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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:54 pm
Time: 9:54 pm
Results for critical incident management
2 results foundAuthor: Braziel, Rick Title: A Heist Gone Bad: A Police Foundation Critical Incident Review of the Stockton Police Response to the Bank of the West Robbery and Hostage-Taking Summary: At first blush, it is easy to criticize the tactics of the Stockton Police Department (SPD) after 33 officers, at four different locations, fired more than 600 times into a getaway car carrying three bank robbers. They killed two of the bank robbers but also took the life of an innocent woman who had been held hostage. Like most things in this complicated world of ours, nothing is ever simple. Every police event is fluid. However, many other extenuating factors played a critical role in this tragic event. The police department, located 60 miles east of San Francisco, was in the midst of a bankruptcy that robbed it of 100 veteran officers while leading to a reduction in training and severely limiting the ability to purchase new equipment and technology. Some of those officers were replaced with rookies straight out of the academy. The bankruptcy also meant that the department had no air support of its own and depended upon other agencies' helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft, which were not always available to the department. The Bank of the West branch that was robbed was nestled in an unusual triangular island created by three major roads, with little room for containment or cover. A bus station nearby put other civilians at risk. The bank robbers led police on an hour-long pursuit, sometimes at speeds exceeding 120 miles per hour. Throughout the ordeal, one of the suspects fired 100-plus rounds from an AK-47 at police, disabling 14 police vehicles, including their armored BearCat. Bullets tore through cars, shattered windshields, shredded tires, and incapacitated engines. And at the conclusion, over 200 rounds were found in the getaway vehicle. The suspects twice escaped the pursuers, but rather than attempting to disappear completely, they chose to wait and ambush police officers. Miraculously, no police personnel or civilians were injured in the shootings. One hostage was shot and wounded by a suspect and dumped from the getaway SUV while another leaped out while it was fleeing, causing her to sustain major injuries. The one surviving suspect only lived because he used Misty Holt-Singh as a shield. The 41-year-old wife and mother of two, who was visiting the bank to take out money for a trip to the hairdresser, was struck ten times by police bullets, killing her instantly. Never in the history of U.S. law enforcement has a police force dealt with an event such as this. The only incident that comes close was the 1997 North Hollywood shootout in which the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers battled a pair of heavily armed bank robbers, who were covered in body armor. But there were no hostages in that event and the suspects never got mobile. Stockton Police Chief Eric Jones knew shortly after the conclusion that he needed to call for an independent review of the bank robbery last year. His staff reached out to the Police Foundation 13 days after the incident and we were grateful to accept their request. Much like our 2014 review of the event involving Christopher Dorner (who was a former police and naval officer who targeted LAPD members and their families, murdering four people), the Stockton bank robbery must be considered a sentinel event. What that entails is a critical incident that tests the nation's public safety system, exposes holes in it, and can lead to important change for the future. The Police Foundation's core mission is to advance policing. One of the ways to do that is by examining these sentinel events. Our goal is to improve protocols, identify new tactics and ideas - and ultimately, unforeseen dangers - and help prepare law enforcement for these new developments in the actions of criminals. One of the frustrations we repeatedly heard during our interviews with Stockton police officers was they were dealing with an event that they had never trained for, let alone truly considered. Even veteran SWAT members found themselves confused and vexed when dealing with a rolling pursuit with hostages, all the while taking heavy fire that repeatedly disabled their police vehicles, and each time left them worrying that one of their colleagues might be hurt or dying while they continued the chase. The goal of this review is to provide lessons learned that can then be applied in the field, increasing the safety of both law enforcement personnel and civilians. What is not a goal is to criticize or blame the men and women of the Stockton Police Department who had to make split-second choices amidst the chaos of such an unprecedented crime. They made a great many smart and courageous decisions that undoubtedly saved lives. Details: Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2015. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 22, 2016 at: http://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/A-Heist-Gone-Bad-Critical-Incident-Review.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/A-Heist-Gone-Bad-Critical-Incident-Review.pdf Shelf Number: 137647 Keywords: Bank RobberyCritical Incident ManagementHostage-TakingPolice ResponsePolice Training |
Author: Straub, Frank Title: Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth Precinct Summary: Summary of events On the morning of November 15, 2015, two Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers were dispatched to an assault call in a North Minneapolis neighborhood just blocks from the police department's Fourth Precinct station. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers fatally shot Jamar Clark. Following the shooting, community members marched to and organized outside the Fourth Precinct police station. Over the course of the next 18 days-from November 15 through December 3, 2015- demonstrators occupied the lawn and street in front of the Fourth Precinct. For the first three days, a group of demonstrators also occupied the front vestibule of the Fourth Precinct station. The street and the surrounding neighborhood were the site of demonstrations, open fires, noisy gatherings, and encampments. The demonstrators called for police reform, and specifically for the release of video footage from the officer-involved shooting. In the early morning hours of December 3, the occupation was successfully and peacefully resolved. After 18 days, the community response was mixed: while the large majority applauded the professionalism and restraint of the Fourth Precinct line officers, some perceived the response as overly-aggressive and unnecessarily forceful, and others questioned why the occupation was allowed to continue for 18 days. Ultimately, the total cost to the city was approximately $1.15 million. The majority of the expenses were for MPD overtime; however, there were also expenses for replacing and repairing barriers and fencing, squad repairs, and hardware replacements. Approximately $50,000 of costs to the city were in property damage. There were five injuries caused by a group of alleged White supremacists who shot into the crowd of demonstrators; however, no serious injuries were attributed to interactions between MPD officers and demonstrators. Implications and challenges Like every significant incident, the occupation posed a unique set of circumstances for city and MPD leaders-circumstances that were unpredictable and rapidly evolving. Significant challenges were associated with managing the demonstrators; the media; and the impacts of the occupation on the surrounding neighborhood, MPD employees, and their families. These issues were compounded by a police department that struggled with the command and control structure and fully implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS), inconsistent communication, and training and equipment deficiencies. City leaders and MPD officials worked to maintain the First Amendment rights of the demonstrators while ensuring their safety, the safety of police officers, and the safety of the community as a whole. They were determined to bring a peaceful end to the occupation in a difficult national environment marred by civil disturbances spurred by officer-involved incidents in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York, and other cities nationwide. For city and law enforcement leaders, this environment reinforced their determination to exercise extreme caution throughout the response. In the end, the city and its police department brought the occupation to a peaceful conclusion and avoided the civil disturbances that occurred in other cities. Public safety response Officers throughout the MPD demonstrated extraordinary resilience and professionalism in their response to the occupation. Many officers worked long shifts and were subjected to verbal, and in some cases physical, assault. At various times, bottles, bricks, Molotov cocktails, bottles of gasoline, and other things were thrown over perimeter fences, threatening officers and damaging police vehicles and the precinct building. During the occupation, Fourth Precinct officers were instructed not to leave the building during their shifts except to provide perimeter security. Meals were brought into the station by chaplains and other volunteers. The commitment of the city, the police department, and individual officers to a peaceful, measured response played a large role in keeping the occupation from escalating into violent riots. Key themes of the review This COPS Office Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the 18-day occupation of the front lawn and the street in front of the MPD Fourth Precinct, completed by the Police Foundation, provides a comprehensive overview of the occupation from the perspectives of the MPD, elected leaders, demonstrators, and community members. The CIR identifies findings and recommendations as they relate to the response in Minneapolis, but apply more generally to civil disturbances across the nation. While the authors understand the unique set of circumstances that surround the protests and occupation of the Fourth Precinct, they also understand that the decision-making framework for the police response to this incident can and should be reviewed within the context of other significant incidents to identify important lessons that can be applied if a similar event occurs in another city, as well as to critical incidents more generally. The findings and recommendations in this report center on leadership; command and control; response to civil disorder; accountability and transparency; internal communications; public information and media; use of force; intelligence gathering; training; equipment and tools for managing demonstrations; officer safety, wellness, and resilience; and community engagement and relationships. Some of the key lessons learned include the following: -- Clearly define leadership roles and responsibilities among elected officials, law enforcement, and other agencies to ensure a coordinated and collaborative response to civil disturbance and other critical incidents. Strained relationships, lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, public disagreements, and lack of consistent internal communication contributed to the dynamic and varied response to this protracted incident. Unified leadership from elected officials, police executive and command staffs, and precinct personnel provides the foundation upon which a cohesive tactical and operational response is built and executed. -- Plan and exercise the unified command system for complex incidents during routine public safety response and operations. A citywide understanding and familiarization with NIMS and ICS is necessary during civil disturbances and other critical incidents to ensure coordination and collaboration among all responding agencies and individuals. Consistent implementation of unified command system principles in response to routine events and pre-planned large-scale events builds confidence in the systems and facilitates their implementation in response to mass demonstrations and critical incidents. -- Clear, concise, and consistent communication, particularly during critical incidents, is key to establishing trust and credibility. Clear, concise, and consistent communication between the Mayor's Office and the MPD, between elected officials, and within the MPD regarding the overall strategy would have led to a more coordinated and collaborative response to the occupation, provided context to the operational and tactical decisions that were made, addressed officer safety concerns, and positively impacted morale. -- Prioritize officer safety, wellness, morale, and resilience before, during, and after a critical incident such as a protracted response to civil disturbance. City and MPD leaders should have addressed and more fully accounted for the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of officers assigned to respond to the 18 days of protests, demonstrations and occupation. -- Build on positive police-community relationships to help mitigate potential future critical incident responses. The MPD 2.0 model, the training and engagement being done as part of the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, and the emphasis on positive interactions and fostering trusting partnerships should continue. Understanding and acknowledging the deep-seated racial and other issues, particularly in North Minneapolis, and building and fostering relationships with traditional and emerging community leaders will be instrumental in learning from the occupation and building opportunities to address areas of community tension and discord. Conclusion Many of the findings and recommendations that resulted from the 18-day occupation and the MPD.'s response build on an existing body of knowledge that can assist law enforcement agencies in their mission to protect, serve, and strengthen relationships with their communities. Given the unprecedented nature of the occupation, we hope that the lessons in this report will provide guidance to other agencies that may encounter similar events in the future and add to the growing body of literature that public safety agencies can use to enhance their preparation for, and response to, civil disturbances in their communities. Details: Washington, DC: U..S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Policing Services, 2014. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2017 at; https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Maintaining-First-Amendment-Rights-and-Public-Safety-in-North-Minneapolis.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Maintaining-First-Amendment-Rights-and-Public-Safety-in-North-Minneapolis.pdf Shelf Number: 146342 Keywords: Critical Incident ManagementCrowd ControlDemonstrationsOfficer-Involved ShootingPolice ProceduresPublic DemonstrationsPublic DisorderPublic SecurityRiots |