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Date: April 26, 2024 Fri
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Results for de-radicalization
11 results foundAuthor: Butt, Riazat Title: European Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany Summary: This report is a comparative assessment of approaches to counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation within four countries from the European Policy Planners' Network (EPPN). It begins by setting out the definitions of key terms. It then provides an overview of the recent history of extremist violence and the approaches taken in tackling radicalisation and facilitating de-radicalisation in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in order to contextualise the environment in which the programmes examined in the report operate. The report will then identify some of the key challenges and lessons that can be learned from the outcomes of policies and initiatives in this area. It is part of a larger project funded by the European Commission and is based on research and interviews conducted during visits to countries in question. Although this paper focuses primarily on four EPPN countries, the appendix contains case studies from elsewhere in Europe that offer valuable insights into other successful initiatives and programs in the field of counter-radicalisation. Although the countries focused on in this report are not diverse in terms of their geographical location, their approaches to the challenges presented by radicalisation vary considerably as do the security and socio-cultural environments that inform them. For example, the problems faced by Germany, a large federal state with a history of far-right and far-left terrorism, are quite different to those faced by its smaller neighbour the Netherlands. In addition to this the evidence base within these countries is strong, allowing for effective and in-depth comparisons. The way in which countries have been affected by extremism has a tangible impact on the formulation of policies and programmes designed to prevent or reduce the impact of radicalisation. Before evaluating the approaches to these issues taken in the four selected European countries, it is important to note that counter- and de-radicalisation policies and programmes cannot "simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They have to develop organically in a specific country and culture." Despite this, by evaluating the strategies and initiatives in their various national contexts it is possible to identify certain elements of good practice that could potentially inform policy and practice elsewhere. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Shelf Number: 135685 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7 Summary: The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government's disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process' four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government's newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) - which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise - to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures. The report recommends the following: - Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation. - Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners. - Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counter-extremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. - Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities. - Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts. - Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism. - Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships. - Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures. - Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention. - Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism. - Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. - Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively. - Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism. - Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role. - Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. - Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities. - Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries. - Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds. While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly - at this critical time - practical recommendations to strengthen the UK's counter-extremism efforts. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Shelf Number: 138174 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-TerrorismDe-radicalizationIslamic State Media MuslimsRadical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 Summary: This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of "global jihad", terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and re-emphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies. Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism recommendations: To the International Community: - Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan. - Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices. - Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions. - Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them. - Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 'value transfer' system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. - Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. - Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138176 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review Summary: The 'radicalisation', 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' are used widely, but the search for what exactly 'radicalisation' is, what causes it and how to 'de-radicalise' those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists has so far been a frustrating experience. The popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. In Europe, it was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) by policymakers who coined the term 'violent radicalisation'. It has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision. Historical Roots and Definitions Based on an in-depth literature review, this paper seeks to explore key terms and the discourses surrounding them in greater detail. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism and this is also reflected in this Research Paper. Looking at the historical roots of radicalism, the subject is a relative one and has often been a force of progress. As such, its derivative, 'radicalisation' is not necessarily a synonym for terrorism. The paper proposes a distinction between radicalism and extremism. While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first tends to be open-minded, while the second manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness to use violence against civilians. A re-conceptualisation of radicalisation is proposed after a discussion of numerous academic and governmental definitions of radicalisation. The Two Sides of Radicalisation The paper also seeks to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of political violence - some worse and some less unacceptable than terrorism itself. It acknowledges that there are certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, while illegal under certain national laws, are accepted under international humanitarian law. For analytical purposes, political violence should be situated in the broader spectrum of political action - persuasive politics, pressure politics and violent politics - by those holding state power as well as non-state militant actors. With this in mind it should also be recognised that radicalisation is not necessarily a one-sided phenomenon, it is equally important to examine the role of state actors and their potential for radicalisation. The use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent years, has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international human rights standards. These are indicative of the fact that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can radicalise. Drivers of Radicalisation An exploration of the literature also confirms the pitfalls of profiling those individuals 'likely' to become terrorists. The current propensity to focus in the search for causes of radicalisation on 'vulnerable' young people has produced inconclusive results. The number of push and pull factors that can lead to radicalisation on this micro-level is very large - the same is true for the factors which can impact on de-radicalisation and disengagement. However, in the literature most findings are derived from small samples and few case studies, making comparison and generalisations problematic, and findings provisional. The paper pleads to look for roots of radicalisation beyond this micro-level and include a focus on the meso-level - the radical milieu - and the macro-level - the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics - to gain a better understanding of the dynamic processes driving escalation. The paper synthesises what we think we know about radicalisation and identifies those areas where our knowledge is 'thin'. Conclusions When it comes to de-radicalisation/dis-engagement and counter-radicalisation the paper concludes that it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive. Local context matters very much and academics and policy makers alike are increasingly recognising this fact. At this stage we still lack rigorous evaluations that allow us to determine the relative merits of various policies with a high degree of certainty. The lack of clarity and consensus with regard to many key concepts (terrorism, radicalisation, extremism, etc.) - ill-defined and yet taken for granted – still present an obstacle that needs to be overcome. The paper concludes with a set of findings and recommendations and identifies two major gaps in current counter-radicalisation efforts - one referring to the role of the media and the Internet and the other to the role of counter-narratives to those of jihadist terrorists. It identifies credibility and legitimacy as core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are key resources in counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation efforts. However, they have, in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics, to be markedly better than extremist parties and terrorist organisations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2013. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper March 2013: Accessed October 21, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 130117 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationDe-RadicalizationExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Thornton, Amy Elise Title: Understanding Radicalisation Summary: Given the considerable amount of effort and public resources invested in countering radicalisation, achieving a clearer understanding of what radicalisation is and of its causes is arguably a worthwhile and necessary endeavour. This thesis argues that such an understanding is lacking at present. Up until recently, researchers have relied upon interviews with current or former radicals in order to try and tease out those factors which might have contributed to radicalisation. As a result of the methodological approach, the focus has been upon individuals who are radicalised and their personal backgrounds, rather than on causal factors and mechanisms which might have been at work at other levels of analysis. Utilising and developing a tripartite theory of radicalisation by Bouhana and Wikström 2011, this thesis focuses on the emergence of radicalising settings. The role of so-called macro-level, or systemic, factors, which would affect the broader ecology and explain why settings propitious to radicalisation do or do not emerge in particular environments (e.g. communities) at particular times has been largely overlooked. One explanation is that such factors are rarely accessible through interviews conducted with those who commit terrorist acts. By using a relatively new methodology in the field, agent-based modelling, simulation experiments were conducted to examine the impact of collective efficacy and social disorganisation upon the emergence and maintenance of radicalisation within a setting. Systematic reviews were conducted in order to elucidate existing data for modelling parameters, while interviews with former radicals and current deradicalisation experts were carried out in order to provide new data for the model and add to a field in which this primary data is still limited. Agent-based modelling is shown to provide the field of radicalisation studies with a methodology in which to test and refine theory, scientifically examine current hypothesis and generate more by investigating potentially unexpected results from simulation experiments. This could be of great help to practitioners who seek to understand the impact of their interventions when conducting counter-radicalisation or de-radicalisation work in the future. Details: London: University College London, 2015. 241p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Shelf Number: 147912 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationDe-RadicalizationRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Exit Strategies Summary: This approach involves setting up de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes aimed at reintegrating violent extremists (de-radicalisation), or at least dissuading them from violence (disengagement). Even after the very best of prevention efforts, some individuals still go on to become (violent) extremists. While en route to that stage, they may fall under the responsibility of security services/police, and - in some cases - of judicial and prison services. However, there will (most likely) come a day when the individual - perhaps after finishing a prison sentence, or when he or she is tired of the movement or is pushed by loved ones to change - needs to be re-integrated into society. For successful re-integration into society it is important to offer de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes to prisoners charged with violent extremist offences . But "Exit" programmes should not only be offered to individuals who have faced imprisonment. Ideally, imprisonment should be prevented by offering this kind of programmes before the individual undertakes illegal activities. These programmes might therefore be targeted towards individuals in different advanced stages of the radicalisation process: from those that have strong views and legitimise the use of violence, those aligned with extremist groups but who have not yet undertaken violent extremist activities, to those that have themselves executed violent extremist or even terrorist attacks. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145563 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Family support Summary: This approach aims to support families vulnerable to and dealing with radicalisation and violent extremism. The role of families in the process or radicalisation has become central to the debate on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Many believe that one of the keys to stopping the process at an early stage lies behind the door of the family home. Proponents of this approach believe that building resilience and creating awareness for parents and other family members will mean that young people are better protected from extremist influences. In reality, families may be both helpful and harmful in radicalisation processes. A distinction should be made between families' intentions and their behaviour. Family members may sometimes do more harm than good because they are unsure how to talk to a relative who they may fear is becoming radicalised. Family members may also explicitly encourage a relative to take an extremist path, as they believe this is the right direction. Families can however also be the key to creating a safety net and be instrumental in helping someone leave an extremist movement and mind-set. Each scenario and family's involvement will be different and requires tailored solutions. Although we talk about families as a whole, the dynamics within families and the roles of each family member will impact radicalisation processes differently. It is therefore important to understand who constitutes the family? Who is part of this group or network of people that considers itself a family? This may differ quite substantially across different cultural backgrounds. Honorary culture within families might also play an important role in both directions. Once there is an understanding as to who is part of the family, dynamics between these individuals can be observed and analysed. For this to happen, a family's cooperation is of utmost importance. Without a family's commitment it will be very difficult for 'outsiders', whether police, family counsellors, social workers or other actors, to build trust and help build resilient family engagement. A family's connection to the wider environment (other families, the community they are part of, institutions) is also a crucial element in family support. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145567 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremism Family EngagementRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Feldstein, Michelle Title: Into the Fold: Evaluating Different Countries' Programs to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists Summary: Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de-radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country's efforts have emphasized different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success. This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state's level of repression affects that country's level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state's official religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious reeducation or on social re-integration. The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country's de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country's level of state repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country's de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state's religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong. Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists-as a practice and concept-is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own country context. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2015. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 23, 2017 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 145667 Keywords: De-radicalizationIslamist TerroristMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Christensen, Tina Wilchen Title: A Question of Participation -- Disengagement from the Extremist Right. A Case study from Sweden Summary: The thesis consists of a collection of six articles: Tina Wilchen Christensen (2014) 'To Study the Significance of Social Interaction for Former Right-wing Extremists Wanting to Disengage: Doing Participant Observation and Qualitative Interviews' in SAGE Research Methods Cases Chapter, http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/methods-case-studies- 2014/n140.xml Tina Wilchen Christensen (2015) 'The Challenge of Researching neo-Nazis Struggling to Leave the White Power Movement' in Deuchar, Ross and Bhopal, Kalwant, (eds.) The complexities and dilemmas of researching marginalised groups, Routledge Tina Wilchen Christensen (2015) 'Tidligere ekstremisters erfaring som nyttig viden - at losrive sig fra en ekstremistisk gruppe er en kompliceret affaer’ in Social Kritik, Tidsskrift for social analyse & debat nr. 142 - juni 2015 and an a English version; ’How Extremist Experiences become Valuable Knowledge in EXIT Programmes’ in Journal for Deradicalisation Summer/15, no. 3 http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/18 Tina Wilchen Christensen (2015) 'When Good Intentions are not Enough - A Successful Mentor-Mentee Relation requires a Deliberate Practice' in Psyke & Logos (1) Tina Wilchen Christensen (2014) 'Eine schwarz-weiße Weltanschauung durch Grautöne ergänzen Wie ehemalige Rechtsextremisten durch Vorbilder und soziale Unterstützung zum Wandel ihrer Identität angeregt werden können' Translate from 'Adding a Grey Tone to a Black and White World View – How Role Models and Social Encouragement can lead Former Right-Wing Extremists to Transform Their Identity' in Rieker, Peter (eds.) Hilfe zum Ausstieg? Ansätze und Erfahrungen professioneller Angebote zum Ausstieg aus rechtsextremen Szenen, Weinheim/Basel: Beltz Juventa, Weinheim/Basel. Tina Wilchen Christensen (2015) 'The Continuous Struggle of Becoming…Somebody - Former Right-Wing Extremists' continued Process of Selftransformation and social re-positioning after an exit programme' (unpublished) Details: Roskilde: Roskilde Universitet. 2015. 301p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 23, 2017 at: http://forskning.ruc.dk/site/files/56384428/twc_fin_ny.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Sweden URL: http://forskning.ruc.dk/site/files/56384428/twc_fin_ny.pdf Shelf Number: 145743 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremist Groups Extremist Violence Radical Groups Radicalization |
Author: Young, Holly F. Title: A Review of Literature on Radicalisation: and What it Means for TERRA Summary: TERRA is funded by the European Commission Directorate General of Home Affairs, and undertaken by Impact (the Netherlands), the Network of Associations of Aid to Victims of Terrorism (NAVT) and the Association of Aid to Victims of March 11 (Spain). It aims to support prevention and de-radicalisation through producing tools which can be used by professionals, such as for example police workers, teachers, or religious leaders, whose work brings them into contact with vulnerable groups or individuals. The literature review, an initial phase in the TERRA research, is described in this report. After a brief introduction of TERRA, its goals and aims, the methodology section describes how Impact researchers developed search terms and carried out a literature search. Terms relating to radicalisation and terrorism are defined according to current literature. Various authors have attempted to formulate a model to express the process of radicalisation, and these models are explored. The decision of TERRA researchers to used Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism model as the basis for its research is discussed. Finally, some initial recommendations for TERRA's follow up research, and for its target groups are derived from the literature Details: Diemen, The Netherlands: TERRA (Terrorism and Radicalisation), 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2017 at: http://www.terra-net.eu/files/publications/20140227160036Literature%20review%20incl%20cover%20in%20color.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.terra-net.eu/files/publications/20140227160036Literature%20review%20incl%20cover%20in%20color.pdf Shelf Number: 146252 Keywords: De-RadicalizationExtremist Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremist Violent Radicalism |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption Summary: Terrorists and extremists are increasingly moving their activities online - and areas of the web have become a safe haven for Islamic State to plot its next attacks, according to a report published today by the Henry Jackson Society. Terror in The Dark: How Terrorists use Encryption, the Darknet and Cryptocurrencies shows how those planning to commit terrorist atrocities are using extremist networks on the 'Darknet' to indoctrinate sympathisers, create a reservoir of propaganda, evade detection and fundraise. It calls for urgent action by government and the policing and security services to step up intelligence gathering and action to counter online extremist activity. The report shows how terrorists are: Using encrypted apps such as Telegram to hide, communicate and plan attacks. Drawing interested sympathisers from the 'surface' world of the web into the Darknet in order to recruit and indoctrinate new supporters. Building up reservoirs of propaganda - saving it from deletion by the security services or tech companies and removing it as potential evidence for use by law enforcement. Using cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin to fundraise, taking advantage of the anonymity they offer. Following the five terror attacks on British soil in 2017, the Government has dedicated more time and funds to the combating of online extremism. However, the report makes a strong case for more attention to be paid to the Darknet, as terrorists mask their actions and intentions unchallenged on a currently anarchic platform. The report recommends: That tech companies should create a self-regulatory system to remove and audit extremist content - and release public annual reports outlining their efforts, including stats on content flagged by users, the outcome of companies' investigations and areas for improvement. That there should be a new internet regulatory body appointed by government, with the role of scrutinising tech companies' efforts to remove extremist content - with the potential for fines if companies consistently fail to take down offending material. More resources for the Joint Terrorism Action Centre to build up intelligence on the Darknet. Social media companies should work with law enforcement to ensure that extremist material is not lost when it is deleted, but is archived - to ensure that we understand extremists' patterns of behaviour online and retain evidence. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Shelf Number: 149759 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDark NetDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |