Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:06 pm
Time: 8:06 pm
Results for corruption (guatemala)
2 results foundAuthor: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Breaking the wave: critical steps in the fight against crime in Guatemala Summary: The new government led by retired General Otto Pérez Molina that is to take office in Guatemala on January 14, 2012 will encounter a familiar set of torments in its in-tray. Whether measured in terms of murder rate, possession of firearms, or the extent of territory under the supposed control of armed criminal groups, this Central American nation stands at the forefront of a crisis of insecurity, in a region that is one of the most violent and lawless in the world. But the portrayal of a country that is a victim to the intrusion of Mexican cartels and is unable to provide basic justice to its citizens no longer represents the whole picture. For over four years, the Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a UN body, has spurred a series of criminal investigations compromising some of the country’s most powerful figures – despite occasional setbacks. A new head of the national prosecution service has managed to shape an extraordinary turnaround, ordering the arrest of several ‘untouchable’ druglords, as well as a former president and general accused of atrocities during the civil war. Drug interdictions have soared; the murder rate has fallen, albeit slightly; even impunity rates for serious crimes are down. This progress cannot hide the dilapidation of the country’s security and justice institutions, notably its police and prisons, nor the acute fear of crime that is felt by many Guatemalans. But in combination with the Central American region’s determination to address its vulnerabilities to transnational crime, it does offer some reason to believe that the crisis may be contained. Pérez Molina, head of the right-wing Patriotic Party, has also made security the overriding imperative for his government. For the moment, however, both Guatemalan civil society and foreign governments are waiting to see how this veteran of military intelligence and the 1980s counter-insurgency – a particularly brutal period of the country’s 36-year civil war – will behave once in power. He pledged repeatedly during the campaign to assign inter-institutional ‘task forces’ to combat major criminal phenomena. His concern over territory that is under the control of drug traffickers may also see much deeper involvement of the armed forces in crimefighting operations. At the same time, there is uncertainty as to whether the new president will respect recent reforms in the police and prosecution service, honour the mandate of the CICIG, or reappoint veterans of the counter-insurgency to key posts in the security apparatus. Even if the president avoids militarizing the country’s security strategy, he will still have to deal with the chronic flaws in the country’s criminal justice system – weaknesses that have emerged time and again since the 1996 peace accords, and have scuppered previous efforts at reform and modernization funded by the donor community. Part of this vulnerability can be attributed to the character of Guatemala’s political system, which has proved extremely permeable to business and criminal interests. Even the outgoing president, Álvaro Colom, failed on several occasions to live up to his commitments to a stronger security system, either by appointing shady operators, cutting security budgets, or by ignoring the CICIG. In addition to political issues, this paper discusses in depth three chronic weaknesses in the criminal justice system that together pose major obstacles to successful reform. Efforts to strengthen criminal justice have so far failed to keep up with the rapid evolution of criminal behaviour, particularly in narco-trafficking and in the composition of local protection rackets. • Reforms have not managed to introduce effective systems of internal discipline and oversight in security and justice institutions, which have been repeatedly infiltrated by criminal activity. • They have not latched on to a credible approach towards ensuring they are sustainable over the long term – either through proper donor coordination, tax reform, constitutional change or genuine public support. On the basis of these three major flaws, the report ends by outlining a comprehensive strategy for security and justice reform that would incorporate each of these issues by stressing the need for greater investigative sophistication, tighter internal controls, and, over the longer term, a route-map towards fiscal, constitutional and social change. The proposal is also grounded in a pragmatic understanding of Guatemalan institutions, emphasizing the need to support bodies that perform well, thereby spreading good practice by example rather than by rhetoric. These recommendations acknowledge, however, that in the short term the priority will be to preserve the modest and fragile progress made in the last few years. For the CICIG, the United Nations and other leading donors, the immediate concern will be to resist excessive dependence on the military, continue to undermine clandestine groups in the state, and build up the capacity of criminal justice institutions. At a crucial time for Guatemala, they will be anxious to see whether the new president serves these goals or imperils them. Details: The Hague: Clingendael Institute/Impunity Watch, 2012. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2012 at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/20120100_briscoe_breaking.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/20120100_briscoe_breaking.pdf Shelf Number: 124416 Keywords: Corruption (Guatemala)Criminal Justice Reform (Guatemala)Organized Crime (Guatemala) |
Author: Lopez, Julie Title: Guatemala's Crossroads: Democratization of Violence and Second Chances Summary: This paper is part of the ongoing work of the Latin American Program on citizen security and organized crime in the region and their effects on democratic governance, human rights, and economic development. This work is carried out in collaboration with the Mexico Institute, which has worked extensively on security and rule of law issues in Mexico. Our goal is to understand the sub-regional dimension of organized crime, focusing on the ways in which the countries of the Andean region, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, the United States, and Canada play central and inter-connected roles. This essay represents one of three papers commissioned by the Woodrow Wilson Center on the nature and dynamics of organized crime in Central America and its connections to broader criminal networks in Mexico and the Andean region. This paper, along with the others in this series, is a working draft. The State of Guatemala is embarked in two wars. On the one hand, it’s fighting organized crime; on the other, it’s at war with itself. While significant portions of its resources are used to fight drug trafficking and extortions, and an explosion of other organized crime activities, the State seems to be imploding from corruption and insufficient professional personnel in the public sector. After a 36-year internal conflict, this stage in Guatemala’s history is often desceribed as the key time to decipher the origin of the country’s current maladies. But the answer is not so clear cut. Security and political analysts attribute the proliferation of organized crime to the Intelligence Structures and Clandestine Security Apparatuses (CIACS, their acronym in Spanish) that were not dismantled after the peace accords were signed. They also attribute it to scores of men left unemployed after the end of the conflict, whose main skill was knowing how to fire a gun. The origin of organized crime and the elements contributing to its growth are broad and complex. Criminal structures can be seen as a three-legged stool, where the three legs are the local crime lords or capos, foreign criminal networks, and local corrupt authorities—which, throughout history, have involved civilians and the military. Some analysts trace the first signs of these structures back to the 1940s, beginning with the strengthening of local criminal networks that worked with foreign contacts on a regional level. Other origins are traced backed to contraband networks dating back to colonial times and the 18th century. Details: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010. 59p. Source: Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2012 at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Lopez.Guatemala.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Lopez.Guatemala.pdf Shelf Number: 124470 Keywords: Corruption (Guatemala)Drug Trafficking (Guatemala)Law Enforcement (Guatemala)Organized Crime (Guatemala)Violent Crime (Guatemala) |