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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri

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Results for criminal networks

145 results found

Author: Englund, Cecilia

Title: The Organisation of Human Trafficking: A Study of Criminal Involvement in Sexual Exploitation in Sweden, Finland and Estonia

Summary: Trafficking in human beings for sexual purposes has attracted great attention in recent years. Many activities have been initiated to combat such global trafficking. However, some areas may have been neglected, in particular the situation with regard to criminal activity. This report sheds light on this aspect, as its aim is to describe trafficking in human beings for a sexual purpose with a focus on the organisation of the criminal networks involved. The study in Sweden, Finland and Estonia This report is based on a study carried out in 2007-2008 in three countries on the Baltic Sea: Sweden, Finland and Estonia. The aim of the study was to examine the organisation and structures of criminal networks involved in human trafficking for sexual purposes and the conditions and factors of the market and the trade in Sweden, Finland and Estonia. Further, the process of trafficking was studied, from recruitment in the country of origin, to the transporting of women and girls to the country of destination, where procuring has taken place. This study has been carried out by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention together with the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI) and the Institute of Law at Tartu University in Estonia.

Details: Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2008. 192p.

Source: Report 2008:21: Accessed Dec. 10, 2018 at: https://www.bra.se/download/18.cba82f7130f475a2f1800023448/1371914733517/2008_21_human_trafficking.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: Europe

URL: https://www.bra.se/download/18.cba82f7130f475a2f1800023448/1371914733517/2008_21_human_trafficking.pdf

Shelf Number: 113237

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Trafficking (Finland, Sweden, Finland)
Organized Crime
Prostitution
Sex Trafficking
Sexual Exploitation

Author: Brady, Hugo

Title: The EU and the Fight Against Organised Crime

Summary: This report calls for closer EU co-operation to fight organized crime. It points out that while criminals can move easily between EU countries, national policemen cannot. The report examines what the EU's role is in helping member-states to tackle the threat of organized crime, and whether police forces are working together closely enough to break up organized criminal networks.

Details: London: Centre for European Reform, 2007. 40p.

Source: Working Paper (Centre for European Reform)

Year: 2007

Country: Europe

URL:

Shelf Number: 113795

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: Martinez, Angelica Duran

Title: Organized Crime, the State and Democracy: The Cases of Central America and the Caribbean

Summary: Over a decade on from the end of the civil wars that devastated the region, large parts of Central America are once again afflicted by chronic violence. This time, however, the principal culprits are narco-traffickers and criminal networks, undermining state structures through corruption and clandestine links to political parties, judges and law enforcement officials. In the Caribbean, meanwhile, a flourishing drug trade has brought wealth, but at the cost of rising homicide rates and grave damage to democratic institutions. Based on a two-day conference of experts held in early 2007 in New York, this report explores new thinking on the ills afflicting the region - including the highly controversial mara gangs - and how the international community might help remedy the problems of crime and corruption without undermining the fragile states that are the essential building blocks of any long-term solution.

Details: Madrid: FRIDE (Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior), 2007. 16p.

Source: Internet Resource

Year: 2007

Country: Central America

URL:

Shelf Number: 118677

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Gangs
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (Central America, Caribbean)
Narcotics
Organized Crime

Author: Briscoe, Ivan

Title: A State of Siege: Elites, Criminal Networks and Institutional Reform in Guatemala

Summary: The scale and severity of the challenges facing the Guatemala state have been underlined by events over the past year. Humanitarian crises and a continuing wave of violent crime, exacerbated by the penetration in Guatemalan territory of Mexican cartels, have multiplied the demands on public authorities. The government of President Alvara Colom, a self-declared social democrat, has vowed to fight poverty and clean up the security and judicial systems. To a significant extent, the country is still locked into the terms of the informal political and economic settlement that lay beneath the formal peace process ending the country's civil war in 1996. Whereas the peace accords promised rural development, a stronger and wealthier public sector, and a dismantling of the structures of counter-insurgency, the post-conflict reality fell under a different paradigm. Criminal groups, involving former military officers, acting state officials, criminal entrepreneurs and gang members, extended their influence. This paper, which forms part of the broader Clingendael research programme into post-conflict and fragile states, aims to unpick these constrains on governance in Guatemala, and also points to the emerging trends that are now altering the country's internal balance of power. In particular, the election of Colom in 2007 and the creation in the same year of the UN Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) are landmark events that appear to have undermined the post-conflict settlement. However, recent setbacks, including the paralysis of key policy initiatives - such as tax reform - and repeated acts of corruption in the security forces and the judicial system have raised questions over whether reform of the state is possible, and how it is to be carried out.

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2010. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2010 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100913_cru_publication_ibriscoe.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Guatemala

URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100913_cru_publication_ibriscoe.pdf

Shelf Number: 119873

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Criminal Violence
Gangs
Organized Crime

Author: Killebrew, Bob

Title: Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security

Summary: Criminal networks linking cartels and gangs are no longer simply a crime problem, but a threat that is metastasizing into a new form of widespread, networked criminal insurgency. The scale and violence of these networks threaten civil governments and civil societies in the Western Hemisphere and, increasingly, the United States as well. American policymakers have been slow to recognize the evolution of the drug cartels and gangs from purely law enforcement problems to the strategic threat they now pose. Drug trafficking is variously described solely in terms of a drug problem, a challenge to other countries or a problem for states along the United States' southern border. Drug trafficking groups are, in fact, a threat across all these categories – they are part of networks attacking the United States and other friendly countries on many fronts. Although the U.S. government is currently implementing measures to address the separate pieces of this problem – for example, deploying National Guard units to the border – it has yet to craft a truly comprehensive domestic and foreign strategy to confront the inter-related challenges of trafficking and violence reaching from the Andean Ridge to American streets. This report is the product of a yearlong study by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). It seeks to explain the scale of organized crime in key countries in the Western Hemisphere and provide elements of such a strategy. We make these observations based on research and analysis of regional trends as well as conversations with government and law enforcement officials, in the United States and abroad, on the front lines of this fight. The first section presents the geography of crime in Latin America, outlining how the criminal networks in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and other countries in between pose a common problem for the region and the United States. While the circumstances and potential futures of each country differ, they are linked. The following section shows how the same networks are also active and growing within the United States, posing the need for domestic as well as foreign action. The last section of this study recommends principles to guide a national strategy against cartels and gangs. Finally, to make the point that illegal drug trafficking is not the cartels’ only business, the appendix summarizes the major kinds of illicit commerce that support organized criminal groups in this hemisphere.

Details: Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010. 77p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 20, 2010 at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_KillebrewBernal.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: United States

URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_KillebrewBernal.pdf

Shelf Number: 119971

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Cartels
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime

Author: Briscoe, Ivan

Title: Kosovo's New Map of Power: Governance and Crime in the Wake of Independence

Summary: The nationalist euphoria that greeted Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 has given way to acute international concern over the character of this new Balkan state. Alleged corruption, abuses of power, murky ties between politicians and business, authoritarian reactions to the media and the continuing existence of inter-ethnic tensions in the flashpoint of north Mitrovica point to serious weaknesses in the country’s capacity for responsible and accountable governance. Recent reports of senior politicians’ involvement in wartime atrocities have only served to deepen the gloom. But this portrait of the country obscures other crucial developments. This report highlights the fundamental obstacles in the way of reform as well as the signs of change in the attitudes of Kosovo’s citizenry towards malfunctioning institutions, exemplified in the elections of December 2010. It concludes by offering some recommendations for donors that would strengthen mechanisms for domestic accountability in Kosovo on the basis of a realistic assessment of the way power is handled and distributed.

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), 2011. 62p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2011 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110503_cru_publication_ibriscoe.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110503_cru_publication_ibriscoe.pdf

Shelf Number: 121727

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Political Corruption (Kosovo)
Political Violence

Author:

Title: Cutting the Links Between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia's 2011 Elections

Summary: Deeply entrenched connections between criminal and political actors are a major obstacle to conflict resolution in Colombia. Illegal armed groups seek to consolidate and expand their holds over local governments in the October 2011 governorship, mayoral, departmental assembly and municipal council elections. The national government appears more willing and better prepared than in the past to curb the influence of illegal actors on the elections, but the challenges remain huge. The high number of killed prospective candidates bodes ill for the campaign, suggesting that the decade-old trend of decreasing electoral violence could be reversed. There are substantial risks that a variety of additional means, including intimidation and illegal money, will be used to influence outcomes. The government must rigorously implement additional measures to protect candidates and shield the electoral process against criminal infiltration, corruption and fraud. Failure to mitigate these risks would mean in many places four more years of poor local governance, high levels of corruption and enduring violence. Decentralisation in the 1980s and 1990s greatly increased the tasks and the resources of local government, but in many municipalities, capabilities failed to keep pace. This mismatch made local governments increasingly attractive targets for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. Violence against candidates, local office holders and political and social activists soared. With a largely hostile attitude to local governments, guerrillas have mainly concentrated on sabotaging and disturbing the electoral process. By contrast, paramilitary groups, particularly after the formation of a national structure under the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), used their links with economic and political elites to infiltrate local governments and capture public resources. That peaked in the 2003 local elections. Since then, and particularly after the official demobilisation of these groups in 2006, the influence politicians linked to paramilitaries enjoyed has weakened but not disappeared. The October elections are the first test of how democratic institutions under the government of President Juan Manuel Santos cope with the growing power of new illegal armed groups and paramilitary successors (NIAGs), now acknowledged as the country’s biggest security threat. These organisations, which the government calls BACRIM (criminal gangs), are unlikely to have a unified stance towards the elections. Some will be content with minimal relations to local politics to guarantee their impunity, access to information and freedom of action. But NIAGs are rapidly evolving into larger, more robust criminal networks, so some could develop a more ambitious political agenda. Several advocates of land restitution for the victims of Colombia’s long-running armed conflict already have been assassinated, suggesting that this major Santos initiative is likely to be met by alliances between criminals and some segments of local economic elites, in defence of the status quo. Meanwhile, frequent attacks against prospective candidates and civilians suggest that the weakened FARC wants to prove it is not a spent force. Colombia is better prepared than in the past to take on these challenges. Impunity is decreasing, as judicial investigations into links between politicians and paramilitaries have resulted in the conviction of some two dozen members of Congress. Investigations and indictments are now moving down to the local government level, albeit slowly and unevenly. In July 2011, the government signed into law a far-ranging political reform, paving the way for the imposition of penalties on parties that endorse candidates with links to illegal armed groups or face investigation for drug trafficking and crimes against humanity. Election financing rules and anti-corruption norms have also been stiffened, although shortcomings in the legal framework remain. Over the long term, these changes should favour more competitive and cleaner local elections, but in the short term, their impact will, for a number of reasons, be limited. The approval of the political reform law less than four months ahead of the elections has heightened uncertainty, and time is running short to apply some of the innovations. More broadly, political parties remain weak, and there are doubts whether they can even effectively determine their own nominees in all cases. Meaningful competition is unlikely to emerge in regions where the political and economic environment is heavily biased towards elites formerly linked to paramilitaries. Clientelism continues to be a drag on local politics, while links between criminals and politicians are frequently difficult to expose because of deep-seated popular mistrust of unresponsive local authorities. Guaranteeing the conditions for free, fair and competitive elections remains the dominant immediate challenge for the government. But more needs to be done to protect local government from the influence of illegal armed groups over the long term. The National Electoral Council (CNE) must be strengthened and become more independent. Congress needs to update and simplify Colombia’s diverse electoral rules. Political parties must establish stronger internal structures and develop a culture of accountability. These changes will ultimately be insufficient, however, if local government continues to lack the institutional capacities to guarantee democratic, clean and efficient management of its affairs.

Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 37: Accessed July 26, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Colombia

URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf

Shelf Number: 122156

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Criminal Violence (Colombia)
Paramilitaries
Paramilitary Groups
Political Corruption

Author: Finklea, Kristin M.

Title: The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement

Summary: Savvy criminals constantly develop new techniques to target U.S. persons, businesses, and interests. Individual criminals as well as broad criminal networks exploit geographic borders, criminal turf, cyberspace, and law enforcement jurisdiction to dodge law enforcement countermeasures. Further, the interplay of these realities can potentially encumber policing measures. In light of these interwoven realities, policy makers may question how to best design policies to help law enforcement combat ever-evolving criminal threats. Criminals routinely take advantage of geographic borders. They thrive on their ability to illicitly cross borders, subvert border security regimens, and provide illegal products or services. Many crimes — particularly those of a cyber nature — have become increasi ngly transnational. While criminals may operate across geographic borders and jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement may not be able to do so with the same ease. Moreover, obstacles such as disparities between the legal regimens of nations (what is considered a crime in one country may not be in another) and differences in willingness to extradite suspected criminals can hamper prosecutions. The law enforcement community has, however, expanded its working relationships with both domestic and international agencies. Globalization and technological innovation have fostered the expansion of both legitimate and criminal operations across physical borders as well as throughout cyberspace. Advanced, rapid communication systems have made it easier for criminals to carry out their operations remotely from their victims and members of their illicit networks. In the largely borderless cyber domain, criminals can rely on relative anonymity and a rather seamless environment to conduct illicit business. Further, in the rapidly evolving digital age, law enforcement may not have the technological capabilities to keep up with the pace of criminals. Some criminal groups establish their own operational “borders” by defining and defending the “turf” or territories they control. Similarly, U.S. law enforcement often remains constrained by its own notions of “turf” — partly defined in terms of competing agency-level priorities and jurisdictions. While some crimes are worked under the jurisdiction of a proprietary agency, others are not investigated under such clear lines. These investigative overlaps and a lack of data and information sharing can hinder law enforcement anti-crime efforts. U.S. law enforcement has, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increasingly relied on intelligence-led policing, enhanced interagency cooperation, and technological implementation to confront 21st century crime. For instance, enforcement agencies have used formal and informal interagency agreements as well as fusion centers and task forces to assimilate information and coordinate operations. Nonetheless, there have been notable impediments in implementing effective information sharing systems and relying on up-to-date technology. Congress may question how it can leverage its legislative and oversight roles to bolster U.S. law enforcement’s abilities to confront modern-day crime. For instance, Congress may consider whether federal law enforcement has the existing authorities, technology, and resources — both monetary and manpower — to counter 21st century criminals. Congress may also examine whether federal law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information.

Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 41p.

Source: Internet Resource: R41927: Accessed August 9, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41927.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: United States

URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41927.pdf

Shelf Number: 122332

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Cybercrime
Cybercriminals
Intelligence Gathering
Law Enforcement

Author: Mastrobuoni, Giovanni

Title: Understanding Organized Crime Networks: Evidence Based on Federal Bureau of Narcotics Secret Files on American Mafia

Summary: Using unique data on criminal profiles of 800 US Mafia members active in the 50s and 60s and on their connections within the Cosa Nostra network we analyze how the geometry of criminal ties between mobsters depends on family ties, community roots and ties, legal and illegal activities. We contrast our evidence with historical and sociological views about the functioning of the Mafia. Much of our findings are remarkably in line with these views, with interesting qualifications. We interpret some of our results in light of a model of optimal vertical and horizontal connections where more connections mean more profits but also a higher risk of defection. We find that variables that lower the risk of defection, among others, kinship, violence, and mafia culture increase the number of connections. Moreover, there is evidence of strategic endogamy: female children are as valuable as male ones, and being married to a “connected” wife is a strong predictor of leadership within the Mafia ranks. A very parsimonious regression model explains one third of the variability in the criminal ranking of the “men of honor,” suggesting that these variables could be used to detect criminal leaders. An additional prediction of our simple model is a right-skewed distribution of the number of connections, which is remarkably in line with the evidence of an extremely hierarchical organization.

Details: Unpublished Working Paper, 2010. 57p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 15, 2011 at: http://www.princeton.edu/chw/lectures-conferences/Mastrobuoni2-Understanding-Organized-Crime-September-2010.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: United States

URL: http://www.princeton.edu/chw/lectures-conferences/Mastrobuoni2-Understanding-Organized-Crime-September-2010.pdf

Shelf Number: 122389

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Mafia
Organized Crime (U.S.)

Author: Shaffer, Gregory C.

Title: Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?

Summary: Countries in virtually every region of the world are criminalizing cartel offenses. Many have initiated prosecutions, several have secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time. Yet outside the United States the enforcement record is hardly uniform, and the debate about cartel criminalization is far from resolved. This situation raises a host of questions. What spurred the trend toward cartel criminalization? Have the changes been driven primarily by criminalization evangelists such as the United States Department of Justice, whether working bilaterally or through transnational networks? Are organic, bottom-up, national processes also at work, suggesting changing moral sensibilities regarding cartel conduct? To what extent have formal legal changes been accompanied by enhanced enforcement? This Essay tackles these questions through a review of criminalization and enforcement developments in the United States, Europe, and around the world. While the emerging legal landscape of anti-cartel activity is complex and varies significantly by jurisdiction, the clear trend is toward increased criminalization, as well as more robust enforcement, including collaboration among national antitrust authorities through informal transgovernmental networks. The trends, however, are not uniform, and the implementation of formal legal changes is an open question in light of divergent institutional contexts and social attitudes regarding cartels.

Details: Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota School of Law, 2011. 34p.

Source: Internet Resource: Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-26: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865971

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865971

Shelf Number: 122639

Keywords:
Criminal Cartels
Criminal Networks
Criminal Organizations

Author: Gastrow, Peter

Title: Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya

Summary: The threat posed by organized crime is not confined to serious crimes such as racketeering, the global drug trade, or human trafficking. For many developing countries and fragile states, powerful transnational criminal networks constitute a direct threat to the state itself, not through open confrontation but by penetrating state institutions through bribery and corruption and by subverting or undermining them from within. Governments that lack the capacity to counter such penetration, or that acquiesce in it, run the risk of becoming criminalized or “captured” states. This paper examines whether Kenya faces such a threat. Six categories of transnational organized crime are examined, pointing to significant increases in criminal activity with pervasive impacts on government institutions in Kenya. Rampant corruption in the police, judiciary, and other state institutions has facilitated criminal networks’ penetration of political institutions. The research findings do not justify Kenya being labeled a criminalized state, but its foundations are under attack. Determined interventions are required to stem organized criminal networks from further undermining the state. The paper concludes with recommendations for steps to be taken at the national, regional, and international levels: National • Establish an independent, specialized serious crimes unit. • Enhance research, analysis, and information dissemination on organized crime in Kenya and East Africa. • Carry out a major overhaul of company registration systems to enhance accuracy, transparency, and public access. Regional • Significantly enhance police cooperation in the East African Community. International • Develop an East African Community Initiative that builds on the experience of the interagency West Africa Coast Initiative.

Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2011. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 18, 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2562.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Kenya

URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2562.pdf

Shelf Number: 123045

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime (Kenya)
Political Corruption

Author: Alkholt, Aimar

Title: Nigerian Criminal Networks; A Comparative Analysis

Summary: Why is an African federation the home to one of the more dominating criminal networks operating globally? Nigeria is not well known for its high level of Internet-infrastructure. Still, it is in a class of its own when it comes to e-fraud or 419 spam mails. It is also prominent within the drug trade and the African-European trafficking network. By comparatively analysing other forms of Organized Crime against the Nigerian Brand, the thesis has tried to find the particulars of Nigerian Criminal Networks. The thesis found two particular indicators that stood out in the analysis: Social Networking and the 419 industry. Also, by looking at the level of integration between Nigerian politics and Criminal Networks and the argumentation used by agents within the Criminal Networks and the dynamics of the Nigerian E-fraud, this thesis argues that the same socio-cultural dynamics stemming from before the colonial period of the "great scramble" to present time, is the very same driving force behind Nigerian Criminal Networks today, forming an "Internet Economy of Affection". A general trend points in the direction that individuals growing up in the Nigerian federation seem to have a higher potential for social networking since their weak state gives them little protection in economic, welfare, security and educational spheres. They have to rely on the informal sector instead: the sphere of social networking. This may be one facet and first step toward the complex explanation how the dynamics of e-fraud, trafficking and drug-trade in Nigerian Criminal Networks, works at present.

Details: Bergen, Norway: University of Bergen, Department of Administration and Organization Theory, 2010. 112p.

Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis:

Year: 2010

Country: Nigeria

URL:

Shelf Number: 123356

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Fraud and Corruption
Internet Crimes
Organized Crime (Nigeria)

Author: Cockayne, James

Title: State fragility, organised crime and peacebuilding: towards a more strategic approach

Summary: Fragile states, with their ready pools of unemployed labour, populations inured to violence and weakened state capacity, offer sites of competitive advantage for militant organisations, criminal networks and political leaders alike. Collaboration among them may benefit all three – financing militancy, protecting crime and securing political control. Criminal networks threaten not only to fuel conflict, but also to undermine post-war gains – by criminalising politics and instrumentalising continuing disorder, thereby creating pervasive fragility in the international system. Yet the international community currently lacks a coherent approach to tackling organised crime in conflict-affected communities. This report argues that there are normative, analytical and practical obstacles to the development of an effective response. Firstly, at the normative level, sovereignty represents a constraint on international action, especially where crime and politics are intertwined. Secondly, there is analytical confusion regarding how to understand and respond to organised criminal actors in peacebuilding contexts. Security-oriented actors tend to treat organised criminals as potentially violent spoilers of peace processes – or potential partners for peace – and focus on coercion, negotiation and compromise. Development actors tend to focus on addressing the structural factors – such as high unemployment, access to weapons and access to profitable illicit markets – that criminal entrepreneurs exploit. These different approaches are poorly integrated and sometimes compete outright. Thirdly, there are numerous obstacles to the international mobilisation and organisation of the capacity needed to tackle organised crime effectively, particularly specialist investigative resources and analytical expertise. The report suggests treating organised crime as a strategy of governance, and differentiates among different strategies (predatory, parasitic, symbiotic) that may pose different threats to peacebuilding. Finally, it proposes a series of specific steps that might be taken immediately and in the medium and long term to equip peace builders with the analysis, tools and capacity they need to mount a more strategic response.

Details: Oslo, Norway: NOREF (Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre), 2011.

Source: Internet Resource, NOREF Report: Accessed on December 8, 2011 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/2af427c8039ed02db6fd29fab1144aa8.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/2af427c8039ed02db6fd29fab1144aa8.pdf

Shelf Number: 123507

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
International Crime
Organized Crime

Author: Vallejo, Catalina

Title: Iron fist politics in Colombia: A panorama of destruction

Summary: During the last decade many Latin American countries have resorted to mano dura (iron fist) politics and militarisation to combat crime, drugs and subversion. The high number of killed, injured and displaced persons in Colombia is a testimony of the failure of the iron fist policy with regard to in a crucial aspect of security: developing cultures of respect. When making policy in response to illegal groups’ violence, does using the same violent strategy allow for constructive social engagement? Does it break cycles of violence? While the villains’ death makes for a peaceful ending in comic books, in Latin America it reproduces violence. It is urgent to reimagine heroism and restore “enemies” their human dignity.

Details: Bergen, Norway: CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), 2011. 4p.

Source: CMI Brief, Volume 11 No. 1: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Colombia

URL: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf

Shelf Number: 123886

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Criminal Violence (Colombia)
Paramilitaries
Paramilitary Groups
Political Corruption
Violence (Colombia)

Author: Bosworth, James

Title: Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Chaos

Summary: Honduras’ geographic features and location make it an ideal midway point between the drug producers in South America and drug consumers in North America. Nobody has a precise number, but the best estimates predict that several hundred tons of cocaine will transit Honduras this year, of which less than 10 percent will be seized by authorities. In its wake, well-funded transnational criminal organizations combined with local gangs are destabilizing the country’s democratic institutions and making it one of the most dangerous countries in the world in terms of violent crime. Since the 1970’s, Honduran criminal organizations focused on getting drugs - particularly cocaine - in, around and through Honduras, taking a cut of the profit along the way. Honduran Juan Ramoìn Matta Ballesteros ran a key organization trafficking cocaine in the early 1980’s between Colombia and Mexico. At times in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, Colombian groups such as Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) exercised management, influence and oversight in the trafficking in Honduras, but the power generally remained with the Honduran transportistas. In the past decade, a crackdown on drug trafficking organizations in Colombia combined with the rise of increasingly powerful Mexican cartels stretching their influence into Central America has impacted the trafficking situation in Honduras. Illicit flights from South America and boats with cocaine moving up both coasts have increased. Youth gangs in Honduras provide the traffickers with organizations that can intimidate and murder for cheap. The Sinaloa Cartel bought or forced its management influence over a number of previously Honduran controlled trafficking routes. The Zetas followed suit. The public security situation in Honduras is among the worst in the world, ranking among the top five nations with the highest number of violent crimes and murders per capita. The government estimates that one person is killed every 88 minutes. The UNODC reported that the province of Atlántida, which includes the port city of La Ceiba, may be among the most violent in the Western Hemisphere with 1 person out of every 1,000 killed in violence crimes. Various press rights organizations believe Honduras, along with Mexico, will be one of the two most dangerous countries for journalists this year. In the past year, the country’s counter-drug czar was killed by a Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and a plot was broken up to assassinate the country’s Minister of Security. To complicate matters, the turmoil in Honduras’ political system over the past two years has opened space for increased organized crime activity. An institutional battle, a military coup, and ongoing complications about the international recognition of Honduras’s government have dissuaded the aid and cooperation believed necessary to fight organized crime. While the following sections of this paper describe the specific influence of the Mexican DTOs and other international organizations, there remains a thriving “independent” industry of transportistas in which people unassociated with specific DTOs move cocaine up the coast and sell it at a higher price to DTOs further north. Groups as small as 2 and as large as 25, usually composed of Nicaraguans or Hondurans, will purchase cocaine in southern parts of Central America (Panama, Costa Rica or Nicaragua) from organizations managed by Colombian and Venezuelan DTOs. They then move the cocaine up the coast to Honduras or Guatemala, where they sell it at a profit on the black market that is run by the Sinaloa, Gulf and Zetas organizations. One such micro-DTO, the Reñazcos, is a Honduran family that operates mostly on the Nicaraguan side of the border, transporting cocaine by land and sea through Nicaraguan territory and into Honduras. Once they move the cocaine into Honduras, they transfer control of the drugs to the Mexican DTOs. Although small in size, the organization has been operating for almost a decade. In 2004 they killed several police officers in the Nicaraguan Caribbean city of Bluefields. The Nicaraguan government claimed in late 2010 that the group tried to break several drug traffickers out of prison in that region.

Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2010. 33p.

Source: Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Honduras

URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf

Shelf Number: 124218

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Cartels
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime (Honduras)

Author: Farah, Douglas

Title: Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facilitators: How Networks Connect

Summary: The multi-billon dollar illicit trade of commodities (from cocaine to blood diamonds, weapons and human beings) has many complexities, from creating or extracting the product to moving the product to international markets to delivering payments. The return cycle is equally complex, including the types of payments used to acquire the commodities, from cash to weapons and other goods the seller may need. This cycle relies on a specific group of individuals who act as facilitators in connecting different facets of the criminal and/or terrorist networks of state and non-state actors. This chapter addresses this crucial role of a cohort of actors -- “fixers,” “super fixers” and “shadow facilitators” -- in empowering social networks that operate within illicit commodity chains.

Details: Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2012. 26p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2012 at http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20120423_Farah_FixersSuperFixersShadow.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: United States

URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20120423_Farah_FixersSuperFixersShadow.pdf

Shelf Number: 125252

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Illicit Trade
Transnational Crime

Author: Madnick, Mattison H.

Title: Street Gangs as Decentralized Criminal Networks?: The Case of the 18th Street Gang

Summary: The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that street gangs have the ability to operate as independent decentralized networks. Street gangs have been stereotyped as having a centralized leadership structure similar to that of larger criminal organizations. Although some gangs do have a formalized hierarchical structure, this is clearly not the case for all gangs. A thorough examination of how some street gangs operate and communicate with each other clearly shows that some street gangs have the capacity to operate sects independently from each other and without a central leadership instructing them on how to operate their criminal enterprise. The 18th Street gang was selected as a case study for this thesis because the gang's network and structure clearly demonstrates the capacity for street gangs and similar groups to operate as decentralized, autonomous criminal networks. This Thesis looks at the various aspects of 18th Street's criminal network. This includes the gang's culture, its methods of communication, how the gang is structured and functions, as well as the techniques used by gang members to shield themselves from law enforcement. The paper will also look at the international impact the gang has had as it has spread from the United States into Mexico and Central America. It will dissect the gang's international structure, criminal enterprise, as well as dissect the validity of the claim that 18th Street is a transnational criminal organization.

Details: San Deigo, CA: San Diego State University, 2010. 91p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 2, 2012 at: http://sdsu-dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.10/311/Madnick_Mattison.pdf?sequence=1

Year: 2010

Country: United States

URL: http://sdsu-dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.10/311/Madnick_Mattison.pdf?sequence=1

Shelf Number: 125443

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Street Gangs (California)

Author: Garzon Vergara, Juan Carlos

Title: The Rebellion of Criminal Networks: Organized Crime in Latin America and the Dynamics of Change

Summary: Organized crime in Latin America is undergoing constant and substantial changes, positioning itself as a relevant strategic actor in the hemisphere, reconfiguring geographic borders, penetrating political and social structures, playing a significant role in the economy, and threatening progress in building the state and strengthening democratic systems. Although its manifestations differ from place to place, organized crime is present in every country in the region and has become one of the biggest challenges governments face. To combat organized crime governments debate whether to employ traditional—mostly “iron first”—policies or adopt newer—and largely unproven—alternatives. In light of the constant changes in criminal structures and their capacities to learn, innovate, and adapt, it is useful to examine the factors that explain these constant shifts as well as how such organizations have managed to expand their influence and presence despite the efforts and policies implemented by Latin American states. This essay introduces a concept—the “rebellion” of criminal networks—to explain the current dynamic of and context within which organized crime operates. The essay concludes with ten recommendations for addressing this challenge.

Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2012. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas: Accessed August 13, 2012 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Garzon.Rebellion.ENG_.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Central America

URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Garzon.Rebellion.ENG_.pdf

Shelf Number: 126011

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime (Latin America)

Author: Sidibé, Kalilou

Title: Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Summary: The three principle and intertwining security threats in the North of Mali are trafficking (drugs, arms, cigarettes, cars, etc.), rebellious uprisings and terrorist activity. Any attempts at maintaining law and order are undermined by the fragility of state structures, and the lack of equipment and infrastructure for the armed forces. These threats also weaken the socioeconomic fabric of local communities and Malian national and territorial unity. The Malian government endeavours to address these challenges by adopting and implementing security and anti-terrorism policies, as well as social and economic development programmes. External partners support the Malian government in its efforts through a variety of joint anti-terrorism and development policies aiming to strengthen the state’s operational capacity in the region. Furthermore, local communities work alongside state actors in the development and securitisation of Northern Mali by employing traditional conflict-management mechanisms (intercommunity and interclan solidarity systems). This strategy builds strong links that considerably reduce the risk of open conflict and contributes to the establishment of a multilevel shared governance system.

Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2012. 108p.

Source: Internet Resource: Research Report Vol. 2012, No. 77: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Mali

URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf

Shelf Number: 126041

Keywords:
Anti-Terrorism Policies
Conflict-Management
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Security
Smuggling

Author: Farah, Douglas

Title: Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority

Summary: The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, which makes the understanding of these new dynamics an important factor in a broader national security context. This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate theory of constraints activity, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, into the potential for trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors. These activities are carried out with the support of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, which yields billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year. These same leaders have a publicly articulated, common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction. The central binding element in this alliance is a hatred for the West, particularly the United States, and deep anti-Semitism, based on a shared view that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a transformative historical event. For Islamists, it is evidence of divine favor; and for Bolivarians, a model of a successful asymmetrical strategy to defeat the “Empire.” The primary architect of this theology/ideology that merges radical Islam and radical, anti-Western populism and revolutionary zeal is the convicted terrorist Ilich Sánchez Ramirez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal,” whom Chávez has called a true visionary.

Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012. 95p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117

Year: 2012

Country: Central America

URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117

Shelf Number: 126258

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Rrafficking
Money Laundering
National Security
Organized Crime (Latin America)
Terrorism
Transnational Crime
Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author: Lacher, Wolfram

Title: Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region

Summary: For the past decade, increasing instability in the Sahel and Sahara region has been a source of growing concern in Europe and the United States. Western governments have worried that the weakness of state control in the area would allow al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) and other jihadist organizations to expand their influence and establish safe havens in areas outside government control. Such fears appear to have been vindicated by the recent takeover of northern Mali by AQIM and organizations closely associated with it. Western governments have focused heavily on AQIM’s presence, providing technical assistance in an attempt to strengthen the capacity of the security sectors and justice systems to combat the group. But Western governments have underestimated, if not ignored, the destabilizing impact of organized crime in the region. AQIM itself is in part a criminal network, kidnapping Western nationals with the double aim of extorting ransoms and freeing the group’s imprisoned members. And up until Mali’s military coup of March 2012, state complicity with organized crime was the main factor enabling AQIM’s growth and a driver of conflict in the north of the country. Actors involved in organized crime currently wield decisive political and military influence in northern Mali. As they have in the past, Sahel governments will be tempted to use organized crime as a political resource by allowing their allies to benefit from criminal activities—which has clear implications for policy. Concentrating on capacity building in the judicial and security sector is the right approach only if governments stand behind efforts to combat criminal networks. Donors should thus focus more on political engagement, encouraging strategies that make the political accommodation of influential players contingent upon their disengagement from the illicit economy and commitment to containing drug and weapons smuggling. This will be especially difficult in Mali, where the government will have to strike deals with local forces, including temporary alliances with at least some of the north’s criminal networks, to gain back control of the territory. The challenge is ensuring that a settlement of the conflict there does not consolidate the power of criminal networks and expand their ability to operate. But with few alternative sources of income in the region and none that can rival the gains to be made from criminal activity, taking strong steps to break up criminal networks could do more harm than good. The best external actors can do is to help incrementally weaken the networks in Mali’s north by developing a coherent international approach to limiting ransom payments, one of AQIM’s main sources of funding, and to help strengthen regional cooperation.

Details: Washignton, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2012 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Africa

URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf

Shelf Number: 126371

Keywords:
Crime and Conflict
Criminal Networks
Transnational Organized Crime (Africa)

Author: Davis, Ian S.

Title: A Theory of Dark Network Design

Summary: This study presents a theory of dark network design and answers two fundamental questions about illuminating and interdicting dark networks: how are they configured and how are they vulnerable? We define dark networks as interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve their purpose. A dark network must design itself to buffer environmental hostility and produce output to achieve its purpose according to its design state. The level of hostility in the environment and the requirement for secure coordination of work determine the dark network’s design state. These factors yield four typological dark network configurations: Opportunistic-Mechanical; Restrictive-Organic; Selective-Technical; and Surgical-Ad hoc. Each configuration must allow the secure coordination of work between the dark network’s directional, operational, and supportive components and should adhere to the six principles of dark network design we identify: security, agility, resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity. If a dark network’s configuration does not fit its design state or violates the principles of dark network design, the network will be vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.

Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 177p.

Source: Iinternet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Dec/10Dec_Davis_Ian.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Dec/10Dec_Davis_Ian.pdf

Shelf Number: 126650

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Criminal Syndicates
Hezbollah
Mara Salvatrucha-13
Network Analysis
Provisional Irish Republican Army
Terrorism

Author: Dietz, Rebekah K.

Title: Illicit Networks: Targeting the Nexus Between Terrorists, Proliferators, and Narcotraffickers

Summary: Globalization and the liberal international marketplace have provided fertile ground for the rise of transnational and non-state actors. Unfortunately, while states and businesses have profited from the increased fluidity of borders and the rise of global commerce, so have the criminal organizations that threaten national and international security. These illicit networks are stateless; they conduct their business in failed or failing states, under the guise of legitimate commerce, and without regard to sovereign borders or even human life. They are the main facilitators of proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics around the world—undeterred and, perhaps, undeterrable. This thesis offers a comparative analysis of three main types of illicit networks: terrorist, proliferation and narcotics networks. Using Jemaah Islamiyah, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and the Medellín drug ‘cartel’ as case studies, it examines their typologies, motivations, structures, characteristics, and sources and patterns of funding. It examines if and how illicit networks overlap, with special attention to intra-network (e.g., terrorist networks with other terrorist networks) and inter-network (e.g., terrorist networks with narcotics networks) overlap. It then explores how this information can inform U.S. counter-network activity.

Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 135p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899

Year: 2010

Country: International

URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899

Shelf Number: 126752

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Illicit Networks
Medellin Cartel
Social Network Analysis
Terrorism
Terrorist Networks

Author: Ahokas, Juha

Title: Assuring Supply Chain Continuity in Industrial Supply Chains and Complying with Authorised Economical Operator AEO Europe. Final Version

Summary: Secure and reliable supply chains and networks enable companies to utilize global markets and resources. Outsourcing and globalization have enabled enterprises to extent their operations to new areas and benefit from economies of scale. Global logistic chains have turned out to be effective platform for the delivery of materials, semi-products and goods between the different economic areas and markets. The development has been beneficial to international companies and economic welfare has increased in several countries. On the other side, dynamic and complex supply chains enable opportunities for criminal action. They create platform for terrorism, crime and illegal competition. Some transnational and poly-crime oriented organized crime groups are aiming at controlling the whole production and distribution processes of entire criminal markets, optimizing profits and cutting out local and minor competitors, on a very rational way. To reach their goal they exploit transportation and financial sector, hire illicit labour to run and manage the supply chain, engage in money laundry, identity frauds and document forgery. International supply chains have turned out to be vulnerable for any crime actions and crime concerns have increased in companies and governments. Especially organized crime and terrorism pose threats to security and safety, to public health, to the environment or to consumers. Traditionally different companies and authorities have concentrated on securing their own operations and sphere of responsibilities. However, supply chain crimes are intertwined in supply chain operations, which transmit forward and reverse goods, services, cash and information. Relying only on inspections or border controls has proven to be always costly leaving doubts concerning the adequate inspection rate. Enterprises have very limited possibilities to self-acquire information related to the backgrounds of their business partners and prospect employees. Generally, crime is recognized to devastate social structures and fair competition. Additionally, private and political interest have emphasized crime preventive approach instead of post-crime measures, thus different kind of customs-government-trade partnerships are endorsed with mutual interest. The terrorist attacks in 2001 formed culmination point to concerns and approaches how to deal with terrorism and crime in supply chains. Since April 2002 several voluntary supply chain security programs and regulations have been established in global trade. The aim of the programs is simply to increase security in international supply chains. The companies fulfilling the security and safety criteria are considered to be secure and safe partners in the supply chain. The reliable traders respecting high standard security criteria benefit from trade facilitation measures: reduced data set for summary declarations, fewer physical and document-based controls, and priority treatment if selected for control. Supply chain security programs can be regarded as good international policy and practices when aiming at better secure supply chains against an intended posed crime act (theft, pilferage, money laundry, currency counterfeiting, industrial espionage, commodity counterfeiting, documents counterfeiting, malicious damage etc.). Additionally, implementation of programs have enabled several companies to gain collateral benefits, including better visibility to the supply chain, swifter response in case of any type of disruptions and lower insurance premiums. However, between security measures and benefits stands a black box, which makes unclear how security programs should be managed to maximize benefits. This publication aims at revealing the inner-side of the black-box. The guide presents and applies practices and procedures, which are approved in a sister discipline that is criminology. Rational choice and situational crime prevention are well-known approaches, which bring criminology down to earth in daily practices and decisions. Rational choice approach takes into consideration a variation and composition of potential crime offenders‘ motivations and capabilities to commit crimes. It supports security efforts and decisions concerning the strategic supply chain and operational design. Situational crime prevention approach provides tools to reduce the opportunities to commit crime and increase the risk of detection if deterrence fails. It focuses on crime opportunities in daily operations and resembles total quality management approach, which is well-known, proved and tried in supply chain and operational management. At last, situational crime prevention approach and total quality management approach are combined in new conceptual model for crime prevention in supply chains. AEO-programs are not self-explaining and self-executing programs. Quite the contrary, they just build a framework, where the compliance with requirements can be attained in several ways. We introduce an implementation model, which is based on teacher-learning cycle aiming at the most cost-efficient implementation in different companies and business units in various cultural conditions. Additionally, it supports government-private partnerships. The model is based on continuous improvement cycle. This guide has 10 chapters with following aims: Chapter 1 elucidates the background of supply chain security programs by presenting World Customs Organization‘s SAFE-program. Chapter 2 works as an incentive to start implementing AEO-supply chain security program. It lists potential benefits, which can be used as financial targets in implementation process. The list of benefits is based on comprehensive literature study. Chapter 3 describes how security issues are included in daily operations. Crime prevention and operational management practices are programmed in same conceptual framework. Chapter 4 elucidates AEO-requirements and appropriate security measures based on available security standards. Chapter 5 suggest methods allocate security resources in an efficient manner. Besides traditional risk assessment approach we emphasize inner-organizational co-operation and efficient communication when tracing crime related problems. Chapter 6 presents an implementation model based on continuous improvement and teaching-learning cycle. Chapter 7 presents customs AEO -audit approach. We give advises how the process could be conducted in an efficient way. Chapter 8 suggest an activity based cost management model, which makes security cost more transparent and traceable. Chapter 9 gives a short description concerning supply chain security technologies. Chapter 10 presents a short summary.

Details: Helsinki: Aalto University, School of Science and Technology, BIT Research Centre, 2012. 103p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://legacy-tuta.hut.fi/logistics/publications/Assuring_SC_Continuity.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://legacy-tuta.hut.fi/logistics/publications/Assuring_SC_Continuity.pdf

Shelf Number: 126764

Keywords:
Cargo Security
Criminal Networks
National Security
Ports-of-Entry, Security
Rational Choice Theory
Situational Crime Prevention
Supply Chains
Terrorism

Author: American Land Forces Institute

Title: Transnational Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Network-Centric Enterprise

Summary: The purpose of this study is to understand the networks involved in transnational criminal organizations across Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. This study uses Social Network Analysis and general socio-cultural analysis techniques to analyze information gathered from open source news media, secondary data collections, analyses conducted by academics and nonprofit organizations, and interviews with former law enforcement officials. . This study analyzes the criminal organizations of each region (Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean) in terms of their (1) historical background, (2) hierarchy and composition, (3) alliances and rivalries with other regional criminal organizations, (4) major criminal activities, (5) recruitment methods and sources, and (6) weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Details: Mico, TX: American Land Forces Institute, 2012. 77p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2012 at: http://alfinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Crime-Families.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Central America

URL: http://alfinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Crime-Families.pdf

Shelf Number: 126810

Keywords:
Criminal Cartels
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Gangs
Organized Crime
Social Network Analysis
Transnational Crime (Latin America, Caribbean)

Author: Ayling, Julie

Title: What Sustains Wildlife Crime? Rhino Horn Trading and the Resilience of Criminal Networks

Summary: The problem of illegal trading in wildlife is a long-standing one. Humans have always regarded other sentient and non-sentient species as resources and tradeable commodities, frequently resulting in negative effects for biodiversity. However, the illegal trade in wildlife is increasingly meeting with resistance from states and the international community in the form of law enforcement and regulatory initiatives. So why does it persist? What makes the criminal networks involved in it resilient? In this paper I consider the networks involved in the illegal trade in rhinoceros horn that is currently posing an existential threat to most rhino species. The paper considers possible sources of these networks' resilience, both internal and external, and the implications for how the trade could be tackled.

Details: Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 2012. 22P.

Source: Transnational Environmental Crime Project, Working Paper 2/2012: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2012 at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152776

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152776

Shelf Number: 126857

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Illegal Trade
Ivory
Organized Crime
Rhinos
Transnational Crime
Wildlife Crime
Wildlife Trade

Author: Poolen, W.J.

Title: Intentional Disintegration of Cybercriminal Networks: Approaches in Network Strategic Security Modeling

Summary: This thesis assesses whether network strategic security models can be used for disintegration of cybercriminal networks. Strategic models are conceptualized as methods for security intervention that use network mathematical algorithms to define sets of targets in a hostile network that seem crucial to attack in order to disintegrate a cybercriminal network. Two strategic models are constructed that are associated with different types of targets in cybercriminal networks. One model focusses on hubs (computer devices, human operators and other nodes that interact within a network); the other model focusses on the exchange connections between clusters of interacting nodes. After elaboration of the strategic models a set of cases of cybercriminal interventions is invoked to investigate how the theoretical models contribute to real life intervention. In reflection on the cases and theory the main issue that becomes apparent is that the strategic models do not adequately take in account the ability of targeted networks to react to disintegration attempts. The notion of network resilience is considered and a subsequent theoretical attempt interprets network resilience as an effect of the relations that a network maintains with its resource networks. Networks are perceived to be embedded and interconnected in a network environment in which they exchange resources. Finally, a broadening of the theoretical understanding towards the multilayered aspects of a network is suggested to gain a more adequate perspective for network strategic security interventions.

Details: Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit,, 2012. 69p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 9, 2012 at: http://www.screenwork.nl/PDF/20120910_masterthesis_webversie.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://www.screenwork.nl/PDF/20120910_masterthesis_webversie.pdf

Shelf Number: 126899

Keywords:
Computer Crime
Computer Security
Criminal Networks
Cyber Security
Cybercrimes
Cybercriminal Networks

Author: Manning, John D.

Title: Dark Networks

Summary: he world today operates in a state of persistent conflict on a sliding scale. The conflicts in question are not traditionally military in nature and often involve nonstate actors. These conflicts present problems for the nation-state, because its historical methods for dealing with conflicts do not work in this case. To manage these conflicts, nation-states and global organizations will have to develop mechanisms to deal with "dark networks." These are networks made up of illicit traffickers, organized crime members, urban gangs, terrorists, pirates, insurgents, and other nefarious characters. The purpose of this paper is to examine the environment that feeds these dark networks, the characters who make up the networks, the networks themselves, and the policy and strategy issues related to defeating dark networks.

Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010. 28p.

Source: Strategy Research Project: Internet Resource: Accessed November 12, 2012 at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518125

Year: 2010

Country: United States

URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518125

Shelf Number: 126920

Keywords:
Armed Conflict
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Terrorism

Author: Goehsing, Julia

Title: A Multi-Pronged Approach to Transnational Criminal Networks: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean

Summary: Conventional wisdom holds that previously unimaginable commercial, political and social opportunities associated with globalization have been paralleled by an unprecedented expansion of transnational criminal networks. Policy makers and academics have been analyzing the causes of transnational criminal networks and how they weaken nation-states on the one hand (Lupsha, 1996, p. 21-48; Maltz, 1990, pp. 41-47; Allum & Siebert, 2003, pp. 38), and how weak nation-stations provide a “breeding ground” for transnational criminal networks on the other hand (Annan, Palermo Address, 2000; Farrar, U.S. State Department, 2005, p.1; Patrick, 2006, p. 1; Asia Pacific Security Center, 2000, p. 3; UNODC Signing Conference for UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, p.1). Nonetheless, transnational criminal networks remain. No nation can defend itself against these threats entirely on its own. The successful prevention, containment and combat of transnational criminal networks require broad and sustainable cooperation among states, regional and international organizations. Without attempting to solve the “chicken and egg and which of them came first” component of transnational criminal networks and how they relate to the nation-state, this essay examines the characteristics of transnational criminal networks and their illegal businesses. Placing the analysis in a Latin American and Caribbean context, this essay explores national, regional and international policy options to prevent and combat the threat originating from transnational criminal networks. By suggesting that transnational criminal networks have become one of the world’s most successful and craftiest “business enterprises” (Andreas in Berdal & Serrano, 2002, p. 13), this essay concludes that the only way to redress transnational criminal networks is through a multi-pronged approach. This approach addresses what institutions and actors can do at the national, regional and international levels and reaffirms United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s vision that states’ and human security goes hand in hand with development and human rights.

Details: Mexico City: Mexico: Centro de Estudios y Programas Intermaericanos, 2006. 37p.

Source: Internet Resource: CEPI WORKING PAPER
No. 5: Accessed December 5, 2012 at: http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working_papers/05JULIA.pdf

Year: 2006

Country: Central America

URL: http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working_papers/05JULIA.pdf

Shelf Number: 127130

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Transnational Organized Crime (Latin America, Cari

Author: Papachristos, Andrew V.

Title: The Small World of Al Capone: The Embedded Nature of Criminal and Legitimate Social Networks

Summary: Everyone was guilty of a criminal oense during U.S. Prohibition, but even the imbibing Chicogoans were concerned by the cozy relationships between politicians, union leaders, businessmen, and mobsters that had made their city infamous. This overlap between the legitimate and criminal words poses several empirical questions: what did such network embeddedness look like, who were the men straddling both words, what was their relationship to Al Capone, and what were their structural signatures within the legitimate and criminal networks? Whereas most of our understanding of this embeddedness problem relies on historical analyses, this paper reexamines organized crime through a new analytical lens| social network analysis. Using a unique relational dataset created by coding more than 4,000 pages of documents, our analysis reveals the precise ways in which the criminal networks associated with Al Capone overlapped with political and other legitimate networks. These new data and the use of social network analysis mark this study as perhaps the rst to (quite literally) map the world of organized crime in Prohibition Era Chicago. The ndings reveal a series of overlapping social networks of more than 1,500 individuals with more than 6,000 ties among and between them. We compare the structural signatures"|i.e., the various network characteristics|of organized crime gures who have been deemed important" from more traditional historical analyses with those deemed important from structural analysis. In short, this paper examines how legitimate and criminal networks coalesce to form the small world of Al Capone.

Details: Amherst, MA: Harvard University and University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2012. 19p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2013 at: http://www.erdr.org/textes/papachristos_smith.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: United States

URL: http://www.erdr.org/textes/papachristos_smith.pdf

Shelf Number: 127448

Keywords:
Al Capone
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime (U.S.)
Prohibition Era
Social Networks

Author: Morselli, Carlo

Title: The Mobility of Criminal Groups

Summary: The present discussion paper will review evidence from past research that offers alternative themes and theories regarding the shifts and patterns in the mobility of criminal groups. Our main objective is to identify push and pull factors that will help us understand how and why criminal groups, organizations, or general organized crime patterns are present across a variety of settings (i.e., geographical locations, criminal markets, and legitimate industries). Push factors refer to forces which drive criminal groups from a setting. Pull factors refer to forces which draw criminal groups to a setting. Aside from reviewing past research in search of such factors, we also apply the general understanding that emerges from our analysis to assessing journalistic case studies that addressed organized crime threats in Canada during recent years. The concluding section of this report identifies the key issues that must be addressed within this area and provides a series of recommendations that law-enforcement officials and policy makers should find relevant for their own experiences with this particular problem. A distinction is made between contexts in which offenders organize around available opportunities (the strategic context) and contexts in which opportunities create organized offenders (the emergent context). The most general statement that can be formulated from the present exercise is that the opportunities matter more than the group itself. What we will demonstrate in this report is that the problems concerning geographical locations, criminal markets, and legitimate industries that are vulnerable to organized crime are persistent and stable over time. Groups that seize such opportunities, on the other hand, are transient and more than often short-lived. Thus, preventing the environmental problems that persist over time and from one criminal group to the next is a more effective approach than repressing one group at a time. This general guideline is supported by past research. Our assessment maintains that while many claim that criminal organizations are intentionally or strategically mobilizing themselves to seize opportunities in various geographical locations across the world, empirical demonstrations supporting such claims are lacking, with most restricted to anecdotal illustrations. Empirical research in this area is rare and the few studies that do provide some level of systematic data generally fall in a less strategic image of criminal groups. Instead, criminal groups are the product of offenders’ adaptations to the constraints and opportunities surrounding them. Such groups are self-organizing and emergent in settings where there are considerable vulnerabilities to exploit across a variety of cross-border, cross-market, and cross-industry contexts. In short, it appears that there is plenty of hype and little demonstration in favour of the more sensationalist strategic criminal organization. In turn, there is less hype and growing evidence for the less sensationalist emergent organized crime scenario. This research review probes the multitude of past studies on criminal market settings, the ethnic composition of criminal networks, criminogenic conditions in legitimate settings, and general research on criminal mobility patterns. The principal push and pull factors identified often overlap across each area of research, with some relating to specific contexts.

Details: Ottawa: Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2010. 47p.

Source: Internet Resource: Report no. 004, 2010: Accessed February 8, 2013 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-91-2010-eng.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Canada

URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-91-2010-eng.pdf

Shelf Number: 127555

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Offender Mobility
Organized Crime (Canada)
Organized Crime Prevention

Author: Silverstone, Daniel

Title: A Response to “The Mobility of Criminal Groups”. A reflection in light of recent research on Vietnamese organized crime

Summary: The degree to which organized crime groups extend their activities and influence into new geographic areas is a major concern for law enforcement officials and policy makers worldwide. Over the last decade, a number of researchers have conducted specialized studies and reviews of this phenomenon, and have offered a number of explanations of its underlying drivers. Recently, Morselli, Turcotte, and Tenti (2010) were commissioned by Public Safety Canada to prepare a report on this topic, The Mobility of Criminal Groups, which reviewed several case studies and prior commentaries and, based on an inductive (evidence-based) process, offered a conceptual framework for understanding how organized crime groups come to establish themselves (successfully or unsuccessfully) in places outside of their area of origin. The current discussion paper consists of a written response to Morselli et al.’s report, reflecting on their position in light of recent research on Vietnamese organized crime in the UK (Silverstone & Savage 2010; Silverstone 2010). In particular, the current paper will provide:  an assessment of the comprehensiveness and depth of the literature review in Morselli et al’s (2010) paper;  a critical reflection and commentary on the strategic vs. emergent taxonomy described by Morselli et al (2010), as well as the associated push and pull factors;  a succinct review of recent case studies on the growth of organized crime within the Vietnamese community in the UK (Silverstone & Savage 2010; Silverstone 2010), with a particular focus on how well the events fit into Morselli et al’s (2010) strategic vs. emergent taxonomy, as well as a discussion of whether the push and pull factors identified by Morselli et al (2010) can account for these developments;  suggestions for additions to the identified push and pull factors; and recommendations for how law enforcement officials and policy makers could use knowledge of the various push and pull factors to stem the transnational spread of organized crime groups.

Details: Ottawa: Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2010. 19p.

Source: Internet Resource: accessed February 11, 2013 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS14-1-2011-eng.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Canada

URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS14-1-2011-eng.pdf

Shelf Number: 127561

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Offender Mobility
Organized Crime
Vietnamese

Author: Farah, Douglas

Title: Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Organizations: The Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil

Summary: On October 11, 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-‐13) a significant transnational criminal organization (TCO). The gang was targeted for its involvement in “serious transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex trafficking, murder, assassinations, racketeering, blackmail, extortion and immigration offenses.”1 The designation, which came as a surprise to Central American governments, has caused considerable debate within the U.S. policy and law enforcement communities over whether the step was merited and whether it would, or could, have a significant impact. This report attempts to offer some insights into those questions at a time when the gangs themselves are in a tremendous state of flux and interacting in new ways amongst themselves and with regional governments. This is particularly true in El Salvador, the spiritual homeland of the MS-‐13. Relying primarily on original fieldwork, the report examines the relationship of the MS-‐13 and Calle 18 gangs to the transnational criminal networks that are growing in strength and sophistication across Central America, particularly in the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

Details: Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2013. 30p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2013 at: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Central America

URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf

Shelf Number: 127916

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Gang Violence
Gangs (Central America)
MS-13

Author: Reitano, Tuesday

Title: Check Your Blind Spot: Confronting Criminal Spoilers in the Sahel

Summary: Western governments focus heavily on the presence of Islamist extremists in the Sahel and have provided technical assistance in an attempt to strengthen the capacity of the security sectors and justice systems in the countries of the region to hold them back. But the preoccupation with West Africa’s war on terror has meant that the destabilising impact of organised crime has been consistently underestimated, if not ignored altogether. As rebuilding begins in Mali, all signs point to the same oversight happening again. Organised crime is not the primary driver of the current conflict in Mali, but any effort to stabilise or resolve this conflict should explicitly take the presence of organised crime, illicit resource flows and criminal networks into account.

Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. 4p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 39: Accessed March 22, 2013 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No39Sahel_14Mar2013V2.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mali

URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No39Sahel_14Mar2013V2.pdf

Shelf Number: 128073

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime (Mali)

Author: Ackerman, Gary

Title: The “New” Face of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National Security

Summary: The continually evolving strategic environment coupled with the ascendant role of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) necessitates a comprehensive understanding of these organizations. TCOs represent a globally-networked national security threat and pose a real and present risk to the safety and security of Americans and our partners across the globe. This challenge blurs the line among US institutions and far surpasses the ability of any one agency or nation to confront it. Thus countering TCOs necessitates a whole-of-government approach and beyond that vibrant relationships with partner nations based on trust. These are essential if the U.S. is to remain the partner of choice, and effectively counter TCOs globally. Weak and unstable government institutions coupled with scarce legitimate economic opportunities, extreme socio-economic inequities, and permissive corrupt environments are key enablers that allow TCOs to operate with impunity. These same factors enable the emergence of VEOs. The potential nexus between VEOs and TCOs remains an area of deep concern. In this context, deeper insight into the contemporary face of TCO's will facilitate the development of strategies to counter and defeat them. In this struggle, DoD lacks law enforcement authorities but brings to the government some unique capabilities. This white volume examines the “new” face of these transnational crime organizations and provides a geopolitical perspective and implications to U.S. national security. The nexus of culture and technology (including modern communication technologies) and their impact on the evolution of TCOs is discussed in addition to their implications to countering TCOs.

Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense, 2013. 206p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733208

Year: 2013

Country: United States

URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733208

Shelf Number: 128311

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Homeland Security (U.S.)
Organized Crime
Transnational Crime

Author: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Title: Being Tough Is Not Enough – Curbing transnational organized crime

Summary: The devastating effects and challenges linked to organized crime have become ever more visible in recent years. It is no great news that organized crime is a truly globalized, transnational business. Flows of both its »products« and related illegal funds largely ignore national borders. At the same time, the scope, patterns and effects of organized crime vary locally, nationally and regionally. Any strategy to counter organized crime needs to be tailored to the respective level, while building on international collaboration. But while transnational cooperation of criminal networks is increasing and adapting, government and governance responses remain too static and stuck within the confines of national borders. International and transnational cooperation in curbing organized crime is still in its infancy. However, it is not only the transnational dimension that renders organized crime so difficult to tackle. It is also a multifaceted challenge in terms of its patterns and impact. The immediate threats to human security and the violence related to organized crime – as currently most apparent in the Mexican drug war – are the most visible negative impact. Beyond that, however, organized crime severely undermines statehood and democratic governance through corruption, intimidation or even state capture in many parts of the world. It also fuels existing violent conflicts or re-ignites dormant ones. Not only in Colombia or the Sahel region are the increasing interrelations between conflict parties, terrorist organizations and networks of organized crime a source of destabilization and concern. Adding the negative impact that organized crime has on the legal part of the economy, one begins to understand that addressing organized crime is about more than just more effective law enforcement. Tackling organized crime in a sustainable manner requires the development and implementation of intelligent, multidimensional approaches to untangle networks and address the incentive structures and enabling factors of the various business models. In the context of our work to promote peace and security, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims at facilitating a strategic reflection on comprehensive policy responses to curb organized crime. In February and March 2013, a smaller expert and parliamentary meeting in Brussels and a wider international expert conference in Berlin represented milestones in this endeavor. Beyond discussing recent trends and effects of organized crime in general, the meetings zoomed in on two central aspects: the illegal drug market, which is arguably still the most profitable one for organized crime, and money laundering, the bottom line of organized crime. The meetings were part of a continuous engagement and will be systematically followed up. Some of the analysis and suggestions discussed during the meetings were results of FES’ work in the different regions. For instance, the process that led to the studies and drug policy reform proposals from Latin America were initiated within the framework of an FES regional security policy project. The respective dialogs in the various regions will continue. But during the Berlin conference, it became particularly obvious that there is also more work to be done in Germany. Given that organized crime not only operates in Germany but also compromises German and European policies – for instance in the fields of security, foreign affairs, development and health – Germany needs to engage much more pro-actively in the international development and implementation of comprehensive responses. Against this background, this conference documentation is meant not only to summarize past debates, but also to stimulate future ones. FES remains committed to providing input, facilitating dialog nationally and internationally and further strengthening the network of actors addressing the challenge of organized crime from different angles and in different parts of the world. To be sure, there will be no easy responses to the challenges posed by organized crime, as experience has shown. Curbing organized crime is more than a matter of repressive measures and law enforcement. In this sense, the subtitle of the Berlin conference remains a guiding theme of further debates and a reminder to be creative in designing comprehensive strategies and policies: Being tough is not enough.

Details: Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013. 52p.

Source: Internet Resource: Conference Report: Accessed July 9, 2013 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10034-20130603.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10034-20130603.pdf

Shelf Number: 129329

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Money Laundering
Organized Crime

Author: Gilbreath, Aaron Hastings

Title: From Made in America to Hecho en Sinaloa: A Historical Geography of North American Methamphetamine Networks

Summary: Most of the major drugs of abuse in the Untied States have a relatively uniform distribution. Their use may cluster in cities, for example, but that general pattern tends to repeat itself in every region of the county. This is not true of the stimulant methamphetamine, which today shows a decidedly uneven distribution. Confounding the matter more is the fact that, because it is a synthetic drug, it is theoretically possible to make methamphetamine anywhere. But it is not made everywhere. In fact, for much of its history, the drug has been concentrated in the American West. Further complicating our understanding is the public's general amnesia regarding methamphetamine's long history in the United States. Without that knowledge, it is impossible to explain the drug' present geography. This dissertation traces the evolution of the various networks that have coalesced around the production and distribution of methamphetamine and finds that much of the drug's current geography can be traced to the manner in which these various groups responded to official attempts to stem the supply of the precursors necessary to produce it.

Details: Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2012. 247p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 13, 2013 at: https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/handle/1808/10250

Year: 2012

Country: United States

URL: https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/handle/1808/10250

Shelf Number: 129380

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Abuse and Addition (U.S.)
Geographic Analysis
Methamphetamine
Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)

Title: Confiscation of the Proceeds of IP Crime: A modern tool for deterring counterfeiting and piracy

Summary: The theft of Intellectual Property (IP) in the forms of trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy is a socio-economic problem of enormous scale that has escalated significantly in the last decade. In one country after another, the massive infiltration of counterfeit and pirated products has created an enormous drain on national economies around the world — crowding out billions in legitimate economic activity and facilitating an “underground economy” that deprives governments of revenues for vital public services, forces higher burdens on tax payers, dislocates hundreds of thousands of legitimate jobs and exposes consumers to dangerous and ineffective products. Moreover, the Internet is increasingly exploited as an illicit marketplace for counterfeiting and piracy. The latest estimate from ICC BASCAP indicates that the total global value of counterfeiting and piracy could reach a staggering peak of USD 1.7 trillion by 2015. IP crime has emerged as a lucrative and growing new activity for organized criminal networks. There is strong evidence that organized criminal groups are moving into counterfeiting and piracy in ever-growing numbers. The high profits and low risk associated with modest penalties and lax enforcement of intellectual property IP crime has made this a major new business opportunity for organized crime networks. Today, counterfeiting and piracy play a key role in the operations of transnational criminal organizations. One recent example of this was the Interpol-led Operation “Black Poseidon”. The operation targeted products being traded illicitly across Eastern Europe (namely Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine) by transnational organized crime groups. Counterfeit products included computers, pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, electronics, alcohol and cigarettes. The operation led to the seizure of goods worth over €120 million and 1,400 persons under arrest or investigation. The emergence of organized IP crime accelerates the globalization of counterfeiting and piracy, helps fund other criminal activities such as extortion, illegal drugs and human trafficking, compromises the international financial system for money laundering purposes and, ultimately, makes it more difficult for existing law enforcement measures to be effective.

Details: Turin, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2013. 84p.

Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 10, 2013 at: www.iccwbo.org

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL:

Shelf Number: 129618

Keywords:
Copyright Piracy
Counterfeit Products
Counterfeiting
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime (International)
Theft of Intellectual Property

Author: Kartas, Moncef

Title: On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border

Summary: Tunisia, Libya, and much of the Arab world are in the midst of political and social upheaval widely known as the 'Arab Spring-. Thus far, the tidal wave of change that began in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010 has led to the end of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's 23-year dictatorship and to the fall of fellow dictator Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, while also setting off government transformations and conflict across the region. The revolutions in Tunisia and Libya have not only changed the political landscapes in both countries, but also affected the informal networks and ties that have long characterized the shared border region of the two nations: the Jefara. Indeed, the revolution in each country has profoundly affected the other and will probably continue to do so. With this understanding, this report investigates how the Libyan armed conflict and its aftermath have affected the security situation in Tunisia, particularly in light of the circulation of firearms and infiltrations by armed groups. As the circulation of Libyan small arms and light weapons in Tunisia cannot be adequately understood without a closer look at the tribal structures behind informal trade and trafficking networks in the border region, this report examines how the Libyan revolution affected such structures in the Jefara. This Working Paper presents several key findings: - Despite the weakening of the Tunisian security apparatus and the ongoing effects of the armed conflict in Libya, the use of firearms connected to crime and political violence has remained relatively low in Tunisia. Even in light of recent assassinations of two prominent leftist politicians and regular armed clashes between violent extremists, the military, and security forces on the Algerian�Tunisian border, the use of firearms remains the exception rather than the rule. - In Tunisia, firearms trafficking currently exists in the form of small-scale smuggling. However, larger smuggling operations have been discovered and tied to Algeria-based violent extremist networks-such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-which have infiltrated the country. - Since the 1980s, tribal cartels have been in control of informal trade and trafficking in the Jefara. Their continued control rests on the cartels' strategic stance, informal agreements with the government, and their ability to withstand new, Libya-based competitors (both tribal and militia-based).

Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of international and Development Studies, 2013. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 17: Accessed April 19, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf

Shelf Number: 132077

Keywords:
Armed Conflict
Arms Trafficking
Border Security
Criminal Networks
Extremists
Gun-Related Violence
Organized Crime
Smuggling

Author: Vira, Varun

Title: Ivory's Curse: The Militarization and Professionalization of Poaching in Africa

Summary: It has been a quarter century since Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) placed all African elephants on Appendix I, thus eliminating commercial trade in elephant ivory. This uniform global prohibition on ivory commercialization demonstrably reduced elephant poaching, helped elephant populations to stabilize, dried up some ivory markets, and essentially made it taboo to acquire elephant ivory. All elephant ivory is bloody ivory. Since then, some southern African countries, namely Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, have relentlessly pursued the reopening of the ivory trade. After exerting significant political pressure, they have succeeded in securing sales of stockpiled ivory to China and Japan. This inexplicable backpedal on the international ivory trade ban has stimulated markets, demand, and ultimately elephant poaching, to supply the trade. Download Ivory's Curse Report Download Acrobat PDF The bloody ivory trade was renewed. In recent years, however, it has been revealed that significant criminal syndicates and organized terrorist gangs have engaged in elephant poaching to acquire ivory, which they sell for arms to ply their deadly activities. Born Free USA, seeking an accurate and complete picture of the depths of this nefarious activity, commissioned C4ADS and its expert defense analysts to examine the military, national security, and localized conflict aspects of elephant poaching and the ivory trade to reveal, in detail, the threats to elephants across Africa. Ivory's Curse: The Militarization and Professionalization of Poaching in Africa was released April 21, and its findings are truly alarming. - From Sudan, government-allied militias complicit in the Darfur genocide fund their operations by poaching elephants hundreds of miles outside North Sudan's borders. - In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, state security forces patronize the very rebels they are supposed to fight, providing them with weapons and support in exchange for ivory. - Zimbabwean political elites, including those under international sanction, are seizing wildlife spaces that either are, or are likely to soon be, used as covers for poaching operations. - In East Africa, al-Shabaab and Somali criminal networks are profiting off of Kenyan elephants killed by poachers using weapons leaked from local security forces. - Mozambican organized crime has militarized and consolidated to the extent that it is willing to battle the South African army and well-trained ranger forces for rhino horn. - In Gabon and the Republic of Congo, ill-regulated forest exploitation is bringing East Asian migrant laborers, and East Asian organized crime, into contact with Central Africa's last elephants. - In Tanzania, political elites have aided the industrial-scale depletion of East Africa's largest elephant population. Born Free USA will use this significant, timely, and shocking report to encourage legislators, conservation authorities, and defense agencies to focus their attention, resources, and efforts on the elephant poaching hotspots we've identified, and exert appropriate pressure at all levels to stop the bloody ivory trade. The scourge of elephant poaching has reached crisis - historically shocking - levels, with an estimated 35,000 to 50,000 elephants poached per year. As a result, certain populations of African elephants are now vulnerable to extinction and may not withstand these poaching thresholds much longer. And, when these elephants disappear, if ivory markets are not eliminated, demand will lead poaching operations further south, attacking the southern African elephant populations, as well. Immediate, robust, and unequivocal action is required if we are to beat back the elephant murderers and ivory profiteers. The brutality of elephant poaching - entire families gunned down, individual animals' faces sawed in two to extract the coveted ivory tusks - should be enough to persuade a global crackdown on the ivory trade. But, the Born Free USA-commissioned Ivory's Curse adds substantial firepower to the argument, and should end the debate. This report should convince anyone who cares about elephants - or the people who are similarly subjected to violence and bloodshed - that the bloody ivory trade must end, once and for all.

Details: Washington, DC: Born Free, 2014. 104p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.bornfreeusa.org/downloads/pdf/Ivorys-Curse-2014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.bornfreeusa.org/downloads/pdf/Ivorys-Curse-2014.pdf

Shelf Number: 132183

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Criminal Networks
Elephants
Illegal Ivory Trade
Organized Crime
Wildlife Conservation
Wildlife Crime

Author: Giacomello, Corina

Title: Women, Drug Offenses and Penitentiary Systems in Latin America

Summary: The number of women in prison for drug-related offenses has increased since the 1980s, rising sharply since the 1990s. This has occurred worldwide, and Latin America is no exception. Women increasingly enter drug-trafficking circuits as consumers, low-level dealers and local (including in prison), national and international transporters. In various countries around the world, the female penitentiary population has grown faster than the male, although women are still the minority. This paper analyzes the roles played by women in criminal networks in Latin America and the means by which they become involved, highlighting the ways in which gender relations and socio-economic factors shape the configuration of international drug trafficking networks and women's participation. It also critically examines the main characteristics of the region's penitentiary systems from a gender standpoint. Finally, it offers a series of conclusions and proposals aimed at promoting a review and reform of drug and penitentiary policies.

Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2013. 23p.

Source: Internet Resource: IDPC Briefing Paper: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://idpc.net/publications/2013/11/idpc-briefing-paper-women-drug-offenses-and-penitentiary-systems-in-latin-america

Year: 2013

Country: Latin America

URL: http://idpc.net/publications/2013/11/idpc-briefing-paper-women-drug-offenses-and-penitentiary-systems-in-latin-america

Shelf Number: 132236

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Female Inmates
Female Offenders
Female Prisoners

Author: United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking

Title: Human Trafficking Sentinel Surveillance. Viet Nam - China Border 2010. Lang Son | Lao Cai | Quang Ninh

Summary: The Mekong region contains diverse patterns of human trafficking. They are both internal and crossborder, highly organized and small-scale, involving sex, labour or marriage through both formal and informal recruitment mechanisms, and can involve men, women, boys, girls and entire families. China is a key destination country for victims of human trafficking from Viet Nam. Due to the underground nature of sex, labour, and marriage trafficking, it is hard to estimate the prevalence of human trafficking in either country, though one 2010 estimate from the Viet Nam Ministry of Public Security estimates that 60 percent of Vietnamese trafficking cases involves trafficking to China. The aim of UNIAP's sentinel surveillance is to assess the situation of Vietnamese deportees being returned from China and, using this information, map trafficking trends and patterns; establish types and profiles of cross-border trafficking victims; and document how brokers and traffickers operate to put Vietnamese in exploitative situations. Through the latter half of 2010, UNIAP researchers were deployed to Lang Son, Lao Cai, and Quang Ninh international border checkpoints to conduct site surveys and structured, indepth interviews with a non-representative sample of 93 male and female Vietnamese citizens deported from China. The research uncovered undocumented labour migration that sometimes involved human trafficking, and sometimes did not. The majority of the 93 deportees were, in fact, undocumented labour migrants who were deported due to immigration violations, and who had not been exploited or abused. However, 20.5 percent of the cases were likely human trafficking cases, including labour, marriage, and sex trafficking. There were also proactively intercepted cases that both Vietnamese and Chinese police identified as possible sex or marriage trafficking, where the likely victim was saved before being entered into an exploitative situation. Due to a variety of factors, including logistical factors related to difficulty in accessing the appropriate checkpoint in time given little advance notice, the sample of 93 deportees does not constitute a representative sample. However, since so little research has been conducted systematically examining Viet Nam-China trafficking into sex, marriage, and labour, these cases are examined with more emphasis on rich qualitative description of vulnerability, exploitation, and trafficking, supplemented with quantitative analysis. The beginning of this report begins with two case studies - one marriage trafficking case and one sex trafficking case - to illustrate the details of the broker-trafficker networks, extent of exploitation and perspectives of victims right from the start. There are six key recommendations proposed, based on the seven key findings from this round of sentinel surveillance. Recommendations for addressing risk factors among vulnerable populations are proposed for trafficking prevention and safe migration policy, as well as outreach and community-based work, primarily on the Viet Nam side but also where exploited Vietnamese are in China. Examining broker-trafficker networks and the exploitative employers, families, and brothels they feed aims to support a stronger investigative and protective response on both the Viet Nam and China sides, and to this end recommendations for where to target labour, marriage, and sex trafficking rings are also provided. Identifying knowledge and skill gaps in both government and non-government personnel working in antihuman trafficking and immigration control aims to help target capacity building and reduce mistreatment of trafficking victims thought to be immigration violators and thus criminals.

Details: Bangkok: United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking, 2011. 84p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2014 at: http://www.no-trafficking.org/reports_docs/siren/SentinelVTNCHN.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.no-trafficking.org/reports_docs/siren/SentinelVTNCHN.pdf

Shelf Number: 132315

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Trafficking
Immigration
Labor Trafficking
Sex Trafficking

Author: International Crisis Group

Title: Corridor of Violence: the Guatemala-Honduras Border

Summary: Competition between criminal groups over drug routes has made the frontier between Guatemala and Honduras one of the most violent areas in Central America, with murder rates among the highest in the world. In the absence of effective law enforcement, traffickers have become de facto authorities in some sectors. Crisis Group's latest report, Corridor of Violence: The Guatemala-Honduras Border, examines the regional dynamics that have allowed criminal gangs to thrive and outlines the main steps necessary to prevent further violence as well as to advance peaceful economic and social development. The report's major findings and recommendations are: - The border corridor includes hotly contested routes for transporting drugs to the U.S. Traffickers, with their wealth and firepower, dominate some portions. On both sides of the border, violence, lawlessness and corruption are rampant, poverty rates and unemployment are high, and citizens lack access to state services. - The arrest of local drug lords has been a mixed blessing to local populations, as the fracturing of existing groups has allowed a new generation of sometimes more violent criminals to emerge. - To prevent further violence, an urgent shift in national policies is needed. The governments should send not just troops and police to border regions, but also educators, community organisers and social and health workers. If criminal structures are to be disrupted and trust in the state restored, these regions need credible, legitimate actors - public and private - capable of providing security, accountability, jobs and hope for the future. - Guatemala and Honduras should learn from other countries facing similar security threats. The Borders for Prosperity Plan in Colombia and the Binational Border Plan in Ecuador and Peru can serve as examples for economic and social development in insecure areas. The U.S., Latin American countries and multilateral organisations should provide funds, training and technical support to embattled border communities to help them prevent violence and strengthen local institutions via education and job opportunities.

Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 37p.

Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 52: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Latin America

URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf

Shelf Number: 132467

Keywords:
Border Security
Criminal Networks
Drug Control
Drug Trafficking
Drug-Related Violence
Gangs
Organized Crime
Violent Crime

Author: Lavorgna, Anita

Title: Transit Crimes in the Internet Age: How new online criminal opportunities affect the organization of offline transit crimes

Summary: There is a general consensus that the Internet has expanded possibilities for so-called transit crimes-i.e., traditional trafficking activities. However, the extent to which the Internet is exploited by offenders to carry out transit crimes and the way in which it has changed those offenders' behaviors and the criminal processes remains under-investigated. The aim of this thesis is to understand what kind of criminal opportunities the Internet offers for conducting transit crimes and how these opportunities affect the organization of transit crimes, as concerns both the carrying out of the criminal activity and the patterns of relations in and among criminal networks. In order to achieve this goal, a model of script analysis-a way to highlight the sequence of actions that are carried out for a determinate criminal activity to occur- was developed in order to classify the criminal opportunities that the Internet supplies for selected transit crimes (wildlife trafficking, trafficking in counterfeit medicines, sex trafficking, and trafficking in recreational drugs), to identify cyber-hotspots, and to allow a richer and deeper understanding of the dynamics of Internet-mediated transit crimes. The data were collected by means of case study research and semi-structured interviews to law enforcement officers and acknowledged experts. For each criminal activity considered, through the script framework it has been possible to identify different types of criminal opportunities provided by the Internet. The empirical evidence presented demonstrates that the criminal markets considered have become-even if to a different extent-hybrid markets which combine the traditional social and economic opportunity structures with the new one provided by the Internet. Among other findings, this research indicates that not only has the Internet opened the way for new criminal actors, but it also has reconfigured relations among suppliers, intermediaries, and buyers. Furthermore, results were compared across transit crimes to illustrate whether and to what extent Internet usage impacts them differently. The differences seem to depend primarily on the social perception of the seriousness of the criminal activity, on the place it fills in the law enforcement agenda, and on the characteristics of the actors involved. This study, albeit with limitations, provides an accurate description of the Internet as crime facilitator for transit crimes. It concludes by highlighting the possibilities of environmental criminology as a theoretical framework to investigate Internet-mediated transit crimes, offering some final observations on how relevant actors behave online, and suggesting new directions for research.

Details: Trento, Italy: University of Trento, Doctoral School of International Studies, 2013. 212p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed June 19, 2014 at: http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/1185/1/PhD_Dissertation_Lavorgna.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/1185/1/PhD_Dissertation_Lavorgna.pdf

Shelf Number: 132532

Keywords:
Computer Crime
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Internet Crimes
Organized Crime
Sex Trafficking
Wildlife Trafficking

Author: World Bank

Title: Enforcing Environmental Laws for Strong Economies and Safe Communities

Summary: This roadmap for environmental and natural resources law enforcement (ENRLE) sets forth a course of action for the World Bank's ENRLE Community of Practice for FY2013-15. It outlines for senior management a strategy to mobilize and strengthen the Bank's engagement in the fight against environmental and natural resource crime, an issue that has significant detrimental effects on the economic, social, political, and environmental stability of our client countries. The roadmap also serves as a mobilizing tool for staff and management in regional departments to demonstrate the importance of ENRLE and to outline the menu of solutions that the Community of Practice (COP) can offer to strengthen our clients' fight against environmental and natural resource crime. Recent spikes in poaching, in illegal logging, and in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing have amplified the already urgent need for action. These crimes increase poverty, shrink prosperity, and magnify social and political tensions that undermine healthy communities and strong economies. Investment returns in wise environmental and natural resource law enforcement can be high. Criminal activities that affect the environment and natural resources are on the increase and pose an increasingly serious threat to development. Data and analyses reviewed by the World Bank's Community of Practice on ENRLE begin to show the magnitude of illegal logging, poaching of wildlife, trade in endangered species, wildland arson, criminal toxic releases, and other environment and natural resource-related crimes. They also show the diversity of the criminal threat, ranging from small-scale, artisanal crime that arises from poverty and inequities to growing problems of organized transnational criminal networks and enterprises using corruption, money laundering, technology, and other sophisticated methods to exploit persistent weaknesses in resource management and law enforcement. All World Bank client countries suffer from these crimes and are underserved by existing international law enforcement institutions and available mechanisms for support, capacity building, and operational cooperation. Vulnerability to environment crimes is often deepened by overarching problems of governance, corruption, and weaknesses in accountability at the national level. Environmental and natural resource crime is common, but in many countries it is rarely prosecuted. The very elements that make these crimes possible-that natural capital is undervalued, seldom properly guarded, and often has unclear or contested ownership-also compromise prosecution. This Roadmap FY2013-15 builds on recently scaled-up support for ENRLE that includes project commitments on the order of $50-60 million per year. Along with investments, the Bank supports advisory and analytic work and leadership in regional and international processes and dialogue. While the Bank is not a law enforcement agency, its established programs to support natural resource and environmental management and to safeguard global public goods, its commitment to strengthening good governance and to fighting corruption, and its partnerships with key law enforcement agencies such as Interpol and Europol give it an opportunity and responsibility to do more. This report discusses how the World Bank Group (WBG) will mobilize to work better on ENRLE. Recognizing the evolving global context, a new and fully mobilized Community of Practice will put more emphasis on building a constituency within the WBG to work on the range of ENRLE issues, on building the capacity of WBG staff to provide investment and technical assistance on ENRLE, on strengthening analytical work to develop a pipeline of ENRLE investments, and on fostering demand among clients for Bank investment in ENRLE.

Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014. 26p.

Source: Internet Resource: Agriculture and environmental services discussion paper ; no. 5: Accessed July 25, 2014 at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/02/20/000442464_20140220144545/Rendered/PDF/843960REVISED0000Enforcing0Env0Laws.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/02/20/000442464_20140220144545/Rendered/PDF/843960REVISED0000Enforcing0Env0Laws.pdf

Shelf Number: 132778

Keywords:
Crimes Against the Environment
Criminal Networks
Natural Resources
Organized Crime
Wildlife Conservation
Wildlife Crimes
Wildlife Management

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2013

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's 2013 Game Changers, where we have sought to highlight some of the year's most important and illustrative trends in the development of organized crime in the Americas. This year has been a year of contradictions. Large criminal groups that seemed untouchable appear to be on the ropes. Others waded through complicated peace and truce processes with incredible patience. Some of the more notable of these processes were initiated by the criminal groups themselves. At the same time, some dynamics in the underworld remained true to form and some new, ugly criminal economies have surged because of these dynamics. Amidst it all, weak states continued to face challenges from below and above, sometimes from those who simply feel they have no choice but to fight criminal groups on their own. These past 12 months could be termed the year of the negotiations. In Colombia, rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued their historic talks with the Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos. By many accounts, these talks are moving along well, but there is concern that even if the FARC leadership signs a deal, parts of the organization will desert and enter the criminal economy. In El Salvador, the truce between the country's two largest gangs showed severe signs of fraying, if not rupturing completely. Homicides surged at the end of the year, as the presidential campaign shifted into full gear. While the mediators claimed the candidates had sought gang support for their campaigns, the country's security minister sought to undermine the truce via public and private channels. Meanwhile, a few more lasting criminal "pacts" emerged, brokered, it appeared, by the criminals themselves. In Medellin, Colombia, remnants of the old guard, known as the Oficina de Envigado, brokered a cease fire with the now surging Urabenos criminal organization, bringing homicides to their lowest levels in 30 years. In Juarez and Tijuana, Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel's apparent dominance over those trafficking corridors led to equally dramatic drops in homicide rates and other criminal acts, such as car-jackings. The emergence of the Urabenos as the singular, monolithic criminal organization to survive the government's assault on the so-called Criminal Bands or "Bandas Criminales" (BACRIM) may be the biggest development in Latin America's underworld. The Urabenos have developed a sophisticated criminal model, which includes a huge variety of revenue streams. They appear to have overcome the loss of numerous top leaders and have an understanding of when to fight and when to make friends, as noted above. However, the Urabenos, and other groups like them, have also ushered in a new era of drug consumption in the region. The consumers are no longer just in Europe, the United States and Asia. They are in small cities and even rural areas throughout the region. They are poor; they are middle class; and they are the elite. And they are getting their drugs from the local criminal groups who are servicing the larger ones, like the Urabenos, throughout the distribution chain. From Brazil and Argentina, to Costa Rica and Mexico, this new, local criminal economy appears to be at the heart of much of the region's violence. It is this violence that pushed civilians to take up arms in places like Guerrero and Michoacan, two embattled Mexican states where so-called "self-defense" groups have surged to try to replace an inept, corrupted and co-opted state. These groups appear to have a wide range of backgrounds: from the poor peasant farmers to the sophisticated rival criminal groups. Yet, the government seems powerless to deal with them, to the point where many authorities have willingly allowed them to break the law in order to ensure others do not. A similar tension between maintaining the law and ensuring justice is also on the minds of the Bolivians as they try to keep some portions of their coca crop in the legal sphere and eliminate those deemed illegal. The challenge is monumental and, as we have seen this year, virtually impossible. Meanwhile, Bolivia's neighbor Peru, is coming to grips with the fact that it is the largest coca producing country in the world. That reality, which is a return to the 1990s status quo, has meant an influx of foreign criminal groups. Finally, for the second straight year, we need to note what is happening in Honduras. The country continues to open its doors to foreign criminal organizations, even while its homegrown groups continue to gain power. This includes one known as the Cachiros, which the US Treasury Department said had accumulated up to $800 million in assets, or roughly five percent of the country's GDP. A newly elected government, which takes power in January, seems to have little idea of how to combat these organizations, much less the resources.

Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2013. 141p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: South America

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf

Shelf Number: 132877

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Gangs
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Wigell, Mikael

Title: Transatlantic Drug Trade: Europe, Latin America and the Need to Strengthen Anti-Narcotics Cooperation

Summary: - The cocaine business has changed significantly in recent years. Once concentrated in Colombia, it has now expanded to the entire Latin American region with Brazil, Mexico, Central America, and Venezuela having become central corridors for the illegal traffic. - As the market for cocaine has been contracting in North America, Latin American drug networks have switched their attention to Europe, which is now the world's fastest growing market for cocaine. - The cocaine enters Europe mainly by exploiting the legitimate container trade. Most shipments continue to be directed to Western Europe, but recently the illicit trade has been expanding eastward with new entry points opening up in the Black Sea and Balkan area. There are also indications of a possible new entry point in the Eastern Baltic Sea area. - Not only are Latin American criminal organizations expanding their activities on the European drug market, but they are also exploiting the European financial crisis to launder their profits and move into other branches of the economy. - The growing transatlantic cocaine trade calls for improving inter-regional counter-narcotics cooperation. Concrete steps should be taken to promote stronger links between anti-drugs programmes, development cooperation and public security policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

Details: Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2012. 9p.

Source: Internet Resource: FIIA Briefing Paper 132: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/343/transatlantic_drug_trade/

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/343/transatlantic_drug_trade/

Shelf Number: 132969

Keywords:
Cocaine
Criminal Networks
Drug Enforcement
Drug Policy
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime

Author: Bunker, Robert J.

Title: Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico

Summary: Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel "enemy intent," a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. 76p.

Source: Internet Resource: Letort Papers: Accessed August 21, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mexico

URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf

Shelf Number: 130006

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Cartels
Drug Trafficking
Drug-Related Violence
Organized Crime (Mexico)

Author: Chi, Jocelyn

Title: Reducing Drug Violence in Mexico: Options for Implementing Targeted Enforcement

Summary: Between 2006 and 2012, drug-related violence in Mexico escalated to unprecedented levels. During this time, five of the top ten most violent cities in the world were found in Mexico, and over 60,000 Mexicans were killed at the hands of Violent Drug Trafficking Organizations (VDTOs). This reign of terror has expanded to include other types of violence, such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and spectacular public displays of violence. Most alarmingly, VDTO victims increasingly include ordinary citizens, journalists, law enforcement and military, and other government officials. To date, enforcement efforts in the United States (U.S.) have focused almost exclusively on reducing the flow of drugs from, and through, Mexico. Violence reduction has been a secondary concern, and has been mostly considered as a potential side-benefit of flow reduction policies. Until recently, Mexican authorities have focused their attacks on the upper leadership of major organized crime groups as a method of reducing flows, and in an effort to address threats to public safety. However, freshly elected President Enrique Pena Nieto has indicated that his administration will shift focus away from drug flows, in order to prioritize crime prevention and violence reduction. Given that both the Bush and Obama Administrations have acknowledged that the U.S. market for illegal drugs is largely responsible for fueling the Mexican drug trade, and that the U.S. has a strategic interest in Mexican security, the U.S. may have a currently-unexploited opportunity to reduce violence in Mexico. In this project, we explore whether the adoption of targeted enforcement in the Unites States could theoretically effect a reduction in violence in Mexico, and, if so, what form that strategy might take. We consider the operational and informational requirements for implementation, as well as the information a decision-maker would require in order to elect targeted enforcement as a strategy for addressing the security problem in Mexico. Targeted enforcement is novel in several respects. While it is not inconsistent with flow-reduction goals, the strategy leverages enforcement resources in the United States to effect violence reduction in Mexico. Furthermore, because it is a deterrent strategy, targeted enforcement requires authorities on both sides to clearly and publicly identify the target and communicate that violence will no longer be accepted as a method of conducting business. Finally, the target will encompass entire VDTOs, and not just individual offenders, which increases the cost of individual offending through internal organizational pressure. Keeping in mind current budgetary constraints, we develop four design options for violence-focused U.S.-side targeted enforcement. We evaluate our options with reference to the potential for crime and violence reduction, intelligence demands, implementation and political feasibility, and community impacts. Through a series of interviews with experts in the field, and an exhaustive review of secondary sources, we find that not only is U.S. adoption of targeted enforcement possible within existing frameworks, but that this approach has great potential for reducing Mexican-side violence. Our findings suggest: - First and foremost, we note that the adoption of a targeted violence-reduction approach need not conflict with current U.S. efforts to reduce drug flows; thus, there should be no cost in terms of drug abuse in the U.S. - While a short-term surge in violence is possible, attacking drug-trafficking revenues in the U.S. could incentivize VDTOs away from using violence to advance their drug-trafficking interests. Authorities would need to better understand the revenue portfolios of VDTOs in order to estimate how responsive organizations might be to attacks on revenues, and measure the cost-effectiveness of such a strategy. - Successful implementation requires sophisticated intelligence, and while there is some indication that both the U.S. and Mexico possess the capacity to gather this intelligence, this capacity would likely need to be refined and/or expanded. - The necessary administrative and enforcement infrastructures appear to be in place in the U.S., though resources would need to be reallocated, and additional funding might be necessary. - In the U.S., policies targeting drug flows are popular due to a perception that they decrease drug consumption; a shift towards violence reduction would probably require intensive outreach to educate stakeholders. In Mexico, current distrust in government would require clear and public communication about target selection and the role of Mexican authorities in U.S.-side enforcement. - Finally, a number of possible community impacts exist, and U.S. and Mexican authorities would need to establish mechanisms for collecting data and tracking trends in order to respond to negative externalities.

Details: Los Angeles: UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 2013. 52p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2014 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mexico

URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf

Shelf Number: 129923

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Markets
Drug Trafficking
Drug-Related Violence (Mexico)
Homicides
Kidnappings
Organized Crime
Targeted Law Enforcement
Violence
Violence Prevention
Violence Reduction
Violent Crime

Author: Goga, Khalil

Title: On the margins: The city of Cape Town and organised crime

Summary: This policy brief explores how the design of the city has affected the way criminal networks impact on governance in Cape Town. It does not purport to be comprehensive, but serves as an initial starting point for further study by highlighting some of the additional themes identified in broader research on crime and governance in contemporary African coastal cities.

Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 8p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 60: Accessed September 11, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief60.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief60.pdf

Shelf Number: 147958

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Design and Crime
Organized Crime (Africa)
Urban Areas

Author: Alemika, Etannibi E.O.

Title: The Impact of Organised Crime on Governance in West Africa

Summary: There are several types of organised criminal activities and operatives in West Africa. These activities include drug trafficking, advanced fee and internet fraud, human trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, money-laundering, arms manufacture, arms trafficking, and armed robbery as well as oil bunkering . Transnational organised criminal activities often involve collaboration among domestic and foreign criminal groups. Organised criminal groups infiltrate governments, businesses, political and economic systems. They undermine the effectiveness of these systems, sometimes through corruption and violence. It is imperative that enough effort is given to the understanding of the impact of organised crime on governance in West Africa. Aim and scope of study In this study, the following issues are addressed: - Variety and trends of organised crime in West Africa; - Impact of organised crime on peace, stability, development and the rule of law; - Transnational linkages of organised crime; and - Linkages between state institutions/politics and organised crime. The focus of the study is different from the prevalent approach to the subject and reports on organised crime in West Africa, which have been more concerned with drug trafficking, human trafficking and scams directed at European and North American countries. Inadequate attention has been paid to other forms of organised crime. More significantly, there has been a lack of attention to the impact of organized crime on the fragile political, economic and social systems of the region. The responses by international, regional and national actors involved in developing and implementing measures against organised crime emphasise developing the capacity of law enforcement and judicial officials to enable effective interdiction and enforce the law. However, experience over the past two decades in many parts of the world indicates that reliance on law enforcement alone may not be an effective and sustainable enough approach. A broader understanding of actors, modes of operation, networks, of the nexus between organised crime and political systems, and the impact of organised criminal activities and actors on the economies and societies of West African countries is a prerequisite for developing a comprehensive and effective response to the activities of criminal networks.

Details: Abuji, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office Abuja, 2013. 106p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Africa

URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf

Shelf Number: 133292

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Human trafficking
Money Laundering
Organized Crime (West Africa)
Smuggling
Tobacco Smuggling
Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Milliken, Tom

Title: Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: As Assessment to Improve Law Enforcement Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project

Summary: Illegal rhino horn trade has reached the highest levels since the early 1990s, and illegal trade in ivory increased by nearly 300 percent from 1998 to 2011, according to a new report by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) partner TRAFFIC. The report, Illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn: an assessment to improve law enforcement, is a key step to achieving USAID's vision to adapt and deploy a range of development tools and interventions to significantly reduce illegal wildlife trafficking. The report was prepared by the wildlife monitoring network TRAFFIC in partnership with USAID. The assessment uses robust analysis to identify capacity gaps and key intervention points in countries combating wildlife trafficking. Seizure data indicate that "the fundamental trade dynamic now lies between Africa and Asia," according to the report. In China and Thailand, elephant ivory is fashioned into jewelry and carved into other decorative items, while wealthy consumers in Vietnam use rhino horn as a drug which they mistakenly believe cure hangovers and detoxify the body. Rhinos and elephants are under serious poaching pressure throughout Africa, with even previously safe populations collapsing: Central Africa's forest elephants have been reduced by an estimated 76 percent over the past 12 years while in Tanzania's Selous Game Reserve, elephant numbers have fallen from 70,000 in 2007 to only 13,000 by late 2013. A record 1004 rhinos were poached in 2013 in South Africa alone - a stark contrast to the 13 animals poached there in 2007 before the latest crisis began. Record quantities of ivory were seized worldwide between 2011 and 2013, with an alarming increase in the frequency of large-scale ivory seizures (500 kg or more) since 2000. Preliminary data already show more large-scale ivory seizures in 2013 than in the previous 25 years. Although incomplete, 2013 raw data already represent the greatest quantity of ivory in these seizures in more than 25 years. Both rhino horn and ivory trafficking are believed to function as Asian-run, African-based operations, with the syndicates increasingly relying on sophisticated technology to run their operations. In order to disrupt and apprehend the individuals behind them, the global response needs to be equally sophisticated. "There's no single solution to addressing the poaching crisis in Africa, and while the criminals master-minding and profiting from the trafficking have gotten smarter, so too must enforcement agencies, who need to improve collaborative efforts in order to disrupt the criminal syndicates involved in this illicit trade," says Nick Ahlers, the leader of the Wildlife TRAPS Project. Rhino horn is often smuggled by air, using international airports as transit points between source countries in Africa and demand countries in Asia. Since 2009, the majority of ivory shipments have involved African seaports, increasingly coming out of East Africa. As fewer than 5 percent of export containers are examined in seaports, wildlife law enforcement relies greatly on gathering and acting on intelligence to detect illegal ivory shipments. The report recommends further developing coordinated, specialized intelligence units to disrupt organized criminal networks by identifying key individuals and financial flows and making more high level arrests. Also critically important are improved training, law enforcement technology, and monitoring judiciary processes at key locations in Africa and Asia.

Details: Cambridge, UK; TRAFFIC International; Washington, DC: USAID, 2014. 30p.

Source: Internet Resource: A Traffic Report: Accessed September 27, 2014 at: http://www.traffic.org/storage/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino-report.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.traffic.org/storage/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino-report.pdf

Shelf Number: 133456

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Criminal Networks
Illegal Trade
Ivory
Rhinos
Smuggling
Wildlife Crime
Wildlife Law Enforcement
Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Jones, Derek

Title: Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations

Summary: Lieutenant Colonel Derek Jones wrote this School of Advanced Military Studies award-winning comprehensive study of clandestine cellular networks and the effect on counterinsurgency operations in 2008 while a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Consequently, his monograph, although timeless in its discussion and analysis of clandestine cellular networks, was drafted years before the May 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden that resulted in his death. Therefore, the paper does not address the impact on such organizations from the death of its most charismatic leader. His monograph does provide, however, a theoretical, doctrinal, and operational understanding of the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks resulting in valuable insight and understanding of the complex nature of these organizations. As the world s societies have migrated into the urban areas, according to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jones, the urban guerrilla, underground, and auxiliaries, all operating as clandestine cellular networks, have become increasingly important, especially the core members of the movement within the underground. His analysis presents the problem from a Western military, and especially the counterinsurgent perspective pointing out that the primary components of these networks, the underground and auxiliary elements and the urban guerrillas, exist among and are drawn from the local population. As such, thus, they continually frustrate counterinsurgent operations. Any misapplication of force by the counterinsurgent, in LTC Jones s view, automatically delegitimizes the government s efforts. LTC Jones answered the primary research question what is the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks? Although each insurgency is unique, underground clandestine cellular networks as the foundation of insurgent organizations are not, nor are their form, function, and logic.

Details: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 139p.

Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-3: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767

Year: 2012

Country: International

URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767

Shelf Number: 131728

Keywords:
Counterterrorism
Criminal Networks
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Salamanca, Luis Jorge Garay

Title: Understanding the Structure of Transnational Criminal Networks Operating in the U.S./Mexico Border and the Southeastern Border of the European Union

Summary: Systemic crime and systemic corruption, much like any other activity, require the interaction of different agents. Some of those interactions are sporadic and some are permanent. In general, there are "many situations that social actors create and must negotiate in their behavior" (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010, p. 308), and it is possible to model and analyze those situations when arranged as a social network. Additionally several States and multilateral agencies acknowledge Transnational Criminal Networks (TCNs) as one of the most important threats for the domestic and transnational stability. Bearing this in mind, the purpose of this document is to model and analyze situations of crime consisting on Transnational Criminal Network (TCNs) operating in the southern border of The United States and the Southeastern border of the European Union, both regions concentrating some of the most dangerous and powerful TCNs on a global scale. The present document consists of eight sections. The first is the methodological and theoretical framework. The second is an introduction to the current situation of crime in Mexico. The third is the model and analysis of a TCN operating across Mexico and the United States, in which members of "Los Zetas" and "La Familia Michoacana" participate on activities of drug and hydrocarbons trafficking. The fourth section is an analysis of how the modeled Mexican TCN operates inside the United States. Implications for the stability and national security of the United States are also explored in the fourth section. The fifth section is an introduction to the situation of crime and corruption in Bulgaria, herein interpreted as the southeastern border of the European Union. In the sixth section four TCNs are modeled and analyzed: two consisting on crime transiting through Bulgaria, related to Drug Trafficking, and two consisting on exporting human trafficking from Bulgaria to Western Europe and a Skimming network. The final section is a summary of recommendations for improving the confrontation of TCNs.

Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation; Sophia, Bulgaria: Risk Monitor, 2013. 235p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf

Shelf Number: 133820

Keywords:
Border Security
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Gang Violence
Gangs
Human Trafficking
Organized Crime
Political Corruption

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Title: Improving Development Responses to Organized Crime

Summary: Over the past decade, there has been a growing realization that organized crime is a spoiler to development. This realization has been charted in a number of seminal reports: in 2005, the report of the Secretary-General "In Larger Freedom" highlighted the challenges of preventing the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) highlighted organized crime as one of the principle threats to peace and security in the 21st Century. In the same year, a UNODC report underscored the linkage between under-development and a crime prone environment. The 2010 "Keeping the Promise" report of the Secretary- General recognized that in order to achieve the MDGs, there would need to be capacity to explicitly respond to organized crime. The World Development Report 2011 concluded that both conflict and organized crime have the same detrimental effect on development: Resulting in 20% less development performance. The "Action Agenda" of the Secretary-General in 2012 cited the need to respond better to organized crime as a priority to achieving a stable world. While organized crime is not a new phenomenon, what is new is both its growth and reach, and the degree to which it threatens countries with the least capacity to respond. There are specific constituencies that are seeing a direct impact of organized crime on their ability to achieve their development objectives. For those working on environmental issues, for example, criminal flows are becoming a fairly significant problem. In areas like sustainable forestry, a substantial proportion of development assistance is being diverted through illegal logging. In addressing fisheries or marine ecosystems, addressing the problem of mass-scale illegal fishing has become more urgent than other research priorities. Globally, more citizens are killed through organized crime related violence in one year than have been killed in terrorist related incidents over the last two decades. In many parts of the world, including in some vulnerable and fragile states, organized crime both exploits and exacerbates conditions that allow it to thrive. In many developing countries organized crime has undermined state institutions across sectors, including for example, in the areas of environment, health, welfare and education, and further weakens state capacity to ensure the rule of law and provide security to citizens. The result is a vicious cycle: organized crime negatively impacts on the rule of law, human and economic development creating the conditions for further instability and distorted or weak governance. Thus while it has become a commonly accepted doctrine that organized crime is a spoiler to peace and development, where the debate has evolved in recent years is to recognize that effective solutions to reducing organized crime and mitigating its impacts are not to be found without development approaches. A combination of the extent of the impact of organized crime, but also the acknowledgement that many of its causes relate to a wider set of governance, social, developmental and other factors, has highlighted incontrovertibly that a narrow security approach will not be effective in countering the problem. It has been proven now in a number of theatres, that investments concentrated on building the capacity of security institutions - police and customs units - cannot alone provide a sustainable solution. It has become imperative that the weight of the development community and their tools can be brought to bear. While the issue may have been recognized to be of importance, the policy debate as to what this means in practical terms for development programming is now only getting underway. Within a broader context of the shifts in the development debate globally, including within the framework of the revision of the MDGs, there is now significant scope for further exploring the role of development actors in countering organized crime and building communities and state institutions that are resilient to its deleterious impacts. The development community needs to review its toolbox and align its responses in what is traditionally considered to be a security space. This report is drawn from a seminar in April 2014, hosted by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The seminar brought together 50 experts from national governments, multi-lateral organizations, think tanks and NGOs working in the development sector. Governments represented were Austria, Germany, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2014. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2014 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Improving%20Development%20Responses%20to%20Organized%20Crime%20-%20July%202014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Improving%20Development%20Responses%20to%20Organized%20Crime%20-%20July%202014.pdf

Shelf Number: 134008

Keywords:
Crime Against the Environment
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Wildlife Crimes

Author: Helfstein, Scott

Title: Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband

Summary: The report makes four main points that run counter to previous conceptions of crime-terror connectivity and the global illicit network. 1) Rather than operating in numerous smaller networks, the criminals and terrorists in our study are largely subsumed (98%) in a single network of 2,700 individuals with 15,000 relationships. Connectivity among actors within the illicit marketplace is relatively high. This should not be construed to say that the network is a cohesive organizational entity. Rather, the phenomenon observed and documented here is a self-organizing complex system built through social connections from the bottom up. 2) By most measures of connectivity, terrorists are more central than almost all other types of criminals, second only to narcotics smugglers. The transnational nature of some terrorist actors allows them to link disparate criminal groups. Importantly our study does not provide evidence that terrorists are shunned by criminal actors because of their ideological motivations. 3) The conventional wisdom that explains crime-terror connectivity as a product of failed or economically poor states is challenged here. Generally speaking, connectivity between terrorists and criminals is highest in resource-rich countries that have little incentive to support substate actors (comparative advantage theory) and resource-poor countries that are incentivized to support criminal or terrorist groups (augment state capabilities theory). 4) Despite the interest surrounding big data and data science, the results of data acquisition and utilization often falls short of their potential. A growing number of data sources and tools offer an opportunity to conduct analyses addressing global challenges like the crime-terror "nexus." Advancing this agenda requires asking questions in unique ways and pursuing creative approaches and partnerships to aggregating and analyzing data.

Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 89p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2014 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf

Shelf Number: 134009

Keywords:
Contraband
Criminal Networks
Illicit Goods
Smuggling
Terrorism
Terrorist Financing

Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda

Title: Changing the Game or Dropping the Ball? Mexico's Security and Anti-Crime Strategy under President Enrique Pena Nieto

Summary: ANALYSIS - Even as the administration of Mexico's President Enrique Pena Nieto has scored important reform successes in the economic sphere, its security and law enforcement policy toward organized crime remains incomplete and ill-defined. Preoccupied with the fighting among vicious drug trafficking groups and the rise of anti-crime vigilante militias in the center of Mexico, the administration has for the most part averted its eyes from the previously highly-violent criminal hotspots in the north where major law enforcement challenges remain. - The Pena Nieto administration thus mostly continues to put out immediate security fires - such as in Michoacan and Tamaulipas - but the overall deterrence capacity of Mexico's military and law enforcement forces and justice sector continue to be very limited and largely unable to deter violence escalation and reescalation. - Identifying the need to reduce violence in Mexico as the most important priority for its security policy was the right decision of the Pena Nieto administration. But despite the capture of Mexico's most notorious drug trafficker, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, much of the security policy reform momentum that surrounded the Pena Nieto administration at the outset of its six-year term has prematurely dissipated. Key pillars of the policy are plodding along meekly, including the national gendarmerie, the new intelligence supercenter, and the mando unico. The October 2013 deadline to vet all police units for corruption and links to organized crime was missed once again and extended until October 2014. As with many institutional reforms in Mexico, there is large regional variation in the quality and even design of the reforms being implemented. At least, however, the Mexican Congress, overall a weak player in setting and overseeing anti-crime policy in Mexico, approved a new criminal code in the spring of 2014. The so-called National Code of Penal Procedure (Codigo Nacional de Procedimientos Penales) will be critical in establishing uniform application of criminal law across Mexico's thirty-one states and the Federal District, and standardizing procedures regarding investigations, trials, and punishment. - Instead of pushing ahead with institutional reforms, the Pena Nieto administration has highlighted poor coordination among national security agencies and local and national government units as a crucial cause of the rise of violent crime in Mexico. It has thus defined improving coordination as a key aspect of its anti-crime approach. - Despite its rhetoric and early ambitions, the Pena Nieto administration fell straight back not only into relying on the Mexican military in combination with the Federal Police to cope with criminal violence, but also doing so belatedly and with an essentially analogous lack of planning and prepositioning, and with essentially the same operational design as the previous Felipe Calderon administration. - Although homicides, including those perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), have decreased in Mexico, the drop did not reach the 50% reduction in the first six months in office that the Pena Nieto administration had promised. Moreover, in various parts of Mexico, the violence reduction cannot be necessarily attributed to government policies, but rather is the outcome of new balances of power being established among criminal groups in previously highly contested hotspots. Many of these balances of power among the DTOs had emerged already in the last years of the Felipe Calderon administration. In these areas of newly established criminal control and deterrence, even kidnapping and extortion might be leveling off and becoming more predictable, even as they are overall on the rise in Mexico. - In its security and law enforcement efforts, the Pena Nieto administration has largely slipped into many of the same policies of President Felipe Calderon. In particular, the current administration has adopted the same non-strategic high-value targeting that defined the previous administration. Perhaps with the exception of targeting the Zetas and Los Caballeros Templarios, this interdiction posture mostly continues to be undertaken on a non-strategic basis as opportunistic intelligence becomes available and without forethought, planning, and prepositioning to avoid new dangerous cycles of violence and renewed contestation among local drug trafficking groups. This development is partially the outcome of institutional inertia in the absence of an alternative strategy, and of operational simplicity, compared to, for example, a more effective but also more demanding policy of middle-level targeting. - Importantly, the Pena Nieto administration has sought to pay greater attention to and respect for human rights issues, such as by allowing civilian claims of human rights violations by Mexico's military forces to be tried in civilian courts and establishing a victims' compensation fund. But the efforts to increase rule of law, justice, and the protection of human rights and to reduce impunity and corruption remain very much a work in progress, with the government's resolve, policies, and outcomes varying widely among Mexico's states. - The Pena Nieto administration's focus on socio-economic anti-crime policies and other crime prevention measures is highly laudable. But its signature anti-crime socio-economic approach - the so-called poligonos program - has not been well-operationalized and is not integrated with law enforcement efforts. The discreet efforts remain scattered. The theory, implementation, and monitoring parameters of the national crime prevention strategy are not yet adequately worked out. These deficiencies undermine the program's effectiveness and risk dissipating the dedicated yet relatively small resources allocated to the effort as well as the effort's energy. Monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of socio-economic anti-crime efforts, including the poligonos approach, is particularly weak and nebulous.

Details: Washington, DC: Latin American Initiative, Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2014. 48p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20felbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mexico

URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20felbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf

Shelf Number: 134070

Keywords:
Criminal Justice Policy
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Drug-Related Violence
Gangs
Homicides
Kidnapping
Organized Crime
Violence (Mexico)
Violent Crime

Author: National Gang Intelligence Center

Title: 2013 National Gang Report

Summary: The 2013 NGR highlights current and emergent trends of violent criminal gangs in the United States. Consistent with the 2011 report, the 2013 installment illustrates that gangs continue to commit violent and surreptitious crimes - both on the street and in prison - that pose a significant threat to public safety in most US jurisdictions across the nation. A comprehensive overview of gang activity in the United States, the 2013 NGR examines gangs from a national standpoint and explains how they function as sophisticated criminal networks that engage in all levels of crime in order to further their objectives to gain control of the territories they inhabit and generate revenue. As the 2013 NGR demonstrates, gangs expand their reach through migration into communities across the nation; collaboration with other illicit networks like drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and rival gangs; active recruitment of membership; and through the absorption of smaller, less visible neighborhood-based gangs (NBGs), which continue to negatively impact US communities at a greater rate than national level gangs. Intelligence herein also reviews how gangs perpetuate their criminal enterprises through their ability to adapt to changing social and economic environments; exploit new technology; target law enforcement; evade law enforcement detection; and enroll or employ within educational facilities, law enforcement agencies, government bodies, and through all branches of the US military.

Details: Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2013. 45p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-report-2013

Year: 2013

Country: United States

URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-report-2013

Shelf Number: 134179

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Gang Violence
Gang-Related Violence
Gangs (U.S.)

Author: Kemp, Walter

Title: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Toward an Integrated Multilateral Response to Organized Crime

Summary: Since the end of the Cold War, organized crime has moved from being a marginal problem in a few cities and regions to being a mainstream threat to national stability and international peace and security. While the threat has become transnational, the multilateral response has been slow, disjointed, and reactive. Broad structural changes are needed to deal more effectively with illicit trafficking and other activities of organized criminal groups. This report-the third in a trilogy of publications by the "Peace without Crime" project of the International Peace Institute (IPI)1-calls for a more integrated multilateral response to organized crime. It highlights the impact of organized crime, provides an overview of international efforts made to tackle the problem, and suggests steps toward a more effective response.

Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2014. 40p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 22, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/general/global/1409_margins_to_mainstream_toc.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/general/global/1409_margins_to_mainstream_toc.pdf

Shelf Number: 134438

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Illicit Trafficking
Organized Crime

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of the Organized Crime in the Americas: 2014

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Game Changers for 2014, where we highlight the year's most important trends in organized crime in the Americas. This year was one of dashed hopes. In the same year that Mexico celebrated the capture of the world's most wanted drug trafficker, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, it also had to accept the horror that came with a smaller, splinter criminal group executing 43 protesting students and burning their bodies to destroy the evidence. The group, known as the Guerreros Unidos, was believed to be acting in concert with the local police, a local mayor and his politically ambitious wife, in what is a blatant example of the regular collusion that exists between local authorities and criminal organizations throughout the region. The death of the students in Mexico shattered the facade created by the administration of President Enrique Pena Nieto that by capturing the country's most wanted figures -- which, in addition to El Chapo, included the heads of the Juarez Cartel and the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) -- and largely ignoring institutional reform, it could quell Mexico's criminal problem. Instead, the resulting atomization of large criminal organizations into smaller, more volatile groups that depend on local revenue streams, has led to bloody battles over the territory they need to keep the money flowing. The Guerreros Unidos, for instance, were once a part of the BLO. This fragmentation is a regional phenomenon. From Colombia to Brazil to Guatemala, large, hierarchical structures are now small, amorphous cells, working in networks, which are responsible for much of the violence that has made Latin America and the Caribbean the most homicidal region in the world. They are thriving, in part, because of the increase in the domestic consumption of illegal narcotics. The US market, while still the biggest consumer of drugs, is being challenged by growing drug use in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico, to name but a few, and these new markets are giving birth to new criminal syndicates that are feeding this violence. Lastly, the Mexico case highlighted a stark reality about security forces: that they are at the heart of much of the violence. This has been a central feature of the Colombian civil conflict and the same is true in Brazil. Brazil continues to implement its once vaunted citizen security project, the UPP, although belief that the program is a panacea is now waning, especially amidst continuing concern over the police's repressive tactics. Not even cameras attached to the police's shirt pockets and fixed to the inside of official vehicles, it appears, can impede the police from doing what they have been doing for years: executing suspects. Brazil also fell under the spotlight this year as it hosted the World Cup. Lost in the pageantry and spectacular performances of the players was the fact that soccer remains central to organized crime. From owners of local teams in the smallest villages to the largest club teams and their most celebrated players, criminal groups use soccer, and the social and political capital it generates, to make huge profits and continue their illicit operations in relative impunity. Efforts to defuse conflicts with large political-criminal organizations also faltered this year. The peace process in Colombia between the government and the country's insurgencies stumbled, after guerrillas from the country's largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), kidnapped an army general. The FARC, the region's oldest and arguably most criminalized insurgency, now seems to be splitting into pieces, some of which may adhere to their Secretariat's move towards peace and demilitarization, and some of which may break away and form their own criminal organizations. El Salvador's government-brokered truce with the two most powerful street gangs, the MS13 and the Barrio 18, also unraveled as a new administration took power and sidelined the efforts. For many who saw the truce as a farce and believe the gangs could develop into transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), the death of the truce was a relief. But for those seeking a reprieve from the resurging violence in that country -- including an increasing number of attacks on security forces and a surge in unaccompanied minors to the United States -- there are few answers. The one silver lining can be found in the slow move towards a new drug policy paradigm, one that so far decriminalizes drug use while continuing to criminalize those who create illegal, dangerous and destabilizing criminal structures. The region is not exactly poised to overturn a century of international legal precedent, but it is taking steps to measure just what levers it can pull and push in order to slow the criminal dynamics that have helped make the Americas the most violent place on the planet.

Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2014. 197p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2015 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/game_changers_2014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: South America

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/game_changers_2014.pdf

Shelf Number: 134509

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (South America)
Gangs
Organized Crime
Street Gangs

Author: Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat

Title: Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa & Yemen: The political economy and protection risks

Summary: This publication, the first in a new series of studies by the RMMS on specific mixed migration issues, focuses on migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Globally, migration and mobility are important survival and poverty reduction strategies for a large and growing number of people. This is no different in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, a poor, environmentally fragile and conflict-prone region that has generated a heavy flow of mixed migration in recent years. In 'mixed migration', different groups of migrants may travel with or alongside each other, using the same routes and means of transport but with different motivations and objectives. The term is relatively new and encompasses groups of refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, Internally Displaced People, stateless persons on the move and trafficked persons. The 'status' (regular, irregular) of people on the move often changes and adapts over the course of a journey, leading to increased difficulties in classification. In this report the term migrant is often used to include all those in the mixed migration flows, even if they include refugees and asylum seekers. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), such movements often involve irregular or clandestine travel, "exposing people to exploitation and abuse by smugglers and traffickers or placing their lives at risk. Most migrants, when they travel irregularly, are in vulnerable situations". The majority in the Horn of Africa and Yemen move with the assistance or under the control of migrant smugglers. Although the results of migration may contribute to social and economic development, such forms of irregular migration represent huge challenges for governments and international organisations with regard to promoting the rights of migrants, addressing the issue of irregular migration and border management, ensuring national security and correct immigration procedures, and countering the activities of criminal networks. Migrant smuggling is a disturbing phenomenon due to the power dynamics and attendant protection risks between migrant and smuggler as well as between migrant and officials in the states through which migrants travel. Unlike human trafficking, the migrant starts his or her journey on a consensual basis, but this often soon changes. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), migrant smuggling can be a 'deadly' business. Between 2006 and 2012, when regular monitoring of new arrivals first began, a conservative estimate indicates that almost half a million migrants (447,000) have set off to Yemen in boats from Djibouti or the Somali port city of Bossaso, almost all of them Somalis and Ethiopians. According to Human Rights Watch, and as this study will illustrate, asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants travelling to Yemen from the Horn of Africa suffer severe human rights abuses, violence or loss of life. They also claim that "despite the numbers and despite the human rights abuses, this has been largely ignored by the outside world". Many Eritrean migrants and asylum seekers take the western route through Sudan into Libya, while a large cohort of other Ethiopians and Somalis stream south through Kenya and towards South Africa. Almost all of this movement is facilitated by human smugglers.

Details: Nairobi: RMMS, 2013. 80p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2015 at: http://regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/monthly%20summaries/series_booklet_Leo.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Africa

URL: http://regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/monthly%20summaries/series_booklet_Leo.pdf

Shelf Number: 134573

Keywords:
Asylum Seekers
Criminal Networks
Human Smuggling (Africa)
Human Trafficking
Migrants
Migration
Organized Crime
Refugees

Author: Caulkins, Jonathan P.

Title: After the Grand Fracture: Scenarios for the Collapse of the International Drug Control Regime

Summary: Key Findings - Decriminalizing the possession of amounts of marijuana suitable for personal use has minimal repercussions beyond a nation's borders. But even one country's legalization of a commercial cocaine or heroin industry would affect global markets. - International prohibitions against cocaine and heroin create asymmetries. Production and transshipment concentrate in relatively few places that bear the bulk of the negative externalities created by the illegal production and international trade. - The impact of negative externalities has led to calls for altering the United Nations treaty framework and for individual nations to legalize outside of the existing framework. - Legalization of production in one country would attract productive activities (with their associated externalities) from the remaining illicit producers. This incentivizes current producing countries to encourage others to take the first step. - Legalization of transshipment in one country would attract transportation activities from existing jurisdictions where drugs remain illegal since it would reduce the need for traffickers to assume the risk of covert shipments or armed guards. - The impact of legalized transshipment of cocaine is different for the United States and for other regions of the world. As the United States shares a large porous border with Mexico, current covert smuggling networks would continue to operate. Transshipment to Europe and Asia would take place through regular trade routes, principally containers, given the distances involved. - If a European or Asian state with large porous land borders were to legalize transshipment, it would attract the bulk of cocaine transported to their region, producing covert smuggling networks similar to those currently existing on the U.S.-Mexico border.

Details: Washington, DC: Brooking Institute, 2015. 17p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Caulkinsfinal.pdf?la=en

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Caulkinsfinal.pdf?la=en

Shelf Number: 135752

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Control Policy
Drug Legalization
Drug Smuggling
Drug Trafficking

Author: Garzon, Juan Carlos

Title: The Criminal Diaspora: The Spread of Transnational Organized Crime and How to Contain its Expansion

Summary: This publication is the culmination of a multi-year project examining the changing dynamics of organized crime in Latin America and its effects on democratic governance. Over the course of the project, we have sought to foster collaboration among Latin American and U.S. researchers to develop a comprehensive understanding of how criminal networks in different sub-regions interact and affect regional as well as global trends. We have also explored the policy implications of these dynamics, including the consequences of organized crime for civic and political participation and democratic citizenship overall. The basis for this publication is a series of commissioned research papers and public meetings organized by the Latin American Program, to examine the factors contributing to the spread of organized crime beyond national borders. The research also seeks to analyze the various policy consequences of these dynamics and the ways governments in the Western Hemisphere have tried to address the challenges posed by organized crime both domestically and jointly in a transnational and multilateral context.

Details: Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013. 18p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2015 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CRIMINAL_DIASPORA%20(Eng%20Summary).pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Latin America

URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CRIMINAL_DIASPORA%20(Eng%20Summary).pdf

Shelf Number: 129828

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: Dongen, Teun van

Title: Detecting Elusive Criminals

Summary: Organized crime for the European market is a multi-billion dollar business that feeds on, as well as sustains, poverty and poor governmental control. As factors like the economic crisis and the emergence and growth of urban slums will sustain organized crime, this threat is likely to stay with us in the foreseeable future. Against this background, this report answers the following question: what research strands need to be explored further in order to find solutions for the threat posed to Europe by transnational organized crime? The flexibility of criminal networks is remarkable, as they seem to think nothing of moving operations to other countries, entering into new partnerships and using other modes of transportation. Also, they are often quick to pick up on new technologies that help them run their businesses. The consequent lack of signature and standard operating procedures on the part of criminal networks means that they are increasingly difficult to detect. The fact that a criminal cell has at one point been in touch with another cell, says little to nothing about the likelihood that they will be in touch again. In general, it is questionable to what extent past behaviors can be used as clues to predict future conduct and eventually find and catch criminal cells. Current research strands that have to do with the detection of criminal networks fail to take into account the state of flux that is characteristic of organized crime. Technological detection tools like scanners and air sampling devices are deployed statically, and fail to uncover more than a small part of all organized criminal activity. Knowledge discovery approaches, in which criminal networks can be detected through the analysis of digital data, are mostly based on police records. This means that approaches along these lines are largely reactive in nature. A similar objection can be raised against crime mapping exercises that are carried out by scholars and government research departments. They register trends and developments in organized crime after they have taken place. This means that organized crime mapping, while useful, is always a step behind- a shortcoming which could be a problem against a threat that changes rapidly and constantly. Therefore, we suggest a series of research strands that are more preventive in nature. First, the detection of criminal networks should be applied to the preventive and early warning phase. We should development frameworks and vulnerability assessment tools to predict or estimate whether a certain area - a neighborhood, a city, a region - will in the near future have to deal with criminal networks. This will help governments act quickly and at an early stage, which is crucial when dealing with a fluid and adaptive threat like the one posed by organized crime. For the development of such vulnerability and early warning frameworks, we need more research into what contextual factors make areas vulnerable to organized crime, and into the motives of criminal networks to choose certain areas of operation over others. We need, in other words, to learn more about the causes behind the trends and developments in organized crime. Second, research is needed to identify and address legal obstacles to the sharing of information between and within governments needed to detect criminal networks or make vulnerability assessments. What should be addressed is not only the legal obstacles between governments, but also within governments and between the government and the private sector. Finally, we should look into technological tools for criminal network detection (e.g., data mining) as well as into possibilities to generate human criminal intelligence, as such an approach will be non-intrusive and will help law enforcement agencies win the trust of the local population.

Details: The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and TNO, 2012. 65p,

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2015 at: http://www.hcss.nl/reports/detecting-elusive-criminals/122/

Year: 2012

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.hcss.nl/reports/detecting-elusive-criminals/122/

Shelf Number: 136127

Keywords:
Criminal Investigation
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: Goga, Khalil

Title: A network of violence: Mapping a criminal gang network in Cape Town

Summary: This study presents and discusses the characteristics of the structure, actors involved and types of interactions of a criminal network formed by a gang operating in Cape Town, South Africa. The analysis is based on data gathered from a case judgment in the Western Cape High Court. The accused group were on trial for a number of crimes, including murder, assault, theft, and malicious damage to property, and were also indicted in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, which criminalises membership of a criminal organisation. This information was processed and analysed by applying specific social network analysis protocols, among other methods.

Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 22p.

Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 271: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper271V2.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: South Africa

URL: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper271V2.pdf

Shelf Number: 136645

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Gang Violence
Gangs
Organized Crime
Social Network Analysis

Author: Briscoe, Ivan

Title: Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali

Summary: Mali's descent into a war of secession at the start of 2012 was a conflict foretold. Yet what followed proved radically distinct from the country's three previous episodes of insurgency in its vast, impoverished and arid north. Radical Islamists seized control of the main urban centres of northern Mali, displacing the Tuareg rebels with whom they had struck a working relationship. In the capital, Bamako, a military coup led by an unknown and low-ranking army captain overthrew a president who had been in power for a decade. An uneasy stand-off came into being: Mali's debilitated military guarded the frontiers to the south, while Islamist hardliners and criminals meted out their own version of sharia justice across the north. As is well known, the decomposition of Malian state authority was finally halted early in 2013. Faced with an Islamist advance to the south, French military forces embarked on a lightning intervention that scattered the extremists and reasserted control over the north. Since then, the pace of Mali's post-conflict recovery and stabilization has been astonishing: a UN peacekeeping mission and a host of bilateral and EU programmes have been put into place; a new president and a new National Assembly have been elected; peace talks with the more moderate armed groups, though stuttering, are under way. But as the national government and the international community leave behind the heat of the crisis, it is now incumbent on them to understand what caused such a perilous tailspin to start in Mali, so as to prevent it from reoccurring. As in other countries of West Africa and the Sahel, transnational organized crime has played a prominent role in the affairs of Mali over the past two decades, above all in the north. Drug trafficking, including large consignments of high-value cocaine from Latin America, as well as kidnapping rackets led by Islamist terror groups operating freely across the borders of the Sahel, are both widely regarded as playing key roles in fomenting the instability, unrest and violence that climaxed in 2012. However, the depiction of a crime-terror nexus in Mali, whereby criminal profits feed insurgent arms and recruitment, does not do justice to the multi-faceted role played by illicit activity across the country. This paper is an attempt to marshal all the available evidence, along with the insights provided by experts in Mali, so as to understand the relations that were forged prior to 2012 between criminal enterprises, communities, political and social elites, armed groups, the Malian state and neighbouring countries. On the basis of recent developments, the paper seeks to outline the likely adaptations that the main illicit networks will now make, and to draw out some recommendations as to how best to temper the criminality and violence that menace Mali's post-conflict transition. At the heart of this analysis is an account of how Mali was both the victim of the displacement of drug-trafficking routes and armed jihadist activity from other countries, and a deeply complicit partner in profiting from the incoming wave of illicit trade and Islamist terror. Behind this willing complicity lay the particular vulnerabilities of Malian state and society. Government in Bamako, the country's capital, had by 2006 replaced direct authority over the north with sporadic, ham-fisted interference. Chronic competition between the north's many ethnic, caste and clan groups offered numerous possibilities for the political elite in Bamako to find useful allies to do its bidding. However, these social fissures were also fodder for the designs of other, newer parties: nearby states such as Algeria and Libya, criminal organizations seeking to traffic drugs, and radical armed groups. The resulting transactions between supranational forces and local ethnic or tribal factions were to set Mali on the way to the fourth, and arguably the most threatening, insurgency of its post-colonial history. But Mali's war was not merely the product of radicalized and internationalized disaffection in the north. The conflict also threw a harsh light on the degradation of the state itself. A model for democratic virtue in Africa, half of whose budget was financed by foreign donors, Mali re-emerged after its coup as a state that had been afflicted by multiple vices. Illicit practices had become rampant across the public sector, corroding popular faith in politicians; Mali's celebrated elections had in fact received some of the lowest turnouts in the democratic world. Moreover, the day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism formed a permissive soil on which an all-powerful presidency could nurture the construction of a shadow state. The greatest drug trafficking scandal of Malian history, the Air Cocaine case of 2009, suggests that official complicity in the criminal business had penetrated the highest echelons of power. Mali has now set the course for a recovery of legitimate and accountable state authority. Its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has backed a clean sweep of the judicial system and a Truth Commission on violence in the north. Captain Sanogo, the coup leader, is in jail, along with his accomplices. Key Islamist leaders and narco-traffickers have been scattered or neutered, as have the masterminds of the shadow state. From the information available, it would seem that major illicit trafficking across the north has also diminished in scale. However, it is far too soon to proclaim an end to the crisis. Occasional terrorist attacks and ethnic skirmishes remain a constant headache for local people and UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the pre-war illicit networks are never far away: clearing corruption from the public sector is set to be a long and arduous haul, while illicit networks in political life are destined to regroup and reconfigure, as they have in many other criminalized environments, notably in Latin America. Nearby countries such as Niger and Libya have quickly emerged as staging posts in the Saharan and Sahelian criminal economy. As Mali negotiates its post-conflict recovery, the focus must be directed at ways to reduce the systemic threat from criminal business while avoiding the sorts of blind repressive policies that have engineered insurgencies in Afghanistan, or terrible bloodshed in Mexico. This paper outlines a number of approaches that should lie at the heart of such a balanced, conflict-sensitive strategy towards crime. A robust and inclusive political settlement for the north is critical, though for this to work attention must now focus on how decentralized or autonomous regional authorities can be supervised without the risk of meddling from Bamako. Provision of security and security reform must be imbued with realism as to what can be achieved with the institutions available, and should be shaped by an emphasis on intelligence-led policing that seeks to sever the most dangerous criminal linkages to power-brokers. Counter-terrorism must also be wise to the intermediation of criminal figures, and to the armed networks that illicit businessmen have cultivated. And lastly, it remains imperative that renascent Mali attacks the roots of the shadow state, and is backed by an international community willing to abandon its hunger for fixers in the state and short-term solutions.

Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, the Clingendael Institute, 2014. 65p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed October 30, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mali

URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf

Shelf Number: 137180

Keywords:
Counter-Terrorism
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Illicit Networks
Kidnapping
Organized Crime
Terrorism
Violence

Author: Smith, Christina M.

Title: The Shifting Structure of Chicago's Organized Crime Network and the Women It Left Behind

Summary: Women are underrepresented in crime and criminal economies compared to men. However, research on the gender gap in crime tends to not employ relational methods and theories, even though crime is often relational. In the predominantly male world of Chicago organized crime at the turn of the twentieth century existed a dynamic gender gap. Combining social network analysis and historical research methods to examine the case of organized crime in Chicago, I uncover a group of women who made up a substantial portion of the Chicago organized crime network from 1900 to 1919. Before Prohibition, women of organized crime operated brothels, trafficked other women, paid protection and graft fees, and attended political galas like the majority of their male counterparts. The 1920 US prohibition on the production, transportation, and sale of alcohol was an exogenous shock which centralized and expanded the organized crime network. This organizational restructuring mobilized hundreds of men and excluded women, even as women's criminal activities around Chicago were on the rise. Before Prohibition, women connected to organized crime primarily through the locations of their brothels, but, during Prohibition, relationships to associates of organized crime trumped locations as the means of connection. Relationships to organized crime were much more accessible to men than to women, and consequently gender inequality increased in the network. The empirical foundation of this research is 5,001 pages of archival documents used to create a relational database with information on 3,321 individuals and their 15,861 social relationships. This research introduces a unique measure of inequality in social networks and a relational theory of gender dynamics applicable to future research on organizations, criminal or otherwise.

Details: Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2015. 233p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1464&context=dissertations_2

Year: 2015

Country: United States

URL: http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1464&context=dissertations_2

Shelf Number: 137867

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Female Offenders
Organized Crime
Social Networks

Author: Billings, Stephen B.

Title: Partners in Crime: Schools, Neighborhoods and the Formation of Criminal Networks

Summary: Why do crime rates differ greatly across neighborhoods and schools? Comparing youth who were assigned to opposite sides of newly drawn school boundaries, we show that concentrating disadvantaged youth together in the same schools and neighborhoods increases total crime. We then show that these youth are more likely to be arrested for committing crimes together - to be "partners in crime". Our results suggest that direct peer interaction is a key mechanism for social multipliers in criminal behavior. As a result, policies that increase residential and school segregation will - all else equal - increase crime through the formation of denser criminal networks.

Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. 36p.

Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series: Working Paper 21962: Accessed February 24, 2016 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21962.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: United States

URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21962.pdf

Shelf Number: 137957

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Neighborhoods and Crime
Schools
Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime

Author: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Title: Illicit Trade: Converging Criminal Networks

Summary: Illicit trade is a worldwide phenomenon. Globalisation has provided opportunities for criminal networks to expand the scope and scale of their operations, with serious negative consequences for the economy, the environment and society. Illicit trade also undermines good governance, the rule of law and citizens' trust in government, and can ultimately threaten political stability. This report provides analysis of some of the main areas of illicit trade, including trafficking in persons, wildlife, counterfeit medicines, narcotics, tobacco, alcohol and sports betting. It looks at what drives and facilitates such activity, estimates the volume of trade and amount of revenue it generates, maps the pathways of illicit goods from production to consumer, describes the shortcomings of current policies for reducing or deterring illicit trade, and suggests avenues for improvement. Understanding illicit trade It is important to clearly define and measure illicit trade, and understand the context that allows it to flourish. However, countries - and sometimes regions within countries - do not always agree on what goods can be legally traded, and there is even greater variance in the application of quality standards and the protection of intellectual property rights. These differences can make cross-country measurement of illicit trade as a whole very difficult, which is why this report takes a sectoral approach. Our increasingly interconnected economies and societies have allowed organized crime to expand alongside the exponential growth in legitimate international trade. Criminal networks exploit differences in regulatory and tax regimes to move goods and services across borders. While exact measurements can be difficult given the clandestine nature of illicit transactions, one estimate puts the profits of international organised crime as high as USD 870 billion, or 1.5% of global GDP. Calculating and tracking the money made from these activities is important as it can provide crucial information to law enforcement. More data and information sharing is needed to develop a clearer understanding of illicit trade and how to combat it. A more holistic view of the cost of illicit trade also takes into account its harmful impacts on consumers, the environment, tax revenues and jobs. Traffic in humans and narcotics, for example, also exact a very heavy social toll. Illicit trade can also be closely linked to criminal violence and terrorism. Costs in terms of law enforcement, incarceration and rehabilitation should also be taken into account. Finally, illicit trade can cause longer-term damage to the rule of law, public trust, human capital and public health, as well as deter foreign investment. Trafficking in persons According to estimates by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 20.9 million people are forced into slavery worldwide causing immense, long-term damage to individuals, communities, and nations. Trafficked persons tend to flow from poorer regions to richer regions and from conflict regions to more stable regions. Governments need to give priority to implementing laws for preventing trafficking, protecting victims and prosecuting both traffickers and the corrupt public officials who assist them. Illicit trade in wildlife Demand for elephant ivory and rhino horn has driven dramatic growth in illegal wildlife markets in recent years due primarily to a growing consumer base in East Asia. Taken together, all forms of wildlife trafficking constitutes one of the most lucrative forms of illicit trade, and the sector has more than doubled since 2007. Monitoring and enforcement in source countries can be effective means to reduce poaching, but training and information systems are needed to build adequate capacity. Counterfeit medicines The trade in counterfeit medicine is a huge industry, generating as much as USD 200 billion a year in tangible goods alone according to OECD's study of 2005 data, which is soon to be updated. It has a direct negative impact on health, depriving users of appropriate treatment and contributing to global microbial resistance. Pharmaceutical companies also suffer a loss in revenue and reputation, and increased costs for security. Successfully combatting counterfeiting will require more extensive information sharing across agencies and nations. Finally, the development and adoption of an international public health treaty would be a significant step toward protecting patients and public health globally. Tobacco products The illicit trade in tobacco is perhaps the most widespread and most documented sector in the shadow economy. It has been estimated that 570 billion illicit cigarettes were consumed worldwide in 2011. Illicit tobacco is an important source of revenue for criminal networks, and deprives government services of excise tax revenues at the same time. To counter the illicit trade in tobacco products, governments developing a multifaceted approach, including: building partnerships, increasing data validity and reliability, launching educational and public awareness campaigns, increasing capacity-building efforts, and prioritising countering illicit tobacco products and its associated crimes. Narcotics The global narcotics trade is thought to be the single largest black market in the world, and is a source of revenue for international criminal organization. In addition to the negative impact on human health and well-being caused by the narcotics themselves, the criminal violence that accompanies all aspects of drug trafficking erodes state institutions and is often difficult to reverse. Tackling the narcotics trade effectively will require not only punitive approaches and sanctions but also state building, economic development and good governance practices. Alcohol It is estimated that billions of dollars from trafficking and illegal trade in alcoholic beverages flow through the global economy each year, distorting local economies, diminishing government and legitimate business revenues, and in some cases posing a serious health risk to consumers. It is estimated that illicit sources account for 25% of total worldwide adult alcoholic consumption. Contributing factors include the higher cost of legal products from taxes, weak laws, lack of enforcement and social acceptance of contraband in some countries. Sports manipulation The globalisation of sports has led to an increase in unregulated sports betting, which is increasingly used for money laundering and has been connected to corruption in sports (match-rigging). An internationally co-ordinated, pro-active response is needed, including initiatives targeting bettors and offenders, police action and co-operation with financial institutions. It is also important to communicate on the subject of sports integrity to all stakeholders, including the public and the media.

Details: Paris: OECD, 2015. 259p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2016 at: http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/illicit-trade-converging-criminal-networks.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/illicit-trade-converging-criminal-networks.pdf

Shelf Number: 138115

Keywords:
Counterfeit Medicines
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Human Trafficking
Illegal Trade
Illicit Tobacco
Illicit Trade
Organized Crime
Sports Betting
Wildlife Crime

Author: Miklaucic, Michael

Title: Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization

Summary: Acceleration. Magnification. Diffusion. Entropy. Empowerment. The global environment and the international system are evolving at hypervelocity. A consensus is emerging among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners that recent sweeping developments in information technology, communication, transportation, demographics, and conflict are making global governance more challenging. Some argue these developments have transformed our international system, making it more vulnerable than ever to the predations of terrorists and This view continues to dominate mindsets within the U.S. national security community. It fails to fully appreciate the growing power of nonstate actors and adversaries, or the magnitude of the threat they pose and the harm they impose on the international system itself. It underappreciates the possibility - indeed likelihood - of the convergence, whether for convenience or growing ambition, of criminal, terrorist, and even insurgent networks. More important even than insufficient recognition of the efficacy of these adversaries is the absence of a plan to counter the threat they pose to both national security and the international state system. In short, this view does not see the big picture - the long view of the declining robustness and resilience of the global system of nation-states that has been dominant for centuries, and the unprecedented attacks on that system. The failure of that system - in which we and so many have prospered beyond belief or precedent in history - would be a catastrophic and existential loss. Global trends and developments - including dramatically increased trade volumes and velocity, the growth of cyberspace, and population growth, among others - have facilitated the growth of violent nonstate actors, the strengthening of organized crime, and the emergence of a new set of transcontinental supply chains as well as the expansion of existing illicit markets. The resourcefulness, adaptability, innovativeness, and ability of illicit networks to circumvent countermeasures make them formidable foes for national governments and international organizations alike. Their increasing convergence gives them ever-improved ability to evade official countermeasures and overcome logistical challenges as well as ever better tools for exploiting weaknesses and opportunities within the state system, and attacking that system. Since illicit actors have expanded their activities throughout the global commons, in the land, sea, air, and cyber domains, nations must devise comprehensive and multidimensional strategies and policies to combat the complex transnational threats posed by these illicit networks. This book is an attempt to map the terrain of this emerging battlespace; it describes the scope of the security threat confronting the United States and the international community from transnational criminal organizations and what is being done to combat that threat - from the strategic level with the release, in July 2011, of the U.S. Government's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security and, in April 2011, of the Department of Defense (DOD) Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy - to the operational level with increased regional partnerships and dialogues. criminals. Others argue that despite this significant evolution, organized crime, transnational terrorism, and nonstate networks have been endemic if unpleasant features of human society throughout history, that they represent nothing new, and that our traditional means of countering them - primarily conventional law enforcement - are adequate. Even among those who perceive substantial differences in the contemporary manifestations of these persistent maladies, they are viewed as major nuisances not adding up to a significant national or international security threat, much less an existential threat.

Details: Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013. 304p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2016 at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf

Shelf Number: 131162

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Illegal Trade
Illicit Markets
Illicit Trade
National Security
Organized Crime
Terrorism

Author: Souza Pinheiro, Alvaro de

Title: Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas

Summary: This monograph by Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro contributes to the discussion of urban guerrillas, their impact on society, and the role of the armed forces in countering criminal elements. The rise of urban guerrillas is a result of an evolution in command and control capabilities, weapons, and doctrine that has given them strong influence over the daily lives of citizens living in neighborhoods where government support and control is limited or absent. The favelas (ghettos, slums) of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are ready examples that provide the setting for General Alvaro's monograph. The urban guerrilla, however, is emblematic of a wider-felt problem, not limited to Brazil. What makes General Alvaro's monograph compelling is that this Brazilian story has universal application in many locales that are under-governed and under-supported by constituted authorities. Urban guerrillas flow from a witch's brew of ersatz political doctrine, readily available and powerful weapons, and criminal gangs that typically are financed by the drug trade. Criminal groups like the Red Command (Comando Vermelho-CV) and Third Command have been able to thrive in the favelas because of ineffective policing and lack of government interest. These Brazilian gangs have filled the void with their own form of governance. As General Alvaro indicates herein, criminal urban guerrillas have latched on to revolutionary doctrine, such as the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla and the First Capital Command Statute, so as to give political legitimacy to their lawlessness. In fact, these are gangs that terrorize the residents of the favelas, holding them hostage to criminal exploits, while keeping government legitimacy and security in check. As in the United States, when the general welfare of civil society is at risk, the President may call upon the armed forces to aid the police or take control. Under the Brazilian Constitution the President can "intervene -- to put an end to serious jeopardy to public order --" through his power to "decree and enforce federal intervention." This is akin to the U.S. President's authorities for civil disturbances and other emergencies, but a notable difference is the expansive role that Brazilian armed forces can take. Under the Brazilian Constitution the armed forces "are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers [legislative, executive, judicial], and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order." Thus during the crisis to restore public order in Rio de Janeiro in November 1994 through January 1995, the military was put in charge as the lead agency, with operational control over federal and state police. With Presidential authorization, the Brazilian Minister of the Army designated the Eastern Military Commander as the General Commander of Operations. Operation Rio commenced with the goals of reducing urban violence and reestablishing government authority. Operations consisted of isolating lawless areas, conducting squad patrols and large sweeps, and on several occasions, attacking the urban guerrilla directly. The operation suppressed urban guerrilla activity-for a time. There was a decrease in bank robberies, car thefts, gang shootouts, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling, plus some 300 automatic rifles and 500 hand guns were confiscated. Yet as General Alvaro illustrates in this monograph, the problem persists today with similar public order crises in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and other cities. It is for good reason that General Alvaro includes in this monograph a translation of Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, since the man and his manual continue to inspire miscreants and would-be revolutionary groups. Much as psychiatrist-philosopher Frantz Fanon provided a rationale for African anticolonialists to kill the white interlopers, Marighella is a symbol for ideological activists who would resist authority, as well as for criminals who profit when government presence and legitimacy are wanting. The military planner and strategist should be familiar with the Minimanual and similar writings since they contribute to the development of the strategic environment as we find it, and it is against this backdrop that we plan for countering insurgencies and terrorism. The military will continue to play an important part in countering the urban guerrilla, whose goal is to separate the population from the government (typically by making government forces overreact) then supplanting it. This suggests that the military will need to conduct a range of irregular warfare activities in coordination with civilian agencies. Whatever the combination of direct and indirect actions that are applied to counter the urban guerrilla, the military planner will be well served to consider General Alvaro's insights about Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas.

Details: Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2009. 98p.

Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 09-8: Accessed March 12, 2016 at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/0909_jsou-report-09-8.pdf

Year: 2009

Country: Brazil

URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/0909_jsou-report-09-8.pdf

Shelf Number: 138195

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Favelas
Gangs
Organized Crime
Urban Guerrillas
Urban Violence
Violent Crime
Weapons Smuggling

Author: Fellman, Philip V.

Title: Disrupting Terrorist Networks - A Dynamic Fitness Landscape Approach

Summary: The study of terrorist networks as well as the study of how to impede their successful functioning has been the topic of considerable attention since the odious event of the 2001 World Trade Center disaster. While serious students of terrorism were indeed engaged in the subject prior to this time, a far more general concern has arisen subsequently. Nonetheless, much of the subject remains shrouded in obscurity, not the least because of difficulties with language and the representation or translation of names, and the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the subject matter. One of the most fruitful scientific approaches to the study of terrorism has been network analysis (Krebs, 2002; Carley, 2002a; Carley and Dombroski, 2002; Butts, 2003a; Sageman, 2004, etc.) As has been argued elsewhere, this approach may be particularly useful, when properly applied, for disrupting the flow of communications (C4I) between levels of terrorist organizations (Carley, Krackhardt and Lee, 2001; Carley, 2002b; Fellman and Wright, 2003; Fellman and Strathern, 2004; Carley et al, 2003; 2004). In the present paper we examine a recent paper by Ghemawat and Levinthal, (2000) applying Stuart Kauffman's NK-Boolean fitness landscape approach to the formal mechanics of decision theory. Using their generalized NK-simulation approach, we suggest some ways in which optimal decision-making for terrorist networks might be constrained and following our earlier analysis, suggest ways in which the forced compartmentation of terrorist organizations by counter-terrorist security organizations might be more likely to impact the quality of terrorist organizations' decision-making and command execution.

Details: Unpublished Paper, 2007. 13p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0707/0707.4036.pdf

Year: 2007

Country: International

URL: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0707/0707.4036.pdf

Shelf Number: 138424

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Decision Making
Network Analysis
Terrorism
Terrorists

Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Title: Violence, Children and Organized Crime

Summary: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) presents a regional report on violence and other violations of rights to which children and adolescents fall victim in contexts in which organized crime and violent or criminal groups operate. The report identifies the leading factors that make the Americas the region with the highest rates of violence in the world, and focuses primarily on analyzing how children and adolescents are affected by different forms of violence in their communities, especially acts committed by members of armed groups but also by agents of the State. Conditions of insecurity and violence in the region are significant factors of concern which involve serious violations of people's human rights. The public often associates these situations with adolescents, who are blamed to a large extent for the climate of insecurity experienced by many communities. The focus tends to be on male adolescents from poor and marginal neighborhoods who belong to groups that have traditionally been excluded and discriminated against and who are stigmatized on a daily basis and singled out as "potential dangers to society" who must be brought under control. However, as the IACHR explains in the report, the reality is different from these perceptions and much more complex. Children and adolescents, in fact, represent one of the groups most affected by different forms of violence and rights violations, as well as by the actions of criminal groups and by repressive citizen security policies. The inhabitants of some communities suffer the scourge of violence more intensely. The areas that are particularly hard-hit are the least developed neighborhoods where there is limited access to basic services, a lack of opportunities, and little State presence. These are areas with populations living in vulnerable conditions, in which their rights are not guaranteed due to structural situations of marginalization and social exclusion. These factors facilitate the emergence and expansion of criminal groups and organized crime. In addition, the enormous financial revenues associated with the illegal drug market have contributed significantly to the expansion of criminal groups that compete for this market and its benefits, unleashing spiraling violence due to clashes between criminal groups and State security forces. Easy access to firearms and the large number of guns in the hands of private individuals exacerbate the existing climate of insecurity and violence. In the report, the IACHR observes with concern that the conditions for children and adolescents living in these contexts can be daunting. Many of them experience situations of violence, abuse, and neglect in their homes, communities, and schools, at the hands of adults, their peers, and even the police. The quality of education is poor, and there are many barriers to accessing higher education and access to job opportunities and decent employment. Children and adolescents are often subjected to pressure, threats, or trickery to get them to join these organizations; other adolescents seek out these groups in search of opportunities, recognition, protection, and a sense of belonging, aspects that they would otherwise not be able to find. Once they are within these structures, they are used and exploited by the adults for a broad range of activities, including surveillance, the transport and sale of drugs, robberies, extortions, kidnappings, and other violent activities related to maintaining the interests of criminal groups. Girls and adolescents in particular are the primary victims of sexual violence and human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Adults use them as disposable, interchangeable parts of criminal structures - the last link in the chain - with the average age of recruitment 13 years old. State responses to these challenges are primarily based on policies that are strongly focused on aspects of coercive control by security forces and punitive repression through the criminal justice system. The common denominator of security strategies in the region has been the allocation of greater responsibilities to State security forces, along with a progressive militarization of the police and their operations and the participation of the army in citizen security tasks. However, these strategies have not significantly eased the climate of insecurity; on the contrary, many countries have experienced a resurgence of violence, in addition to reported abuses, arbitrary practices, and human rights violations carried out by State security forces. In this report, the IACHR expresses its concern regarding the high rates of arbitrary detentions; excessive use of force and lethal force; cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, even extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances, as well as sluggish investigations and high levels of impunity for these types of acts. Due to the social stigma they face, some adolescents from certain groups of society are often victims of these types of abuses and arbitrary practices. Among the situations it found, the IACHR has observed that the application of the crime of "unlawful assembly" or "conspiracy" or "belonging to a criminal group" has increased the number of arbitrary detentions of adolescents based on their appearance and on the belief that they may belong to a gang or a criminal group, without any evidence that a crime has been committed. Current drug policies have also contributed to an increase in the number of children and adolescents deprived of liberty for drug-related offenses such as micro-trafficking and possession of small quantities. In several countries of the region, adolescents who are poor, of African descent, or members of minorities are over-represented among those detained by the police. The prosecution of crimes of "unlawful assembly" and drug-related crimes has also led to an increase in pretrial detentions and for longer periods, due to an overextended criminal justice system. Meanwhile, States in the region tend to prioritize punitive and retributive responses to adolescent offenders, with incarceration the most widespread measure used. State responses have focused on proposals to reduce the age of criminal responsibility for adolescents, in some cases starting at age 12, and to lengthen prison sentences. In practice, this might mean that they would be locked up for their entire adolescence - a crucial phase for their personal development, growth, and education. Added to this is the fact that detention centers, where conditions are generally alarming in terms of safety, health, and overcrowding, have become factors aggravating adolescents' vulnerability and exposure to violence and crime, which only worsens and reinforces the problem States are seeking to solve. The IACHR reiterates in the report that measures designed to hold adolescents accountable for their actions should be based primarily on a model of restorative justice and socio-educational measures, one whose purpose is to rehabilitate adolescents and reintegrate them into society. In the Inter-American Commission's judgment, current policies seek to show short-term results but do not adequately address structural causes or focus sufficiently on prevention or on social investment programs and promotion of rights. The current policies do not take into account the specific consequences of these environments for adolescents who are in an especially vulnerable and unprotected situation which puts them at risk of being captured and used by organized crime, becoming involved in violent and criminal activities, or becoming victims of such activities. The report concludes with a series of recommendations to the States to address violence and insecurity through comprehensive, holistic public policies that take into account the centrality of human rights and effectively ensure the exercise of rights by children and adolescents.

Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2016. 227p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ViolenceChildren2016.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: South America

URL: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ViolenceChildren2016.pdf

Shelf Number: 138593

Keywords:
Children and Violence
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Violence
Youth Gangs
Youth Violence

Author: Europol

Title: Migrant Smuggling in the EU

Summary: Europe has seen an unprecedented increase in the number of irregular migrants arriving in the European Union since 2014. The scale of these migratory flows reached previously unseen heights in 2015. This trend of exponentially increasing numbers of migrants arriving in the EU is set to continue in 2016. In 2015, more than one million migrants reached the EU. This development has had a profound impact on Europe's criminal landscape. Criminal networks have quickly adapted to this development and substantially increased their involvement in migrant smuggling. More than 90% of the migrants travelling to the EU used facilitation services. In most cases, these services were offered and provided by criminal groups. A large number of criminal networks as well as individual criminal entrepreneurs now generate substantial profits from migrant smuggling. Criminal networks exploit the desperation and vulnerability of migrants. They offer a broad range of facilitation services such as the provision of transportation, accommodation and fraudulent documents at excessively high prices. In many cases, irregular migrants are forced to pay for these services by means of illegal labour. The scale of this exploitation is set to further increase in 2016. In 2015 alone, criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling are estimated to have had a turnover of between EUR 3 -6 billion. This turnover is set to double or triple if the scale of the current migration crisis persists in the upcoming year. Migrant smuggling to and within the EU is a highly attractive business for criminal networks and has grown significantly in 2015. As the fastest growing criminal market in Europe and other regions, this trend is set to continue in 2016. In tackling the sophisticated international and European migrant smuggling networks generating enormous profits, law enforcement authorities face a significant challenge over the coming years.

Details: The Hague: EUROPOL, 2016. 15p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2016 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/migrant-smuggling-eu

Year: 2016

Country: Europe

URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/migrant-smuggling-eu

Shelf Number: 138619

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Forced Labor
Human Smuggling
Illegal Migrants
Migrants
Organized Crime

Author: Europol

Title: Trafficking in Human Beings in the EU

Summary: Key findings Trafficking in human beings (THB) in the EU is predominantly a European affair. ◊ 70% of the identified victims and suspects in the EU are EU nationals. ◊ Victims and suspects generally share nationality, ethnic ties and sometimes kinship links. ◊ Mobility and rotation of victims are key features within this criminal market. Austria is a crucial transit country, especially for victims originating from Central Eastern Europe. Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are key entry points for non-EU victims. A vast majority of the criminal groups active in THB are capable of controlling the entire process of trafficking, from the recruitment of victims to the reinvestment of the criminal proceeds. ◊ While most traffickers are male, female suspects are also involved in low-ranking tasks. Nigerian criminal networks form an exception where women play a central role in the exploitation process. ◊ The typical structure of criminal groups engaged in THB consists of loose networks linked by kinship or ethnic ties. ◊ Criminal proceeds are primarily sent back to their country of origin. Human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation is the most reported form of THB in the EU. ◊ Most reported victims are female EU nationals from Central and Eastern Europe. ◊ Non-EU victims mainly originate from Albania, Brazil, China, Nigeria, and Vietnam. ◊ EU victims usually use genuine documents, while non-EU victims use forged or look-alike documents. ◊ Deception is commonly used to lure potential victims, including the 'lover boy' method.

Details: The Hague: EUROPOL, 2016. 41p.

Source: Internet Resource: Situation Report: Accessed April 11, 2016 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/trafficking-human-beings-eu

Year: 2016

Country: Europe

URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/trafficking-human-beings-eu

Shelf Number: 138620

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Trafficking
Organized Crime
Sexual Exploitation

Author: Nussio, Enzo

Title: Peace and Violence in Colombia

Summary: The Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos is currently in talks with the oldest of Latin America's guerilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); most recently, it has also engaged with the smaller Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN). In particular, it appears possible that a peace agreement will soon be signed with FARC. President Santos is promoting the negotiations in Havana internationally as good news in a crisis-ridden world. However, the general population of Colombia remains skeptical. In a survey of March 2016, about two thirds of respondents were pessimistic about the negotiations; nearly half would prefer an end of negotiations and a military offensive against FARC. Many Colombians have no faith in a treaty with the rebels, whom they regard as untrustworthy, and believe that the violence plaguing Colombia cannot be eliminated at the negotiation table. "Peace" is generally regarded as an unrealistic, utopian goal, even if the FARC and ELN fighters should lay down their arms. Despite the hopeful prospects, it is likely that the pessimism of the general population will prove correct: An end of political violence would by no means lead to the end of societal and criminal violence in the country.

Details: Zurich, SWIT: Center for Security Studies (CSS), 2016. 4p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-191-EN.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Colombia

URL: https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-191-EN.pdf

Shelf Number: 139050

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug-Related Violence
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
Guerilla Groups
Political Violence
Violence
Violent Crime

Author: Europol

Title: Exploring Tomorrow's Organised Crime

Summary: Law enforcement is often criticised for being reactive rather than proactive. A reactive approach to criminal offences committed lies in the nature of police work � in solving criminal cases, supporting victims and working within our judicial systems to create justice. However, we can also be more proactive in fighting crime, particularly organised crime, in anticipating the development of new modi operandi, shifts in criminal markets and changes in organised crime structures. Looking ahead will enable us to better allocate resources, plan operational activities and engage with policy- and law-makers to prevent certain types of crimes from emerging. This document considers the future of serious and organised crime in the EU and while we do not claim to make definitive predictions, we identify a series of key driving factors that will impact on the serious and organised crime landscape in Europe.

Details: The Hague: European Police Office, 2015. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2016 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/edi/EuropolReportDigitalCove.html

Year: 2015

Country: Europe

URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/edi/EuropolReportDigitalCove.html

Shelf Number: 139222

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: Miller, Jackson

Title: Species of Crime: Typologies and Risk Metrics for Wildlife Trafficking

Summary: The recognition of wildlife crime as a global transnational crime threat has taken on new urgency since President Obama's 2013 Executive Order on Combating Wildlife Trafficking. Meanwhile, private transportation logistics and financial services companies have independently expressed concern due to their potential exposure to wildlife and environmental transnational organized crime (TOC) activity, and also a desire to take action. A key impediment to addressing their concerns has been a lack of information on both the types of supply chain abuse that may occur and the types of wildlife criminal networks that may be operating. Such information may help refine and strengthen compliance controls to ensure that funds and services reach their intended beneficiaries. This paper begins to address this need by: 1. Outlining context; 2. Identifying red flag indicators, high-risk jurisdictions and container profiles; 3. Providing typologies with examples of wildlife TOC network activity. We intend for our research to launch a more robust examination of wildlife TOC activity. We hope our efforts may begin to bridge a critical knowledge gap by disseminating information to help African and East Asian - linked private - sector transport and payments businesses better monitor their risk. We also recommend that organizations review the US Federal Government's "Implementation Plan" for the National Strategy on Wildlife Trafficking, along with the Yearly Typologies Reports released by Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

Details: Washington, DC: C4ADS, 2015. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2016 at: http://ejfphilanthropies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/species-of-crim.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: http://ejfphilanthropies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/species-of-crim.pdf

Shelf Number: 139269

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Trafficking in Wildlife
Wildlife Crime
Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Rettberg, Angelika

Title: Gold, Oil and the Lure of Violence: The Private Sector and Post-conflict Risks in Colombia

Summary: For the first time in decades Colombia seems to be on course towards a negotiated settlement with its two remaining guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army. However, the post-conflict prospects are not altogether auspicious. Abundant weapons in circulation, demobilised combatants with criminal expertise, and multiple opportunities for applying this know-how in both legal and illegal activities and organisations as part of the steady and continuing reconfiguration of criminal groups pose serious risks to stability and the sustainability of peace in Colombia over the coming years. This report presents a number of the challenges for Colombia's post-conflict stability arising from criminal networks and activities in regions associated with the extractive industry - and specifically in regions dedicated to oil extraction and gold mining. While domestic and foreign investments have risen over recent years, and overall security conditions have improved, it is likely that armed violence will continue and undergo further transformations in these regions. The emergence of new sorts of non-conventional armed violence, operating across the spectrum between conflict and criminality, illustrates the challenge of consolidating a post-conflict arrangement in Colombia.

Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2015. 13p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 28, 2016 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Rettberg_NOREF%20Clingendael_Gold%20oil%20and%20the%20lure%20of%20violence_the%20private%20sector%20and%20post-conflict%20risks%20in%20Colombia_Sept%202015_FINAL.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Colombia

URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Rettberg_NOREF%20Clingendael_Gold%20oil%20and%20the%20lure%20of%20violence_the%20private%20sector%20and%20post-conflict%20risks%20in%20Colombia_Sept%202015_FINAL.pdf

Shelf Number: 139886

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Gold
Natural Resources
Oil
Organized Crime
Theft of Natural Resources

Author: Rogers, Douglas B.

Title: Organizing Crime: Towards a Theory of the Criminal Firm

Summary: This dissertation investigates the industrial organization of criminal enterprise. We argue that differences in contestability across criminal industries crucially shape how producers in these industries organize. In more contestable criminal industries, producers use organizational hierarchy to enforce collusion and preserve their returns. However, hierarchy creates scope for boss self-dealing and so is costly. In less contestable criminal industries, where producers' benefit from colluding is smaller, this cost exceeds organizational hierarchy's benefit. Here producers organize "flatly" instead. To examine this hypothesis we explore history's most infamous criminal organizations: the Sicilian Mafia and Caribbean pirates. It also investigates the problem of external costs within a violent criminal industry. These costs arise when the activities of one criminal enterprise result in increased pressure by the state on other criminal enterprises. Since the costs of violent crime are borne in part by other criminal enterprises, each criminal enterprise engages in a suboptimally high degree of criminal activity from the perspective of the industry as a whole, driving profitability towards zero. In order to internalize the costs of violence, and thus sustain criminal activity, criminals establish collusive inter-firm institutions designed to regulate the overall amount of criminal activity. These institutions, however, once established, increase profitability in the industry and thus elicit competition amongst the cartel members, increasing the amount of criminal activity. Thus, criminal industries facing problems of external costs exhibit a cycle of regulated and unregulated violent activity. To test this hypothesis, I examine inter-firm institutions, known as commissions, in La Cosa Nostra1. Finally, a laboratory experiment was conducted to examine the performance of a market for protection in the absence of external enforcement. The focus of the experiment is whether subjects given the power to protect or predate, designated as "elites," form a cartel and charge a monopoly price to a set of subjects we label "peasants", or whether these elites compete as separate entities and charge peasants a competitive price. The price of protective services is measured by the amount of tribute transferred by peasants to a particular elite. Since we endow elites with superior ability in the use of force, they may also utilize involuntary transfers, La Cosa Nostra is commonly referred to as the Sicilian Mafia. which incur deadweight losses, to transfer resources. Thus, the subjects are motivated to devise a voluntary means of transfer through tribute within our environment. A baseline treatment was run where there was only a single provider of protection to establish a benchmark comparison. In building the design design, several different literatures were drawn upon, which discuss the viability of a private market for protection. This debate is particularly salient to discussions of protection services in developing countries.

Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2011. 103p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 3, 2016 at: http://mars.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/6380/Rogers_dissertation_2011.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://mars.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/6380/Rogers_dissertation_2011.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Shelf Number: 139958

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Mafia
Organized Crime

Author: Hughes, Caitlin

Title: Trafficking in Multiple Commodities: Exposing Australia's poly-drug and poly-criminal networks

Summary: International law enforcement agencies have increasingly pointed to an apparent rise in poly-drug traffickers: high level drug traffickers who choose to trade in multiple illicit drugs. This project provided the first detailed examination of poly-drug and poly-crime trafficking in Australia. It used three different types of Australian Federal Police data (border seizures, cases and linked-cases) and court sentencing data to estimate the scale of and trends in poly-drug commercial importation at the Australian border from 1999-2012; generate and compare criminal profiles of 20 poly-drug and 20 mono-drug traffickers; and conduct social network analysis of three Australian poly-drug networks. The analysis showed that over the 14 year period, from 1999 to 2012, between 5% and 35% of commercial importations at the Australian border involved poly-drug trafficking. Poly-drug trafficking occurred in almost every year of analysis: and increased only slightly over time. Finally, poly-drug traffickers were associated with more serious and potentially harmful behaviour. For example, compared to mono-drug traffickers, poly-drug traffickers were associated with larger quantities of drug seized, larger networks, longer periods of operation, and greater involvement in other types of serious crime. The project concluded that some fears about poly-drug traffickers may have been overstated particularly about the inherent escalation of this form of trafficking, but that poly-drug traffickers are likely to pose added risks to governments and law enforcement than mono-drug traffickers. Two key implications are that first, poly-drug traffickers warrant increased attention in Australia; and second, regulatory or law enforcement responses aimed at one drug may increase the problems associated with another drug. This demands a new way of thinking about Australian illicit drug markets that can better respond to drug traffickers operating in an inter-connected marketplace.

Details: Canberra: National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund, 2016. 133p.

Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series No. 62: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph-62.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph-62.pdf

Shelf Number: 140130

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Markets
Drug Trafficking
Illicit Drugs
Organized Crime

Author: Duijn, Paul A.C.

Title: The Relative Ineffectiveness of Criminal Network Disruption

Summary: Researchers, policymakers and law enforcement agencies across the globe struggle to find effective strategies to control criminal networks. The effectiveness of disruption strategies is known to depend on both network topology and network resilience. However, as these criminal networks operate in secrecy, data-driven knowledge concerning the effectiveness of different criminal network disruption strategies is very limited. By combining computational modeling and social network analysis with unique criminal network intelligence data from the Dutch Police, we discovered, in contrast to common belief, that criminal networks might even become 'stronger', after targeted attacks. On the other hand increased efficiency within criminal networks decreases its internal security, thus offering opportunities for law enforcement agencies to target these networks more deliberately. Our results emphasize the importance of criminal network interventions at an early stage, before the network gets a chance to (re-)organize to maximum resilience. In the end disruption strategies force criminal networks to become more exposed, which causes successful network disruption to become a long-term effort.

Details: Sci. Rep. 4, 4238; DOI:10.1038/srep04238 2014. 15p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2016 at: http://www.nature.com/articles/srep04238?WT.ec_id=SREP-704-20140304

Year: 2014

Country: Netherlands

URL: http://www.nature.com/articles/srep04238?WT.ec_id=SREP-704-20140304

Shelf Number: 140167

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Social Network Analysis

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2015.

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Game Changers 2015, where we highlight the year's most important trends in organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. This year saw some potentially game changing developments related to government corruption, organized crime, and rising pressure to alter alliances between members of the state and criminal groups. It also saw important shifts in the criminal world, in particular related to street gangs and the realignment of large criminal enterprises. From Mexico to Brazil and numerous places in between, officials came under fire for establishing mafia-like schemes that defrauded their citizens and ensured impunity for government officials connected to criminal groups. The long-term results of the widespread outcry from multilateral bodies, non-governmental organizations, private sector, political organizations, and religious and civic groups designed to disrupt these criminal networks are not yet clear, but the short-term impact has been profound. In August, Guatemala's President Otto Perez Molina resigned. This came just three months after Guatemala's Vice President Roxana Baldetti resigned. The two were accused of running a massive customs fraud scheme, which has been a mainstay of a criminal network run by current and ex-military officials for decades. Perez and Baldetti's departures came after the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), working with the Attorney General's Office, began revealing a spate of corruption cases. These investigations touched the highest levels of congress, as well as government purveyors such as the social security institute and mayors' offices. All of these had set up criminal networks to embezzle money from the government coffers. The public outcry that followed hastened the officials' departures. In Mexico, the power and popularity of President Enrique Pena Nieto's government has eroded in large part due to its handling of several major security crises, some of which spilled over from 2014. These events include the disappearance and likely murder of 43 students at the hands of a criminal group with deep ties to the local government and police; the apparent massacre of at least 22 suspected criminals by the Mexican army; and the dramatic escape of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman from a high security prison in June. Outside investigators from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) pilloried Mexico's Attorney General's Office for the numerous gaps, inconsistencies, and improbable explanations about what happened to the student teachers. In October, the government's own Human Rights Commission confirmed that the army extra-judicially executed at least 15 of the 22 suspected criminals in the so-called Tlatlaya massacre. And in September, the government arrested 13 officials - including the former head of the prison system - for allegedly assisting Guzman's flight to freedom via a one kilometer tunnel that ran from underneath the shower in his jail cell to a small farmhouse.

Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2015. 162p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: South America

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf

Shelf Number: 140254

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (South America)
Gangs
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Liang, Christina Schori

Title: The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights into Modern Terrorist Financing

Summary: Terrorism is proving to be an enduring global security threat. Since the late 1990s terrorist groups have become more lethal, networked, and technologically savvy. The world is currently dealing with two global terrorist groups - al-Qaeda and IS - that have recruited affiliates across the globe. In 2014 the lives lost due to terrorism around the world increased by 80 per cent compared to the previous year. Several terrorist groups currently have the ability to control land and hold entire cities hostage. The growing power of terrorist groups is linked to their ability to generate revenue from numerous criminal activities with almost complete impunity. Without funding, terrorist groups can neither function nor carry out attacks. To strip terrorists of their power, world leaders and the international community must work together to combat related crime and to implement and enforce global mechanisms for preventing terrorist financing. This paper provides a snapshot of how modern terrorist groups finance their organisations and operations. It will identify the key issues that are driving the growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime. The paper will also explore the various working relationships between terrorist and criminal groups, outlining under what conditions and to what extent they cooperate. This will help to identify existing and potentially new countermeasures to dry up terrorist funding, and to dismantle and destroy terrorist-criminal networks in the future.

Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Security Analysis, no. 10: Accessed September 14, 2016 at: http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-into-Modern-Terrorist-Financing

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-into-Modern-Terrorist-Financing

Shelf Number: 147742

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Jihadist
Organized Crime
Terrorism
Terrorist Financing

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Elites and Organized Crime: Introduction, Methodology, and Conceptual Framework

Summary: Organized crime and the violence associated with it is the preeminent problem in Latin America and the Caribbean today. The region is currently home to six of the most violent countries in the world that are not at war. Four of those countries are in Central America, where we centered our research. Public opinion polls also consistently show that crime and insecurity are at the top of the region�s concerns. Governments and multilaterals have channeled vast resources towards dealing with this prosperity, and turning them into tools for wielding power. And it is changing the dynamics of international affairs, politics and elite relations in these countries. However, the analysis of organized crime has not kept pace with these developments. Indeed, the idea for this study came from scanning governmental and nongovernmental reports on organized crime and realizing that too often it is characterized as separate from, rather than integrated with, the communities in which it operates. In the traditional conception, criminal economies are considered to be parallel, not essential, to the lives of those who live where they operate. The protagonists are identified as gang members, thugs and hoodlums; rarely as bankers, politicians and security forces personnel. Governments rarely look inward at their own history, their geography, or their failing institutions to find out why organized crime is thriving in their country. They blame what they see as outsiders -- frequently foreigners -- or those on the margins, particular the poor. There are Italian, Russian, Colombian and increasingly Mexican mafias that are considered to be somehow distinct and ruthless because of their upbringing, their culture, or their ethnicity. The result is a distorted view of who the criminals are and how they gained such a solid foothold in the region. Traditional assessments have little concept of organized crime�s activities and businesses, the role it plays and how it is integrated into the economy, politics and social life of communities. These assessments have yet to measure how crime impacts governance and democracy, from local community associations to the national vote. And they struggle to conceptualize the role crime plays in the formation of the state, from both an economic perspective and a security perspective. What�s more, most assessments focus on two aspects of the government�s efforts against organized crime: its ability to reform or beef up its judicial system or security forces; and its ability to implement social and economic programs to keep potential recruits from joining organized criminal gangs. The emphasis of these assessments is greatly influenced by the principal ways in which they view crime, i.e., as the result of a �failed� state or a �failed� economy. This view leads to a false choice, one in which governments, multilaterals, foundations and others must decide between �good guys� and �bad guys� in a zero-sum game. This is a dangerous way to frame the issue, as it cuts off huge portions of society, politics and the business sector who, whether they like it or not, must operate within or around organized criminal activities. It also ignores the West�s own history, in which pirates, bootleggers and others played important roles in the construction of social, economic and political structures. issue, and international aid and humanitarian organizations have shifted their mandates to better confront its effects. The problem is as broad as it is deep. It touches all aspects of society, politics and business in these countries. Organized crime is undermining democracy and distorting economies. It is fueling small gangs and international criminal syndicates that use their money and weapons to co-opt or subvert the security forces. It is penetrating the state, breaking apart the institutions that were established to protect citizens and promote In our study, we are seeking to expand the notion of how organized crime works. We see it as something that is integrated into society, into the development of a country�s economy, its governance structures, and social groups. Organized crime does not penetrate as much as it blends in with the various parts of the community, the political class and the business moguls. This includes the �elite,� i.e., decision-makers, influencers, political operators, and those who control capital and the means of production. By expanding who we include in our study, we can see the whole picture, one that is not restricted to a zero-sum game of cops and robbers, but considers more nuanced and little-understood factors to identify why this phenomenon is so hard to eliminate, and what we can do to foster a society that does not reward criminal activity, especially activities that rely on violence. Specifically, we are interested in exploring three areas that deserve more attention: organized crime�s interaction with economic development, governance, and social and cultural dynamics.

Details: InsightCrime.org, 2016. 51p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Introduction_Section_Elites_Organized_Crime

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Introduction_Section_Elites_Organized_Crime

Shelf Number: 140327

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Political Corruption
Violence
Violent Crime

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime

Summary: Guatemala is Central America's most populous country and its largest economy. But an intransigent elite, an ambitious military and a weak state has opened the way for organized crime to flourish, especially since the return of democracy. During three decades of democratic rule since 1985, the longest such period in Guatemala's history, economic elites have sought to gain hegemonic control. In doing so they have tried to exercise power that is not sustained by military force, but rather by legitimacy and consensus, at least among the diverse group of elites who share power. Historically, there were two prominent power actors: ideologically conservative businessmen and high-ranking military officials from the middle classes who derived their influence by maintaining the army as an institution of social and political control. The political parties distinguished themselves between those that mobilized the social base to gain power and those who opposed them while at a disadvantage and under persecution. In contrast, almost all popular movements were opposed to the power groups, or openly challenged the established political system. Some of these popular movements eventually formed the core of insurgent groups which fought with the state between 1960 and 1996 in a brutal civil war that left more than 200,000 dead and 70,000 disappeared. Throughout, elites have remained central actors in Guatemalan politics, as their economic power is based on their influence within political circles. They employ diverse mechanisms -- formal and informal -- to influence public policy. They can differ in their interests, values and functions, and operate on an unequal plane of power relations, being simultaneously in conflict with and dependent on society. These actors exercise autonomy and can formulate as well as carry out projects at the local and national level.

Details: InsightCrime.org, 2016. 112p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Guatemala_Elites_Organized_Crime

Year: 2016

Country: Guatemala

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Guatemala_Elites_Organized_Crime

Shelf Number: 140351

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Huistas
Organized Crime
Political Corruption

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Title: Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Local Democracy

Summary: Local democracy encompasses formal and informal sub-national institutions that respond to citizens' needs. At the centre of local democratic practice are open governments, which provide people with space to promote participation, deliberation and a focus on public interests. However, local state fragility undermines democracy. Organized crime increasingly exploits such weaknesses in order to protect its illicit businesses, as political corruption is an ideal avenue preferred by organized criminal groups. This report examines the interlinkages between organized crime networks and political actors at the local level. It also analyses policy responses (particularly decentralization policies) that have�intentionally or unintentionally- enabled or prevented organized crime engagement in political corruption at the local level. Case studies from Afghanistan, Colombia and Niger illustrate how illicit networks relate to local levels of government and decentralization processes.

Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 71p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/protecting-politics-deterring-the-influence-of-organized-crime-on-local-democracy-pdf.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/protecting-politics-deterring-the-influence-of-organized-crime-on-local-democracy-pdf.pdf

Shelf Number: 140460

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Cartels
Illicit networks
Organized Crime
Politicians

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Title: Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Public Service Delivery

Summary: Public service delivery is one of the main tasks citizens expect from their governments. Democracy is a political system that should improve service delivery as it offers the building blocks for equitable resource distribution and sustainable development. Indeed, in the frameworks of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the democratic principles of transparency and accountability play a key role in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. However, in many contexts, public service delivery is fraught with corrupt practices, leading to less accountable and less effective public services that are not adequately reaching those they are intended to serve. Particularly in fragile and conflict affected states, corrupt practices can sometimes be linked to organized crime. These illicit groups and networks increasingly form parallel structures that compete with the state to provide services, either in open conflict with the state, or sometimes working with the explicit or tacit agreement of the authorities. In other cases, however, organized crime does not become a service provider but instead hinders the state's provision of services by leeching off state resources through corruption in public contracts. In all of these cases, organized crime perpetuates poverty and inequality, while threatening economic growth and, by extension, democracy itself. Furthermore, organized crime challenges the state's legitimacy by profiling itself as a viable provider of services to the population, while the state's capacity to provide services is undermined. Citizens are consequently left with hollow democratic state institutions that are not capable of delivering better lives for them. Growing discontent with politics, as reflected in a number of public perceptions surveys and massive protests around the world, are important wake-up calls to implement serious strategies to prevent and mitigate political corruption linked to organized crime. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI) are therefore committed to supporting countries around the world in addressing the threat that organized crime poses to their democracies. Understanding how organized crime challenges the state's legitimacy as public service provider is therefore one important contribution to these efforts. That is why, in 2011, International IDEA launched the Protecting Politics project, conducting research and providing policy support to tackle the nexus between organized crime and political actors. Most importantly, in 2015 International IDEA joined forces with GI to explore the linkages between organized crime and public service delivery. This report summarizes these findings, drawing on case studies from Afghanistan, Colombia and Somalia to analyse in detail how organized crime has become a viable service provider in some localities in these countries, and how it has captured legitimacy from the state in the process. This report complements three other papers that examine how organized crime affects political parties, elections and local democracy, respectively. Together, these four reports provide a unique and detailed overview of democratic systems' capacity to deal with complex security threats such as organized crime.

Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 65p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/protecting-politics-organized-crime-public-service-delivery/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageID=80689

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/protecting-politics-organized-crime-public-service-delivery/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageID=80689

Shelf Number: 140461

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Cartels
Illicit networks
Organized Crime
Politicians

Author: Briscoe, Ivan

Title: Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin America

Summary: Organized criminal networks are global phenomena that distort local and global economic markets, bring violence and blur the role of the state in providing basic services, all in the interest of increasing their wealth. The main weapon used by such networks is corruption - of politicians and of many of the state apparatuses in the countries in which they operate. This undermines the basic principles of democracy and puts the state at the mercy of illicit economic interests. This is a global challenge. Latin America has particularly suffered from these issues for a number of reasons. The strong presence of illicit networks dedicated to illegal mining, the trafficking of exotic species, arms trafficking and, in particular, the production and sale of illegal drugs such as cocaine has created a massive inflow of illicit money. Together with the high cost of political activity in the region and difficulties in controlling political contributions, this has allowed organized crime to penetrate the political landscape. However, efforts made in different Latin American countries to confront these networks have seen significant achievements. There is a wealth of positive and negative experience on how these problems can be confronted that will be useful for countries in the same region and on other continents. This book focuses on experiences in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru. The authors draw on research that illustrates how relationships are forged between criminals and politicians. They identify numerous mechanisms for tackling these relations, and discuss both the achievements and the challenges concerning their practical application.

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), 2014. 305p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm

Year: 2014

Country: Latin America

URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm

Shelf Number: 140463

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Illegal Mining
Illicit Networks
Money Laundering
Organized Crime
Political Corruption
Wildlife Trafficking

Author: National Gang Intelligence Center

Title: 2015 National Gang Report

Summary: The purpose of the 2015 NGR [National Gang Report] is to provide a national overview of the current gang threat in the United States by collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing data obtained from law enforcement agencies across the nation. The assessments contained herein were derived from data provided by law enforcement through the '2014 FBI Safe Streets and Gang Task Force Survey', the NAGIA [National Alliance of Gang Investigators' Association] '2015 National Gang Report Survey', law enforcement reporting, and open source information. One hundred and nine respondents completed the '2014 FBI Safe Streets and Gang Task Force Survey' to create a representative sample of the five Safe Streets and Gang Task Force geographic regions. Combining data from the Safe Streets and Gang Task Forces allowed the NGIC to incorporate data from our partner agencies who participate on task forces, but did not complete the NAGIA '2015 National Gang Report Survey'. Thus, data from the '2014 FBI Safe Streets and Gang Task Force Survey' was combined with 569 responses from the four components of the NAGIA '2015 National Gang Report Survey', law enforcement reporting, and open source information to develop a holistic picture of current gang activity across the country.

Details: Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2016. 68p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2016 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=792574

Year: 2016

Country: United States

URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=792574

Shelf Number: 146148

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Gang Violence
Gang-Related Violence
Gangs (U.S.)

Author: Villaveces-Izquierdo, Santiago

Title: Illicit Networks and Politics in the Baltic States

Summary: One of the biggest threats to democracy today is infiltration of political processes by transnational organized crime. It undermines constitutional frameworks and the rule of law, it violates the integrity of the electoral process, and it corrupts political parties and the very principle of democratic representation. This study explores how the Baltic States are affected by illicit interests. It looks into how illicit networks and political actors forge relations in this region, from illicit financing of political campaigns, to intimidation of voters, establishment of new political parties, joint economic enterprises and money laundering operations. The authors identify policy responses to this phenomenon, highlighting challenges in implementing them and proposing options on how to strengthen these responses.

Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2013. 40p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics/index.cfm

Year: 2013

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics/index.cfm

Shelf Number: 146117

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Illicit Networks
Organized Crime
Political Corruption

Author: Cockayne, James

Title: Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime: Sicily, New York and the Caribbean, 1859- 1968, and Mexico and the Sahel.

Summary: Criminologists have long recognized that some groups govern criminal markets. Strategists and political scientists, however, downplay the role organized crime plays in domestic and international politics - though the United Nations Security Council, World Bank and White House have warned that role may be growing. The assumption has been that states and insurgents exist in a political 'upperworld' while organized crime exists in a separate, profit-driven 'underworld'. We consequently lack a framework for understanding the strategic logic of organized crime: how it uses force, and other means, to compete, cooperate and collaborate with states and other political organizations for governmental power. This dissertation develops such a framework, drawing on strategic theory, criminology, and economic and management theory. It applies the framework to the emergence, development and movement of mafias in Sicily, New York, and the Caribbean between 1859 and 1968. Using unpublished judicial, intelligence and diplomatic material, mafia memoires, and published secondary sources, the dissertation reveals mafias becoming autonomous strategic actors in both domestic and international politics. They deliberately influenced elections, organized domestic insurgency and transnational armed attacks, attempted regime change, and formed governmental joint ventures with ruling groups. Mafias played important and unappreciated military and political roles during the Second World War, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Based on this historical analysis, the dissertation identifies six ways criminal groups position themselves in the 'market for government'. These positioning strategies help explain the emergence and behaviours of mafias, warlords and gang rulers; political-criminal alliances; acts of terrorism by criminal groups; and criminal sponsorship of new political structures ('blue ocean' strategy). The final section applies these concepts to two contemporary cases - Mexico and the Sahel - and considers the overall implications for strategic theory, efforts to combat organized crime and the management of criminal spoilers in peace processes.

Details: London: King's College London, 2015. 376p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/44634722/2015_Cockayne_James_1018212_ethesis.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/44634722/2015_Cockayne_James_1018212_ethesis.pdf

Shelf Number: 140599

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Gangs
Mafia
Organized Crime
Warlords

Author: Le, Vy Kim Thi

Title: Understanding the operational structure of Southeast Asian drug trafficking groups in Australia

Summary: This thesis examined the operational structure of Southeast Asian drug trafficking groups operating on the eastern seaboard of Australia by testing the validity and application of organised crime and drug trafficking typologies using data obtained from 159 drug trafficking cases in three Australian states: New South Wales; Queensland; and Victoria. Key findings indicated that the usefulness of typologies is limited when classifying and analysing organised crime groups. In particular, Southeast Asian drug trafficking groups operated largely in small, informal, family-based hierarchies or groups that were better conceptualised using theoretical perspectives from network and cultural studies. The study recommended that replicating previous empirical research in the field is an effective approach that will contribute towards building a cumulative body of knowledge on organised crime structures

Details: Brisbane: Queensland University of Technology, 2013.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 11, 2016 at: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/60670/

Year: 2013

Country: Australia

URL: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/60670/

Shelf Number: 130145

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime

Author: Kuhne, Winrich

Title: West Africa and the Sahel in the Grip of Organized Crime and International Terrorism – What Perspectives for Mali after the Elections?

Summary: On July 28, 2013, Mali held its first presidential election after the military coup in March 2012 and the end of the war in the North. In the first round, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, a former prime minister, received 39.2 % of the votes cast. Soumaila Cissé, a former finance minister, came in second with 19.4 %. Altogether 27 candidates competed for the presidency. In accordance with the constitution a second round took place on August 11 between the two leading candidates Keita and Cisse. In this round, Keita was elected as Mali's new president with a majority of 77.6 %. His opponent received 22.3 %. Accepting his clear defeat he already congratulated Keita for his victory before the final results came out. There is no doubt that the election of a new president has given Mali a chance for a new start. However, Mali had such a chance twice before but dismally failed. This paper argues that the structural causes for these past failures are still present today. Indeed, they have become even more worrisome and difficult to tackle. This is in particular true with regard to the key issues for stability in Mali: the interaction between the Tuareg conflict and the governability of the North on the one hand and the penetration of West Africa and the Sahel by increasingly symbiotic networks of organized crime and international terrorism on the other hand.

Details: Baltimore, MD: School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, 2013. 10p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Briefing: Accessed November 15, 2016 at: http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Winrich_Kuehne_Aug_2013_ENG.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Mali

URL: http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Winrich_Kuehne_Aug_2013_ENG.pdf

Shelf Number: 141164

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Terrorism

Author: Solar, Carlos

Title: The Governance of Organised Crime in Chile 1990-2014

Summary: The re-democratisation of Chile set an important landmark for the governing of the country's security. Despite the initial effort undertaken by the democratically elected authorities to ensure the rule of law, the passing of time soon exposed the state's limited capacity for confronting the pressing risks that came along with more openness in the country. The perilous evidence of organised crime swarming in the country caught many of the country’s public security actors unaware and thus confused regarding their response. A series of factors undermining an encompassing response to complex criminality were evident. Public security institutions lacked the knowledge, skills, and resources and, what is more, they were highly divorced from one another due to their previous experiences in delivering security within a dictatorship. However, and almost 25 years later, the governance of organised crime had been transformed into a complex engagement of policy dissimilar to that of early re-democratisation. Multiple public institutions, demonstrating a set of highly interconnected relationships, were able to engage in policy networks to put forth a series of security policy plans. This thesis aims to explore the scholarly relevance of such governance evolution by asking the following research question: how can we explain the governing relationships that Chile’s public institutions have put up to confront organised crime since redemocratisation? This research project explains therefore how public security actors have been able to move away from inward and hierarchical patterns of policy action and develop instead horizontal relations that favour an inter-institutional style of policy-making. Through its empirical research, this thesis argues that Chile's state bureaucracies have been able to steer the governance of organised crime; however, not within the realms of a central unified authority, but through a set of self-governing institutions that, since the 1990 return to democracy, have gradually adopted norms, practices, and beliefs.

Details: York, UK: University of York, 2016. 298p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/42606048.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Chile

URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/42606048.pdf

Shelf Number: 147929

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Rule of Law

Author: Agreste, Santa

Title: Network Structure and Resilience of Mafia Syndicates

Summary: In this paper we present the results of the study of Sicilian Mafia organization by using Social Network Analysis. The study investigates the network structure of a Mafia organization, describing its evolution and highlighting its plasticity to interventions targeting membership and its resilience to disruption caused by police operations. We analyze two different datasets about Mafia gangs built by examining different digital trails and judicial documents spanning a period of ten years: the former dataset includes the phone contacts among suspected individuals, the latter is constituted by the relationships among individuals actively involved in various criminal offenses. Our report illustrates the limits of traditional investigation methods like tapping: criminals high up in the organization hierarchy do not occupy the most central positions in the criminal network, and oftentimes do not appear in the reconstructed criminal network at all. However, we also suggest possible strategies of intervention, as we show that although criminal networks (i.e., the network encoding mobsters and crime relationships) are extremely resilient to different kind of attacks, contact networks (i.e., the network reporting suspects and reciprocated phone calls) are much more vulnerable and their analysis can yield extremely valuable insights.

Details: Unpublished paper, 2015. 22p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2016 at: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1509.01608v1.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1509.01608v1.pdf

Shelf Number: 147811

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Mafia
Organized Crime
Social Network Analysis
Social Networks

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2016.

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's GameChangers 2016, where we highlight the most important trends in organized crime in the Americas. This year we put a spotlight on crime and corruption among the region's political elites, while reporting on government struggles to corral criminality fueled by street gangs, drug cartels and Marxist rebels alike. Top government officials spent much of the year fending off accusations of corruption and organized crime with varying degrees of success. At the center of the storm was Brazil, where government deals led to bribes and kickbacks that over time reached into the billions of dollars. The top casualty of the scandal was Dilma Rousseff who, ironically, was ousted from the presidency for misuse of funds, not corruption. In reality, it is her Worker's Party that more resembles a criminal organization than she does. Like a mafia, the party collected and distributed money to keep the wheels of political power moving and laundered that money through elaborate schemes involving construction companies and offshore accounts. Rousseff's mentor, the celebrated former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was charged with what appeared to be the type of routine payments all Brazilian politicians and ex-politicians get from the movement of state contracts. Indeed, those who ousted Rousseff are facing similar corruption allegations, illustrating just how institutionalized the problem appears to be. Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro is facing down a different type of crisis, one that includes an economic emergency, widespread corruption and rising crime rates at home, and an increasing number of current and ex-officials charged with drug trafficking abroad. The US government's case against the first lady's "Narco Nephews" got most of the headlines, but numerous other former military officials are revealing to US investigators just what the Venezuelan government looks like from the inside. It is a not a pretty picture, and Maduro's domestic and international issues appear to be pushing him into tighter alliances with the criminal elements in his government. Guatemala's Attorney General's Office and its United Nations-backed appendage, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), continued to arrest and charge more suspects from the mafia state established under former President Otto Pérez Molina, his Vice President Roxana Baldetti and their Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota - PP). The most startling and revealing case was one they termed the "cooptación del estado," or the "Cooptation of the State," a scheme involving numerous campaign contributors whose return on investment was guaranteed once the PP took power in 2012. Among those arrested for the Cooptation of the State case was former Interior Minister Mauricio López Bonilla. Once a staunch US counter-drug ally and hero from that country's civil war, López Bonilla is also being investigated for his multiple shady deals with drug traffickers such as Marllory Chacón Rossell, to whom he provided a government protection service even after she was accused of money laundering by the US Treasury Department; and with Byron Lima, a former army captain who was killed in jail amidst a public squabble with the former interior minister. Potential corruption and organized crime cases continue to shake the foundations of Guatemala, including one that connects a now extradited drug trafficker to the current vice president and a corruption scandal connected to the current president's son and his brother.

Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2016. 55p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2017 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: South America

URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf

Shelf Number: 140596

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (South America)
Gangs
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Lopez Guevara, Estefania

Title: Coltan Trafficking Network in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Summary: Trafficking of Coltan is the main economic, social and political source of instability in The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and surrounding countries, including Rwanda and Burundi. The illegal market of the ore has roots in transnational and domestic corruption, financial support to armed groups, violation of workers' rights, multinationals collusion, instability of international prices minerals and lack of diversification. Armed groups earn hundreds of millions of dollars every year by trading coltan that is smuggled out of Congo throughout neighboring countries and then shipped to smelters for refinement. Once the coltan is processed, it is difficult to trace its origin, so it easily makes its way all over the world, mainly, in electronic products. The sophisticated trafficking system of coltan is based on elite networks that operate mainly in DRC, linked to transnational organized crime and also to transnational lawful agents, such as corporations. Several lawful and unlawful agents conform each network. In fact, it has been reported that there is - competition between corrupt generals and rebels. In the case of the militia groups profits go on buying arms on the black market. With the generals, some [profits] go on arms, but lots of it goes on luxury things like villas. The profits are funding the war for everyone - both sides. It's a self-supporting war. (France 24, 2008) This document is the analysis of a criminal network traffics coltan, diamonds, arms, gold, and other minerals and commodities across the DRC and surrounding countries. The document has five parts: The first part is an introduction; the second part is a description of the methodology and the concepts related to Social Network Analysis, which is the methodological approach herein applied; the third part is a presentation of a criminal network defined as a "coltan trafficking and elite network in DRC", as well as the sources gathered and processed in this analysis; the fourth part is a presentation of the characteristics of the criminal structure, which includes a description of the types of nodes/agents, the interactions established, and the nodes/agents concentrating direct interactions and the capacity to arbitrate resources. The fifth part includes conclusions related to the characteristics the analyzed network.

Details: Bogotá, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2016. 39p.

Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks: Research Paper No. 19. VORTEX Working Papers no. 14: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/522e46_f0896eb2340e4941bdd0de3f52e3bc65.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Congo, Democratic Republic

URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/522e46_f0896eb2340e4941bdd0de3f52e3bc65.pdf

Shelf Number: 145815

Keywords:
Conflict Minerals
Criminal Networks
Illegal Mining
Mining Industry
Natural Resources
Organized Crime
Trafficking in Natural Resources

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Title: Development Responses to Organized Crime: An analysis and programme framework

Summary: With the approval of the Sustainable Development Goals 2030, development actors are increasingly both recognising the need and being called upon to respond to the challenges of organised crime and its impact. But there remains a significant lacuna on what the implications are for how development programming should be delivered. This framework is an attempt to shift to a situation where development actors are proactively acknowledging and addressing crime and criminal actors in their work. This framework provides a three-step exercise, which attempts to move beyond traditional approaches by offering • a means for policy-focused analysis, • a structure through which responses can be prioritised using the nature of the impact and harm caused as the primary lens of analysis, and • a set of programmatic responses that are sensitive to opportunities and entry points for engagement.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 45p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Global-Initiative-Assessment-and-Programmign-Tool-for-Organized-Crime-and-Development-April-2016.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Global-Initiative-Assessment-and-Programmign-Tool-for-Organized-Crime-and-Development-April-2016.pdf

Shelf Number: 147338

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: International Alert

Title: Organised Crime in Mali: Why It Matters for a Peaceful Transition from Conflict

Summary: Inadequate governance, institutional fragility and widespread insecurity are both consequences and causes of the expansion of criminal activities. The impact of their proliferation is key to understanding the current - and endemic - instability affecting Mali. Yet, to date, there is little indication that policy strategies put forward by the Malian government, as well as by its international partners, are learning from the past to engage with the issue of organised crime as a threat to peace and security. This policy brief aims to help address this gap. Understanding how crime impacts on the achievement of development goals, on conflict risks, and on mounting fragility and safety threats is indeed crucial for building long-lasting and sustainable peace in Mali.

Details: London: International Alert, 2016. 5p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali_OrganisedCrime_EN_2016.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Mali

URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali_OrganisedCrime_EN_2016.pdf

Shelf Number: 145090

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: Rabasa, Angel

Title: Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks

Summary: In July 2011, President Barack Obama promulgated the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In the letter presenting the strategy, the president stated that the expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century. Through an analysis of transnational criminal networks originating in South America, this report develops a more refined understanding of the operational characteristics of these networks; the strategic alliances that they have established with state and other nonstate actors; and the multiple threats that they pose to U.S. interests and to the stability of the countries where they operate. It identifies U.S. government policies and programs to counter these networks; the roles of the Department of Defense, the geographic combatant commands, component commands, and task forces; and examines how U.S. Army assets and capabilities can contribute to U.S. government efforts to counter these networks. The report also recommends reconsidering the way in which nontraditional national security threats are classified; updating statutory authorities; providing adequate budgets for the counternetwork mission; and improving interagency coordination. Key Findings Countering Transnational Organized Crime Is a New Mission for the Department of Defense Success in counternarcotics has been traditionally measured by the amount of illicit drugs interdicted. However, even if drug flow reduction goals are met, the drug trafficking infrastructure would still be in place. Countering transnational criminal networks requires identifying the critical nodes in the criminal organizations and determining where operations can achieve the greatest effect. Gaps in authorities may create difficulties in military abilities to participate in this effort. Destabilizing Effects of Transnational Criminal Networks These criminal organizations take root in supply areas and transportation nodes while usurping the host nations' basic functioning capacity. Over time, the illicit economy grows and nonstate actors provide an increasing range of social goods and fill the security and political vacuum that emerges from the gradual erosion of state power, legitimacy, and capacity. The U.S. Army Could Play a Role in Combating Transnational Criminal Networks Combating transnational criminal organizations is an endeavor in which the Army could help develop interagency and multinational strategies to more effectively counter these organizations and then assist with planning to implement those strategies. Such initiatives would constitute a valuable expansion from the Army's current efforts to build partner capacity, perform network analysis, and support detection and monitoring. Recommendations The U.S. government could bring authorities and policy guidance in line with the strategy to combat transnational organized crime. Interagency efforts to combat these networks could be improved, roles could be better defined, and joint doctrine could be developed. The Army could take several steps to clarify its role in countering criminal networks, including participating in strategy development, increasing support to network analysis efforts, and working with partner nations and militaries to help them strengthen border control.

Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND< 2017. 215p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1481.html

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1481.html

Shelf Number: 145102

Keywords:
Border Security
Counter-Terrorism
Criminal Networks
Illegal Drug Trade
Organized Crime
Transnational Crime

Author: Daly, Sarah Zukerman

Title: Wartime Networks and the Social Logic of Crime

Summary: Failure of ex-combatants to reintegrate into legal, civilian life is a source of disorder around the world. Leading explanations for such failure focus on individualistic decisions based on economic or psychological factors. Yet, ex-combatants are embedded in networks that persist following demobilization. We contrast an individual to a social logic of ex-combatant criminality, combining administrative data from Colombia with original survey data that accounts for the challenges of studying sensitive subjects. The results show that conflict networks predominate in explaining criminality while individual factors do not. Further analysis suggests that commanders enter into crime first, recruiting rank-and-file from their networks. As criminal behavior pervades a network, peer relations drive individual crime while peer and commander relations drive gang-related crime through norms, status-seeking, and social pressure. These results provide some of the first evidence of how wartime networks evolve following demobilization, with important implications for understanding reintegration and social stability.

Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://sarahzukermandaly.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/colombia_main_submit.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://sarahzukermandaly.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/colombia_main_submit.pdf

Shelf Number: 145319

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Ex-Military
Gangs
Military
Wars and Crime

Author: Vesterhav, Daniel

Title: Criminal Networks and Groups: Police Perception of Power Structures and Criminal Markets

Summary: "Organised crime" is an expression which is used freely in public debate in Sweden. However, the term encompasses a host of different phenomena and forms of organisation, and the import of "organised crime" thus varies depending on who uses the term and how, and when, the term is used. This report presents a theoretical framework – a conceptual structure – for the various forms of networks, groups, and phenomena that usually fall under the larger "umbrella" known as organised crime. The purpose of the categorisation is to make it simpler to describe and understand power structures, criminal markets, and the criminality which is carried out by different forms of networks, constellations, and groups. The second and third parts of the report apply the conceptual structure to various forms of organised crime on the basis of some 60 interviews with police employees and a review of some 60 intelligence reports. This means that the descriptions of organised crime provided in the report articulate the perceptions of the interviewed police employees. The fourth and final part of the report provides overall reflections. An appendix to the report sets forth police employees' ideas for measures against various forms of organised crime. These are based on three seminars which were conducted with police employees in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö.

Details: Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) , 2016. 15p.

Source: Internet Resource: English Summpary of BRA report 2016:12: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://www.bra.se/download/18.4a33c027159a89523b11c65d/1485182325798/2016_12_Criminal_networks_and_groups.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Sweden

URL: https://www.bra.se/download/18.4a33c027159a89523b11c65d/1485182325798/2016_12_Criminal_networks_and_groups.pdf

Shelf Number: 146982

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: Charosky, Hernan

Title: Transnational Criminal Networks and The Public Sector: Findings and Recommendations About Permeable Borders

Summary: The aim of this document is to collect, present and assess points of juncture between Transnational Criminal Networks ("TCNs") and the public sector in a wide sense (political institutions, public administration and security agencies, public service agents), and propose recommendations. These points of juncture are heterogeneous and refer to different kinds of public sector entities and different levels of government: from the way in which parliaments work -in some of the cases referred here, in the interest of TCNs- to the informal agreements between municipal authorities and TCN bosses -from a blind eye to their activities to the active commitment of local police agents in criminal activities.

Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2014. 35p.

Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 14: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_eaee567619174b9485011f83e5898a5c.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_eaee567619174b9485011f83e5898a5c.pdf

Shelf Number: 144856

Keywords:
Criminal Cartels
Criminal Networks

Author: Petrunov, Georgi

Title: Analysis of Social Network Models of Transnational Criminal Networks operating in the Southeastern Border of the European Union

Summary: This paper examines the transnational criminal networks (TCN) operating in the Southeastern border of the European Union (SBEU). More specifically, the analysis focuses on TCN operating on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, which became the external border of the European Union after the country’s accession to the EU in 2007. The primary data used for the analysis is based on court rulings from four criminal trial cases in Bulgaria. The indictments for each of the four cases were also studied, in order to provide more details about the criminal activities of the TCN.

Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2013. 76p.

Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 10: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_c7a68970d13d4fad80374ad3c7ffc0a7.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Bulgaria

URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_c7a68970d13d4fad80374ad3c7ffc0a7.pdf

Shelf Number: 141199

Keywords:
Border Security
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Social Network Analysis

Author: Garay-Salamanca, Luis Jorge

Title: Illicit Networks Reconfiguring States: Social Network Analysis of Colombian and Mexican Cases

Summary: People have often thought that as a rule, criminal gangs confront the State. We have this preconceived notion of the State as a homogeneous entity acting as a block to guarantee law enforcement, and of organized crime, such as drug trafficking, seeking ways to get away with breaking the law. In achieving these two objectives, violence ensues: the State resorts to coercion, and organized crime resorts to bribery, kidnapping, murder, or terrorism. However, research carried out during recent years shows that the history of the relationship between the State and organized crime is not always one of confrontation. Indeed, in some cases the latter has been able to infiltrate and to co-opt some State institutions in order to achieve its unlawful objectives. On the other hand, government officials and politicians, in many cases, get along well with organized crime, taking advantage of its criminal power in order to obtain egoistic, exclusive and morally unlawful benefits to the detriment of public interests. It has been reported around the world that policemen infiltrate gangs, criminal gangs bribe government officials to obtain privileged information, and government officials reach secret agreements with gangs of outlaws. However, the social situations analyzed in this book go beyond the classic stories of bribed policemen, infiltrated gangs, or egoistic government officials. This book analyzes cases in which the State has been infiltrated and manipulated, sometimes resulting from alliances between the organized crime and lawful officials and organizations. These alliances can be observed even at high decision-making levels, affecting the structure and operation of institutions. In previous books, the concept of Co-opted State Reconfiguration (CStR) has been introduced to describe situations in which unlawful groups reach agreements with authorities in order to infiltrate State institutions. This concept was also useful to describe situations in which lawful organizations, such as political movements, groups of individuals as landowners, government officials and politicians, establish alliances with unlawful groups to take advantage of their criminal and violent potential. In both cases, the objective is to manipulate and use legitimate institutions in order to obtain unlawful benefits, or obtain lawful benefits that are socially questionable. In both cases the result goes beyond the economic framework, encompassing objectives of political, criminal, judicial and cultural manipulation, and to gain social legitimacy. The CStR has been defined as a more developed and complex process of State Capture (StC), since in the traditional StC lawful economic groups manipulate law making in order to attain exclusive economic benefits. Against this backdrop, the objective of this book is to go deeper into the conceptual, methodological, and empirical issues of the State Capture (StC) and Co-opted State Reconfiguration (CStR). To fulfill this objective, a conceptual and empirical analysis of specific cases of organized crime in Colombia and Mexico will be made. A methodology identifying when a social situation may be defined as either traditional or systemic corruption, StC or CStR, will be presented, developed, and applied. This methodology will also be used to infer the institutional scope, or the degree of damage that a criminal organization may impinge on informal and formal State institutions. Therefore, the StC and CStR will be the guiding concepts throughout the book. The empirical issues will be developed through the social network analysis (SNA), in which alliances such as the above mentioned are found. The first network analyzed is a Mexican cartel, well known for its extreme violent actions throughout the past decade. The second network analyzed is related to an unlawful paramilitary group operating in a Colombian province called Casanare. This province has been favored for more than two decades with huge amounts of public resources coming from oil royalties. However, most of the province’s budget has been misspent, stolen, or appropriated by lawful agents and outlawed organizations, and diverted for purposes other than providing for the social needs of a poor and backward population. The third network is related to five Colombian provinces in the Atlantic Coast of Colombia: Sucre, Córdoba, Cesar, Atlántico, and Magdalena. In these provinces, the United Self–Defense Forces of Colombia [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC], the most powerful unlawful paramilitary group that has ever existed in the recent Colombian history, consolidated its unified command at the end of the nineties. This group, with its increase of de facto power, combined violent actions, drug trafficking, and corruption in order to grab large portions of public budget, manipulate elections, and ultimately, get elected to the Colombian Congress. These actions were carried out with the purpose of promoting law making that favors its interests and achieving social legitimacy at the same time.

Details: Bogota, Colombia: Metodo Foundation, 2010. 140p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_f5aa311ed5854d24b2d823f0176e593c.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Colombia

URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_f5aa311ed5854d24b2d823f0176e593c.pdf

Shelf Number: 141201

Keywords:
Cartels
Criminal Networks
Criminal Violence
Gang-Related Violence
Organized Crime
Social Network Analysis

Author: Lopez Guevara, Estefania

Title: Trafficking of Coltan in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Summary: The subjects analyzed in the document are the commerce, fraud, and contraband, as well as mechanisms and agents at internal and external levels intervening in the trafficking of coltan. This document also examines the (i) key criminal agents and other activities relating to the traffic of the ore, (ii) hotspots and (iii) recent cases covered by media.

Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex, 2016. 27p.

Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 4.: Accessed February 24, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/522e46_bee14894ac2a4354a2ae49710c88bdd0.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Congo, Democratic Republic

URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/522e46_bee14894ac2a4354a2ae49710c88bdd0.pdf

Shelf Number: 141218

Keywords:
Conflict Minerals
Criminal Networks
Illegal Mining
Mining Industry
Natural Resources
Organized Crime
Trafficking in Natural Resources

Author: Lopez Guevara, Estefania

Title: Babies Trafficking Networks in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria

Summary: This document is the Social Network Analysis applied to criminal structures involved in the market of child trafficking operating across various African countries. Besides presenting an explanation of the methodology applied for modeling the criminal network, the document includes a description of the operations carried out in the child trafficking market, and the main actors involved. It also presents the sources and cases that were modeled and analyzed, as well as the main characteristics of the specific criminal networks.

Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2017. 29p.

Source: Internet Resource: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_2b050e7ae37a4723a34f4535fcc79485.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Africa

URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_2b050e7ae37a4723a34f4535fcc79485.pdf

Shelf Number: 141219

Keywords:
Child Trafficking
Criminal Networks
Human Trafficking
Social network Analysis

Author: Shores, Michael

Title: Informal Networks and White Collar Crime: An Extended Analysis of the Madoff Scandal

Summary: Understanding the nature of white collar crime is a central issue in public policy. Testing the theories presented by Benson, Madensen and Eck (2009), I examine the role of informal religious networks in the criminal activity of Bernard Madoff, perpetrator of one of the largest white collar crimes in United States history. In contrast to previous studies that suggest that religion may reduce the incidence of criminal behavior, I show that the opposite can also be true. Most white collar crimes, like those perpetrated by Madoff, are exploitations of trust, which can be fostered by a shared religious identity between the victim and perpetrator. Using data from the National Center of Charitable Statistics, I construct two measures of Jewish religious network strength at the county level: the concentration of Jewish non-profit organizations and the revenue of Jewish non-profit organizations. Additionally, using data from the Jewish Community Center Association of North America and several U.S. Kosher certification organizations, I construct the number of Jewish community centers and the number of kosher restaurants per county. I show that conditional on the number of high income individuals in a county, residents of counties in which there were stronger Jewish networks were more likely to have been victimized by Madoff. In addition, I show that residents of areas where Madoff lived or worked were more likely to be victims, but that Jewish network strength appears to counteract this "distance effect." Non-profit organizations, which were also victims of Madoff, were less affected by the strength of this informal network.

Details: Ithaca, NY: Department of Policy Analysis & Management Cornell University, 2010. 71p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/15068/Michael%20Shores%20May10%20thesis.pdf?sequence=2

Year: 2010

Country: United States

URL: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/15068/Michael%20Shores%20May10%20thesis.pdf?sequence=2

Shelf Number: 141253

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Financial Crime
Fraud
White Collar Crime

Author: Guevara Moyano, Inigo

Title: Sharp Around the Edges: A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Criminal Networks on the Southern Borders of NAFTA and the EU

Summary: Although radically different in so many ways, Mexico and Bulgaria share the common benefits, grievances, and some major misfortunes of being on the bottom end of the two most powerful economic development polls in the Western World: NAFTA and the EU. The most disrupting of misfortunes is that both countries have become hubs to a broad number of Transnational Criminal Networks (TCNs). This paper compares TCN's in Mexico and Bulgaria, analyzing their network’s structure, modus operandi, and development, prescribing a set of recommendations to assist the institutions in charge of combating them as well as those that need to survive them.

Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2014. 19p.

Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 13: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: http://www.casede.org/BibliotecaCasede/13VWPSharpAround.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Mexico

URL: http://www.casede.org/BibliotecaCasede/13VWPSharpAround.pdf

Shelf Number: 141259

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Economics of Crime
Organized Crime
Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime

Author: El Kamouni-Janssen, Floor

Title: 'Only God Can Stop the Smugglers': Understanding smuggling networks in Libya

Summary: This report examines human smuggling networks in Libya. The smuggling of human beings is an established fact of today’s political economy in Libya and it is firmly embedded in local subsistence economies. As such there is a dizzying array of actors involved in the business of which some claim to act on behalf of the state. The human smuggling business not only brings them money, it also offers the opportunity to acquire legitimacy and political and territorial power. An understanding of the incentives and objectives of these actors to enage in the human smuggling business not only shows why it is so difficult to root out human smuggling in Libya, but it is also essential in formulating realistic and humane policies to address human smuggling in and through Libya

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2017. 47p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/only_god_can_stop_the_smugglers.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Libya

URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/only_god_can_stop_the_smugglers.pdf

Shelf Number: 141308

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Economics of Crime
Human Smuggling
Migrants

Author: Molenaar, Fransje

Title: Turning the Tide: The politics of irregular migration in the Sahel and Libya

Summary: This online report analyses the relationship between irregular migration and conflict and stability in Mali, Niger and Libya. Studying the human smuggling networks that operate within and across these three countries provides insights into the transnational dynamics of irregular migration as well as these networks' interaction with local, national and regional political and economic dynamics. The report's main finding is that current EU policies are misaligned with the reality of trans-Saharan migration as they do not take into account the diversity of intra-African migration. In addition, human smuggling networks form part of larger political economies and cannot be addressed effectively without taking into account the extent to which state authorities are involved in and/or capable of controlling irregular migration. Failure to take these local realities into account results in ineffcient and ineffective policies at best, and counter-productively strengthens one of the root causes of migration at worst, because it overlooks the intricate links that exist between migration and conflict and stability in the region. This report synthesises the findings of the following background studies: - Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali - Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Niger - Understanding human smuggling networks in Libya

Details: The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2017. 80p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/turning_the_tide.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Africa

URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/turning_the_tide.pdf

Shelf Number: 141311

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Smuggling
Illegal Immigration
Immigration
Migrants

Author: Molenaar, Fransje

Title: Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali

Summary: In 2016, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 migrants transited through Mali on their way to Algeria and Libya. One major dilemma facing policy makers that want to stop irregular migration through Mali is that state authorities are either complicit in migration, such as by providing migrants free passage in exchange for a toll at roadblocks or by issuing false passports, or that they lack the effective presence and/or capacity to counter human smuggling. This problem is particularly salient in the north, where armed groups have taken over territorial control and offer protection to, and feed off, the human smuggling industry. At the time of writing, a solution to the internal conflict appears to lie in the distant future, meaning that addressing the issue of irregular migration remains one of the lowest priorities on the government’s agenda. Regaining political stability is its number one concern.

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2017. 36p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/irregular_migration_and_human_smuggling_networks_in_mali.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Mali

URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/irregular_migration_and_human_smuggling_networks_in_mali.pdf

Shelf Number: 141312

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Smuggling
Illegal Immigration
Immigrants
Migration

Author: Molenaar, Fransje

Title: Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Niger

Summary: This report outlines some of the dilemmas that the human smuggling industry poses for policy makers addressing irregular migration flows in Niger. Through a detailed focus on the manifestation of the relationship between human smugglers and state authorities on the ground, and between state authorities and former rebels more generally, this report shows that the development of human smuggling networks reinforces prevailing patterns of collusion between armed and/or criminal actors, state security forces and political elites. Any attempt to address irregular migration through securitised measures should take into account that security forces, local authorities and even national political elites are tied to the smuggling industry in direct and indirect ways. They are not neutral actors, and any attempt to treat them as such could result in heightened conflict risk and/or the instrumental use of policy instruments to take out competitors. Policy makers should also recognise that the issue of irregular migration is tied to broader issues of good governance and rule of law. Policies targeting migration should therefore form part of a broader package of measures combatting state fragility and insecurity.

Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2017. 40p.

Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/irregular_migration_and_human_smuggling_networks_in_niger.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Niger

URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/irregular_migration_and_human_smuggling_networks_in_niger.pdf

Shelf Number: 141313

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Smuggling
Illegal Immigration
Immigrants
Immigration

Author: Rostami, Amir

Title: Criminal Organizing: Studies in the sociology of organized crime

Summary: What organized crime is and how it can be prevented are two of the key questions in both organized crime research and criminal policy. However, despite many attempts, organized crime research, the criminal justice system and criminal policy have failed to provide a shared and recognized conceptual definition of organized crime, which has opened the door to political interpretations. Organized crime is presented as an objective reality—mostly based on anecdotal empirical evidence and generic descriptions—and has been understood, as being intrinsically different from social organization, and this has been a justification for treating organized crime conceptually separately.In this dissertation, the concept of organized crime is deconstructed and analyzed. Based on five studies and an introductory chapter, I argue that organized crime is an overarching concept based on an abstraction of different underlying concepts, such as gang, mafia, and network, which are in turn semi-overarching and overlapping abstractions of different crime phenomena, such as syndicates, street-gangs, and drug networks. This combination of a generic concept based on underlying concepts, which are themselves subject to similar conceptual difficulties, has given rise to a conceptual confusion surrounding the term and the concept of organized crime. The consequences of this conceptual confusion are not only an issue of semantics, but have implications for our understanding of the nature of criminal collaboration as well as both legal and policy consequences. By combining different observers, methods and empirical materials relating to dimensions of criminal collaboration, I illustrate the strong analogies that exist between forms of criminal collaboration and the theory of social organization.I argue in this dissertation that criminal organizing is not intrinsically different from social organizing. In fact, the dissertation illustrates the existence of strong analogies between patterns of criminal organizing and the elements of social organizations. But depending on time and context, some actions and forms of organizing are defined as criminal, and are then, intentionally or unintentionally, presumed to be intrinsically different from social organizing. Since the basis of my argument is that criminal organizing is not intrinsically different from social organizing, I advocate that the study of organized crime needs to return to the basic principles of social organization in order to understand the emergence of, and the underlying mechanism that gives rise to, the forms of criminal collaboration that we seek to explain. To this end, a new general analytical framework, “criminal organizing”, that brings the different forms of criminal organizations and their dimensions together under a single analytical tool, is proposed as an example of how organizational sociology can advance organized crime research and clarify the chaotic concept of organized crime.

Details: Stockholm, SWE: Stockholm University, 2016. 103p.

Source: Internet Resource: STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY, CRIMINAL ORGANIZING, NEW SERIES 62: Accessed March 24, 2017 at: https://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:921818/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Sweden

URL: https://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:921818/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Shelf Number: 144573

Keywords:
Criminal Gangs
Criminal Networks
Mafia
Organized Crime

Author: Micallef, Mark

Title: The Human Conveyor Belt: trends in human trafficking and smuggling in post-revolution Libya

Summary: The proliferation of human smuggling in Libya is both a criminal problem and a feature of Libya’s fracture into competing armed factions. Whilst most acutely perceived on Libya's coast, it is in fact an illicit trade embedded across the country, encompassing and feeding on the political economy and geopolitics of Libya’s Southern, Eastern and Western borders. The expansion and consolidation of smuggling activity has been further predicated on the interface with communities, as it has been justified as a means to fund militias, which in turn provide security in the face of external threats from competing families, tribes and towns. Migrants and refugees have become simply another commodity to be exploited in the broader resource predation carried out by armed groups that exercise effective control over the Libyan territory. The consequences for human security, both for the migrants but for the Libyan people, are considerable. Action is urgently needed but a long-term perspective is imperative. Any intervention by the international community or national Libyan agents that takes a short-term perspective risks playing into the hands of the very same armed groups at the heart of the problem. Not only would such action risk failing to achieve the stated goal of bringing order to migratory flows running through Libya, but may in fact contribute to the further destabilisation of the country. The alternative is not inaction but greater investment in bridging the knowledge gaps with a view to identify ways in which to isolate smuggling industries from their communities at a local level. Key Findings • Market Liberalisation: The liberalisation of the human smuggling market in the immediate aftermath of Libya's revolution provided established smugglers with new opportunities to internationalise their network with the help of Middle Eastern and East African middlemen and better access to hawala1 (paperless financial transactions based on honour) – an activity that was closely monitored by the Qaddafi regime. While coastal linchpins had enjoyed long established relationships with East African manadeeb (plural of mandub, agent or representative), these contacts were furthered during this period. Moreover, the advent of Syrian refugees seeking to cross to Europe from Libya opened new opportunities to establish a financial infrastructure which was fundamental for the development of the smuggling industry in the following years. • Smuggling as Resource Predation: The protection market developed by various militias and armed groups around smuggling is a feature of the general resource predation which has come to characterise Libya's socio-political landscape after the revolution. This interfaces the activity with local familial, tribal and community interests, resulting in some instances in the perception of legitimacy of smuggling, or at the very least the view that such activities are a necessary evil for the provision of a community's security in the face of outside threats from competing or antagonist groups. • Capacity Expansion: The involvement of militias in the smuggling process both through the taxing of activities in their territory and the direct running of human smuggling networks has reshaped the market which can no longer be described as a liberalised market. The rules of supply and demand cannot be applied directly to the analysis of human smuggling and trafficking in Libya anymore because access to protection is what ultimately guarantees a network’s position in the market place. The militarisation of the activity is squeezing small-timers out of the business and concentrating smuggling activities in the hands of fewer, well-organised criminal networks. The territorial access provided by militias has expanded smugglers' logistical capacity and further increased efficiency, opening the Libyan territory to a lot more "business", particularly in the context of a seemingly limitless demand. It is this enhanced capacity that has led to the explosion in numbers seen in the aftermath of the revolution, especially after 2013. • Transnational Consolidation: There are clear signs some networks have developed into transnational consortia, able to handle routes and volumes of people requiring substantial logistical and financial capacity. Of particular relevance is the fact that different networks are sharing facilities. This is a new phenomenon to the Libyan context, which has substantial implications for policy formulation. While, diaspora networks from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and sub-Sahara regions have long operated over huge geographies requiring coordination in multiple countries and different parts of Libya, such coordination was mostly confined to the supply side. Each of these networks would make its own arrangements with different players in Libya (desert guides/transit smugglers/coastal smugglers). That coordinating role now appears to have been taken over - at least on some routes - by Libyan linchpins who are able to guarantee access to multiple territories.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 63p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global-initiative-human-conveyor-belt-human-smuggling-in-libya-march-2017.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Libya

URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global-initiative-human-conveyor-belt-human-smuggling-in-libya-march-2017.pdf

Shelf Number: 144688

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Smuggling
Human Trafficking
Militias

Author: May, Channing

Title: Transnational Crime and the Developing World

Summary: his March 2017 report from Global Financial Integrity, "Transnational Crime and the Developing World," finds that globally the business of transnational crime is valued at an average of $1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion annually. The study evaluates the overall size of criminal markets in 11 categories: the trafficking of drugs, arms, humans, human organs, and cultural property; counterfeiting, illegal wildlife crime, illegal fishing, illegal logging, illegal mining, and crude oil theft. The combination of high profits and low risks for perpetrators of transnational crime and the support of a global shadow financial system perpetuate and drive these abuses. The report also emphasizes how transnational crime undermines economies, societies, and governments in developing countries. National and global policy efforts that focus on curtailing the money are needed to more successfully combat these crimes and the illicit networks perpetrating them. Primary Findings Transnational crime is a business, and business is very good. Money is the primary motivation for these illegal activities. Of the 11 illicit activities studied, counterfeiting ($923 billion to $1.13 trillion) and drug trafficking ($426 billion to $652 billion) have the highest and second-highest values, respectively; illegal logging is the most valuable natural resource crime ($52 billion to $157 billion). The ranges demonstrate the serious magnitude of and threat posed by global transnational crime. The revenues generated from the 11 crimes covered in this report not only line the pockets of the perpetrators but also finance violence, corruption, and other abuses. Very rarely do the revenues from transnational crime have any long-term benefit to citizens, communities, or economies of developing countries. Instead, the crimes undermine local and national economies, destroy the environment, and jeopardize the health and well-being of the public. The report rankings for the illicit markets examined are: Counterfeiting $923 billion to $1.13 trillion Drug Trafficking --$426 billion to $652 billion Illegal Logging $52 billion to $157 billion Human Trafficking -- $150.2 billion Illegal Mining -- $12 billion to $48 billion IUU Fishing -- $15.5 billion to $36.4 billion Illegal Wildlife Trade -- $5 billion to $23 billion Crude Oil Theft -- $5.2 billion to $11.9 billion Small Arms & Light Weapons Trafficking -- $1.7 billion to $3.5 billion Organ Trafficking -- $840 million to $1.7 Total --$1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion Policy Recommendations Transnational crime will continue to grow until the paradigm of high profits and low risks is challenged. In addition to current efforts to fight these crimes, this report calls on governments, experts, the private sector, and civil society groups to seek to address the global shadow financial system by promoting greater financial transparency. This will help cutoff the money flows and the profits, and it will increase the ability to bring these criminals to justice and defeat their illicit transnational networks. GFI recommends several steps governments and other regulatory bodies can take to increase the levels of detection and interdiction of the proceeds of transnational crime: Require that corporations registering and doing business within a country declare the name(s) of the entity's true, ultimate beneficial owner(s) Flag financial and trade transactions involving individuals and corporations in "secrecy jurisdictions" as high-risk and require extra documentation Scrutinize import and export invoices for signs of misinvoicing, which may indicate technical and/or physical smuggling Use world market price databases such as GFTradeTM to estimate the risk of misinvoicing for the declared values and investigate suspicious transactions Share more information between agencies and departments on the illicit markets and actors that exist within a country"s border

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2017. 166p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf

Shelf Number: 144741

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Developing Nations
Financial Crimes
Illegal Markets
Illicit Markets
Organized Crime
Transnational Crime

Author: Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe

Title: Trafficking in Persons Along Mexico's Eastern Migration Routes: The Role of Transnational Criminal Organizations

Summary: The aim of this research is to understand the role of transnational organized crime in human trafficking along Mexico's eastern migration routes, from Central America to Mexico's northeastern border. In this region, drug traffickers are smuggling and trafficking unauthorized migrants in order to diversify their revenue streams. This project analyzes the new role of Central American gangs and Mexican -origin drug trafficking organizations--now known as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) - in the trafficking of persons from Central America to Mexico's northeastern border.

Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2017. 14p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2017 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/final.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Mexico

URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/final.pdf

Shelf Number: 144799

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Smuggling
Human Trafficking
Illegal Immigrants
Organized Crime

Author: Magalingam, Pritheega

Title: Complex network tools to enable identification of a criminal community

Summary: Retrieving criminal ties and mining evidence from an organised crime incident, for example money laundering, has been a difficult task for crime investigators due to the involvement of different groups of people and their complex relationships. Extracting the criminal association from enormous amount of raw data and representing them explicitly is tedious and time consuming. A study of the complex networks literature reveals that graph-based detection methods have not, as yet, been used for money laundering detection. In this research, I explore the use of complex network analysis to identify the money laundering criminals' communication associations, that is, the important people who communicate between known criminals and the reliance of the known criminals on the other individuals in a communication path. For this purpose, I use the publicly available Enron email database that happens to contain the communications of 10 criminals who were convicted of a money laundering crime. I show that my new shortest paths network search algorithm (SPNSA) combining shortest paths and network centrality measures is better able to isolate and identify criminals' connections when compared with existing community detection algorithms and k-neighbourhood detection. The SPNSA is validated using three different investigative scenarios and in each scenario, the criminal network graphs formed are small and sparse hence suitable for further investigation. My research starts with isolating emails with 'BCC' recipients with a minimum of two recipients bcc-ed. 'BCC' recipients are inherently secretive and the email connections imply a trust relationship between sender and 'BCC' recipients. There are no studies on the usage of only those emails that have 'BCC' recipients to form a trust network, which leads me to analyse the 'BCC' email group separately. SPNSA is able to identify the group of criminals and their active intermediaries in this 'BCC' trust network. Corroborating this information with published information about the crimes that led to the collapse of Enron yields the discovery of persons of interest that were hidden between criminals, and could have contributed to the money laundering activity. For validation, larger email datasets that comprise of all 'BCC' and 'TO/CC' email transactions are used. On comparison with existing community detection algorithms, SPNSA is found to perform much better with regards to isolating the sub-networks that contain criminals. I have adapted the betweenness centrality measure to develop a reliance measure. This measure calculates the reliance of a criminal on an intermediate node and ranks the importance level of each intermediate node based on this reliability value. Both SPNSA and the reliance measure could be used as primary investigation tools to investigate connections between criminals in a complex network.

Details: Melbourne: School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences, College of Science, Engineering and Health, RMIT University, 2015. 129p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:161407/Magalingam.pdf

Year: 2015

Country: Australia

URL: https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:161407/Magalingam.pdf

Shelf Number: 145462

Keywords:
Criminal Investigation
Criminal Networks
Geospatial Analysis
Money Laundering
Network Analysis
Organized Crime

Author: Redmond, Sean

Title: Lifting the Lid on Greentown. Why we should be concerned about the influence criminal networks have on children's offending behaviour in Ireland

Summary: A large body of research exists in relation to youth crime. However, comparatively little is known in relation to the contexts of children who engage in serious offending behaviour and participate in criminal networks. Using a case study design, this study first identified and then examined the behaviour of a criminal network operating in a Garda Sub-District in Ireland in 2010-2011. For the purposes of the study, the Garda Sub-District, which is located outside of Dublin, has been given the pseudonym Greentown. In order to facilitate this examination, Garda analysts constructed a network map for the study using incident data to position 31 individuals aged 11-36 years who had been involved in either burglary or drugs for sale and supply in Greentown in 2010- 2011. Importantly, the map indicated relationships where two or more individuals were involved in the same offence. The map was used as the key reference tool to interview Greentown Garda about the activities and contexts of the individuals identified. The Twinsight method A method called Twinsight was designed to facilitate access to actual case-related data. This involved the use of two near-identical versions of the network map during the interviews with Gardai. In the researcher's version, the name of each individual was replaced with a unique identifying code, e.g. A1, B2, and D1. In the version used by Garda interviewees, the names of the individuals appeared alongside their identifying code. This permitted the researcher and the Garda respondents to talk about the same individuals, with their identities known only to the Garda. Twinsight enabled the production of an authentic narrative around key events, while protecting the identities of the individuals at all times. Key findings It was found that the criminal network which existed in Greentown in 2010-2011 was hierarchical in nature and was governed by a family and kinship-based 'core'. The hierarchical structure was supported by a deeply embedded sympathetic culture in the area, as well as powerful ongoing processes - in particular, patronagebased relationships which shared the rewards of crime among associates, but also generated onerous debt obligations. It was also found that the power and influence of the network is most influenced by the intensity of the relationships between individual members of the network and the network patrons, but geographical proximity between them also plays a role. The overall key finding of the study was that criminal networks play a significant role in encouraging and compelling children to engage in criminal behaviour. The study identified potential applications for the methods used in the project to progress further research on serious youth crime, and outlined some implications for youth crime-related policy. Chapter 1 presents a review of the existing literature, outlining the strengths and limitations of existing mainstream scientific knowledge on youth crime, followed by a more specific review of the literature relating to networks and crime. Chapter 2 outlines the overall methodological strategy and describes how a case study method was operationalised. Chapter 3 presents the research findings. Chapter 4 assesses the study's contribution to the existing body of knowledge, and considers the study's implications for wider policy and practical application.

Details: Dublin: Department of Children and Youth Affairs, 2016. 80p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: http://ulsites.ul.ie/law/sites/default/files/3910_DCYA_Greentown_%20Full%20report%20final%20version.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Ireland

URL: http://ulsites.ul.ie/law/sites/default/files/3910_DCYA_Greentown_%20Full%20report%20final%20version.pdf

Shelf Number: 145945

Keywords:
Co-offending
Criminal Networks
Gangs
Juvenile Offenders
Youth Gangs
Youthful Offenders

Author: Chayes, Sarah

Title: When Corruption is the Operating System: The Case of Honduras

Summary: In some five dozen countries worldwide, corruption can no longer be understood as merely the iniquitous doings of individuals. Rather, it is the operating system of sophisticated networks that cross sectoral and national boundaries in their drive to maximize returns for their members. Honduras offers a prime example of such intertwined, or "integrated," transnational kleptocratic networks. This case thus illustrates core features of the way apparently open or chaotic economies are in reality structured worldwide - and some of the dynamics that are driving climate change, persistent inequality, and spiraling conflict. THE HONDURAN KLEPTOCRATIC OS IN ACTION - In this example, the three interlocking spheres are roughly co-equal in psychological impact if not in amounts of captured revenue. They retain a degree of autonomy, and are often disrupted by internal rivalry. - This system's operations devastate the environment-though Honduras is not a "resource" country. Most threats to biodiversity derive from deliberate "development" policies-whose primary purpose is actually to funnel rents to network members. - Modern renewable energy, as well as hydropower, is captured by the network. The migrant crisis is also fueled by this brand of corruption. - Repression is carefully targeted for maximum psychological effect. An example was the March 2016 assassination of environmental and social justice activist Berta Caceres, which reverberated through like-minded communities. _ The kleptocracy benefits from significant external reinforcement, witting or unwitting, including not just military assistance, but much international development financing. A DIFFERENT "CHIP" - The first step to disabling the kleptocratic OS is to acknowledge it, and outsiders' role reinforcing it. Western policymakers should invest in the candid study of these networks and to corruption as an intentional operating system, and evaluate whether their inputs are, on balance, enabling or challenging these structures. - Environmental protection is part of an awakening indigenous worldview that provides an integrated, positive vision many find worth fighting for. Community groups are establishing their own networks, in which cultural and environmental revival is linked to labor and land rights and autonomous education. But these groups receive proportionately little support from donor governments and institutions. - Community-supported alternative development models exist. Members of such organizations-who have faced death to combat network-controlled dams-readily identify micro-dams that meet their approval. They have helped design and construct some; others contribute to local well-being. Development implementers should study such projects and apply their principles. - Lessons from Honduras are applicable worldwide. Engaged Honduran community groups have valuable insights not just into how development assistance can produce better results in Honduras, but into ways the West might retool its economy to reduce inequality while preserving and cultivating natural resources.

Details: Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. 174p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Chayes_Corruption_Final_updated.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Honduras

URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Chayes_Corruption_Final_updated.pdf

Shelf Number: 146322

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Environmental Crimes
Natural Resources
Offenses Against The Environment

Author: Hubschle, Annette Michaela

Title: The Groenewald Criminal Network: Background, legislative loopholes and recommendations

Summary: This paper provides a brief perspective of the Groenewald gang in the broader wildlife crime context before assessing whether the case presents an exception or a common trend. In a second step, the legislative and institutional loopholes are discussed. The paper also assesses whether regulators are aware of the scheme and what measures have been taken to address this. Finally, an assessment is made whether "gray" nodes (legal players who participate in illegal activities) are dealt within the most expedient manner and what lessons could be learned from the model

Details: Bogota: VORTEX Foundations, 2017. 21p.

Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks - Research Paper No. 11. VORTEX Working Papers No. 25: Accessed July 5, 2017 at:

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_eb15f7ef5f0544018473f4a8f003206e.pdf

Shelf Number: 146504

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Criminal Networks
Ivory Trade
Organized Crime
Rhinoceros
Wildlife Crime

Author: Goga, Khalil

Title: Rhino poaching and Rhino Horn Traffic in South Africa

Summary: While rhino poaching has often been portrayed as a conflict between 'dark' and 'bright' agents, the reality of the trade is far more complex and compromises a host of actors in a variety of fields in legitimate and illegitimate spheres. As it is explained in this document, it is critical to understand the participation of agents operating within lawful public and private positions, who participate in various activities from the poaching to the final consumption and use of the rhino horn.

Details: Bogota: VORTEX Foundation, 2017. 19p.

Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks - Research Paper No. 9. VORTEX Working Papers No. 23: Accessed July 5, 2017 at: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_838df24339064fcf9a0a510bb1ebed18.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: South Africa

URL:

Shelf Number: 146506

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Criminal Networks
Ivory
Organized Crime
Rhinoceros
Wildlife Crime

Author: Marshak, Charles Zachary

Title: Applications of Network Science to Criminal Networks, University Education, and Ecology

Summary: Networks are a powerful tool to investigate complex systems. In this work, we apply network{theoretic tools to study criminal, educational, and ecological systems. First, we propose two generative network models for recruitment and disruption in a hierarchal organized crime network. Our network models alternate between recruitment and disruption phases. In our first model, we simulate recruitment as Galton-Watson branching. We simulate disruption with an agent that moves towards the root and arrests nodes in accordance with a stochastic process. We prove a lower bound on the probability that the agent reaches the kingpin and verify this numerically. In our second model, we propose a network attachment mechanism to simulate recruitment. We define an attachment probability based on an existing node's distance to the leaf set (terminal nodes), where this distance is a proxy for how close a criminal is to visible illicit activity. Using numerical simulation, we study the network structures such as the degree distribution and total attachment weight associated with large networks that evolve according to this recruitment process. We then introduce a disruptive agent that moves through the network according to a self-avoiding random walk and can remove nodes (and an associated subtree) according to different disruption strategies. We quantify basic law enforcement incentives with these different disruption strategies and study costs and eradication probability within this model. In our next chapter, we adapt rank aggregation methods to study how Mathematics students navigate their coursework. We first translate 15 years of grade data from the UCLA Department of Mathematics into a network whose nodes are the various Mathematics courses and whose edges encode the flow of students between these courses. Applying rank aggregation on such networks, we extract a linear sequence of courses that reflects the order students select courses. Using this methodology, we identify possible trends and hidden course dependencies without investigating the entire space of possible schedules. Specifically, we identify Mathematics courses that high-performing students take significantly earlier than low-performing students in various Mathematics majors. We also compare the extracted sequence of several rank aggregation methods on this data set and demonstrate that many methods produce similar sequences. In our last chapter, we review core-periphery structure and analyze this structure in mutualistic (bipartite) fruigivore-seed networks. We first relate classical graph cut problems to previous work on core-periphery structure to provide a general mathematical framework. We also review how core-periphery structure is traditionally identified in mutualistic networks. Next, using a method from Rombach et al., we analyze the core-periphery structure of 10 mutualistic fruigivore-seed networks that encode the interaction patterns between birds and fruit-bearing plants. Our collaborators use our network analysis with other ecological data to identify important species in the observed habitats. In particular, they identify certain types of birds (mashers) that play crucial roles at a variety of sites, which are though to be less important due to their feeding behaviors.

Details: Los Angeles: University of California, 2016. 184p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 27, 2017 at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6zs7394q

Year: 2016

Country: United States

URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6zs7394q

Shelf Number: 146588

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Illicit Activity
Network Analysis

Author: Goga, Khalil

Title: Using social network analysis to understand the interactions of a Cape Town gang

Summary: This case study uses social network analysis to study the interactions of a criminal network operating in a township outside Cape Town. Data was gathered from a court judgment following the trial. Code names are used throughout the study as many of those involved in the trial are appealing their sentences.

Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 30p.

Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 272: Accessed September 27, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper272V2.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: South Africa

URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper272V2.pdf

Shelf Number: 147470

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Social Network Analysis
Social networks

Author: Shaw, Mark

Title: Africa's Changing Place in the Global Criminal Economy

Summary: Africa's role in the global criminal economy is shifting. This is a function of several factors, including changes in African and global illicit markets, as well as the kinds of vulnerabilities that have marked the continent's recent history. This shift has happened in a fairly short space of time - notably over the last two decades. Tracking this change is challenging, however. Data is scarce given that research on how Africa is connected to the global criminal economy is but in its infancy. But if the detrimental effects on Africa caused by global illicit markets and organised crime could be efficiently captured and measured - in terms of lost lives and lost livelihoods, poor governance, conflict, the obliteration of natural resources (such as rare animal species) - then the cumulative damage would no doubt be clearer for all to see. The results would highlight the need for a sustained focus to address the challenge. But, even with the fragmentary data that we do have, there can be little doubt that organised crime has emerged as a key feature of the African policy debate in recent years. Its impact is widespread and growing, yet it is little understood. The rising influence of criminal networks is part of a wider realignment of the international system, to which Africa belongs. An array of networks - commercial, social, political and criminal - now stand alongside traditional forms of statehood.1 Disentangling these interwoven networks and understanding how the criminal economy in particular, shapes governance and distorts development must now be key objectives for analysts of African affairs. References to criminal influence and 'shadow economies' are now pervasive in much of the recent writing on Africa, but there have been few attempts to consider these phenomena in their own right. Several analysts have observed that, far from isolating Africa from the global economy, illicit markets are integrating the continent in a significant way - even if only into the perverse underside of globalisation. Criminal markets, for example, have revitalised ancient African trade and pilgrimage routes that connect the continent to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In patterns that are both old and new, Africa is becoming more enmeshed in a global web of illicit economic networks. Today, the continent is regularly featured in media reports on worldwide criminal markets and organised crime. Such coverage often focuses on what might be called organised corruption; the so-called 'migrant crisis' enabled by human smuggling from North Africa and the Sahel; or the poaching of animal species, such as rhinos and elephants in Southern Africa; the growth of different types of financial fraud; or the illegal trade in commodities or drugs across the continent. Indeed, one of the marked features of Africa's criminal economy is its diversity. How do we analyse the recent growth of these illicit markets and the organised-crime networks associated with them in Africa? And how do we understand and measure their impact on indicators such as governance, economic development, poverty reduction, human security and quality of life? What impact do they have on Africa's long-standing (and increasing) conflicts and on violence? And how can we do so in a way that is useful across the plethora of criminal challenges Africa now faces? These are the challenges that the ENACT project aims to address. The objective of ENACT is to enrich the foundation of the evidence basis on organised crime and its activities across the continent through research, qualitative and quantitative data gathering, multi-sectoral policy engagement, awareness raising and advocacy. But at the outset of this project, it is clear that the way in which organised crime in Africa has evolved cannot be understood without understanding wider trends in the global criminal economy. That is the focus of this report.

Details: Pretoria: ENACT, 2017. 44p.

Source: Internet Resource: Continental Report 01: Accessed September 27, 2017 at: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-09-26-enact-continental-report1.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Africa

URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-09-26-enact-continental-report1.pdf

Shelf Number: 147471

Keywords:
Criminal Markets
Criminal Networks
Economics of Crime
Illegal trade
Illicit Markets
Organized Crime

Author: Garzon, Juan Carlos

Title: Mafia & Co.,: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia

Summary: Mafia & Co. provides an analytical perspective of the inner workings and expansion of organized crime in three Latin American countries. Juan Carlos Garzon, a Colombian political scientist, provides a comparative investigation looking specifically at criminal networks in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil.

Details: Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2008. 190p.

Source: Internet Resource: accessed January 22, 2018 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mafiaandcompany_reducedsize.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: Latin America

URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mafiaandcompany_reducedsize.pdf

Shelf Number: 121335

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Mafia
Organized Crime

Author: DellaPosta, Daniel

Title: Wise Guys: Closure and Collaboration in the American Mafia

Summary: How do organizations obtain access to valued resources without diluting the loyalties and identities of their members? Network analysts suggest focusing on the boundary-spanning activities of "brokers" who bridge gaps in social structure. In many contexts, however, brokers are viewed with suspicion and distrust rather than rewarded for their diversity of interests. This dissertation examines organizations in which the theoretical deck is seemingly stacked against brokerage and toward parochialism: American-Italian mafia families. Through an institutional analysis of the mafia organization, I trace how ethnic and organizational closure led marginalized actors to seek alternative paths to enrichment beyond the family-controlled networks and industries. Using a historical network data set, I document a division of network labor in which a small number of brokers-often, surprisingly, ethnic outsiders and lower-status criminals-bridged otherwise disconnected islands of criminal activity. More than coordination among elite criminals, it was entrepreneurial action by marginal and excluded actors-outsiders operating largely beyond the control of mafia organizations themselves-that generated the integrated and highly connected mafia network. This dissertation accounts for a striking historical paradox by showing how it was possible for the American Mafia to appear for all intents and purposes to be a well-organized national conspiracy even as the individual groups involved remained organizationally and geographically separate from one another.

Details: Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2017. 161p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 27, 2018 at: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/51672/DellaPosta_cornellgrad_0058F_10240.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Year: 2017

Country: United States

URL: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/51672/DellaPosta_cornellgrad_0058F_10240.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Shelf Number: 149262

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Mafia
Organized Crime

Author: Perotti, Victoria

Title: Imagining the Future of Crime and Politics

Summary: Organized crime networks dedicated to illicit trafficking of drugs, people and wildlife-as well as money laundering and cybercrime, among other activities-are engines of instability. From Latin America to West Africa, from West Asia to Eastern Europe, and from Central Africa to Southern Europe, these networks engage in corruption to advance their interests, depriving the state of precious resources needed to build resilient institutions (OECD 2014). Corruption is channeled through multiple avenues, including by pouring illicit money into political institutions and actors (Villaveces-Izquierdo and Uribe Burcher 2013; Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014; Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016). The world is experiencing several parallel trends-including increased violent conflict, democratic backsliding and technological advancements-that affect these corrupt dynamics. Given that conflict and weak governance typically create a fertile environment for organized crime to engage in public sector corruption (Lupsha 1996; Cockayne and Pfister 2008: 18; Kupferschmidt 2009), and since technology may facilitate or hinder criminal behaviour (Baker 2014), these trends will presumably have a pivotal impact on the fight against organized crime and political corruption. On 4 May 2017, International IDEA hosted the workshop 'Political corruption and organized crime: Drivers, effects and responses' at the 2017 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, organized by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2017). The workshop aimed to discuss potential future trends regarding corruption linked to organized crime and strategic policy responses. It gathered scholars and practitioners in anticorruption, international crime prevention and peacebuilding in a common dialogue. This Discussion Paper was initially drafted as a scenario-building exercise to inform the workshop and was further developed with the input of its participants. Scenario building is an analytical method that encourages prospective thinking within a thematic field to identify new strategic policy alternatives (Conway 2006). Specifically, the scenarios consist of an illustration of possible futures. As such, they are not intended to predict the future (European Commission 2007). The methodology tends to be qualitative and engages a group of people in a simulation process. By developing a future narrative that takes existing interconnected trends to the extreme, participants can challenge assumptions and expand their perceptions of options available, ultimately engaging in strategic conversations. This Discussion Paper and the adapted scenario-building exercise on which it is based were therefore developed from the perspective of a fictitious criminal network. Its hypothetical activity focus is diverse and, depending on the opportunities, it could hypothetically venture to any existing and new illicit activities. Its structure is flexible as well; as such, it can potentially adapt to new markets. Section 1 illustrates some of the key geopolitical trends and drivers in governance, peace and technology that may affect corruption dynamics in relation to organized crime in the coming 10 years. Written from the perspective of a fictitious criminal network, it depicts a scenario where conflict, democratic decline and new technologies exacerbate the negative impact of organized crime on the state. By describing an imaginary future, it includes the most relevant concerns for practitioners within the field. Section 2 briefly presents current policy options for tackling organized crime and political corruption, and outlines recommendations for future policy adjustments that may contribute to the improvement of crime and corruption prevention and mitigation. The main argument of this Discussion Paper is that the policies that seek to address corruption and organized crime should be brought closer together in the promotion of global peace and stability.

Details: Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018. 23p.

Source: Internet Resource: International IDEA Discussion Paper 2/2018: Accessed April 3, 2018 at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/imagining-the-future-of-crime-and-politics.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: International

URL: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/imagining-the-future-of-crime-and-politics.pdf

Shelf Number: 149660

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Organized Crime
Political Corruption
Wildlife Crime

Author: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

Title: Facing Extinction: Survival of the Vaquita Depends on Eliminating the Illegal Trade in Totoaba

Summary: Ahead of the 69th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee, EIA's new briefing provides an update on the world's most threatened marine mammal - the vaquita - and the ongoing illegal trade in totoaba that is driving the species to extinction. EIA urges Mexico, China and the US to substantially increase enforcement efforts, dismantling the criminal networks facilitating the trade and fully protecting the last remaining handful of vaquita.

Details: London: EIA, 2017. 8p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2018 at: https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA_Ocean_report_briefing_Vaquita_Final.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA_Ocean_report_briefing_Vaquita_Final.pdf

Shelf Number: 149714

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Environmental Crime
Illegal Trade
Marine Mammals
Organized Crime
Wildlife Crime

Author: Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo

Title: The Lava Jato Network: Corruption and Money Laundering in Brazil

Summary: The "Lava Jato" Operation is an on-going Federal Police investigation executed for dismantling corruption and money laundering schemes that involved Petrobras, the Brazilian State-managed oil company, Electrobras, the Brazilian state-managed nuclear company, among other Brazilian public institutions. From 2014 to mid-2017, this operation has developed 41 phases of investigation involving various public and private companies, politicians, businesspersons, doleiros, and drug traffickers, among other types of agents. Since the initial complaint filed by Hermes Freitas Magnus, who owned the Brazilian company "Dunel", along with Maria Teodora Silva, a series of investigations began, which allowed identifying four large criminal groups led by the currency exchange operators Carlos Habib Chater, Alberto Youssef, Nelma Mitsue Penasso Kodama and Raul Henrique Srour. As a result of these investigations, Brazilian officials discovered that those four criminal organizations operated together between 2005 and 2014 to launder money through alliances between companies and to obtain contracts with Petrobras through bribe payments to public officers of the company, and politicians with the power of keeping the officials on their positions. The evidence gathered and analyzed for this report revealed a major scheme of corruption and money laundering in Brazil, involving more than 220 Brazilian and foreign companies, 170 business persons, and 100 public servants. Considering the institutional impact of the criminal scheme installed initially at Petrobras, and how it engaged on corruption across Latin America and money laundering across the Western Hemisphere and beyond, this document is the centralized analysis of this complex criminal structure, according to the sources listed below. This document has five sections. The first part is this introduction; the second is a description of the methodology and the concepts related to Social Network Analysis and additional protocols of analysis, which is the methodological approach herein applied; the third is a brief presentation of the criminal structure referenced here as "Petrobras Criminal Network", as well as the sources gathered and processed to model the structure; the fourth is an analysis of the characteristics of the criminal structure, which includes a description of the types of nodes/agents, the types of interactions established, and the nodes/agents concentrating direct interactions and the capacity to arbitrate resources across the network; and the fifth part includes conclusions related to the characteristics of the analyzed network.

Details: Bogota, Colombia/Sao Paulo, Brazil: Humanitas360 and Vortex Foundation 2018. 106p.

Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks - Working Paper No. 29. VORTEX Working Paper No. 43; Accessed May 11, 2018 at: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_fcb25fe62d8f4776982f1fc39200e1f2.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Brazil

URL: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_fcb25fe62d8f4776982f1fc39200e1f2.pdf

Shelf Number: 150158

Keywords:
Bribery
Corruption and Fraud
Criminal Networks
Financial Crime
Money Laundering

Author: La Rosa, Lucy

Title: The New Generation: Mexico's Emerging Organized Crime Threat

Summary: Over the past decade, more than 200,000 people have been murdered in Mexico, including the record 29,000 murders that occurred in 2017 alone. While there are complex underlying factors behind every individual homicide, a substantial portion of Mexico's recent violence is attributable to organized crime groups. In an effort to reduce the operational capabilities of these groups, the government of Mexico has responded to this crisis with a deliberate strategy to target top organized crime figures for arrest and even extradition. In January 2017, these efforts culminated in the downfall of famed drug trafficker, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, who was extradited to the United States and is currently preparing to stand trial for various related crimes in New York. One of the unintended consequences of Guzman's downfall has been an increase in homicides to unprecedented levels. Following Guzman's removal as the purported head of the Sinaloa Cartel, one of Mexico's most powerful criminal organizations, splinter groups and rival organizations have competed to take over the lucrative drug trafficking routes he formerly controlled. One group that has been behind much of this violence is a relatively new organized crime syndicate known as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion, CJNG), an offshoot of the Sinaloa Cartel that has managed to re-brand itself, consolidate splintered criminal networks, and emerge as one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Mexico.

Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, 2018. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180319-Policy_Brief-CJNG.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Mexico

URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180319-Policy_Brief-CJNG.pdf

Shelf Number: 150594

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Cartels
Drug Trafficking
Homicides
Organized Crime
Trafficking Drugs

Author: Calderon, Laura

Title: Organized Crime and Violence in Baja California Sur

Summary: During the last decade, Mexico has witnessed elevated levels of violence, reaching a total of almost 300,000 victims of intentional homicide from 2000 to 2017. Violence, however, is now affecting areas that it did not reach before, turning vacation paradises into hotly contested areas of control for organized crime groups in recent years. Such has been the case of Manzanillo, Cancun, Acapulco, and most recently, the case of Baja California Sur cities, Los Cabos and La Paz, as the state's homicide levels increased by almost 300% in 2017.

Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, 2018. 15p.

Source: Internet Resource; Working Paper Series, 15(2): Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180216_CALDERON-WP-BCS_v1.1.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: United States

URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180216_CALDERON-WP-BCS_v1.1.pdf

Shelf Number: 150595

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Homicides
Organized Crime
Violence
Violent Crime

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Game Changers 2017: What to Watch for in 2018

Summary: Organized crime thrives amid political corruption and uncertainty. There will be plenty of this in Latin America in 2018, helping organized crime deepen its roots across the region over the course of the year. This is the moment when we draw on our extensive research and experience to make our predictions for the coming year. And the panorama for 2018 is one of the bleakest that InSight Crime has faced in our nine years of studying criminal phenomena in Latin America and the Caribbean. Tackling organized crime requires stable governments with purpose, strategy, strong security forces, healthy democracy and transparency, along with international cooperation. These currently seem in short supply around the region. Political chaos, infighting and upheaval ensure that attention is occupied on survival and manipulation of democracy, not with tackling organized crime. State legitimacy has come into question in certain nations in the region, as political leaders are investigated for corruption or manipulation of power. Embattled political leaders will often cut backroom deals with criminal elements to ensure their survival. Moreover, several countries will see important elections in the coming year, contributing to political instability. Political Hangovers From 2017 As we wrote in our introduction to this GameChangers, 2017 saw corruption take hold at high levels in governments across the region. So we enter 2018 with several political hangovers, where we believe corruption will assume a still stronger grip: Venezuela, where the last fig leaf of democracy has fallen and a corrupt regime is entrenching itself in power. As oil revenue dries up, the government may further criminalize to survive. The disintegration of the Venezuelan state and its total corruption has far-reaching regional implications for criminal dynamics. These are most immediately impacting on neighbors like Colombia, Brazil and Caribbean nations (Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba and the Dominican Republic foremost among them), but the effects are spreading further afield. Honduras, where the re-election of President Juan Orlando Hernandez has been disputed amid claims of fraud and corruption. This has further undermined his already battered legitimacy. This Northern Triangle nation is of extraordinary importance for drugs moving from South America to the United States. Peru, which saw President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski narrowly avoid being removed from power amid accusations of corruption. He survived only by pardoning former President Alberto Fujimori, who was jailed for human rights abuses. The Fujimori family control one of the most powerful factions in Congress. Kuczynski has been fatally weakened and discredited. We expect to see major underworld activities such as cocaine, timber and gold trafficking strengthened as a result. Bolivia's president, Evo Morales, has manipulated the constitution and looks set to perpetuate himself in office by standing for a fourth term. Most checks on his power now seem to have been stripped away, even as the country plays a central role in South America's drug trade. Ecuador has seen its vice president removed after a conviction for corruption, while President Lenin Moreno find himself locked in a political war with former President Rafael Correa. Organized crime is far down the president's list of priorities, despite that the fact that we believe the port of Guayaquil to be one of the major departure points for cocaine shipments across the globe. Presidential Elections in 2018 To further feed the political uncertainty, there are elections in six important nations, which mean that political attention will be utterly focused on these and not on the fight against organized crime. Brazil has a president with around five percent approval rating universally seen as corrupt. The favorite to win this election, Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, was convicted in July of accepting bribes from an engineering firm in exchange for public works contracts. Colombia, the world's foremost producer of cocaine, is struggling to implement a peace agreement with Marxist rebels and prevent a recycling of criminal actors. The enemies of peace seem stronger than its friends as the candidates line up. Costa Rica, sat astride the Central America route for cocaine heading towards the United States, has seen transnational organized crime take root and feed national criminal structures. Mexico has seen violence reach new heights and its current president, Enrique Peea Nieto, has provided few new strategies to tackle homicides or the organized crime that feeds them. New leadership is desperately needed, but no matter who wins the July elections no real changes in strategy are expected until the end of the year, when a new president will take office. Paraguay, South America's most prolific producer of marijuana already has a president associated with criminal activity in the form of cigarette smuggling. With Brazilian criminal groups projecting themselves into this landlocked nation, clear leadership is needed to contain rampant criminal activity. Venezuela is due to have presidential elections, but with President Nicolas Maduro now operating a dictatorship, there are no guarantees these will be held, much less that any real change will occur. Economic collapse is more likely to produce change than political challenge. Even in Cuba, dominated by the Castro brothers since 1959, change is coming as Raul Castro has promised to step down in 2018. And Nicaragua's president Daniel Ortega, in power since 2007, is tightening his grip on the levers of power and undermining democracy. Not since the days of the Cold War have democracy and good governance been under such threat in Latin America. These conditions have in part been created by organized crime and the corruption it feeds. And organized crime will continue to profit from the chaos. Cooperation is also key to fighting transnational organized crime and for good or ill, the United States has often provided coherency and leadership in the war on drugs and organized crime. That leadership is gone along with much US credibility in the region. All this simply gives yet more room for criminals to maneuver. More 'Plata' Than 'Plomo' There is another aspect of organized crime worth mentioning when we look to 2018. While corruption has always been one of the primary tools for organized crime, its flip side has been intimidation and violence. Pablo Escobar used to famously offer his victims two choices: "plata" ("silver," a bribe) or "plomo" ("lead," a bullet). What is becoming clear to the most sophisticated criminals is that bribery now gets you a lot further, a lot quicker, than violence. The expanding corruption scandals are evidence of this. While Mexico, Venezuela and much of the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras register epidemic levels of homicides, Colombia is bucking the trend. Even as cocaine exports reach record levels, along with internal drug consumption, with other booming illegal economies such as gold mining and extortion, murders are falling. While this is in part due to the de-escalation of the civil conflict with the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC), the other major factor is the development of a Pax Mafiosa. The first "mafia peace" was forged in Medellin, the capital of the cocaine trade, and expanded from there across the country. This means that our mission of exposing organized crime is getting harder here in our home base of Colombia. The criminal history of Latin America has been driven by criminal entrepreneurs, principally in the forms of the drug cartels. This is not the case in Africa, where criminal activity is often managed by elements within government. As Latin organized crime continues to fragment, and corruption becomes the preferred method of doing illicit business, Latin America may begin to look more like Africa. Criminality may not only be protected at the highest levels of government but perhaps run by these elements. This is a phenomena we have studied closely in our "Elites and Organized Crime" investigations. We will dedicate yet more resources to these kinds of investigations as we believe they point the way forward in terms of criminal evolution. SEE ALSO: InDepth Coverage of Elites and Organized Crime Transnational organized crime is the most agile business on the planet and adapts to changing conditions much faster than governments. When those governments become weakened, undermined and corrupted by transnational crime groups, the already uneven playing field become yet further skewed. This year is likely to be a year of further criminal entrenchment in the region, of further corruption of high levels of government or even state capture. Be ready, because we need to pay very close attention, if we are to see the hand of organized crime amid the political chaos

Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2018. 60p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: South America

URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf

Shelf Number: 150738

Keywords:
Corruption
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking (South America)
Gangs
Homicides
Organized Crime
Street Gangs
Violence

Author: Haysom, Simone

Title: The heroin coast: A political economy along the eastern African seaboard

Summary: This report examines the characteristics of the heroin trade off the East African coast and highlights the criminal governance systems that facilitate drug trafficking along these routes. In recent years, the volume of heroin shipped from Afghanistan along a network of maritime routes in East and southern Africa appears to have increased considerably. Most of this heroin is destined for Western markets, but there is a spin-off trade for local consumption. An integrated regional criminal market has developed, both shaping and shaped by political developments in the region. Africa is now experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use worldwide and a spectrum of criminal networks and political elites in East and southern Africa are substantially enmeshed in the trade. This report focuses on the characteristics of the heroin trade in the region and how it has become embedded in the societies along this route. It also highlights the features of the criminal governance systems that facilitate drug trafficking along this coastal route.

Details: s.l.: ENACT, 2018. 54p.

Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper, Issue 04 : Accessed July 5, 2018 at: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-02-research-paper-heroin-coast.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-02-research-paper-heroin-coast.pdf

Shelf Number: 150768

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Drug Markets
Drug Trafficking
Heroin
Illicit Drugs
Organized Crime

Author: Galeotti, Mark

Title: Crimintern: How the Kremlin Uses Russia's Criminal Networks in Europe

Summary: Over the past 20 years, the role of Russian organised crime in Europe has shifted considerably. Today, Russian criminals operate less on the street and more in the shadows: as allies, facilitators and suppliers for local European gangs and continent-wide criminal networks. - The Russian state is highly criminalised, and the interpenetration of the criminal 'underworld' and the political 'upperworld' has led the regime to use criminals from time to time as instruments of its rule. - Russian-based organised crime groups in Europe have been used for a variety of purposes, including as sources of 'black cash', to launch cyber attacks, to wield political influence, to traffic people and goods, and even to carry out targeted assassinations on behalf of the Kremlin. - European states and institutions need to consider RBOC a security as much as a criminal problem, and adopt measures to combat it, including concentrating on targeting their assets, sharing information between security and law-enforcement agencies, and accepting the need to devote political and economic capital to the challenge.

Details: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed July 27, 2018 at: https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR208_-_CRIMINTERM_-_HOW_RUSSIAN_ORGANISED_CRIME_OPERATES_IN_EUROPE02.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Europe

URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR208_-_CRIMINTERM_-_HOW_RUSSIAN_ORGANISED_CRIME_OPERATES_IN_EUROPE02.pdf

Shelf Number: 150945

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime

Author: Mann, Lori

Title: Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants in ACP Countries: Key Challenges and Ways Forward Informing discussions of the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and Development

Summary: This report was commissioned by the ACP-EU Migration Action in 2017 as part of the Action's efforts to collect, analyse and disseminate information and knowledge on the results achieved through its activities. Focusing on trafficking in human beings (THB) and the smuggling of migrants (SoM), experts from ACP and EU countries met in Brussels in July 2014 to discuss their respective policies pertaining to these fields, and to identify concrete areas of cooperation in order to tackle both phenomena in a spirit of shared responsibility and cooperation. The meeting demonstrated a shared commitment to address challenges, and recognized the necessity to deepen cooperation among countries of origin, transit and destination, including by fostering a South-South perspective. The recommendations elaborated during the experts' meeting were subsequently validated by the Ambassadors' meeting in January 2015. Soon after, the ACP-EU Migration Action began implementing activities to address the issues of THB and SoM. The ACP-EU Dialogue recommendations on THB and SoM include: - Enact (or amend) comprehensive national legislation on both trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants, in line with the Palermo Protocols and EU legislation; - Effectively implement national legislation on trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, ensuring victim identification and protection and the prosecution of perpetrators for the full range of existing forms of exploitation; - Raise awareness regarding THB and SoM among all key stakeholders, including: law enforcement, the judiciary, health care workers and labour inspectors, among others, by providing information and training; - Promote cross-border and international cooperation among countries of origin, transit and destination through bilateral Memorandums of Understandings (MoUs) and a special focus on South-South cooperation; - Improve data collection on THB and SoM as a prerequisite for evidence-based policy action; - Promote a victim-centred, human rights-based, gender-sensitive approach to ensure victim protection and identification in full cooperation with NGOs; - Dismantle criminal networks through financial tracking and tackling corruption among public officials, and prosecute traffickers and smugglers to prevent impunity; mentation of existing laws, the lack of comprehensive legislation on trafficking- and smuggling-related issues and underlying primary governance problems constitute additional significant barriers to addressing THB and SoM. The prevention of, and response to, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling requires a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach. It touches upon a myriad of related issues, inter alia: corruption, access to civil registration documents, labour laws and inspections, access to social welfare, gender-based violence, child protection and migration. As many of the recipients of the Action's support are poor and/or Small Island States, they face basic infrastructure and primary governance challenges that necessitate, but at the same time complicate, the provision of specialized technical assistance. Meeting the demand for institutional strengthening and capacity building requires adapting methodologies to the particularities of each country, including geographical and resource constraints, as well as the ways in which social and cultural norms function in relation to forms of exploitation and gender-based violence that lead to, or themselves might constitute of trafficking in human beings. Cooperation is the cornerstone of effective anti-trafficking and anti-migrant smuggling initiatives, and is required between States, institutions and non-State actors at all levels: subnational, national and international. Several ACP State recipients demonstrate increasingly effective cooperation at diverse levels, especially where such efforts benefit from existing structures and/or support at the regional level, such as regional platforms or cooperation agreements. However, for most State recipients, weak inter-agency cooperation at the national level constitutes a huge barrier to the effective implementation of laws and policies. National inter-agency coordination mechanisms to address trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling (where existent) remain new for many of the examined ACP States, and few work systematically with civil society organizations. Cooperation between States is crucial for disrupting both the smuggling and trafficking business models, given the inherently transnational nature of the former and the often -albeit not always- international character of the latter. Cross-border collaboration must hence also be strengthened, especially with regards to data sharing, investigations, prosecutions and returns. Yet, the best examples of cooperation do not focus on policing alone, but include elements of prevention and development, and the integration of a human rights-based approach. The potential use of regional mechanisms should be highlighted too, given the increased interest by stakeholders in this modality of South-South cooperation, and the large percentage of victims trafficked regionally. The most striking gap among ACP State recipients is the absence of the provision of assistance to, and the protection of, trafficking victims and smuggled migrants, which should be at the heart of any anti-THB and anti-SoM strategy. Upholding human rights remains central for all cases. In addition to the rights accorded to trafficking victims, and those accorded to smuggled migrants, specific needs due to individual trafficking or smuggling experience, as well as characteristics such as gender and age and socio-cultural norms, should be taken into account. To date, little efforts have been made in most of the examined countries to develop referral systems and for ensuring that victims are duly identified and receive the needed assistance. Moreover, cases were noted where victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants were not shielded from prosecution - as is set forth by the Protocols - and in few countries they are subject to immediate deportation and potential refoulement. In some countries, civil society actors play an important role in providing shelter and other basic necessities. Yet sometimes they operate with no clear mandate to assist trafficking victims or vulnerable migrants specifically, indicating a potential lack of experience and expertise in addressing the needs and rights of trafficking victims and smuggled migrants. In addition, many operate with little if any government support or involvement. Prevention efforts should raise awareness on trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants among the public, while addressing the root causes of both phenomena, and targeting a wide range of stakeholders. Many of the examined ACP countries have organized, or are in the process of organizing capacity building for government entities at the policy and/or frontline level, including awareness raising on these phenomena. However, prevention and awareness raising should target and actively involve a wider range of stakeholders, for example traditional community leaders and diaspora, given the direct contact they have with (aspiring) migrants in many ACP countries. Communities should also be consulted in the design of awareness campaigns. The private sector is another key partner for prevention efforts in ACP countries, especially when addressing the demand side of the trafficking chain. Any meaningful prevention effort must be associated with realistic alternative options to unsafe migration, such as development and work opportunities that benefit migrants and their societies in the countries of origin and destination. Finally, reliable data is the most basic prerequisite for developing policies that are evidence based and respond appropriately to the local context. However, in many of the examined ACP countries, data tends to range from anecdotical to non-existent. In many instances, capacity building on data management, analysis and sharing is needed, at the inter-agency as well as the international level. Proper case management systems with standardized interfaces are also essential. However, the limitations in both infrastructure and resources should be taken into account and in that sense, international methodologies and systems for data collection and management should be adapted to the local context. Through a series of baseline assessments, the ACP-EU Migration Action has identified the above mentioned gaps among other specific barriers to effective anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling strategies. Such assessments are conducted within each targeted country and form the foundation of the related technical assistance support. In light of its work with States and Regional Organizations throughout the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions, the Action remains poised to provide the needed technical assistance and to contribute new knowledge to the concrete dialogue that is ongoing between States within the ACP-EU Partnership framework. The recommendations presented at the conclusion of the report build upon those issued by the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and Development and seek to highlight emerging challenges while bringing the achievement of stakeholders and the related good practices to the fore. This analysis seeks to produce knowledge that can be adapted for use in other context where States struggle with these same phenomena.

Details: Brussels: IOM, 2018. 233p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 1, 2018 at: http://acpeumigrationaction.iom.int/sites/default/files/final_web.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: http://acpeumigrationaction.iom.int/sites/default/files/final_web.pdf

Shelf Number: 151003

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Human Smuggling
Human Trafficking
Illegal Immigration
Immigrants
Migration
Organized Crime
Victims of Trafficking

Author: Utermohlen, Mary

Title: In Plane Sight: Wildlife Trafficking in the Air Transport Sector

Summary: Wildlife traffickers are benefiting from an increasingly interconnected world. As marketplaces have become progressively more international, wildlife trafficking networks have been able to exploit the advance of technology, profiting off the development of the international financial system and increasingly intertwined transportation networks. By 2016, environmental crime had grown into a multi-billion dollar industry, worth as much as $91 to $258 billion annually, with wildlife crime specifically making up $7 to $23 billion of the total. But while wildlife criminal networks were learning to take advantage of finance and transportation networks, they made a mistake: they became dependent on them. Wildlife criminal groups now rely on international systems of trade, finance, and transport to make a profit, forcing them to emerge from behind their carefully constructed disguises to engage with the lawful, regulated world, thus exposing themselves to discovery. Wildlife seizures are the clearest outward sign of this weakness. If carefully collected, stored, and analyzed, wildlife seizure data can reveal a great deal about wildlife trafficking trends, routes, and methods, including how wildlife networks seem to respond to different enforcement and market pressures. In Plane Sight examines wildlife trafficking through the air transport sector by analyzing nine years' worth of open source seizure information, and is intended to provide an update on wildlife trafficking activity in airports since last year's Flying Under the Radar. Unhindered by laws, regulations, or bureaucracy, criminal networks are creative and evolve quickly, generally outpacing enforcement, which remains perpetually a step behind. Ultimately, large-scale disruption of wildlife criminal networks requires shifting alongside them, identifying new trafficking methods as they arise, and overtaking them by anticipating their responses to enhanced enforcement activity and preparing accordingly. Over the past year, C4ADS analysts have continued to collect ivory, rhino horn, reptile, and bird seizures, and have developed three new datasets covering pangolin, marine products, and mammal seizures. Together, these seven categories account for about 81% of known trafficked wildlife, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although seizure data can present a slightly inaccurate view of wildlife trafficking, if considered with the appropriate caveats, it provides the best available picture of overall trafficking activity and can be used to direct future anti-trafficking efforts. This report is divided into the seven different wildlife categories included in the C4ADS Air Seizure Database. The analysis in each section is broken down into smaller subsections that review, in order: overall trafficking trends, trafficking routes, and trafficking methods. The first four sections (ivory, rhino horn, reptiles, and birds) focus primarily on 2017 data, while the next three sections (pangolins, marine products, and mammals) cover 2009 through 2017. The wildlife category sections are followed by five appendices, which include: 1) an analysis of WCO CEN wildlife seizure data, 2) an analysis of FWS LEMIS seizure data, 3) annual trafficking route maps (2015 through 2017) for each wildlife category, 4) a Human Trafficking Assessment Tool for the air transport sector, 5) a seizure reporting template, and 6) the R packages used to create the graphics for this report. In general, this report finds wildlife trafficking activity to be truly global in scope, and increasingly so, as trafficking networks continue to seek out new source regions and demand markets for their illicit products.

Details: Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), 2018. 214p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 9, 2018 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5b68614a2b6a28d46b615f5f/1533567389029/In+Plane+Sight.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: International

URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5b68614a2b6a28d46b615f5f/1533567389029/In+Plane+Sight.pdf

Shelf Number: 151088

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Illicit Products
Organized Crime
Trafficking in Wildlife
Wildlife Crime
Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Schmid, Alex P.

Title: Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime 22 Years Later

Summary: The Research Paper opens with a conceptual discussion about definitions of 'organised crime/groups' (OCGs) and 'terrorism/terrorist groups (TGs)'. It distinguishes between four types/levels of 'links' between OCGs and TGs and identifies two special types of violent hybrid organisations. It first summarises the main findings of a background report on the links between transnational organised crime groups and international terrorist groups, prepared by the author for the UN Crime Commission in the mid-1990s. After presenting key aspects of transnational OCGs and TGs in the 1990s, and comparing some of the features noted then to the situation today, the paper elaborates key differences and similarities between these two types of organisations. In the mid-1990s, transnational organised crime groups and terrorist organisations were decidedly distinct, linked in some ways but separated in more important other ways. Today the situations has evolved as there are new features not prominent in 1996. Looking at the present situation, the paper notes that recruiters of OCGs and TGs in Western diasporas increasingly fish in the same pool of mainly ethnic youth gangs and petty criminals. Another novelty is the role of prisons where convicted terrorists have successfully radicalised common petty criminals and members of OCGs. The report also draws attention to the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa where some smuggling and trafficking networks and jihadist networks have assumed a hybrid character. The criminalisation of some states and the involvement of government officials in organised crime or in supporting terrorism is also addressed. Concluding, the Research Paper notes an increase in both organised crime and terrorism since the mid-1990s but sees the main cause for this not so much in greater and deeper links between terrorist and organised crime groups but in the development of in-house capabilities of organised crime methods by TGs and terrorist tactics by OCGs and - more importantly - in changes in their operational environments due to, inter alia, globalisation and the role of the Internet. While the links between TGs and OCGs are a matter of serious concern for the international community, the far greater problem is that increasingly past and present political power holders are involved as third parties, whereby state facilities (e.g. diplomatic channels) are used as vehicles and cover for violent and predatory crimes across international borders. The paper also features an extensive, up-to-date bibliography on the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organised crime.

Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018. 40p.

Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ICCT-Schmid-International-Terrorism-Organised-Crime-August2018.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: International

URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ICCT-Schmid-International-Terrorism-Organised-Crime-August2018.pdf

Shelf Number: 151320

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Terrorism

Author: Slade, Gavin

Title: Mafia and Anti-Mafia in the Republic of Georgia: Criminal Resilience and Adaptation Since the Collapse of Communism

Summary: 'Thieves-in-law' (vory-v-zakone in Russian or kanonieri qurdebi in Georgian) are career criminals belonging to a criminal fraternity that has existed at least since the 1930s in the Soviet Gulag. These actors still exist in one form or another in post-Soviet countries and have integrated into transnational organised criminal networks. For reasons yet to be explicated, thieves-in-law became exceptionally prevalent in the Soviet republic of Georgia. Here, by the 1990s, they formed a mafia network where this means criminal associations that attempt to monopolize protection in legal and illegal sectors of the economy. In 2005, Mikhail Saakashvili, the current president of Georgia claimed that 'in the past 15 years...Georgia was not ruled by [former President] Shevardnadze, but by thieves-in-law.' Directly transferring anti-organised crime policy from Italy and America, Saakashvili's government made reform of the criminal justice system generally and an attack on the thieves-in-law specifically a cornerstone of the Rose Revolution. New legislation criminalises the possession of the status of 'thief-in-law' and of membership of criminal associations that constitute what is known as the 'thieves� world' (qurduli samkaro). Along with a sweeping reform of the police and prisons and a 'culture of lawfulness' campaign, Georgian criminal justice reforms since 2003 may be seen as the first sustained anti-mafia policy to be implemented in a post-Soviet country. It also appears to have been very successful. The longevity and sudden decline of the thieves-in-law in Georgia provides the main questions that the following study addresses: How do we account for changes in the levels of resilience to state attack of actors carrying the elite criminal status of 'thief-in-law'? How has this resilience been so effectively compromised since 2005? Utilising unique access to primary sources of data such as police files, court cases, archives and expert interviews this thesis studies the dynamics of changing mafia activities, recruitment practices, and structural forms of a criminal group as it relates to changes in the environment and, in particular, the recent anti-organised crime policy.

Details: Oxford, UK: St. Antony's College, Oxford University, 2011. 339p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 23, 2018 at: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/catalog/uuid:1a0fdb4a-a671-4675-840d-dea296bc5272/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=THESIS01&type_of_work=Thesis

Year: 2011

Country: Georgia

URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/catalog/uuid:1a0fdb4a-a671-4675-840d-dea296bc5272/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=THESIS01&type_of_work=Thesis

Shelf Number: 153065

Keywords:
Career Criminals
Criminal Networks
Mafia
Organized Crime

Author: Environment Agency (United Kingdom)

Title: Novel Approaches to Waste Crime

Summary: Executive Summary The European Pathway to Zero Waste (EPOW) programme has eight actions, five of which are led by the Environment Agency and three by WRAP who took over from the South East England Development Agency in April 2011. One of the actions under the programme is assessing and reporting on novel approaches to tackling waste crime which aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of new public sector led approaches to reducing waste crime and supporting new markets for the reuse of recovered materials. This study reports on the outcomes from a pilot of the best novel approaches. Environmental crime is a high priority area for European Member States; tackling the issue are international networks, working groups and organisations that include the European Commission, Interpol, Europol, Member State regulatory agents and a wide range of specific task force groups. These bodies are set up to deliver programmes that address and implement waste crime reduction measures. In its 2011 EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment Report however, Europol notes that "substantial intelligence gaps (in the area of waste crime) preclude comprehensive assessment of organised crime activity in this area". The intelligence on European waste crime notes: - Illegal waste activities within the EU are organised and sophisticated networks with clear division of roles with some organised gangs making billions of Euros per year; - Waste brokers feeding these networks can also be part of and embedded within the legal waste management system, appearing to be operating legitimate businesses; - Complexity in the legal waste management system facilitates rather than prevents criminal activity; and - There are substantial financial burdens borne by affected Member States (e.g. those where the illegal dumping and disposal are occurring), which intelligence suggests to be south-east and eastern Member States plus those countries that share a border with these Member States (e.g. Albania). As a consequence of globalisation, enhanced market development and trade outside the EU, the flow of waste around Europe and outside its borders has become larger, more complex and significantly more costly to police. Rises in the number of conventions, Directives and state laws have, to some degree and with varying success, been instruments to ensure proper re-use, recovery, recycling and disposal of wastes. Waste recovery, management and disposal remains a sector where illegal activity and criminal organisations freely operate, often making large financial gains from their activities to the detriment of legitimate businesses, the common market and society at large. This document, focusing on the reused and recovered waste tyre market, reports on the current size of the EU, UK and South East of England tyre market, followed by a number of public sector led case studies illustrating novel approaches to reducing waste tyre crime. This study has identified that there are several commonly accepted motivators for tyre crime including: financial gain, convenience, opportunism, market dynamics/demand, lack of a threat of being caught and lenient sentences/punishment for offences. The novel approaches identified as part of this study commonly use an intelligence-led approach, whereby data gathered proactively is used to tackle crime on a number of fronts. Novel approaches can involve new partnerships, new approaches and intervention points, sharing of information and multi-agency collaboration, targeting different players in the supply chain and pairing crime enforcement action with awareness raising to stop crime occurring. It also involves mechanisms to support secondary waste market development, tackling one of the key sources - the waste itself - making it a valuable resource rather than a material to discard at lowest cost. The intelligence-led approach is now a widely accepted methodology for profiling organised waste crime and coordinating surveillance, awareness-raising and ultimately building a case for enforcement and prosecution. The case studies examined within this report use this intelligence-led approach to help tackle waste crime - they go beyond reactive policing. The demonstrable advantages of this approach include multi-agency collaboration giving access to pooled resources with greater breadth and depth, sharing intelligence and information to take fast action on emerging crime problems, engaging with and gathering knowledge from the general public and businesses and making decisions on allocating resources where the best outcomes can be anticipated.

Details: Reading, UK: Environment Agency, 2012. 66p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/289927/geho0312bwdy-e-e.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: United Kingdom

URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/novel-approaches-to-waste-crime

Shelf Number: 154277

Keywords:
Case Studies
Criminal Networks
Environmental Crime
European Pathway to Zero Waste (EPOW)
Europol
Illegal Dumping
Illegal Waste
Intelligence-Led
Interagency Collaboration
Organized Crime Threat Assessment Report
Supply Chain
Tire Market
United Kingdom
Waste Crime
Waste Recovery

Author: McBride, David

Title: Who is a Member? Targeted Killings against Members of Organized Armed Groups

Summary: INTRODUCTION This paper argues that the most practical and legally correct definition is somewhere between the extreme views of Dr Melzer or the one hand, and Brigadier General Watkin on the other. It is submitted, to be properly categorized as a 'member of organized armed group' a person does not have to directly inflict harm in one causal step on a recurrent basis. However, neither should 'a cook' be properly considered a 'member of an organized armed group'. A more accurate reflection of who is a legitimately targetable member of an organized armed group is based not on the harm the individual causes, but simply on conduct that shows they intentionally enable the operational activities of the group. Accordingly, this paper will submit that a more satisfactory way of defining them will come from simply considering whether they form part of the 'armed force', in a not dissimilar way one might recognise a State Armed force, without recourse to formal membership, or indicia such as uniforms. This is quite a different test to one used to decide whether a civilian has lost his protection from attack, and I submit it produces a more logical representation of an armed group than a test that is based on an individual's proximity to the causing of harm, let alone one based on the causing of harm in a single causal step.

Details: S.L., 2013. 46p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 21, 2019 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261128

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261128

Shelf Number: 154338

Keywords:
Armed Force
Armed Groups
Criminal Groups
Criminal Networks
Organized Crime
Organized Crime Groups
Targeted Killings

Author: Interpol

Title: Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in North Africa

Summary: Executive Summary Transnational organized crime in Northern Africa poses a substantial threat to the safety and security of all member countries in the region, and poses a significant challenge to law enforcement agencies. As a result, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, has sought to catalogue and assess organized crime in the region to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response. International criminal organizations target North Africa due to the significant illicit wealth that can be generated from criminal market opportunities throughout the region, notably but not limited to drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, the counterfeiting of a range of goods, and the illicit traffic of cultural heritage. Crime syndicates exploit various social issues and take advantage of state fragility and limited law enforcement policing capacities to conceal and develop their activities. In addition, there are a number of additional facilitating factors bolstering organized criminality throughout the region such as the length of the region's borders with sub-Saharan Africa, the strategic geographic position of the region between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, the inclusion of North African countries in global trade flows, fragile economies, war profiteering stemming from many of the recent conflicts in the region or its vicinity, as well as corruption to varying degrees. The threat from organized crime in Northern Africa is therefore substantial, yet often going undetected and underreported, despite various data sources indicating major activities and dynamics of groups and networks active in the region. This mostly stems from limited and unequal capacity amongst law enforcement in the region to manage complex organized crime issues. A greater awareness of the scope and functioning of organized crime in North Africa, nurturing stronger partnerships amongst law enforcement agencies in the region, will contribute to better tackle the threat posed by organised crime.

Details: Lyon, France: Interpol, 2018. 47p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2019 at: https://enactafrica.org/research/analytical-reports/interpol-overview-of-serious-and-organised-crime-in-north-africa-2018

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-12-12-interpol-north-africa-report.pdf

Shelf Number: 154820

Keywords:
Arms Trafficking
Crime Syndicates
Criminal Networks
Drug Trafficking
Human Smuggling
North Africa
Organized Crime
Transnational Organized Crime

Author: InSight Crime

Title: Criminal Game Changers 2018

Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Criminal GameChangers 2018, where we highlight the most important trends in organized crime in the Americas over the course of the year. From a rise in illicit drug availability and resurgence of monolithic criminal groups to the weakening of anti-corruption efforts and a swell in militarized responses to crime, 2018 was a year in which political issues were still often framed as left or right, but the only ideology that mattered was organized crime. Some of the worst news came from Colombia, where coca and cocaine production reached record highs amidst another year of bad news regarding the historic peace agreement with the region's oldest political insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC). The demobilization of ex-FARC members has been plagued by government ineptitude, corruption, human rights violations, and accusations of top guerrilla leaders' involvement in the drug trade. And it may have contributed directly and indirectly to the surge in coca and cocaine production. It was during this tumult that Colombia elected right wing politician Ivan Duque in May. Duque is the protege of former president and current Senator Alvaro Uribe. Their alliance could impact not just what's left of the peace agreement but the entire structure of the underworld where, during 2018, ex-FARC dissidents reestablished criminal fiefdoms or allied themselves with other criminal factions; and the last remaining rebel group, the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional - ELN), filled power vacuums in Colombia and neighboring Venezuela, making it one of our three criminal winners this year. Meanwhile, a new generation of traffickers emerged, one that prefers anonymity to the large, highly visible armies of yesteryear. Also of note in 2018 was a surge in synthetic drugs, most notably fentanyl. The synthetic opioid powered a scourge that led to more overdose deaths in the United States than any other drug. Fentanyl is no longer consumed as a replacement for heroin. It is now hidden in counterfeit prescription pills and mixed into cocaine and other legacy drugs. It is produced in Communist-ruled China and while much of it moves through the US postal system, some of it travels through Mexico on its way to the United States. During 2018, the criminal groups in Mexico seemed to be shifting their operations increasingly around it, especially given its increasing popularity, availability, and profitability. The result is some new possibly game changing alliances, most notably between Mexican and Dominican criminal organizations. Among these Mexican criminal groups is the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion - CJNG), another of our three criminal winners for 2018. The CJNG has avoided efforts to weaken it with a mix of sophisticated public relations, military tactics and the luck of circumstance - the government has simply been distracted. That is not the say it is invulnerable. The group took some big hits in its epicenter in 2018, and the US authorities put it on its radar, unleashing a series of sealed indictments against the group. Mexico's cartels battled each other even as they took advantage of booming criminal economies. The result was manifest in the record high in homicides this year. The deterioration in security opened the door to the July election of leftist candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. AMLO, as he is affectionately known, did not necessary run on security issues, but he may have won on them, and in the process, inherited a poisoned security chalice from his predecessor. While Pena Nieto can claim to have arrested or killed 110 of 122 criminal heads, AMLO faces closer to a thousand would-be leaders and hundreds of criminal groups....

Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2019.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2019 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CRIMINAL-GAMECHANGERS-2018-InSight-Crime.pdf

Year: 2019

Country: Latin America

URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CRIMINAL-GAMECHANGERS-2018-InSight-Crime.pdf

Shelf Number: 155157

Keywords:
Cocaine
Criminal Networks
Drug Cartels
Drug Trafficking
Fentanyl
Illicit Drugs
Opioids
Organized Crime
War on Drugs

Author: Great Britain. HM Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Prisons

Title: Prison Drugs Strategy

Summary: The misuse of drugs in prison is one of the biggest challenges facing our criminal justice system today. Drug misuse is prevalent and contributes to violence, crime and vulnerability within prisons, which threatens safety and the ability of our hard-working prison staff to deliver effective regimes. We will not be able to improve safety, prevent re-offending and tackle serious and organised crime without reducing the misuse of drugs in prisons. This is a complex, multi-faceted problem with no simple answer - it requires a coordinated effort to limit the supply of drugs both inside and outside prisons, encourage people away from drug misuse towards positive and productive activities, and support those requiring treatment. It is therefore crucial that our approach to tackling the problem considers the whole system, working across government and with our partners at a national, regional and local level. The scale of the problem is significant and has become more challenging in recent years. Between 2012/13 and 2017/18, the rate of positive random tests for 'traditional' drugs in prisons increased by 50%, from 7% to 10.6%, and drug use in prisons is now widespread, particularly in male local and category C prisons. The emergence of psychoactive substances such as synthetic cannabinoids has exacerbated the problem, and these are often used in conjunction with other drugs, while we remain aware of problems with the diversion and misuse of prescription medication. The prevalence and patterns of drug misuse in prisons is shaped by patterns in the community, and the challenges faced by prisons can be exacerbated when those entering prison have an existing drug misuse issue or when drug misuse has been normalised in the community. Evidence shows us that the prisons with the highest rates of positive random drug tests are the prisons that are the least stable. 2 The misuse of drugs contributes to a cycle of disruption and violence, leading to a reduced or unstable regime, which through unpredictability and lack of purpose can encourage prisoners to turn to drugs and alcohol. The debt resulting from the supply, distribution and use of drugs is also a significant cause of violence, intimidation and self-harm across the estate, endangering both staff and other prisoners. Consequently, to tackle drug misuse, we need changes in all elements of this cycle, enabling prisoners to engage positively with rehabilitation, in a calm and safe environment. Reducing drug misuse is crucial to the safety of our prisons and the rehabilitation of prisoners. This strategy has been developed by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), working with other partners across government. It sets out our plans to reduce the misuse of drugs in our prisons, and will provide direction to assist all stakeholders in this. We are also releasing detailed guidance for prisons to support them in identifying issues and share best practice. Together, we will focus on restricting the supply of drugs by improving security, building intelligence, and targeting the criminal networks which aim to bring drugs into prison. We will also reduce the demand for drugs in prison by developing more meaningful regimes, providing more constructive ways for prisoners to spend their time and ensuring the balance of incentives encourages prisoners to make the right choices. We will work closely with our health and justice partners to build recovery for prisoners who want to overcome their substance misuse, providing prisoners who are serious about living substance free with the environment to do so successfully. It is crucial that we deliver all three strands of this strategy in unison to make a meaningful, positive difference to both prisoners and staff.

Details: London: Authors, 2019. 27p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 15, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/792125/prison-drugs-strategy.pdf

Year: 2019

Country: United Kingdom

URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/792125/prison-drugs-strategy.pdf

Shelf Number: 155408

Keywords:
Contraband
Criminal Networks
Drugs in Prison
Illicit Drugs
Prison Contraband

Rutgers - School of Law, Newark

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