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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
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Results for criminal intelligence
17 results foundAuthor: Wade, Cheryl L. Title: The California Law Enforcement Community’s Intelligence-Led Policing Capacity Summary: Hindsight gives the nation much clarity regarding the cause of the failure to prevent the tragic events of 9/11. Calls for reform challenge the intelligence community, and law enforcement in general, to create the collaborative capacity to connect the dots, dare to imagine, and become accustomed to expecting the unexpected. Throughout the various reformation efforts over the last nine years, one central theme endures: the ability to share intelligence across interagency and intergovernmental barriers is imperative. The inextricable link between foreign and domestic intelligence demands that changes be made to smooth the continuum of efforts from public safety, to homeland security, to national security. If the quality of intelligence in this continuum is directly related to the depth and breadth of information available, then the participating agencies must be fully networked. Such a network is one way to transform the unknowingly relevant into potentially actionable intelligence. How else can domestic events be understood in an international context (or vice versa)? Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11524 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11524 Shelf Number: 122782 Keywords: Community-Oriented PolicingCrime AnalysisCriminal IntelligenceIntelligence AnalysisIntelligence-Led Policing |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress Summary: The 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., “connecting the dots”) as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Two of the efforts undertaken since 2001 to tackle these issues included • Congress mandating the creation of an information-sharing environment (commonly known as the “ISE”) that would provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies. • States and major urban areas establishing intelligence fusion centers to coordinate the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism intelligence and analysis. The imperative for the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is founded on three propositions. The first is that any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur in a community within a state or tribal area, and the initial response to it will be by state, local, and tribal emergency responders and law enforcement officials. Second, the plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack within the United States (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities. Third, “[i]nformation acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources.” Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) contain information about criminal activity that may also reveal terrorist pre-operational planning. Many believe that the sharing of SARs among all levels of government and the fusing of these reports with other intelligence information will help uncover terrorist plots within the United States. The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) is an effort to have most federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations participate in a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, and analyzing terrorism-related SARs. The NSI is designed to respond to the mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), for a “decentralized, distributed, and coordinated [information sharing] environment ... with ‘applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.’” This report describes the NSI, the rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective. It examines the privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the initiative and identifies other oversight issues for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R40901: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf Shelf Number: 123560 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceFusion CentersInformation SharingTerrorism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Police Information and Intelligence Systems Summary: In recent years there have been some important developments concerning the use of criminal intelligence by law enforcement agencies in many parts of the world and these have resulted in an increasing recognition amongst practitioners that: timely and actionable criminal intelligence is essential to make an impact on the prevention, reduction and investigation of serious and organised crime, particularly when it is of a trans-national nature. (“Timely” means that it is provided in good time and “actionable” means that its detail and reliability supports the taking of action.); criminal intelligence can play a significant role in helping with the directing and prioritising of resources in the prevention, reduction and detection of all forms of crime – through the identification and analysis of trends, modus operandi, “hotspots” and criminals – both at the national and transnational level; and intelligence can form the bedrock of an effective policing model – often termed “Intelligence Led Policing” – where intelligence is essential to providing strategic direction and central to the deployment of staff for all forms of tactical policing activity, including community policing and routine patrols. Whilst significant differences will be seen in the understanding and acceptance of information and intelligence as a law enforcement tool, the fact remains that, in many countries and international organisations, criminal intelligence has been adopted as the law enforcement strategy of choice to drive policing forward in the next century. Details: New York: UNODC, 2006. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit 4: Accessed May 16, 2012 at: http://www.unrol.org/files/4_Police_Information_Intelligence_Systems.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: http://www.unrol.org/files/4_Police_Information_Intelligence_Systems.pdf Shelf Number: 125308 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceIntellegence-Led PolicingOrganized Crime |
Author: The Constitution Project Title: Recommendations for Fusion Centers: Preserving Privacy & Civil Liberties while Protecting Against Crime & Terrorism Summary: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the federal and state governments embarked on a far-ranging effort to detect and defend against potential terrorist threats. One of the central components of this effort has been the creation of a network of state and regionally-based fusion centers that share information among law enforcement and some intelligence agencies. Today at least 77 fusion centers are active in the United States. While these state entities have received substantial support from Congress and the Executive Branch, their roles and missions vary widely and are still being developed. Run properly, fusion centers could play an important role in addressing terrorist and other criminal threats. Yet fusion centers can also pose serious risks to civil liberties, including rights of free speech, free assembly, freedom of religion, racial and religious equality, privacy, and the right to be free from unnecessary government intrusion. Several fusion centers have issued bulletins that characterize a wide variety of religious and political groups as threats to national security. In some instances, state law enforcement agencies that funnel information to fusion centers have improperly monitored and infiltrated anti-war and environmental organizations. Moreover, the manner in which fusion centers amass and distribute personal information raises the concern that they are keeping files—perhaps containing information that is sensitive or concerns constitutionally protected activities—on people in the United States without proper justification. For these reasons, we, the members of The Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee endorsing this report, have undertaken this examination of fusion centers, and offer a set of recommendations to assist policymakers to ensure that fusion centers operate effectively while respecting civil liberties and constitutional values. Part II of this report provides an overview of the structure of fusion centers and the institutional framework within which they operate. Parts III, IV and V identify specific concerns raised by fusion center data collection, data storage and use, and accountability and governance mechanisms. Part VI outlines our specific recommendations for reforms that address civil liberties concerns. We hope that these recommendations will facilitate the development of sound rules and best practices to ensure respect for constitutional rights and values. Indeed, fusion centers themselves seek concrete guidance on the practical application of constitutional principles to daily threat assessment. We also hope that they will encourage further consideration of the proper role and mission of fusion centers within the nation’s law enforcement and anti-terrorism framework. Details: Washington, DC: The Constitution Project, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2012 at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Shelf Number: 126403 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCriminal IntelligenceFusion CentersInformation SharingPrivacyTerrorism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Criminal Intelligence: Manual for Front-line Law Enforcement Summary: This manual offers criminal intelligence guidance to law enforcement officers, from understanding relevant concepts and categories, through to specific components of the intelligence process. The Manual specifically address the evaluation of sources and data, analysis and the analytical process, the role of analysis and analytical techniques. This manual offers criminal intelligence guidance to analysts from understanding relevant concepts and categories, through to specific components of the intelligence process. Specially, the manual clarifies evaluation sources of intelligence and data, focusing particularly on basic analytical techniques, including link analysis, event charting, flow analysis and telephone analysis. The manual also equips practitioners to develop inferences and present he results of their analysis. Details: New York: UNODC, 2010. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Front_Line_Law_Enforcement.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Front_Line_Law_Enforcement.pdf Shelf Number: 126658 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsPolice Manuals |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Criminal Intelligence: Manual for Analysts Summary: This manual offers criminal intelligence guidance to analysts from understanding relevant concepts and categories, through to specific components of the intelligence process. Specially, the manual clarifies evaluation sources of intelligence and data, focusing particularly on basic analytical techniques, including link analysis, event charting, flow analysis and telephone analysis. The manual also equips practitioners to develop inferences and present he results of their analysis. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Analysts.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Analysts.pdf Shelf Number: 126802 Keywords: Crime AnalysisCriminal IntelligenceHandbooksIntelligence Gathering |
Author: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Title: Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media in Intelligence and Investigative Activities: Guidance and Recommendations Summary: The advent of social media sites has created an environment of greater connection among people, businesses, and organizations, serving as a useful tool to keep in touch and interact with one another. These sites enable increased information sharing at a more rapid pace, building and enhancing relationships and helping friends, coworkers, and families to stay connected. Persons or groups can instantaneously share photos or videos, coordinate events, and/or provide updates that are of interest to their friends, family, or customer base. Social media sites can also serve as a platform to enable persons and groups to express their First Amendment rights, including their political ideals, religious beliefs, or views on government and government agencies. Many government entities, including law enforcement agencies, are also using social media sites as a tool to interact with the public, such as posting information on crime trends, updating citizens on community events, or providing tips on keeping citizens safe. Social media sites have become useful tools for the public and law enforcement entities, but criminals are also using these sites for wrongful purposes. Social media sites may be used to coordinate a criminal-related flash mob or plan a robbery, or terrorist groups may use social media sites to recruit new members and espouse their criminal intentions. Social media sites are increasingly being used to instigate or conduct criminal activity, and law enforcement personnel should understand the concept and function of these sites, as well as know how social media tools and resources can be used to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and investigate criminal activity. To ensure that information obtained from social media sites for investigative and criminal intelligence-related activity is used lawfully while also ensuring that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected, law enforcement agencies should have a social media policy (or include the use of social media sites in other information-related policies). This social media policy should communicate how information from social media sites can be utilized by law enforcement, as well as the differing levels of engagement—such as apparent/overt, discrete, or covert—with subjects when law enforcement personnel access social media sites, in addition to specifying the authorization requirements, if any, associated with each level of engagement. These levels of engagement may range from law enforcement personnel “viewing” information that is publicly available on social media sites to the creation of an undercover profile to directly interact with an identified criminal subject online. Articulating the agency’s levels of engagement and authorization requirements is critical to agency personnel’s understanding of how information from social media sites can be used by law enforcement and is a key aspect of a social media policy. Social media sites and resources should be viewed as another tool in the law enforcement investigative toolbox and should be used in a manner that adheres to the same principles that govern all law enforcement activity, such as actions must be lawful and personnel must have a defined objective and a valid law enforcement purpose for gathering, maintaining, or sharing personally identifiable information (PII). In addition, any law enforcement action involving undercover activity (including developing an undercover profile on a social media site) should address supervisory approval, required documentation of activity, periodic reviews of activity, and the audit of undercover processes and behavior. Law enforcement agencies should also not collect or maintain the political, religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any individual or group, association, corporation, business, partnership, or organization unless there is a legitimate public safety purpose. These aforementioned principles help define and place limitations on law enforcement actions and ensure that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are diligently protected. When law enforcement personnel adhere to these principles, they are ensuring that their actions are performed with the highest respect for the law and the community they serve, consequently fostering the community’s trust in and support for law enforcement action. The Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media in Intelligence and Investigative Activities: Guidance and Recommendations is designed to guide law enforcement agency personnel through the development of a social media policy by identifying elements that should be considered when drafting a policy, as well as issues to consider when developing a policy, focusing on privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. This resource can also be used to modify and enhance existing policies to include social media information. All law enforcement agencies, regardless of size and jurisdiction, can benefit from the guidance identified in this resource. The key elements identified in this resource can be applied to “traditional” social media sites (such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) and are also applicable as different and new types of social media sites emerge and proliferate. As a policy is developed, the agency privacy officer and/or legal counsel should be consulted and involved in the process. Additionally, many agencies have an existing privacy policy that includes details on how to safeguard privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and an agency’s social media-related policy should also communicate how these protections will be upheld when using information obtained from social media sites. Social media sites have emerged as a method for instantaneous connection among people and groups; information obtained from these sites can also be a valuable resource for law enforcement in the prevention, identification, investigation, and prosecution of crimes. To that end, law enforcement leadership should ensure that their agency has a social media policy that outlines the associated procedures regarding the use of social media-related information in investigative and criminal intelligence activities, while articulating the importance of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. Moreover, the same procedures and prohibitions placed on law enforcement officers when patrolling the community or conducting an investigation should be in place when agency personnel are accessing, viewing, collecting, using, storing, retaining, and disseminating information obtained from social media sites. As these sites increase in popularity and usefulness, a social media policy is vital to ensuring that information from social media used in criminal intelligence and investigative activities is lawfully used, while also ensuring that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are diligently protected. Details: Washington, DC: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 29, 2013 at: https://it.ojp.gov/gist/Document/132 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://it.ojp.gov/gist/Document/132 Shelf Number: 128845 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsInformation TechnologyIntelligence GatheringMedia and CommunicationsSocial Media |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Fusion Center Summary: This review examined the operations of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Fusion Center (OFC) and assessed its process for sharing its analytical products. The OFC is a multi-agency intelligence center that produces intelligence products in response to requests from federal investigators (requesters). The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Special Operations Division (SOD) supports the OFC in developing these products. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2014. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: I-2014-002: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/e1402.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/e1402.pdf Shelf Number: 132194 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceDrug EnforcementFusion CentersInformation SharingOrganized Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation Title: The FBI Story Summary: For the FBI and its partners, 2012 was a year that reminded us once again of the seriousness of the security threats facing our nation. During the year, extremists plotted to attack-unsuccessfully, thanks to the work of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces-the U.S. Capitol, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and other landmarks on U.S. soil. Tragically, on the 11th anniversary of 9/11, a hateful attack in Benghazi took the lives of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other Americans. In the cyber realm, a rising tide of hackers took electronic aim at global cyber infrastructure, causing untold damages. High-dollar white-collar crimes of all kinds also continued to siphon significant sums from the pocketbooks of consumers. And in Newtown, Connecticut, 20 young children and six adults lost their lives in one of the worst mass shootings in American history, ending a year of violence that saw similar tragedies around the country. Working with its colleagues around the globe, the FBI is committed to taking a leadership role in protecting the nation. As you can see from this book-an annual compilation of stories from the FBI's public website that provides a snapshot of Bureau milestones, activities, and accomplishments-we used the full range of our intelligence, investigative, and operational skills to address major threats during the year. We helped avert terrorist attacks and derail terrorist supporters, put cyber criminals and fraudsters behind bars, and dismantled violent gangs and organized crime groups. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 28, 2015 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fbi-story/fbistory2012.pdf/view Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fbi-story/fbistory2012.pdf/view Shelf Number: 129962 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceFBIFederal Bureau of InvestigationHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Kowalick, Phil Title: Opportunities abound abroad: Optimising our criminal intelligence system overseas Summary: Criminal intelligence (CrimInt) is so useful in serious criminal investigations that it's difficult to envisage a situation where it shouldn't be sought and used if it's available. This special report argues that Australia's current arrangements for gathering and disseminating CrimInt overseas are suboptimal. While additional resources are needed to address this condition, there's also a need to streamline priority setting and associated collection requirements, provide ways to evaluate and better coordinate the collection of information and intelligence product, and expand opportunities to improve training in CrimInt. The paper provides recommendations to improve the quality and utility of our overseas CrimInt effort for law enforcement, policy and regulatory agencies. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/opportunities-abound-abroad-optimising-our-criminal-intelligence-system-overseas/SR90_CrimInt.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/opportunities-abound-abroad-optimising-our-criminal-intelligence-system-overseas/SR90_CrimInt.pdf Shelf Number: 139615 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsPolice Intelligence |
Author: Mohler, George O. Title: Randomized controlled field trials of predictive policing Summary: The concentration of police resources in stable crime hotspots has proven effective in reducing crime, but the extent to which police can disrupt dynamically changing crime hotspots is unknown. Police must be able to anticipate the future location of dynamic hotspots to disrupt them. Here we report results of two randomized controlled trials of near real-time Epidemic Type Aftershock Sequence (ETAS) crime forecasting, one trial within three divisions of the Los Angeles Police Department and the other trial within two divisions of the Kent Police Department (UK). We investigate the extent to which i) ETAS models of short term crime risk outperform existing best practice of hotspot maps produced by dedicated crime analysts, ii) police officers in the field can dynamically patrol predicted hotspots given limited resources, and iii) crime can be reduced by predictive policing algorithms under realistic law enforcement resource constraints. While previous hotspot policing experiments fix treatment and control hotspots throughout the experimental period, we use a novel experimental design to allow treatment and control hotspots to change dynamically over the course of the experiment. Our results show that ETAS models predict 1.4-2.2 times as much crime compared to a dedicated crime analyst using existing criminal intelligence and hotspot mapping practice. Police patrols using ETAS forecasts led to a average 7.4% reduction in crime volume as a function of patrol time, whereas patrols based upon analyst predictions showed no significant effect. Dynamic police patrol in response to ETAS crime forecasts can disrupt opportunities for crime and lead to real crime reductions. Details: Unpublished paper, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2016 at: http://paleo.sscnet.ucla.edu/MohlerEtAl-2015-JASA-Predictive-InPress.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://paleo.sscnet.ucla.edu/MohlerEtAl-2015-JASA-Predictive-InPress.pdf Shelf Number: 146052 Keywords: Crime ForecastingCrime MappingCriminal IntelligenceHot SpotsPredictive Policing |
Author: Laros, Jeroen F.J. Title: Metrics and Visualisation for Crime Analysis and Genomics Summary: Informally speaking, Data Mining [67] is the process of extracting previously unknown and interesting patterns from data. In general this is accomplished using different techniques, each shedding light on different angles of the data. Due to the explosion of data and the development of processing power, Data Mining has become more and more important in data analysis. It can be viewed as a subdomain of Artificial Intelligence (AI [61]), with a large statistical component [4, 28]. Amongst the patterns that can be found by the usage of Data Mining techniques, we can identify Associations. Examples of this can be found in market basket analysis. One of the (trivial) examples would be that tobacco and cigarette paper are often sold together. A more intricate example is that certain types of tobacco (light, medium, heavy) are correlated with different types of cigarette paper. This so-called Association Mining is an important branch of Data Mining. Other patterns that are frequently sought are Sequential patterns. Sequential patterns are patterns in sets of (time)sequences. These patterns can be used to identify trends and to anticipate behaviour of individuals. Associations and Sequential patterns will play a major role in this thesis. Once patterns have been identified, we often need a visualisation of them to make the discovered information insightful. This visualisation can be in the form of graphs, charts and pictures or even interactive simulations. Data Mining is commonly used in application domains such as marketing and fraud detection, but recently the focus also shifts towards other (more delicate) application domains, like pharmaceutics and law enforcement. In this thesis we focus on the application domains law enforcement and sequence analysis. In law enforcement, we have all the prerequisites needed for Data Mining: a plethora of data, lots of categories, temporal aspects and more. There is, however, a reluctance when it comes to using the outcome of an analysis. When used with care, Data Mining can be a valuable tool in law enforcement. It is not unthinkable, for example, that results obtained by Data Mining techniques can be used when a criminal is arrested. Based on patterns, this particular criminal could have a higher risk of carrying a weapon, or an syringe, for example. In law enforcement, this kind of information is called tactical data. After the Data Mining step, statistics is usually employed to see how significant the found patterns are. In most cases, this can be done with standard statistics. When dealing with temporal sequences though, and lots of missing or uncertain data, this becomes exceedingly harder. Details: Leiden: University of Leiden, 2009. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/14533/thesis.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/14533/thesis.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 144935 Keywords: Crime AnalysisCriminal IntelligenceData MiningDNA |
Author: Wesseling, Mara Title: An EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System Summary: The idea for a European equivalent to the US's Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) - an investigative tool for tracing and linking international financial transactions in order to detect terrorist plots and networks - was first proposed by members of the European Parliament and certain EU member states during the 2010 negotiations on the EU-US TFTP Agreement. Under this arrangement, the EU is not allowed direct access to the US system but may submit search requests. Critically, transactions conducted under the auspices of the EU's own pan-European payments initiative, the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which enables bank-to-bank payments within the Eurozone, are excluded from the TFTP, an omission that some refer to as 'the SEPA data gap'. SEPA is the EU-wide single market for payments made in euros that has been progressively established with adoption of the Payment Services Directive (PSD) of 5 December 2007 to facilitate cross-border payments. It refers to both a geographic space and a legal framework, providing a standardised payment format for credit transfers, debits, (credit) card payments and money remittance, as well as mobile and online payments. Financial services providers had to migrate to the SEPA format before 1 February 2014, while non-EU SEPA countries must comply with the SEPA framework by the end of 2016. Article 11 of the EU-US TFTP Agreement specifies that the possibility of introducing a socalled 'EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System (EU TFTS)' would be investigated and that the US would provide assistance and advice in establishing such a system, should this be the result of the investigation. The first impact assessment, produced in November 2013 and detailing the options towards this end, was not taken forward. Nevertheless, a renewed interest in a European system for tracking terrorist finance emerged after the terrorist attacks on the Paris offices of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and further Paris attacks in November of the same year. The latest EU 'Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Terrorist Financing', published on 2 February 2016, demanded that by December 20165 the European Commission should undertake a new assessment of a possible EU TFTS, which would complement the existing EU-US TFTP Agreement. This paper is structured around two key issues. First, it studies past debates and negotiations concerning the US TFTP in order to highlight those issues of importance should an EU TFTS be created. Second, it examines previous and current proposals, as well as debates, concerning the creation of an EU TFTS, drawing out the differences between previous iterations and current demands. This paper is concerned with identifying the lessons that can be learned from previous experiences and with the analysis of past and current debates on the creation of an EU TFTS. The last section offers further food for thought regarding the possible creation of an EU TFTS. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_wesseling_an_eu_terrorist_finance_tracking_system.1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_wesseling_an_eu_terrorist_finance_tracking_system.1.pdf Shelf Number: 140775 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Title: Law Enforcement Use of Cell-Site Simulation Technologies: Privacy Concerns and Recommendations Summary: Advances in emerging surveillance technologies like cell-site simulators – devices which transform a cell phone into a real-time tracking device – require careful evaluation to ensure their use is consistent with the protections afforded under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The United States' military and intelligence agencies have developed robust and sophisticated surveillance technologies for deployment in defense against threats from foreign actors. These technologies are essential to keeping America safe. Increasingly though, domestic law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels are using surveillance technologies in their every-day crime-fighting activities. In the case of cell-site simulators, this technology is being used to investigate a wide range of criminal activity, from human trafficking to narcotics trafficking, as well as kidnapping, and to assist in the apprehension of dangerous and violent fugitives. Law enforcement officers at all levels perform an incredibly difficult and important job and deserve our thanks and appreciation. While law enforcement agencies should be able to utilize technology as a tool to help officers be safe and accomplish their missions, absent proper oversight and safeguards, the domestic use of cell-site simulators may well infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the right to free association. Transparency and accountability are therefore critical to ensuring that when domestic law enforcement decide to use these devices on American citizens, the devices are used in a manner that meets the requirements and protections of the Constitution. After press reports alleged wide-spread use of cell-site simulation devices by federal, state, and local law enforcement, the Committee initiated a bipartisan investigation in April 2015. At the outset of the investigation, the use of these devices by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies was not well known, and in many instances, appeared to be shrouded in secrecy. This is partly due to the use of the technology by military and intelligence agencies and the need for sensitivity in national security matters. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, avoided disclosing not only its own use of the devices, but also its role in assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in obtaining and deploying these devices. Indeed, the Committee's investigation revealed that as part of the conditions for being able to sell cell-site simulators to state and local law enforcement, the manufacturers of these devices must first notify the FBI, and those agencies in turn must sign a non-disclosure agreement with the FBI that expressly prohibits them from publicly disclosing their use of this technology, even in prosecutions where the use of the technology was at issue. On April 24, 2015, the Committee sent letters to then-Attorney General Eric Holder and Homeland Security Director Jeh Johnson, requesting information about their agencies' use of cell-site simulators and the privacy concerns inherent with their use. During the course of the investigation, it became clear that the use of cell-site simulators by state and local law enforcement agencies was not governed by any uniform standards or policies. In an effort to determine how widespread this problem was, the Committee identified four cities of varying sizes and crime rates, along with two states, for the purpose of ascertaining the number and type of cell-site simulators in use, as well as the policies that were employed for their use. In particular, the Committee sent letters to the police departments in Washington, D.C.; Alexandria, Virginia; Sunrise, Florida; Baltimore, Maryland; the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation; and the Virginia State Police, requesting among other things, information regarding the number, the funding, and the use of these devices at the state and local level. Documents and information obtained by the Committee confirmed varying standards for employing cell-site simulation devices among federal, state, and local law enforcement. Notably, the documents and information revealed that when the Committee first began its investigation in April 2015, federal law enforcement entities could obtain a court’s authorization to use cell-site simulators by meeting a standard lower than probable cause — the standard to obtain a search warrant. On October 21, 2015 the Committee’s Subcommittee on Information Technology (the Subcommittee) held a public hearing on DOJ's and DHS’s use of cell-site simulators. 7 The hearing focused on the agencies’ policies and procedures for deploying cell-site simulation technology. In September 2015, five months into the Committee's investigation and with the hearing upcoming, DOJ announced a new policy for its use of cell-site simulation devices. Shortly thereafter, DHS followed suit with the announcement of a similar new policy. At the hearing, it became evident that prior to the Committee’s investigation, the component law enforcement entities of DHS and DOJ had different policies and procedures governing their use of this technology and the agencies were not always obtaining a probable cause based warrant prior to deploying these devices. The new policies substantially changed how the agencies obtain authorization to deploy cell-site simulation technology. The new policies also introduced a measure of uniformity to how the various component agencies of each department used cell-site simulators, and importantly, required the agencies to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause in the majority of situations. Details: Washington, DC: The Committee, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/THE-FINAL-bipartisan-cell-site-simulator-report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/THE-FINAL-bipartisan-cell-site-simulator-report.pdf Shelf Number: 147302 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceInformation TechnologyIntelligence GatheringSurveillance Technology |
Author: Oak, Gillian S. Title: Building the Guatemalan Interagency Task Force Tecún Umán Lessons Identified Summary: Guatemala is a major transit point for drugs bound for the United States and the recipient of U.S. counternarcotics aid and technical assistance, much of which is provided through U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. Army South. As a first step by Guatemala in putting this aid to work toward developing its own counternarcotics capacity, the president of Guatemala established the Interagency Task Force (IATF) Tecún Umán. USSOUTHCOM has expressed the intent to apply the IATF as a model to other similarly porous border regions in the area. Thus, documenting and using lessons from the IATF Tecún Umán will help in the development of new and similar units. This report is intended to support that lessons-learned function, demonstrate how these preliminary lessons are being applied to future IATF development, and provide recommendations on how to resolve remaining IATF challenges. Lessons learned include the importance of establishing the interagency legal framework early, clearly defining the interagency relationships, developing an intelligence capability organic to the task force, implementing police authority and leadership, identifying measures of success, communicating the IATF's purpose and success to the public, and maintaining equipment. Remaining tasks include resolving the duality-of-command issue, improving operational planning capability, addressing corruption problems, and addressing IATF Tecún Umán issues before refocusing efforts to IATF Chortí. The United States has played a key role in supporting Guatemala's efforts to overcome these challenges. By investing in the IATF and building capacity, the United States will contribute to the Guatemalans' ability to sustain the IATF themselves. Key Findings The legal framework and early definition of interagency relationships are vital to success. Creating a legal framework and documentation with support from all involved government agencies was crucial for gaining complete cooperation in establishing IATF Tecún Umán. However, the required legal documents were not issued until after the unit had been established and personnel had started working. Had the framework been documented first, many of the growing pains in the interagency relationships might have been avoided. IATF Tecún Umán lacks an organic intelligence capability. Most IATF personnel are capable of gathering their own tactical intelligence, but they have no place to feed it and no support or authority to plan or conduct autonomous operations, thus limiting their ability to react to any intelligence threats discovered. The military is still running the IATF at the tactical level. Although IATF Tecún Umán leadership at the operational level consists of military personnel, police are being trained to take over the leadership roles, as was intended. Operational effectiveness isn't consistently measured or communicated to the public. The office of the vice minister for counternarcotics and IATF leadership have made progress in collecting data and measures focused on the effects of the operations in which the IATF was involved, but assessment capability is still limited. Demonstrating the value of the IATF to the Guatemalan people, especially those nearby, is also important. Lack of logistical support jeopardizes equipment sustainment and maintenance. Recommendations Resolve the duality-of-command issue. Guatemalan leadership, with U.S. support, needs to ensure each level understands and commits to associated roles and responsibilities, from the most senior leader to the most junior soldier or police agent on the ground. To create operational planning capability, Guatemala and the United States should work together to set up an operational planning cell in the vice minister's office and establish an intelligence feedback loop to inform planning. Guatemala and the United States should collaborate in developing and executing train-the-trainer courses to develop organic training capability, allowing Guatemalans to train their own forces. The United States should continue to work with the Guatemalans on applying stringent vetting to police hires, investigating corruption charges, and ensuring that the police academies are closely complying with new regulations to prevent corruption problems. The Guatemalans should refocus on resolving the major problems that prevent IATF Tecún Umán from conducting autonomous operations. Having invested millions of dollars in IATF Tecún Umán, the United States should make clear that the development and success of the new IATF Chortí is tied to finishing the job at Tecún Umán. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR885.html Year: 2015 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR885.html Shelf Number: 141071 Keywords: Border Security Criminal IntelligenceDrug Trafficking Illegal Drug Trade |
Author: Hawk, Shila Rene Title: A Multi-Method Examination of Homicide Investigations on Case Outcomes Summary: Approximately a third of homicide cases go unsolved each year. Research focused on understanding what affects homicide clearance rates is often methodologically underdeveloped and has produced mixed findings. These deficiencies compromise the ability of researchers to provide important guidance to police practitioners seeking to develop best practices. Under-specified modeling and limited access to accurate sources of homicide investigation data are two potential and interconnected reasons for the inconsistencies found in previous studies. The purpose of this study was to expand the literature on homicide case outcomes as follows: 1) to organize predictors into five substantive domains (involved subjects, event circumstances, case dynamics, ecological characteristics, and investigator factors) and operationalize multiple measures of each as viable predictors of clearance outcomes; 2) to explore the utility of using original and verified police data with a larger number of nuanced data points than previously documented in modeling efforts; and 3) to forward a unique multi-method account of the factors that predict homicide case outcomes that can be readily replicated in future studies. Data were collected from one Southern metropolitan police department's 2009 to 2011 homicide investigations (N = 252). Access to official homicide case files allowed for key subject, incident, and evidentiary information to be obtained. Critical investigation details and context were added to the case file data via interviews and survey administration efforts involving the lead detectives that worked the cases. The dataset was further supplemented with Census data. Subsequent analyses included examination of the data quality and multivariate logistic regressions. A comparison of the dataset after the first stage of data collection to the final product was conducted to understand the extent to which the dataset were improved. The multi-method process resulted in more precision to the data recorded from case files, significant reductions in missing data, and heightened detail on key variables. Consequently those data allowed for specification of a multivariate model that included multiple measures from all of the homicide investigation domains. Those results suggest the expanded data more accurately captured the factors that predict clearance outcomes as measures within all five domains were significant predictors of investigation closure. Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2015. 302p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 10, 2017 at: http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=cj_diss Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=cj_diss Shelf Number: 144771 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal Investigations Homicides Murders |
Author: Thomas, Garry Title: A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales Summary: This research critically analyses the use of community intelligence in the delivery of local neighbourhood policing in South Wales and the police service in general. It examines in detail the development of policing and intelligence, particularly neighbourhood policing and community intelligence from its early beginnings and evaluates the contemporary definitions and police officer and staff perceptions of neighbourhood policing and community intelligence. This research also proposes a new definition of community intelligence and analyses how community intelligence is gathered, recorded and processed, and its relationship to the Intelligence Cycle and the National Intelligence Model. It further examines the operational application of community intelligence, including in counter terrorism and tackling organised crime, and the competing priorities, tensions and contradictions between performance management, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing. This research also evaluates the decision making process and how that may be affected by organisational issues such as, organisational culture, behaviour, management, leadership, information and knowledge. It examines the importance of community engagement in developing community intelligence and providing cohesive policing services to the public. Furthermore, this research considers the future directions of community intelligence and research on policing. The findings from this research indicate that some community intelligence is used to direct policing patrols and operations. However, there is some confusion by police officers and staff as to what constitutes community information and intelligence and thus it is not always recorded correctly limiting its use in the delivery of local neighbourhood policing and resulting in the loss of intelligence. This serves to highlight some of the areas for improvement in the policies, procedures, systems and management of intelligence. The findings also indicate the potential use of community intelligence in counter terrorism and in the provision of improved policing services to the public. Details: Pontypridd: University of South Wales, 2014. 385p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 14, 2017 at: http://dspace1.isd.glam.ac.uk/dspace/handle/10265/767 Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://dspace1.isd.glam.ac.uk/dspace/handle/10265/767 Shelf Number: 144907 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceNeighborhood Policing Police-Citizen Interactions Police-Community Relations |