impunity that these groups enjoy, and the requirement that they mostly fund themselves, has pushed them to engage in lucrative illicit activities. - The military should also investigate and take concerted action to end drug-related corruption within its ranks, focusing on senior officers who facilitate or turn a blind eye to the trade. - Myanmar's neighbours should stop illicit flows of precursors, the chemicals used to manufacture drugs, into Shan State. As the main source of such chemicals, China has a particular responsibility to end this trade taking place illegally across its south-western border. It should also use its influence over the Wa and Mongla armed groups controlling enclaves on the Chinese border to end their involvement in the drug trade and other criminal activities. Targeting the major players in the drug trade will not be easy and comes with risks of pushback, perhaps violent, from those involved. But the alternative - allowing parts of Shan State to continue to be a safe haven for this large-scale criminal enterprise - will see closer links between local armed actors, corrupt officials in Myanmar and the region, and transnational criminal organisations. The more such a system becomes entrenched, and the greater the profits it generates, the harder it will be to dislodge and the longer conflicts in that area are likely to persist. The people of Shan State, and Myanmar as a whole, will pay the highest price.

Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2019. 36p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2019 at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/299-fire-and-ice-conflict-and-drugs-myanmars-shan-state

Year: 2019

Country: Asia

URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/299-fire-and-ice.pdf

Shelf Number: 154750

Keywords:
Corruption
Crystal Meth
Drug Dealing
Drug Trade
Drug Trafficking
Ice
Methamphetamine
Myanmar
Shan State

Author: Vaz, Matthew

Title: The Jackpot Mentality: The Growth of Government Lotteries and the Suppression of Illegal Numbers Gambling in Rio de Janeiro and New York City

Summary: This dissertation examines social and political conflict over gambling policy in the United States and Brazil from 1960 to the present with a particular focus on New York City and Rio de Janeiro. The study accounts for the process by which illegal numbers gambling in New York and the jogo do bicho in Rio de Janeiro were determined to be the basis for widespread corruption and lawlessness. As policy makers proposed enhanced government lotteries as a solution for the problem of illegal gambling, numerous groups scrambled for position within shifting gambling frameworks. Tens of thousands of persons who had long worked in illegal numbers networks pressed for access to legal gambling jobs, corporate entities partnering with government lotteries pushed to secure monopoly concessions, while many citizens and religious groups opposed any and all forms of gambling legalization. As gambling workers, bettors, clergy, police officers, politicians and corporate lobbyists all struggled over how gambling would be conducted going forward, an intense debate unfolded in both Brazil and the United States with issues relating to police corruption, welfare, public safety, state sovereignty, personal liberty, and distribution of the tax burden all under examination. While there are many comparative elements of this study, it is ultimately transnational in that the narrative histories of gambling policy in Brazil and the United States eventually converge through the gambling technology corporation Gtech, which emerged as a powerhouse in the government lottery sectors of both nations. As the low stakes illegal gambling games of the numbers and the jogo do bicho are suppressed in favor of legal government lotteries, a vast new array of gambling habits are introduced to the gambling public in both Brazil and the United States. Of particular importance to this study is the growth of multimillion-dollar jackpot games offered by governments and their corporate partners. As players leave behind the old games with their reasonable odds and their modest payouts, they take up new games with astronomical odds and obscene jackpots. In the argument of this study, jackpot style gambling has brought the gambling habits of the poor and working classes into accord with contemporary patterns of wealth distribution.

Details: New York: Columbia University, 2011. 439p.

Source: Internet Resource Dissertation: Accessed May 22, 2019 at: https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8B85G4C

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8B85G4C

Shelf Number: 155965

Keywords:
Addictive Behavior
Brazil
Corruption
Gambling
Gambling Industry
Illegal Gambling
Lottery

Author: Congressional Research Service

Title: Combating Corruption in Latin America: Congressional Considerations

Summary: Corruption of public officials in Latin America continues to be a prominent political concern. In the past few years, 11 presidents and former presidents in Latin America have been forced from office, jailed, or are under investigation for corruption. As in previous years, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index covering 2018 found that the majority of respondents in several Latin American nations believed that corruption was increasing. Several analysts have suggested that heightened awareness of corruption in Latin America may be due to several possible factors: the growing use of social media to reveal violations and mobilize citizens, greater media and investor scrutiny, or, in some cases, judicial and legislative investigations. Moreover, as expectations for good government tend to rise with greater affluence, the expanding middle class in Latin America has sought more integrity from its politicians. U.S. congressional interest in addressing corruption comes at a time of this heightened rejection of corruption in public office across several Latin American and Caribbean countries. Whether or not the perception that corruption is increasing is accurate, it is nevertheless fueling civil society efforts to combat corrupt behavior and demand greater accountability. Voter discontent and outright indignation has focused on bribery and the economic consequences of official corruption, diminished public services, and the link of public corruption to organized crime and criminal impunity. In some countries, rejection of tainted political parties and leaders from across the spectrum has challenged public confidence in governmental legitimacy. In some cases, condemnation of corruption has helped to usher in populist presidents. For example, a populist of the left won Mexico's election and of the right Brazil's in 2018, as winning candidates appealed to end corruption and overcome political paralysis. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy characterizes corruption as a threat to the United States because criminals and terrorists may thrive under governments with rampant corruption. Studies indicate that corruption lowers productivity and mars competitiveness in developing economies. When it is systemic, it can spur migration and reduce GDP measurably. The U.S. government has used several policy tools to combat corruption. Among them are sanctions (asset blocking and visa restrictions) against leaders and other public officials to punish and deter corrupt practices, and programming and incentives to adopt anti-corruption best practices. The United States has also provided foreign assistance to some countries to promote clean or "good" government goals. U.S. efforts include assistance to strengthen the rule of law and judicial independence, law enforcement training, programs to institutionalize open and transparent public sector procurement and other clean government practices, and efforts to tap private-sector knowledge to combat corruption. This report examines U.S. strategies to help allies achieve anti-corruption goals, which were once again affirmed at the Summit of the Americas held in Peru in April 2018, with the theme of "Democratic Governance against Corruption." The case studies in the report explore: - Brazil's collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice and other international partners to expand investigations and use tools such as plea bargaining to secure convictions; - Mexico's efforts to strengthen protections for journalists and to protect investigative journalism generally, and mixed efforts to implement comprehensive reforms approved by Mexico's legislature; and - the experiences of Honduras and Guatemala with multilateral anti-corruption bodies to bolster weak domestic institutions, although leaders investigated by these bodies have tried to shutter them. Some analysts maintain that U.S. funding for "anti-corruption" programming has been too limited, noting that by some definitions, worldwide spending in recent years has not exceeded $115 million annually. Recent congressional support for anti-corruption efforts includes: training of police and justice personnel, backing for the Trump Administration's use of targeted sanctions, and other efforts to condition assistance. Policy debates have also highlighted the importance of combating corruption related to trade and investment. The 116th Congress may consider the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which would revise the NAFTA trade agreement, and contains a new chapter on anti-corruption measures.

Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019. 48p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 28, 2019 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45733.pdf

Year: 2019

Country: Latin America

URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45733.pdf

Shelf Number: 156054

Keywords:
Anti-Corruption
Bribery
Corruption
Latin America
Organized Crime
Public Officials
Public Services

Rutgers - School of Law, Newark

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