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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:26 pm
Time: 8:26 pm
Results for cyberattacks
3 results foundAuthor: Libicki, Martin C. Title: Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace Summary: This report presents some of the results of a fiscal year 2011 RAND Project AIR FORCE study on the integration of kinetic and nonkinetic weapons, “U.S. and Threat Non-Kinetic Capabilities.” It discusses the management of cybercrises throughout the spectrum from precrisis to crisis to conflict. The basic message is simple: Crisis and escalation in cyberspace can be managed as long as policymakers understand the key differences between nonkinetic conflict in cyberspace and kinetic conflict in the physical world. Among these differences are the tremendous scope that cyberdefense affords; the near impossibility and thus the pointlessness of trying to disarm an adversary’s ability to carry out cyberwar; and the great ambiguity associated with cyberoperations—notably, the broad disjunction between the attacker’s intent, the actual effect, and the target’s perception of what happened. Thus, strategies should concentrate on (1) recognizing that crisis instability in cyberspace arises largely from misperception, (2) promulgating norms that might modulate crisis reactions, (3) knowing when and how to defuse inadvertent crises stemming from incidents, (4) supporting actions with narrative rather than signaling, (5) bolstering defenses to the point at which potential adversaries no longer believe that cyberattacks (penetrating and disrupting or corrupting information systems, as opposed to cyberespionage) can alter the balance of forces, and (6) calibrating the use of offensive cyberoperations with an assessment of their escalation potential. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 24, 2013 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf Shelf Number: 127383 Keywords: Computer CrimeCyberattacksCybercrime (U.S.)National SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor Market Summary: There is a general perception that there is a shortage of cybersecurity professionals within the United States, and a particular shortage of these professionals within the federal government, working on national security as well as intelligence. Shortages of this nature complicate securing the nation's networks and may leave the United States ill-prepared to carry out conflict in cyberspace. RAND examined the current status of the labor market for cybersecurity professionals - with an emphasis on their being employed to defend the United States. This effort was in three parts: first, a review of the literature; second, interviews with managers and educators of cybersecurity professionals, supplemented by reportage; and third, an examination of the economic literature about labor markets. RAND also disaggregated the broad definition of "cybersecurity professionals" to unearth skills differentiation as relevant to this study. In general, we support the use of market forces (and preexisting government programs) to address the strong demand for cybersecurity professionals in the longer run. Increases in educational opportunities and compensation packages will draw more workers into the profession over time. Cybersecurity professionals take time to reach their potential; drastic steps taken today to increase their quantity and quality would not bear fruit for another five to ten years. By then, the current concern over cybersecurity could easily abate, driven by new technology and more secure architectures. Pushing too many people into the profession now could leave an overabundance of highly trained and narrowly skilled individuals who could better be serving national needs in other vocations. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html Shelf Number: 132617 Keywords: Computer CrimeCyberattacksCybercrime (U.S.)CybersecurityInternet CrimeNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: The Defender's Dilemma: Charting a Course Toward Cybersecurity Summary: Cybersecurity is a constant, and, by all accounts growing, challenge. Although software products are gradually becoming more secure and novel approaches to cybersecurity are being developed, hackers are becoming more adept, their tools are better, and their markets are flourishing. The rising tide of network intrusions has focused organizations' attention on how to protect themselves better. This report, the second in a multiphase study on the future of cybersecurity, reveals perspectives and perceptions from chief information security officers; examines the development of network defense measures and the countermeasures that attackers create to subvert those measures; and explores the role of software vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses. A heuristic model was developed to demonstrate the various cybersecurity levers that organizations can control, as well as exogenous factors that organizations cannot control. Among the report's findings were that cybersecurity experts are at least as focused on preserving their organizations' reputations as protecting actual property. Researchers also found that organizational size and software quality play significant roles in the strategies that defenders may adopt. Finally, those who secure networks will have to pay increasing attention to the role that smart devices might otherwise play in allowing hackers in. Organizations could benefit from better understanding their risk posture from various actors (threats), protection needs (vulnerabilities), and assets (impact). Policy recommendations include better defining the role of government, and exploring information sharing responsibilities. Key Findings Common Knowledge Confirmed Security postures are highly specific to company type, size, etc.; and there often aren't good solutions for smaller businesses. Quarantining certain parts of an organization offline can be a useful option. Responding to the desire of employees to bring their own devices and connect them to the network creates growing dilemmas. Chief information security officers (CISOs) feel that attackers have the upper hand, and will continue to have it. Reasonable Suppositions Validated Customers look to extant tools for solutions even though they do not necessarily know what they need and are certain no magic wand exists. CISOs want information on the motives and methods of specific attackers, but there is no consensus on how such information could be used. Current cyberinsurance offerings are often seen as more hassle than benefit, only useful in specific scenarios, and providing little return. Surprising Findings A cyberattack's effect on reputation (rather than more direct costs) is the biggest cause of concern for CISOs. The actual intellectual property or data that might be affected matters less than the fact that any intellectual property or data is at risk. In general, loss estimation processes are not particularly comprehensive. The ability to understand and articulate an organization's risk arising from network penetrations in a standard and consistent matter does not exist and will not exist for a long time. Recommendations Know what needs protecting, and how badly protection is needed. It was striking how frequently reputation was cited by CISOs as a prime cause for cybersecurity spending, as opposed to protecting actual intellectual property. Knowing what machines are on the network, what applications they are running, what privileges have been established, and with what state of security is also crucial. The advent of smart phones, tablets, and so forth compounds the problem. Know where to devote effort to protect the organization. A core choice for companies is how much defense to commit to the perimeter and how much to internal workings. Consider the potential for adversaries to employ countermeasures. As defenses are installed, organizations must realize they are dealing with a thinking adversary and that measures installed to thwart hackers tend to induce countermeasures as hackers probe for ways around or through new defenses. Government efforts aren't high on CISO's lists, but governments should be prepared to play a role. By and large, CISOs we interviewed did not express much interest in government efforts to improve cybersecurity, other than a willingness to cooperate after an attack. Yet it seems likely that government should be able to play a useful role. One option is to build a body of knowledge on how systems fail (a necessary prerequisite to preventing failure), and then share that information. A community that is prepared to share what went wrong and what could be done better next time could produce higher levels of cybersecurity. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1024/RAND_RR1024.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1024/RAND_RR1024.pdf Shelf Number: 140475 Keywords: Computer Crime Cyberattacks Cybercrime (U.S.) Cybersecurity Internet CrimeNational Security Terrorism |