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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
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Results for counterterrorism
18 results foundAuthor: Willis, Henry H. Title: Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry Summary: "This report offers research and recommendations on ways to measure the overall efforts of the national border-security enterprise between ports of entry. To be meaningful, the set of measures for effectiveness of border security should be sound, reliable, useful, and general. Three Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions appear to currently be of special interest to DHS leadership because they are especially problematic: illegal drug control, counterterrorism, and illegal migration. The report recommends measuring performance of three fundamental functions that border-security efforts contribute to achieving national policy objectives: interdiction, deterrence, and exploiting networked intelligence. If the steps described here are taken, DHS and its components will be in a better position to discuss past performance and to provide reasoned justifications for future allocation of resources. Further, they will be able to relate their efforts to those of other agencies in pursuit of national objectives." Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. Source: Internet Resource; Technical Report Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119332 Keywords: Border SecurityCounterterrorismDrug ControlIllegal DrugsIllegal Immigration |
Author: Davis, Lois M. Title: Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement's Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Summary: Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the need for increased counterterrorism (CT) and homeland security (HS) efforts at the federal, state, and local levels has taken the spotlight in public safety efforts. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many law enforcement agencies (LEAs) shifted more resources toward developing CT and HS capabilities, and the federal government continues to support these efforts with grants provided through the Department of Homeland Security. This monograph examines the long-term adjustments that large urban LEAs have made to accommodate the focus on CT and HS, as well as the advantages and challenges associated with it. The study relies primarily on in-depth case studies of five large urban LEAs, as well as a review of federal HS grant programs and a quantitative analysis of the potential costs associated with shifting law enforcement personnel from traditional policing to focus on HS and CT functions. Major trends among the five case study LEAs include the creation of specialized departments and units, as well as an increased emphasis on information-sharing, which, nationwide, has led to the creation of fusion centers that serve as formal hubs for regional information-sharing networks. LEAs' HS and CT efforts are also greatly influenced by the restrictions and requirements associated with federal HS grant funding. Finally, using cost-of-crime estimates, it is possible to partially quantify the costs associated with LEAs' shifting of personnel away from traditional crime prevention toward CT and HS - there are also clear benefits associated with law enforcement's focus on CT and HS, but they are difficult to quantify, and this is posing a challenge for LEAs as the economic downturn puts pressure on public budgets. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 15, 2010 at: http://health.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://health.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf Shelf Number: 120522 Keywords: CounterterrorismDomestic IntelligenceEmergency PreparednessHomeland SecurityLaw Enforcement |
Author: Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu Title: Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism Summary: A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks at home and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the terrorist campaign. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism at home, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the developed country; increases in the skilled immigration quota may or may not raise terrorism against the developed country. When the developed country assumes a leadership role, it strategically augments its terrorism defenses and reduces its unskilled immigration quota to induce more proactive measures in the host country. The influence of leadership on the skilled immigration quota is more nuanced. Details: St. Louis, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series; Working Paper 2011-012A: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-012.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-012.pdf Shelf Number: 121613 Keywords: CounterterrorismEconomicsImmigrantsImmigration PolicyTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Harcourt, Bernard E. Title: Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial Profiling an Effective Counterterrorist Measure and Does It Violate the Right to Be Free from Discrimination? Summary: Racial profiling as a defensive counterterrorism measure necessarily implicates a rights trade-off: if effective, racial profiling limits the right of young Muslim men to be free from discrimination in order to promote the security and well-being of others. Proponents of racial profiling argue that it is based on simple statistical fact and represents “just smart law enforcement.” Opponents of racial profiling, like New York City police commissioner Raymond Kelly, say that it is dangerous and “just nuts.” As a theoretical matter, both sides are partly right. Racial profiling in the context of counterterrorism measures may increase the detection of terrorist attacks in the short term, but create the possibility of dangerous substitutions in the long run. Defensive counterterrorism measures are notoriously tricky and can easily backfire. The installation of metal detectors in airports in 1973, for instance, produced a dramatic reduction in the number of airplane hijackings, but also resulted in a proportionally larger increase in bombings, assassinations, and hostage-taking incidents. Target hardening of U.S. embassies and missions abroad produced a transitory reduction in attacks on those sites, but an increase in assassinations. The evidence shows that some defensive counterterrorism measures do not work and others increase the likelihood of terrorist acts. As a practical matter, then, both sides are essentially wrong: racial profiling is neither “just” smart, nor “just” nuts. The truth is, we simply have no idea whether racial profiling would be an effective counterterrorism measure or would lead instead to more terrorist attacks. There is absolutely no empirical evidence on its effectiveness, nor any solid theoretical reason why it would be effective overall. As a result, there is no good reason to make the rights trade-off implicated by a policy of racial profiling in the counterterrorism context. Details: Chicago: The Law School, University of Chicago, 2006. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 288 (2D SERIES): Accessed October 31, 2011 at: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/286.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/286.pdf Shelf Number: 116318 Keywords: CounterterrorismMuslimsRacial Discrimination in Law EnforcementRacial Profiling in Law Enforcement |
Author: Cortright, David Title: Friend not Foe: Civil Society and the Struggle against Violent Extremism - A report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame Summary: Repressive counterterrorism measures (CTMs) have led to an erosion of civil liberties and human rights in many countries. The repercussions have been felt keenly by civil society groups, especially in the global South. Overly restrictive security policies have contributed to a climate of suspicion toward nongovernmental groups, particularly those that challenge social exclusion and unequal power relations. Many of the organizations that work against extremism by promoting human rights and development are themselves being labeled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to operate. Counterterrorism measures include a wide range of policies with differing impacts, which can be loosely characterized as the good, the bad, and the ugly. In the bad and ugly categories are CTMs that overemphasize security and distort development priorities, and that lead to extrajudicial killings, greater state repression, and increased human rights abuse. Repressive counterterrorism measures constrain the operational capacity of civil society actors and impede the work of groups promoting rights-based development. On the positive side are cooperative nonmilitary measures that enhance the capacity of governments to thwart terrorist attacks. Also in the good category are policies that encourage support for sustainable development and the defense of human rights, as recommended in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006. The evaluation of particular policies should be based on the degree to which they contribute to genuine security and democratic governance, while also upholding the rule of law and protecting the work of those striving to defend human rights, promote development, and resolve conflict. The recent trend toward the use of development funding for security-related programs has stirred controversy among development agencies and civil society actors. In the United States a growing percentage of development funding is being channeled through the Pentagon or integrated with military operations. Development advocates recognize the connections that exist between development and security, but they oppose the diversion of development funding to serve the security interests of governments in the global North. The integrity and autonomy of development and human rights activities must be respected as ends in themselves, not as means to other purposes. International policies to prevent the financing of terrorism have adversely affected nonprofit charities and have created a chilling effect in the donor community. Transnational Islamic NGOs have experienced particular difficulties in fulfilling the almsgiving obligation of the zakaat. In several countries, governments have adopted legislation and regulations curbing remittances and imposing conditions on foreign funding. Such restrictions have made it more difficult to finance independent humanitarian assistance, development, and conflict mediation activities. In response to the repressive pressures and restrictions that have been imposed on civil society groups and their supporters, NGOs have established a set of core principles, based on international legal conventions, for protecting the operational and political space of civil society groups. These are: the right to entry, defined as the freedom to associate and form organizations; the right to operate without unwanted state interference; the right to free expression; the right to communicate and cooperate freely internally and externally; the right to seek and secure resources; and the right to have these freedoms protected by the state. States have a duty under international law to assure all citizens the full range of human and civil rights, including freedoms of association and expression. Through their efforts for development and human rights, civil society groups are working to dry up the wells of extremism from which violence springs. Civil society organizations address political grievances, socio-economic injustices, and power imbalances that are among the roots causes of armed conflict. This work is not labeled counterterrorism, nor should it be, but it is exactly what is needed to counter violent extremism. International policymakers must recognize and protect this vital civil society mission and take action to eliminate counterproductive CTMs. In the global struggle against terrorism civil society groups should be welcomed as friends, not hounded as foes. Details: Goshen, IN: Fourth Freedom Forum, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 2, 2012 at http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/KROC_FriendFoe_CivilSocietyAgainstViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/KROC_FriendFoe_CivilSocietyAgainstViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 124351 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCounterterrorismHuman RightsViolent Extremism |
Author: Abbas, Hassan Title: Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success Summary: It is a globally recognized fact that a state’s police and law enforcement agencies play a critical role as the first line of defense against the threats of terrorism and insurgencies. An informative RAND study titled How Terrorist Groups End provides evidence that effective police and intelligence work, rather than the use of military force, deliver better counterterrorism results. Based on this conclusion, the report suggested to U.S. policymakers that they stop using the phrase “war on terrorism,” because there is no battlefield solution to defeating terrorists. Another valuable study analyzing the police role in counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Cyprus concluded that nearly all major twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns relied heavily on indigenous police as well as military forces. Both studies are very relevant to the terrorism and insurgency crisis faced by Pakistan today. Many security experts rightfully contend that both Pakistan and Afghanistan are facing a growing Taliban insurgency in the Pak-Afghan tribal belt – some even call it a Pashtun insurgency. According to Kelev I. Sepp’s Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, which closely studied seventeen insurgencies, the role of the police is always central to any successful counterinsurgency measures. His recommended measures for insurgency hit areas emphasize “police in the lead” with the military providing backup support and strengthening the police with diversified training capabilities to help meet the security needs of the at-risk population. Since 9/11 and the consequent US/NATO military action in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s troubled northwestern frontier has come under increasing pressure from militant and terrorist organizations operating in the area. Pakistan’s deficient and flawed law enforcement capacity in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the adjacent North West Frontier Province (NWFP) have helped Pakistani Taliban and other terrorist groups expand their influence and strongly challenge the state’s writ. Outgunned and outfinanced, on average 400 police officers have been killed every year in terrorist attacks since 2005. Controversial and haphazard Pakistani military action in the area has led to more instability, and limited resistance in FATA has now become a growing ethnic insurgency. As is clear from the turmoil in the NWFP’s Swat district, any army action can provide no more than a breathing space to the state; only police and law enforcement actions can help the state reestablish its writ and stabilize the area. A timely police action can be more effective in quelling emergent insurgencies. My research into the 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) crisis in Islamabad, where a strong military operation led to hundreds of deaths and dozens of retaliatory suicide attacks, also indicates that: (a) an effective police action in time (2004-05) could have avoided the later bloody clash and (b) the police lacked authority and the permission of the state and its important institutions to legally pursue the rebel clerics in the mosque (during the 2004-07 timeframe). The police infrastructure is one of Pakistan’s most poorly managed organizations. It is aptly described as ill-equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized, and chronically corrupt. It has performed well in certain operations; overall, however, that is a rare phenomenon. Arguably, the primary reason for this state of affairs is the government’s persistent failure to invest in law enforcement reform and modernization. It is ironic that despite frequent internal crises since its inception in 1947, ranging from ethnic confrontations and sectarian battles to a sharp rise in criminal activity and growing insurgencies, both political and military policymakers have never given this sector top priority. Hence, poor police performance in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not surprising. The fact that the police successfully challenged some militant religious groups in Punjab and tackled an insurgency-like situation in Karachi in the late 1990s shows that they do have the potential to deliver the desired results when political support is present and resources are provided. Clearly, better policing standards and performance will add to the government’s credibility and establish its writ more effectively in areas that are currently slipping out of its hands. Learning lessons from what transpired in the NWFP in recent years especially in order to plan for any preemptive law enforcement actions in South Punjab, where banned local militant groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are resurgent, is the need of the hour. This policy paper makes the case for international support for police reform in Pakistan to enhance its law enforcement and counterinsurgency capacities. The Obama administration's proposed $1.5 billion annual aid package for Pakistan for the next five years must also include sufficient resources for this sector. To build schools and hospitals, create jobs and spur economic development, security environment in Pakistan has to improve significantly. Police and civilian law enforcement agencies are the most appropriate institutions to spearhead that effort countrywide. Rule of law besides requiring requiring an effective criminal justice system and independent judiciary also needs a competent law enforcement infrastructure. If U.S. funds will make all that happen, it will correspondingly lead to its better image in Pakistan. Democratic institutions in turn will also benefit as their dependence on military for internal law and order duties will lesson. Details: Clinton, MI: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2009. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2012 at: http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 126468 Keywords: CounterterrorismLaw EnforcementPolice ReformPolicing (Pakistan)Terrorism |
Author: Horowitz, Jonathan Title: Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Uganda: The World Cup Bombing and Beyond Summary: East Africa has emerged in recent years as a focus of both transnational terrorism and Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Governments have a responsibility to combat terrorism in a lawful manner. But as this report documents, counterterrorism tactics and operations in East Africa have led to a variety of human rights violations. Governments in the region have cited the need to fight terrorism as a pretext to crack down on political opposition, human rights defenders, and lawful expressions of dissent. This report looks at how the governments of Kenya, Uganda, the United States, and the United Kingdom responded to the 2010 World Cup bombing in Kampala, Uganda. The counterterrorism actions that followed the bombing were characterized by human rights violations, including allegations of arbitrary detention, unlawful renditions, physical abuse, and denial of due process rights. In examining these abuses and the parties responsible for them, the report argues that Kenya, Uganda, and the Western countries that support them must thoroughly investigate the alleged abuses, and must pursue counterterrorism activities that do not entail human rights violations. Details: New York: Open Society Foundations, 2012. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-human-rights-abuses-kenya-uganda-20121127.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-human-rights-abuses-kenya-uganda-20121127.pdf Shelf Number: 127142 Keywords: CounterterrorismHuman Rights Abuses (Kenya and Uganda)TerrorismWorld Cup Bombing |
Author: Coburn, Tom Title: Safety At Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security Spending in U.S. Cities Summary: The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the attacks of September 11, 2011 will forever be etched in our collective memory and forever serve as painful reminders that the enemies of freedom are many and our security often comes at a steep price—in dollars, lives and liberty. We no longer can assume our distant shores from foreign lands or having the greatest military force in the history of the world are enough to protect us. We now live with the reality terrorists are within our midst and they may look, sound and act like us, but they hate everything we are and the values we share. The balancing act between liberty and security has been tenuous throughout the history of our nation, founded upon basic freedoms granted by our Creator and protected from government infringement within the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. But a new element has been added to this equation over the past decade that threatens to undermine both our liberty and security—excessive government spending and insurmountable debt. We cannot secure liberty and guarantee security simply by spending more and more money in the name of security. Every dollar misspent in the name of security weakens our already precarious economic condition, indebts us to foreign nations, and shackles the future of our children and grandchildren. Our $16 trillion national debt has become the new red menace not only lurking in our midst, but created and sustained by shortsighted and irresponsible decisions made in Washington. We can only defend our freedoms by ensuring the dollars we spend on security are done so in a fiscally responsible manner, meet real needs, and respect the very rights we are aiming to preserve and protect. This report, Safety at Any Price, exposes misguided and wasteful spending in one of the largest terror-prevention grant programs at the Department of Homeland Security – the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). We cannot assume that because the UASI program has an important mission and a large budget it is accomplishing its goals, however. Significant evidence suggests that the program is struggling to demonstrate how it is making U.S. cities less vulnerable to attack and more prepared if one were to occur—despite receiving $7.1 billion in federal funding since 2003. After ten years, a clear danger for the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant program is that it would be transformed from a risk-based program targeting security gaps into an entitlement program for states and cities. My office has conducted a year-long inquiry into the this grant program found that to wide of latitude is given to states and urban areas to determine the projects they will fund, and program parameters defining what constitute allowable expenses are extremely broad. Congress and DHS failed to establish metrics to measure how funds spent through the UASI program have made us safer or determine the right amount to dedicate to counterterrorism programs to mitigate the threat. While DHS recently established its first National Preparedness Goal, it has yet to develop a robust assessment of the nation’s current preparedness capabilities or defined performance metrics to assess the effectiveness of federal expenditures made to date. If in the days after 9/11 lawmakers were able to cast their gaze forward ten years, I imagine they would be surprised to see how a counter-terrorism initiative aimed at protecting our largest cities has transformed into another parochial grant program. We would have been frustrated to learn that limited federal resources were now subsidizing the purchase of low-priority items like an armored vehicles to protect festivals in rural New Hampshire, procure an underwater robot in Ohio and to pay for first responder attendance at a five-day spa junket that featured a display of tactical prowess in the face of a “zombie apocalypse.” As we mark the tenth anniversary of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the time has come for Congress to reconsider DHS’s mission and approach to counterterrorism. We must be honest with the American people that we cannot make every community around the country invulnerable to terrorist attacks by writing large checks from Washington, D.C. Not only is this an unrealistic goal, but it also undermines the very purpose of our efforts. By letting every level of government – federal, State and local – do the things each does best, we can secure our cities and our freedoms. Confusing these roles, as we have done with UASI, leads to waste, inefficiency and a false sense of security. We must rededicate ourselves to ensuring that every dollar the federal government spends on terrorism prevention programs is spent wisely, yielding the largest improvement in security and best return on investment for your tax dollars. Facing a $16 trillion national debt, Congress needs to have a conversation about what we can afford to spend on the Department of Homeland Security’s terrorism prevention programs and where to spend it. The American people recognize and understand the limits we face. They understand that we should never sacrifice all of our freedoms in the name of security. We similarly cannot mortgage our children and grandchildren’s future by funding unnecessary and ineffective programs, even including those that have important missions. Details: Washington, DC: Office of U.S. Senator Tom Coburn; Member, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2012. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 13, 2012 at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b86fdaeb-86ff-4d19-a112-415ec85aa9b6 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b86fdaeb-86ff-4d19-a112-415ec85aa9b6 Shelf Number: 127209 Keywords: Costs of Criminal JusticeCounterterrorismCrime PreventionHomeland SecuritySecurity |
Author: UK Cabinet Office Title: The Report of the Detainee Inquiry Summary: On 6 July 2010, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that the government was establishing an independent, judge-led inquiry - The Detainee Inquiry - to be chaired by Sir Peter Gibson, a former senior Court of Appeal Judge, that would: - look at whether Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees, held by other countries, that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. On January 18, 2012, the then Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rt. Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP statement to the House announced: - following consultation with Sir Peter Gibson, the Inquiry Chair, we have decided to bring the work of his Inquiry to a conclusion. We have agreed with Sir Peter that the Inquiry should provide the government with a report on its preparatory work to date, highlighting particular themes or issues which might be the subject of further examination. The government is clear that as much of this report as possible will be made public. This is the report of The Detainee Inquiry on its preparatory work. It highlights particular themes and issues that the Inquiry Panel believe might merit further examination. The Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP made a statement to Parliament about it on 19 December 2013. Details: London: Cabinet Office, 2013. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2014. Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267695/The_Report_of_the_Detainee_Inquiry_December_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 131753 Keywords: CounterterrorismCriminal InvestigationsInterrogationInterviewingPolice Interrogation |
Author: Price, Michael Title: National Security and Local Police Summary: The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted a national effort to improve information sharing among all levels of law enforcement, including on the local level. Federal money poured into local police departments so they could fulfill their new role as the "eyes and ears" of the intelligence community. But how do local police departments go about collecting intelligence? What guidance do they use? What standards or policies, if any, must they adhere to? To learn how state and local agencies are operating in this domestic intelligence architecture, the Brennan Center surveyed 16 major police departments, 19 affiliated fusion centers, and 14 JTTFs. What we found was organized chaos - a sprawling, federally subsidized, and loosely coordinated system designed to share information that is collected according to varying local standards. As detailed in the following report, this headlong rush into intelligence work has created risks that hurt counterterrorism efforts and undermine police work. The lack of oversight, accountability, and quality control over how police collect and share personal information about law-abiding Americans not only violates their civil liberties of Americans, but creates a mountain of data with little to no counterterrorism value. Details: New York: Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law, 2013. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2014 at Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf Shelf Number: 131768 Keywords: CounterterrorismIntelligence GatheringInteragency CooperationNational SecurityPolicing Networks |
Author: Jones, Derek Title: Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations Summary: Lieutenant Colonel Derek Jones wrote this School of Advanced Military Studies award-winning comprehensive study of clandestine cellular networks and the effect on counterinsurgency operations in 2008 while a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Consequently, his monograph, although timeless in its discussion and analysis of clandestine cellular networks, was drafted years before the May 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden that resulted in his death. Therefore, the paper does not address the impact on such organizations from the death of its most charismatic leader. His monograph does provide, however, a theoretical, doctrinal, and operational understanding of the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks resulting in valuable insight and understanding of the complex nature of these organizations. As the world s societies have migrated into the urban areas, according to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jones, the urban guerrilla, underground, and auxiliaries, all operating as clandestine cellular networks, have become increasingly important, especially the core members of the movement within the underground. His analysis presents the problem from a Western military, and especially the counterinsurgent perspective pointing out that the primary components of these networks, the underground and auxiliary elements and the urban guerrillas, exist among and are drawn from the local population. As such, thus, they continually frustrate counterinsurgent operations. Any misapplication of force by the counterinsurgent, in LTC Jones s view, automatically delegitimizes the government s efforts. LTC Jones answered the primary research question what is the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks? Although each insurgency is unique, underground clandestine cellular networks as the foundation of insurgent organizations are not, nor are their form, function, and logic. Details: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 139p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-3: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767 Shelf Number: 131728 Keywords: CounterterrorismCriminal NetworksTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Desta, Tu'emay Aregawi Title: ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion Summary: Money laundering and terrorist financing are major, interconnected problems for East Africa and the Horn. As the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 makes clear, they pose a significant threat not only to security but also to development. Both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have identified a number of states in the subregion as demonstrating weak implementation of international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). Some states in the subregion (Ethiopia and Kenya) have even been placed within the FATF International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) process, which can ultimately lead to obstacles to engagement with the international financial system. There is consequently a growing recognition that states in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) subregion stand to benefit in multiple ways from a more concerted effort to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There is also, however, a chronic limitation of data and knowledge about the problems of money laundering and terrorist financing and about AML/CFT vulnerabilities, risks, and capacities in the subregion. States of the subregion have their own specific vulnerabilities, challenges, weaknesses, and strengths, even as they share certain cross-cutting challenges. In this Baseline Study, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) set out with support from the Royal Government of Denmark to provide a more detailed and nuanced analysis of AML/ CFT challenges and opportunities in the IGAD region, to inform a better allocation of resources to risk and to potential return on investment. The study is a joint effort developed in response to repeated requests by the ISSP's and the CGCC's governmental, intergovernmental, private sector, and civil society partners in the subregion who sought assistance in obtaining baseline data about money laundering risks and AML capacity in the region and guidance on the data's potential use for CFT efforts. Throughout the project design and execution, emphasis has been placed on local ownership. Experts from the East African and Horn subregion coordinated and conducted the project and, where appropriate, also drew on outside expertise. This included input from members of the Danish, Malawian, and Nigerian financial intelligence units (FIUs). The study was prepared by a project team of 10 independent researchers with logistical support and analytical guidance from the ISSP and the CGCC and an informal advisory group of interested officials, academics, and business professionals from the subregion, serving in a personal capacity. That advisory group met twice in Addis Ababa: in October 2011 to help frame the project and develop the research methodology and in March 2012 to critique the resulting analysis and a draft version of this report. The final draft report was shared with all IGAD member states for further review, interagency discussion, comment, and revision. The ISSP and the CGCC approved this report before publication. This study does not provide an exhaustive catalogue or review of money laundering and terrorist financing risks or AML/ CFT efforts in the subregion. Also, it does not purport to provide a categorical assessment of specific AML/CFT projects in the subregion or a country's "performance." This study did not set out to replicate the technical proficiency or political legitimacy of a FATF or ESAAMLG assessment or peer review. Instead, this study represents the collected views of stakeholders in the subregion, gathered by a group of independent analysts, convened by the ISSP and the CGCC, and guided by our Advisory Group. Our aim was not to pass judgment but to provide some starting points for an inclusive and, we hope, coordinated and evidence-based discussion in the years ahead among many stakeholders - national, international, private sector, and civil society - regarding strengthening AML/CFT capacities in the IGAD subregion. This study explores AML/CFT efforts in Djibouti; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; Somalia, including Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and non-TFG efforts; South Sudan; Sudan; and Uganda and at the regional and subregional level (the African Development Bank [AfDB], the African Union [AU], the East African Community [EAC], the East African Development Bank [EADB], the ESAAMLG, and IGAD). Researchers developed desk analysis that was tested through roughly week-long field visits, during which researchers met with relevant local and foreign government officials, civil society actors, private sector entities, and independent analysts. Twenty to 25 interviews were conducted for most jurisdictions - approximately 160 in all - over the course of 60 days of fieldwork. Interviewers used a semistructured format responding to a common set of research questions. The names and institutional affiliations of interviewees have been withheld to ensure confidentiality; a list of institutions that participated may be provided on request. Due to limited resources and concerns about the physical security of the researchers, a methodology not involving field visits by external researchers was used for Eritrea and Somalia. Analysis for these jurisdictions should be read with additional caution, as further verification of the results may be necessary before they can serve as the basis for policy development. A separate chapter of the Baseline Study addresses each of the covered jurisdictions. As far as possible, each chapter addresses similar issues. - Money laundering and terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities and how they are perceived by different stakeholders. - An overview of AML/CFT efforts, including discussion of capabilities and resources (material, legal, human, financial, and political) and how they are perceived by different stakeholders. - An identification of key entry points for international assistance and support to local stakeholders to promote AML/CFT efforts. Details: New York; Addis Ababa: Center on Global Counterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AML_Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AML_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 136482 Keywords: CounterterrorismFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Cragin, Kim Title: What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank Summary: Continued terrorist attacks and the involvement of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have prompted a surge of interest among policymakers, law enforcement, journalists, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic on the topic of terrorist radicalization. Many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Instead of examining the factors that lead to radicalization and the commission of terrorist acts, this report takes a new approach. What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank empirically addresses the topic of why youth reject violent extremism. To do this, the authors focus on the Palestinian West Bank. The report begins with a theoretical model and then tests this model with data gathered through structured interviews and a survey. For this study, ten semistructured interviews were conducted with politicians from Hamas and Fatah in 2012. Along with these interviews, the authors conducted a survey among 600 youth (ages 18-30) who lived in Hebron, Jenin, and Ramallah. The overarching findings from this effort demonstrate that (1) rejecting violent extremism, for residents of the West Bank, is a process with multiple stages and choices within each stage; (2) family plays a greater role than friends in shaping attitudes toward nonviolence; (3) demographics do not have a significant impact on attitudes toward nonviolence; and (4) opposing violence in theory is distinct from choosing not to engage in violence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Palestine URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Shelf Number: 136954 Keywords: CounterterrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Millar, Alistair Title: Blue Sky II: Taking UN Counterterrorism Efforts in The Next Decade From Plans to Action Summary: This report includes a critical analysis of the outcomes of deliberations around the 2016 review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and reflects on implementation efforts going forward. The study is informed by research on current threats and organizational responses; interviews and consultations with UN officials, member state representatives, academics, and practitioners through bilateral discussions; small-group events; and a tailored survey open to governments, UN officials, and civil society. Details: Washington, DC: Global center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Blue-Sky-III_low-res.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Blue-Sky-III_low-res.pdf Shelf Number: 147860 Keywords: CounterterrorismTerrorism |
Author: Glazzard, Andrew Title: Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter-Terrorism Summary: This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the EU's external interventions in counter-terrorism (CT), including preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) carried out in the first semester of 2018. The evaluation does not cover the entirety of the EU's CT interventions, but only those financed by the EU's external instruments. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the relevance, coherence, efficiency and impact of the EU's interventions in order to determine the extent to which the objectives and desired outcomes of the EU's CT policy have so far been achieved. Details: The Hague, Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/publication/global-evaluation-of-the-european-union-engagement-on-counter-terrorism/ Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/eu-ct-evaluation-v7-final.pdf Shelf Number: 153949 Keywords: Countering Terrorism FinancingCountering Violent ExtremismCounterterrorismImpact EvaluationIntervention ProgramsPreventing Violent ExtremismProgram EvaluationViolent Extremism |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Introduction It is the responsibility of both Government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of these incidents. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for providing a protective security overlay. They have been specifically identified - nationally and internationally - as attractive targets by those wishing to engage in terrorism, as well as disgruntled or mentally impaired individuals. Active armed offender attacks have occurred, and continue to occur, in crowded places around the world such as sporting stadiums, transport hubs and entertainment venues. Crowded places present a particularly attractive target for terrorism, due to the ready access to large numbers of potential victims. Attacks which occur in crowded places are particularly insidious because crowds using these places are often distracted by the venue event, reducing their situational awareness of their immediate environment. The Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places are intended to increase understanding of the threat that active armed offender incidents pose in crowded places. The Guidelines seek to illustrate the key role that owners and operators of crowded places can play in developing and implementing appropriately informed prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements to reduce the risks posed by such a threat. The guidance material has been developed by the 'Crowded Places Advisory Group' (CPAG) on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Counter - Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). It should be read in conjunction with Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines for Crowded Places, Chemical Weapon Guidelines and the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines for Crowded Places. Purpose These Guidelines aim to increase the awareness of owners and operators of crowded places of the dynamic terrorism threat, while providing guidance on the issues and options which can be considered during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. These Guidelines set out several broad guiding principles which public and private sector stakeholders should consider to reduce the vulnerability of their site to the threat of terrorism. The Guidelines aim to supplement and build upon some of those broad areas of focus, with particular emphasis on the following two principles: - Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach. - Effective security outcomes in complex crowded place environments require cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. Gaining a better understanding of the risk environment, and options for preventing and dealing with active armed offender incidents, will enable owners and operators in the private sector in particular to more effectively contribute to the collective national efforts to manage the active armed offender threat to crowded places. It is intended that this knowledge will lead to the development of 'contingency plans' or sub-plans to supplement existing emergency response plans and arrangements at facilities and venues. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-armed-offender-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/active-armed-offender-guidelines-for-crowded-places.aspx Shelf Number: 154371 Keywords: Active Armed OffenderAustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesCrowded Places Advisory GroupEntertainment VenuesEvent SecurityNew ZealandRadicalizationRisky FacilitiesSporting StadiumsTerrorismTerrorist AttacksVenue Security |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Introduction Crowded places can pose a broad range of security challenges for their owners and operators. Terrorists and other criminals have, and will continue to, see crowded places as attractive targets for attacks both in Australia and overseas. Terrorist attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) often target crowded places such as public transport hubs, sporting arenas, entertainment precincts, and shopping malls. Government and private sector cooperation helps to ensure incident planning and arrangements are integrated and effective, while aiming to reduce the likelihood and impact of IED attacks. The Crowded Places Advisory Group (CPAG) has developed these Guidelines on behalf of the Australia New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), with input from the Business Advisory Group (BAG). They should be read in conjunction with Australias Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places, Chemical Weapon Guidelines and Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines. Purpose Those who own or operate crowded places are responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the general public by applying well-informed risk and emergency management arrangements. It benefits everyone to stop or limit the consequences of an IED incident and quickly restore normal business activities. These Guidelines help people who own or operate crowded places to be more aware of the threat posed by IEDs. They also provide guidance on the issues and options to consider during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. Australias Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism sets out several guiding principles for public and private sector stakeholders to reduce their vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. These Guidelines supplement the Strategy with key emphasis on the following two principles: - Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence- led, risk management approach; and - Effective security outcomes in complex environments where large crowds gather require cooperation and coordination between all stakeholders. Details: Canberra, Australia: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2017. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/IED-Guidelines/IED-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/australias-strategy-for-protecting-crowded-places-from-terrorism.aspx Shelf Number: 154373 Keywords: AustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesCrowded Places Advisory GroupEntertainment VenuesImprovised Explosive DevicesNew ZealandRisk ManagementRisk MitigationRisky Facilities |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Who should read this and why - vehicles as weapons This publication provides an overview of hostile vehicle mitigation to all owners and operators responsible for the management of crowded places. It offers insight into how protective measures can be integrated into public and private places in order to mitigate and reduce the impact of vehicles being used as weapons. Owners and operators of crowded places want their site to be as safe as reasonably possible for their staff and the public. Organisational reputation, business continuity, and legal requirements for publicly accessible areas to be safe are all important reasons for owners and operators to understand and mitigate the risk posed by hostile vehicles. The aim of this document is to provide those responsible for crowded places with knowledge to inform security design considerations and decisions. It is intended to be a starting point to the development of effective and aesthetically complementary designs that help protect crowded places from hostile vehicles. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Shelf Number: 154374 Keywords: AustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesHostile VehiclesNew ZealandRisk ManagementRisk MitigationTerrorismTerrorist AttacksVehicles as Weapons |