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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:00 pm
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Results for drug smuggling
15 results foundAuthor: Donati, Sandro Title: Dossier Colombia: Production and Smuggling of Cocaine Summary: This report on the production and smuggling of cocaine in Colombia calls into question the success of Plan Colombia. It does this by comparing figures and statistics offered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes with those of other field researchers. Details: Turin, Italy: Flare, 2009. 16p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 116488 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug SmugglingDrug TraffickingPlan Colombia |
Author: Jensema, Ernestien Title: A Matter of Substance: Fighting Drug Trafficking With a Substance-Oriented Approach Summary: This paper discusses the “substance-oriented approach” Dutch authorities implemented to to scare off potential small-scale cocaine smugglers. The focus was on the drugs, rather than the couriers, and on incapacitating the smuggling route, rather than deterrence by incarceration. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2010. 12p. Source: Internet Resource; Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, No. 7 Year: 2010 Country: Netherlands URL: Shelf Number: 119437 Keywords: Drug Policy (Netherlands)Drug SmugglingDrug Trafficking |
Author: Bateman, Sam Title: Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia Summary: This policy paper examines the threats to good order at sea in Southeast Asia . Threats to good order include piracy and armed robbery against ships, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking in drugs and arms, people smuggling, pollution, illegal fishing and marine natural hazards. This paper reviews the current situation and makes recommendations for non-governmental actions that would enhance cooperation in addressing the problem. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Policy Paper: Accessed August 20, 2010 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Shelf Number: 119644 Keywords: Drug SmugglingHuman SmugglingIllegal FishingIllicit TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOffenses Against the EnvironmentPiratesWildlife Crime |
Author: Tanner, Murray Scot Title: China Confronts Afghan Drugs: Law Enforcement Views of “The Golden Crescent” Summary: The rising flow of illegal drugs from the “Golden Crescent” region—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran — into western China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has caused increasing concern to Chinese law enforcement officials and analysts. This study seeks to strengthen understanding of Chinese law enforcement perceptions of the Golden Crescent drug problem by making use of previously underexploited Chinese law enforcement publications. Key Findings include the following: • Chinese law enforcement officials and analysts now see Golden Crescent trafficking as a major and rapidly growing threat to society. This view reflects a major shift from China’s earlier exclusive focus on the “Golden Triangle” region drug threat. • Chinese law enforcement analysts blame the rise in Golden Crescent drug smuggling on the increase in foreign supply rather than Chinese demand. These analyses tend to understate Chinese domestic problems, such as police corruption, ethnic tensions, and rising drug prices and demand, which may have made China a more attractive drug shipping route. • Chinese analyses of popular Golden Crescent smuggling routes emphasize highway, air, and rail routes through Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. If correct, these analyses indicate that these four important security partners of Beijing may be failing to prevent trafficking into China across their territory. • The Chinese law enforcement writings reviewed indicate that China has serious weaknesses in its counternarcotics intelligence capabilities and is anxious to overcome them. Problems include meager clandestine intelligence on Asian drug networks, weak data on trafficking by ethnic separatists, and poor intelligence networking and sharing across jurisdictions. • Increasingly sophisticated trafficker techniques coupled with greater linguistic diversity among traffickers are frustrating Chinese law enforcement officials, who find these traffickers more difficult to investigate, detect, and interrogate. • Even though law enforcement analysts confidently assert a significant link between terrorism and drug trafficking, sources reviewed for this study provide very little solid evidence that the two are connected. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2011. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/China%20Confronts%20Afghan%20Drugs...%20D0024793.A1_1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Asia URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/China%20Confronts%20Afghan%20Drugs...%20D0024793.A1_1.pdf Shelf Number: 122784 Keywords: Drug SmugglingDrug Trafficking (China)Drug Trafficking EnforcementDrugs |
Author: Yeh, Brian T. Title: Drug Offenses: Maximum Fines and Terms of Imprisonment for Violation of the Federal Controlled Substances Act and Related Laws Summary: This is a chart of the maximum fines and terms of imprisonment that may be imposed as a consequence of conviction for violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and other drug supply and drug demand related laws. It lists the penalties for: heroin, cocaine, crack, PCP, LSD, marihuana (marijuana), amphetamine, methamphetamine, listed (precursor) chemicals, paraphernalia, date rape drugs, rave drugs, designer drugs, ecstasy, drug kingpins, as well as the other substances including narcotics and opiates assigned to Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III, Schedule IV, and Schedule V of the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (Title II and Title III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act). Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: RL30722: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30722.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30722.pdf Shelf Number: 123561 Keywords: Drug OffendersDrug OffensesDrug SmugglingDrug TraffickingFinesImprisonmentPunishment |
Author: Lichtenwald, Terrance G. Title: Smuggling Multi-Consignment Contraband: Isolated Incidents or a New Trend? Summary: The study included an extensive literature review and a number of scholarly articles, books, national and international government documents, and newspaper stories. Web crawlers ran 24 hours a day every day between the years 2004 through 2009, with all possible MCC combinations being searched for (i.e., drugs, guns, jewels, nuclear weapons, cigarettes, wildlife, immigrants, human trafficking, etc.), and located key words identifying MCC incidents. This study found 16 documented cases of smugglers transporting more than one type of contraband in the same shipment. MCC shipments were frequently associated with Phase II and III smuggling organizations. MCC is occurring by land, air, and sea. A number of cases were identified where a smuggler or smuggling organization had smuggled more than one type of contraband but not in the same shipment. There were two incidents of a smuggler using multiple contrabands as a Trojan horse. There was one incident of a weapons smuggler assisting what he believed was a terrorist group involved in drug production and smuggling, with purchasing one hundred Igla surface-to-air missiles, armor-piercing rocket launchers, and combat helicopters. There was one finding of a smuggling organization having an armory that included a light anti-tank weapon. Details: Springfield, MO: Inside Homeland Security, Summer 2009. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2012 at http://www.all-about-forensic-science.com/support-files/smuggling.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.all-about-forensic-science.com/support-files/smuggling.pdf Shelf Number: 123974 Keywords: Alien SmugglingDrug SmugglingHuman TraffickingTrafficking of Nuclear Materials |
Author: Winter, Brian Title: Brazil's 'Gringo' Problem: Its Borders Summary: For the first 500 years of Brazil's history, pretty much anything that wanted to cross its borders could do so in relative peace, whether cattle, Indians or intrepid explorers. That era is now drawing to a close. Brazil's economic rise is forcing it to deal with a problem it long regarded as the sole concern of rich countries like the United States: the need to secure its borders and slow down a flood of drugs, illegal immigrants and other contraband. Brazil's prosperity has created a new consumer class of tens of millions of people who happen to live right next to the world's three biggest producers of cocaine: Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Brazil is now the world's No. 2 cocaine consumer, behind only the United States, according to U.S. government data. It is also a booming consumer of marijuana, ecstasy, and other narcotics. Details: New York: Thomson Reuters, 2012. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2012 at: http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/04/BrazilBorders.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/04/BrazilBorders.pdf Shelf Number: 125150 Keywords: Border SecurityCocaineDrug SmugglingDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal Immigrants (Brazil)Immigration |
Author: Bjerk, David Title: The Market for Mules: Risk and Compensation of Cross-Border Drug Couriers Summary: This paper uses a unique dataset to shed light on the economics of cross-border drug smuggling. Our results reveal that loads are generally quite large (mean 56 Kg) and of high wholesale value (mean $73,348). We also find that mule compensation is substantial (mean $1,601), and most interestingly, that mules appear to be paid compensating wage differentials for loads that carry a higher sentencing risk if detected and for loads that carry an arguably higher likelihood of detection. This suggests that this underground and unregulated labor market generally acts like a competitive labor market, with an equilibrium in which risk-sensitive, reasonably well informed workers are compensated for taking on higher risk tasks. Details: Unpublished Paper, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881212 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881212 Shelf Number: 126660 Keywords: Drug CouriersDrug SmugglingDrug TraffickingUnderground Markets |
Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs Title: Cannabis Production and Markets in Europe Summary: This study brings together available evidence to provide a comprehensive analysis of cannabis production and markets across the EU. It combines information from EMCDDA routine reporting — data on patterns of prevalence and use, seizures, police reports, drug-law offences, cannabis potency and retail market prices — with literature on cannabis markets to create an in-depth analysis of the issue in a European context. The analysis presented in this volume covers, as far as possible, the 30 countries that participate in the EMCDDA’s reporting system. That is the 27 EU Member States, Croatia, Turkey and Norway. The information reviewed is based on a number of sources and methodologies. We list below the main sources and data used as a basis for the analysis, and more detailed methodological notes are provided throughout the text. Some of the data used in this report are derived from the EMCDDA’s routine monitoring, based on its Reitox network of national focal points. Data on prevalence and patterns of drug use, drug seizures, police reports of drug law offences, cannabis potency and retail prices are part of the quantitative data sets submitted by reporting countries on an annual basis. Quantitative data are routinely analysed and made available in the online Statistical bulletin (EMCDDA, 2011b), but more in-depth analyses were carried out for this publication. In addition, the EMCDDA’s routine monitoring includes a national narrative report providing an overview of the drug phenomenon and, among other issues, information on drug supply and drug trafficking, drug laws and sentencing practices. Legal texts held in the European Legal Database on Drugs (ELDD) and an ad hoc consultation of the legal correspondents network that informs the database were also used as sources of information for this report. In addition, two independent studies were carried out to obtain more detailed data and other information on specific aspects of cannabis production and markets in Europe. The issue of market shares of different cannabis products was a focus of both of these exercises. First, the national focal points, within the context of a Selected issue data collection exercise (Reitox national focal points, 2009), provided an overview of cannabis production (brief history, plantations seized, ‘grow shops’), distribution of cannabis at national level (structure and actors, wholesale prices, retail outlets, transaction sizes) and cannabis supply reduction responses (law enforcement activities, cannabis seizures, cannabis offences). These national contributions result from an analysis of different sources, including quantitative data, targeted studies, research, expert opinions and information from operational actors such as law enforcement. Second, the EMCDDA commissioned a study (Costes et al., 2009) to provide an overview of cannabis production methods (covering topics such as materials and costs) and typologies of growers, and of cannabis flows and trafficking routes to and within Europe. The authors carried out a survey based on key informants drawn from across Europe as part of this exercise. This report is also informed by an extensive review of the literature, which took in both scientific papers published in peer-reviewed journals and the ‘grey literature’ 16 (including reports from international organisations). For a number of the issues addressed in this report, the literature served as the only information source or as a complement. Analysis of the literature proved to be key in areas where standardised data collections are relatively rare, in particular on the botany of cannabis and on the production of cannabis both outside and within Europe. Chapter 1 reviews the origins of cannabis and its diffusion. Consideration is given to the morphology and anatomy of this interesting plant — which can be characterised by its extreme natural variation. This is accompanied by an analysis of production issues, including cultivation and processing for consumption. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the source countries for the cannabis imported into Europe. It includes a critical review of the considerable, and arguably insurmountable, challenges associated with estimating global cannabis production. The chapter focuses mainly on cannabis production in, and exportation to Europe from, the five regions and countries (the ‘big five’) most often mentioned as a source: North Africa (Morocco), south-west Asia (Afghanistan), the Balkans (Albania), the Middle East (Lebanon) and sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa). Chapter 3 is dedicated to cannabis production in Europe. Starting with the historical context, including the substitution of imported resin by domestically produced herb in some countries, it then reviews available evidence of the extent and type of cannabis cultivation across Europe. A typology of cannabis growers and their motivations is discussed. Distribution, either social or commercial, is addressed, and an analysis of issues related to transactions and prices is presented. Cannabinoid contents, and in particular tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), are addressed in Chapter 4, as are issues affecting the sampling and quantitative analysis of THC in cannabis products. This is followed by a review of the data available on cannabis potency in Europe. Chapter 5 focuses on cannabis consumption. Starting with an overview of the situation and trends in cannabis use in Europe, it then reviews the results of the few studies that have estimated the size of the market for cannabis in Europe. It ends with an analysis of the market shares at consumer level of cannabis herb and cannabis resin across Europe. Differences in the legislations controlling cannabis cultivation and supply in Europe are discussed in Chapter 6, which also provides an analysis of data on cannabis offences reported by law enforcement, and of cannabis seizures across Europe. The chapter ends with a brief overview of the strategies and tactics employed by law enforcement in their fight against cannabis cultivation and cannabis trafficking in Europe. Details: Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2012. 274p. Source: Internet Resource: EMCDDA Insights Series No 12; Accessed November 9, 2012 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/insights/cannabis-market Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/insights/cannabis-market Shelf Number: 126911 Keywords: CannabisDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug Markets (Europe)Drug OffendersDrug SmugglingMarijuana |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct. There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border. CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity. CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations). However, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents. Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process. CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a strategy, but CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy. Moreover, he stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority for overseeing all integrity-related activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-59: Accessed February 21, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf Shelf Number: 127690 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Customs OfficialsDrug SmugglingEmployee CorruptionEmployee MisconductHuman Smuggling |
Author: Frontex Title: Annual Risk Analysis 2013 Summary: Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU’s external borders dropped sharply in 2012 to about 73 000, i.e. half the number reported in 2011. This was the first time since systematic data collection began in 2008 that annual detections have plunged under 100 000. In the Central Mediterranean area, the large number of detections in 2011, which suddenly increased following the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Libya, had been significantly reduced by the end of 2011. However, throughout 2012, detections steadily increased and by the end of the year they totalled more than 10 300. Starting from 2008, considerable numbers of migrants had been detected crossing illegally the border between Turkey and Greece, along the so-called Eastern Mediterranean route. The situation changed dramatically in August 2012 when the Greek authorities mobilised unprecedented resources at their land border with Turkey, including the deployment of 1 800 additional Greek police officers. The number of detected illegal border-crossings rapidly dropped from about 2 000 in the first week of August to below 10 per week in October 2012. The enhanced controls along the Greek-Turkish land border led to a moderate increase in detections of illegal border-crossing in the Aegean Sea and at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey, but simultaneous mitigation efforts in Turkey and Bulgaria have so far contained the displacements. There remains the risk of resurgence of irregular migration, since many migrants may be waiting for the conclusion of the Greek operations before they continue their journey towards Europe. Many migrants who cross the border illegally to Greece move on to other Member States, mostly through the land route across the Western Balkans. Contrary to the decrease at the Greek-Turkish land border, there was no decrease in detections of illegal border- crossing on the Western Balkan route (6 390, +37%). In 2012, in the Western Mediterranean area between North Africa and Spain, detections of illegal border-crossing decreased by nearly a quarter compared to 2011 but remained above the levels recorded in previous years (6 400, -24%). In 2012, Afghans remained the most detected nationality for illegal border-crossing at EU level, but their number considerably dropped compared to 2011. Syrians stand out, with large increases in detections of illegal bordercrossing and for using fraudulent documents compared to 2011. Most of the detected Syrians applied for asylum in the EU, fleeing the civil war in their country. There were large increases in refusals of entry at the Polish land border with Belarus and Ukraine. However, these increases were offset by a decrease in refusals of entry issued at other border sections, resulting in a stable total at EU level compared to 2011 (-3%, 115 000 refusals of entry). Detections of illegal stayers, which totalled about 350 000 in the EU in 2012, have shown a stable but slightly declining long-term trend since 2008. Most migrants detected illegally staying in the EU were from Afghanistan and Morocco. Despite a short-term increase of 10% between 2011 and 2012, the overall trend of detections of facilitators of irregular migration has been falling since 2008, totalling about 7 700 in 2012. This long-term decline may be in part due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels (such as overstaying, abuse of visa-free regime, etc.) and document fraud, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously. In 2012, there were around 8 000 detections of migrants using fraudulent documents to enter the EU or Schengen area illegally. Preliminary data on asylum applications in 2012 indicate an overall increase of about 7% compared to the previous year. While Afghans continue to account for the largest share of applications, much of the increase was due to an increasing number of applications submitted by Syrian nationals. The number of asylum applications submitted in the EU by Western Balkan citizens, mostly those from Serbia, remained unabated in 2012. Consequently, following the implementation of the visa facilitation agreement with five Western Balkan countries that started at the end of 2009, there are now discussions in the EU about the possible reintroduction of the visa regime. In 2012, there was a steady trend of about 160 000 third-country nationals effectively returned to third countries. Greece reported the largest number of returns of a single nationality (Albanians), and effective returns in Greece increased markedly in the last quarter of 2012 following the launch of the Xenios Zeus operation. Looking ahead, the assessment of risks along the EU’s external borders shows that despite a sharp reduction in detections between 2011 and 2012, the risks associated with illegal border- crossing along the land and sea external borders remain among the highest, in particular in the southern section of the border of the EU. The risk of illegal border-crossing along the land borders of the Eastern Mediterranean route, including the Greek and Bulgarian land border with Turkey, is assessed amongst the highest. This comes after several years of large numbers of migrants detected at the Greek land border with Turkey. Although the flow abruptly stopped in August 2012, there are reports of uncertainties related to the sustainability of the efforts and growing evidence that migrants are waiting in Turkey for the end of the operation. Increases at the neighbouring sea border (Aegean Sea), at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey and increases in detections of document fraud from Istanbul airports, although so far relatively small, indicate that alternatives to the Greek land border are being explored by facilitators. Many of the migrants who crossed illegally through the Eastern Mediterranean route are expected to continue making secondary movements across the Western Balkans and within the EU. The risk of illegal border-crossing across the Central Mediterranean area was also assessed amongst the highest due the continued volatile situation in countries of departure in North Africa. Crisis situations are still likely to arise at the southern border with thousands of people trying to cross the border illegally in the span of several weeks or months. Past experiences also show that these crises take their toll on human lives, and are very difficult to predict and quell without a coordinated response. Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU. These risks are also common to nearly all Member States, as they are associated with passenger flows and border checks, which are a specific expertise of bordercontrol authorities. Fraud is expected mostly among EU travel documents (e.g. passports, visas and ID cards). False pretence or deception is used to obtain a wide range of documents. The most common technique is to use fraudulent documents to obtain short-term visas. Most risks associated with the abuse of legal channels are assessed as high as they are common and widely spread phenomena. Based on currently available information, the risks associated with cross-border criminality are assessed as moderate, including the risks of trafficking in human beings, terrorism, smuggling of illicit drugs and exit of stolen vehicles. Details: Warsaw, Poland: Frontex, 2013. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 128911 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityDrug SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrationRisk Assessment (Europe)Stolen Vehicles |
Author: World Customs Organization Title: Illicit Trade Report: 2012 Summary: Illicit trade involves money, goods or value gained from illegal and otherwise unethical activity. It encompasses a variety of illegal trading activities, including human trafficking, environmental crime, illegal trade in natural resources, intellectual property infringements, trade in certain substances that cause health or safety risks, smuggling of excisable goods, trade in illegal drugs, and a variety of illicit financial flows. These activities cause a wide range of economic, social, environmental or political damage. Estimates of the global retail value of illicit trade vary, but recent estimates by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) place the total at US$ 650 billion for goods, and at US$ 2 trillion if illicit financial flows are included1. Customs administrations address risk wherever it is found and, increasingly, as early in the supply chain as possible. The WCO, through its Customs Enforcement Network (CEN), has been recording Customs seizures worldwide to allow tracking and analysis of the latest trends and patterns in relation to illicit trade. These recorded seizures do not only contribute to better knowledge about current smuggling and cross-border criminal activities but also reveal important information about evolving or emerging risks in the international Customs context. The WCO Illicit Trade Report comprises six chapters. Each chapter is dedicated to a single thematic area : Drugs, Revenue, IPR/Health and Safety, Environment, Security and the Customs Enforcement Network. The commentary on each of these outlines our programmes, activities undertaken within the programmes and key observations associated with those activities. Details: World Customs Organization, 2013. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.cites.org/fb/2013/wco_illicit_trade_report_2012.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cites.org/fb/2013/wco_illicit_trade_report_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 129664 Keywords: Alcohol SmugglingCommercial FraudDrug SmugglingIllicit Trade (International)Tobacco SmugglingTrafficking in Cultural GoodsWildlife Crime |
Author: Caulkins, Jonathan P. Title: After the Grand Fracture: Scenarios for the Collapse of the International Drug Control Regime Summary: Key Findings - Decriminalizing the possession of amounts of marijuana suitable for personal use has minimal repercussions beyond a nation's borders. But even one country's legalization of a commercial cocaine or heroin industry would affect global markets. - International prohibitions against cocaine and heroin create asymmetries. Production and transshipment concentrate in relatively few places that bear the bulk of the negative externalities created by the illegal production and international trade. - The impact of negative externalities has led to calls for altering the United Nations treaty framework and for individual nations to legalize outside of the existing framework. - Legalization of production in one country would attract productive activities (with their associated externalities) from the remaining illicit producers. This incentivizes current producing countries to encourage others to take the first step. - Legalization of transshipment in one country would attract transportation activities from existing jurisdictions where drugs remain illegal since it would reduce the need for traffickers to assume the risk of covert shipments or armed guards. - The impact of legalized transshipment of cocaine is different for the United States and for other regions of the world. As the United States shares a large porous border with Mexico, current covert smuggling networks would continue to operate. Transshipment to Europe and Asia would take place through regular trade routes, principally containers, given the distances involved. - If a European or Asian state with large porous land borders were to legalize transshipment, it would attract the bulk of cocaine transported to their region, producing covert smuggling networks similar to those currently existing on the U.S.-Mexico border. Details: Washington, DC: Brooking Institute, 2015. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Caulkinsfinal.pdf?la=en Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Caulkinsfinal.pdf?la=en Shelf Number: 135752 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug Control PolicyDrug LegalizationDrug SmugglingDrug Trafficking |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: The Afghan Opiate Trade and Africa - A Baseline Assessment Summary: This report presents a "Baseline Assessment" of the illicit Afghan opiate trafficking situation in Africa, with a focus on heroin trafficking along the southern route out of Afghanistan into, through and from Africa. The main objective of this report is to provide an initial evidence base to support policymakers and law enforcement officials in evaluating the trafficking of Afghan opiates into and across the continent, and to allow the development of effective responses to the issue. While Africa has traditionally been perceived as a transit region for heroin and other drugs moving to destination markets in Europe, North America and Asia, drug trafficking and organized crime is increasingly posing a multifaceted challenge to health, the rule of law and development within the continent itself. Eastern Africa faces many challenges. Natural disasters and civil war, recurrent food shortages and droughts have left many of the region's 180 million people struggling under extreme poverty, and this has been exacerbated by corruption and poor governance. Eastern Africa is increasingly becoming a major landing point for heroin shipped from Afghanistan to Africa via the Indian Ocean. However, despite this increase in maritime smuggling, seizure rates of opiate within Eastern Africa remain low. In Western Africa, drug trafficking, notably via air couriers, has been going on for decades with trafficking networks making extensive use of established courier networks to move drugs, both heroin and cocaine, towards destination markets. This is one of the poorest regions in the world, and in many of the countries in this region governance and law enforcement continues to face challenges as a result of a lack of resources, making the region vulnerable to organised crime. These factors, combined with West Africa's geographic location along major and well established trafficking routes between, for example, South America and Europe, make it attractive to organized crime. Northern Africa appears to be somewhat of an outlier in this analysis of the opiate trade in the African continent, possibly due to being separate from wider drug trafficking trends seen in sub-Saharan Africa, and as a result of being mainly supplied by a sub-section of the Balkan route rather than the southern route. Heroin seizures in Northern Africa are limited and drug addiction rates are generally low. Knowledge of the current drug trafficking picture in Southern Africa is limited. A lack of heroin seizure, purity and consumption data is notable across the region, largely due to a lack of law enforcement capacity and poor data collection processes. While Mozambique and South Africa are known to be major transshipment countries for Afghan opiates, the broader picture of how this affects Southern Africa remains largely unknown. There remains a risk that traffickers will exploit limited law enforcement capacity in Southern Africa, leading to increasing drug trafficking and use, which in turn will further inhibit economic and social development within the region. Comprehensive data on the prices of opiates throughout Africa is currently unavailable. Although heroin commands a reasonably high price in parts of Africa, greater profits can generally be made in other destination markets and it is likely that prices of heroin in Africa remain significantly lower than in other international markets. There is limited data on the purity of heroin trafficked into, through and out of Africa, and there is no evidence to suggest that heroin is produced in Africa itself. Globally, Africa is estimated to be home to 11 per cent of global opiate users and of this 11 per cent of users living in Africa, more than 50 per cent live in Western and Central Africa. While cannabis remains the number one illicit drug used both on the continent and globally, and the only drug produced in Africa for export in large quantities, heroin appears to be becoming more popular in some areas, particularly in Eastern Africa. Synthetic opiates such as Tramadol are also used in Africa and use of such opiates may lead to the use of Afghan opiates, should market conditions for heroin change. Use of Afghan-sourced heroin has wider public health impacts in Africa, including on transmission rates of HIV and Hepatitis C, although data on this area remains limited. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2016. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opiate_trade_Africa_2016_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opiate_trade_Africa_2016_web.pdf Shelf Number: 138840 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug SmugglingDrug TraffickingHeroinMaritime CrimeOpiumOrganized Crime |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Afghanistan Affectations: How to Break Political-Criminal Alliances in Contexts of Transition Summary: The case of Afghanistan analyzes how counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction dynamics have interacted with the generalized predatory criminality in Afghanistan and how the latter became the crux of Afghanistan's dire and fragile predicament. The transition choices by the Afghan government and the international community, particularly the embrace of problematic warlords for the sake of short-term military battlefield advantages and as tools of political cooptation, shaped and reinforced criminality and corruption in post-2001 Afghanistan and thus delegitimized the post-Taliban political dispensation. The analysis identifies four possible inflection points where the international community and the Afghan government could have fundamentally altered the course after the initial choices of the informal distribution of power and its connections to criminality were made in 2001. These four possible inflection points provided opportunities for tackling corruption and criminality in order to limit power abuse and strengthen the rule of law and political inclusiveness-namely: (1) the 2004 disarmament effort; (2) the beginning of the Obama administration and its surge of resources in Afghanistan; (3) the 2014 formation of the NUG whose two protagonists crucially campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; and (4) the 2015 missed opportunity to react resolutely to the Taliban's takeover of Kunduz City. But the international community and the Afghan government failed to take advantage of these possible inflection points. Or to the extent that they tried, such as during the first two years of the Obama administration, other strategic directives, timelines, and imperatives interfered with them and directly contradicted them. Thus, the anti-corruption and anti-criminality efforts were not underpinned by political heft and power, such as cutting off aid to or otherwise sanctioning particular powerbrokers. Hence pernicious individual powerbrokers and the political system quickly learned how to ride the anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts, further delegitimizing the system and enabling a significant intensification of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan. No doubt, the Taliban itself has become deeply involved in all kinds of illicit economies, including drugs, timber, and gems. This involvement has grown over time despite the fact that since its inception in 1994 and as a product of the brutality and chaos of the 1990s civil war, the Taliban defined its purpose as improving governance in Afghanistan and acting against the rampant criminality that swept the country. Indeed, during the administration of President George W. Bush, it was the Taliban's involvement in the drug economy that received most international attention out of all the illicit economies, corruption, and predatory criminality that went on in Afghanistan. Yet the counternarcotics policies which were chosen both failed to accomplish their stated goal of bankrupting the Taliban and turned out to be highly counterproductive. Far from delegitimizing the Taliban in the eyes of local populations as a mere cartel or as narco-guerrillas, efforts to eradicate opium poppy cultivation as well as particular designs of drug interdiction allowed the Taliban to present itself a protector of people's livelihoods and thereby to obtain significant political capital. Thus, the international community mounted the most intense efforts precisely against the wrong type of illicit economy and criminality: the labor-intensive poppy cultivation that underpins much of the country's economic growth and provides elemental livelihoods and human security to vast segments of the rural population. Instead, the anti-crime efforts should have focused on the predatory criminality and non-labor intensive aspects of transactional crimes, such as drug smuggling. The Obama administration at least defunded eradication, but its efforts against predatory crime ultimately proved unsatisfactory. Its efforts against predatory criminality were held hostage to the administration's own strategic decision to define the mission there as principally one of limited couterterrorism and to de-emphasize state-building and also to impose restrictive and counterproductive timeliness on U.S. assistance, particularly military, efforts. Thus, from the very beginning of the U.S. intervention, when there was the largest window of opportunity to embrace Afghan aspirations for good governance and shape the outcome, and throughout 2014 when the number of U.S. troops in Aghanistan was radically reduced, Washington neglected to commit itself to rebuilding Afghanistan in the right way. And earlier inflection point that perhaps could have countered the basic mis-governance trends in the country and the rise of predatory criminality was in 2004 when the first disarmament effort was undertaken. However, that opportunity was missed, with most of the crucial warlords not fully and sufficiently disarmed. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime-Conflict Nexus Series: No 8: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2442/Afghanistan-Affectations-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2442/Afghanistan-Affectations-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf Shelf Number: 146319 Keywords: Crime-Conflict NexusDrug SmugglingDrug WarlordsIllegal EconomiesIllicit DrugsIllicit EconomiesOpiumPolitical Corruption |