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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:25 pm
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Results for counter-terrorism
165 results foundAuthor: United Nations. Office of Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Thematic evaluation of the global project on strengthening the legal regime against terrorism Summary: This evaluation of the Global Project on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism is focused on the selected countries of Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama. The aim is to provide insights to help the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime increase the effectiveness and impact of its technical assistance to counter-terrorism efforts. Details: New York: 2008 Source: Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 115759 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism |
Author: Kundnani, Arun Title: Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: This report critically examines the UK government's counter-terrorism strategy, and suggests that it is counter-productive in reducing the risk of violent extremism. Details: London: Institute for Race Relations, 2009. 45p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 117579 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism |
Author: Lindelauf, Roy Title: Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption Summary: This article investigates the structural position of covert (terrorist or criminal) networks. Details: Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University, 2009. 13p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117867 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismOrganized CrimeTerror NetworksTerrorism |
Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society Summary: The U.K. Coalition Government has the opportunity to initiate a new era of counter terrorism policy. It has started well by signalling its commitment to ‘restore the rights of individuals in the face of encroaching state power’, including the introduction of a ‘Freedom Bill’, and a review of counter-terrorism legislation. This paper considers one aspect of that review, ‘home-grown’ terrorism, and the future of one specific type of response, prevention. It argues for an approach to prevention work that is consistent with the Coalition’s goal of creating a Big Society of active citizens and protecting civil liberties. That there has been no successful terrorist plot in the UK since 7/7 owes much to the skills of our policing and security services, as well as a sustained effort from Muslim communities to fight terrorism. But the threat of al-Qaeda inspired terrorism remains, as does a sense of alienation and frustration among many British Muslims. Preventing terrorism before it takes place is a vital part of the counter-terrorism effort, particularly given the home-grown threat we face. This is known as ‘Prevent’, which is the second ‘P’ in the UK’s CONTEST II strategy (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare). However, the five years since 7/7 have demonstrated how complicated prevention work is. Stopping a problem before it arises always poses ethical and practical questions; in counter-terrorism, it involves sensitive issues of theology, integration, and identity. And because the paths that people take into terrorism are varied, complicated, and unpredictable, it is difficult to know where and when ‘prevention’ should take place. A number of recent reports have been critical of the UK’s current prevention efforts, culminating in the House of Commons Select Committee Report into Preventing Violent Extremism, released in March 2010. It is widely believed that Prevent has alienated Muslim communities, increased intercommunity tensions, and threatens to undo a number of good initiatives that contribute to community cohesion because of the link to counter terrorism. It is also extremely difficult to assess its effectiveness as the relationship between these programmes and countering terrorism is weak. Thus,in a time of tightening public sector budgets, the question of value for money is impossible to determine.Some of these criticisms have been based on misconceptions about what prevention is about but it is difficult to know how to overcome them. Some form of terrorism prevention work must remain. This paper sets out a new vision for how it could be reformed under a new government. It proposes replacing the current broad approach to prevention, which targets all Muslims, with a more precise focus on individuals that have the intent to commit criminal acts. Broader plans for cohesion are important, but should not be pursued directly or through the prism of security. Instead, Big Society initiatives can indirectly create a more cohesive society and address some of the root causes of terrorism. But a Big Society will mean disagreement, dissent, and extremism. Deciding the limits of free expression will be a defining question. Rather than vague notions of tackling extremism, we propose a liberal republican solution. This means that intolerance must be allowed a platform, but the onus falls on us to demolish it in argument. It also means intervening when certain types of extremism stop others leading a life of their own choosing. The recommendations contains a number of recommendations to enable the coalition government to create a cohesive society and address some of the causes of terrorism. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Shelf Number: 119743 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsMuslimsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The Power of Unreason: Conspiracy Theories, Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Summary: Conspiracy theories have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon. This paper considers the role they play in extremist groups and counterterrorism work. It presents the first ever analysis of conspiracy theories in the ideology and propaganda of fifty extremist groups: religious, far-right and left, eco, anarchic and cult-based. It is argued that conspiracy theories are a ‘radicalising multiplier', which feed back into the ideologies, internal dynamics and psychological processes of extremist groups in three ways. Firstly, they create demonologies of ‘the enemy’ that the group defines itself against. Secondly, they delegitimise voices of dissent and moderation. And thirdly, they encourage a group or individuals to turn to violence, because it acts as rhetorical devices to portray violence as necessary to ‘awaken’ the people from their acquiescent slumber. More broadly, conspiracy theories drive a wedge of distrust between governments and particular communities which can hinder community-level efforts to fight violent extremism. It is, however, difficult for government to tackle conspiracies. The paper calls for government institutions to be more open, investment to enable young people to think critically and recognise propaganda, and for civil society to play a proactive role. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Shelf Number: 119795 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsTerrorismViolence |
Author: Merritt, Zina D. Title: Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed Summary: The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital partner in combating terrorism. The strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by Saudi nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. GAO was asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies’ assessment of and the Saudi government’s views on progress toward the goals of this strategy. GAO analyzed relevant U.S. and Saudi strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to efforts since 2005, and discussed these efforts with subject matter experts and U.S. and Saudi officials in Washington, D.C., and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. GAO submitted a copy of this report to intelligence agencies, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury for their review and comment. GAO recommends the Secretary of State direct the U.S. mission in Saudi Arabia to reinstate certain targets related to preventing financing of terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia. State agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-883: Accessed October 7, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Saudi Arabia URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf Shelf Number: 116506 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Citizen's Crime Commission of New York City Title: Police and Public Safety in New York City Summary: This study of police operations, crime and public safety in New York discusses recent trends in law enforcement including the increased importance of counter-terrorism police work in the post-Sept. 11 environment. It also includes the results of surveying work regarding public perceptions about neighborhood safety, police and police-community relations, and quality of life enforcement. These findings are presented both at the citywide level and also broken down by borough and ethnicity. Details: New York: Citizens Crime Commission of New York City, 2004. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 8, 2010 at: http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/1247.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/1247.pdf Shelf Number: 120417 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismPolice-Community RelationsPolicing (New York City)Public OpinionPublic Safety |
Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists Summary: Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the process of violent Islamist radicalization, but far less research has explored the equally important process of deradicalization, or how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies. Proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism have been implemented, to varying degrees, in several Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and European countries. A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement (a change in behavior) or deradicalization (a change in beliefs) of militants. Furthermore, a unique challenge posed by militant Islamist groups is that their ideology is rooted in a major world religion. An examination of deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each program, finding that the best-designed programs leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their objectives. Such programs cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another. They need to develop organically in a specific country and culture. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 214p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf Shelf Number: 120548 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Sloan, Britt Title: Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences Among Transnational Threats? Summary: Despite their diverging strategic objectives, terrorists, criminals, and insurgents appear increasingly to collaborate. The deep connections among terrorism, drug production, and insurgency in Afghanistan and Colombia are well known. In the Sahel, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is funded at least in part through the paid protection of trafficking routes and through criminal kidnapping campaigns. In southern Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) long has mixed oil bunkering, kidnapping, and ethnic rebellion, and it recently may have added terrorism to its repertoire. In Somalia, there is increasing concern about the possibility of Islamist militants taxing, controlling, or even investing in the piracy industry. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) made millions of dollars from sophisticated cybercrime, including extensive credit card fraud, and for years used its resulting military might to exercise de facto control over a large territory. Fragile states, with their ready pools of unemployed labor and populations inured to and traumatized by violence, frequently represent sites of competitive advantage for terrorist organizations, criminal networks, and violent political leaders alike. Collaboration among them may benefit all three —financing terrorism, protecting crime, and securing political control. The UN Security Council has gone so far as to suggest that such conjoined transnational threats may represent a threat to international peace and security. Yet, policymakers appear unclear about how to handle the confluence of these threats. This policy brief offers eight targeted policy recommendations for combating the convergence of terrorism, crime, and politics. Rather than simply warning about the potential for interaction and synergy among terrorist, criminal, and political actors, this policy brief aims to explore possibilities for exploiting their divergences. In particular, it emphasizes the need to grapple with the economic, political, and combat power that some terrorist groups enjoy through their involvement in crime and conflict. This requires an approach to counterterrorism that incorporates policy proscriptions from the criminological, conflict transformation, peacebuilding, development, and sociological arenas, while developing a coordinated interagency strategy for deploying common tools, such as macroeconomic reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts; security sector reform (SSR); improved border control; financial sector reform; and legal-institution capacity building. Above all, this approach requires taking the social power of violent organizations more seriously. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed March 14, 2011 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/BS_policybrief_117.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/BS_policybrief_117.pdf Shelf Number: 120928 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismTerroristsTransnational Crime |
Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Use of the Internet for Counter-Terrorist Purposes Summary: On 1 May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, tried to detonate a car bomb in the heart of New York’s Times Square. Thanks to the vigilance of local witnesses and to technical shortcomings, the bomb was detected and failed to explode. The investigation surrounding Shahzad’s case, like other, more recent cases, shows that the Internet played an important role in his violent radicalization and the planning and execution of the attempted attack. For example, he drew spiritual inspiration from lectures and videos circulated online by Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-Yemeni cleric, who helped to convince Shahzad to take up the cause of al-Qaida. Shahzad accessed Web sites for operational and planning purposes. He viewed “real-time video feeds of different areas of Times Square” to help determine which areas attract a large crowd and would result in a high casualty rate if attacked. Shahzad also used the Internet to discuss his plans with militants based in Pakistan. Terrorist operatives such as Shahzad often draw inspiration, reinforcement, support, and guidance from a variety of on- and off-line sources. Some clerics; experts; scholars, such as al-Awlaki; and virtual communities use the Internet to promote violent extremism on their blogs, social network pages, discussion forums, or through the streaming of videos on multimedia platforms such as YouTube. This brief provides an overview of challenges posed to stakeholders by the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. It argues that the Internet is not the problem and that the online platform can be employed to counter terrorism efforts. Specifically, models of violent radicalization processes off-line offer an important and useful framework for the development and implementation of policies to counter online use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. The brief concludes by offering multilateral institutions, states, civil society organizations, the media, and the private sector examples of how they can use the Internet more effectively as a counterterrorism tool to prevent and counter the use of the Internet for violent radicalization. Four intervention points are suggested: (1) weaken cult personalities, (2) challenge the extremist doctrine, (3) dispel the glory of the “terrorist lifestyle,” and (4) offer a street-smart and locally developed and communicated counternarrative. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed March 18, 2011 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/LS_policybrief_119.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/LS_policybrief_119.pdf Shelf Number: 121073 Keywords: Computer CrimesCounter-TerrorismInternet CrimesTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Innes, Martin Title: Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers Summary: “This report provides an assessment of the effects of Prevent policing. Informed by analyses of the British Crime Survey and ninety five in-depth interviews with Muslim community members (n=53) and police involved in delivering Prevent (n=42), it seeks to develop an evidence-led account of what Prevent policing has and has not achieved since its inception in 2003. The interview data clearly capture that community participation in co-‐productive working to solve problems is involving both organizations that are formally funded by Prevent, but also more ‘organic’ forms of activism. However, reflecting a key finding of the earlier report, it remains the case that Muslim communities continue to express a preference for using their own informal social control resources to solve a problem when this is (or at least is believed to be) feasible. The evidence suggests that many Muslims hold quite complex and sophisticated views about the Prevent programme. Frequently, across the course of a single interview, community representatives talked both positively and negatively about their encounters with Prevent. Many of the reservations expressed about Prevent policing centred upon the means sometimes implemented. In particular, objections were registered about how Prevent funding had gone to groups who were not delivering much practical benefit. These concerns were reinforced by the wide-‐ranging disposition of the Prevent programme and the tendency for it to define Muslims’ relations with key state agencies, such as the police. Overall, the attitudes and perceptions of people belonging to Muslim communities can be divided into three main positions: Some are fundamentally ‘anti--Prevent’ and anti-police. This stance views the entire Prevent agenda as flawed and misconceived. Whilst this ‘strong critique’ of Prevent policing has achieved some political traction, the evidence collated suggests that it is not a mainstream or majority view within Muslim communities. At the other end of the continuum are people who are ‘advocates’ of Prevent. They accept the premises of Prevent and are often actively engaged in helping to deliver it, either within or outside of formal programme structures. In between these two positions are a large group of ‘non-aligned’ Muslims, whose views shift according to the unfolding of events. For many of these, a ‘weaker’ critique of Prevent does have some resonance in that they disagree with how some aspects of it have been delivered, but accept that ultimately there is a problem that needs to be confronted. Their concerns are pragmatically grounded in terms of how interventions should and should not be delivered. The police role in Prevent appeared to be viewed more positively than the wide-ranging remit afforded to the local authority based ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ element. Overall though, there was a strong sense in the data of Prevent being a ‘tainted’ brand’. Such views have been strongly influenced by the legacy of how Prevent was initially introduced in a hurry without establishing clarity of mission, or testing of appropriate tactical and strategic interventions. These concerns notwithstanding, appropriately configured targeted policing interventions did receive community support and backing. Taken as a whole, Muslims express higher levels of trust and confidence in the police than do the general population. This is in spite of them reporting crime and disorder impacts more negatively upon them than do the general population. This is an important finding because it challenges the oft repeated claim that Muslim communities in the UK are being profoundly alienated and disenchanted by the workings of the Prevent programme. The evidence available for this study suggests that the actual situation is somewhat more complex. Time trend analysis of a number of general policing indicators contained within the BCS covering the period in which Prevent has been implemented shows that Muslim community perceptions of the police have been remarkably stable, and largely positive. It is thus concluded that Prevent policing does not appear to be causing widespread damage to police and Muslim community relations.” Details: London: The Association of Chief Police Officers, 2011. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 14, 2011 at: http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Final%20send%202.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Final%20send%202.pdf Shelf Number: 121337 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismMinority GroupsMuslimsPolice-Community RelationsPolicing (U.K.) |
Author: Nasser-Eddine, Minerva Title: Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review Summary: This report consists of a literature review and analysis of the existing research concerning ‘countering violent extremism’. This multifaceted report demonstrates the complexity of understanding Violent Extremism and best strategies to Countering Violent Extremism. This has been undertaken with the broader analysis of radicalisation and social cohesion theories, models and government policies and how they may impact on or contribute to best practice and policy in countering violent extremism. Details: Edinburgh, South Australia: Australian Department of Defence, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, 2011. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/10122/1/DSTO-TR-2522%20PR.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/10122/1/DSTO-TR-2522%20PR.pdf Shelf Number: 121836 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist Groups (Australia)Terrorism |
Author: Muhlhausen, David B. Title: Terror Trends: 40 Years' Data on International and Domestic Terrorism Summary: A decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, looking back is as important as looking forward in order to learn from the past and to examine the current and future threats facing the U.S. This survey aggregates international data on global and domestic terrorism from the past 40 years. Combined with new intelligence, this data can better inform U.S. counterterrorism decisions and continue the process of delineating enhanced homeland security policies for the future. From 1969 to 2009, almost 5,600 people lost their lives and more than 16,300 people suffered injuries due to international terrorism directed at the United States. The onus is now on the President and Congress to ensure that the U.S. continues to hone and sharpen its counterterrorism capabilities and adapt them to evolving 21st-century threats. Details: Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/sr0093.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/sr0093.pdf Shelf Number: 121937 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Archick, Kristin Title: U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism Summary: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks gave new momentum to European Union (EU) initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation among its member states. Since the 2001 attacks, the EU has sought to speed up its efforts to harmonize national laws and bring down barriers among member states’ law enforcement authorities so that information can be meaningfully shared and suspects apprehended expeditiously. Among other steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls and improve aviation security. As part of its drive to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also made improving cooperation with the United States a top priority. Washington has largely welcomed these efforts, recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks against the United States or its interests abroad. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001. A number of new U.S.-EU agreements have also been reached; these include information-sharing arrangements between the United States and EU police and judicial bodies, two new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on container security and airline passenger data. In addition, the United States and the EU have been working together to clamp down on terrorist financing and to improve aviation and transport security. Despite U.S.-EU strides to foster closer counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, some challenges remain. Data privacy has been and continues to be a key sticking point. In February 2010, the European Parliament (EP) rejected a U.S.-EU agreement—known as the SWIFT accord—that would have continued allowing U.S. authorities access to financial data stored in Europe to help combat terrorism on the grounds that it did not contain sufficient protections to safeguard the personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens. Although the EP approved a revised U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement in July 2010, some Members of the European Parliament—for many years and for similar reasons—have also challenged a U.S.-EU agreement permitting airlines to share passenger name record (PNR) data with U.S. authorities. U.S. and EU officials are currently negotiating revisions to the existing PNR accord in an effort to assuage EP concerns. Other issues that have led to periodic U.S.-EU tensions include terrorist detainee policies, differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist designation lists, and balancing border security with legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce. Nevertheless, both the United States and the EU appear committed to fostering closer cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism and other homeland security issues. Congressional decisions related to improving border controls and transport security, in particular, may affect how future U.S.-EU cooperation evolves. In addition, given the European Parliament’s growing influence in many of these policy areas, Members of Congress may be able to help shape Parliament’s views and responses through ongoing contacts and the existing Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD). This report examines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation and the ongoing challenges that may be of interest in the 112th Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: RS22030: Accessed July 6, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Shelf Number: 121982 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Sanchez, Julian Title: Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform Patriot Act Surveillance Authorities Summary: Congress recently approved a temporary extension of three controversial surveillance provisions of the USA Patriot Act and successor legislation, which had previously been set to expire at the end of February. In the coming weeks, lawmakers have an opportunity to review the sweeping expansion of domestic counter-terror powers since 9/11 and, with the benefit of a decade’s perspective, strengthen crucial civil-liberties safeguards without unduly burdening legitimate intelligence gathering. Two of the provisions slated for sunset—roving wiretap authority and the socalled “Section 215” orders for the production of records — should be narrowed to mitigate the risk of overcollection of sensitive information about innocent Americans. A third—authority to employ the broad investigative powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act against “lone wolf” suspects who lack ties to any foreign terror group — does not appear to be necessary at all. More urgent than any of these, however, is the need to review and substantially modify the statutes authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation to secretly demand records, without any prior court approval, using National Security Letters. Though not slated to sunset with the other three Patriot provisions, NSLs were the focus of multiple proposed legislative reforms during the 2009 reauthorization debates, and are also addressed in at least one bill already introduced this year. Federal courts have already held parts of the current NSL statutes unconstitutional, and the government’s own internal audits have uncovered widespread, systematic misuse of expanded NSL powers. Congress should resist recent Justice Department pressure to further broaden the scope of NSL authority — and, indeed, should significantly curtail it. In light of this history of misuse, as well as the uncertain constitutional status of NSLs, a sunset should be imposed along with more robust reporting and oversight requirements. Details: Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Analysis No. 675: Accessed August 1, 2011 at: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA675.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA675.pdf Shelf Number: 122241 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismPatriot ActPrivacySurveillance (U.S.) |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich , Bruck, Tilman, Meierrieks, Daniel Title: The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II) Summary: This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe. Details: Berlin: Economics of Security, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Economics of Security Working Paper Series no. 45: Accessed August 16, 2011 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.372925.de/diw_econsec0045.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.372925.de/diw_econsec0045.pdf Shelf Number: 122411 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismEconomics of CrimeTerrorism |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich , Bruck, Tilman, Meierrieks, Daniel Title: The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part I) Summary: This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe. Details: Munich, Germany: Institute for Economic Research, 2010. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 3011: Accessed August 16, 2011 at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1185552.PDF Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1185552.PDF Shelf Number: 122412 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismEconomics of CrimeTerrorism (Europe) |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11 Summary: The events of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government policies and structures to confront homeland security threats. Most notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United States, and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,000 products on DHS's operations in such areas as border and transportation security and emergency management, among others. As requested, this report addresses DHS's progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts. This report is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, supplemented with DHS Office of Inspector General reports, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008. GAO also analyzed information provided by DHS in July and August 2011 on recent actions taken in response to prior work. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. For example, DHS (1) issued plans to guide its efforts, such as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which provides a framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles; (2) successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce to assume security screening responsibilities at airports nationwide; and (3) created new programs and offices to implement its homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help coordinate efforts to address cybersecurity threats. Such accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. Examples of progress made and work remaining include: Border security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States (individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission). Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo. However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container. Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and involvement with state and local governments' capacity. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. GAO's work identified three themes at the foundation of DHS's challenges. This report contains no new recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-881: Accessed September 12, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Shelf Number: 122718 Keywords: Aviation SecurityCounter-TerrorismCyber SecurityHomeland Security (U.S.)ImmigrationMaritime SecurityRisk ManagementTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: Disley, Emma Title: Individual Disengagement from Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups. A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism Summary: This paper looks at why and how individuals stop being violent and whether there are intervention practices to learn from. It also explores transferable knowledge from the literature on street gangs, religious cults, right-wing groups and organised crime groups. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper No. 99: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123276 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDesistanceExtremist GroupsGangsOrganized CrimeRadical GroupsTerrorismViolence |
Author: Walters, Julie Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing across the globe: A comparative study of regulatory action Summary: Most developed countries across the globe have enacted legislation to proscribe acts of money laundering and financing of terrorism, and to enable the proceeds of crime to be recovered from offenders. Such legislation reflects the principles developed by the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF-GAFI) 40 plus Nine Recommendations to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (FATF-GAFI 2004) to varying degrees. FATF-GAFI was established in 1989 as an international body to examine techniques employed by criminals to launder the proceeds of crime and the approaches taken internationally to counteract such activities, as well as to identify policies to impede money laundering and the financing of terrorism. FATF-GAFI issued 40 Recommendations to combat money laundering in 1990 and expanded these to deal with the problem of financing of terrorism after the 11 September 2001 attacks by adding a further Nine Special Recommendations on terrorism financing. Details: Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 119p. Source: AIC Reports, Research and Public Policy Series 113: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2012 at Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 124104 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismInternational CrimeLegislationMoney LaunderingTransnational Crime |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues Summary: The UK faces a significant threat from international terrorism. The current assessed threat level to the UK can be found on the MI5 website1 where more information can also be found on what threat levels mean, who decides the level of threat and how the threat level system is used. Whilst there have been attacks against well protected targets around the world, experience shows that crowded places remain an attractive target for terrorists who have demonstrated that they are likely to target places which are easily accessible, regularly available and which offer the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone (for example, serious disruption or a particular economic/political impact). The purpose of this guide is to give advice about counter-terrorism protective security design to anyone involved in the planning, design and development of the built environment from the preparation of local planning policy to the commissioning, planning, design and management of new development schemes through to detailed building design. Whilst it draws largely on good practice examples from England and refers to legislation that applies to England, this guide will be of interest to the Devolved Administrations. This guide will also be of interest to designers/architects, town planners, engineers, highway engineers and police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) and Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs). It will also be of interest to those who have responsibility for ongoing management and maintenance of public spaces and streetscapes and to conservation officers in the context of development in Conservation Areas. The guide gives practical advice on how best to incorporate counter-terrorism protective security measures into proposed new development schemes whilst ensuring that they are of high design quality. The advice that is set out is generic and cannot address the plethora of varying circumstances and degrees of risk which apply to different facilities. Consideration should first be given to the relevance of such measures and whether or not they can be appropriately achieved through the planning system in any particular case. If so, the measures should be appropriate, proportionate and balanced with other relevant material considerations. The aim of the guide is to equip the reader with a better understanding of the links between the counter-terrorism dimension of crime prevention and the built environment, so that reducing the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack can be tackled in an imaginative and considered way. The guide is not a manual to be applied by rote or a substitute for using skilled designers. Details: London: Home Office, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/crowded-places/design-tech-issues?view=Binary Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/crowded-places/design-tech-issues?view=Binary Shelf Number: 124283 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrime PreventionDesign Against CrimeTerrorism (U.K.) |
Author: Hayes, Ben Title: Counter-Terrorism, 'Policy Laundering' and the FATF: Legalising Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society Summary: This new report published by the Transnational Institute and Statewatch examines the global framework for countering-terrorist financing developed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other international law enforcement bodies. The report includes a thorough examination of the impact of FATF’s ‘Special Recommendation VIII’ on countering the threat of terrorist financing said to be posed by non-profit organisations (NPOs). Developed out of a G7 initiative in 1990, the FATF’s ‘40+9’ Recommendations on combating money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) are now an integral part of the global ‘good governance’ agenda. More than 180 states have now signed up to what is in practice, if not in law, a global convention. The FATF is headquartered at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris; a further eight regional FATF formations replicate its work around the world. The report argues that a lack of democratic control, oversight and accountability of the FATF has allowed for regulations that circumvent concerns about human rights, proportionality and effectiveness. Countries subject to the FATF’s Anti Money Laundering (AML)/Counter Terrorism Financing (CFT) requirements must introduce specific criminal laws, law enforcement powers, surveillance and data retention systems, financial services industry regulations and international police co-operation arrangements in accordance with FATF guidance. Participating countries must also undergo a rigorous evaluation of their national police and judicial systems in a peer-review-style assessment of their compliance with the Recommendations. Developed out of World Bank and IMF financial sector assessment programmes, this process significantly extends the scope of the Recommendations by imposing extraordinarily detailed guidance – over 250 criteria – on the measures states must take to comply with the 40+9 Recommendations. The rewards for FATF compliance are being seen as a safe place to do business; the sanctions for non-cooperation are designation as a ‘non-cooperating territory’ and international finance capital steering clear. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute; London: Statewatch, 2012. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 2, 2012 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/fatf_report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/fatf_report.pdf Shelf Number: 124338 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing (Europe) |
Author: Australian National Audit Office Title: Fighting Terrorism at its Source Summary: The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) administration of the Fighting Terrorism at its Source (FTAS) initiative and related measures. The audit examined individual elements of the initiative and the overall program of activity, to determine whether: policy and program direction is considered within an established governance framework that promotes alignment with overarching policy and integration of related measures, and that key stakeholders are engaged; planning and delivery of individual measures and packages of measures is thorough, with objectives and outcomes agreed to and key risks identified and managed, and implementation was efficient, effective and in accordance with better practice principles; and outcomes are monitored and evaluated with appropriate oversight, and feedback to stakeholders informs ongoing administration. The ANAO examined a broad range of measures and activities relating to regional counter‐terrorism engagement by the AFP and focused the audit on those programs and activities which are closely aligned or integrated with the key components of the FTAS initiative. The activities examined include both front‐line activities (primarily based in regional host countries but including some domestic activities) and enabling activities (generally Australia‐based although including some deployable elements). In the course of fieldwork, the ANAO conducted site visits, reviewed documents and held discussions with key stakeholders in Canberra, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. While a modest expansion of the AFP’s international counter‐terrorism liaison network was funded from the FTAS initiative, the general administration of this network has not been included within the scope of the audit. The administration of the domestic Community Liaison Teams, although funded through the 2009 renewal of the FTAS initiative, were also outside of the scope of this audit as they form an element of the Government’s broader policy on countering violent extremism. The Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), established in 2004, was included within the scope of the audit only to the extent that it supports the identification, delivery and evaluation of training aimed at building regional counter‐terrorism capacity. In conducting this audit, the ANAO necessarily held discussions and reviewed documents which reflected matters which are sensitive from a national security, operational or international relations perspective. In line with previous practice, these matters are not discussed in detail in this report. Details: Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2012. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ANAO Audit Report No.30 2011–12: Accessed May 1, 2012 at: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Uploads/Audit%20Reports/2011%2012/201112%20Audit%20Report%20No%2030.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Uploads/Audit%20Reports/2011%2012/201112%20Audit%20Report%20No%2030.pdf Shelf Number: 125113 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism (Australia) |
Author: Freeman, Michael Title: Gangs and Guerrillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Summary: In a discussion at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, it became apparent that there were many similarities between insurgent behavior and gang behavior – similarities that would make a more rigorous analysis worthwhile. With this theme in mind, the faculty of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, experts in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, were enlisted to address these similarities and to share their theories, models, and ideas from their own disciplines of political science, sociology, anthropology, international relations, and more. This collection of short papers is the result. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2011/NPS-DA-11-001.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2011/NPS-DA-11-001.pdf Shelf Number: 125465 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCounterinsurgencyGangsTerrorism |
Author: Walters, Julie Title: The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime in Australia: Perceptions of Regulated Businesses in Australia Summary: In Australia, legislation was introduced in 2006 that requires specified businesses to forward reports of certain financial transactions to the Australian Government agency, AUSTRAC. As part of the Australian Institute of Criminology’s research in to Australia’s anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing regime, a survey was conducted in mid 2009 of all business with reporting obligations to AUSTRAC. This report examines the findings of the survey on the perceptions of Australian businesses to the reporting regime in Australia. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series 117: Accessed September 13, 2012 at: http://aic.gov.au/documents/B/B/A/%7BBBA061D1-79A8-4F55-9429-B7390A34E13C%7Drpp117.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/documents/B/B/A/%7BBBA061D1-79A8-4F55-9429-B7390A34E13C%7Drpp117.pdf Shelf Number: 126323 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrimes Against BusinessesFinancial CrimesMoney Laundering (Australia)Terrorist Financing |
Author: U.S. Senate. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Title: Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Summary: Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and Federal officials is crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this objective was the motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars over the last nine years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United States. The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers forwarded “intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism. Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead this initiative. A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found, however, that DHS’s work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support Federal counterterrorism efforts. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS officials’ public claims about fusion centers were not always accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion centers existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion centers’ “success stories.” At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose or acknowledge non-public evaluations highlighting a host of problems at fusion centers and in DHS’s own operations. Since 2003, over 70 state and local fusion centers, supported in part with Federal funds, have been created or expanded in part to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly to detect, disrupt, and respond to domestic terrorist activities. DHS’s support for and involvement with these state and local fusion centers has, from the beginning, centered on their professed ability to strengthen Federal counterterrorism efforts. Under the leadership of Senator Coburn, Ranking Subcommittee Member, the Subcommittee has spent two years examining Federal support of fusion centers and evaluating the resulting counterterrorism intelligence. The Subcommittee’s investigative efforts included interviewing dozens of current and former Federal, state and local officials, reviewing more than a year’s worth of intelligence reporting from centers, conducting a nationwide survey of fusion centers, and examining thousands of pages of financial records and grant documentation. The investigation identified problems with nearly every significant aspect of DHS’s involvement with fusion centers. The Subcommittee investigation also determined that senior DHS officials were aware of the problems hampering effective counterterrorism work by the fusion centers, but did not always inform Congress of the issues, nor ensure the problems were fixed in a timely manner. Regarding the centers themselves, the Subcommittee investigation learned that a 2010 assessment of state and local fusion centers conducted at the request of DHS found widespread deficiencies in the centers’ basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities. DHS did not share that report with Congress or discuss its findings publicly. When the Subcommittee requested the assessment as part of its investigation, DHS at first denied it existed, then disputed whether it could be shared with Congress, before ultimately providing a copy. In 2011, DHS conducted its own, less rigorous assessment of fusion centers. While its resulting findings were more positive, they too indicated ongoing weaknesses at the fusion centers. The findings of both the 2010 and 2011 assessments contradict public statements by DHS officials who have described fusion centers as “one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy,”2 and “a major force multiplier in the counterterrorism enterprise.”3 Despite reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from April 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, the Subcommittee investigation could identify no reporting which uncovered a terrorist threat, nor could it identify a contribution such fusion center reporting made to disrupt an active terrorist plot. Instead, the investigation found: The Subcommittee investigation found that the fusion centers often produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting to DHS, and many produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever. • Nearly a third of all reports – 188 out of 610 – were never published for use within DHS and by other members of the intelligence community, often because they lacked any useful information, or potentially violated Department guidelines meant to protect Americans’ civil liberties or Privacy Act protections. • In 2009, DHS instituted a lengthy privacy and civil liberties review process which kept most of the troubling reports from being released outside of DHS; however, it also slowed reporting down by months, and DHS continued to store troubling intelligence reports from fusion centers on U.S. persons, possibly in violation of the Privacy Act. • During the period reviewed, DHS intelligence reporting suffered from a significant backlog. At some points, hundreds of draft intelligence reports sat for months before DHS officials made a decision about whether to release them to the intelligence community. DHS published many reports so late – typically months late, but sometimes nearly a year after they were filed – that many were considered “obsolete” by the time they were released. • Most reporting was not about terrorists or possible terrorist plots, but about criminal activity, largely arrest reports pertaining to drug, cash or human smuggling. • Some terrorism-related “intelligence” reporting was based on older news releases or media accounts. • Some terrorism-related reporting also appeared to be a slower-moving duplicate of information shared with the National Counter Terrorism Center through a much quicker process run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center. In interviews, current and former DHS officials involved in the fusion center reporting process stated they were aware that “a lot of [the reporting] was predominantly useless information,” as one DHS official put it.4 A former reporting branch chief said that while he was sometimes proud of the intelligence his unit produced, “There were times when it was, ‘what a bunch of crap is coming through.’”5 The Subcommittee investigation also examined DHS’s management of the fusion center counterterrorism intelligence reporting process. The investigation discovered: • DHS required only a week of training for intelligence officials before sending them to state and local fusion centers to report sensitive domestic intelligence, largely concerning U.S. persons. • Officials who routinely authored useless or potentially illegal fusion center intelligence reports faced no sanction or reprimand. The Subcommittee investigation also reviewed how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component of DHS, distributed hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to support state and local fusion centers. DHS revealed that it was unable to provide an accurate tally of how much it had granted to states and cities to support fusion centers efforts, instead producing broad estimates of the total amount of Federal dollars spent on fusion center activities from 2003 to 2011, estimates which ranged from $289 million to $1.4 billion. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS failed to adequately police how states and municipalities used the money intended for fusion centers. The investigation found that DHS did not know with any accuracy how much grant money it has spent on specific fusion centers, nor could it say how most of those grant funds were spent, nor has it examined the effectiveness of those grant dollars. The Subcommittee conducted a more detailed case study review of expenditures of DHS grant funds at five fusion centers, all of which lacked basic, “must-have” intelligence capabilities, according to assessments conducted by and for DHS. The Subcommittee investigation found that the state and local agencies used some of the Federal grant money to purchase: • dozens of flat-screen TVs; • Sport Utility Vehicles they then gave away to other local agencies; and • hidden “shirt button” cameras, cell phone tracking devices, and other surveillance equipment unrelated to the analytical mission of a fusion center. All of those expenditures were allowed under FEMA’s rules and guidance, DHS officials told the Subcommittee. Yet none of them appeared to have addressed the deficiencies in the centers’ basic information analysis and sharing capabilities, so they could better contribute to Federal counterterrorism efforts. Every day, tens of thousands of DHS employees go to work dedicated to keeping America safe from terrorism; Federal funding of fusion centers was intended to advance that Federal objective. Fusion centers may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism, such as contributions to traditional criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster response and recovery efforts. In this investigation, the Subcommittee confined its work to examining the Federal return on its extensive support of state and local fusion centers, using the counterterrorism objectives established by law, Executive strategy, and DHS policy statements and assessments. The investigation found that top DHS officials consistently made positive public comments about the value and importance of fusion centers’ contributions to Federal counterterrorism efforts, even as internal reviews and non-public assessments highlighted problems at the centers and dysfunction in DHS’s own operations. But DHS and the centers do not shoulder sole responsibility for the fusion centers’ counterterrorism intelligence failures. Congress has played a role, as well. Since Congress created DHS in 2003, dozens of committees and subcommittees in both Houses have claimed jurisdiction over various aspects of the Department. DHS officials annually participate in hundreds of hearings, briefings, and site visits for Members of Congress and their staffs. At Congress’ request, the Department annually produces thousands of pages of updates, assessments and other reports. Yet amid all the Congressional oversight, some of the worst problems plaguing the Department’s fusion center efforts have gone largely undisclosed and unexamined. At its conclusion, this Report offers several recommendations to clarify DHS’s role with respect to state and local fusion centers. The Report recommends that Congress and DHS revisit the statutory basis for DHS support of fusion centers, in light of the investigation’s findings. It also recommends that DHS improve its oversight of Federal grant funds supporting fusion centers; conduct promised assessments of fusion center information-sharing; and strengthen its protection of civil liberties in fusion center intelligence reporting. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2012 at: www.hsgac.senate.gov Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126564 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismFusion CentersHomeland Security (U.S.)Intelligence GatheringTerrorism |
Author: Rollins, John Title: Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress Summary: This report provides an overview of transnational security issues related to patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups. In addition, the report discusses the U.S. government’s perception of and response to the threat. It concludes with an analysis of foreign policy options. In recent years, the U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national security interests. Although unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections, observers often focus on several common patterns. • Partnership Motivations and Disincentives: Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier for both criminal and terrorist groups, as well as a strategic weakness. Conditions that may affect the likelihood of confluence include demand for special skills unavailable within an organization, greed, opportunity for and proclivity toward joint ventures, and changes in ideological motivations. • Appropriation of Tactics: Although ideologies and motivations of an organization may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared similar tactics to reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of corrupt government officials. • Organizational Evolution and Variation: A criminal group may transform over time to adopt political goals and ideological motivations. Conversely, terrorist groups may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist organizations involved in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al Qaeda’s affiliates, D-Company, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah. To combat these apparent criminal-terrorist connections, Congress has maintained a role in formulating U.S. policy responses. Moreover, recent Administrations have issued several strategic documents to guide U.S. national security, counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence activities. In July 2011, for example, the Obama Administration issued the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which emphasized, among other issues, the confluence of crime and terrorism as a major factor in threatening the U.S. global security interests. While the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime separately, Congress has been challenged to evaluate whether the existing array of authorities, programs, and resources sufficiently respond to the combined crime-terrorism threat. Common foreign policy options have centered on diplomacy, foreign assistance, financial actions, intelligence, military action, and investigations. At issue for Congress is how to conceptualize this complex crime-terrorism phenomenon and oversee the implementation of cross-cutting activities that span geographic regions, functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are largely dependent on effective interagency coordination and international cooperation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R41004: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Shelf Number: 126799 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismForeign PolicyOrganized CrimeTerrorism (U.S.)Transnational Crime |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes Summary: The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes is a rapidly growing phenomenon, requiring a proactive and coordinated response from Member States. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) plays a key role in providing assistance to Member States, in furtherance of its mandate to strengthen the capacity of national criminal justice systems to implement the provisions of the international legal instruments against terrorism, and does so in compliance with the principles of rule of law and international human rights standards. In particular, in 2011, the General Assembly, in its resolution 66/178, reaffirmed the mandate of UNODC to continue to develop specialized legal knowledge in the area of counter-terrorism and pertinent thematic areas, including the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Despite increasing international recognition of the threat posed by terrorists’ use of the Internet in recent years, there is currently no universal instrument specifically addressing this pervasive facet of terrorist activity. Moreover, there is limited specialized training available on the legal and practical aspects of the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases involving the use of the Internet. The present publication complements the existing resources developed by UNODC in the areas of counter-terrorism, cybercrime and rule of law. It also addresses the importance of developing integrated, specialized knowledge to respond to the technical assistance needs of Member States in combating this continually evolving threat. UNODC is deeply grateful for the generous support of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which made the publication of that work possible. The publication, which is intended for use both as a stand-alone resource and in support of the capacity-building initiatives of UNODC, is aimed at providing guidance regarding current legal frameworks and practice at the national and international levels relating to the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of terrorist cases involving the Internet. Terrorism, in all its manifestations, affects us all. The use of the Internet to further terrorist purposes disregards national borders, amplifying the potential impact on victims. By highlighting cases and best practices that respond to this unique challenge, the present publication has two aims: first, to promote a better understanding of the ways in which communications technologies may be misused in furtherance of acts of terrorism and, second, to increase collaboration among Member States, so that effective criminal justice responses to this transnational challenge can be developed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2012. 158p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf Shelf Number: 126804 Keywords: Computer CrimesCounter-TerrorismInternet CrimesTerrorism |
Author: Stevens, Tim Title: Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action Summary: Political extremists and terrorists are using the internet as an instrument for radicalisation and recruitment. This report – resulting from the first systematic effort to bring together industry, experts and government on the issue of online radicalisation – examines what can be done by governments, industry and civil society to counter their activities. Most governments have focused on technical solutions, believing that removing or blocking radicalising material on the internet will solve the problem. Yet, this report shows that any strategy that relies on reducing the availability of content alone is bound to be crude, expensive and counterproductive. Radicalisation is largely a real-world phenomenon that cannot be dealt with simply by ‘pulling the plug’. The analogy with countering child sexual abuse on the internet is flawed, because much of the material involved in child sexual abuse is clearly illegal and there are no political constituencies which might be offended if repressive action is taken against it. Any strategy that hopes to counter online radicalisation must aim to create an environment in which the production and consumption of such materials become not just more difficult in a technical sense but unacceptable as well as less desirable. Elements of this strategy include: Deterring the producers of extremist materials; Empowering online communities to self-regulate; Reducing the appeal of extremist messages; and, Promoting positive messages. The report thus develops concrete proposals for action within each of the four strands: Deterring producers, The selective use of takedowns in conjunction with prosecutions would signal that individuals engaged in online extremism are not beyond the law; Empowering online communities, The creation of an Internet Users Panel in order to strengthen reporting mechanisms and complaints procedures would allow users to make their voices heard; Reducing the appeal, More attention must be paid to media literacy, and a comprehensive approach in this area is badly needed; Promoting positive messages, The establishment of an independent start-up fund would provide seed money for grassroots online projects aimed at countering extremism. Efforts to counter online radicalisation must view new technologies and modes of interaction not as a threat but as an opportunity. Relying on government alone is not sufficient. It is vital to capitalise upon the potential contributions of all stakeholders, including internet companies and internet users. Details: London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2009. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1236768491ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1236768491ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf Shelf Number: 127274 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismRadicalization, Internet |
Author: Goodwin, Matthew Title: The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad Challenge Summary: While right-wing extremism and populist extremist parties have been the subject of growing attention in Europe and North America, the emergence of ‘counter- Jihad’ groups has been relatively neglected. Campaigning amid fiscal austerity and ongoing public concerns over immigration, these groups are more confrontational, chaotic and unpredictable than established populist extremist political parties, yet not enough is known about who supports them – and why. Widely held assumptions about their supporters – which often stress economic austerity, political protest and Islamophobia as the key drivers – are challenged by new survey data on public attitudes towards the ideas of one leading counter- Jihad group, the English Defence League. The data indicate that supporters of such groups are not necessarily young, uneducated, economically insecure or politically apathetic. They are not simply anti-Muslim or overtly racist, but xenophobic and profoundly hostile towards immigration. They are more likely than others in society to expect inter-communal conflict and to believe that violence is justifiable. And their beliefs about the threatening nature of Islam have wider public support. Few mainstream voices in Europe are actively challenging counter-Jihad narratives, or the surrounding reservoir of anti-Muslim prejudice among the general public, but this is an essential part of any successful counter-strategy. Details: London: Chatham House, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed March 12, 2013 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf Shelf Number: 127923 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismEnglish Defence LeagueExtremism (U.K.)Extremist GroupsMuslimsRadical Groups |
Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Capacity Building to Counter Terrorism in Fragile Institutional Contexts: Lessons From Development Cooperation Summary: This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically. After providing definitions of capacity and capacity building, this brief outlines the five basic principles of the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as they relate to capacity development. The discussion then turns to how criminal justice and rule of law capacity building can contribute to countering terrorism and to mitigating conditions conducive to violent extremism by enhancing the capacity of weak state institutions to deliver equitable security and justice to all. It concludes by offering guidance based on best practices and lessons learned from past and ongoing capacity-building efforts in accordance with key themes presented over the course of the brief. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: www.globalct.org Year: 2012 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128208 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRule of LawTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations Summary: Terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, reflecting a desire for violent and immediate political transformation. The technologies available in a globalized world today, however, have expanded the theater of conflict into a broader swath of spaces—governed, less governed, virtual—than ever. Groups such as al-Qaida have articulated a clear mission statement and excelled at strategic communication, crafting messages based on audience perceptions and including actions as well as words. Yet, extremists do not constitute a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas. States and international organizations provide their own narratives that shape identities, relationships, and interactions among peoples and states, but they have often struggled to challenge extremist messages and draw on their own compelling stories. This should not be the case. The United Nations is the only international organization to boast universal membership and has spent more than six decades promoting sustainable development, promoting human rights and the rule of law, strengthening governance, and supporting representative government. Member states have worked together to mitigate violent conflict, support humanitarian assistance, and address threats to human security. The organization has a good story to tell, a powerful counternarrative to that proclaimed by extremist groups. Yet, does the story get out and reach key audiences outside and inside the United Nations? This report presents a qualitative analysis of how strategic communication principles can strengthen international efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism. The report examines the evolution of the challenge and draws on discussions with officials, diplomats, and experts to offer a series of recommendations for enhancing strategic communications on counterterrorism. While this study focuses on the United Nations, the key principles and recommendations may also be applicable to governments and international organizations confronting this complex transnational threat. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/publications/mastering-the-narrative-counterterrorism-strategic-communication-and-the-united-nations/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/publications/mastering-the-narrative-counterterrorism-strategic-communication-and-the-united-nations/ Shelf Number: 128312 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists Groups |
Author: Patel, Faiza Title: A Proposal for an NYPD Inspector General Summary: Over the last decade, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), like state and local law enforcement agencies around the country, has become increasingly involved in collecting counterterrorism intelligence. But the NYPD’s counterterrorism and intelligence gathering operations are unique among municipal police departments, both in size and character. The magnitude of these operations vastly exceeds that of similar efforts in other major cities: In 2010, the NYPD’s budget for counterterrorism and intelligence was over $100 million and the two divisions reportedly employed 1000 officers. Equally important, while New York City police cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on counterterrorism matters, they also conduct intelligence operations and investigations completely separate from federal authorities. The creation of this stand-alone capability was a stated goal of Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, and is an accomplishment frequently highlighted by the Department. Unlike the FBI and other national intelligence agencies, the NYPD’s sizable counterterrorism and intelligence operations operate largely free from independent oversight. Currently, oversight of the NYPD – as conducted by the Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption and the Civilian Complaint Review Board – focuses almost exclusively on police corruption and individual police misconduct. The City-wide Department of Investigation similarly focuses on corruption, incompetence, and misconduct in 300 municipal agencies and, in any event, does not cover the police. The City Council has supervisory jurisdiction over the police, but has rarely examined its intelligence operations. Control mechanisms established by a 1980s consent decree largely have been eliminated. In the federal system, Congressional supervision informed by reports from independent inspectors general has been a crucial tool for increasing transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in the realm of intelligence and counterterrorism. This oversight system was developed in the wake of the 1970s Congressional investigations into the FBI’s and the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) illegal collection of intelligence about Americans, and both agencies have operated for decades under its strictures. Even after the September 11th attacks, this system continues to function well and has, in fact, been strengthened. The FBI, in particular, has benefitted from a robust inspector general who has contributed to the effectiveness of its counterterrorism programs through reviews of issues ranging from the need for the Bureau to develop a comprehensive risk assessment of the terrorist threat to its use of the new intelligence techniques that have been authorized over the last decade. Given that the NYPD has built an intelligence and counterterrorism capability more in line with the FBI than a traditional urban police force, it is time to build an oversight structure that is appropriate for its size and functions. An independent inspector general should be established for the NYPD. This would be an enormous step forward for police accountability and oversight for several reasons: • ENSURING TRANSPARENCY – The inspector general would be in a position to make policing more transparent, thus allowing the Mayor and the City Council to better exercise their oversight responsibilities and increase public confidence in policing. Reliable information about how policies and legal constraints are implemented is especially important in the context of intelligence operations, the specifics of which are often necessarily concealed. • PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES – As the NYPD continues its important work of keeping New Yorkers safe, the inspector general would have the mandate, expertise, and perspective to make sure that it does so consistent with our constitutionally guaranteed liberties. • REFORMING FROM WITHIN – The inspector general would be in a position to work with the police cooperatively to address any problems in the Department’s operations and to keep track of progress. Details: New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2013 at: http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/proposal-nypd-inspector-general Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/proposal-nypd-inspector-general Shelf Number: 128363 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismIntelligence GatheringPolice (New York City, U.S.)Police CorruptionPolice MisconductStop and Frisk |
Author: Desta, Tu'emay Aregawi Title: The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Regime in Ethiopia: Second Assessment Report Summary: Money laundering and terrorist financing pose an ongoing challenge for countries in the greater Horn of Africa and the international community as a whole. In addition to negatively affecting the integrity and stability of national financial systems, they also threaten national security and undermine economic development. The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Regime in Ethiopia: Second Assessment Report builds upon an assessment conducted in early 2012 for a baseline study on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) in East Africa. This second assessment report identifies key areas of progress, limitations and challenges to, and opportunities for the ongoing development of Ethiopia’s AML/CFT regime. It also outlines recommended entry points to further strengthen and expedite AML/CFT efforts in compliance with regional and international standards. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/13Feb27_EthiopianFIC-SecondAsmntRpt_TAD_Final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Ethiopia URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/13Feb27_EthiopianFIC-SecondAsmntRpt_TAD_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 128408 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismMoney Laundering (Ethiopia)TerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Jackson, Emily Lindsay Title: Broadening National Security and Protecting Crowded Places - Performing the United Kingdom's War on Terror, 2007-2010 Summary: This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part applies critical geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. It argues that UK national security reiterates the ‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive policy responses. The second part carries out an exploratory case study of one such coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as reliant on practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive 'zero tolerance' risk imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. In other words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices. The thesis uses an innovative methodological and conceptual strategy combining Foucauldian discourse analysis of security policies, participant observation of situated security practices, with theoretical frameworks from political geography, international relations and visual culture. It also develops Judith Butler’s theory of performativity as a conceptual tool to critique the materialisation of contemporary spaces of security and counter-terrorism, from the meta-imaginative geographies of national security to the micro-spaces of counter-terrorism in UK public space. In sum, this thesis points towards new avenues for understanding the on-going encroachment of the war on terror into everyday spaces in the UK Details: Durham, UK: Durham University, Department of Geography, 2012. 265p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 4, 2013 at: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Shelf Number: 128666 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrowd ControlNational SecurityPublic Order ManagementPublic SpaceTerrorism (U.K.) |
Author: Smith, David Michael Title: Immigrants and Counterterrorism Policy: A comparative study of the United States and Britain Summary: This project examines the political mechanisms through which foreign nationals are perceived as security threats and, as a consequence, disproportionately targeted by counterterrorism policies. Evidence suggests that domestic security strategies that unduly discriminate against non-citizens or national minorities are counterproductive; such strategies lead to a loss of state legitimacy, they complicate the gathering of intelligence, and they serve as a potential source of radicalization. At the same time, discriminatory counterterrorism policies represent a significant break from liberal democratic ideals by legitimizing unfair treatment of targeted groups. If discriminatory counterterrorism policies are counterproductive and undemocratic, why do policymakers support such strategies in the first place? By what means do these types of policies and related administrative measures gain traction in the political system? How do these measures operate in practice, and what accounts for variations in their implementation over time? To answer these questions, a policy process model is used that distinguishes between the problem definition and agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, and policy implementation phases of policymaking. The American government’s handling of the First Red Scare (1919-1920), the American response to 9/11, and the British response to 9/11 are examined to provide a comparative perspective on these issues. Policy outputs across these three cases were remarkably similar. The rights of noncitizens were curtailed to a much greater extent than were the rights of citizens. These similarities are attributed to the ways in which notions of national identity influence problem definition and policy legitimation. In particular, concepts that were prevalent in nationalist narratives about the Other were incorporated into dominant policy narratives about terrorism. The nationalist Other became indistinguishable from the terrorist Other, thereby contributing to the translation of group-neutral policies into a group-specific practice of counterterrorism. The greatest variation, within and between cases, was observed in the implementation of counterterrorism policy. Each instance of implementation represented a unique trajectory, and both American cases displayed a much more vigorous and public set of counterterrorism activities than the British case. These differences are traced to variations in other institutional (domestic and international) and political variables that were found to be influential in each case. Details: Boston: Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, 2013. 263p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Shelf Number: 128779 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic SecurityHomeland SecurityImmigrants (U.S. and U.K.)TerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Mullins, Samuel J. Title: Australian Jihad: Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism Summary: This ARI summarises the findings from an-depth empirical study of all publicly-confirmed cases of Islamist terrorism involving Australians. The domestic situation of Australian Muslims is briefly described, followed by an overview of Islamist terrorism cases to date, including the number and location of cases and the level of threat they have presented, both domestically and internationally. The background characteristics of offenders and details of radicalisation are discussed, followed by an examination of the national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, with a focus upon counter-radicalisation initiatives. Current CT tactics appear to be appropriate to the nature of the threat; however, it will be important to closely monitor preventive measures in order to avoid a potential backlash similar to that in the UK, and to make sure that they are appropriately targeted. Details: Analisis of the Real Instituto Elcano, 2011. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Shelf Number: 128888 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismIslamistsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolence (Australia)Violent Extremism |
Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit Sector Summary: This joint CGCC and United Nations report summarizes the outcomes of a multiyear project led by the UN and aimed at developing a common understanding of sound practices to counter the risk of terrorism financing through the nonprofit sector, protecting the sector and preventing terrorist abuse of nonprofit organizations. The project included two global-level meetings and five regional-level expert meetings. More than 50 states and 80 nonprofit organizations participated in the meetings, in addition to representatives of relevant UN and multilateral agencies, officials from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-style regional bodies, and the financial sector. Details: Washington, DC: , 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Shelf Number: 129018 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismFinancial CrimesTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Kundnani, Arun Title: Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe Summary: This paper discusses the challenges of countering far‐Right political violence in the wake of the terrorist attack carried out by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in July 2011. With brief case studies of Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium, it argues that classic neo‐Nazi groups are being supplemented by new ‘counter‐jihadist’ far‐Right movements, which use various modes of political action, including participation in elections, street‐based activism and terrorist violence. Building on recent interest among scholars and practitioners in the role of narratives and performativity in counter‐terrorism, this paper argues that official security discourses tend to hinder efforts to counter far‐Right violence and can unwittingly provide opportunities for counter‐jihadists to advance their own narratives. When leaders and officials of Western European governments narrate issues of multiculturalism and radical Islamism in ways that overlap with counter‐jihadist ideology, it suggests a need for reflection on the unintended side‐effects of their security discourse. The paper concludes with a discussion of how governments can rework their security narratives to oppose far‐Right violence. Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter‐Terrorism (ICCT), 2012. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper, June 2012: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 129196 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsPolitical VioelnceTerrorism |
Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Engagement in West Africa and the Sahel: An Action Agenda Summary: On 18–19 April 2013, the governments of Burkina Faso and Denmark hosted a workshop in Ouagadougou on the subject of countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. The workshop was hosted under the auspices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and its Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group, which focuses on community engagement as one of its five workstreams. Convened by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), the workshop brought together 141 participants from 27 countries, four regional and international organizations, and 28 civil society organizations, providing a forum for discussions that highlighted the drivers of violent extremism in the region and explored practical ways of addressing their impact on regional stability, security, and development. As the workshop participants noted, violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel is fueled by a combination of complex circumstances, including societal conflicts, intercommunal tensions, an underdeveloped sense of citizenship and national loyalty and identity, organized crime, illiteracy, and other challenges related to weak governance, inadequate justice systems, and insufficient service delivery. Violent extremists are exploiting these circumstances and creating what members of the UN Security Council have called an “arc of instability” spanning the Sahara and Sahel. In May 2013, the UN Security Council issued a statement on terrorism in the Sahel that recognized that “terrorism will not be defeated by military force or security forces, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone” and underlined “the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including, but not limited to, strengthening efforts for the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged conflicts, and also promoting the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, tolerance and inclusiveness.” That statement highlights the need for concerted action from states, civil society, and international partners to work together to build trust with local communities and help them to counter violent extremism. There is no agreed definition of countering violent extremism (CVE) programming although it has been described as efforts to “prevent non-radicalized populations from becoming radicalized. The objective is to create individual and communal resilience against cognitive and/or violent radicalization through a variety of non-coercive means.” CVE programming can also focus on the need to reduce support for or active participation in violent extremist actions through noncoercive means. Therefore, the range of CVE and terrorism prevention programming and the practitioners involved is quite broad. Numerous actors, including bilateral donors, regional and international bodies, states in the region, and civil society organizations, are pursuing a wide range of activities that contribute to countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. In many cases, CVE measures build on existing initiatives and policies to address violence and insecurity and promote good governance and development. By addressing conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, these measures can be understood as relevant to countering violent extremism without the need to explicitly label them as CVE measures. In the co-chair’s summary at the workshop’s conclusion, Danish Ambassador to Burkina Faso Bo Jensen highlighted four recurring themes that capture the range of CVE and CVE-relevant programming. 1. Empower local community, government, and traditional leaders to work on conflict prevention and resolution in a region that has been plagued by several prolonged conflicts. 2. Strengthen law enforcement, criminal justice, and security sector actors through training and technical assistance focusing on community engagement, the rule of law, and human rights. 3. Actively engage and support civil society at the regional and international level. 4. Identify and prevent violent extremism by addressing its structural and ideological drivers.5 Building on those four themes and other inputs collected from participants during the meeting, this Action Agenda outlines a range of proposed activities to enhance existing CVE-relevant efforts. Details: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10299/44331/Action+Agenda+ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10299/44331/Action+Agenda+ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 129607 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism (Africa) |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress Summary: As the threat from terrorism becomes more diffuse, networked, and transnational, with newly emerging lone terrorists or small groups, so too have the tools of counterterrorism continued to evolve. Policymakers and practitioners are focusing more on preventing and countering radicalization and recruitment and improving the resilience of individuals and communities against the appeal of violent extremism. Reflective of these trends, efforts on countering violent extremism (CVE)1 have emerged in a relatively short period as an increasingly important instrument in the counterterrorism tool kit as an integral part of their wider strategic objectives on countering terrorism. States are more attentive to the development of CVE strategies and are supporting initiatives that move beyond policy development and into implementation. Additionally, multilateral counterterrorism actors, such as the European Union and United Nations, have expanded their interest in CVE activities. Of particular note in this regard is the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), an informal, multilateral counterterrorism body comprising 29 countries plus the European Union that was launched in September 2011.2 The GCTF serves as a platform for identifying critical civilian counterterrorism needs and mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. In December 2012, the Hedayah International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism was launched as an initiative of the GCTF in Abu Dhabi to assist governments and stakeholders in their efforts.3 Furthermore, regional organizations and civil society actors are becoming increasingly engaged in the development and implementation of CVE programming. This shift toward a more proactive approach to terrorism and the resulting proliferation of CVE programming have raised questions and concerns about its effectiveness. Challenges exist not only in designing preventive programs but also in developing tools for measuring and evaluating their impact. For example, developing a CVE intervention requires that a number of questions be addressed: How does radicalization occur, and at what stage in the radicalization process is an intervention warranted? Should CVE programs target all who are sympathetic to the causes espoused by militant groups or only those who have provided active support? Do programs that address some of the grievances often associated with violent extremism, such as underdevelopment, inequality, or sociopolitical marginalization, merit being tagged with a CVE label? What kind of added value can be provided by CVE programs that are not included within development, education, or conflict mitigation and peace-building efforts? The responses to these questions are important for establishing the scope and parameters of the program and in contributing to the development of indicators against which success can be measured, which should ideally be embedded in program design from the outset. Once the intervention has been designed, however, a number of obstacles remain in measuring its impact. These challenges include (1) determining the scope of the evaluation; (2) attributing causality where the desired outcome is a nonevent, i.e., “measuring the negative”; and (3) obtaining resources and technical expertise to conduct an evaluation.4 To a large extent, the answers to these questions will vary across regions and contexts and be determined by lessons learned from past practices. Reflecting the prevalence of CVE programs, there is now greater acceptance of the need to invest in program evaluation in order to address the questions and concerns about preventive interventions. It is no longer a question of whether, but how to conduct these evaluations. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129612 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremists GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism ( International) |
Author: Romyn, David Title: Red-Teaming Terrorist Attacks: A Simulation Approach Summary: This paper reviews the sequence of events leading up to terrorist attacks, in particular, the tasks that must be undertaken, being target selection, weapons acquisition, surveillance and implementation. Through an online survey of participants involved in counter terrorism operations, the authors identified preferences for a particular order in these tasks, and specific target locations. It is also noted that specific attributes in target locations are deemed to be important. The authors highlight how this study’s findings could enhance current counter terrorism strategies. Details: Nathan, QLD, AUS: ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, 2013. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Issue 23: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.ceps.edu.au/CMS/Uploads/file/Issue%2023_WEB.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.ceps.edu.au/CMS/Uploads/file/Issue%2023_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 129642 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism (International) |
Author: Hunt, Alice E. Title: Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: To guide future American efforts to counter violent Islamist extremism, the Center for a New American Security launched a strategy development process modeled after President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium. CNAS asked five experts to recast the effort in sustainable terms and in a manner consistent with American values. The result was a series of essays that recommended new counterterrorism tools and strategies for the Obama administration. Kristin Lord, John Nagl, and Seth Rosen present a comprehensive strategy to combat violent Islamist extremism. David Kilcullen recommends a “balanced • response” that disaggregates disparate Islamist groups and recalibrates the civilian and military tools of U.S. power. Larry Diamond focuses on democratization in • the Arab world as a means to staunch the supply of violent extremists and the grievances that inspire them. Camille Pecastaing suggests that the U.S. government dismantle the “war on terror,” relegate counterterrorism to the jurisdiction of technical government agencies, and educate the American public about the true nature of the threat. Harvey Sapolsky proposes a reduction of U.S. • military deployments in order to undercut extremist propaganda and conserve limited resources. Finally, Daniel Benjamin presents a counter• terrorism strategy that would recommit the United States to international legal standards and to expand civilian tools of government, while continuing to track down al Qaeda. CNAS researchers James Miller and Alice Hunt then convened the authors, along with leading experts and stakeholders from the U.S. government, to debate the merits and challenges of each approach. From these discussions, CNAS researchers crafted a draft strategy and presented it to the authors and outside experts at a second conference. The feedback from that session, along with a series of expert reviews, resulted in the final documents presented in this volume. Details: Washington, EC: Center for a New American Security, 2009. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/LordNaglRosen_Beyond%20Bullets%20Edited%20Volume_June09_0.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/LordNaglRosen_Beyond%20Bullets%20Edited%20Volume_June09_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129647 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsIslamist TerrorismRadical GroupsViolent Extremism (International) |
Author: Connery, David Title: The Commonwealth's Part in the fight Against Organised Crime: It's worth doing more Summary: Organised crime is a significant threat to Australia's society and economy, and Australian governments already devote much attention and resources to combating it. This attention includes a new initiative to enhance Commonwealth - state law enforcement cooperation: an anti-gangs squad. The new squad will bring a range of new information sources to help state police forces in practical and direct ways. It will be welcome and is likely to enhance the existing effort against organised crime. But there's another area where the Commonwealth could show leadership: by helping all Australian jurisdictions to build capability to counter organised crime. Capability is simply the mixture of people, equipment, processes and training that gives an organisation the potential to achieve its mission. But capability development, as it's known, is an active process that requires money and attention. After making the case for the Commonwealth to do more in the area of organised crime, and outlining the role and function of the Australian Government's anti-gangs squad initiative, this paper proposes two options for how the government could promote nationwide capability development in this area. The first is to expand the function and resources given to the Senior Officers Group on Organised Crime (SOG on OC) so that it has the funds and support to make a plan for new, nationally consistent capability. This option would cost around $18 million a year and require an expansion of the committee. The second option is to extend the remit of the Australia - New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee. This option would leverage the extensive (but not complete) overlap between the needs of countering terrorism and countering organised crime. Of the two options, expanding and funding the SOG on OC, using money from proceeds-of-crime or unexplained wealth confiscations, is suggested as a good first step because it involves the least amount of change. But it should be only an interim step. What should also occur at the same time is an extensive review of the interjurisdictional governance arrangements for domestically oriented security challenges in Australia. The review should aim to minimise the current duplications among committees and enhance the effectiveness of the Commonwealth-state partnerships in areas including crime fighting, counterterrorism, emergency management and cybersecurity. Details: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2014 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-commonwealths-part-in-the-fight-against-organised-crime/SR61_Organised_crime.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-commonwealths-part-in-the-fight-against-organised-crime/SR61_Organised_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 132379 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCriminal GangsCybersecurityOrganized Crime (Australia)Partnerships |
Author: Olojo, Akinola Title: Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram Summary: Over the past decade, the northern region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites. These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This paper argues that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state. This paper therefore presents the case for a thorough examination of the factors that have inspired public support for Boko Haram and the trajectory of the group's mobilisation of various forms of support in northern Nigeria. This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general difficulty which research in the field of (counter-)terrorism encounters while trying to gather primary source data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zones of conflict. Nevertheless, the author of this paper has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through interviews and research reports. Two central questions at the core of this study include: To what extent do socio-economic issues such as poverty and underdevelopment among youths, the role of religion, and political interests explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram? Second, how can the existing leadership in Nigeria address the escalating crisis; and what role can institutional leadership at the local, national and regional levels play in addressing the problem? One of the theoretical considerations in this paper relates to the structural violence paradigm. Its suggestion of how economic deprivation, class discrimination and societal injustice prevent citizens from reaching their full potential helps to place in context the influence which socio-economic drivers exert on public support for Boko Haram. The awareness that a lack of economic, social and/or political development feeds into the structural factors conducive to terrorism is not new; it already played a prominent role in the first ever resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) on counter-terrorism in 1972 (GA Resolution 3034). In fact, the logic of the structural violence paradigm, as advocated by its chief proponent Johan Galtung, underscores how socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions act as indirect instigators of violence. Individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. The relevance of this can also be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being conceptualised within the framework of human security. As already noted, these issues collectively inform one of the central questions of this study primarily because of its causal link with the crisis context of northern Nigeria. While this is the case, the structural violence approach may very well lose some of its potency when evaluated based on the accounts of other country/conflict settings. Even in the Nigerian situation, and as this paper will further highlight, while structural violence helps to explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram, it nonetheless remains inadequate as a single factor instigating the crisis. Indeed, not every Boko Haram member that has engaged in violence is socio-economically deprived. At the same time, not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of terror perpetrated by the group. Therefore, this study acknowledges that there will always be nuances reflected in varying contexts both within and outside the Nigerian case study. After briefly tracing the course of Boko Haram's emergence as a group, this paper will shed light on the bearing which political and elite interests may have exerted on public support for Boko Haram. Subsequently, the socio-economic context of the crisis will be examined with a view to determining the degree to which it incites public support for Boko Haram. Beyond these issues are other intervening variables that are frequently at play within the Nigerian state. The fifth section will focus on the most important among these, probing the catalytic role of religion and how this has been exploited by the group in generating mass appeal in the north. The sixth part will explore the often assumed external dimension of Boko Haram's activities within the context of weapons, terrorist funding and foreign fighters. The concluding sections will underscore what is instructive about the lessons emerging from the undercurrents of public support for the group, while also reflecting on implications for the development of more robust and concerted counter-terrorism policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 20 p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132671 Keywords: Boko HaramCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsSocioeconomic Conditions TerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 Summary: Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery. Our findings provide law enforcement, homeland security officials, and policy makers with an improved understanding of the types of clues and methods that should be emphasized to more reliably prevent terrorist attacks, including the need to: -Recognize the importance of law enforcement and public vigilance in thwarting terror attacks. More than 80% of foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations from law enforcement or the general public. Tips included reports of plots as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, para-military training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents. - Continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by "lone wolves." Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways. Additionally, plots by single actors ("lone wolves") have proven particularly successful, reaching execution nearly twice as often as plots by groups. - Ensure processes and training are in place that enable law enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal investigations. Almost one in five plots were foiled "accidentally" during investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Training is needed to recognize when ordinary crimes may be connected to terrorism. - Work to establish good relations with local communities and avoid tactics that might alienate them. Approximately 40% of plots were thwarted as a result of tips from the public and informants. Establishing trust with persons in or near radical movements is jeopardized by tactics such as racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological profiling. - Support "quality assurance" processes to ensure initial clues are properly pursued and findings shared. Investigating leads and sharing information across agencies led to foiling the vast majority of terrorist plots in our sample. Similarly, breakdowns in these basic processes led to lost opportunities to thwart some of the worst attacks, including 9/11. - Expand the federal standards for categorizing suspicious activity reports (SARs). A large majority of the initial clue types we identified, including public and informant tips, as well as law enforcement observations made during routine criminal investigations, are only indirectly referenced in the current national SAR standards. Expanding them would enable more comprehensive reporting and greater information sharing of potential terrorist activity. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Shelf Number: 132707 Keywords: Counter-terrorismCriminal InvestigationsHomeland SecurityIntelligence GatheringTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activitiy. Final Report Summary: For the past decade, members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities have been working to develop methods and processes to identify and thwart terrorist plots. As part of these efforts, state and local law enforcement agencies have been increasingly recognized as the "first-line preventers" of terrorism (Kelling & Bratton, 2006). The network of over 17,000 law enforcement agencies, including regional and state fusion centers, represents a resource that exponentially increases the United States' ability to identify, report, and analyze information that is potentially terrorist-related. However, these agencies also face ongoing challenges in this counterterrorism role. Perhaps the most pressing issue has been the lack of coordination and standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have often developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious activity reports (SARs) - reports of activities and behaviors potentially related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911 calls, and tips from the public. The lack of standardization has impeded the sharing and analysis of such information (Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project, 2008). Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD), among others, have made it part of their mission to standardize this process. One of the first steps was the introduction of the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), which created "a unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing of SARs" (National Strategy for Information Sharing [NSIS], 2007, p. A1-7). This project, funded by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), considered the collection and use of SARs at the state and local level. We assess how tips and clues generated from state and local sources have been used to prevent terrorist plots, assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources from which SARs are often derived, and make recommendations for improving the collection, processing, and evaluation of tips and clues reported at the local level. The project was conducted in three phases. Phase I included an analysis of publicly-reported terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009, including both foiled and executed plots, to determine what types of suspicious behaviors and means of reporting most frequently led to (or could have led to) their discovery and ultimate prevention (Strom et al., 2010). The report published from Phase I examined open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets. In Phase II, we conducted interviews with members of the law enforcement, fusion center, and intelligence communities to gain an improved understanding for how these agencies collect, process, and analyze SARs. In addition, we sought to gain more perspective on how these agencies could better use the information gathered and what challenges they face with respect to SARs. Phase III of the study assessed the primary data sources for SARs, the processes used to collect and analyze SARs, and approaches used to prioritize SARs. We also developed a set of recommendations that can be used by law enforcement and fusion center personnel to improve their practices of collecting, managing and prioritizing SARs. The work conducted across these phases resulted in a set of recommendations and conclusions, which we believe can improve the SAR process. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 125754 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Fusion CentersHomeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions Summary: Since September 11, 2001, the US government has prosecuted more than 500 people for alleged terrorism-related offenses in the United States. Many prosecutions have properly targeted individuals engaged in planning or financing terrorist acts under US law. However, in other cases, the individuals seem to have been targeted by US law enforcement because of their religious or ethnic background, and many appear to have engaged in unlawful activity only after the government started investigating them. In Illusion of Justice, Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School's Human Rights Institute examine 27 federal terrorism-related prosecutions against American Muslims since 2001 that raise serious human rights concerns. While the government maintains its actions are intended to prevent future attacks, in practice US law enforcement has effectively participated in developing and furthering terrorism plots. As a judge said in one case, the government "came up with the crime, provided the means, and removed all relevant obstacles," and in the process, made a terrorist out of a man "whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in scope." Other concerns include the use of overly broad material support charges, prosecutorial tactics that may violate fair trial rights, and disproportionately harsh conditions of confinement. US counterterrorism policies call for building strong relationships with American Muslim communities. Yet many of the practices employed are alienating those communities and diverting resources from other, more effective, ways of responding to the threat of terrorism. The US government should focus its resources on a rights-respecting approach to terrorism prosecutions, one that that protects security while strengthening the government's relationship with communities most affected by abusive counterterrorism policies. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 212p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132735 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHuman Rights Abuses (U.S.)MuslimsProsecutionsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Couture, Krista London Title: A Gendered Approach To Countering Violent Extremism. Lessons Learned From Women In Peacebuilding And Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully In Bangladesh And Morocco Summary: As the United States and world transition from a reflexive and hard approach in counterterrorism to a more reflective and soft one for the prevention of terrorism, the search for best practices and lessons learned is more critical than ever. While programming related to countering violent extremism (CVE) continues to grapple with the adoption of official definitions, priorities, evaluation methodologies, and qualitative and quantitative metrics, there is a growing awareness of the importance of harnessing female actors as positive, operational agents of change. Women continue to be an underutilized and under-tapped resource in the fight against extremism. This research identifies best practices through lessons learned from efforts that utilize women to encouragingly affect catalysts and circumstances that drive individuals to engage in terrorism. The empowerment of women not only makes practical sense, but also is a good investment in economics, business, and counterterrorism. In micro lending, for every $1US a woman earns, she reinvests 90 percent back into her family and/or community; men re-invest only 40 percent. When a woman has an education, she marries on average four years later, enters into non-abusive relationships, and has 2.2 children who are healthier and better educated. Extremism is most effectively countered through increased education, better critical thinking, and enhanced opportunities. These empowerment scenarios and positive outcomes become manifest in the impact a woman has within her family and community. In the words of former Secretary to the United Nations Kofi Annan, "There is no development strategy more beneficial to society as a whole - women and men alike - than the one which involves women as central players." While originally intended to only bring awareness of the role of women in preventing terrorism, this research reveals several additional important findings. Most notably, as is the case with their impact on peace and stability, women play a critical role in the security realm, and CVE is no exception. Empowering women in culturally and country-specific ways enables them to be valuable players in the extremism paradigm. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Shelf Number: 132873 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerroristsViolence PreventionViolent Extremism (Bangladesh, Morocco) |
Author: White, Gentry Title: Modelling the Effectiveness of Counter-terrorism Interventions Summary: This paper models the connection between the rate of terrorist events and the occurrence of counter-terrorism interventions in order to examine the relative effectiveness of the interventions. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database and information on interventions collected by the authors, model results show that for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, reactive types of interventions, such as arrests, indictments, imprisonments, assassinations and other operational activities show the strongest association with the rate of terrorism incidents over time. Maximum effectiveness - as measured by the number of days after an intervention exhibits its full inhibitory effect on the risk of subsequent terrorist attacks - was found to be greatest in Indonesia and the Philippines (11 days and 8 days respectively) and least effective in Thailand (impacting only on the day the intervention occurred). This paper also examines the number of days after an intervention that the response was able to maintain a high level of effectiveness - 17 days in Indonesia, 13 days in the Philippines and one day in Thailand. There were significant differences across these three countries and these results highlight a new approach to conceptualising the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 475: Accessed August 12, 2014 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi475.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi475.pdf Shelf Number: 133016 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismInterventionsTerrorism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT Visiting Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid seeks to clarify some conceptual issues that tend to obscure the debate about how best to counter violent extremism. The main focus of this Research Paper is on obtaining a clearer understanding of what "Islamist extremism" entails in the context of the ongoing debate on allegedly "acceptable" non-violent extremists and "unacceptable" violent extremists. The author discusses a number of conceptualisations of religious extremism in the context of liberal democracies and also distinguishes, inter alia, between merely "not (yet) violent" militancy and principled non-violent political activism in the Gandhian tradition. The author argues that the distinction between "non-violent extremism" and "violent extremism" is not a valid one. The paper provides a set of twenty indicators of extremism that can be used as an instrument for monitoring extremist statements and actions, with an eye to challenging and countering such non-democratic manifestations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper, 2014: Accessed September 2, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133388 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsReligious ExtremismViolent Extremism |
Author: Perito, Robert Title: A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan's Police Stations Summary: Violence is escalating in Pakistan, both in its megacities and along the border with Afghanistan-from terrorism, to secessionist insurgency, to sectarian conflict, to ethnic turf wars. The police station and the police who staff it, despite their historic role as a symbol of government authority and responsibility for public order, are woefully ill prepared and ill equipped to meet these challenges. This report, part of a project to increase Pakistan's capacity to combat terrorism, explores the role police stations could and should play and suggests definitive steps to that end. Summary - Terrorism, secessionist insurgency, sectarian conflict, and ethnic turf wars have convulsed both Pakistan's major cities and tribal areas along the Afghanistan border. The escalation in mega-urban centers in particular has increased the importance of the police in controlling the endemic violence. - The police station retains both its historic role as the symbol of government authority and its position as the basic law enforcement institution responsible for public order, law enforcement, and police services. Yet police stations and personnel are ill prepared and poorly equipped to meet the challenges of the country's complex, urbanized, and increasingly violent society. - Pakistani police have found themselves on the front lines, and a growing number have given their lives to protect others in the struggle against terrorist and criminal groups. The need is now urgent to empower the police through a program of positive reform that would begin with modernizing police stations and reorienting and retraining their personnel. - An effective program for police station reform would begin with assigning primacy to the police for controlling terrorism. It would include developing new organizational structures, positions, and standard operating procedures to ensure that local police understand their enhanced role and mission. It would also include improving police-public relations and networking police stations into a national information-sharing network with anti-terrorist agencies. - Creating high-profile specialized units appears to offer a quick fix to a complex and increasingly pervasive problem. The real solution, however, lies in empowering Pakistan's police stations to protect their communities from criminal and extremist violence through modernization and reform. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 351: Accessed September 27, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR351-A-Counterrerrorism-Role-for-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Police-Stations.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR351-A-Counterrerrorism-Role-for-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Police-Stations.pdf Shelf Number: 133452 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismPolice ReformPolicingTerrorism (Pakistan) |
Author: Gibbs, Stephen Title: Applying the Theory and Techniques of Situational Criminology to Counterinsurgency Operations: Reducing Insurgency through Situational Prevention Summary: This research introduces and adapts the 25 techniques of Situational Crime Prevention for use in counterinsurgency operations. These techniques are based on a set of powerful theories within the fields of Environmental and Situational Criminology. Situational Prevention is a strategy that addresses specific crimes, or insurgent activity, by managing, designing, and manipulating the environment in a manner that seeks to increase the risk to the insurgent, while reducing the insurgent's potential reward for committing the act. The 25 techniques offer a practical means to apply these theories to the reality of counterinsurgency operations. Use of the 25 techniques would expand the repertoire of preventive countermeasures, and enable a security force to intervene in the causal chain events to prevent or reduce the occurrence of insurgent violence and crime. These techniques originate from five core principles: increasing effort, increasing risk, reducing rewards, removing excuses, and reducing provocations. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=21247 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=21247 Shelf Number: 133612 Keywords: Counter-terrorismCounterinsurgencyDesign Against CrimeSituational Crime Prevention |
Author: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Title: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach Summary: Terrorism is a denial of democracy and of human rights, which are at the very core of the OSCE. The OSCE participating States are determined to combat all acts of terrorism, without exception, as most serious crimes. States, through their police agencies in particular, have a duty to protect all individuals within their jurisdictions from terrorism, as part of their human rights obligations to guarantee the right to life, the right to security and other human rights and fundamental freedoms. This requires that they adopt a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), while upholding human rights and the rule of law. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's actions against terrorism will be undermined if the state, through any of its agencies, uses its power in violation of international human rights standards. As the police play a central role in countering terrorism, it is particularly crucial that the police be held accountable for their actions in order to ensure legitimacy, confidence, trust and support from the public. Radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change. For instance, people advocating the abolition of slavery or who championed universal suffrage were at one time considered to be radical as they stood in opposition to the prevailing views in their societies. Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear-cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism. Possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case. Profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are not only discriminatory but are also ineffective. OSCE participating States firmly reject the identification of terrorism with any nationality, religion or ethnicity. Countering VERLT requires a sophisticated, comprehensive response. This should include both effective criminal-justice action, in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law, against those who incite others to terrorism and seek to recruit others for terrorism, and multidisciplinary efforts to address conditions that are conducive to terrorism. There are many issues, relevant but not specific to terrorism that need to be genuinely addressed, in their own right and without undue security bias. The police have a key role in the criminal-justice response to VERLT, but their role should be limited in proactive prevention efforts. The state has the obligation and primary responsibility to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the state needs to draw on the support of society in general, including civil society and businesses, to successfully counter this phenomenon. OSCE participating States have acknowledged the usefulness of such joint efforts in the form of public-private partnerships in countering terrorism. There has been a growing recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. Some OSCE participating States are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness. These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media. Details: Vienna: OSCE, 2014. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Shelf Number: 134917 Keywords: Community-PolicingCounter-terrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists (Europe)Violent Extremism |
Author: Cigar, Norman Title: Tribal Militias: An effective tool to counter Al-Qaida and its affiliates? Summary: Despite over a decade of open war, dealing with Al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Middle East is likely to remain a concern for the foreseeable future and will pose a challenge requiring the use of any tool that is likely to be effective in meeting the threat. Most of the local societies in which Al-Qaida has operated in the Middle East and Africa after September 11, 2001, have a predominantly tribal character or at least have a strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Developing effective tools to counter Al-Qaida's continuing presence in that social environment, therefore, is a priority and requires understanding Al-Qaida's critical vulnerabilities when it operates in those societies and developing the means to counter Al-Qaida's efforts. This monograph addresses the role of tribal militias in the context of the fight against Al-Qaida. The intent is to enrich policy analysis and clarify options for future operations by focusing on past experience in order to identify the positive and negative aspects related to the use of such militias. The focus in this monograph is on Iraq and Yemen. However, many of the lessons learned may be applied more broadly. The thesis is that the capabilities which tribally-based militias provide may be one of the most efficient, cost-effective tools against Al-Qaida. In some cases, such militias can act as a force multiplier for U.S. Landpower forces, whether deployed on the ground in significant numbers, or, in other cases, if such militias can reduce the need for a U.S. commitment on the ground in environments that might present unfavorable conditions for a significant U.S. Landpower footprint. At the same time, given the complexity of the local political environment, tribal militias are no panacea, but can be a two-edged sword. Like any weapon, the use of tribal militias has to be understood and wielded with caution and skill in order to avoid unintended consequences. This discussion includes two models for the tribal militias based on the nature of their patron. In Model 1, the patron of a militia is an outside entity; in Model 2, the national government is the patron (although an outside entity may provide ancillary support). The first case study deals with a Model 1 situation, where a foreign patron - the United States - acted in that role in Iraq beginning in late-2006 and lasting through the hand-over to Iraqi authorities during the period from December 2008 to April 2009. The second case study deals with two ongoing Model 2 situations, again with Iraq, but taking place after the national government's assumption of responsibility for the tribal militia in 2009. This case study is especially useful for comparative purposes with the first case study. The third case study deals with Yemen, where the local government has acted as the militia patron since 2012. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2015 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1230.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1230.pdf Shelf Number: 134967 Keywords: Counter-terrorismMilitia GroupsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Proscribed Terrorist Organisations Summary: This document lists the terrorist groups or organisations banned under UK law, and provides the criteria that are considered when deciding whether or not to proscribe a group or organisation. Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf Shelf Number: 135256 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism Terrorists (U.K.) |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is mandated to provide assistance to requesting countries in the legal and criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism. Its Terrorism Prevention Branch is leading this assistance delivery, primarily by assisting countries to ratify the international legal instruments against terrorism, incorporate their provisions in national legislation and build the capacity of the national criminal justice system to implement those provisions effectively, in accordance with the rule of law, including human rights. The Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum is one of the tools developed by the Branch for transferring the knowledge and expertise needed to strengthen the capacity of national criminal justice officials to put the universal legal framework against terrorism into practice. This knowledge transfer is pursued through: - Direct training of criminal justice officials - Train-the-trainers activities - Supporting national training institutions of criminal justice officials (schools of judges and prosecutors, law enforcement academies and other relevant institutions) to develop/ incorporate counter-terrorism elements in their curricula The Curriculum consists of several modules, each dealing with specific thematic areas of the legal and criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism. Its first five modules are: - Module 1. Counter-Terrorism in the International Legal Context (under preparation) - Module 2. The Universal Legal Framework Against Terrorism (issued) - Module 3. International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Counter-Terrorism (issued) - Module 4. Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism (this issue) - Module 5. Transport related (civil aviation and maritime) Terrorism Offences (being issued) Details: New York: UNODC, 2014. 222p. Source: Internet Resource: Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum MODULE 4 Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Human_Rights/Module_HR_and_CJ_responses_to_terrorism_ebook.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Human_Rights/Module_HR_and_CJ_responses_to_terrorism_ebook.pdf Shelf Number: 135623 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHuman RightsNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Zimmermann, Katie Title: Terrorist Group Efforts in the Homeland and the Strategy to Combat Them Summary: While the U.S. continues to remain vigilant in fighting the war on terror abroad, homegrown terrorism within the U.S. has remained a growing concern. Homegrown terrorists are not leaving the U.S. to receive training; instead they are being pushed to embrace jihadist propaganda and motivated to the point of violent extremism within the U.S. These individuals have the ability to utilize the Internet to provide them the ammunition and knowledge needed to conduct attacks. This thesis addresses how terrorist groups exploit the Internet to radicalize and recruit U.S.-based individuals; and the proposed programs aimed at solving this problem. The first chapter answers the question of how U.S. based individuals are becoming radicalized, especially given the U.S. posture of preventing terrorists from infiltrating the homeland. In observing the root causes of radicalization and how the Internet has transformed the way in which terrorist groups spread propaganda, I hypothesize that U.S.-based individuals are susceptible to self-radicalization. Through case study analysis, I was able to confirm that my hypothesis was correct under certain circumstances, in that U.S.-based individuals do not need to belong to a terrorist group in order to become radicalized. The second chapter addresses the question of how individuals in the U.S. are being recruited. Again, there are limited opportunities for members of terrorist groups to actively recruit individuals in the U.S. without law enforcement or intelligence agencies being notified. By examining the types of recruitment models and grounds (locations) utilized by terrorist groups to attract individuals, I hypothesize that terrorist groups primarily use the Internet to recruit individuals, thereby moving away from actual face-to-face interaction/recruitment methods. The case study analysis in this chapter disproved my hypothesis in that terrorist organizations primarily use the Internet to recruit because terrorist groups still prefer personal interactions via face to face to demonstrate the level of commitment by that group to the potential recruit. Using a case study comparison of three programs with different structures, the final chapter addresses how effective the CVE programs are in the U.S. By examining the current U.S. CVE strategy and some of the negative impacts that it has had on Muslim American communities, I hypothesize that government-led CVE programs contribute to the radicalization of individuals. While the case study results in this chapter indicate there may be connection between government led CVE programs and the alienation of Muslim communities, there is little to suggest these programs lead to the radicalization of individuals, thereby neither approving nor disproving my hypothesis. Each of the chapters addresses the threat of homegrown terrorism as fueled by terrorist groups and potential policy implications. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2014. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37312/ZIMMERMANN-THESIS-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37312/ZIMMERMANN-THESIS-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 135644 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist Groups Homeland Security Internet Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Soldz, Stephen Title: All the President's Psychologists: The American Psychological Association's Secret Complicity with the White House and US Intelligence Community in Support of the CIA's Summary: When considering the analysis presented here, it is important to be mindful of the fundamental principles that define and inform the behavior of all health professionals and professional associations. A profession is characterized by a specialized body of knowledge applied in the service of the individual patient and society. It is incumbent upon a profession to disseminate and expand such knowledge, to abide by codes of ethics worthy of the designation of "profession," including the responsibility to self regulate. The APA is the largest association of professional psychologists in the United States, and, indeed, the world. As such it plays a major role in setting standards for psychological research, practice, and education. Those standards are a primary mechanism that international standards for health professionals, including such international instruments as the Convention against Torture, become integrated into the practice and standards of US psychologists. Further, APA's standards and positions exert influence on psychological professionals and associations around the world. The APA lobbies on behalf of funding for psychological research and practice, credentials graduate training programs and internships, and is responsible to protect the interests of psychology as a profession. The APA created and periodically revises a code of ethics that governs the ethical behavior of members and is integrated into or forms the basis of most state licensing requirements for psychologists. That code, like that of other health professions, is based on principles of avoiding harm and improving people's lives. These principles undergird the basis of trust in the profession necessary for psychologists being able to help people with some of the most difficult and intimate of life's problems. Federal regulations require that professional psychologists in the employ of the US government, including those in the military, be licensed by a state and follow the state's ethics code. The APA's complicity in the CIA torture program, by allowing psychologists to administer and calibrate permitted harm, undermines the fundamental ethical standards of the profession. If not carefully understood and rejected by the profession, this may portend a fundamental shift in the profession's relationship with the people it serves. Details: s.l., 2015. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2015 at: https://www.transcend.org/tms/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/All-The-Presidents-Psychologists-Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.transcend.org/tms/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/All-The-Presidents-Psychologists-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135812 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismPrisoner InterrogationTerrorismTerroristsTorture |
Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: This report outlines ideas for strategies, programs, and initiatives that can be implemented to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa and increase human security and community resilience. Suggestions include training officials and frontline practitioners to enhance their engagement with communities, improving service delivery and reform of the security and criminal justice sectors, introducing disengagement and reintegration programs, promoting subregional cooperation and information sharing, fostering youth leadership, engaging the media and the private sector, and strengthening the capacity of and engagement with civil society actors. The recommendations are targeted towards (1) states in the subregion; (2) subregional, regional, and international actors, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, the East African Community, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum; and (3) civil society actors, the private sector, and the media. The Action Agenda stresses the importance of holistic and inclusive approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism that involve a range of actors, including states in the subregion, partner governments, and international and multilateral actors, as well as regional, subregional, and nongovernmental organizations. With an eye toward increasing the sustainability and impact of programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, it advises to build on initiatives that are already in place in the Greater Horn of Africa and ensure that current and future activities are embedded in ongoing efforts that aim to build capacity across the criminal justice, security, and development sectors. The ideas proposed in this Action Agenda were developed by the Global Center, based on existing experiences and practices in the Greater Horn of Africa as well as consultations with various stakeholders. An earlier draft of the Action Agenda was circulated at the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Horn of Africa Working Group in March 2015. This report has been made possible by the generous support of the governments of Norway and Turkey. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security , 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Shelf Number: 135838 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent ExtremismViolent Groups |
Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Strengthening Rule of Law Responses to Counter Violent Extremism: What Role for Civil Society in South Asia? Summary: Across South Asia, civil society has made important contributions to enhancing rule of law based efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism. Their roles as advocates, monitors, technical experts, trainers, service providers, and information hubs complement the efforts of law enforcement and security actors, and many opportunities exist for partnerships. Civil society actors have also played an important role in promoting development, improved governance and human rights in the region, and in promoting a resilient social contract between citizens and the state. This policy brief reflects on these contributions and explores opportunities for civil society to support cooperative regional efforts to respond to terrorism and violent extremism in the region. It draws largely from a workshop on "Strengthening Rule of Law-Based Responses to Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia: What Role for Civil Society?" organized by the Global Center, in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore and The Institute for Inclusive Security. Following an overview of the limitations and challenges faced by civil society actors in the region, it offers a set of recommendations for policymakers and practitioners with a view to informing the design and implementation of programming to prevent violent extremism and terrorism in South Asia. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Shelf Number: 135839 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Khanna, Gaurav Title: Guns and Butter? Fighting Violence with the Promise of Development Summary: There is growing awareness that development-oriented government policies may be an important counterinsurgency strategy, but existing papers are usually unable to disentangle various mechanisms. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we analyze the impact of one of the world's largest anti-poverty programs, India's NREGS, on the intensity of Maoist conflict. We find short-run increases of insurgency-related violence, police-initiated attacks, and insurgent attacks on civilians. We discuss how these results relate to established theories in the literature. The main mechanism consistent with the empirical patterns is that NREGS induces civilians to share more information with the state, improving police effectiveness. Details: Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2015. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper no. 9160: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9160.pdf Year: 2015 Country: India URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9160.pdf Shelf Number: 136053 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismEconomic DevelopmentPolice EffectivenessPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations Summary: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts. This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-684: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Shelf Number: 136242 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: The Future of the Afghan Local Police Summary: The Afghan Local Police (ALP) began as a small U.S. experiment but grew into a significant part of Afghanistan's security apparatus. In hundreds of rural communities, members serve on the front lines of a war that is reaching heights of violence not witnessed since 2001, as insurgents start to credibly threaten major cities. The ALP also stand in the middle of a policy debate about whether the Kabul government can best defend itself with loosely regulated units outside the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) structure. The mixed record suggests that the ALP contribute to security where local factors allow recruitment of members from the villages they patrol and where they respect their own communities. But such conditions do not exist in many districts. The ALP and pro-government militias are cheap but dangerous, and Kabul should resist calls for their expansion. Reforms are needed to strengthen oversight, dismiss ALP in the many locations where they worsen security and incorporate the remaining units into the ANSF. Since 2001, when intelligence officers arrived in northern Afghanistan to raise local militias against the Taliban, the U.S. presence has been associated with a proliferation of irregular or semi-regular forces backed by American sponsors. None has approached the scale of the ALP, which has perhaps 29,000 men deployed in 29 of 34 provinces. Its predecessors were invented to meet short-term tactical requirements, such as assisting counter-terrorism teams in border regions; the ALP is a broader effort to correct strategic problems in the war against the Taliban. U.S. planners realised they were sending Afghan forces into rural communities that treated them as outsiders because of their tribe, ethnicity or urban background. Senior Afghan officials were reluctant to endorse community-based units, in part because they circumvented central government authority, but also because they resembled militias that had contributed to the civil wars of the 1990s. President Hamid Karzai eventually accepted the ALP concept after insisting the armed villagers would at least nominally be categorised as "police" and answer to the interior ministry. He approved a 10,000-man roster as a two- to five-year temporary measure to address growing instability, although the program rapidly expanded. Five years later, officials in President Ashraf Ghani's government are considering plans to increase the roster to 45,000 and seeking money to continue the program after the scheduled September 2018 expiration of U.S. funding. U.S. and Afghan security officials also continue experimenting with other irregular units. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the first vice president and an ex-militia leader, has publicly called for a new force of 20,000. Already, security officials are attempting to raise about 5,000 militiamen in at least seven provinces as a stopgap against rising insecurity. Afghan officials who feel qualms about hastily-raised forces with little training may lose the internal argument if insurgent attacks continue growing in 2015-2016 as forecast, leading to more pressure for quick fixes. However, the ALP program has not improved security in many places and even exacerbated the conflict in a number of districts. A minority of villagers describe it as an indispensable source of protection, without which their districts would become battlegrounds or insurgent havens, but it is more common to hear complaints that ALP prey upon the people they are supposed to guard. Such behaviour often provokes violence: in 2014, an ALP officer was three to six times more likely to be killed on duty than his ANSF counterpart. At times, this reflected the way ALP units have become a central part of the war, singled out by Taliban as important targets. In other places, the high rate resulted from abuses - extortion, kidnapping, extrajudicial killings - that instigated armed responses. Teachers who feel outraged by ALP behaviour and pick up guns to attack an ALP outpost may have no connection to insurgents and may quickly return peacefully to civilian life. Such cases illustrate how ALP can inspire conflict, instead of quelling it. The chequered history suggests further expansion of such forces would be a mistake, but an abrupt halt to the program would give insurgents a military edge, and ex-fighters might also be drawn to banditry and other forms of lawlessness if not carefully reintegrated into society or the ANSF. New policies are needed to extend ALP units with proven good behaviour, while reducing the overall force and ultimately ending the program. The mix of interventions required - strengthened oversight and integration into ANSF of units that would remain after poor ones are disbanded - includes additional training, vetting and discipline. Many domestic and international actors should be empowered to identify where the ALP contributes to instability, including the councils of elders originally convened to approve the program. Oversight mechanisms should have power only to reduce or eliminate ALP where the program is not working, not authorise bigger rosters or shift resources to new locations. Only a minority of the existing ALP would likely pass muster in such a stringent system, but those remaining should receive pay increases equivalent to those received by the national police (ANP), and adequate support from the government and international community. Washington's allies have been reluctant to get involved with the program, but they should set aside their concerns as ALP members become bona fide policemen and leave behind the ALP's history as a U.S. military project. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 268: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-local-police.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-local-police.pdf Shelf Number: 136338 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismPolice BehaviorPolice Education and TrainingPolice EffectivenessPolice PerformancePolice ReformPolicing |
Author: Keen, David Title: Dilemmas of counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding. A discussion paper Summary: Security threats defined as stemming from 'terrorism' or 'rogue regimes' have significant public profile, and have led to responses from different branches of government. In tackling these threats - through counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding - a 'mainstream' approach has evolved, which involves defining conflicts in a way that designates some actors as 'spoiler(s)' (i.e. 'terrorists', 'radicalised groups', etc.) and proceeds to address such conflicts by opposing 'spoilers' in partnership with whatever allies can be found. The paper begins from the assumption that counter-terrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches - while distinct from each other, and different in different contexts - are linked in important ways, and have followed a discernible pattern in recent decades as part of what we describe here as the 'mainstream' approach. This typically involves use of military force, generally combined with - or followed by - some kind of 'stabilisation' or 'statebuilding' effort. This can involve negotiating a pragmatic 'deal' with influential actors (with a willingness to overlook the limitations of allies), which reinforces those actors included in the deal while continuing to use force against 'spoilers'. However, as the recent past illustrates, this approach has not proven to have had sustainable success; here we examine the drawbacks of this position and propose alternatives to the mainstream. In this paper, David Keen and Larry Attree discuss how the international community has tried to counter terror, achieve stability, build states and foster peace around the world. It examines whether these objectives and approaches are being pursued effectively and coherently and whether there are contradictions between them. It is based on a review of relevant literature, is not exhaustive in scope, and is intended to stimulate debate among the policy actors and practitioners engaged in these approaches. Details: London: Saferworld, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/875-dilemmas-of-counter-terror-stabilisation-and-statebuilding Year: 2015 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 136504 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Michel, Steve Title: Use of Programs and Interventions with Canada's Federally Sentenced Radicalized Offenders Summary: What it means By examining the institutional and community-based interventions which the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has utilized with radicalized offenders and the congruence of these interventions with identified needs, CSC achieves a more comprehensive understanding of how past and current intervention options address the needs of radicalized offenders. This knowledge can be used to inform any future intervention referrals for radicalized offenders, identify limitations in current intervention options, and highlight opportunities for adaptation of existing or new interventions for this group. What we found The three most commonly attended interventions by radicalized offenders were identified as institutional employment, education, and psychological services. When examining core correctional programming specifically, radicalized offenders were most likely to participate in living skills, violent offender, personal development, and substance abuse programming, however this involvement was much less frequently identified than participation in other institutional interventions such as social programs or chaplaincy. Those with an identified need in the education and employment domain were the most likely to participate in at least one intervention that addressed the education and employment domain. The next most common need domain addressed was community functioning (for those assessed by the Dynamic Factor Identification and Analysis, or DFIA) and personal/emotional needs (for those assessed by both the DFIA and its revised version DFIA-R). Least likely to be addressed were needs related to the marital/family domain; however this was a need area that was not frequently identified as problematic for radicalized offenders. Why we did this study Since 1989, CSC has applied the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) principle in order to identify and address the risks and criminogenic needs of the federally sentenced offender population. The effectiveness of this approach has been empirically assessed and validated on offender populations in general. However, to date, there has not been research to demonstrate the applicability of the RNR principle with radicalized offenders. This paper identifies the interventions in which radicalized offenders participated in relation to their identified criminogenic and violent extremist needs. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report No. R-345: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-0345-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-0345-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136628 Keywords: Correctional ProgramsCounter-terrorismRadicalizationRadicalized offendersRehabilitationRisk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls Summary: The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadis' propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism. The militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan's evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadis will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military's continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy's restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority. After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government's 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial "apex committees", enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalised civilian institutions in devising and implementing counterterrorism policy. Despite claims to the contrary, the military, which has almost complete control over national security and counter-terrorism policy, also still distinguishes between "bad" jihadi groups, those targeting the security forces, and "good" jihadi groups, those perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan. Anti-India outfits such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed version of the banned Lashkare- Tayyaba (LeT), have even expanded their activities through so-called charity fronts. Military-backed Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, have not been targeted in ongoing operations in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Instead, the Haqqanis, like the LeT/JD, have been kept off Pakistan's list of terrorist groups. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 271: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Shelf Number: 136632 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Strengthening the Case: Good Criminal Justice Practices to Counter Terrorism Summary: The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector elaborates guidance on 15 good practices that promote rule of law-based criminal justice responses to terrorism. The GCTF encourages all countries to consider the Rabat Memorandum as a source of guidance and its members and partners have been working both bilateral and multilaterally to promote its implementation national and regional contexts. In support of these efforts, the US Department of State Counterterrorism Bureau commissioned the Global Center to undertake a stocktaking of national efforts to implement rule of law-based criminal justice measures to counter terrorism in selection of countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report presents the core findings of the stocktaking project. It highlights trends, challenges, and opportunities for implementing the good practices of the Rabat Memorandum and for leveraging these practices to more effectively counter terrorism while promoting and protecting human rights. As noted in the introduction of the Rabat Memorandum, compliance with international law and human rights standards in national criminal justice responses to terrorism is not isolated to the mere existence of certain legal tools, or to the skills of specialized practitioners alone. Rather, it recognizes that "states should in the first instance have a modern, fair and efficient criminal justice system that forms the basis for a robust criminal justice response to terrorism." While the Global Center's report highlights examples of a wide range of good practices being implemented in national jurisdictions, it also calls attention to diverse legal and institutional, organizational, and operational challenges that seriously undermine rule of law-based criminal justice across all countries examined. As stated in the Rabat Memorandum, criminal justice efforts to counter terrorism "must be built on a functional criminal justice system that is capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the human rights of the accused." The findings suggest that core criminal justice sector development efforts are essential for strengthening national implementation of rule of law based criminal justice practices to counter terrorism. The report concludes with a series of cross-cutting recommendations to support the ongoing efforts of the GCTF's Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Strengthening-the-case-high-res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Strengthening-the-case-high-res.pdf Shelf Number: 136852 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismRule of LawTerrorism |
Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice Summary: This volume reports on the range of papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Conference 2014 from 7-8 December 2014 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The Conference was organized and hosted by Hedayah (the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism), Curtin University, People Against Violent Extremism (PaVE), and the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The Conference was also sponsored in part by the European Commission and the United States Department of State. The event was attended by approximately 100 academics, practitioners and policymakers from over 25 countries. The 2014 CVE Research Conference follows from the inaugural CVE Symposium hosted by Curtin University, PaVE, Macquarie University and Hedayah in Perth, Australia in 2013. As the first of its kind in the region, the 2013 Symposium brought together national and international scholars, practitioners, policymakers and former extremists to discuss and debate the current state and future directions for CVE. The intention for the CVE Research Conference is to be an annual event at which the yearly highlights of cutting-edge CVE research and innovation can be presented to academics, researchers, practitioners and policymakers on a global scale. Details: Perth, WA, AUS: Curtin University, 2015. 159p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Shelf Number: 136857 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremists GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Nielsen, Thomas Galasz Title: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror by America and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geographical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over governments' decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare - counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad. When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO's core principle of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case, one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach and engaged itself and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale military operations against the enemy's strongholds - primarily the city of Kabul. At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks from training and operating on Afghan soil. Though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the offensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan. Prior to, and alongside with, the development in Afghanistan, Pakistan faced similar problems with religious extremism and militant groups. Given its status as a key regional actor, the development in Afghanistan created a new situation for Pakistan's security matrix. Afghanistan and its population faced its third big war in four decades. Previous wars, the Soviet Union's 1979-89 intervention, and the 1992-96 civil war, had had a devastating effects in terms of refugees and spill-over to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, with Pakistan experiencing the greatest impact by far. This has had massive negative consequences for Pakistani society, especially in relation to its economy and domestic security. While the country has struggled with these consequences, it is important to remember that positive and stable development in Afghanistan will, conversely, have a massive positive effect on all levels of Pakistani society. It has been argued from many NATO countries that the Afghan insurgency groups have been, and still are being, sustained through their connections into Pakistan and their ability to cross the border and obtain safe havens on Pakistani soil. Adding to the problem is, of course, the continued external funding for religious madrassas in the remote areas of the country where government outreach in relation to education, health care, and other civil services is sparse. The lack of governmental outreach presents an opportune environment for establishing and developing insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, a new turn has seemed to take root in Pakistan, and since June 2014 the Pakistani army has been very active in the Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in counter-militancy, including CT operations. This turn was underlined by the tragic events in December 2014, when terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)6 killed 132 school children and 9 teachers in an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. While claiming responsibility for the dastardly act, the terrorists afterwards stated that the attack was a reaction to the operations conducted by the Pakistani Military in FATA. Details: Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2015. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2015 at: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 137893 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali Summary: Mali's descent into a war of secession at the start of 2012 was a conflict foretold. Yet what followed proved radically distinct from the country's three previous episodes of insurgency in its vast, impoverished and arid north. Radical Islamists seized control of the main urban centres of northern Mali, displacing the Tuareg rebels with whom they had struck a working relationship. In the capital, Bamako, a military coup led by an unknown and low-ranking army captain overthrew a president who had been in power for a decade. An uneasy stand-off came into being: Mali's debilitated military guarded the frontiers to the south, while Islamist hardliners and criminals meted out their own version of sharia justice across the north. As is well known, the decomposition of Malian state authority was finally halted early in 2013. Faced with an Islamist advance to the south, French military forces embarked on a lightning intervention that scattered the extremists and reasserted control over the north. Since then, the pace of Mali's post-conflict recovery and stabilization has been astonishing: a UN peacekeeping mission and a host of bilateral and EU programmes have been put into place; a new president and a new National Assembly have been elected; peace talks with the more moderate armed groups, though stuttering, are under way. But as the national government and the international community leave behind the heat of the crisis, it is now incumbent on them to understand what caused such a perilous tailspin to start in Mali, so as to prevent it from reoccurring. As in other countries of West Africa and the Sahel, transnational organized crime has played a prominent role in the affairs of Mali over the past two decades, above all in the north. Drug trafficking, including large consignments of high-value cocaine from Latin America, as well as kidnapping rackets led by Islamist terror groups operating freely across the borders of the Sahel, are both widely regarded as playing key roles in fomenting the instability, unrest and violence that climaxed in 2012. However, the depiction of a crime-terror nexus in Mali, whereby criminal profits feed insurgent arms and recruitment, does not do justice to the multi-faceted role played by illicit activity across the country. This paper is an attempt to marshal all the available evidence, along with the insights provided by experts in Mali, so as to understand the relations that were forged prior to 2012 between criminal enterprises, communities, political and social elites, armed groups, the Malian state and neighbouring countries. On the basis of recent developments, the paper seeks to outline the likely adaptations that the main illicit networks will now make, and to draw out some recommendations as to how best to temper the criminality and violence that menace Mali's post-conflict transition. At the heart of this analysis is an account of how Mali was both the victim of the displacement of drug-trafficking routes and armed jihadist activity from other countries, and a deeply complicit partner in profiting from the incoming wave of illicit trade and Islamist terror. Behind this willing complicity lay the particular vulnerabilities of Malian state and society. Government in Bamako, the country's capital, had by 2006 replaced direct authority over the north with sporadic, ham-fisted interference. Chronic competition between the north's many ethnic, caste and clan groups offered numerous possibilities for the political elite in Bamako to find useful allies to do its bidding. However, these social fissures were also fodder for the designs of other, newer parties: nearby states such as Algeria and Libya, criminal organizations seeking to traffic drugs, and radical armed groups. The resulting transactions between supranational forces and local ethnic or tribal factions were to set Mali on the way to the fourth, and arguably the most threatening, insurgency of its post-colonial history. But Mali's war was not merely the product of radicalized and internationalized disaffection in the north. The conflict also threw a harsh light on the degradation of the state itself. A model for democratic virtue in Africa, half of whose budget was financed by foreign donors, Mali re-emerged after its coup as a state that had been afflicted by multiple vices. Illicit practices had become rampant across the public sector, corroding popular faith in politicians; Mali's celebrated elections had in fact received some of the lowest turnouts in the democratic world. Moreover, the day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism formed a permissive soil on which an all-powerful presidency could nurture the construction of a shadow state. The greatest drug trafficking scandal of Malian history, the Air Cocaine case of 2009, suggests that official complicity in the criminal business had penetrated the highest echelons of power. Mali has now set the course for a recovery of legitimate and accountable state authority. Its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has backed a clean sweep of the judicial system and a Truth Commission on violence in the north. Captain Sanogo, the coup leader, is in jail, along with his accomplices. Key Islamist leaders and narco-traffickers have been scattered or neutered, as have the masterminds of the shadow state. From the information available, it would seem that major illicit trafficking across the north has also diminished in scale. However, it is far too soon to proclaim an end to the crisis. Occasional terrorist attacks and ethnic skirmishes remain a constant headache for local people and UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the pre-war illicit networks are never far away: clearing corruption from the public sector is set to be a long and arduous haul, while illicit networks in political life are destined to regroup and reconfigure, as they have in many other criminalized environments, notably in Latin America. Nearby countries such as Niger and Libya have quickly emerged as staging posts in the Saharan and Sahelian criminal economy. As Mali negotiates its post-conflict recovery, the focus must be directed at ways to reduce the systemic threat from criminal business while avoiding the sorts of blind repressive policies that have engineered insurgencies in Afghanistan, or terrible bloodshed in Mexico. This paper outlines a number of approaches that should lie at the heart of such a balanced, conflict-sensitive strategy towards crime. A robust and inclusive political settlement for the north is critical, though for this to work attention must now focus on how decentralized or autonomous regional authorities can be supervised without the risk of meddling from Bamako. Provision of security and security reform must be imbued with realism as to what can be achieved with the institutions available, and should be shaped by an emphasis on intelligence-led policing that seeks to sever the most dangerous criminal linkages to power-brokers. Counter-terrorism must also be wise to the intermediation of criminal figures, and to the armed networks that illicit businessmen have cultivated. And lastly, it remains imperative that renascent Mali attacks the roots of the shadow state, and is backed by an international community willing to abandon its hunger for fixers in the state and short-term solutions. Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, the Clingendael Institute, 2014. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed October 30, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mali URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Shelf Number: 137180 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingIllicit NetworksKidnappingOrganized CrimeTerrorismViolence |
Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The State of the Art 2015: A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counter-terrorism Summary: This paper is a review of how information and insight can be drawn from open social media sources. It focuses on the specific research techniques that have emerged, the capabilities they provide, the possible insights they offer, and the ethical and legal questions they raise. These techniques are considered relevant and valuable in so far as they can help to maintain public safety by preventing terrorism, preparing for it, protecting the public from it and pursuing its perpetrators. The report also considers how far this can be achieved against the backdrop of radically changing technology and public attitudes towards surveillance. This is an updated version of a 2013 report paper on the same subject, State of the Art. Since 2013, there have been significant changes in social media, how it is used by terrorist groups, and the methods being developed to make sense of it. In particular, the context in which this research took place has changed in a number of significant ways. First, there have been continuing concerns about internet surveillance and privacy following the revelations of NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Second, and partly as a result, there have been changes in the way that people use social media, and indeed in social media companies and platforms themselves. Third, so-called Islamic State (IS) made social media a central component of their modus operandi - particularly for propagandistic purposes. Finally, the methods and software used to make sense of social media have continued to improve. Social media research has emerged as a practice, but is still not yet a coherent academic discipline or distinctive intelligence tradecraft. It is neither a distinct area of study, nor driven by a united research community. It is conducted across the public, private and academic sectors, spanning disciplines from the computer sciences and ethnography to advertising and brand management. Its aims range from understanding the topography of social networks comprising millions of individuals to the deep, textured knowledge of the social worlds of individuals and small groups. As such, techniques and approaches often reflect specific disciplinary traditions and rarely refer to those found elsewhere. Social media research is also fragmented by platform. There is already a distinct nascent discipline surrounding Twitter, driven by free access to millions of tweets, an easily available Application Programming Interface (API) and fewer concerns about privacy and intrusion. Since 2008, the corpus of work on 'Twitterology' has grown from a handful to hundreds of research papers, covering everything from topic identification to event detection and political forecasting. Details: London: Demos, 2015. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2015 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/State_of_the_Arts_2015.pdf?1442411063 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/State_of_the_Arts_2015.pdf?1442411063 Shelf Number: 137369 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismSocial MediaSurveillance Terrorism |
Author: Groenewald, Hesta Title: "Hammering the Bread and the Nail": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Afghanistan Summary: The international intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was in many respects a watershed for the country and for the global agenda on combating terrorism. The decision to react to the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 with a military-led response was intended to close down al-Qaeda's operational space in Afghanistan, which the Taliban regime refused to challenge. Yet, the country was also in ongoing civil conflict and the actions of the Taliban regime were as much targeted against the Afghan population as they were causing insecurity for Western countries and Afghanistan's neighbours. Focusing the international intervention on the narrow counter-terrorism aims of defeating al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power meant missing early opportunities to support political transition, development progress and long-term peacebuilding. This research report reviews international engagement in Afghanistan with a view to identifying lessons and recommendations regarding statebuilding, peacebuilding and counterterrorism in the country and elsewhere. Based mostly on existing literature, the report focuses in particular on US, UK and EU involvement. While providing an overview of the key dilemmas, the analysis generates important recommendations for future support to Afghanistan, and also aims to inform ongoing policy debates about international engagement with 'terrorism-generating' contexts. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Shelf Number: 137727 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsHuman Rights AbusesTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Suri, Sunil Title: "Barbed Wire on Our Heads": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia Summary: Since 2007 the US, UK and EU have provided significant funds to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and regional actors aimed at militarily defeating al-Shabaab. These resources have been provided despite questions about the objectives of regional actors and evidence that their actions have undermined efforts to build peace in Somalia. The US, UK and EU have all been prominent backers of the stabilisation and statebuilding agendas in Somalia - the latter of which is enshrined in the Somali Compact - and have been particularly active in political processes to form interim regional administrations and the creation of a federal system. These approaches have wrested much territory from al-Shabaab control, particularly since the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012. However, these territorial gains remain both relative and fragile, and have both caused harm and created risks for longer-term stability. With the mandate of the FGS coming to an end in 2016, the US, UK and EU have the opportunity to reflect upon the lessons of over twenty years of involvement and adjust their policies in the country. This report, informed by field research in Somalia and Kenya, aims to inform this debate about the impact of US, UK and EU counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches in the southern and central areas of Somalia since 2001. Assessing the impact of their engagement on Somali conflict dynamics from a peacebuilding perspective, it argues that counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts have had significant negative impacts, and based on this identifies lessons and recommendations for the future. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 66p., bibliography Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1032-barbed-wire-on-our-heads Year: 2016 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1032-barbed-wire-on-our-heads Shelf Number: 137728 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Attree, Larry Title: Blown back: Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Yemen Summary: Since serious terror threats emerged in Yemen in 2000, the West has invested significantly in counter-terror and stabilisation. Alongside direct military action to assassinate key militants (by the US), Western actors backed the Government of Yemen to fight, prosecute or punish terrorists, and gave capacity-building support to institutions, hoping to address the weakness of a willing but fragile state. The Western approach reflects a domestic discourse in the West in which Yemen has been defined primarily as a 'threat' - an unstable context that plays host to al-Qaeda and other dangerous groups, which must be defeated by backing the state at all costs. This report analyses external actors' approaches to Yemen and their impacts on its conflict dynamics from a peacebuilding perspective. It argues that counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts have had significant negative impacts, and based on this identifies lessons and recommendations for the future. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1033-blown-back Year: 2016 Country: Yemen URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1033-blown-back Shelf Number: 137729 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Stuart, Hannah Title: Community Policing and Preventing Extremism: Lessons from Bradford Summary: Since the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, police forces nationally have implemented successive counter-radicalisation policies. Community Policing and Preventing Extremism, based on a series of interviews with senior police officers from the West Yorkshire Police and the North East Counter-Terrorism Unit, provides a practical perspective on the challenges of delivering preventative work at grassroots level as well as on policy debates about the remit of counter-extremism in a free society. Key findings include: ◾The police advocate building sustainable relationships with communities based on mutual trust and confidence; and recognise the need to be representative and to respond to changing community dynamics; ◾A focus on successful community policing and "quality of life issues" allows the police to proactively create resilient partnerships rather than attempting to force a relationship in response to a counter-radicalisation-related issue; ◾A strategic mechanism for supporting the ideological challenge against extremism is promoting critical thinking skills and credible voices, which builds resilience against extremism; helps isolate extremists; and promotes dialogue around other controversial issues, such as grooming; ◾Promoting safe giving is a key response to the religious injunction for charity within Muslim communities, which can increase vulnerability to fundraising for criminal or terrorist intent and to intimidating styles of fundraising that take advantage of a generous and permissive cultural attitude towards giving; ◾Police forces are well-placed to identify grievances and negative perceptions within communities. Successful work around education, internet safety and grooming demonstrates the value of promoting counter-radicalisation as a safeguarding issue rather than simply as a counter-terrorism tool; ◾Among the biggest challenges anticipated for 2015 is ensuring consistency in relation to freedom of speech and the thresholds used to measure extremism, particularly as it manifests either online or in public situations, for example at universities and during political protests. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper No. 4: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137850 Keywords: Community PolicingCounter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Hussain, Ghaffar Title: Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter it Summary: Online extremism and the role the Internet plays in the radicalisation process is currently being debated and discussed by journalists, academics, technologists and government officials alike. This report demystifies the topic of extremist content online and exposes the manner in which online tools are being used by Islamist extremist organisations and individuals to recruit and propagandise. Current measures to tackle online extremism are also assessed and critiqued, after which the report details a practical strategy for countering extremism online and making the Internet a less hospitable domain for extremists. The research conducted for this report focuses on 30 Islamist extremist groups operating in the UK and France, mapping their use of the Internet and what they hope to achieve through their online activities. Popular online platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter as well as chat rooms, discussion forums and static websites are analysed with a view to assessing the role online extremist messaging plays in the radicalisation process. The report also addresses the issue of censorship, assessing the effectiveness of current filtering methods available and their overall efficacy. Research for this report was based on original data collection and analyses as well as interviews with a range of experts, mentors and target audiences. Key findings in this report: - With the Internet often being accused of producing radicalisation in isolation of other factors, this report found that the vast majority of radicalised individuals come into contact with extremist ideology through offline socialisation prior to being indoctrinated online. In other words, the Internet does not radicalise in isolation of other factors and should not be targeted as the 'cause' of radicalisation. As such, the Internet's role is less about initiating the radicalisation process; rather it acts as a facilitator and catalyst for the radicalisation process by 1) indoctrinating, 2) educating and 3) socialising individuals. - Although governments are increasingly relying on censorship and filtering methods to counter online extremism, this report found that negative measures, or censorship in general, was not only ineffective and costly but also potentially counter-productive. - Positive measures, such as developing counter-extremist efforts through online counter-speech content and popularising online initiatives that fight against extremism are much more effective in challenging extremist ideologies. However, there are currently not enough materials that counter extremist content online, allowing extremists to monopolise certain issues. - We found that results from search engines rarely, if ever, provide links to content that supported Islamist extremism. It was equally rare to find content countering extremist narratives. - Research also found that available Islamist extremist content websites were most successful if they provided more subtle, non-illegal information platforms with links to active social media platforms for users. Available static websites served primarily to 1) propagate the Islamist narrative through specific interpretations of scriptures, 2) promote martyrdom and 3) solidify a 'self versus other' allegiance to Muslims, rejecting non-Muslims. This report seeks to differentiate itself from previous reports on online extremism in two ways; firstly the research itself is much more in-depth and diverse, combining qualitative and quantitative data to reach conclusions. Secondly, this report offers a comprehensive and practical list of recommendations which, if implemented fully, could unleash a new wave of online activism that will take the fight to extremists online, breaking the current monopoly they hold over certain socio-political issues. Recommendations to public, private and third party sectors based on our findings: - Establishing a forum that deals with online extremism and brings stakeholders from key sectors together in order to do so. - Improving digital literacy and critical consumption skills in schools and communities. - Encouraging the establishment of a social media outlet that clarifies government policies and debunks propaganda. - A mapping exercise that explores current efforts to tackle extremism online and identifies partners that could be given support to develop an effective online presence. - Establishing a central body that offers seed funding and training for grassroots online counter-extremism initiatives. - More research into how the far right is using the Internet to propagandise giving a broader view of 'extremism online'. The findings and recommendations of this report suggest a clearer understanding of the role the Internet plays in radicalisation process and an appreciation of the dangers of relying on illiberal censorship can contribute towards the development of a more holistic approach to tackling extremism online. Relying on the cultivation of grassroots initiatives to develop and promote counter-speech online, as opposed to censorship, could help turn the tide against current extremist efforts. However, co-operation and regular communication between stakeholders from key sectors is vital in order for the above vision to be realised and, thus, the establishment of a forum that allows this to take place is also important. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Shelf Number: 137854 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsInternetIslamistsOnline CommunicationsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Georgetown University, Justice Policy Institute Title: Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism Summary: The United States (US) is the primary target among western states for lone wolf terrorist (LWT) attacks, and the frequency of attacks continues to increase. Even though LWT attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than terrorist attacks conducted by organizations, the US must continue to focus counterterrorism resources and encourage further research to combat this threat to national security. In this assessment, the Georgetown National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF) hopes to inform key stakeholders about the most critical lone wolf terrorism issues and spark new policy discussions on how to address the problem. The NSCITF articulates eight findings that inform the collective understanding of lone wolf terrorism and offers three actionable recommendations to address those findings. First, the NSCITF finds that no single USG definition on lone wolf terrorism exists. Second, the NSCITF identifies the following four current trends in domestic LWT attacks, each of which highlight multiple issues that US policymakers must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies directed at LWTs: 1) Increased targeting of law enforcement (LE) and military personnel; 2) Overwhelming use firearms to conduct attacks, compared to LWTs in other western countries who rely on hijackings or bombs; 3) Increased radicalization via the Internet, extremist media, and the civilian workplace; and, 4) Proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized extremist groups. Third, despite the presence of overarching trends among domestic LWTs, the NSCITF determines that profiling fails to target potential LWTs effectively. Consequently, in the fourth finding, the NSCITF provides a framework to understand how an individual becomes a LWT and to identify possible intervention points. Fifth, the NSCITF develops a typology that organizes lone wolves in terms of their ideological autonomy and social competence to explicate why lone wolves operate alone, a key gap in the extant literature on terrorism. The final three findings address US federal and local law enforcement policies to prevent LWT attacks. In the sixth finding, the NSCITF identifies the challenges of using traditional law enforcement tactics to identify and stop LWTs. Specifically, the NSCITF highlights how the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals an ability to become radicalized without physically interacting with others and research various attack methodologies undetected. The seventh finding demonstrates that aggressive law enforcement tactics - namely, surveillance and monitoring of targeted individuals - risk community mistrust because of perceived infringements on civil liberties and privacy rights. In the final finding, the NSCITF notes that the US lacks a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach that coherently and systematically organizes the federal, local, and state efforts to combat lone wolf terrorism. Based on the above findings, the NSCITF offers three recommendations. First, the USG should adopt a standard definition of lone wolf terrorism. Second, the USG should appoint clear leadership over the problem of lone wolf terrorism to streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels. Finally, the USG should emphasize the prevention and short-circuiting of the radicalization process. Each recommendation will help the USG streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent future LWT attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 137881 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityLaw EnforcementLone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Lee, Walter A. Title: Finding the Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Ways to Distinguish and Deter Lone-Wolf Terrorists Summary: Despite the rise in the number of attacks by lone-wolf terrorists, the lone-wolf threat has largely been neglected by academic researchers and counterterrorism practitioners. The nature of the lone-wolf terrorist has introduced new challenges to law enforcement and counterterrorism unlike the more discussed problems of international group terrorism. This thesis suggests, however, that policies created to help deter group terrorism could be useful in detecting and deterring lone-wolf terrorists. The existing policy framework for group terrorism deterrence may have great utility in the fight against lone wolves, but policy use and effectiveness requires a careful examination of the characteristics unique to lone-wolf terrorism to ensure that the deterrence policies match. This thesis uses the comparative method and examines three case studies of lone-wolf terrorism from the United States and Europe: the Fort Hood shooter of 2009 (Major Nidal Hasan), the Boston Marathon bombers, and Anders Behring Breivik of Norway. By examining the unique circumstances of each case, this thesis determines what policies were and were not effective and in need of adaption to deter the threat of lone-wolf terrorism. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley Knox Library, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Theses: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=765305 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=765305 Shelf Number: 137890 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismLone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review Summary: This paper is the first publication in the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project, which aims to improve understanding of, and responses to, the phenomenon of (potentially) violent lone actors through analysis of comprehensive data on cases from across Europe. Despite recent depictions within the media, lone-actor terrorism is not a new phenomenon; however, research suggests the threat is increasing as pressure from security services forces a tactical adaptation and groups - including Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) - call on those who share their ideology to act alone without direction or support. This paper examines the current state of knowledge surrounding the phenomenon, assessing the limitations of the literature and identifying where further research should focus to add real value to countering the threat. Three recommendations are made: first, increased methodological rigour in empirical research; second, focus on process as well as perpetrators; and third, specific examination of the confluence between returning foreign fighters, domestic Daesh supporters, and the lone-actor threat. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 1: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137894 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismLone Wolf TerrorismLone Wolf TerroristRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 1: Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the first of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague. This paper focuses on the personal characteristics of lone-actor terrorists, resulting in a number of policy recommendations. The analysis specifically outlines the importance of benchmarking and looking at different sub-groups. It further identifies the importance of trust and openness, and of multi-agency co-operation. These factors might be the basis of formulating an effective response to the challenge of lone-actor terrorism Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism series No. 5: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138003 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityLone-Wolf TerroristsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Palombi, Simon Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 2: Attack Methodology and Logistics Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the second of four policy papers in the CLAT series, published by RUSI on behalf of Chatham House. The CLAT project identified a need to understand the factors underlying the attack methodology and logistics of lone-actor terrorists. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the key variables of the data set. The results are then used to develop a more nuanced understanding of the lone-actor terrorism threat in Europe. Details: London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper; Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 6: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138006 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Smith, Melanie Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the third of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Preventing every single instance of lone-actor terrorism is impossible. This is particularly true in countries where freedom of thought, speech and privacy are highly valued and must be protected. The recommendations stemming from this paper's analysis provide practical suggestions for preventing instances of lone-actor terrorism - based on findings relating to motivations, political engagement and online activity - that adhere to these principles. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 7: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Shelf Number: 138004 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityLone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Social MediaTerrorism |
Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 4: 'Leakage' and Interaction with Authorities Summary: This is the fourth and final policy paper in the CLAT series. It outlines the policy implications of analysis in relation to changes in perpetrator behaviour, 'leakage' of extreme views or intention to act, and interactions with public authorities in the time leading up to an attack. It provides a series of practical policy recommendations in order to develop an effective response to various lone-actor threats. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 8: Accessed march 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Shelf Number: 138005 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Lone-Wolf Terrorists RadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing Summary: The majority of this report was written as part of Quilliam's evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee's (HASC) inquiry on Countering Extremism. In addition to the analysis of the Islamist narrative and the strategic framework required to counter it, this strategic briefing includes three case studies of counter-narratives put together by Quilliam (not included in the HASC submission), and recommendations based on experience, expertise and these case studies for future counter-narrative approaches. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Shelf Number: 138130 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Challenging the Narrative of the "Islamic State" Summary: ISIS has brought terrorist propaganda to a new level, targeting its main audiences in nearly two dozen languages with up to 90,000 tweets every day. Governments have generally been at a loss as how to counter the ISIS narrative with persuasive counter-arguments to reduce its attraction for rebellious Muslim youths in Western diasporas and Muslim-majority countries. At the core of ISIS' narrative are themes familiar to most Muslims. ISIS has appropriated and instrumentalised them for its main purpose: to expand the Caliphate proclaimed in mid-2014. In this Research Paper, Dr. Alex Schmid identifies a dozen narrative themes of ISIS and discusses them from theological, historical and other angles in an attempt to show vulnerabilities and point the way towards developing convincing counter-arguments. While the potential of this approach is demonstrated, Dr. Schmid argues that a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic, inter-disciplinary teamwork, is required to develop successful counter-narratives and that these need to be tested on audiences with a cultural affinity to ISIS main target groups before being utilised by credible Muslim voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational and faith-based arguments. The Research Paper concludes with the observation that developing counter-narratives, while necessary, is not enough. It is even more necessary to develop credible alternative narratives - narratives that can give a new sense of purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they have no future in their and our societies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138159 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic StateOnline CommunicationsRadical Groups Religious ExtremismSocial MediaViolent Extremism |
Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7 Summary: The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government's disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process' four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government's newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) - which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise - to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures. The report recommends the following: - Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation. - Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners. - Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counter-extremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. - Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities. - Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts. - Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism. - Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships. - Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures. - Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention. - Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism. - Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. - Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively. - Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism. - Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role. - Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. - Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities. - Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries. - Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds. While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly - at this critical time - practical recommendations to strengthen the UK's counter-extremism efforts. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Shelf Number: 138174 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-TerrorismDe-radicalizationIslamic State Media MuslimsRadical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 Summary: This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of "global jihad", terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and re-emphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies. Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism recommendations: To the International Community: - Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan. - Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices. - Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions. - Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them. - Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 'value transfer' system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. - Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. - Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138176 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Secretary of State Title: Counter-Extremism Strategy Summary: 1. Life in our country is based on fundamental values that have evolved over centuries, values that are supported and shared by the overwhelming majority of the population and are underpinned by our most important local and national institutions. These values include the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs. 2. All people living in Britain are free to practise a faith or to decide not to follow any faith at all. We are free to build our own churches, synagogues, temples and mosques and to worship freely. We are free to establish our own faith schools and give our children - boys and girls alike - the best education possible. 3. Our values are not exclusive to Britain, nor have they been arrived at by accident, or imposed from above. They have been shaped by our history. Our acceptance of the freedom of religious choice was born of religious conflict, which taught us that the alternative to tolerance is violence and bloodshed. Our support for democracy developed over centuries as a guard against the abuse of power. Our belief in equality followed a history in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation. 4. These values are under attack from extremists operating at a pace and scale not before seen. We will meet this challenge with a new and more assertive approach to defeat extremists. We will challenge their ideology, and defend and promote the values that unite us, not just because we are proud of these values, but because they are the means by which we have made a diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society succeed. Our society works because we have responsibilities as well as rights. We all have the freedom to live how we choose, but in return it is vital that we respect the choices made by others. 5. The greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism. We see this in the violence of Al Qa'ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The appalling attack in Tunisia in June 2015 took the lives of 38 people, 30 of them British. More than 750 UK-linked individuals have travelled to take part in the Syrian conflict. Worryingly we have seen examples of women, children and families buying into ISIL's extremist narrative and travelling to live under their brutal regime. Islamist extremists have also inspired the overwhelming majority of over 40 terrorist plots which have been disrupted since the London bombings of 2005. 6. Islamist extremism is not the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups. In 2013 Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year old British Muslim from Birmingham, was murdered by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme-right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially-motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales, and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was 'revenge for Lee Rigby', and extreme-right publications were found at his home. The Government is determined that such violence, and the Islamophobia that underpins it, will be defeated and perpetrators brought to justice. Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Cm 9148: Accessed March 31, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Shelf Number: 138503 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Great Britain. House of Commons. Defence Committee Title: Deterrence in the twenty-first century Summary: This inquiry is the fourth of a series which have evolved from our inquiry Towards the next Defence and Security Review. These cover a number of significant strands which the Committee believe would benefit from further Defence Committee consideration. The context in which deterrence must operate has changed in recent years with the diminution in some former threats and the emergence of new ones, but in its widest sense the concept of deterrence remains as important as ever. The Committee will examine: The concept of deterrence Definitions Where deterrence sits in the continuum stretching from influence to intervention The climate in which deterrence must operate and how it has changed The targets of deterrence Is every threat potentially deterrable? The different levels of deterrence, when each might be appropriate, and the likely efficacy of each nuclear deterrence deterrence though conventional forces the link between the two The significance of Ballistic Missile Deterrence deterrence by protection of potential targets The cyber dimension The importance of credibility The sufficiency of the means The sufficiency of the will and of the ways in which it is expressed Communication of the message, including to the target How the UK Armed Forces currently contribute to deterrence and how this contribution can be improved How deterrence can be expected to change in future Details: London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2014. 2 vols. Source: Internet Resource: HC 1066: Accessed April 2, 2016 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/fence/1066/1066.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/fence/1066/1066.pdf Shelf Number: 138612 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCybercrimeTerrorism |
Author: Benotman, Noman Title: The Children of Islamic State Summary: The future of children born and raised in Islamic State is a pertinent and pressing problem, requiring the immediate attention of the international community. There are currently 31,000 pregnant women within the 'caliphate'. As many as 50 children from the United Kingdom are growing up on jihad in Islamic State, and no prior research examines what will happen to them if they choose to return. This report attempts to fill this gap by addressing the reintegration, re-education, and rehabilitation challenges of returning or escaping children. Over the last six months, Quilliam researchers have archived, translated, and analysed propaganda released by Islamic State featuring children. This is the first database of its kind, and reveals the following: - The largest amount of Islamic State media featuring children relates to violence, comprising either of children directly participating in violence, or being exposed and normalised to violence. - Islamic State's wilayats in Iraq have released the most images showing children and teens in combat and acting as suicide bombers. - In the last six months, Islamic State propaganda depicts 12 child executioners, and one child participating in a public execution. The report highlights the following exclusive findings which pertain to the recruitment and training of child soldiers in the Islamic State: - Direct coercion into joining Islamic State generally occurs through abductions. However, Islamic State also engages in more indirect, systemic coercion where people, specifically children, are pressured to join the group out of fear. - Children can not only assist in meeting the present needs of the 'caliphate', but can continue to propagate its existence and expansion once they grow up, thus securing the long-term survival of the 'caliphate'. - The current generation of fighters sees children as better and more lethal fighters than themselves. Rather than being converted into radical ideologies, children have been indoctrinated into extreme values from birth or at a young age. - Schools and the education system are central to shaping the hearts and minds of the next generation. The indoctrination that begins in schools intensifies in training camps, where children between the ages of 10 and 15 are instructed in shari'a, desensitised to violence, and are taught specific skills to best serve the state and take up the banner of jihad. - Boys learn a rigid Islamic State curriculum, where drawing, philosophy and social studies, the 'methodology of atheism', have been removed. Instead, children churn out memorised verses of the Qur'an and attend 'Jihadi Training', which includes shooting, weaponry and martial arts. Girls, also known as the 'pearls of the caliphate', are veiled, hidden, confined to the home, and taught to look after husbands. - The prolonged exposure and desensitisation to violence that children experience affects their physical and psychological well-being, both in the short term and in the long term. Looking to the future, it is inevitable that these children will suffer from severe physical and mental trauma, as well as systematic extremist indoctrination. By coupling in-depth fieldwork with extensive research, Quilliam was able to discern not only what life for children within Islamic State is like, but the extent of the challenge of re-integration to come. Based on our findings, the report proposes a thorough assessment process for children who return or escape from Islamic State. This procedure evaluates the extent of radicalisation of the child, their degree of agency in joining Islamic State, the trauma and abuse they have suffered, and the immediate and long-term needs for ensuring effective Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation DDR(R). The recommendations detail a multi-structural support network for monitoring a child's progress. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2725/files/2016/04/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 147741 Keywords: CaliphateChild SoldiersCounter-terrorismExtremismIslamic StateJihadRadicalizationTerrorist |
Author: Sondergaard, Susanne Title: TACTICS: Policy and strategic impacts, implications and recommendations Summary: In recent years the threat of terrorism in urban environments has become an important issue, emphasised by several successfully carried out terrorist attacks (New York, Madrid, London, Copenhagen and Paris are just some examples). When security forces are alerted to a specific terrorist threat, their main goal is to prevent an actual attack. On the other hand, if prevention fails and the attack is carried out, independent of the degree of success, security forces become responsible for stopping it and mitigating its consequences. In both cases, the efficiency and effectiveness of the response relies on three key pillars: 1. Ability to respond quickly, without bias in decisionmaking, enabled by specific and precise requests for information and clearly issued orders. 2. Ability to decompose threats into observable terrorist behaviours specific for urban environments to enable an increased level of preparedness by security forces. 3. Ability to efficiently and effectively manage capabilities. TACTICS is an FP7 project commissioned by the European Commission in 2012 to develop low technology readiness level (TRL) decision support technology to assist security forces in countering terrorist threats in urban environments. The system that was developed as part of this project brings an innovative approach built around the three core capabilities described above. The acronym stands for Tactical Approach to Counter Terrorists in Cities. Conceptually, it can be defined as a counterterrorism decision support technology designed to facilitate a clearer understanding of both the threat and the capabilities available to counteract it, enabling a faster, more efficient and effective security force response. Technology has played, and will continue to play, a central role in counterterrorism policy, strategy and operations. Recent years have seen rapid innovation and the development of new technological applications, such as facial recognition and biometrics, counter-IED, communications interception, airport security, explosive and weapon detection, and so on. This report analyses eight case studies of counterterrorist technology implementation in order to extract lessons that can be applied in the context of deploying a TACTICS-like system in Europe. Furthermore, it presents a series of lessons extracted from relevant case law. There are a number of challenges that policymakers face today in the ever-increasing reliance on technology for countering terrorism in Europe today. These include: The level of engagement with the communities affected by the technology implementation; The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures; The resources dedicated to counterterrorism; Achieving an appropriate balance between privacy and security; Data sharing challenges; and Respect for criteria of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1287/RAND_RR1287.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1287/RAND_RR1287.pdf Shelf Number: 138567 Keywords: Counter-terrorismInformation SharingLaw Enforcement TechnologyTerrorismUrban Security |
Author: Veldhuis, Tinka M. Title: Thinking before Leaping: The Need for More and Structural Data Analysis in Detention and Rehabilitation of Extremist Offenders Summary: In this ICCT Research Paper, Tinka M. Veldhuis and Eelco J.A.M. Kessels argue that our current understanding of detention and rehabilitation of extremist offenders is sub-optimal, and highlight several key questions that require answering before policy interventions can be truly optimised. The authors suggest that increased and structural data analysis is essential to produce evidence-based policies that are tailored to the problem and geared to an effective solution. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCD Research Paper, 2013: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Veldhuis-Kessels-Thinking-before-Leaping-February-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Veldhuis-Kessels-Thinking-before-Leaping-February-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 138568 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDeradicalizationExtremistsTerrrorists |
Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-TerrorismCybercrimeData ProtectionDrug TraffickingExtremist GroupsInformation SharingMoney LaunderingPartnershipsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Kavanagh, Jennifer E. Title: The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses. Summary: Existing literature does not explain why protracted terror-counterterror conflicts are sometimes characterized by escalating, tit-for-tat retaliation, but exhibit little responsive violence at other points. I argue that the expectations of local constituents and local political dynamics are primary determinants of conflict escalation and de-escalation. State and non-state constituents form expectations about the efficacy of violent and political approaches to a protracted conflict through Retrospective Projection, which combines evaluations of the past, present, and future. Demands for violence are most likely when the expected benefits of a military (militant)-based strategy exceed confidence in existing political alternatives. Demands for retaliation by local publics create incentives for state and non-state actors to use violence as a tool of Constituent Service. I evaluate the argument with extended case studies of Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and the Second Intifada, supplemented by four qualitative cases: Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Iraq, and Pakistan. The extended case studies combine qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis using vector autoregression (VAR) to empirically describe dynamic associations between violence and political attitudes. Consistent with the argument, constituent expectations about the efficacy of violent and political alternatives influence the timing of demands for retaliation, and demands for violence determine the timing and form of armed retaliation by state and non-state actors. Demands for violence occur where military-based strategies appear more effective than political alternatives, prior to 2002 in the Second Intifada and in the 1970s during the 'Troubles,' and retaliatory violence is most likely in these same periods. Military failures and political alternatives that weaken constituent support for violence encourage de-escalation. Effective counterterror policies are those that shift the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism, constraining violence by reducing demands for violence. There is a place for military-based counterterrorism, but the case studies underscore the benefits of strategies that encourage confidence in political alternatives. Law-enforcement counterterrorism and influence operations appear especially valuable because they erode support for violence and shape attitudes towards political compromise at the local level. Local political dynamics and constituent expectations must inform counterterror policy applied in regional protracted terror conflicts and used against transnational terrorist threats Details: Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2011. 430p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 11, 2015 at: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/84524 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/84524 Shelf Number: 138622 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Robinson, Linda Title: Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for Adaptation Summary: This report assesses the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIL), focusing on the military and political lines of effort. The capabilities and motivations of the various counter-ISIL forces on the battlefield are assessed, as well as the U.S.-led efforts to provide training, equipment, advice, and assistance, including air support. While the campaign has degraded ISIL by targeting leadership and retaking a portion of territory, achieving lasting defeat of ISIL will be elusive without local forces capable of holding territory. Successful conclusion of the campaign will require significantly increased effort on two fronts. First, more-comprehensive training, advising, and assisting will be required to create more-capable, coordinated indigenous forces of appropriate composition and enable them to regain and hold territory. Second, political agreements must be forged to resolve key drivers of conflict among Iraqis and Syrians. Without these elements, resurgent extremist violence is likely. Many factors complicate the prospects for success, including sectarian divisions in Iraq, Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, the Syrian civil war, and Russian intervention to support the besieged regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, the Syrian regime also lacks sufficient competent local forces and is heavily reliant on external militia support. The government in Iraq, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, has pledged decentralization efforts to address Sunni concerns, but lacks sufficient Shia support to enact them. This report offers recommendations for a more comprehensive advisory approach, emphasizing the political line of effort, and achieving synergy between the military and political efforts. Key Findings U.S. Efforts to Bolster Counter-ISIL Forces Have Achieved Limited Results - The advisory effort was circumscribed by location, unit, and function. Lack of advisers at the operational level in Iraq and lack of support to Syrian opposition fighters limited effectiveness of indigenous forces. - The training effort was also limited: Some 20,000 Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces were trained in 18 months, including 2,000 Iraqi special operations personnel. Efforts to arm and train Sunni tribes were halting. Anti-ISIL Forces Suffer from Capability Gaps and Lack of Coordination Among Disparate Forces - Iraqi's military crumbled after the 2014 ISIL offensive due to cumulative weaknesses. - Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service carried the brunt of the fighting, suffering extensive casualties and materiel losses. - Shia militias, some of them advised and supported by Iran, were not integrated with the overall military effort. Effective command and control of the overall effort was lacking. - In Syria, most territory was retaken by the Syrian Kurdish militia, and other efforts such as the New Syrian Forces were inadequate in numbers and capability. Coordination was also lacking among Syrian forces. Detailed Political Strategies to Resolve Underlying Conflicts Were Not Developed and Not Synchronized with the Military Effort for Maximum Effect - The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi articulated proposals to address Sunni concerns, but insufficient Shia support was provided to implement them. U.S. senior-level engagement with Abadi was also limited. - No overarching Syria strategy was developed. Relying on Syrian Kurds has escalated tensions with Turkey dramatically and created concern among Syrian Arabs. Recommendations - More comprehensive advisory support from senior echelons through the brigade level to increase coordination of forces, morale, and leadership. - A long-term training and equipping effort will be required to create capable indigenous security forces that incorporate sufficient Sunnis. - The successful support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service provides a replicable model. - An unconventional warfare approach may regain Mosul and Raqqa from ISIL with less material damage by leveraging internal discontent and underground forces. - Syria's counter-ISIL effort cannot succeed in seizing and holding key terrain without Syrian Arabs; their support may require unified effort with the counter-Assad campaign. - Increased materiel aid to anti-Assad forces including tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless guided weapon systems and surface-to-air missiles may preserve the moderate opposition and create leverage in negotiating a transition under the Geneva terms. - The Abadi government and Shia parties should craft proposals with international support to resolve the political drivers of conflict in Iraq. Visible, high-level U.S. support to such detailed political proposals may include linkage with military support. - The United States should elevate its focus on advisory support to indigenous forces, not just eliminating ISIL leadership and resources. It should, above all, prioritize the political line of effort, backed by military measures. Syrian opposition fighters may become increasingly radicalized in the absence of greater U.S. commitment and coordination. U.S. allies have backed disparate opposition groups, increasing the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the Syrian opposition. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Shelf Number: 138893 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorist |
Author: Carlisle, David Title: Targeting Security Threats Using Financial Intelligence: The US Experience in Public-Private Information Sharing since 9/11 Summary: Since the founding of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989, global efforts on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing have rested on the principle that co-operation between the public and private sectors is essential in generating financial intelligence. Recently, however, a consensus has emerged in both the public and private sectors that the frequency and quality of financial information sharing is inadequate. Observers argue that governments do not supply the private sector with sufficient detail about key threats, such as terrorism, for financial institutions to generate high-quality financial intelligence (FININT). On the other hand, private sector reporting of FININT through the traditional Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) process is often slow and inefficient, hindering the ability of governments to act against criminals or terrorists. Fortunately, one relatively longstanding model for public-private information sharing does exist. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001, President George W Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act. One aim of the Act was to elevate the role of FININT in identifying and disrupting security threats. Two sections of the Act have particular relevance for promoting public-private information sharing to this end: Sections 314 and 311. Set alongside the traditional SARs regime, Sections 314 and 311 help to sustain a robust, if still maturing, public-private partnership aimed at protecting the US financial system against a broad array of illicit finance threats. This paper offers an overview of the aims of US policy, an examination of the US experience in implementing Sections 314 and 311 of the PATRIOT Act, and a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the US approach. It also draws lessons from US experience and provides seven principles for policy-makers to consider when developing public-private information-sharing arrangements at the national or international level. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper, 2016: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_op_financing_patriot_act_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_op_financing_patriot_act_final.pdf Shelf Number: 138894 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingPatriot ActTerrorist Financing |
Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses Summary: This report is part of a program implemented by the Global Center, supported by the U.S. Department of State, and aimed at understanding and strengthening capacities to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa. It focuses on a subset of countries in the region - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. In short, this report aims to - provide an easily accessible overview of the Greater Horn's regional and national trends and drivers of violent extremism and related sources of insecurity - identify relevant actors and describe their responses aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, and - highlight entry points for developing holistic strategies on countering violent extremism (CVE) inclusive of governmental and civil society actors that promote good governance and community-based responses to violent extremism. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Shelf Number: 139346 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Khalil, James Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation Summary: Countering violent extremism (CVE) and risk reduction (RR) provide two increasingly prominent frameworks for countering the influence of individuals and entities involved in violent extremism (VE). Widely understood to describe a range of preventative and non-coercive measures, CVE may involve, for instance, community debates on sensitive topics, media messaging, interfaith dialogues, training of state governance and security actors, and a variety of initiatives with individuals deemed to be 'at risk' of being drawn to violence, such as vocational training and mentorship programmes. While there are substantial overlaps between CVE and RR in terms of activities, and many authorities group them under the same umbrella, RR can be considered distinct because its activities more narrowly target individuals who were previously directly or indirectly involved in the production of violence, such as defectors from VE entities, or those serving sentences for terrorism-related charges. This report aims to assist policy-makers and implementers by examining approaches through which to understand the drivers of VE and the wider context in which this violence occurs. It also looks at the design of CVE and RR programmes, and outlines key issues relating to programme monitoring and evaluation. The report recommends that those involved in designing and implementing CVE and RR programmes should adopt robust classification systems for VE drivers; apply the 'results frameworks' and 'theories of change' approaches; recognise that CVE is not rebranded development programming; target 'at risk' individuals; mitigate risk without being excessively risk-averse; and explore possibilities for experimental and quasi-experimental designs. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Whitehall Report 2-16: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf Shelf Number: 139370 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism |
Author: Williams, Michael J. Title: Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program Summary: This project represents the first ever evaluation of a CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program in the United States. The evaluation will be conducted in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The first phase of the project will use a multi-method evaluation design to a) understand recruitment and retention practices of participants in a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, b) identify the outcomes of participation in that program, c) assess and explore community knowledge of risk factors associated with radicalization, and individuals' natural inclinations in response to those factors, and d) identify barriers to individual help-seeking and community-law enforcement collaborations in a CVE context. What will emerge from this phase is a set of working theories that clarify the relationships among these four subcomponents and lead to enhanced CVE programming and implementation. The second phase will develop survey instruments designed to measure quantifiably each of the Phase I subcomponents. Additionally, formalized curricula (i.e., educational materials and a manual for law enforcement) will be developed regarding a) awareness of risk factors of radicalization and civic-minded responses to them, and b) training for law enforcement officers regarding ways to build effective collaborations with local Islamic communities. Additionally, the CVE program will adjust its recruitment practices, based on 'lessons learned' from Phase I. The final phase of the project will assess the effectiveness of the CVE programs' adjusted (i.e., Phase II) recruitment practices. Additionally, the CVE programs' outcomes will be tested by comparing participant involvement groups (i.e. those who have never participated vs. participated once vs. participated multiple times). Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Shelf Number: 139624 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsIslamic ExtremistsMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schuurman, Bart Title: Converts and Islamist Terrorism: An Introduction Summary: Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community in Western countries. Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism and terrorism, research has suggested that converts are considerably over-represented. This ICCT Policy Brief serves as an introduction to this topic by providing an overview of what is known about converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. Notwithstanding considerable reservations about the quantity and quality of the available data, this Policy Brief finds support for the notion of convert over-representation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of foreign fighters. What little data was found on converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism provided a more nuanced picture, emphasizing that over-representation may not be the norm in all Western countries and that it may be a relatively recent development. Numerous explanations for converts' involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism have been provided, running the gamut from structural-level explanations to distinctly personal motives. At present, however, a comprehensive, theoretically sound and empirically grounded understanding of how and why converts become involved in Islamist militancy is absent. The Policy Brief concludes by stressing the need to develop our understanding of this important yet under-researched topic. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 139817 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremistsJihadMuslimsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Jones, Seth G. Title: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab Summary: This report analyzes the U.S. and allied campaign against the al Qa'ida-linked terrorist group al Shabaab in Somalia, examines what steps have been most successful against the group, and identifies potential recommendations. It concludes that, while al Shabaab was weakened between 2011 and 2016, the group could resurge if urgent steps are not taken to address the political, economic, and governance challenges at the heart of the conflict. This study finds that a tailored engagement strategy - which involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, provide intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations - was key in degrading al Shabaab. Still, progress in Somalia is reversible in the absence of continued and consistent pressure and political, economic, and social reforms. Today's terrorism and insurgency landscape defies easy solutions, with challenges from the Islamic State, al Qa'ida, and other groups across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. While there has been a significant focus on how and why the U.S. and other Western governments have failed to degrade terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and other countries, there has been far less attention on successful efforts to degrade groups. In Somalia, there has been limited progress. The challenge will be preventing a reversal. Key Findings A Tailored Engagement Strategy Was Key to Degrading al Shabaab This involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, provide intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations. There were several other factors that weakened al Shabaab, such as internal friction among al Shabaab's senior cadre caused by poor leadership, battlefield losses, personality clashes, clan dynamics, and ideological disputes. Without Continued and Consistent Pressure and Reform, Progress in Somalia Can Slip Al Shabaab has not given up its ambition to control greater Somalia, and it retains the ability to retake territory, particularly if the United States and its allies fail to effectively deal with the challenges outlined in this report. Numerous challenges are posed in this region that can hinder progress, such as the weak Somali government, a poorly trained Somali National Army force, and the use of clan militias by the African Union Mission to Somali (AMISOM) following al Shabaab's withdrawal. The United States and other Western governments have not committed enough resources and attention to address Somalia's political, economic, and governance challenges that are at the heart of the conflict. Recommendations Reopen the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu. Increase economic assistance to Somalia. Augment U.S. military train, advise, assist, and accompany efforts. Aid Somalia's neighbors and support continuation of the African Union Mission to Somali (AMISOM). Continue limited U.S. direct action operations. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html Year: 2016 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html Shelf Number: 140507 Keywords: Al QaidaCounter-TerrorismTerrorism |
Author: Johnson, Kirk A. Title: The longue duree: Indonesia's response to the threat of jihadist terrorism 1998-2016 Summary: This thesis studies the evolution of the Indonesian government's response to the threat of transnational jihadism and addresses the debate over the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism policy. It poses the question: has Indonesian policy on transnational terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups? By examining the three periods since Indonesia's transition to democracy - 1998- 2001, 2002-2008, and 2009-present - the prominent political and social issues considered by politicians and counter-terrorist specialists can be seen through the lenses of the threats facing Indonesia and the state's response. Through these means, the evolution and effectiveness of Indonesian counter-terrorism may be further measured against the context and interplay of three factors: counter-terrorism policies chosen, changing nature and evolution of the jihadist groups, and public opinion. These factors enabled state capacity and the implementation of a criminal justice counter-terrorism approach effectively implementing "hard" and "soft" methods. With continued implementation of this approach, Indonesia may be positioned to combat the re-emergent transnationally influenced jihadist threats. The findings and lessons learned identified in this thesis may assist countries like Indonesia in their CT strategy development, capacity building, and application. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 8, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49499/16Jun_Johnson_Kirk.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49499/16Jun_Johnson_Kirk.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145370 Keywords: al-QaedaCounter-terrorismJihadistsTerrorism |
Author: Davis, Lois M. Title: Assessment of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program Summary: The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program in 1996 to provide counterterrorism training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel. The authors of this report assess the nature and value of the SLATT Program. The authors reviewed the current terrorism threat, both foreign and domestic, to gauge the need for the type of training that SLATT provides; examined how SLATT training is planned and operates; conducted a survey of participants of five SLATT investigative/intelligence workshops and train-the-trainer workshops; and conducted an analysis of the costs and benefits of SLATT to training participants based on results of a choice experiment that was part of the survey to identify what program features participants valued most. The authors conclude with suggestions for improving BJA's SLATT Program. Key Findings Terrorism Threat Assessment Analysis While the United States has not suffered an attack in the past 15 years as catastrophic as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there appears to be no significant abatement of attack attempts or attack planning since 2011. There is an ongoing need to ensure that state and local law enforcement receives training in this area. Assessment of SLATT Workshops A majority of trainees have counterterrorism as a major responsibility of their position. Overall, 6 out of 10 workshop participants indicated that the information provided during the SLATT workshops would change their approach to international terrorist or domestic terrorist threats and/or how they might investigate them. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they had participated in only one or two SLATT trainings in the past five years. Assessment of Costs of SLATT to Law Enforcement Participants SLATT workshops are offered at no cost to law enforcement, though law enforcement agencies incur some modest costs in terms of sending officers to a training and backfilling the positions of those sent, and the agencies that host the SLATT trainings incur some costs in terms of working to plan, market, and support the event. Assessing Features and the Value of SLATT to Participants Across the two types of workshop participants, participants most valued training that was three days in duration and that was less than 100 miles away. Although investigative/intelligence workshop participants preferred a program with both domestic and international terrorist topics, they valued having the training include local examples of the terrorist threat in their region or jurisdiction more than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Shelf Number: 145313 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Loada, Augustin Title: Preventing Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso: Toward National Resilience Amid Regional Insecurity Summary: Burkina Faso has a reputation for being relatively peaceful and stable in an insecure region. Violent extremism has significantly impacted other Sahelian and West African states, especially in light of the conflict in Mali and the increase in terrorist violence in northern Nigeria. Burkina Faso's relative stability has meant that it has attracted less attention than its neighbors in international and regional security debates. Nevertheless, maintaining relative peace and security in Burkina Faso should be a priority for all stakeholders; and stability there is relative, not absolute. A crisis in Burkina Faso would be costly for Burkinabes and the region. Understanding the sources of relative peace and security in Burkina Faso can yield insights for countering violent extremism in the region and beyond. This study asks, What is the extent of violent extremism in Burkina Faso today? What are the origins of violent extremism or its likely sources? What are the sources of resilience against violent extremism in Burkina Faso? To answer these questions, we undertook extensive desk research and placed a premium on field work, conducting in-depth interviews, convening focus groups with a wide range of stakeholders in five locations across Burkina Faso, and gathering a significant amount of original data. We find that Burkina Faso is vulnerable to the threat of violent extremism because structural conditions, or "push factors," that increase the risk of violent extremism are prevalent in the country. These include political drivers such as endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites; socioeconomic drivers such as frustrated expectations, relative deprivation, and unmet social and economic needs; and cultural drivers, including religious factors. Despite the prevalence of push factors, we found only modest evidence regarding extremism at the individual and group levels. We looked for "pull factors" resulting from spillovers from regional extremist violence, radicalization among individuals or groups domestically, and the presence of foreign extremists, i.e., from outside the region. We found a few cases of Burkinabe involvement in extremist activity but gained the impression that these incidents were isolated. Where we did find evidence of Burkinabe involvement in extremism, it was the result of organized recruitment efforts by well-resourced regional extremist groups, although we cannot claim that this reflects a trend. In sum, Burkina Faso is vulnerable to violent extremism, but the threat is not imminent. There is a prevalence of push factors but a near absence of pull factors. To some extent, this reflects the nascent counterterrorism measures being advanced by the Burkinabe government to manage this vulnerability, often with the support of regional and international partners. Many sources of resilience are present in Burkina Faso. These derive from the state and civil society and provide a basis for stakeholders to act to prevent violent extremism in Burkina Faso. We recommend that stakeholders—the government of Burkina Faso, donor governments, and civil society—take steps to nurture resilience through measures that promote development and social cohesion. These include initiatives to improve governance, address identity-based grievances, and build the capacity of the Burkinabe state to counter violent extremism, as well as measures to advance the work of civil society in such key sectors as education and with key actors, such as youth. In the short term, a successful political transition in 2015 and a more robust response to the grievances expressed by the population are the best chances to maintain peace and stability and to mitigate the effects of structural conditions that might otherwise lead to conflict and violent extremism. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BF-Assessment-Eng-with-logos-low-res.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BF-Assessment-Eng-with-logos-low-res.pdf Shelf Number: 141069 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Violent Extremism |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Grounds for Concern: Belgium's Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks Summary: In November 2015, coordinated attacks by armed extremists killed 130 people in Paris. Four months later, attackers struck in Brussels, killing 32. The attacks were the deadliest in France and Belgium in decades. In both cases, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed responsibility. Perpetrators in both strikes had connections to Belgium. The Belgian authorities responded by enacting a ra of counter-terrorism laws and deploying 1,800 soldiers in major cities. The police have carried out several hundred raids, detentions, and stops-and-searches. These actions have helped the authorities charge and convict dozens of terrorism suspects. But as Grounds for Concern reveals, these laws, particularly if enforced arbitrarily or in ways that could be perceived as discriminatory, threaten basic rights including those to movement, liberty, free expression and privacy. In addition, some police operations have involved alleged beatings or other use of excessive force. Human Rights Watch investigated 26 incidents of alleged police abuse. In all but one case those targeted were Muslim. The Belgian authorities should amend and monitor counter-terrorism laws and policies to ensure they do not erode fundamental rights and enforce zero tolerance for police abuse. Governments have a responsibility to protect people from attack and to hold those responsible to account. But disproportionate responses are not only unlawful, they also risk driving a wedge between the Belgian authorities and communities that feel targeted—the very outcome that ISIS seeks to provoke. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Shelf Number: 147308 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist ViolenceExtremistsHuman Rights AbusesISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Green, Shannon N. Title: Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: The United States lost nearly 3,000 lives in the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On that day, a problem that had been slowly festering and barely noticed in the West broke onto the world stage in a forceful and heart-wrenching way. Those events and many that would follow have prompted trillions of dollars to be poured into military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations. Yet the problem of violent extremism has grown more severe and urgent. Despite the many efforts to extinguish the flames of violence, new and powerful extremist movements have taken root. Terrorist groups around the world have used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and word of mouth to sell their twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convince too many recruits that glory can be found in the mass murder of innocent civilians. The spread of extremist ideologies and increasingly frequent terrorist attacks are stoking anxiety and fear across the globe. According to a survey conducted by the Commission, people are willing to try just about anything to stop the bloodshed: from military action to stronger border controls and mandatory identification cards to relinquishing privacy and accepting constraints on speech. The increasing potency and reach of terrorist groups—and a sense that governments’ response to the threat has been inadequate—is creating deep political divisions and fueling support for populist solutions. There are no easy solutions to this problem. Neither troops nor police nor economic sanctions alone can address this threat. We cannot close our borders and hope that the problem goes away. And we cannot abandon our commitment to human rights and freedom of expression in an attempt to quell violent extremism. Diminishing the appeal of extremist ideologies will require a long-term, generational struggle. The United States and its allies must combat extremists' hostile and apocalyptic world view with the same level of commitment that we apply to dealing with its violent manifestations. We urgently need a new comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism—one that is resolute, rests in soft and hard power, and galvanizes key allies and partners from government, civil society, and the private sector. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Shelf Number: 147863 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Ingram, Haroro J. Title: A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: A Two-Tiered Framework for Practitioners Summary: This Policy Brief outlines a "linkage-based" approach to combating militant Islamist propaganda tailored for practitioners. It argues for a two-tiered approach to counter-terrorism strategic communications that addresses a spectrum of target audience motivations: antis, curious, engaged, tacit supporters and active supporters. The first tier undermines the key arguments at the heart of militant Islamist narratives and offers alternative narratives. This approach is designed to dismantle the "systems of meaning" at the heart of militant Islamist propaganda via the deployment of pragmatic- and identity-choice messages tailored to dissolve the linkages violent extremists draw between themselves and solutions and their enemies and crisis. The second tier uses strategies of network disruption and disengagement strategies to catalyse behavioural changes in target audiences away from joining or acting on behalf of violent extremist groups like al Qaeda or so-called Islamic State (IS). These tiers are mutually reinforcing: the first degrades the appeal of violent extremist messaging in an effort to constrict those who may become engaged in or even supporters of violent extremists while the second disturbs the trajectory of individuals from tacit to active supporters. The framework is designed to not only assist practitioners with synchronising campaign planning and message design but provides a way to categorise messaging and facilitate metric collection for better informed decision-making. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed December 13, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 146040 Keywords: Counter-terrorismIslamic StateTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Whiteside, Craig Title: Lighting the Path: the Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-2016) Summary: The media products of the revolutionary movement known as the Islamic State (also IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) have received a significant amount of attention from analysts and journalists alike. While extremely helpful, most of this effort is focused at performing content analysis of fairly recent products. As part of the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication (CTSC) project's effort to better understand propaganda messaging in the 21st century, the author of this Research Paper examined primary documents and other media published by the Islamic State movement during its entire existence in order to develop a history of the media department since 2003. The framework for analysis focused on the interaction between key media leaders, the ever-expanding structure and institutions, and the process of innovation used to experiment with different media techniques in different phases of the group's evolution. Based on this history, the paper presents six observations about the media department and its role in the larger movement – in the hopes that this knowledge will be helpful in efforts to combat this particular group and its inevitable imitators in the future. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 144914 Keywords: Counter-terrorismISISIslamic StateMediaRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption Summary: One of the biggest barriers to designing a comprehensive Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme is defining its scope. This paper argues for a narrow approach, focusing on disengagement and the disruption of recruitment. The author develops a simplified model of radicalisation and the concurrent terrorist recruitment process, proposing concrete themes for disruptive intervention and messaging. After analysing case studies of disengagement, the author offers recommendations for specific action to accomplish CVE goals by disrupting recruitment processes and deploying targeted messaging within the framework of the correlated models. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Shelf Number: 146161 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Women and Violent Extremism: Colluding, Perpetrating, or Preventing? Summary: Summary • Women’s role in violent extremism has too often been simplified to a binary: either victim of the choices of men or deviant anomaly. • Women play a diverse range of roles in violent extremism in Afghanistan—as they do around the world—not only as peacebuilders but also as recruiters, sympathizers, perpetrators, and preventers. • Roles and motivations vary, but what is clear is that the construct of disempowered victims simply does not hold true for all women involved. • Women’s roles in violent extremism and the underlying reasons behind those roles need to be fully understood and appropriately reflected in policy and practice. • Women’s rights and place in society are central to the narratives of violent extremist groups, and these narratives are the terrain on which women in Afghanistan fight to establish their rights. • Women have the potential, whether through their own involvement or as family members of those who are involved, to counter radicalization dynamics. • Countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) programming needs to include women as specific target groups, be engendered more generally, and address the underlying issues of women’s status and agency. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 396: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 146123 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Owens, Kimberly B. Title: Beyond hate: countering violent extremism from the white power movement Summary: Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 146134 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Bhulai, Rafia Title: Strengthening Regional Cooperation to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South Asia. What Role for Civil Society? Summary: Since 2011, the Global Center has worked with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with generous support from the government of Norway, to implement a process that engages civil society actors and experts in efforts to enhance regional cooperation in South Asia. This process, undertaken in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, included regular dialogue and engagement with nongovernmental actors in South Asia to foster deeper understanding of local and regional drivers of terrorism and violent extremism and to identify critical gaps, opportunities, and priorities for capacity-building support to address the threat. This assessment presents key outcomes of the multiyear civil society and experts process. It provides an overview of regional challenges and the efforts by the Global Center and CTED to identify key needs and priorities to inform responsive policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in South Asia. A set of recommendations highlight practical ways that multilateral and regional organizations and national governments can work with civil society, experts, and practitioners to address this threat in the region. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Shelf Number: 146118 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Sullivan, Mark P. Title: Latin America: Terrorism Issues Summary: Compared to other parts of the world, the potential threat emanating from terrorism is low in most countries in Latin America. Most terrorist acts occur in the Andean region of South America, committed by two Colombian guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and one Peruvian guerrilla group, the Shining Path (SL). All three of these groups have been designated by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The FARC, however, has been engaged in peace negotiations with the Colombian government since 2012, culminating in a peace accord signed in September 2016. Although the accord was narrowly rejected by a national plebiscite in early October, both sides hammered out a new peace accord in November 2016, which was ratified by Colombia’s Congress at the end of that month. Negotiations between the Colombian government and the smaller ELN had several false starts in 2016, although to date formal talks with the government have not started. The Shining Path has been significantly diminished because of Peruvian military operations. For a number of years, there has also been U.S. concern about Iran's increasing activities in the region as well as those of Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group with close ties to Iran. Both are reported to be linked to the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people in Buenos Aires. More recently, U.S. concerns have included financial and ideological support in South America and the Caribbean for the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS), including the issue of individuals from the region leaving to fight with the Islamic State. The United States employs various policy tools to counter terrorism in the region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to sanctions against U.S.-designated FTOs in the region, the United States has imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela since 2006 because the Department of State has determined that Venezuela is not fully cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The United States has also imposed sanctions on several current and former Venezuelan officials for assisting the FARC and on numerous individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. Cuba had been on the State Department's so-called list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, but in May 2015, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba’s designation as part of its overall policy shift on Cuba. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: RS21049: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Shelf Number: 147300 Keywords: Counter-terrorismTerrorism |
Author: Mehra, Tanya Title: Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Trends, Dynamics and Policy Responses Summary: This paper, which was developed for the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group, takes stock of the current trends and dynamics related to the FTF phenomenon and identifies some of the gaps that still need to be addressed. The distinction between home-grown terrorists and (returning) FTFs is fading, the difference between ISIL/Da’esh inspired or directed terrorist attacks is becoming more fluid and the nexus between terrorism and crime is more prominent, which clearly indicates that terrorism can manifest itself in many different ways. The involvement of returning FTFs in some terrorist attacks is a stark reminder of the potential threat returning FTFs pose. The data also indicate a demographic change with a more prominent role of female FTFs and children being recruited and used in hostilities or involved in terrorist attacks. The current trends underline the need for a comprehensive, tailored and multidisciplinary approach including the involvement of stakeholders at the local level to adequately address the evolving aspects of the FTF phenomenon. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, (ICCT), 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed January 26, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ICCT-Mehra-FTF-Dec2016-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ICCT-Mehra-FTF-Dec2016-1.pdf Shelf Number: 145432 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Keatinge, Tom Title: Lone-Actor and Small Cell Terrorist Attacks: A New Front in Counter-Terrorist Finance? Summary: As the threat from lone-actor and small cell terrorism evolves, this paper examines the financing of both disrupted and successful plots since 2000 in Great Britain, France and Australia. These plots often require minimal amounts of funding, making proactive identification through financial means challenging. Nonetheless, this paper highlights a number of key themes that warrant further investigation, showing the potentially disruptive role that financial intelligence can play. Efforts to disrupt the funding of Daesh have taken up a significant amount of the time and resources of policymakers, law enforcement and the military. These efforts have also involved mobilising the private sector, particularly banks, oil companies and antiquities dealers. However, little attention has been paid to understanding and addressing the financing associated with the plots (whether successful, failed or disrupted) of lone actors and small cells that have acted beyond Daesh-controlled territory. This paper seeks to provide insight into the financing connected with a sample of 63 lone-actor and small cell terrorist plots in Great Britain and France since 2000, including those that are religiously inspired, right wing, nationalist, and single issue. The aim is to inform thinking and raise awareness among those charged with tackling this threat. The report also draws on a similar study by Australia's financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC, thereby providing an overview of lone-actor and small cell terrorist finance from the perspective of three countries, each with individual and distinct experiences. What is clear from both studies is that the simplicity and spontaneity of these attacks, particularly those attempted by a lone assailant as opposed to a dyad or triad, means that assailants are often able to make use of their own funding resources, offering limited opportunities for traditional counter-terrorist financing (CTF) approaches to reveal financial indications of plans prior to their execution. Despite this challenge, the research conducted for this paper has highlighted a number of key themes that it is hoped can contribute to the approaches taken by law enforcement and security authorities as they adapt their CTF response to the evolving threat posed by such terrorists: While there has been an undoubted need to focus on disrupting the significant financing accrued by Daesh over the past two years, a comprehensive CTF strategy should not lose sight of the fact that lone actors and small cells operating at home present a considerably more immediate threat to citizens than Daesh, given that the latter mainly operates in Iraq and Syria. Although it has traditionally been the case in many countries that terrorist financing has been addressed separately from broader financial crime, the increasing intersection of lone actors and small cells with low-level criminality suggests that this separation needs to be reconsidered. Investigations need to at least acknowledge this emerging connection and create dedicated inter-agency links to combat it. Attacks undertaken with knives have certainly resulted in casualties; however, the use of firearms (particularly automatic weapons) has resulted in casualties on a far greater scale. As such, increased focus should be placed on identifying and disrupting financial flows related to the trade in illicit firearms. Information about the financial tools employed by lone actors and small cells must be more widely disseminated to raise awareness among those agencies and actors = in both the public and private sectors - who are less familiar with terrorist financing techniques. These might include certain types of retailer, payday lenders and student loan companies, as well as online payment systems that may increasingly be the target of terrorist-related fraud. Closer monitoring of the welfare system is also advised, in light of cases identified where benefits were used to fund terrorist plots. The financial patterns of lone actors and small cell operators are often indistinguishable from legitimate financial behaviour, and proactive identification of these individuals through financial reporting remains challenging. National financial intelligence units must therefore act as a critical bridge between national security and law enforcement agencies (that identify subjects of interest via non-financial means) and the private sector, to allow financial institutions to conduct more targeted monitoring. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Shelf Number: 145541 Keywords: Counter-terrorismLone Wolf TerrorismTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Lamb, Robert Dale Title: Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens Summary: Individuals and groups who use violence in ways that threaten the United States, its allies, or its partners habitually find or create ways to operate with impunity or without detection. Whether for private financial gain (e.g., by narcotics and arms traffickers) or for harmful political aims (e.g., by insurgents, terrorists, and other violent extremists), these illicit operations are most successful "and most dangerous" when their perpetrators have a place or situation that can provide refuge from efforts to combat or counter them. Such places and situations are often called safe havens, and potential safe havens are sometimes called ungoverned areas. A key component of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stabilization, peacekeeping, and other such efforts is to reduce the size and effectiveness of the safe havens that protect illicit actors. Agencies in defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and other areas all have capabilities that can be applied to countering such threats and building the capacity and legitimacy of U.S. partners to prevent ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas from becoming safe havens. To do this effectively requires careful consideration of all the geographical, political, civil, and resource factors that make safe havens possible; a sober appreciation of the complex ways those factors interact; and deeper collaboration among U.S. government offices and units that address such problems - whether operating openly, discreetly, or covertly - to ensure unity of effort. This report offers a framework that can be used to systematically account for these considerations in relevant strategies, capabilities, and doctrines/best practices. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2008. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Shelf Number: 146248 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingPublic SafetySafe HavensViolenceViolent Extremists |
Author: Norton, Simon Title: Detect, Disrupt and Deny: Optimising Australia's Counterterrorism Financing System Summary: Detecting, disrupting and denying terrorist financing is vital to efforts to degrade terrorist organisations. Reducing or cutting their cash flow makes it harder for them to attract and train new members, equip themselves and conduct their operations. Understanding their financing methods provides intelligence to support disruption efforts of police and military forces. Terrorist organisations are adaptive. They take advantage of opportunities created by technology, poor governance and changes to the financial system. They exploit consequent weaknesses in countering terrorism financing (CTF) systems. Because the terrorism and the terrorism financing environment is constantly evolving, CTF arrangements must be continually reviewed, refined and innovated, and they are only as strong as their weakest link. This paper examines the nature of terrorist financing and the system used to counter this activity in three sections. Using both contemporary and historical examples, Section 2 analyses how terrorist organisations raise, move and use funds. While the focus is currently on Islamist terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), historical examples demonstrate how terrorism and terrorism financing are neither new phenomena nor dominated only by groups in the Middle East. ISIL is simply terrorism’s latest and most high profile iteration. Some of the groups mentioned in this report have been defeated—and countering their financing played an important role in their downfall. Section 3 examines the international and Australian systems for targeting terrorism financing before turning to analyse the key CTF measures and actors. After an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each CTF element, we find that Australia’s overall system is robust but could be enhanced and strengthened. The Australian Government's recent Review of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 and Associated Rules and Regulations (AML/CTF Review) is a good start to improving the CTF system but doesn't go far enough in some cases. However, because of controversy surrounding some of the review's 84 recommendations, the implementation of its recommendations isn't guaranteed. This misalignment could create weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Australia’s CTF system, providing exploitable opportunities for terrorist organisations and their financiers. Drawing from our findings in sections 2 and 3, Section 4 sets out our recommendations on how the Australian Government could enhance Australia's CTF system. Some of the recommendations require legislative amendments, while others are aimed at transforming CTF culture and information sharing within the private and public sectors. Specifically, we recommend that Australia address three lines of effort through a number of initiatives. Details: Barton ACT Australia: Australian Strategic policy Institute, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/detect,-disrupt-and-deny-optimising-australias-counterterrorism-financing-system/SR98_countering_terrorism_funding.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/detect,-disrupt-and-deny-optimising-australias-counterterrorism-financing-system/SR98_countering_terrorism_funding.pdf Shelf Number: 140803 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism Terrorist Financing |
Author: Helmus, Todd C. Title: Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: Key Findings - American Muslims are increasingly using the Web and social media to help counter violent extremism. Discussions with a number of Muslim leaders active in social media suggest that it is possible to expand such efforts even further, and doing so is a major objective of the August 2011 White House strategy to counter violent extremism. - While Muslim Americans play an active role in countering extremism, several factors may work to undermine higher-level engagement, including: low radicalization rates among American Muslims, negative perceptions of U.S. counterterrorism policies, a limited reservoir of leadership capacity and CVE funding (which prevents effective outreach), and being viewed as sell-outs to those most sympathetic to jihadi causes. - In some cases, the First Amendment may limit U.S. government attempts to fund CVE programs of an ideological bent, but this restriction could ultimately benefit CVE discourse as it frees Muslim groups of the taint of government funding and prevents the government from having to "choose sides" in intra-Muslim discourse and debate. - Both the U.S. State Department and the "think-do tank" Google Ideas have initiated insightful programs that seek to build capacity and otherwise promote credible Muslim voices. - Recommendations include desecuritizing efforts to counter violent extremism, addressing sources of mistrust within the Muslim community, focusing engagements and CVE education on social media influencers, building leadership and social media capacity in the Muslim community, enhancing private sector funding and engagement, and finding avenues to enhance government funding. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Shelf Number: 144830 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsMuslimsRadicalizationSocial MediaViolent Extremism |
Author: Davis, Lynn E. Title: A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat Summary: The debate in the past over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the focus to policies beyond the military dimension. Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on removing the underlying conditions sustaining ISIL and other violent jihadist groups, i.e., the lack of security, justice, and political representation. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with future territorial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria. In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspective: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Shelf Number: 145032 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland SecurityISIS Islamic StateRadical Groups Terrorist |
Author: Fajmonova, Veronika Title: Origin-group differences in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims: Reactions to the War on Terrorism Summary: This study compared opinions relating to the war on terrorism for six origin-groups in the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S Muslims (each poll ~1000 participants). Origin-groups included Muslims born in Iran, Pakistan, other South Asian countries, Arab countries, and sub-Saharan African countries, as well as African-American Muslims. Opinions changed little from 2007 to 2011 except for a massive increase in presidential approval (Obama vs. Bush). In each origin-group, nearly half of respondents continued to believe the U.S. war on terrorism is not a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism, but approval of al-Qaida and suicide bombing in defense of Islam was less than ten percent. Within these general similarities two groups stood out. Iran-born were older and less religious than other groups but had opinions similar to other U.S. Muslims. African-American Muslims reported lower education and income than other groups and were generally most negative about living as Muslims in the United States. Experience of discrimination did not predict opinion of al-Qaida or suicide bombing, nor were converts more extreme. Discussion emphasizes the need to understand why many U.S. Muslims are negative toward the war on terrorism and why a very few persist in radical opinions approving al-Qaida and suicide bombing. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144825 Keywords: Al-QaidaCounter-TerrorismMuslimsRadical GroupsSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Patel, Sophia Title: The Sultanate of Women: Exploring female roles in perpetrating and preventing violent extremism Summary: This paper examines the appeal of Islamic State (IS) to Western women and explores how women can be employed in countering violent extremism (CVE) structures to prevent further involvement. It aims to deliver a comprehensive analysis for academics, policymakers and practitioners working in CVE program and policy design and implementation in order to bridge the gap between community development work and security and intelligence. Two case studies of Australian women - Zehra Duman (a.k.a. Umm Abdullatif al-Australi) and Zaynab Sharrouf (a.k.a. Umm Hafs) - illustrate the appeal as well as the contradictions. A series of recommendations suggests changes to existing CVE structures and their approaches to integrating, women. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 145767 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateViolent Extremism |
Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks Summary: In July 2011, President Barack Obama promulgated the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In the letter presenting the strategy, the president stated that the expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century. Through an analysis of transnational criminal networks originating in South America, this report develops a more refined understanding of the operational characteristics of these networks; the strategic alliances that they have established with state and other nonstate actors; and the multiple threats that they pose to U.S. interests and to the stability of the countries where they operate. It identifies U.S. government policies and programs to counter these networks; the roles of the Department of Defense, the geographic combatant commands, component commands, and task forces; and examines how U.S. Army assets and capabilities can contribute to U.S. government efforts to counter these networks. The report also recommends reconsidering the way in which nontraditional national security threats are classified; updating statutory authorities; providing adequate budgets for the counternetwork mission; and improving interagency coordination. Key Findings Countering Transnational Organized Crime Is a New Mission for the Department of Defense Success in counternarcotics has been traditionally measured by the amount of illicit drugs interdicted. However, even if drug flow reduction goals are met, the drug trafficking infrastructure would still be in place. Countering transnational criminal networks requires identifying the critical nodes in the criminal organizations and determining where operations can achieve the greatest effect. Gaps in authorities may create difficulties in military abilities to participate in this effort. Destabilizing Effects of Transnational Criminal Networks These criminal organizations take root in supply areas and transportation nodes while usurping the host nations' basic functioning capacity. Over time, the illicit economy grows and nonstate actors provide an increasing range of social goods and fill the security and political vacuum that emerges from the gradual erosion of state power, legitimacy, and capacity. The U.S. Army Could Play a Role in Combating Transnational Criminal Networks Combating transnational criminal organizations is an endeavor in which the Army could help develop interagency and multinational strategies to more effectively counter these organizations and then assist with planning to implement those strategies. Such initiatives would constitute a valuable expansion from the Army's current efforts to build partner capacity, perform network analysis, and support detection and monitoring. Recommendations The U.S. government could bring authorities and policy guidance in line with the strategy to combat transnational organized crime. Interagency efforts to combat these networks could be improved, roles could be better defined, and joint doctrine could be developed. The Army could take several steps to clarify its role in countering criminal networks, including participating in strategy development, increasing support to network analysis efforts, and working with partner nations and militaries to help them strengthen border control. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND< 2017. 215p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1481.html Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1481.html Shelf Number: 145102 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-TerrorismCriminal NetworksIllegal Drug TradeOrganized CrimeTransnational Crime |
Author: Assanvo, William Title: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Summary: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, still struggles to demonstrate its effectiveness. Observers also continue to question to what extent it is operational. Yet despite the numerous political, logistical, technical and financial challenges it has been facing, the MNJTF is gradually gaining ground. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue 10: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Shelf Number: 146970 Keywords: Boko HaramCounter-TerrorismRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Parker, Tony C. Title: Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America's Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization Summary: Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America's homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison deradicalization program. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 144858 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDeradicalizationExtremismHomeland SecurityPrisonersPrisonsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Department Title: Counter-terrorism cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood Summary: Since the EU adopted its Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005, it has focused on forging closer ties with third countries in the fight against terrorism. Cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood in this field is particularly important. Every single country within this region is affected by terrorism to different degrees and terrorist attacks on European soil are increasingly linked with the Middle East and North Africa. The EU adopted a wide-ranging counter-terrorism approach in the South including actions that go beyond the strictly military and security interpretations of counter-terrorism. In line with the UN's 4-pillar approach, the EU’s counter-terrorism measures can be broadly subdivided into four fields: (i) building state capacity (particularly in the areas of border control, criminal investigation and prosecution, and countering the financing of terrorism); (ii) strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; (iii) fostering regional cooperation; and (iv) preventing and combating terrorism. This study outlines and contextualises current counter-terrorism activities in the region. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2017. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578013/EXPO_IDA(2017)578013_EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578013/EXPO_IDA(2017)578013_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 141255 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamist Terrorism: A Look at Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS Summary: This Research Paper seeks to explore what 'sympathy' and 'support' actually mean when it comes to terrorism. The text addresses some of the problems of public opinion surveys, includes a conceptual discussion and then continues with the presentation of data from public opinion surveys. It notes that opinion polls can be helpful in gauging (verbal) support for terrorism but also finds that the questions asked in opinion polls are generally lacking precision while the answers are often influenced by political pressures. When translating (generally low) percentages of sympathy and support for al Qaeda and so-called Islamic State in various countries into actual population figures, it emerges that there is a sizeable radical milieu in both Muslim-majority countries and in Western Muslim diasporas, held together by the world wide web of the internet. While large majorities of Muslims in most countries have no love for jihadist extremists, there are more than enough breeding grounds for terrorism. The Research Paper concludes that better instruments for measuring sympathy and support for jihadist terrorism are needed to inform counter-terrorist strategies Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Shelf Number: 141336 Keywords: al QaedaCounter-TerrorismExtremists GroupsIslamic StateJihadistsPublic OpinionTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Rueppel, Patrick Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe Summary: Countering violent extremism and terrorism has been a top priority of governments in Asia and Europe for many years. Terrorist cells posed a severe threat to home security, even before the emergence of Daesh. However, as a consequence of Asian and European citizens joining Daesh, terrorists have been able to establish networks among fighters from both regions. It has thus become imperative that governments from Asia and Europe enhance their collaboration and coordination in all dimensions of counter-terrorism efforts. Details: Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper, no. 4: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Shelf Number: 145585 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Title: Counterterrorism Yearbook 2017 Summary: his yearbook looks at those areas around the world where terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) are in greatest focus. Each chapter examines CT developments in 2016, including the terrorist threat being faced and how governments and others have approached CT through both policy and operations. Countries and regions covered include Australia, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Turkey, UK, USA, Canada, Africa, Russia and China. Through this first Counterterrorism Yearbook, in what will be an annual publication, we aim to promote understanding and contribute to shared knowledge of CT. The authors of individual pieces are Anthony Bergin, Jacinta Carroll, Colin Clarke, Michael Clarke, Virginia Comolli, Greg Fealy, Fadi Hakura, Peter Jennings, Shashank Joshi, Lydia Khalil, Joseph Chinyong Liow, Olga Oliker, Raffaello Pantucci, Thomas Renard, Vern White, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institiute: ASPI, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/counterterrorism-yearbook-2017/ASPI-Counterterrorism-YB2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/counterterrorism-yearbook-2017/ASPI-Counterterrorism-YB2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144681 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Swedberg, Jeffrey Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa Summary: Based on a review of quantitative and qualitative information and data from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), it can be concluded that USAID-s Niger, Chad and Mali programs have had some positive impact - most strikingly on lower-level programmatic goals such as civic engagement and listenership for USAID-sponsored radio. Results on higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism, were also positive in the aggregate but less dramatic. Despite this empirical evidence of program impact, implementation of the TSTCP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel, indicating a continued need for counter-extremism programming. Background - In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's counterextremism-programming in Africa, focusing on the TSCTP. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant). The Sahel has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State on the TSCTP. The USG's interagency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. USAID implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense. USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad (and in Mauritania until activities were suspended), implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED); and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance. Methodology - The evaluators developed qualitative information (focus groups and key informant interviews) and quantitative data (surveys), and conducted an in-depth review of literature and past reports. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this impact evaluation analyzed survey data to determine if treatment populations in Niger, Chad and Mali, where TSCTP programming was present, had more favorable responses to the survey questionnaire than comparison populations in areas where less TSCTP programming had been present. In all, the evaluators analyzed the results of 1,064 surveys administered in five treatment and four comparison clusters across three countries. The evaluators used the same survey mechanism in both Niger and Chad, and a slightly different version in Mali. The questions for the surveys were chosen from previous questionnaires that had been administered in these countries before, allowing for comparison with baseline data. These - source surveys included the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for Niger and Chad; the Afrobarometer for Mali; and the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey commissioned by AFRICOM for all three countries. The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a -- with the least favorable answer coded as a .... This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale . In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as ―treatment‖ clusters, and -comparison clusters.‖ The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community. Survey Results - While results from this quasi-experimental survey design cannot be considered definitive proof of impact, the findings are consistent with existing literature on the TSTCP. According to the surveys, the program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries. The graphic on the following page (Figure 1) highlights the differences on the survey questions shared in all three countries covered by this evaluation - The differences between treatment and comparison areas, when shown on a one to five scale, are modest - an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters. However, the impact appears mostly consistent across countries. The biggest impact for all three countries came on the survey question regarding whether respondents listen to TSCTP-sponsored peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, data indicates that complementary TSCTP programming, such as governance, youth, micro-enterprise, religious outreach and education, significantly boosts listener-ship. Scores on whether respondents -participate in decision-making - , a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and its predecessor program. The level of - satisfaction with services, -- a key socio-economic indicator, shows marginal but positive results across the countries. The aggregated AFRICOM cultural questions - measuring respondents' views on the degree to which they were against Al Qaeda; against violence in the name of Islam; their opinion of the United States; whether they approved of working with West to combat terrorism; and felt that the U.S. was fighting terrorism not Islam - measure progress on the hardest goals to achieve, and are arguably the most important indicators for demonstrating TSCTP's long-term impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest on the cultural/attitudinal questions. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic TSTCP program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated but less integrated with other USAID programming. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2011. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Shelf Number: 145465 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al QaedaCounter-TerrorismCountering-ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Boyd, Katharine A. Title: Ecology of Terrorism: Cross-National Comparison of Terrorist Attacks Summary: The term terrorism is used to describe a large range of behaviors conducted by a wide variety of groups. Terrorist groups differ in ideology, size, financial support, group longevity, and the number of alliances with other terrorist groups. Relatedly, terrorist groups conduct different number of attacks with varying intents to cause fatalities using diverse forms of violence. This study uses ecological theory to contextualize terrorist violence as a product of terrorist group traits in relation to the environmental context. It is hypothesized that terrorist violence is associated with group traits in relation to the varying political, social, and religious contexts of the countries in which groups operate. Using longitudinal multilevel modeling this study analyzes how terrorist group traits, country characteristics, and exposure to counterterrorism tactics, influence terrorist violence (e.g. number of attacks, fatalities, targets, mode of attack, location of attack) over time. This study uses counterterrorism and group-level data from the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD1, 2) datasets, attack data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), country data from multiple public datasets, and counterterrorism and terrorist group data originally collected from open-sources. The results show that each form of violence has a unique set of predictor variables and the results of moderation hypotheses show that group ideologies are associated with different trajectories over time, that group traits condition the effect of counterterrorism, and country characteristics moderation how different terrorist groups conduct violence. This work is among the first to evaluate moderation hypotheses and is one of few studies on terrorism to use advanced statistical methods to evaluate these relationship over time and cross-nationally. The study contributes to the literature on terrorism with relevant policy implications, and contributing to the development of ecological theory and its application to political and religiously motivated violence. Details: New York: City University of New York, 2014. 266p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 20, 2017 at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1174&context=gc_etds Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1174&context=gc_etds Shelf Number: 145660 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorism |
Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Summary: In this ICCT Research Paper Dr. Bibi van Ginkel takes an in depth look at how multi‐lateral institutions, engage with civil society to counter violent extremism. Dr.van Ginkel argues that civil society can play a crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism in numerous ways - by working on development programs, through their work in conflict transformation, in providing a platform to raise political grievances and to facilitate dialogue, or through their work in empowering victims and survivors of terrorism. The paper finds that over the last decade there has been a more intensive coordination of activities between the UN and other multi‐lateral organisations and civil society but the question remains whether the implementation as well as the drafting of these policies will live up to their potential effectiveness. This paper gauges how effective these measures have been and what more there is to do. The final section concludes with a series of policy recommendations Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 145749 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Idris, Iffat Title: Women and countering violent extremism Summary: There is no consensus on the definition of countering violent extremism (CVE), in part because there is no consensus on the definition of violent extremism (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2016; Striegher, 2015). The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (UN, 2015) does not provide one because consensus could not be reached due to the political sensitivities involved. A working definition cited in Foreign Affairs that encompasses the key concepts is: 'the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives'. The idea underpinning CVE is that violent extremists should not be fought exclusively with intelligence, police, and military means, but the structural causes of violent extremism must also be tackled (Frazer & Nunlist, 2015). Prevention is a major aspect of CVE, aiming to get at the root causes and factors that contribute to extremism and terrorism, by engaging with individuals, communities and others. 'It is not enough to counter violent extremism - we need to prevent it' (UNESCO2). This review looks at the role that women can play in CVE, lessons from programmes on women and CVE, donor policy guidance and programming approaches, and networks supporting women and CVE. Note that 'women' refers to women and girls: this is consistent with concepts of gender equality, gender violence, and so on, which all encompass both women and girls. (Moreover perceptions of when womanhood starts vary across cultures, with some considering puberty as the point at which a girl becomes a woman.) The available literature largely comprised of government and donor agency reports, think-tank papers and grey literature. Note that some literature refers to just women and CVE, and some to women and preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). For each source, the review uses the term (CVE or P/CVE) used in that source. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Helpdesk Research Report: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Shelf Number: 145907 Keywords: Counter-terrorismCountering Violent ExtremismExtremist GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Jones, Seth G. Title: Rolling Back the Islamic State Summary: In 2014, the Islamic State conducted a blitzkrieg into Iraqi cities, such as Mosul, and seized significant chunks of territory in Syria and Iraq. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared a pan-Islamic caliphate and eventually expanded the group to include eight formal provinces; more than a dozen informal provinces; and tens of thousands of inspired individuals across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America. This report examines the Islamic State and offers a global strategy to roll the group and its movement back. It assesses key countries where the Islamic State has controlled territory: Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, and Afghanistan. It also analyzes the group's global efforts to spread its ideology; move money, material, and people; secure resources; and conduct attacks. The report should be of interest to policymakers, academics, and general audiences that want to learn more about the Islamic State and strategies to counter the group. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 297p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1912/RAND_RR1912.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1912/RAND_RR1912.pdf Shelf Number: 145989 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismISIS Islamic State Terrorism |
Author: Robinson, Eric Title: What Factors Cause Individuals to Reject Violent Extremism in Yemen? Summary: Why do some individuals become terrorists? Why do some choose to travel overseas to become foreign fighters and others remain home to engage in political violence? More than academic, the answers to these questions inform a central component of U.S. national security strategy: countering violent extremism. This report addresses the topic of radicalization - or individual motivations to engage in political violence-in Yemen. This report uses data from focus groups and a national survey conducted during the spring of 2016. Yemen is in the midst of a civil war. In the wake of the collapse of the government of Tunisia in 2011, Yemeni protesters took to the streets in major cities to protest the reelection of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. After protracted negotiations by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was Saleh's vice president, took over the presidency in February 2012. By then, the internal strife had gained momentum. The Houthis, who had fought several wars against Saleh's forces, had used the unrest to expand from their stronghold in the Sa'ada governorate. They eventually seized the capital of Sana'a in September 2014. President Hadi and his forces retreated to Aden and southern Yemen, but the Houthis pushed south and assaulted Aden's international airport in March 2015. The civil war had begun. More than 10,000 people have died in Yemen's civil war. Nearly 2.2 million-out of a total population of 27 million-are internally displaced and an additional 200,000 are refugees overseas. Various nonstate armed groups exist. Some fight with the aforementioned Houthi movement. Others have joined the local al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Still, others are associated with the Islamic State. These armed groups fight against one another as well as the Yemeni military forces and those of the Arab coalition. With such a widespread conflict, it would be easy to understand the motivations of those who are sympathetic to, or become involved in, political violence. But rather than focus on support for political violence per se, the report looks at the other side of the coin - why individuals reject violent extremism in Yemen. It argues that the more effective approach to countering violent extremism is to reinforce a propensity toward nonviolence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed June 17, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Yemen URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Shelf Number: 146245 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West Summary: "What is coming is tougher and worse for the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers", the so-called Islamic State declared in its statement taking credit for the May 22, 2017 bombing of a crowded Manchester, England arena. Among the victims were scores of children and their parents - callously derided in the IS claim as "polytheists" and "Crusaders" attending "a profligate concert". Seven children perished, including an eight-year-old girl. It is worthwhile to recall that only a few years ago the end of terrorism was being heralded with the killing of bin Laden and advent of the Arab Spring. As one pundit then reassuringly pleaded, "So, can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of an impending caliphate, and put [the] problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective?". Today, there is indeed a very different perspective on this ongoing and, as some analysts believe, worsening threat: shaped not only by this most recent tragedy but by the events of the past two years that have seen a succession of attacks linked to IS convulse the West. Within the span of four weeks last summer, for instance, persons pledging or professing some allegiance to the IS were responsible for four terrorist incidents in three European countries that claimed the lives of more than 120 persons. It is too soon to tell whether the Manchester attack will prove to be a harbinger of another summer of tragedy and terrorism. But we now fortunately have a better understanding of this campaign along with an ability to anticipate the future evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat to the West as a result of the publication of Fear Thy Neighbor. Written by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, this report sheds important light on the historical record and characteristics of jihadist attacks against the West between 2014 and 2017. Among the study's most revealing findings is the United States' own prominence in this pantheon of Islamist terrorist attacks in the West as the country targeted most frequently after France - and with the second highest number of casualties. The report also incisively assesses the role of women and persons with criminal backgrounds in this campaign; the involvement of converts; and, most importantly the exact nature and dimensions of the ties between the attackers and the IS. The emergence of "radicalization hubs" in abetting or facilitating these heinous acts of violence is perhaps this work's single most important conclusion. Fear Thy Neighbor is an invaluable resource that will be of great use to scholars, students, governmental agencies, non-governmental and community organizations, and the media. It presents a sober and compelling depiction of this threat and the measures needed to counter it. Details: Milano, IT, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Shelf Number: 146333 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Hayes, Ben Title: The impact of international counter-terrorism on civil society organisations: Understanding the role of the Financial Action Task Force Summary: This report examines the impact of international counterterrorism frameworks on the work of civil society organisations. In particular, it explains the role of the Financial Action Task Force in setting international standards that affect the way in which civil society organisations are regulated by nation-states, their access to financial services, and their obligations to avoid proscribed organisations and other entities deemed to pose a 'terrorism' risk. The introduction to the report frames these developments in the context of the 'shrinking space' of civil society organisations. This narrative describes a new generation of restrictions and attacks on the legitimacy and actions of non-profits and social justice organisations. Chapter two introduces the counterterrorism frameworks that have most affected civil society. This includes UN Security Council measures on combating terrorism, the new international CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) agenda, the FATF's counterterrorist financing requirements, and the EU's development and implementation of these measures. Chapter three examines the worldwide proliferation of restrictive civil society laws and their relationship to the FATF's recommendations on the regulation of the non-profit sector. It draws on existing research showing how these have been used as a vehicle for the imposition of restrictive legislation across the globe, and augments this discourse with new evidence, examples and case studies. It also considers the prospects for reform, and the potential for the FATF to engage proactively in preventing further restrictions. Chapter four addresses a relatively newer phenomenon: the financial exclusion of civil society organisations and resulting from the 'due diligence' obligations mandated by the FATF. Driven by ever-tighter demands on financial institutions to scrutinise their customers for links to terrorism, crime and corruption - and underscored by substantial fines for failures due diligence - banks and intermediaries are cutting ties with non-profits and refusing to process "suspicious" cross-border transactions. This is a process that economists have termed 'de-risking'. While more research is needed, examples show how financial exclusion can fundamentally compromise the ability of affected non-profits to implement their programmes and fulfil their mandates. Chapter five examines the impact of terrorist 'blacklisting' and sanctions regimes more widely on activities such as peacebuilding and the provision of humanitarian assistance. It shows how the rigid interpretation of states' obligations by the FATF is exacerbating what have become often intractable problems for conflict resolutions organisations and NGOs working at close proximity to conflict zones or 'suspect communities'. The report draws three main conclusions. First, without fundamental reform to the FATF's non-profit sector recommendations, the proliferation and legitimisation of restrictive counterterrorism laws is likely to continue unabated. Second, the FATF is undermining international law by directly promoting laws that contravene states' human rights obligations, even where the draft laws have been criticised by UN mandate holders. Third, a rights-based approach to financial services in which the onus is on the banks and regulators to service non-profits and process transactions is the only way to address this particular problem of de-risking. The report makes 11 recommendations to civil society organisations, national and regional parliamentary committees, national governments and the FATF. It also encourages civil society organisations concerned about the developments described in this report to join the international coalition of organisations established to engage with the FATF and create and 'enabling environment' for civil society. Details: Berlin: Bread for the World - Protestant Development Service Protestant Agency for Diakonie and Development, 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis 68: Accessed June 24, 2017 at: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Shelf Number: 146364 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCountering ExtremismFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremism |
Author: Overton, Iain, ed. Title: Addressing the Threat Posed by IEDS: National, Regional and Global Initiatives Summary: This report seeks to respond to the threat posed by IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) by investigating the C-IED (Counter-IED) initiatives that are being conducted around the world. We specifically focus on three of the most-impacted regions: the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. The paper also identifies Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia and Pakistan as four additional countries that are highly impacted by IEDs and therefore warrant examination. The research was conducted over ten months and examined 39 countries in total. 227 actors engaged in C-IED throughout the regions are included in the report, whilst over 300 were examined globally in total during the course of this research. This makes this report the largest study of C-IED actors in these regions. Our research finds that C-IED initiatives vary greatly from country to country. Not only were the typical 'destroy the device', 'train the force' and 'attack the network' approaches found, but efforts that fall under the banner of counterterrorism, demining and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) featured as well. Such efforts have the ability to greatly reduce IED usage, as well as serving to disrupt the networks that use them, and consequently were essential to incorporate. As part of this research, questionnaires were sent out to actors within the C-IED field. Phone interviews were also conducted in order to understand the role of the various actors in the field and the situation in the countries in which they operate. Through the responses received, key challenges to C-IED operations were identified. These include inadequate resources, lack of awareness, lack of victim assistance programmes, and a general resistance to information sharing. The IED threat and C-IED work in these regions were examined country-by-country. The national, bilateral, regional, and international C-IED initiatives that the state was involved in, or that were seen to be operating in the state, were assessed, as well as the NGOs and private actors working on such operations in the countries. The research conducted on C-IED capacity in the Middle East showed that, whilst many of the states had received training focused on military and law enforcement, many were under-resourced. This effectively means that many states lack the equipment to adequately tackle their respective IED threat. For less-impacted states in the region, border security was understandably a top priority. Efforts to implement better border security often focused on a person-centric approach, which left customs vulnerable and allowed dual-use materials (such as fertiliser) to end up more easily in IEDs. Similarly, North Africa's C-IED efforts predominantly focused on military-based initiatives, whilst also leaving countries too under-resourced to carry out C-IED effectively. Unlike many other regions, there were some initiatives working on psychological victim assistance, an area of C-IED which often remains ignored. Other preventative measures such as terrorism financing and investigations were found to need more assistance in North Africa. Countries in the Sahel region seem to be heavily reliant on external assistance from other nation states, international actors and NGOs. However, Sahelian states also, in general, seem to embrace support and utilise resources that other regions did not. For example, they were more welcoming of assistance from neighbour states and better at integrating C-IED strategies into communities than countries in the other regions examined. The last group of nations examined included highly impacted states. Some of these nations have been impacted by IEDs for a long time, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cooperation is essential between these states to prevent the use of the weapons in both countries. Knowing this, Afghanistan has been a strong advocate for cooperative techniques to tackle IED harm, not just in relation to the national problem but also on the international stage. In Kenya and Somalia, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IED threat is one that needs a trans-border cooperative effort as the threat chiefly stems from al-Shabaab cells in both states. However, it is clear that Kenya has far greater capacity to combat IEDs on their side of border. Kenya also provides assistance to Somalia through the African Union's military mission in Somalia, AMISOM. After examining the various countries and regions, this report explores some of the leading regional C-IED initiatives, including regional military efforts (such as the Multinational Joint Task Force) as well as data collection and information sharing efforts. Regional efforts also sought to build regional capacity through training and cooperation. This section draws upon some of the initiatives already partially explored within the nationally focused section. Lastly, this report reflects on the C-IED progress made on the global stage. Emphasis is initially placed on UN initiatives due to the recent successes of these programmes. Other initiatives of importance are also reflected upon to reveal the steps taken to generate a more rounded approach, highlighting the success of some of these initiatives, as well as emphasising where challenges remain. Information sharing is identified as one such area. In conclusion, there are still many challenges that need to be addressed in the battle to combat the rising tide of IEDs. These include the provision of resources and equipment, victim assistance and information sharing. The report, to support this need, highlights past successes that might give insight on how to best meet these challenges. The paper also draws on the expertise of influential C-IED actors, and notes that many see greater information sharing as an important leap to be taken, as has been acknowledged throughout the report. The conclusion also recognises passages of progress where C-IED initiatives are building on lessons learnt to reinvigorate C-IED efforts internationally. Details: London: Action on Armed Violence, 2017. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 24, 2017 at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Addressing-the-threat-posed-by-IEDs.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Addressing-the-threat-posed-by-IEDs.pdf Shelf Number: 146365 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExplosive DevicesTerrorismTerrorist Bombings |
Author: Hug, Erin C. Title: The Role of Isolation in Radicalization: How Important Is It? Summary: This thesis will provide readers an in-depth analysis of three well-known terrorists in order to highlight the role isolation played in their radicalization process. This thesis researched Timothy McVeigh, responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings; Anders Behring Breivik, responsible for the 2011 massacres in Oslo and Utya, Norway; and Omar Hammami, an American-born individual believed to have been involved in numerous terrorist attacks throughout Somalia on behalf of al-Shabaab. The research evaluated both international and domestic terrorists with differing ideologies, and these individuals were found to represent a broad spectrum. The thesis specifically evaluated whether or not each individual experienced social, emotional, or perceived isolation at any point throughout his radicalization process. It was determined that isolation does play a very multifaceted role in both the initial involvement and initial engagement phases of radicalization. By better understanding the contributing factors of radicalization, homeland security officials may be better positioned to effectively intervene, prevent, or deter radicalization. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 2, 2017 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38949 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38949 Shelf Number: 147022 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismIsolation Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Carrera, Sergio Title: Reflections on the Terrorism Attacks in Barcelona: Constructing a principled and trust-based EU approach to countering terrorism Summary: This Policy Insight examines EU counter-terrorism policies in the aftermath of the recent terrorist attacks of 18 August 2017 in Catalonia and explores what more the EU can do to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of those policies. To this end, it puts forward two policy recommendations: The EU should construct and progressively develop a principled and trust-based policy approach to countering terrorism. Such an approach would consist of an evaluation (fitness check) and regular reappraisal of the effectiveness and efficiency of current EU policies and their priorities - particularly those related to information exchange (and interoperability) and countering radicalisation. The authors argue that the EU's present policy is based on two long-standing (mis)conceptions, namely that existing priorities and instruments are effective in preventing, investigating and prosecuting terrorist crimes and that EU principles and fundamental rights act as obstacles to efficient law enforcement. They examine these two conceptions and call for them to be reconsidered in light of existing research and evidence, explaining how they have led to what may be called the "EU liberal paradox". This paradox relates not only to the deleterious impact that counter-terrorism policies have on the EU and national constitutional principles, which terrorism seeks to destroy, but also the questionable extent to which the objectives pursued in EU security policies and tools are efficiently met in their implementation and practical uses. If EU policies aimed at tackling terrorism are not properly informed and tested, and their societal impacts and ethical implications rigorously assessed, the result will be a lack of mutual confidence between EU and state law enforcement authorities and judicial practitioners, as well as social mistrust on the part of citizens and communities. The conclusions outline a set of recommendations for the next phases of the European Agenda on Security aimed at implementing a principled and trust-based EU approach in countering terrorism. Details: Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2017. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Insights No. 2017-32: Accessed September 11, 2017 at: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/reflections-terrorist-attacks-barcelona-constructing-principled-and-trust-based-eu Year: 2017 Country: Spain URL: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/reflections-terrorist-attacks-barcelona-constructing-principled-and-trust-based-eu Shelf Number: 147206 Keywords: Counter-terrorismTerrorism |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Terrorism: An Overview Summary: The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists - people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements - have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist "threats." These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion. The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and domestic terrorist activity has received public attention. This boundary is highlighted by a number of criminal cases involving supporters of animal rights - one area in which specific legislation related to domestic terrorism has been crafted. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374) expands the federal government's legal authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed into law in November 2006, it amended the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-346). This report is intended as a primer on the issue, and four discussion topics in it may help explain domestic terrorism's relevance for policymakers: - Level of Activity. Domestic terrorists have been responsible for orchestrating numerous incidents since 9/11. - Use of Nontraditional Tactics. A large number of domestic terrorists do not necessarily use tactics such as suicide bombings or airplane hijackings. They have been known to engage in activities such as vandalism, trespassing, and tax fraud, for example. - Exploitation of the Internet. Domestic terrorists - much like their jihadist analogues - are often Internet and social-media savvy and use such platforms to share ideas and as resources for their operations. - Decentralized Nature of the Threat. Many domestic terrorists rely on the concept of leaderless resistance. This involves two levels of activity. On an operational level, militant, underground, ideologically motivated cells or individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction from an organization that maintains traditional leadership positions and membership rosters. On another level, the above-ground public face (the "political wing") of a domestic terrorist movement may focus on propaganda and the dissemination of ideology - engaging in protected speech. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44921: Accessed September 15, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Shelf Number: 147336 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Murphy, Kristina Title: Avoiding community backlash in the fight against terrorism: Research report Summary: While terrorism in different forms has always presented a threat to state security, scholars and policy-makers have argued that since 9/11, states face new forms of terrorism that are mainly motivated by religious extremism, with 'Islamic fanaticism' seen as a major threat (Howard & Sawyer 2004; Jackson 2007). One of the unfortunate consequences of the global "war on terror" is that Muslims in Western countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, have become a stigmatised minority and defined as a potential threat to state security due their religious affiliation with Islamic radicalisation or terrorist groups (Peek 2011; Pickering, McCulloch & Wright-Neville 2008; Kundani 2014; Sentas 2014). Scholars and Muslim community groups argue that Muslims have been labelled a suspect community (Sentas 2014; Breen-Smyth 2014; Weine 2015). This has generated not only a sense of being under siege, but also Muslim hostility towards counterterrorism policing and laws (Peek 2011; Pickering, McCulloch & Wright-Neville 2008; Kundani 2014). The consequence is that this can engender a general unwillingness to cooperate with authorities in efforts to address terrorism and radicalisation (Cherney & Murphy 2013; Lambert 2011; Spalek 2013; Weine 2015). Given the potential of counter-terrorism policies to generate hostility and resistance among groups who feel unfairly targeted by these strategies, this project aimed to: 1. Gauge the perceptions among Muslims in Australia about the fairness of counterterrorism policing and laws. 2. Identify how community cooperation in counter-terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism can be enhanced. 3. Identify how community backlash against counter-terrorism can be avoided. This project involved two phases of data collection: 1. 14 focus groups: 104 Muslim participants, comprising three groups; youth, middle aged, new arrivals to Australia, living in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne; Focus groups were conducted in 2013 and 2014. 2. Face-to-face survey of Muslims: sample of 800 in total, living in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. Survey was conducted in 2014. Details: Report to the Australian Research Council, 2015. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 25, 2017 at: http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/1537_cherney.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/1537_cherney.pdf Shelf Number: 147448 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist Groups Islamic Radicalization Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism |
Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU Summary: Upon request by the LIBE Committee, this study focuses on the question of how to best prevent youth radicalisation in the EU. It evaluates counter-radicalisation policies, both in terms of their efficiency and their broader social and political impact. Building on a conception of radicalisation as a process of escalation, it highlights the need to take into account the relation between individuals, groups and state responses. In this light, it forefronts some of the shortcomings of current policies, such as the difficulties of reporting individuals on the grounds of uncertain assessments of danger and the problem of attributing political grievances to ethnic and religious specificities. Finally, the study highlights the ambiguous nature of pro-active administrative practices and exceptional counter-terrorism legislation and their potentially damaging effects in terms of fundamental rights Details: Brussels: European Unioin, 2014. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2017 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/509977/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2014)509977_EN.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/509977/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2014)509977_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 147454 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremism Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists |
Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Correcting the Course: Advancing Juvenile Justice Principles for Children Convicted of Violent Extremist Offenses Summary: Children have always been among the most vulnerable victims of violence and, at times, some of its brutal purveyors. They have played various roles in furthering violent extremism and participating in acts of violence, ranging from inciting propaganda online to carrying out deadly attacks. Rather than exceptionalizing these children, their treatment under the criminal justice system should be grounded in juvenile justice standards. To advance the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the government of Australia commissioned the Global Center and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT) to prepare a report and accompanying policy brief putting forward guiding principles, recommendations, and considerations for the detention, rehabilitation, and reintegration of juveniles convicted of terrorism and violent extremism offenses. Together, they advance a juvenile justice approach for authorities responsible for their care and support the notion that national security interests and juvenile justice imperatives are compatible and mutually reinforcing in preventing and countering violent extremism. Responding to a call from the GCTF Neuchatel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism Context to collect and collate information on children engaged in terrorism-related activity, the report takes stock of theory, policies, and practice globally. The recommendations draw from international juvenile justice standards, the emerging body of principles and practices in the detention of adult violent extremist offenders, and the national experiences in demobilizing and reintegrating child combatants and members of organized criminal groups. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security; The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2017 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Correcting-the-Course_Global-Center_ICCT.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Correcting-the-Course_Global-Center_ICCT.pdf Shelf Number: 147499 Keywords: Child CombatantsCounter-terrorismJuvenile JusticeJuvenile OffendersTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Zerzan, Andrew Title: Policing Financial Services: Surveying the Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Regime Summary: The anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism international (AML/CFT) standards were created over twenty years ago by the world's biggest economies. Since then, the standards have become increasingly implemented globally. They have established a regulatory regime in which many different public institutions play a role. The majority of these public institutions are not traditionally involved in crime fighting or counter-terrorism so certain challenges exist, especially for those in developing countries. For instance, the AML/CFT rules dictate how people of all types can connect - or not connect - to the financial sector. The paper provides an overview of what the standards mean for public institutions and highlights challenges that have surfaced to date. The intended audience is the development community so that it is better informed in its efforts to improve the application and revision of the standards, which is currently underway. High-level findings: The regime that countries must put in place is complex and there are many interdependencies. The effectiveness of the system relies highly on ensuring that all key elements are in place. If one part of the system is missing, it is likely to greatly hinder effectiveness of the rest. Interaction between the standard setter and developing countries, especially the poorest, is very little. There has been some improvement in dialogue via intermediary organizations but a direct link has not been established. This will have an impact on how the standards are written as well as their effectiveness in these countries. Interpretation of the standards has prompted countries to create regulatory frameworks that are highly data-driven. This means that effectiveness hinges greatly on a country's ability to both collect data from a great number of sources as well as analyze it. Whether this is the right approach for developing countries with low capacity needs to be assessed. Details: London: GSMA, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2017 at: http://www.t.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/policingfinancialservicessurveyingtheantimoneylaunderingregulatoryregime2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.t.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/policingfinancialservicessurveyingtheantimoneylaunderingregulatoryregime2011.pdf Shelf Number: 147516 Keywords: Counter-terrorismFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Yale Law School. Center for Constitutional Rights Title: The Darkest Corner: Special Administrative Measures and Extreme Isolation in the Federal Bureau of Prisons Summary: Prisoners, psychologists, and human rights advocates have long attested to the horrors of solitary confinement: cramped concrete cells, sensory deprivation, and overwhelming social isolation. Scientific consensus that such conditions cause permanent harm led the former United Nations ("U.N.") Special Rapporteur on Torture to declare that "any imposition of solitary confinement beyond 15 days constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." The practice has prompted hearings before the U.S. Senate, and at the state level, many corrections leaders have recognized that long-term isolation is unnecessary and even counterproductive. Yet amid growing recognition of these harms, the federal government has been expanding its use of a lesser known and more extreme form of isolation: Special Administrative Measures ("SAMs"). SAMs are the darkest corner of the U.S. federal prison system, combining the brutality and isolation of maximumsecurity units with additional restrictions that deny individuals almost any connection to the human world. Those restrictions include gag orders on prisoners, their family members, and their attorneys, effectively shielding this extreme use of government power from public view. SAMs deny prisoners the narrow avenues of indirect communication - through sink drains or air vents - available to prisoners in solitary confinement. They prohibit social contact with anyone except for a few immediate family members, and heavily regulate even those contacts. And they further prohibit prisoners from connecting to the social world via current media and news, limiting prisoners' access to information to outdated, government-approved materials. Even a prisoner's communications with his lawyer - which are supposed to be protected by attorney-client privilege - can be subject to monitoring by the FBI. The U.S. Attorney General has sole discretion to impose SAMs, and a prisoner lacks the most basic procedural protections to allow him to contest the SAMs designation. Indeed, prisoners may be left in the dark as to why they have been subjected to SAMs, because the Attorney General's justification often cites little more than the prisoner's charges or conviction. Many prisoners remain under these conditions indefinitely, for years or in some cases even decades. And court challenges are difficult. For convicted prisoners in particular, the regulations operate to obstruct their access to counsel, impeding the act of filing a challenge. And even when prisoners can bring challenges, courts routinely rule against them, accepting the government's vague national security justifications. The imposition of SAMs extends beyond convicted prisoners. Federal prosecutors regularly request that the Attorney General place defendants under these punishing conditions while they await trial, before they have been convicted of any crime. In numerous cases, the Attorney General recommends lifting SAMs after the defendant pleads guilty. This practice erodes defendants' presumption of innocence and serves as a tool to coerce them into cooperating with the government and pleading guilty. Indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") for years relied on the torture of isolation and sensory deprivation as a tool to elicit what it termed "learned helplessness" in detainees suspected of terrorism. For those defendants who do fight their charges at trial, SAMs infect the entire proceeding, limiting prisoners' capacity to participate in their defense and hindering their attorneys' abilities to investigate and zealously advocate. In addition to shrinking the entirety of the prisoner's world to the four corners of his prison cell, SAMs prevent anyone else from understanding what happens within. Prisoners under SAMs are prohibited from communicating with anyone except a few pre-approved individuals - their attorneys and immediate family members - and SAMs prohibit those individuals from repeating the prisoner's words to anyone else. There is also an explicit prohibition on all forms of communication with the media. In effect, the regulations silence those most qualified to attest to the harms of SAMs. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") further shrouds SAMs under a veil of secrecy by concealing who is subject to these conditions and why. Indeed, the DOJ and Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") consistently ignore or deny Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests seeking basic information about prisoners under SAMs. The psychological and physiological harms are thus hidden from public oversight and democratic accountability. The lack of transparency surrounding SAMs makes these measures ripe for discriminatory use against "disfavored" populations. Interviews, publicly available information, and FOIA documents obtained through litigation reveal that the federal government has leveraged SAMs predominantly against Muslims. While the government refuses to reveal the religious identities of people under SAMs, publicly available evidence makes two facts clear: the use of SAMs has increased dramatically since September 11, 2001, and a disproportionately high number of SAMs prisoners are Muslim. In November 2001, there were only sixteen individuals under SAMs; by 2009 there were thirty, and, as of June 8, 2017 there were fifty-one. SAMs represent the extreme end of a spectrum of discriminatory "counterterrorism" measures targeting Muslims since 9/11, including abusive conditions of confinement and lack of due process at Communication Management Units ("CMUs"), indefinite detention and the military commissions system at Guantanamo Bay, suspicion-less surveillance, sweeping immigration roundups, coerced informancy and entrapment, placement on various administrative watch lists, and criminal convictions based on overbroad interpretations of material support and conspiracy statutes. The widespread use of these tools is particularly troubling now, under an administration that has openly discriminated against Muslims and a President who has specifically advocated for the use of torture. Particularly in light of the Trump Administration's open animosity towards other groups, including immigrants and protestors, there is a risk that these tools will be used to target other marginalized groups in the future. The imposition of SAMs raises serious concerns under U.S. and international law. SAMs eviscerate fair trial protections and the presumption of innocence. They infringe on the rights to free speech and association, religious freedom, family unity, due process, and equal protection under the Constitution and international law. And, not least, they constitute inhumane treatment that may rise to the level of torture. So, while many on both sides of the aisle have criticized President Trump for vowing to "bring back" torture, the torture of SAMs and its underlying conditions of solitary confinement never went away. This report aims to shed light onto this darkest corner of the U.S. federal prison system. The report necessarily fails to represent the views of the people who are most intimately familiar with SAMs - those who have been subjected to them. Nonetheless, the available information reveals that the severity of SAMs, their increasing use, their lack of procedural protections, and their potential discriminatory application pose urgent concerns for our democracy. Details: New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, The Center for Constitutional Rights 2017. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 3, 2017 at: https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/09/SAMs%20Report.Final_.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/09/SAMs%20Report.Final_.pdf Shelf Number: 147540 Keywords: Counter-terrorismIsolation Muslims Restrictive Housing Solitary Confinement U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons |
Author: Victoria State Government Title: Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers. Report 2 Summary: In June 2017, the Victorian government established the independent Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers ('Expert Panel'), led by former Victoria Police Chief Commissioner, Ken Lay AO, and former Victorian Court of Appeal Justice, the Hon David Harper AM. The panel was tasked with examining and evaluating the operation and effectiveness of Victoria's key legislation and related powers and procedures of relevant agencies to prevent, monitor, investigate and respond to terrorism. This second report from the panel extends the focus of the first report to include the full spectrum of policies and programs to prevent and intervene early in relation to emerging risks of violent extremism, or to respond rapidly to risks after they have eventuated. It contains 26 recommendations relating to: countering violent extremism; enhancing disengagement programs; changing the definition of a terrorist act; creating a support and engagement order; creating an offence for the possession of terrorism related material; extending the preventative detention scheme to minors; and creating a post-sentence supervision scheme for high-risk terrorist offenders. Details: Melbourne: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2017. 121p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Shelf Number: 148285 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist GroupsHomeland Security Preventive DetentionTerrorism TerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Preventing extremism in London Summary: Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government's Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy-and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy-sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has-and continues to-experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015. Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative- one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story-to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counternarrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way. The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met's Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve. The policy: the Government's Prevent Strategy The Government's approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area. It is hard to measure the impact of the Government's approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government's increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government's definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government's approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149033 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Gavrielides, Theo Title: Young, marginalised but not radicalised: A comparative study of positive approaches to youth radicalisation Summary: Prevention and control have been dealt with as top down responsibilities of governments, but young people believe that it is now time that they have their say. YEIP was created in response to the lack of effective youth policies that can enhance young people's social inclusion and minimize the risk of radicalization with greater 'buy in' from youth themselves. The conference will launch the book "Young, marginalised but not radicalized: A comparative study of positive approaches to youth radicalization". This is the outcome of research that was carried out in the UK, Italy, Romania, Portugal, Cyprus, Greece and Sweden. It features the national findings written in native languages as well as their comparative analysis and summaries written in English. Details: London: IARS International Institute, 2018. 359p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2018 at: http://yeip.org/awareness-raising-material/yeip-ebooks/ Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://yeip.org/awareness-raising-material/yeip-ebooks/ Shelf Number: 149412 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Counter-terrorism ExtremismRadicalization Restorative Justice Violent Radicalism Youth Empowerment |
Author: Hill, Max Title: The Westminster Bridge terrorist attack Summary: 1. On Wednesday 22 March 2017, 52-year old British-born Khalid Masood drove a hired vehicle across Westminster Bridge in the direction of the Palace of Westminster. He mounted the pavement twice colliding with pedestrians and then a third time crashing into the east perimeter gates of the Palace of Westminster. Masood then exited the car and ran into the vehicle entrance gateway of the Palace of Westminster, Carriage Gates, where he attacked and fatally injured PC Keith Palmer using a knife. Masood was shot at the scene by armed police protection officers who were in Parliament at the time of the attack. The whole incident lasted approximately 82 seconds. The attack resulted in 29 people injured and 6 fatalities. 2. The ensuing police investigation was named Operation Classific. Counter-terrorism policing officers arrested and detained 12 people in the course of the investigation. All were released without charge. I have been provided with the full details of all who were arrested, but I am unable to publish names which are not already in the public domain, because none have been charged with any offence. 3. I conducted a 'snapshot review' of the arrests, detention and release of all twelve persons in Operation Classific. I conclude, in summary, as follows: a. The police and emergency services were confronted by a terrorist incident which claimed multiple lives and which occurred mid-afternoon in central London. An immediate and comprehensive criminal investigation was required by the police, who had to work with the facts and materials presented to them at the scene, namely the abandoned hire car and its contents. b. It is important to review Operation Classific contemporaneously, in other words placing oneself in the position of police commanders on 22nd March 2017 and in the days which followed. Whilst the physical aftermath of the deadly terrorist attack was managed by all of those services who rushed to Westminster Bridge, the Metropolitan Police team were required to make quick decisions to unearth any and all evidence which might be relevant to Masood's attack planning. Whilst hindsight has its place, it is secondary to understanding in-the-moment decisions taken by police officers as the criminal investigation rapidly unfolded. c. The use of arrest and detention powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 nonetheless requires careful scrutiny. A fast-moving investigation such as this one required ongoing assimilation of information as it came to light, and quick reaction to successive events including the discovery of persons at premises known to have been associated with Masood. In the event, twelve people were lawfully arrested and detained, in most cases under the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000. Their respective detention times varied widely. All were released, and none were charged with any offence. d. The fact that twelve people were arrested and detained, and none were charged with any offence, does not imply any criticism of this investigation. Whilst the police must always strive to manage counter-terrorism investigations appropriately, and must strive to reduce pre-charge detention time in every case to no more than a necessary minimum, it is a feature of fast-moving, modern investigations into serious terrorism offences that arrest and detention powers will be used and will not lead in every case to a positive charging decision. e. Operation Classific was fast, efficient and comprehensive. Whilst lessons can always be learned from scrutinizing the arrest and detention phase of such an investigation, I have concluded on the basis of the information and materials provided to me that there was a reasoned and proportionate use of the relevant terrorism legislation in this case. I have summarised my recommendations in Chapter 4 of this report. Details: London: U.K. Government, 2018. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695304/IRTL-Westminster_Bridge_Attack_Report_March_2018..pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695304/IRTL-Westminster_Bridge_Attack_Report_March_2018..pdf Shelf Number: 149600 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption Summary: Terrorists and extremists are increasingly moving their activities online - and areas of the web have become a safe haven for Islamic State to plot its next attacks, according to a report published today by the Henry Jackson Society. Terror in The Dark: How Terrorists use Encryption, the Darknet and Cryptocurrencies shows how those planning to commit terrorist atrocities are using extremist networks on the 'Darknet' to indoctrinate sympathisers, create a reservoir of propaganda, evade detection and fundraise. It calls for urgent action by government and the policing and security services to step up intelligence gathering and action to counter online extremist activity. The report shows how terrorists are: Using encrypted apps such as Telegram to hide, communicate and plan attacks. Drawing interested sympathisers from the 'surface' world of the web into the Darknet in order to recruit and indoctrinate new supporters. Building up reservoirs of propaganda - saving it from deletion by the security services or tech companies and removing it as potential evidence for use by law enforcement. Using cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin to fundraise, taking advantage of the anonymity they offer. Following the five terror attacks on British soil in 2017, the Government has dedicated more time and funds to the combating of online extremism. However, the report makes a strong case for more attention to be paid to the Darknet, as terrorists mask their actions and intentions unchallenged on a currently anarchic platform. The report recommends: That tech companies should create a self-regulatory system to remove and audit extremist content - and release public annual reports outlining their efforts, including stats on content flagged by users, the outcome of companies' investigations and areas for improvement. That there should be a new internet regulatory body appointed by government, with the role of scrutinising tech companies' efforts to remove extremist content - with the potential for fines if companies consistently fail to take down offending material. More resources for the Joint Terrorism Action Centre to build up intelligence on the Darknet. Social media companies should work with law enforcement to ensure that extremist material is not lost when it is deleted, but is archived - to ensure that we understand extremists' patterns of behaviour online and retain evidence. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Shelf Number: 149759 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDark NetDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending Title: Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting American While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability Summary: The United States currently lacks an accurate accounting of how much it has spent on the fight against terrorism. Without accurate data, policymakers will have difficulty evaluating whether the nation spends too much or too little on the counterterrorism (CT) mission, and whether current spending is doing its job effectively or efficiently. In the summer of 2017, the Stimson Center convened a nonpartisan study group to provide an initial tally of total CT spending since 9/11, to examine gaps in the understanding of CT spending, and to offer recommendations for improving U.S. government efforts to account for these expenditures. Stimson's research suggests that total spending that has been characterized as CT-related - including expenditures for government-wide homeland security efforts, international programs, and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria - totaled $2.8 trillion during fiscal years 2002 through 2017. According to the group's research, annual CT spending peaked at $260 billion in 2008 at the height of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This represents a 16-fold increase over the 2001 total. In 2017, as war funding declined, total CT spending amounted to $175 billion, nearly an 11-fold increase from the 2001 level. With this growth, CT spending has become a substantial component of total discretionary spending for programs across a wide range of areas, including defense, education, and medical research. Of $18 trillion in discretionary spending between fiscal years 2002-2017, CT spending made up nearly 16 percent of the whole.[i] At its peak in 2008, CT spending amounted to 22 percent of total discretionary spending. By 2017, CT spending had fallen to 14 percent of the total. Despite this drop, the study group found no indication that CT spending is likely to continue to decline. At the same time, budgetary caps enacted in 2011 in the Budget Control Act (BCA) have created an attractive fiscal loophole by placing new pressures on spending while exempting spending characterized as emergency or war spending, also known as overseas contingency operations (OCO). In recent years, billions of dollars in spending unrelated to the wars has been characterized as OCO in order to exempt it from the BCA caps. This practice makes it more difficult to identify spending that is truly dedicated to CT and to evaluate potential trade-offs. The Stimson study group found a variety of weaknesses in definitions, tracking, and consistencies that limit accuracy and contribute to a lack of transparency regarding the current data on CT spending. These weaknesses make it difficult to evaluate whether CT spending has been effective at enhancing security at home or overseas. The study group's recommendations are designed to improve the accuracy of tracking CT spending and to provide greater clarity for budget planning for future CT programs. The study group concluded that a broader set of parameters is urgently needed in order to make the full federal investment in CT more transparent, to identify gaps and trade-offs, and to permit more useful evaluations of the effectiveness and efficiency of that spending. 1. Create a clear and transparent counterterrorism funding report. Congress should reinstate and expand the statutory requirement that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) compile data and analyze government-wide U.S. homeland security spending in its annual budget request. OMB should provide metrics that show Congress and the public the scope of counter-terrorism spending relative to total discretionary spending and total spending, including mandatory spending. 2. Adopt a detailed agency-wide definition for counter-terrorism spending. OMB and Congress should develop, adopt, and enforce a clear, usable set of criteria to define counter-terrorism spending, including programs with the primary purpose of preventing, mitigating, or responding to terrorist attacks in the United States or overseas. This definition may be tailored to individual agency missions as long as agencies show how any counterterrorism spending addresses a credible threat to the United States. 3. Build on current accounting structures to anticipate future budget pressures. OMB should work with agencies to build on the current accounting structure to distinguish counter-terrorism spending at the program, activity, and project levels, identifying ongoing vs. incremental emergency needs. 4. Tie the definition of war spending to specific activities. OMB and Congress should develop and implement clear criteria for terrorism-related spending through overseas contingency operations and other emergency authorities. This should include the cost of deploying U.S. troops to conflict zones; countering terrorist groups through military, diplomatic, or other operations; training foreign militaries; and conducting emergency military response activities within the United States that have a counter-terrorism focus. Overseas contingency operations should be limited to such spending. 5. Require Congress to separately approve emergency or wartime spending. Congress should pass new legislation that requires it to vote separately to approve spending that is designated as war-related emergency or wartime overseas contingency operations spending before those funds can be obligated. Details: Washington, DC: Stimson, 2018. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 150191 Keywords: Costs of TerrorismCounter-terrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: European Court of Auditors Title: Tackling radicalisation that leads to terrorism: the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but with some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation Summary: I. European Union (EU) Member States are responsible for national security, including the fight against terrorism. They are in charge of designing and implementing measures at national level that aim to tackle radicalisation, i.e. the phenomenon of people embracing extremist ideologies and behaviours which could lead them to commit acts of terrorism. As radicalisation is caused by several factors, a wide range of preventive actions are generally deployed to address the problem. The Commission's role is to support Member States in their efforts and help to ensure that good practices are exchanged. To do so, the Commission draws on an increasingly wide range of EU funds. II. Our audit examined whether the Commission manages this cross-cutting support well. In particular, we assessed whether: the Commission provides Member States with relevant support; the actions financed by the different EU funds are coordinated to make the most of any synergies; the Commission has put in place a framework to assess the effectiveness and value for money of its support. III. Overall, we found that the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but there were some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation. IV. The Commission promoted cooperation between Member States through relevant initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network. V. The Commission coordinated its cross-cutting support, for example, by means of consultation between directorates-general when approving work programmes. This has resulted in synergies between its actions. However, despite recent improvements, there is still scope to improve the coordination of Commission actions. For example, the Commission's overview of EU-funded actions in this area does not include those managed by Member States, which would be useful to make the most of potential synergies. We also found that the RAN, one of the Commission's main initiatives, was not used to its full potential to disseminate the results of successful EU-funded projects. VI. The Commission has not sufficiently developed its framework for assessing whether its support is effective and offers value for money. For example, it has not broken down the overall policy objectives into more specific and measurable objectives, and the funds that the Commission has used are not accompanied by indicators and targets designed to measure success in addressing radicalisation. VII. Moreover, the achievements of specific actions are often measured in terms of amount of activity rather than effectiveness. As a result, there is a risk that useful lessons might not be disseminated or taken into account when the Commission designs actions or develops its policy further. VIII. On the basis of its findings, the ECA recommends that the Commission should: improve the framework for overall coordination of actions addressing radicalisation; increase practical support to practitioners and policymakers in Member States; and improve the framework for assessing results. Details: Luxembourg City, Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 15, 2018 at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 150558 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismNational SecurityRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Nemr, Christina Title: It Takes A Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism Summary: This report examines the role of civil society organisation (CSOs) in the rehabilitation and reintegration of those associated with and affected by violent extremism. It builds on the work conducted by ICCT and the Global Center on Cooperative Security, together with four subregional partners over the past two-and-a-half years in Africa and South-East Asia. The project aimed to first understand how CSOs work within their communities and with their governments to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, victims of violence, and affected communities. It then supported the work of select CSOs by facilitating small grants to bolster existing efforts or pilot innovative approaches. The findings and lessons learned from the project have culminated in the development of this action agenda, which provides policy and programmatic recommendations for stakeholders working on rehabilitation and reintegration and the role of CSOs in supporting that process. The project focused on three regions: the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal); the Greater Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda); and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). While each region has its own rich experiences and unique challenges, there are overarching lessons that emerged-lessons that are applicable to a variety of rehabilitation and reintegration contexts. The action agenda therefore is not divided by region but, rather, by themes and the audiences to whom the recommendations are directed. Overall, the report consists of six guiding principles and 10 recommendations targeted to a range of audiences. Each guiding principle and recommendation is followed by examples that illustrate the ways a recommendation has been put into practice or offer suggestions for implementing a given recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 151328 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCountering Violent ExtremismRadical GroupsTerrorist RehabilitationTerroristsViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Rekawek, Kacper Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Kick-Off Report Summary: The most well-known ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, saw individuals who in the past had been involved in organized crime and illegal trade graduate into the ranks of the world's most successful terrorist organisation. It is now widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are no longer radicals first and foremost but criminals who turned to political violence at some stage throughout their ordinary crime careers. Thus a threat emanating from the "crime-terror nexus" hangs over Europe. GLOBSEC, an independent, non-partisan, non-governmental organisation which aims to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy, responded to this threat by developing a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Our project titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? will: collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2018 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Shelf Number: 152909 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrime-Terror NexusIllegal TradeSecurity TerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Durner, Tracey Title: Untangling a Marriage of Convenience: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Summary: Within the realm of policy discussions, anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts are generally treated as a package deal. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the FATF Recommendations, and related guidance documents represent today's international AML and CFT standards and are mirrored in laws and initiatives around the world. Given the "obvious similarities and differences between money laundering and terrorism financing," FATF notes "the risks (of both) are often assessed and managed using the same information flows between public and private sector institutions." This convergence between the types of information and stakeholders relevant to money laundering and terrorism financing is, in part, behind the unification of AML and CFT efforts. From a policy-making standpoint, the combination makes sense. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) already analyze suspicious financial activity, including potential instances of money laundering, often triggered by reports from the private sector resulting from frontline compliance and transaction monitoring procedures. It seems logical to incorporate the deterrence, detection, and tracking of terrorism financing into existing AML frameworks. In practice, critics have argued this "marriage" places undue burden on the private sector to understand the intent of criminals behind the actual transactions.2 Others contend that the very premise of CFT policies are misguided, resulting in ineffective and even harmful outcomes. With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the preponderance of low-cost, lone-actor attacks in North America and Europe, international attention once again has focused on CFT as a central tenet in the fight against terrorism. In 2016, FATF issued a consolidated strategy on CFT, followed by the adoption of an operational plan in 2018. CFT-specific entities such as the Counter ISIL Financing Group have emerged, and the French government in 2018 convened a high-level international conference focused on combating the financing of ISIL and al-Qaida, with a second conference scheduled for Australia in mid-2019. This brief examines where and how AML frameworks are fit for purpose relative to CFT and considers where additional CFT-specific efforts are necessary. It begins with a brief summary of the evolution of money laundering and terrorism financing policies, discussing the unification of the two fields and the key differences between the motivations and typologies of money laundering and terrorism financing crimes. Against that backdrop, it explores the four objectives of CFT efforts (prevent, detect, freeze, and trace) to identify areas where existing unified AML/CFT frameworks are working and areas where more nuance is required to effectively combat threats specific to terrorism financing. Although particular attention is given to the United States and United Kingdom as international financial centers, similar approaches and convergences between AML and CFT policies and practices occur worldwide. The brief concludes with recommendations on how current CFT policy discourse and evolution can meaningfully support broader counterterrorism objectives. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2019. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154691 Keywords: Counter-terrorismFinancial CrimesFinancing of TerrorismMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorism Financing |
Author: U.S. Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States Title: Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach Summary: Despite our success protecting America's homeland, extremism is spreading. Since 9/11, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide per year has increased five-fold. As long as this continues, the United States will remain vulnerable to terrorism while extremism contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that drains U.S. resources, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. We need a new strategy to prevent extremism in fragile states. If we can mitigate the underlying conditions that allow extremism to emerge and spread in these states, the United States will be closer to breaking out of the costly cycle of perpetual crisis response, pushing back against the growing threat of extremism, and positioning itself effectively for strategic engagement with its competitors. Recent successes in the fight against the Islamic State makes this a unique opportunity to focus on prevention. We must move from defeating terrorists, to preventing extremism. Established in response to a request from the U.S. Congress in 2017, the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States has developed a new strategy that represents the insightful and bipartisan foreign policy thinking of fifteen leading former policymakers, legislators, and other experts on how to empower fragile states to resist extremism on their own. Executive Summary -- We need a new strategy to prevent the spread of extremism, which threatens our homeland, our strategic interests, and our values. Our current focus on counterterrorism is necessary, but neither sufficient nor cost-effective. Congress has charged this Task Force with developing a new approach, one that will get ahead of the problem. We need a new strategy because, despite our success protecting the homeland, terrorism is spreading. Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased five-fold since 2001. The number of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled and they are now present in nineteen countries in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near East. We need a new strategy because the costs of our current approach are unsustainable. Over the last eighteen years, ten thousand Americans have lost their lives and fifty thousand have been wounded fighting this threat, at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers. We need a new strategy because terrorism is not the only threat we face. Terrorism is a symptom, but extremism - an ideology calling for the imposition of a totalitarian order intent on destroying free societies like ours-is the disease. Extremism both preys on fragile states and contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that kills innocents, drains U.S. resources, forecloses future market opportunities, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. To reduce our expenditure of blood and treasure, protect against future threats, and preserve American leadership and values in contested parts of the world, we must not only respond to terrorism but also strive to prevent extremism from taking root in the first place. This does not mean seeking to stop all violence or to rebuild nations in vulnerable regions of the world. Instead, it means recognizing that even modest preventive investments-if they are strategic, coordinated, and well-timed-can reduce the risk that extremists will exploit fragile states. The objective of a preventive approach should be to strengthen societies that are vulnerable to extremism so they can become self-reliant, better able to resist this scourge, and protect their hard-earned economic and security gains. This imperative for prevention is not new. Back in 2004, the 9/11 Commission argued that counter-terrorism and homeland security must be coupled with "a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military." That call has not been answered. And so the threat continues to rise, the costs mount, and the need for a preventive strategy grows more compelling. Progress has undoubtedly been made since 9/11. The U.S. government has a better understanding of what works. There is bipartisan agreement in Congress that a new approach is needed. However, the United States cannot-nor should it-carry this burden alone. U.S. leadership is needed to catalyze international donors to support preventing extremism. And the international community-both donor countries and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank-are increasingly willing to engage these problems with us, including through the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. But challenges persist. There is still insufficient prioritization, coordination, or agreement on what to do, both within the U.S. government and across the international community. Our Task Force offers three recommendations to build on emerging opportunities and overcome persistent hurdles to preventing extremism effectively. First, there must be a new effort to unite around a joint strategy aimed at preventing the underlying causes of extremism. The United States should adopt a shared framework for strategic prevention that recognizes that extremism is a political and ideological problem. The framework should also identify building partnerships with leaders, civil society, and private sector actors in fragile states who are committed to governing accountability as the best approach to preventing extremism. Extremists' attempts to, in the Middle East and Africa, establish an absolutist state ruled by a rigid, twisted, and false interpretation of Islam resonate only in societies where the existing state has failed its people. The antidote to extremist ideology, therefore, must be political. But inclusive institutions, accountable governments, and civic participation cannot be imposed from the outside. What the United States can do is identify, encourage, and build partnerships with leaders in fragile states including nationally and locally, in government and civil society with women, youth, and the private sector who are committed to rebuilding trust in their states and societies. However, bitter experience teaches that where such leaders are lacking, the United States stands little chance of furthering its long-term interests. In such cases, it must seek to seize opportunities where possible and always mitigate the risk that its engagement, or that of other actors, could do more harm than good. Second, to ensure that agencies have the resources, processes, and authorities they need to operationalize this shared framework, the Congress and the Executive Branch should launch a Strategic Prevention Initiative to align all U.S. policy instruments, from bilateral assistance to diplomatic engagement, in support of prevention. The Initiative should set out the roles and responsibilities of each department for undertaking prevention. Its principal objective should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states. It should grant policymakers new authorities to implement a preventive strategy. In particular, because local conditions and needs differ widely, it is important that U.S. diplomats and development professionals on the ground in fragile states be given direct responsibility, flexibility, and funding to experiment with and develop effective and tailored solutions. However, the United States neither can nor should prevent extremism by itself. It is not the only country with a vested interest in doing so and can build more effective partnerships with fragile states if other countries cooperate. Thus, our Task Force calls on the United States to establish a Partnership Development Fund, a new international platform for donors and the private sector to pool their resources and coordinate their activities in support of prevention. This would ensure that the work being done by the United States as part of the Strategic Prevention Initiative is matched by other international donors working jointly toward the same goals. It would create a mechanism for other countries to share the burden and incentivize an enterprise-driven approach. A single, unified source of assistance might also entice fragile states that would otherwise look elsewhere for help. A preventive strategy will not stop every terrorist attack. It will take time to produce results. It will require us to recognize the limits of our influence and work hard to leverage our resources more effectively. And it is not something that we can implement alone-our international partners should do their fair share. But it offers our best hope. Neither open-ended military operations, nor indefinite foreign assistance, nor retrenchment offers a better alternative. Through targeted, evidence-based, strategic investments where the risks are the highest, our interests the greatest, and our partners the most willing, prevention provides a cost-effective means to slow, contain, and eventually roll back the spread of extremism. The United States needs to enable fragile states and societies to take the lead in averting future extremist threats. If we succeed, our children and grandchildren will live in a more peaceful world. Details: Washington, DC: USIP, 2019. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Shelf Number: 154816 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Tricot O'Farrell, Kloe Title: A threat inflated? The countering and preventing violent extremism agenda in Kyrgyzstan Summary: Often overshadowed by regional headline-grabbing hotspots like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan rarely get international attention. The post-Soviet country - once on the ancient Silk Road - rarely makes the news now, but it has its share of challenges. Bisected by the 'northern route' of opioid traffickers, it struggles with pervasive corruption and the threat of political instability, ethnic conflict and now - purportedly - a jihadist underbelly. In response, alongside counter-terror efforts to bolster Central Asian state security services with training and equipment, international policy towards Kyrgyzstan has become increasingly focused on 'countering/preventing violent extremism' (C/PVE). Over the past five years, Saferworld research has documented how international counter-terror and C/PVE efforts have played out in different contexts. In countries like Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, the evidence suggests that these approaches pose a range of risks to sustainable peace. C/PVE can work in favour of peace, but our research suggests that its narrow focus on the recruitment of individual 'violent extremists' is no substitute for more comprehensive strategies that address all the causes of conflict and prioritise peace, rights and development for all. In this long-read article, which draws on interviews with national and international experts and practitioners, the latest scholarly research, and years of community-based programming in-country, our researchers analyse how C/PVE has and hasnt worked in Kyrgyzstan. Details: London: Saferworld, 2019. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2019 at: https://www.saferworld.org.uk/long-reads/a-threat-inflated-the-countering-and-preventing-violent-extremism-agenda-in-kyrgyzstan?utm_source=smartmail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=A+threat+inflated%3F+The+countering+and+preventing+violent+extremism+agenda+in+Kyrgyzstan Year: 2019 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: https://www.saferworld.org.uk/long-reads/a-threat-inflated-the-countering-and-preventing-violent-extremism-agenda-in-kyrgyzstan?utm_source=smartmail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=A+threat+inflated%3F+The+countering+and+preven Shelf Number: 155050 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDrug Trafficking Extremist Groups Terrorism Violent Conflict Violent Extremism |
Author: Jones, Chris Title: The EU Data Retention Directive: a case study in the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policy Summary: SECILE is an EU-funded research project examining the legitimacy and effectiveness of European Union counter-terrorism measures (CTMs). This report examines the implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks (the "Data Retention Directive"). The Directive obliges providers of internet and telephony services to keep detailed "traffic data" (or "metadata") regarding the identities and activities of their subscribers for between 6 and 24 months and provide access to police and security agencies for the purposes of investigating serious crime, and has been described as the "the most privacy-invasive instrument ever adopted by the EU". This report explains the policy-making process that resulted in the Directive, the obligations stemming from it, and the way these have been transposed into the national law of the member states with reference to infringement proceedings, legal challenges and the review of the legislation by the European Commission. Details: SICILE Consortium, 2013. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: SECILE Deliverable 2.4. www.secile.eu : Accessed march 27, 2019 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Shelf Number: 155181 Keywords: CommunicationsCounter-TerrorismCriminal InvestigationsData RetentionTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Colomina, Pierre Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: France Summary: The worse ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, were undertaken by individuals who had been involved in criminality and illegal trade before they joined the ranks of the world's most dangerous terrorist organisation. It is no longer widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are radicals first and foremost: the bulk of them are criminals who turned to political violence along the way. The threat of a "crime-terror nexus" therefore hangs over Europe. In view of this, GLOBSEC - an independent, non-partisan, nongovernmental organisation aiming to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy - has developed a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back?, the remit of the project is to: 1. collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. 2. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. 3. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2019. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: France URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155599 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrime-Terror NexusIllegal TradeSecurity TerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Koehler, Daniel Title: Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat Summary: Extreme right-wing violence and terrorism are a growing threat to Western societies. This form of political violence is also quite elusive and differs from others (e.g. jihadist violence) in some key characteristics. Since the September 11 attacks, policy makers, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as researchers have focused most of their attention on Islamic extremist violence and terrorism. This has led to an imbalance in the understanding of other threats, especially from the far-right, and adequate ways to counter it. This paper, using Germany as a main case study, argues that far-right violence has a potential risk of being misunderstood and under-classified, thus creating the perception among victims of that violence that democratic countries "are blind on the right side". This erosion of trust in the rule of law and the monopoly of force is one goal of extreme right-wing terrorists. Specific recommendations to improve countering the threat posed by the far-right are avoiding double standards in dealing with political violence at all costs, swift and efficient appropriate legal actions against extreme right perpetrators of violence, an increase in funding for research about right-wing terrorism, a possible refinement of the legal definition of "terrorism" and a discussion about its relationship with hate crimes, as well as wide scale support for countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation programs targeting the far-right. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Germany URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155701 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Jackson, Brian A. Title: Practical Terrorism Prevention: Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the Threat of Ideologically Motivated Violence Summary: Terrorism prevention - superseding the programs and activities previously known as countering violent extremism (CVE) - policies seek to broaden the options available to address the risk of individual radicalization and mobilization to ideologically driven violence. These programs provide alternatives to arrest, prosecution, and incarceration by countering recruiting or radicalizing messages, intervening before individuals have committed serious crimes, or supporting the reentry and desistance from violence of individuals convicted and incarcerated for terrorism-related offenses. Government involvement in these programs has been controversial, due to concerns about such efforts' potential to infringe on Constitutionally protected rights and the risk of outreach or intervention activities stigmatizing communities by associating them with terrorism or extremism. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office of Policy requested that the Homeland Security and Operational Analysis Center examine past U.S. CVE and current terrorism prevention efforts, evaluate the DHS and interagency posture for federal efforts, and explore policy options to strengthen terrorism prevention going forward. Researchers found that current terrorism prevention capabilities are relatively limited. Most initiatives are implemented locally or outside government, and only a subset receive federal support. Among interviewees in law enforcement, government, and some community organizations, there is a perceived need for a variety of federal efforts to help strengthen and broaden local and nongovernmental capacity. However, doing so will be challenging, since concerns about past counterterrorism and CVE efforts have significantly damaged trust in some communities. As a result, terrorism prevention policy and programs will need to focus on building trust locally, and designing programs and federal activities to maintain that trust over time. Key Findings -- Current terrorism prevention efforts are limited Limited programmatic focus and resource investment since 2014, coupled with sustained opposition that focused on limiting CVE efforts, have constrained efforts to develop approaches to individuals at risk of ideological violence other than arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. Reinvestment in federal field staff is key Personnel who are based locally but who are aware of the federal picture could help to build relationships, strengthen trust, and act as on-the-ground facilitators of local terrorism prevention efforts. This could both deliver immediate results and help to build for the longer term. Interviewees identified specific needs in the areas of awareness and training, federal support, federal program development, and research and evaluation Objective threat information is needed by technology companies to guide their efforts in the online space. Improved risk-assessment tools also would be useful to manage programming for individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Sharing best practices and knowledge was viewed as important, and interviewees noted the value of bringing together researchers, implementers, and others to share information. Federal action to facilitate local programs and capability-building should be the priority across multiple components of terrorism prevention. A more robust and interdisciplinary research community is needed for terrorism prevention, and, although efforts in the past regarding CVE were useful and should be continued, they are not enough. Recommendations For countermessaging and intervention programming, the federal government should focus on funding and assisting state, local, and nongovernmental organizations and private actors rather than building capabilities itself. The federal government should continue to provide community awareness briefings and training exercises to local groups. These activities were viewed by interviewees as successful in disseminating needed information. Recent reductions in staffing have limited federal capacity to do so. Adapting existing tools like table-top exercises to help empower local areas to explore the types of terrorism prevention that are appropriate for their circumstances appeared to be promising. Openness and transparency in training delivery would help to support trust in a controversial area, and using unclassified and open source information that can be shared broadly is more practical for efforts that must bridge many organizational boundaries. Pursuing public-private partnerships and broadening support from nonsecurity agencies would be a practical approach to supporting terrorism prevention efforts in a way that is potentially more acceptable to communities and members of the public. Building and maintaining the bench of expert practitioners will be important in developing programs from the national to the local levels. Strengthening investment in evaluation would address criticism of the effectiveness of both past CVE and current terrorism prevention efforts in the future. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019. 335p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html Shelf Number: 155851 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremismRadicalizationTerrorism PreventionTerrorism Risk Assessment |
Author: Helmus, Todd C. Title: Assessing Outcomes of Online Campaigns Countering Violent Extremism: A Case Study of the Redirect Method Summary: The number of programs dedicated to countering violent extremism (CVE) has grown in recent years, yet a fundamental gap remains in the understanding of the effectiveness of such programs. This is particularly the case for CVE campaigns, which are increasingly conducted in the online space. The goal of this report is to help CVE campaign planners better evaluate the impact of online efforts. It reviews prior assessments of online CVE campaigns, provides recommendations for future assessments, and provides a case study of one particular CVE campaign - the Redirect Method. A limited evaluation of the Redirect Method process variables suggests that the implementers are able to use advertisements linking to counter-extremist videos to effectively expose individuals searching for violent jihadist or violent far-right content to content that offers alternative narratives. Users clicked on these ads at a rate on par with industry standards. However, as is the case with other CVE evaluations, this partial evaluation did not assess the impact of the video content on user attitudes or behavior. The potentially highly radical nature of the Redirect Method's target audience makes evaluation of the campaign particularly complicated and therefore might necessitate the recruitment of former extremists to help gauge audience response. Alternatively, it might be advisable to analyze user comments to understand how a subsample of users respond to the content. Key Findings -- The unique nature of social media can impede conventional approaches to assessing program impact Exposure to social media content is highly self-selective. The rapid flow of social media information across browser screens can reduce the accuracy of exposure recall. Previous assessment efforts examined basic process characteristics Virtually all of the reviewed CVE evaluations focused on analysis of reach, views, and engagement. The field is still immature; very few systematic evaluations are published, most of which are brief case-study analyses. The Redirect Method campaign targets violent extremist content The campaign consisted of two separate arms, one focused on targeting violent jihadist extremists and the other targeting violent far-right extremists. The primary goal of the intervention was to "prevent unobstructed access to extremist content." Analysis of the results of the Redirect Method campaign focused on impression shares, clicks, click-through rates, and video watch statistics The violent far-right campaign achieved a much higher number of total impressions, which likely indicates that, in the United States, the number of violent far-right sympathizers is larger than the number of violent jihadist extremist sympathizers. Results for impression shares varied significantly between the two campaigns, with the violent jihadist campaign achieving more than 90-percent impression shares, compared with 51.23 percent for the violent far right campaign. Recommendations -- Online CVE campaign evaluators can study "open" campaigns using a social media platform's analytics to test reach and reactivity to the campaign and to evaluate other process-oriented metrics. "Closed" evaluation designs, which use participant surveys and random assignment to CVE content, enable researchers to assess changes in audience attitudes. Other approaches to evaluation include measuring audience responses to "calls to action" (social media campaigns that encourage audience members to engage in an observable behavior, such as calling phone lines or clicking on particular links); assessment of audience comments; and A-B testing, in which media planners compare audience reactions to two or more versions of online content. The Redirect Method should consider more-tailored options. First, it can recruit former extremists to help assess whether Google Ads and video content is entertaining, accurate, and potentially persuasive. Second, it might be feasible to test the impact of the Redirect Method in a closed evaluation design, drawing on a specially recruited population of participants, which would prevent the provision of survey content to viewers of the live campaign. A new method for analysis involves developing a sample of users who post comments on the Redirect Method's YouTube page, then assessing the comments that those users post to videos that they watch before and after watching Redirect Method videos. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2813.html Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2813.html Shelf Number: 156405 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremists Media Campaigns Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Davey, Jacob Title: Counter Conversations: A model for direct engagement with individuals showing signs of radicalisation online Summary: Extremist groups deploy a clear strategy for radicalising and recruiting new supporters online: marketing their ideas through the spread of propaganda and then engaging interested individuals in direct, private messaging to recruit new members to their causes. Direct engagement with radicalising individuals by mentors and 'intervention providers' is now a well-established component of offline counter-terrorism efforts in a number of countries. These programmes are delivered by both government and civil society, and often include former extremists and social workers as intervention providers. Until now, online prevention efforts have largely focused either on the removal of terrorist content or on the production and dissemination of counter-narrative and counter-speech campaigns to compete with extremist propaganda. However, there have been no systematised attempts to supplement counter-speech efforts with direct online messaging and engagement at scale. ISD's Counter Conversations programme is an experimental approach designed to fill this gap and test if the methods deployed in offline interventions can be brought into the social media domain. Delivered on Facebook to date and working across Extreme Right and Islamist ideologies, the programme provides an opportunity for individuals showing clear signs of radicalisation to meet and engage with someone that can support their exit from hate. In this report, we present the findings of our most recent pilot programme of Counter Conversations. The results demonstrate the positive potential of direct online engagements and point to the need for further exploration into how this model can be deployed in a responsible, effective and scaled fashion, as part of a suite of online risk reduction methodologies. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 25, 2019 at: http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Counter-Conversations_FINAL.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Counter-Conversations_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 156629 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremism Extremist Groups Online Communications Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment |