Date: November 22, 2024 Fri

Time: 11:30 am

Results for drug trafficking

521 results found

Author: Golunov, Sergey Title: Drug Trafficking as a Challenge for Russia's Security and Border Policies Summary: This report discusses issues of trans-boundary drug-trafficking through Russia's post-Soviet borders. Details: Budapest: International Policy Fellowship Program, Open Society Institute, 2006 Source: Year: 2006 Country: Russia URL: Shelf Number: 117288 Keywords: Drug Trafficking International Crime

Author: Wyler, Liana Sun Title: Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy. Summary: Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent years has increasingly become a locus for drug trafficking, particularly cocaine. This report examines the growth in the drug trafficking through Africa and the implications for the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009 Source: Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 117322 Keywords: Africa Drug Trafficking

Author: Zaluar, Alba Title: Violence Related to Illegal Drugs, "Easy Money" and Justice in Brazil: 1980-1995. Summary: The aim of this paper is to understand the connections between poverty and drug traffic, specifying the different economic, social and institutional devices and changes that affect the matter in question. It is based on primary data from several fieldwork researches as well as data obtained from official sources in Brazil - the Ministry of Health, the Police and the Judiciary. Details: Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, MOST Programme, 1999 Source: Discussion Paper Series - No. 35 Year: 1999 Country: Brazil URL: Shelf Number: 117333 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Poverty Violence

Author: Cockayne, James Title: The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking Through West Africa Summary: An invisible tide is rising on the shores of West Africa, creeping into its slums, its banks, its courts, its barracks, and its government ministries. It is a tide of money, influence, and power, born from the drug trafficking that is sweeping the region. This paper explains what the risks are, and recommends steps that policymakers in national capitals and multilateral institutions might take to address them in the next three to five year. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2009 Source: Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116520 Keywords: Africa Drug Trafficking

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Addiction, Crime and Insurgency the Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium Summary: This report looks at multiple consequences of Afghan drugs as they move through neighboring states, along the Balkan and Eurasian routes, ending up in Europe, the Russian Federation, even China and India. This analysis intends to aid the international community appreciate the inter-connected nature of the world community and the Afghan drug trade. This is pursued utilizing three main points related to the drug chain: 1) assistance to farmers to reduce supply 2) drug prevention and treatment to curb demand, and 3) law enforcement against intermediaries. Details: Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009 Source: Year: 2009 Country: Austria URL: Shelf Number: 116654 Keywords: Afghanistan Drug Trafficking International Crime Opiates

Author: Goodhand, Jonathan Title: Bandits, Borderlands and Opium Wars: Afghan State-building Viewed from the Margins Summary: This paper explores the linkages between the drugs economy, borderlands and 'post conflict' state building in Afghanistan. It does this through an historical analysis of Sheghnan, a remote district of the Afghan-Tajik border in the north-east. The paper charts the opening and closing of the border; the movement of people, commodities and ideas across the border; the effects of changing political regimes; the role of resources and their effects on local governance; and the complex, multifacted networks that span the border and are involved in the drugs trade. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009 Source: DIIS Working Paper 2009:26 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 117632 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control

Author: Queensland. Crime and Misconduct Commission Title: Illicit Drug Markets in Queensland: A Strategic Assessment Summary: This strategic intelligence assessment presents a market-based analysis of the risk posed by illicit drug markets in Queensland, with a particular focus on organised criminal involvement in those markets. Details: Brisbane: Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2010. 92p. Source: Crime Bulletin Series; No. 12 Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 117699 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Organized Crime

Author: Navarrete-Frias, Carolina Title: Illegal Drugs and Human Rights of Peasants and Indigenous Communities: The Case of Colombia Summary: This study analyses the problem of illegal drugs and human rights abuses in Colombia, paying special attention to the effects of the illegal drugs industry on indigenous and peasant communities and to their responses to the industry's development. Details: Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2005. 49p. Source: Management of Social Transformations; Policy Papers No. 15 Year: 2005 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 116260 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Rights Indigenous Peoples

Author: Navarrete-Frias, Carolina Title: Illegal drugs and Human Rights of Peasants and Indigenous Communities: The Case of Bolivia Summary: This study analyses the problem of illegal drugs and human rights abuses in Bolivia, paying special attention to the effects of the illegal drugs industry on indigenous and peasant communities and to their responses to the industry's development. Details: Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2005. 46p. Source: Management of Social Transformations; Policy Papers No. 14 Year: 2005 Country: Bolivia URL: Shelf Number: 116259 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Rights Indigenous Peoples

Author: Navarrete-Frias, Carolina Title: Illegal Drugs and Human Rights of Peasants and Indigenous Communities: The Case of Peru Summary: This paper analyses the problem of illegal drugs and human rights abuses in Peru, paying special attention to the effects of the illegal drugs industry on indigenous and peasant communities and to their responses to the industry's development. Details: Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2005. 38p. Source: Management of Social Transformations; Policy Papers No. 13 Year: 2005 Country: Peru URL: Shelf Number: 116258 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Rights Indigenous Peoples

Author: Lake, Jannifer E. Title: Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence Summary: This report focuses on how policy makers would identify any spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. It provides (1) an overview of Mexican drug trafficking organization structures, how they conduct business, and the relationship between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and their partnerships operating here in the United States; (2) a discussion of the illicit drug trade between Mexico and the United states; (3) an analysis of the possibly nature of any spillover violence may arise; and (4) an evaluation of the available data concerning drug trafficking-related crime. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 32p. Source: Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 117834 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Violence

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats Summary: This report looks at the relationship between organized crime and instability: how illicit commodities usually originate in trouble spots, are then trafficked through vulnerable regions, to affluent markets. It focuses in particular on the impact of drug flows (cocaine and heroin), as well as piracy around the Horn of Africa, and the impact of minerals smuggling on Central Africa. Details: Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010. 59p. Source: Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117626 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Piracy/Pirates Smuggling

Author: Schloenhardt, Andreas Title: Palermo on the Pacific Rim: organised crime offences in the Asia Pacific region. Summary: This paper suggests that 'We must recognise the failure of the "organised crime laws" to win the "war on organised crime".' Offences designed to penalise criminal organisations constitute the most recent and perhaps most ambitious strategy to fight organised crime. The common feature of these offences is that they are designed to target the structure, organisation, members, and associates of organised crime groups. Their shared rationale is the view that disrupting criminal activities and arresting individual offenders does not dismantle the criminal organisations that stand behind these illegal activities. Four main types of organised crime offences are identified in this study. These include: 1. The conspiracy model, found in the Convention against Transnational Crime and in jurisdictions such as Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and several Pacific Island nations; 2. The participation model stipulated by the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, and also adopted in Canada, New Zealand, New South Wales, PR China, Macau, Taiwan, the Pacific Islands, and California; 3. The enterprise model based on the US RICO Act, which is also used in many US States, and the Philippines; 4. The labelling/registration model of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, New South Wales, and South Australia. Details: Bangkok, Thailand: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific, 2009, 315p. Source: Internet Source: Accessed April 27, 2018 at: http://apo.org.au/node/18766 Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://apo.org.au/node/18766 Shelf Number: 116380 Keywords: Asia Criminal Law Drug Trafficking Illicit Markets Organized Crime

Author: Laniel, Laurent Title: Cocaine: A European Union Perspective in the Global Context Summary: This report provides an overview of what is known about how cocaine is produced and trafficked into the European Union. It aims to provide a better understanding of the actors involved, the routes taken, and the scale of the problem in Europe. It also reviews some of the supply reduction responses already developed at the European level. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010. 42p. Source: EMCDDA-Europol Joint Publication No. 2 Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 118249 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control

Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction Title: Drug Offences: Sentencing and Other Outcomes Summary: The sentences that offenders receive for drug law violations across the European Union are examined. By analysing the most recent year's statistics, this report attempts to answer the question: What is the most likely outcome for an offender after being stopped by police for a drug law offense of use or personal possession, or supply or trafficking. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2009. 23p. Source: Selected Issue 2009 Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 118250 Keywords: Drug Offences Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Sentences (Drug Offenders)

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center Title: Marijuana and Methamphetamine Trafficking on Federal Lands Threat Assessment Summary: Drug trafficking organizations, criminal groups, and independent traffickers frequently produce and transport illicit drugs, particularly marijuana and methamphetamine, in or through federal lands. The largest seizures of cannabis from federal lands have been in California and Kentucky, where the primary producers are Mexican drug trafficking organizations and Caucasian independent dealers, respectively. Mexican drug trafficking organizations and criminal groups smuggle marijuana across the Southwest Border through federal lands; Canada-based criminal groups, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and independent dealers smuggle marijuana through federal lands along the Northern Border. Details: Johnstown, PA: National Drug Intelligence Center, 2005. 14p. Source: Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116184 Keywords: Cannabis Drug Trafficking Marijuana Methamphetamine Organized Crime Smuggling (Drugs)

Author: Bliss, Katherine E. Title: Trafficking in the Mesoamerican Corridor: A Threat to Regional and Human Security Summary: This report presents a summary of a one-day meeting intended to (1) raise awareness of the relationships among arms trafficking, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and wildlife trafficking in the Mesoamerican region; (2) identify similarities and differences in approaches to the organized movement of diverse illegal products in the region; (3) discuss the challenge and opportunities for promoting cooperation not just among law enforcement agencies but also among advocacy groups, technical agencies, and research entities; and (4) to articulate recommendations for enhanced cooperation in the future. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. 20p. Source: A Report of the CSIS Americas Program Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117625 Keywords: Arms Trafficking Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues Summary: On October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Merida Initiative, a multi-year proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America aimed at combating drug trafficking and organized crime. This report provides an overview of the funding provided for the Initiative and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees implemention of the Initiative. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009. 28p. Source: Serial Publication; CRS Report for Congress; R40135 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 117767 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Trafficking Merida Initiative Organized Crime

Author: Canadian Human Rights Commission Title: Freedom of Expression and Freedom from Hate in the Internet Age Summary: This report provides a comprehensive analysis of a current debate: what is the most effective way to prevent the harm caused by hate messages on the Internet, while respecting freedom of expression? Details: Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government, 2009. 58p. Source: Special Report to Parliament Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: Shelf Number: 118364 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Freedom of Expression Gun-Related Violence Hate Crimes Internet Organized Crime Violence (Latin America) Violent Crime

Author: Peters, Gretchen Title: How Opium Profits the Taliban Summary: In Afghanistan's poppy-rich southwest, a raging insurgency intersects a thriving opium trade. This study examines how the Taliban profit from narcotics, probes how traffickers influence the strategic goals of the insurgency, and considers the extent to which narcotics are changing the nature of the insurgency itself. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 39p. Source: Peaceworks No. 62 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 115811 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Narcotics Opium Taliban

Author: Donati, Sandro Title: Dossier Colombia: Production and Smuggling of Cocaine Summary: This report on the production and smuggling of cocaine in Colombia calls into question the success of Plan Colombia. It does this by comparing figures and statistics offered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes with those of other field researchers. Details: Turin, Italy: Flare, 2009. 16p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 116488 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking Plan Colombia

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center Title: National Methamphetamine Threat Assessment Summary: This report presents a national-level strategic assessment of methamphetamine trafficking in the United States. This assessment addresses significant trends in methamphetamine production, transportation, distribution, and abuse. It discusses a wide range of issues, including methamphetamine production in the United States and Mexico and the impact of foreign and domestic methamphetamine production. Details: Johnstown, PA: National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009. 44p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 118585 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Drugs Methamphetamines (U.S.)

Author: Kego, Walter Title: Counteracting Transnational Organized Crime: Challenges and Countermeasures Summary: According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, transnational organized crime is one of the major threats to human security, impeding the social, economic, political and cultural development of societies worldwide, and involved in trafficking in human beings, drugs and firearms, money laundering, etc. This report outlines the origins of transnational organized crime, describes how it manifests itself and identifies possible threats against societies. Money laundering is dealt with in some detail since it facilitates transnational crime activities and their expansion into the legal economy. The challenges posed by financial crime are identified and guidelines for its prevention are outlined. The EU strategy against transnational organized crimes is an example of how the common European model of crime prevention can be implemented elsewhere. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource; Stockholm Paper Series Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118591 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Transnational Crime

Author: Jelsma, Martin Title: Redefining Targets: Towards a Realistic Afghan Drug Control Strategy Summary: This policy briefing provides an update on the drug control efforts in Afghanistan and outlines policy dilemmas on drugs production, trafficking and consumption issues facing Afghan officials and international agencies today. It also reflects concerns and needs of heroin users and - former - opium farmers. Key issues include the chronic absence of coordination of drug control efforts; the foreign-driven and often hypocritical nature of the agenda; and the difficulties in defining realistic drug policy objectives. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009. 12p. Source: Drug Policy Briefing No. 30; Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 119837 Keywords: Drug Control Policy (Afghanistan) Drug Trafficking Opium

Author: Van Heuvelen, Elizabeth S. Title: Uniting the Golden Crescent and Central Asia: The Potential for Greater Regional Cooperation to Curb Afghanistan's Opium Trade Summary: This paper explores the potential for greater regional cooperation betwen Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asian Republics in combating the opium trade. Through examining the history of the regional dynamics of the opium trade, this paper concludes that elimination of the opium trade will require sustained regional cooperation that targets reduction of both supply and demand. There are significant challenges to enacting such a program, but there is also the potential to build on and expand initiatives with similar goals that are already underway. In the context of the Obama administration's broad review of U.S. foreign policy and strategy in the region, now is a fertile time to explore and pursue such efforts. Details: Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, 2009. 35p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 118671 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Opium Trade(Afghanistan)

Author: Brands, Hal Title: Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State Summary: In numerous Latin American countries, organized crime and violence are corroding governance and imperiling democratic legitimacy. This phenomenon is most severe in Guatemala, which is currently experiencing a full-blown crisis of the democratic state. An unholy trinity of criminal elements - international drug traffickers, domestically based organized crime syndicates, and youth gangs - have dramatically expanded their operations since the 1990s, and are effectively waging a form of irregular warfare against government institutions. The effects of this campaign have been dramatic. The police, the judiciary, and entire local and departmental governments are rife with criminal infiltrators; murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in recent years; criminal operatives brazenly assassinate government officials and troublesome members of the political class; and broad swaths of territory are now effectively under the control of criminal groups. Guatemala's weak institutions have been unable to contain this violence, leading to growing civic disillusion and causing marked erosion in the authority and legitimacy of the state. This problem cannot be addressed through police measures alone; combating it will require a holistic strategy that combines robust enforcement and security measures with sustained efforts to broaden socio-economic oppportunities, combat corruption, and, above all, to build a stronger and more capable state. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 63p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Guatemala URL: Shelf Number: 118749 Keywords: Criminal Activity (Guatemala) Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Youth Gangs

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Patterns and trends of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants and other Drugs in East and South-East Asia (and neighborhood regions) Summary: UNODC launcehd the Global Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and Trends (SMART) Programme in September 2008. The Programme seeks to enhance the capacity of Member States and authorities in priority regions, to generate, manage, analyze and report synthetic drug information, and to apply this scientific evidence-based knowledge to design the policies and programmes. The Global SMART Programme is being implemented in a gradual phased manner, with East Asia being the first focus priority region. This annual report is the first regional situation assessment for East and South-East Asia put forward under the Global SMART Programme. If forms one of the first essential key steps, in providing consolidated up-to-date analysis, based on the information shared by the members countries. This report provides an overview of the amphetamine-type stimulants in the region, and outlines several key issues and emerging threats throughout the region and their implications for the neighbouring regions. It also highlights the need for continued and joint efforts, both at the national as well as regional levels. Details: Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009. 140p. Source: Internet Resource; Global SMART Programme Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: Shelf Number: 117587 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Drugs

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa: Situation Report Summary: Although cocaine is not produced in Africa, the rapid increase in seizures suggests that the continent, and in particular its Western region, is growing in importance as a transit area for cocaine trafficking between Latin American countries and Europe. This note reviews recent cocaine seizures in African countries, as well as cocaine seizures originating from African countries and reported by European countries. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2007. 16p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: Africa URL: Shelf Number: 119238 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking

Author: Tajikistan. Drug Control Agency Title: Report on the Drug Situation in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2009. Summary: This report presents an analysis of illegal drug situation in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, a description of the criminal market for narcotic drugs in the area, and efforts to combat illegal drug trafficking in Tajikistan and the surrounding area. Details: Dushanbe: Tajikistan Drug Control Agency, 2009. 49p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Tajikistan URL: Shelf Number: 119121 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drugs Narcotics

Author: Meza, Ricardo Vargas Title: The Security Approach to the Drugs Problem: Perpetuating Drugs and Conflict in Colombia Summary: The drugs problem in Colombia is intertwined with structural factors at the social, economic, institutional and cultural levels. Moreover, its relationship to the armed conflict has had serious consequences for the socio-economic conditions of peasant and indigenous communities affected by the production of raw materials used to produce cocaine. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009. 8p. Source: Internet Resource; Drug Policy Briefing No. 31 Year: 2009 Country: Colombia URL: Shelf Number: 119212 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drugs

Author: Tinajero, Jorge Hernandez Title: Mexico: The Law Against Small-Scale Drug Dealing: A Doubtful Venture Summary: In August 2009, Mexico adopted a new law against small-scale drug dealing, which introduces some significant advances in key subjects, such as the recognizing of and distinguishing between user, drug addict and dealer. However it still has significant flaws in continuing to treat demand and supply of drugs as a criminal and market phenomenon that are likely to undermine its successful application. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009. 8p. Source: Internet Resource; Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies Nr. 3 Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 119232 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Offenders Drug Policy Drug Trafficking

Author: Reuter, Peter H. Title: Assessing Changes in Global Drug Problems, 1998-2007: Main Report Summary: This report provides key findings of the RAND Europe study which assesses how the global market for illicit drugs has developed from 1998 to 2007 and describes worldwide drug policies implemented during that period to address the problem. The study assesses the impact of policy measures, both at the national and sub-national levels, on the illicit drugs problem. To the extent data allows, the project assessed how much policy measures, at the national and sub-national levels, have influenced drug problems. The analysis is focused on policy relevant matters but it does not attempt to make recommendations to governments. The evidence suggests that illicit drugs presented as much of a problem in 2007 as in 1998. Broadly speaking, while the situation may have improved slightly in some of the world's richer countries, it has substantially worsened in others, which include a few large developing or transitional countries. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 68p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117653 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Policy Drug Regulation Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs

Author: Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Title: Project SPAWN: A Strategic Assessment of criminal Activity and Organized Crime Infiltration at Canada's Class 1 Airports Summary: The purpose of this report is to present a national strategic assessment of the scope of criminal activity and organized crime infiltration at eight Canadian Class 1 international airports - Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Otttawa, Montreal (Trudeau) and Halifax. This assessment should provide a basis for more effective prevention and enforcement action, including through enhanced inter-agency cooperation. Details: Ottawa; RCMP, 2010. 20p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: Shelf Number: 114906 Keywords: Airport Security (Canada) Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Organized Crime (Canada)

Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Ecuador at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerillas and the Citizens' Revolution Summary: The chaning internatl situation in colombia and the expanding influence of the Mexican drug cartels, have helped Ecuador become an important and growing center of operation for transnational organized criminal gangs. This poses a significant threat not only to the Ecuadoran state but all of America and the United States. Details: Alexandria, VA: International ssessment and Strategy Center, 2010. 77p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Ecuador URL: Shelf Number: 117666 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Gangs (Ecuador) Organized Crime (Ecuador)

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: The Cocaine Trade: Seventh Reprot of Session 2009-10 Summary: This report examines the trends in cocaine use in the U.K. and the progress to date in tackling the cocaine trade in terms of reducing both supply and demand. Details: London: Stationery Office, 2010. 2 v. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 117866 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Abuse and Addition Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drugs

Author: Ahrari, Ehsan Title: Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: Narcotics production and trafficking is a critical dimension of the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan. With Afghanistan as the world's largest opium producer, narcotics are the economic lynchpin connecting key players in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The increase in narco-trafficking routes through Russia and Central Asia to supply global demand introduces important international variables. This report assesses the global and regional dynamics of narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the implications for counterinsurgency efforts in the region. Details: Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009. 57p. Source: Internet Resource; NBR Special Report No. 20 Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: Shelf Number: 117571 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Narcotics Opium

Author: Kego, Walter Title: Internationally Organized Crime: The Escalation of Crime within the Global Economy Summary: International organized crime is growing in significance, not just in some countries, but on a worldwide scale with an increasing number of people affected. The trade in narcotics is the principal source of revenue for international criminal organizations. The countries for production, transit, and consumption are all integrated in complex networks, which are characterized by economic gain, violence, and corruption. Nation-states and boundaries are not much of an obstacle in thwarting these criminal networks. Moreover, the criminal organizations are apt at altering their structure to make themselves more flexible and consequently more difficult to penetrate by law enforcement agencies. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2009. 17p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Paper Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118775 Keywords: Criminal Organizations Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Organized Crime

Author: Brombacher, Daniel Title: The Transatlantic Cocaine Business: Europe's Options as it Confronts New Drug Trafficking Routes (WP) Summary: For traffickers, the risk of getting caught increases with the amount of levels of control they must dodge. This increase in risk is reflected in the price of the drug. At the international level, there tends to be intervention at each point in the chain of production, using both penal and legal tools as well as political ones and others based on development: control of chemical precursors, forced eradication of coca crops, alternative development measures and transit control. This Working Paper aims to analyse the intervention measures recently reaffirmed by the CND. Using drug prices as a starting point, we analyse the problem of drug trafficking and assess the efficiency of policies to control supply. But no drug control policy can be based solely on limiting supply. It must also feature measures to reduce demand. However, the goal of this study is to review European foreign policy tools involved in controlling supply, leaving aside domestic policy measures designed to cut demand, the efficiency of which is widely recognised in most countries of the EU. Details: Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, 2009. 40p. Source: Internet Resource; Working Paper 45/2009 Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 117635 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Policy Drug Trafficking

Author: Caulkins, Jonathan P. Title: Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan Summary: This report contributes to the ongoing debate about counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan, and in relation to counter-insurgency operations by adding a heretofore missing element–applied economic analysis of the effect of counter-narcotics policies. It does so by applying to a stylized depiction of the Afghan situation a standard model that economists and policy analysts have applied to a large range of policy areas. Details: New York: New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 119430 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Reform Drug Trafficking

Author: Jensema, Ernestien Title: A Matter of Substance: Fighting Drug Trafficking With a Substance-Oriented Approach Summary: This paper discusses the “substance-oriented approach” Dutch authorities implemented to to scare off potential small-scale cocaine smugglers. The focus was on the drugs, rather than the couriers, and on incapacitating the smuggling route, rather than deterrence by incarceration. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2010. 12p. Source: Internet Resource; Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, No. 7 Year: 2010 Country: Netherlands URL: Shelf Number: 119437 Keywords: Drug Policy (Netherlands) Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking

Author: Percy, Stephen L. Title: Evaluation of the Safe and Sound Initiative in Milwaukee Summary: The Safe & Sound Initiative contracted with the Center for Urban Initiatives and Research (CUIR) at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the Safe & Sound Initiative. The three prongs of the Initiative include: (1) Safe Places that offer programs and support for youth after school and in the early evening, (2) Community Partners who work in Milwaukee’s neighborhoods as organizers to learn resident concerns about crime and share crime information with law enforcement agencies, and (3) Area Specific Law Enforcement where the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD), Safe & Sound, and Milwaukee High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) work together to produce a reduction in violent crime. This comprehensive assessment of the Safe & Sound Initiative utilized an extensive and diverse array of data collection strategies in order to garner knowledge on many different facets of the Initiative and obtain information from a large set of stakeholders. Data collection strategies include: (1) information abstracted from proposals for Safe Places funding, (2) interviews with key staff in Safe Places, (3) interviews with Community Partners, (4) interviews with community leaders, (5) interviews with law enforcement officials, (6) interviews with local elected officials, (7) interviews with neighborhood residents living near Safe Places, (8) focus groups with youth who attend Safe Places, (9) “quick”, on-the-street surveys with youth, (10) on-site observations at Safe Places, and (11) examination of crime data. For Safe Places, this evaluation is conducted at two levels of analysis. The first level explores the full array of 35 Safe Places operating during 2007 and the second examines, more intensely, eight selected Safe Places that together represent diversity with regard to type of organization (i.e., some operated as branches of larger organizations and some were single entity nonprofits), geographic location within the city, programming, and size of budget. The eight intensive study sites are: Running Rebels, Latino Community Center, Mary Ryan Boys and Girls Club, Agape Community Center, Parkland YMCA, Silver Spring Neighborhood Center (at the John Muir Community Learning Center), COA Golden Center, and Davis Boys and Girls Club. Details: Milwaukee, WI: University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, Center for Urban Initiatives and Research, 2008. 257p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119517 Keywords: Community Participation Delinquency Prevention Drug Trafficking Juvenile Crime Juvenile Offenders Violent Crime (Milwaukee)

Author: Keefer, Philip Title: Innocent Bystanders: Developing Countries and the War on Drugs Summary: Drug use and abuse is one of the most difficult challenges facing the contemporary world. If it is true that there has always been consumption of different types of drugs in different societies, although not in all of them, it is no less true that it generally took place in restricted, socially regulated realms, especially in ritualistic ceremonies. This is not the case today. Drug use has spread to all segments of society, with hedonistic motivations; although it is often not socially sanctioned, users are at times, depending on the drug, treated with leniency. It is well-established that all drugs are harmful to the health, even the legal ones, such as alcohol and tobacco, and that some drugs are more harmful, such as heroin and crack. The discussion of 'gateway drugs' is a medical issue on which there is no consensus. For the purposes of public policy design, the important thing to keep in mind is that drugs produce negative consequences for both users and societies in general, and that minimizing their consumption should be the main goal. The salient discussion, therefore, is about choosing among different strategies to achieve the same goal. Most of all, this report contributes to the debate by shedding light on the understanding of the economics and logistics of the drug market. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010. 362p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119523 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Markets Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drugs

Author: Walser, Ray Title: Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative: A Fight We Cannot Afford to Lose Summary: Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in 2006, a virulent war has raged with the Mex­ican drug cartels, and this drug-related violence has spilled across the U.S. border, threatening U.S. lives and public safety. Geostrategic pessimists fear that the U.S. has been taking Mexico's stability for granted and warn that Mexico is teetering on the brink of a drug-induced disaster. However, the seriousness of the drug threat to Mexico also presents a strategic opportunity. At the invitation of the Mexican government, the Bush Administration is working to establish a partnership to make Mexico safer and more secure without sacri­ficing the sovereignty of either nation. The Bush Administration's Merida Initiative—a three-year, $1.5 billion anti-drug assistance package for Mexico and Central America—is a quantitative and qualitative jump in support for the drug fight in the region. Unlike Plan Colombia, which helped to rescue Colombia from the throes of a narco-war, the Merida Initiative will provide assistance in equipment, tech­nology, and training without a significant U.S. military footprint in Mexico. President George W. Bush signed the Merida Initiative into law as part of the Supplemen­tal Appropriations Act of 2008 on June 30, 2008. In Mexico and in the press, the Merida Initiative is being viewed as a critical test of U.S.–Mexican rela­tions. Its implementation will be closely scrutinized on both sides of the aisle in Congress. The Merida Ini­tiative could become an important legacy of the Bush presidency in the Western Hemisphere and should create a solid platform for U.S.–Mexican coopera­tion for the next Administration. The initiative, however, is just a start. The U.S. needs to do more to secure the border, reduce the flows of illegal arms and illicit cash south into Mex­ico, and alter immigration laws to permit tempo­rary workers to cross the border legally to help fill the U.S. demand for labor. Policymakers need to develop a comprehensive strategy that covers all transit and source countries. Mexico needs to continue exercising the political will to combat the deadly drug cartels and continue reforming its judicial system, overhauling police and law enforcement, and modernizing and devel­oping its economy. Finally, the Mexican government needs to take an active role in preventing illegal third-country nationals from transiting Mexican territory, as well as in closing down smuggling orga­nizations that operate on Mexican soil and discourag­ing Mexican citizens from entering the U.S. illegally. Both nations would benefit substantially from a re­turn to law and order on both sides of the border. Details: Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008. 12p. Source: Internet Resource; Backgrounder, No. 2163 Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 119542 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico) Drug Control Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Violence

Author: Burnet Institute Title: Situational Analysis of Drug and Alcohol Issues and Responses in the Pacific 2008-09 Summary: This situational analysis focuses on the Pacific region, including both licit and illicit drug use. The assessment recognises the risks for drug-related crime as identified by international and regional law enforcement agencies for more than a decade. Information collected by enforcement organisations and networks suggests that illicit drugs are becoming an increasing concern in the region. More importantly, health and other community services have begun to highlight the social and economic costs of high levels of alcohol use as an area of increasing concern. The report provides considers recommendations for framing appropriate responses coordinated at the regional level, via regional and international coordinating mechanisms and donors. Details: Canberra: Australian National Council on Drugs, 2010. 275p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119557 Keywords: Alcohol Abuse Drug Abuse Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drugs (Pacific Area)

Author: Kilmer, Beau Title: Estimating the Size of the Global Drug Market: A Demand-Side Approach Summary: This report uses data on the prevalence of drug use, retail prices, and consumption patterns to generate country-level consumption and retail expenditure estimates for cannabis, heroin, cocaine, and amphetamine-type substances. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 94p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 10, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR711.sum.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR711.sum.pdf Shelf Number: 117655 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Markets Drug Trafficking

Author: Aning, Kwesi Title: Understanding the Intersection of Drugs, Politics & Crime in West Africa: An Interpretive Analysis Summary: This paper examines the relationship between drugs, politics and crime in West Africa by using Ghana as a case study, and discusses some of the initiatives in place to curb the international drug trade as it affects West African states. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 12p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 13, 2010 at: http://http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/wor_docus/45_GCST_Policy_Brief_6_-_Understanding_The_Intersection_Of_Drugs,_Politics_&_Crime_In_West_Africa._An_Interpretive_Analysis.pdf; Policy Brief Series; No. 6 Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/wor_docus/45_GCST_Policy_Brief_6_-_Understanding_The_Intersection_Of_Drugs,_Politics_&_Crime_In_West_Africa._An_Interpretive_Analysis.pdf; Policy Brief Series; No. 6 Shelf Number: 119599 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Political Corruption

Author: Weintraub, Sidney Title: Cooperative Mexican-U.S. Antinarcotics Efforts: A Report of the CSIS Simon Chair in Political Economy Summary: "Because of high U.S. narcotics consumption and Mexico’s role as the main transit country for cocaine from Colombia, the dominant narcotics activity in the Western Hemisphere takes place between the United States and Mexico. Competition among the large Mexican drug-trafficking organizations to maximize their sales in the United States has led to terrible violence in Mexico, and that country’s “war” against those organizations has amplified that violence. Mexico was a small player in the movement of cocaine to the United States before the 1980s, when the main route was from Colombia through the Caribbean to Florida. After that route was largely abandoned because of heavy U.S. sea and land interdiction, Colombian cocaine began to enter the United States through Central America and Mexico. This report focuses on four drugs: cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Mexico produces the last three of these drugs, which are shipped directly to the United States. If reliance on Mexico as the final transit country for cocaine sales to the United States were to become too costly for the drug-trafficking organizations, the route could change again. And while the violence in Mexico might then diminish, cocaine would still come into the United States because of the demand for the drug. For many years the U.S. government was unwilling to admit explicitly that U.S. narcotics consumption bore some responsibility for the violence in Mexico. During a visit to Mexico in March 2009, however, the U.S. secretary of state finally stated the obvious: that U.S. narcotics demand was fueling drug violence in Mexico. This report thus comes at a time of antinarcotics cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation does not mean that the problems related to drug trafficking and consumption are on their way to solution, only that issues not discussed earlier can now be put on the table. The purpose of this report is to provide a full discussion of such issues." Details: Washington, DC: Center for Stratigic and International Studies, 2010. 57p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 14, 2010 at: http://csis.org/publication/cooperative-mexican-us-antinarcotics-efforts Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://csis.org/publication/cooperative-mexican-us-antinarcotics-efforts Shelf Number: 119606 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Gun Violence Narcotics

Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative Summary: This paper looks at three distinct parts of the money structure of the Mexican drug trafficking organizations. One is bulk cash shipment, moved largely by vehicle across the U.S.-Mexican border. Another is the broader issue of how other types of drug money circulate in Mexico's formal and informal economies and the how that is used. A third is how money obtained from the cocaine trade is moved back to purchase more cocaine in order to keep the cartels operational. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars - Mexico Institute; San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource; Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation; Accessed August 17, 2010 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Money%20Laundering%20and%20Bulk%20Cash%20Smuggling.%20Farah.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Money%20Laundering%20and%20Bulk%20Cash%20Smuggling.%20Farah.pdf Shelf Number: 119620 Keywords: Cash Smuggling Drug Cartels (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Money Laundering (Mexico) Terrorism Financing

Author: U.S. General Accounting Office Title: Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement System to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities Summary: The Department of Defense (DOD) leads detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States in support of law enforcement agencies. DOD reported resources of more than $1.5 billion for fiscal year 2010 to support its counternarcotics activities. Congress mandated GAO report on DOD’s counternarcotics performance measurement system. Specifically, this report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD’s counternarcotics performance measurement system enables DOD to track progress and (2) DOD uses performance information from its counternarcotics performance measurement system to manage its activities. GAO analyzed relevant DOD performance and budget documents, and discussed these efforts with officials from DOD and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to improve DOD’s counternarcotics performance measurement system by (1) revising its performance measures and (2) applying practices to better facilitate the use of performance data to manage its counternarcotics activities. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10835.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10835.pdf Shelf Number: 118806 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs (U.S.)

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Merida Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures Summary: Crime and violence related to drug trafficking in Mexico and Central America have increased in recent years and pose a threat not only to those areas but to the United States as well, particularly along the Southwest border. The Mérida Initiative, announced in 2007, provides about $1.6 billion in law enforcement support to Mexico and Central American countries. The Department of State (State) manages the Initiative while other U.S. agencies play key roles in implementation. This report examines: (1) the status of Mérida program implementation; (2) State's strategy for implementation; and (3) coordination mechanisms in place for Mérida. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency documents; interviewed officials at State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, and other relevant agencies; and conducted fieldwork in Mexico and Central America. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State incorporate into the strategy for the Mérida Initiative outcome performance measures that indicate progress toward strategic goals and develop more comprehensive timelines for future program deliveries. State agreed with the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf Shelf Number: 119629 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Law Enforcement Drug Trafficking

Author: Beare, Margaret Title: Global Transnational Crime: Canada and China Summary: This paper presents a review of the phenomena of transnational crime/organized crime (TNC/OC) as it relates to Canada and China. The paper begins by outlining the changing understanding of TNC/OC. Three issues dominate much of the current debate: issues of the breakdown in strictly ‘ethnic’-based operations and the refocus of law enforcement on criminal markets; the changing perception of the structure of criminal organizations and finally, a recognition of harm as a determinant of the types of criminal activity that ought to be treated internationally with the seriousness of the more traditional organized crimes. Next, this paper identifies the key illicit markets related to Canada and China. These markets include: money laundering, drug trafficking, human smuggling and the counterfeiting of goods, cards and currency. This paper concludes with a discussion on areas of tension and opportunities for enhanced cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis between Canada and China. One key unresolved tension relates to China’s quest for international assistance in combating corruption. China and Canada have ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption and in addition Canada is involved in four international agreements dealing with the criminal aspect of corruption – but from China’s perspective these agreements were supposed to assist countries in their fight against various forms of corruption but are either not effective or are not implemented. Details: Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: China Paper No. 16: Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.onlinecic.org/resourcece/archives/chinapapers/cic_chinapapersno16_bearepdf Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: http://www.onlinecic.org/resourcece/archives/chinapapers/cic_chinapapersno16_bearepdf Shelf Number: 119658 Keywords: Counterfeiting Drug Trafficking Human Smuggling Illicit Markets Money Laundering Organized Crime Transnational Crime (Canada and China)

Author: Colak, Alexandra Abello Title: Civil Society and Security Transformation in Medellin: Challenges and Opportunities Summary: Medellin, the second biggest city in Colombia, experienced an impressive transformation after 2002 when a combination of national and local initiatives succeeded in dramatically reducing acute levels of violence. After being the most violent city in the world, Medellin became a successful case of urban security transformation. The aim of this research was to explore the role played by civil society in that process. However, not long before this project began, the security situation started to deteriorate in the poor communities of Medellin. The vacuum of power created by the extradition of a demobilized paramilitary leader had triggered wars between gangs and criminal groups. This made it necessary to explore not only the limitations of the recent security transformation, which is now in question, but also the way this outbreak of violence is affecting communities and the role that civil society can play in this context. In the first section this document presents an overview of the insecurity context of Medellin prior to the transformation started in 2002. The second section discusses the problems with the role that civil society is asked to play within current frameworks for security transformation, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and current models of democratic security governance in Latin America. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: New Voices Series, no. 2: Available at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php Shelf Number: 119680 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs Violence Violent Crime

Author: Weisburd, David Title: The Importance of Place in Policing: Empirical Evidence and Policy Recommendations Summary: This monograph argues that the police can be more effective if they shift the primary concerns of policing from people to places. Such a shift is already underway in American policing where place has begun to be seen as an important focus of police crime prevention effort. But even in the U.S., people and not places remain the central concern of policing. Places in this context are specific locations within the larger social environments of communities and neighborhoods. They may be defined as buildings or addresses, block faces or street segments, or as clusters of addresses, block faces or street segments that have common crime problems. This report presents research which describes from both empirical and theoretical perspectives how the police can produce substantial crime prevention effects by directing their focus at small, well-defined locations with high levels of crime. The research findings presented in this report also strongly indicate that place-based policing of this kind can prevent crime using considerably less resources than more traditional policing methods. Details: Stockholm: Brottsforebyggande radet (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention), 2010. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2010 at: http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=The_importance_of_place_in_policing.pdf&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/100609/d4dd5dc1d51f6c3442a975a5f37d9ef3/The%255fimportance%255fof%255fplace%255fin%255fpolicing.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=The_importance_of_place_in_policing.pdf&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/100609/d4dd5dc1d51f6c3442a975a5f37d9ef3/The%255fimportance%255fof%255fplace%255fin%255fpolicing Shelf Number: 119686 Keywords: Crime Locations Crime Prevention Drug Trafficking Maritime Crime (Gulf of Guinea; Africa) Maritime Security Organized Crime Piracy Policing Public Safety Public Spaces

Author: Whitworth, Steven Scott Title: The Untold Story of Mexico's Rise and Eventual Monopoly of the Methamphetamine Trade Summary: This thesis examines the dominant role of Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in the multi-billion dollar trade in illegal narcotics between Latin America and the United States since 1995. It assesses the implications of the existence and operation of the four major and thriving, Mexico cartels (or DTOs) for both the United States and Mexico. The story of Mexico’s rise to prominence by the mid- to late-1990s as the primary transshipment route for cocaine entering the United States is well known. However, much less attention has been devoted to how the Mexican cartels, which now control 80 % percent of all illegal drug trafficking into the United States, have become the primary producer and trafficker of methamphetamine for the American market in the past decade. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2010 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Jun/08Jun_Whitworth.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Jun/08Jun_Whitworth.pdf Shelf Number: 119693 Keywords: Cocaine Columbian Cartels Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Methamphetamine

Author: O'Regan, Davin Title: Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean Summary: Africa is facing an increasingly menacing threat of cocaine trafficking that risks undermining its security structures, nascent democratic institutions, and development progress. Latin America has long faced similar challenges and its experience provides important lessons that can be applied before this expanding threat becomes more deeply entrenched on the continent - and costly to reverse. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 5: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/AfricaBriefFinal_5.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/AfricaBriefFinal_5.pdf Shelf Number: 119704 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Violence

Author: Dudley, Steven S. Title: Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras Summary: This chapter is about drug trafficking organizations (DTO) operating in Central America. It is broken down by theme rather than by country. It provides a brief history of DTO activity in the region; descriptions of who operates the DTOs, both locally and internationally, and their modus operandi; the use of street gangs in DTO activities; DTO penetration in government and security forces; local, regional and international efforts and challenges as they try and combat DTOs. The chapter is centered on the three countries where the problem of DTOs appears to be the most acute: Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute; San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Serieson U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Drug%20Trafficking%20Organizations%20in%20Central%20America.%20Dudley.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Central America URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Drug%20Trafficking%20Organizations%20in%20Central%20America.%20Dudley.pdf Shelf Number: 119707 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Street Gangs

Author: Vogel, Augustus Title: Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the Roles of African Maritime Security Forces Summary: Piracy, illegal fishing, and narcotics and human trafficking are growing rapidly in Africa and represent an increasingly central component of the threat matrix facing the continent. However, African states’ maritime security structures are often misaligned with the challenges posed and need coast guard capabilities and an array of intra-governmental partnerships. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2009. 6p Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 2: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AfricaBrief_2.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AfricaBrief_2.pdf Shelf Number: 119708 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Illegal Fishing Maritime Crime Maritime Security Pirates

Author: Bailey, John Title: Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico: What are Mexican and U.S. Strategies? Are They Working? Summary: Mexico confronts the greatest threat to its democratic governance from internal violence since the Cristero Revolt of the latter stages of the Revolution of 1910-29. In this case, the threat is posed by criminal groups, especially by politically savvy, hyper-violent drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), currently inflicting spectacular damage in several regions and sowing insecurity throughout the country. But the DTOs are only the most pressing symptom of a growing mix of forms of organized crime (OC) rooted in a robust informal economy and a civic culture marked by comparatively little confidence in the police-justice system and low compliance with the state’s law. The threat is further exacerbated by a crisis of political legitimacy and state capacity. Neo-liberal policies since the mid 1980s have not generated a new social contract to replace the populist consensus of the “golden age” of growth with stability (1950s-1970s), and the Mexican state lacks an effective police-justice-regulatory system capable of enforcing its laws with respect to public security. This chapter first examines the evolution of the Mexican and US national government strategies for confronting OC/DTOs, with particular attention to the institutional frameworks that have been established to implement these strategies. It then evaluates the degree of “fit” between the two governments’ strategies and considers metrics by which progress can be measured. It concludes with an assessment of progress. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute; San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Combating%20Organized%20Crime.%20Bailey.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Combating%20Organized%20Crime.%20Bailey.pdf Shelf Number: 119588 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Violence

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Reforming Haiti's Security Sector Summary: Operations led by the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) largely disbanded armed gangs in the slums of Haiti's cities, but progress has been undermined by persisting crime, political instability and natural disasters. Reforming Haiti's Security Sector , the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the difficulties in strengthening the justice sector and establishing an operational and sufficiently staffed police force - two crucial elements for the country's future stability and development. Making decisive and swift headway with security sector reform (SSR) is a vital part of any durable solution to Haiti's political and economic, as well as security problems", says Bernice Robertson, Crisis Group's Haiti Senior Analyst. "The process to create a 14,000-strong Haitian National Police (HNP) by 2011 must be speeded up". The fall of Prime Minister Jacques-Adouard Alexis during last April's protests, the drawn-out negotiations between President Rena Preval and parliament over his successor and new Prime Minister Michele Pierre-Louis' political difficulties have put Haiti's fragile governance once again under severe strain. Drug traffickers, organised criminals and corrupt politicians have mobilised the population for their own benefit and a procession of hurricanes in August and September has caused enormous damage to Haiti's physical infrastructure. HNP vetting needs to be concluded, the number of police cadets has to be increased and officers should receive further training in specific skills, including anti-kidnapping, riot control, counter-drug, border control, forensics and intelligence gathering and analysis. Special crime chambers ought to be created to try serious offenders, and the inhumane prison conditions have to be improved quickly. MINUSTAH should maintain its present military component but increase the number of international police, and deploy UN civil affairs and police personnel with special experience in border control to assist HNP units along the frontier with the Dominican Republic. "Haiti urgently needs a professional HNP as a prerequisite and bulwark if the new government is to move the country, with MINUSTAH and donor help, toward stability", says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group's Latin America Program Director. "But it also needs a justice system capable of upholding the rule of law and programs that provide swift, visible relief to families enduring extremely harsh living conditions and natural disasters". Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2008. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 28: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/28_reforming_haiti_s_security_sector.ashx Year: 2008 Country: Haiti URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/28_reforming_haiti_s_security_sector.ashx Shelf Number: 119709 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Kidnapping Organized Crime Police Corruption Police Reform Violence

Author: Title: Improving Security Policy in Colombia Summary: Colombia’s new government has to improve security policy to tackle the guerrilla tactics of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as well as their broadened participation in drug trafficking and newly forged alliances with other illegal armed groups. Details: Brussels; Bogota, Colombia: International Crisis Group, 2010. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Briefing No. 23: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.ashx Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.ashx Shelf Number: 119714 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs Security Violence

Author: Camp, Roderic Ai Title: Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges Summary: This essay proposes to briefly describe and analyze the evolution of the Army and Navy’s role in drug interdiction, focusing on the patterns that have emerged since 1995, when the Army accepted responsibility for that task without any internal opposition. This paper argues that Mexican national security priorities have shifted significantly, focusing on domestic security issues, specifically drug-related criminal activity and violence. In response to the government’s emphasis on drug-related crime, civil authorities have relied increasingly on the armed forces to carry out an aggressive anti-drug mission. The increased role of the military in carrying out these assignments has produced significant changes within the Mexican Navy and the Army, and in their relationship with the American armed forces. Citizen views of the Mexican armed forces as an institution, its performance of the anti-drug mission, and its reactions to increased levels of personal insecurity, have altered Mexican perceptions of national sovereignty and the United States’ role in their country. Finally, the role of the Catholic Church as an increasingly influential actor in government attempts to curb the drug cartels, as well as the source of potential conflict with the armed forces over growing numbers of human rights abuses, are essential to understanding the consequences of the military’s anti-drug mission. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute: San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Armed%20Forces%20and%20Drugs.%20Camp.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Armed%20Forces%20and%20Drugs.%20Camp.pdf Shelf Number: 119716 Keywords: Armed Forces Drug Cartels Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control

Author: Gillmore, Edward Title: The Expansion in the EU of Baltic Organized Criminal Groups Summary: Two recent reports have highlighted the expansion into the EU of organized criminal groups trafficking drugs, human beings and arms. The reports analyze the structural and functional features of these groups as well as the economic mechanisms supporting their activities. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2010. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: ISDP Policy Brief, No. 24: Accessed September 2, 2010 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_gillmore_the-expansion-in-the-eu.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_gillmore_the-expansion-in-the-eu.pdf Shelf Number: 119727 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime Transnational Crime

Author: Kalacska, Margaret Title: Technological Integration As A Means of Enhancing Border Security and Reducing Transnational Crime Summary: “This report examines the porosity of the Canada-US border, focusing on the areas between ports-of-entry. Such locations have traditionally been perceived as low risk areas, but actually facilitate criminal activities that endanger the national security and economies of both countries. This analysis also considers the root causes of major illicit activities that flourish as transnational ventures in these border regions, and reiterates the need for increasing security without imposing further restrictions on legitimate travel and trade. This report makes eight recommendations to improve security between the major ports-of-entry: • Increase technological infrastructure for the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) and Coast Guard teams between the ports-of-entry. • Increase basic security and communications measures at the small and medium rural ports-of-entry. • Increase international interoperability and communication (such as real-time, integrated shared databases on criminal records, investigations in progress, and outstanding warrants) between the Canadian Border Services Agency, US Customs and Borders Protection, IBET and municipal, provincial, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Such a united, coordinated effort will be more successful at intercepting transnational crime and cross border insurgency. • Develop a mechanism to enable agents from one country to pursue fleeing suspects across the border to maintain visual surveillance on their whereabouts until authorities from the other country are able to respond. • Harmonize the sentences for smugglers and traffickers of narcotics, arms and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora-related products between Canada and the US without eligibility for early release for those convicted in Canada. • Remove the allowance of acquiring and possessing methamphetamine and methylene-dioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) chemical precursors that do not have any legitimate industrial use. • Increase the use of operationally proven technology to improve security in the areas between ports-of-entry to provide real-time information on threats to enforcement teams. • Increase the number of IBET teams: these teams should have the capability to respond to threats near real-time. Identifying the most likely between-ports-of-entry crossing points from actual data, and the field experiences of the officers on the ground, will increase the number of individuals apprehended for illegally crossing the border having significant impacts on illicit enterprises. If used correctly, appropriate technology will augment the effectiveness of the agents on the ground, especially when resources are limited.” Details: Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2010 at: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Shelf Number: 119748 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Illegal Immigrants Smuggling Transnational Crime

Author: Mejia, Daniel Title: The War on Illegal Drugs in Producer and Consumer Countries: A Simple Analytical Framework Summary: This paper develops a model of the war against illegal drugs in both producer and consumer countries. The paper studies the trade-off faced by the government of the drug consumer country between prevention policies (aimed at reducing the demand for drugs) and enforcement policies (aimed at reducing the production and trafficking of drugs), and shows how the optimal allocation of resources between these two alternatives depends on the key parameters of the model. We use available data for the war on drugs in Colombia, and against consumption in the U.S., to calibrate the unobservable parameters of the model, such as the price elasticity of demand for cocaine; the effectiveness of prevention and treatment policies; and the relative effectiveness of interdiction efforts. Details: Munich: CESifo, 2008. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper, No. 2459: Accessed September 14, 2010 at: http://www.cesifo.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp2459.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.cesifo.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp2459.pdf Shelf Number: 119800 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Prevention Drug Trafficking Drug Treatment Plan Colombia War on Drugs

Author: Great Britain. Sentencing Advisory Panel Title: Sentencing for Drug Offences: Advice to the Sentencing Guidelines Council Summary: This advice to the Sentencing Guidelines Council makes proposals in relation to the sentencing of the most commonly sentenced drug offences. It considers those offences which derive from conduct intended to bring illicit drugs into circulation (including importation, production and supply) as well as those relating to possession and use. Details: London: Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2010. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2010 at: http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/press/publications/2010/03/downloads/11-drug-offences.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/press/publications/2010/03/downloads/11-drug-offences.pdf Shelf Number: 119853 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Offenses Drug Trafficking Sentencing

Author: Nopens, Patrick F.P. Title: Countering Afghan Narcotics: A Litmus Test for Effective NATO and Russia Cooperation? Summary: Afghan opiates kill 100,000 people a year globally. Every year NATO countries lose over 10,000 people to heroin overdoses. In Russia an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people die of drug overdoses yearly. Counter-narcotics in Afghanistan is an area where NATO’s and Russia’s interests clearly coincide. If NATO and Russia cannot find a way of effectively cooperating in this matter, not only will the Afghan narcotic problem spiral completely out of control, but NATO-Russia cooperation could come under pressure. Details: Brussels, Belgium: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2010. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Security Policy Brief, No. 14: Accessed October 5, 2010 at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-gov/SPB-14-Nopens-countering-afghan-narcotics.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-gov/SPB-14-Nopens-countering-afghan-narcotics.pdf Shelf Number: 119859 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Narcotics Opiates Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: An Asessment of Transnational Organized Crime in Central Asia Summary: Transnational organized crime in Central Asia represents a serious threat to the region inhibiting the emergence of stable societies. This report provides an overview of the scope of the problem of transnational organized crime in Central Asia. The report identifies trafficking in drugs, human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption as the principle and most serious crimes in the Central Asian region. It provides an analytical framework based on causal factors as well as on facilitating and inhibiting factors. Acknowledging the difficulties and limitations associated with research on organized crime in Central Asia, the report is a synthesis of information from a multitude of sources. It includes information provided by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan together with data and information drawn from secondary literature, expert opinions and other sources. An analysis of organized crime in Central Asia must take into account historical, political, social and economic developments in the region. Most states in Central Asia are in a transitional period and are characterized by developing, but still relatively low levels of effective governance. Gaps in governmental capacity and voids created by weak and ineffective state institutions are a strong contributing factor in the proliferation of organized criminal activities. Moreover, cultural, religious and ethnic differences are exploited by organized criminals to achieve their objectives and to facilitate the spread of organized crime. Organized crime, therefore, must be seen as a consequence of the interplay between these various elements. The report discusses the specific structures and modes of operation of the Central Asian criminal groups. It highlights the diversity of those groups and the tendency towards more flexible network organizations. Various types of activities in which criminal groups are engaged are explored in the report, with drug trafficking presenting the most serious problem. With three of the Central Asian states, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, sharing borders with Afghanistan, the largest producer of illicit opiates in the world, Central Asia is an important transit zone for illicit drugs. A consequence of the drug trafficking has been a major increase in drug abuse in the region. However, it is not the only form of criminal activity associated with organized crime in the region. Organized crime activity includes significant—and in some cases growing—incidents of trafficking in human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption. Details: New York: UNODC, 2007. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 116541 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Fraud Human Trafficking Organized Crime Trafficking in Firearms

Author: de Andres, Amado Philip Title: West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as the New Threats to Global Security Summary: This paper provides an overview on the current situation in West Africa with regard to drug trafficking (cocaine, heroin and hashish), organized crime (from human trafficking to diamond trade and its link with terrorism financing) and terrorism. Details: Madrid: UNISCI, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: UNISCI Discussion Paper, No. 16: Accessed October 12, 2010 at: http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf Shelf Number: 119931 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Kilmer, Beau Title: Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help? Summary: U.S. demand for illicit drugs creates markets for Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and helps foster violence in Mexico. This paper examines how marijuana legalization in California might influence DTO revenues and the violence in Mexico. Key findings include: 1) Mexican DTOs' gross revenues from illegally exporting marijuana to wholesalers in the United States is likely less than $2 billion; 2) The claim that 60 percent of Mexican DTO gross drug export revenues come from marijuana should not be taken seriously; 3) If legalization only affects revenues from supplying marijuana to California, DTO drug export revenue losses would be very small, perhaps 2–4 percent; 4) The only way legalizing marijuana in California would significantly influence DTO revenues and the related violence is if California-produced marijuana is smuggled to other states at prices that outcompete current Mexican supplies. The extent of such smuggling will depend on a number of factors, including the response of the U.S. federal government. 5) If marijuana is smuggled from California to other states, it could undercut sales of Mexican marijuana in much of the U.S., cutting DTOs' marijuana export revenues by more than 65 percent and probably by 85 percent or more. In this scenario, the DTOs would lose approximately 20% of their total drug export revenues. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf Shelf Number: 119939 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Marijuana Violence

Author: McGuire, Peter L. Title: Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa: A Governance Challenge Summary: West Africa is one of the most impoverished, underdeveloped, and instability prone regions in the world. Many of the nation-states in the region are empirically weak: they lack the capacity to deliver public goods and services to their citizens, do not claim effective control over their territories, are marked by high levels of official corruption, and are plagued by political instability and violent conflict. Since 2004 the region has faced an unprecedented surge in illicit narcotics (primarily cocaine) trafficking, raising fears within the international community that foreign (largely South American) trafficking groups would engender escalated corruption and violence across the region. This paper examines the effect that the surge in narcotics trafficking has had on governance and security in the region, paying particular attention to the experience of Guinea-Bissau and neighboring Republic of Guinea (Guinea-Conakry), two West African states that have been particularly affected by the illicit trade. The central argument presented is that narcotics trafficking is only one facet of the overall challenge of state weakness and fragility in the region. The profound weakness of many West African states has enabled foreign trafficking groups to develop West Africa into an entrepôt for cocaine destined for the large and profitable European market, sometimes with the active facilitation of high-level state actors. Thus, simply implementing counter-narcotics initiatives in the region will have a limited impact without a long-term commitment to strengthening state capacity, improving political transparency and accountability, and tackling poverty alleviation and underdevelopment. Without addressing the root issues that allowed for the penetration of trafficking groups into the states of the region in the first place, West Africa will remain susceptible to similar situations in the future, undermining the region’s nascent progress in the realms of governance, security, and development. Details: Boston: Boston University, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: The Pardee Papers, No. 9: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2010/03/Pardee_Paper-9-Narcotics-Trafficking.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2010/03/Pardee_Paper-9-Narcotics-Trafficking.pdf Shelf Number: 119953 Keywords: Cocaine Corruption Drug Trafficking Narcotics Organized Crime Poverty

Author: Title: Colombia: President Santos's Conflict Resolution Opportunity Summary: President Juan Manuel Santos, in office since 7 August 2010, has an opportunity to end Colombia’s generations of armed conflict by building on but adjusting and substantially broadening the strategy followed for eight years by his predecessor. Alvaro Uribe’s predominantly military approach – the “democratic security policy” – did produce important security gains, but Colombia remains plagued by new illegal armed groups (NIAGs) and other criminal actors. By concentrating mainly on fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it neglected other sources of violence and, most importantly, failed to address underlying causes of the conflict. Santos, who was elected with the largest majority in history, should use his political capital to implement a more integrated conflict resolution strategy that advances institutional and structural reforms needed to address illegality and impunity, expand access to services and tackle issues of land and victims’ rights. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource; Latin America Report No. 34; Accessed October 15, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/34%20Colombia%20-%20President%20Santoss%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Opportunity.ashx Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/34%20Colombia%20-%20President%20Santoss%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Opportunity.ashx Shelf Number: 119980 Keywords: Criminal Violence Drug Trafficking Militant Groups Organized Crime

Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez: An Analysis of Human Rights Violations by the Military in Mexico Summary: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America: Mexico: Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center (Center Prodh), 2010. 15p. Details: This report focuses on human rights violations that occurred in Ciudad Juarez in the context of Joint Operation Chihuahua, which began in March 2008, and reviews the drug policies adopted by the Mexican government, with support from the U.S. government, to address the security crisis in Mexico. The report aims to give voice to some of the victims of the war against organized crime in Mexico: in particular, individuals who have been abused by the very security forces who are supposed to protect them. It does not seek to minimize the countless atrocities committed by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups in Mexico, which have been widely reported in the press. Rather, the report focuses on human rights violations — including forced disappearances, torture and arbitrary detentions — that have been committed by the Mexican government’s security forces, mainly the Mexican military, in the context of the counter-drug efforts in the country. The failure to hold soldiers responsible for the violations they commit leads to more abuses, weakens citizen trust, and undermines the population’s willingness to collaborate in the struggle against any type of crime. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2010 at: http://www.wola.org/images/stories/Mexico/wola%20prodh%20juarez%20report%20color.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wola.org/images/stories/Mexico/wola%20prodh%20juarez%20report%20color.pdf Shelf Number: 119981 Keywords: Criminal Violence Drug Trafficking Forced Disappearances Human Rights Military Personnel Organized Crime Torture

Author: Killebrew, Bob Title: Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security Summary: Criminal networks linking cartels and gangs are no longer simply a crime problem, but a threat that is metastasizing into a new form of widespread, networked criminal insurgency. The scale and violence of these networks threaten civil governments and civil societies in the Western Hemisphere and, increasingly, the United States as well. American policymakers have been slow to recognize the evolution of the drug cartels and gangs from purely law enforcement problems to the strategic threat they now pose. Drug trafficking is variously described solely in terms of a drug problem, a challenge to other countries or a problem for states along the United States' southern border. Drug trafficking groups are, in fact, a threat across all these categories – they are part of networks attacking the United States and other friendly countries on many fronts. Although the U.S. government is currently implementing measures to address the separate pieces of this problem – for example, deploying National Guard units to the border – it has yet to craft a truly comprehensive domestic and foreign strategy to confront the inter-related challenges of trafficking and violence reaching from the Andean Ridge to American streets. This report is the product of a yearlong study by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). It seeks to explain the scale of organized crime in key countries in the Western Hemisphere and provide elements of such a strategy. We make these observations based on research and analysis of regional trends as well as conversations with government and law enforcement officials, in the United States and abroad, on the front lines of this fight. The first section presents the geography of crime in Latin America, outlining how the criminal networks in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and other countries in between pose a common problem for the region and the United States. While the circumstances and potential futures of each country differ, they are linked. The following section shows how the same networks are also active and growing within the United States, posing the need for domestic as well as foreign action. The last section of this study recommends principles to guide a national strategy against cartels and gangs. Finally, to make the point that illegal drug trafficking is not the cartels’ only business, the appendix summarizes the major kinds of illicit commerce that support organized criminal groups in this hemisphere. Details: Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 20, 2010 at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_KillebrewBernal.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_KillebrewBernal.pdf Shelf Number: 119971 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Leijonmarck, Erik Title: The Role of Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan's Ethnic Crisis Summary: On October 10, Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections. According to reports, the elections were surprisingly free and fair. Unfortunately, the problem of state criminalization remains. The new government will face a tough task when dealing with this problem. The conflict that erupted in June in southern Kyrgyzstan is generally seen as being driven by external factors, such as Islamic radicals exploiting socio-economic grievances and the extreme politicization of ethnicity and identity. Although these are important factors, the role of organized crime in the outbreak of ethnic conflict should not be overlooked. Behind the conflict lies the interplay between external and domestic factors as well as the link between regional/local organized crime and the corrupt family politics of former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2010. 3p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Policy Brief, No. 39: Accessed November 1, 2010 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_leijonmarck-asyrankulova_the-role-of-organized-crime.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_leijonmarck-asyrankulova_the-role-of-organized-crime.pdf Shelf Number: 120148 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Organized Crime State Crime

Author: Porobic, Jasmin Title: Arms Availability and its Impact on Drug Trafficking: A Balkan Perspective Summary: Large scale weapons stockpiling during contemporary Balkan wars left behind massive quantities of arms and other military equipment. The reaction of the international community to the outbreak of the wars was to establish an arms embargo, which had little effect, as the republics turned to the international black marketers and in a world-wide arms trading within organized crime groups from all over the world. Moreover, after the conflicts, disarmament processes were not efficient, leaving most of the arms beyond effective government control. Arms trafficking was closely tied with organized crime activities for their great profitability and existed in areas of armed conflict and where organized groups needed arms for own protection or violent activities. This environment led to the development of smuggling channels and reinforced the organized crime groups. Initially, channels were used to smuggle arms but also other scarce goods which led to strengthening of organized crime groups’ cooperation in fostering the black market. The conflicts (1991-1999) in the Former Yugoslavia provided ample opportunities for arms and drugs trafficking in unprecedented proportions. Unlike opposing legal structures, organized crime groups in the Balkans are multiethnic, transnational and well-integrated within its corresponding European criminal counterparts. Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Kosovar, Montenegrin and Serbian criminal groups work not only together but also with drug manufacturers from Asia and South America and European distributors. Today, Albania is among the leading countries in the world in processing opium, with widespread organized criminal groups in all former Yugoslav republics and throughout the world. During the conflicts, more often than not, proceeds from drug trafficking and distribution were used to buy the weaponry to arm certain belligerent groups. Recent police actions to combat organized criminal groups in virtually all cases indicate that arms smuggling is consistently linked to drugs trafficking. The police reports show that every police operation stepping up the fight against organized crime seizes large quantities of both drugs and arms as it goes ‘hand in hand’. Attempts of illegal cross-border trafficking of drugs and arms have been a common occurrence. Despite permanent police operations aimed at suppressing organized criminal activity this phenomenon is on the rise. For example, among numerous actions – within the scope of the region-wide police operation dubbed Network 2010, large quantities of narcotics and arms were seized at the Klobuk border crossing near Trebinje between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Some 155 kilograms of a potent strain of cannabis, ‘skunk’, and 276 rifles were found in a hidden compartment of a truck after a months-long, carefully planned operation. However, the fight against these types of organized crime activities is difficult in this region given the high rate of corruption and links between organized crime groups and high state officials. This policy paper therefore provides a general overview of trends and circumstances surrounding the most resilient sectors of organized crime – illicit drugs and arms – and comparatively assesses the efforts of governments in the Western Balkans in containing them. It further offers possible remedial solutions to the problem. An analysis of domestic and international academic literature, appropriate legislation and security agency materials, as well as deductive, comparative and descriptive were utilized in preparation of the policy paper. Data were gathered by using interrogative method and individual interviews of narrowed-down population of officials from various police agencies, judicial and customs institutions involved in small arms control and organized-crime investigative matters. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief Series, No. 13: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/179_Policy_Brief_13_-_Arms_availability_and_its_impact_on_drug_trafficking._A_Balkan_perspective.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/179_Policy_Brief_13_-_Arms_availability_and_its_impact_on_drug_trafficking._A_Balkan_perspective.pdf Shelf Number: 120163 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Aguiar, Jose Carlos Title: Stretching the Border: Smuggling Practices and the Control of Illegality in South America Summary: The Tri-Border Region in South America spreads across the frontiers of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. It encompasses a trans-border urban conglomerate of about 600 thousands inhabitants in the three countries. Through the years, it has been a frontera porosa (porous border) where trafficking boomed after Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner declared Ciudad del Este a free-trade zone in the 1960s. The city soon became a shopping paradise for counterfeit cigarettes and spirits. Yet, since the 2000s there are signs of some reordering in the region. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government encouraged national states to control the flows of people and goods at the region. Allegedly, illegal activities are headed by international networks, which would finance religious extremism around the globe. The governments have accordingly launched a number of plans to improve surveillance, such as the Integrated System of Migration Registration (SICaM in Spanish) in Argentina in 2005 and the 'sacoleiro law' in 2009, an attempt to regulate smuggling in Brazil. Paraguay has also embarked in 2009 in the renewal of the customs office at the international bridge. These policies reveal programmes of increasing state intervention to halt trafficking in electronics, drugs, weapons and humans, and any kind of undocumented border crossing. This article poses the concept border synergy to capture the mobility of goods and values across boundaries, which entails a double connotation, that of the border as the national limit between countries, but also the one defining legal and illegal domains. This argument is based on ethnographic material gathered at the Tri-Border Region during a period of three years. Participant observations, interviews and visual recording were among the research techniques applied. The informants include local entrepreneurs and sellers, social workers, religious leaders, municipal and federal authorities, and smugglers. Polyphony guarantees here a dense ethnographic description. The results presented give evidence from an anthropological perspective on the trans-border smuggling across the national frontiers of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, and the extent economic agents manipulate borders in region. The policies implemented to 'regulate' smuggling and halt illegal practices at the Tri-Border Region raise relevant questions regarding the study of border cities, transnational trade and illegality. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: New Voices Series, No. 6: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/181_New_Voices_Series_6_-_Stretching_the_Border_-_Smuggling_Practices_and_the_Control_of_Illegality_in_South_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South America URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/181_New_Voices_Series_6_-_Stretching_the_Border_-_Smuggling_Practices_and_the_Control_of_Illegality_in_South_America.pdf Shelf Number: 120164 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Illicit Trade Smuggling

Author: Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009 Summary: Mexico closed the decade with an unprecedented level of violence, and a record number of drug-related killings in 2009. In light of the spectacular nature of this violence and the challenge it represents for the Mexican state, it raises serious concerns for the Mexican public, for policy makers, and for Mexico's neighboring countries. This report provides an overview of the trends found in available data on drug-related killings in Mexico, and offers some brief observations about the causes of violence and the effectiveness of recent efforts to combat organized crime. Details: San Diego, CA: Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2010 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/2010-Shirk-JMP-Drug_Violence.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/2010-Shirk-JMP-Drug_Violence.pdf Shelf Number: 120171 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Violence (Mexico) Violent Crime

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of ATF's Project Gunrunner Summary: This review by the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined the impact of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) implementation of Project Gunrunner on the illicit trafficking of guns from the United States to Mexico. Violence associated with organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico is widespread, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. In part because Mexican law severely restricts gun ownership, drug traffickers have turned to the United States as a primary source of weapons, and these drug traffickers routinely smuggle guns from the United States into Mexico. The criminal organizations responsible for smuggling guns to Mexico are typically also involved in other criminal enterprises, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and cash smuggling. This requires ATF to work with other federal entities, as well as with state and local law enforcement partners, in sharing intelligence, coordinating law enforcement activities, and building cases that can be prosecuted. To help combat firearms trafficking into Mexico, ATF began Project Gunrunner as a pilot project in Laredo, Texas, in 2005 and expanded it as a national initiative in 2006. Project Gunrunner is also part of the Department’s broader Southwest Border Initiative, which seeks to reduce cross-border drug and firearms trafficking and the high level of violence associated with these activities on both sides of the border. In June 2007, ATF published a strategy document, Southwest Border Initiative: Project Gunrunner (Gunrunner strategy), outlining four key components to Project Gunrunner: the expansion of gun tracing in Mexico, international coordination, domestic activities, and intelligence. In implementing Project Gunrunner, ATF has focused resources in its four Southwest border field divisions. In addition, ATF has made firearms trafficking to Mexico a top ATF priority nationwide. The OIG conducted this review to evaluate the effectiveness of ATF’s implementation of Project Gunrunner. Our review examined ATF’s enforcement and regulatory programs related to the Southwest border and Mexico, ATF’s effectiveness in developing and sharing firearms trafficking intelligence and information, the number and prosecutorial outcomes of ATF’s Project Gunrunner investigations, ATF’s coordination with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement partners, ATF’s traces of Mexican “crime guns,” and challenges that ATF faces in coordinating efforts to combat firearms trafficking with Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2010. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2010 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf Shelf Number: 120279 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gun Violence Guns Organized Crime Trafficking in Weapons Weapons

Author: Leslie, Glaister Title: Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica Summary: Jamaica’s murder rate—62 per 100,000 in 2009— is one of the highest in the world. The small island grapples with violent crime within a context of gangs, guns, and allegations of political and police corruption. This report presents an overview of the history, prevalence, and distribution of gangs, focusing in particular on their involvement in international drug and arms trafficking and the possible influence of deportees from the United States. It finds that there is a dense social web connecting highly organized, transnational gangs to loosely organized gangs whose activities are often indistinguishable from broader community violence. Persistent facilitation of gang activity by politicians continues to hinder targeted violence reduction efforts, despite the government’s public condemnation of crime and violence, and official support of violence reduction. The report’s findings include: There are around 268 active gangs operating throughout the island, five times the number estimated in 1998; Gangs are accused of being responsible for as much as 80 per cent of all major crimes in Jamaica; Over the past decade, murders committed in Jamaica have almost doubled, and gun-related murders have driven the increase; Most firearms seized in Jamaica are traced back to three counties in the US state of Florida, all of which have large Jamaican populations. Most small arms used in crimes are believed to have entered the country illegally, but much of the ammunition appears to have entered the country legally before being transferred to illicit markets. The discovery in early 2010 of large amounts of illegal ammunition and firearms — all originating from the police force’s central armoury—has conclusively linked security forces to the distribution of ammunition and weapons to criminals. Reductions in Jamaica’s violence will be short-lived unless the linkages between politicians, organized crime, and gangs are severely eroded. Community policing may offer an important alternative to security forces’ more repressive approaches to crime control. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 26: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP26-Jamaica-gangs.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Jamaica URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP26-Jamaica-gangs.pdf Shelf Number: 120297 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gang Violence Gangs (Jamaica) Illegal Trade Trafficking in Weapons Violent Crime

Author: Xiu, Liu Title: Organized Crime and the Black Economy in China Summary: Organized crime has now become a serious social problem in all cities in China. Officially, the Chinese government has thus far acknowledged that only a few criminal groups have acquired so-called mafia-like characteristics in their organizational structure. However, there are no real mafia-type organizations in China. Organized crime in China mainly engages in drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, human trafficking, manufacture and smuggling of counterfeit money and guns, prostitution, etc. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 7: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/173_Working_Paper_7_-_Organized_Crime_and_the_Black_Economy_in_China.pdf Year: 2010 Country: China URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/173_Working_Paper_7_-_Organized_Crime_and_the_Black_Economy_in_China.pdf Shelf Number: 120299 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime (China) Prostitution Smuggling Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Goodhand, Jonathan Title: Drugs and (Dis)Order: A Study of the Opium Trade, Political Settlements and State-Making in Afghanistan Summary: This paper represents one contribution to a wider research project led by the Crisis States Programme2, which examines how patterns of resource mobilisation and rent appropriation, in war to peace transitions, shape wider political relations and institutions. The research aims to test the hypothesis that particular types and patterns of rent appropriation may contribute to more inclusive/exclusive political settlements which translates into more/less stability of the state. Here we are primarily concerned with the political economy of post-Bonn Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the role of the drugs industry and its impacts upon processes of state-building and peace-building. Section one introduces our theoretical framework and background on the Afghan case. Section two gives an overview of the structural characteristics and contemporary dynamics of the drugs industry. Section three provides a comparative analysis of the linkages between drugs, the political settlement and post conflict state-building, through three provincial level studies. Section four building on the case studies and relevant literature draws out some of the underlying relationships and broader patterns connecting drugs, violence and political coalitions in Afghanistan. Section five outlines some tentative conclusions and broader theoretical and policy implications. Details: London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2010. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP83.2.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP83.2.pdf Shelf Number: 120305 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drugs ( Afghanistan) Opium Trade

Author: Koenders, Sara Title: Between Trust and Fear: Mothers Creating Spaces of Security Amid Violence in Vila Cruzeior, Rio de Janeiro Summary: In interaction between the gang, the police and the residents of Vila Cruzeiro a cycle of violence, fear, and insecurity is produced and maintained. This interaction is based on images the actors hold of one another and that are at the same time the product of this interaction. The police and the gang are creating, acting upon and reinforcing structures of domination, signification, and legitimation which have allowed for the militarization of policing and increasing presence of traffickers enforcing a ‘law of the favela.’ The cycle of violence is so persistent mainly because the police not only fails to guarantee security, but is often directly involved in the perpetuation of crime. At the same time, the ‘war on crime’ is used to legitimize repressive and indiscriminate policing that poses a serious threat to the lives of the residents. This leadsr esidents to rely more and more on the traffickers. Thus, although the relations between gang members and residents are multiple and highly ambiguous, residents tend to be more sympathetic towards the traffickers with whom they live on a day-to-day basis. The traffickers use the negative image of the state to gain support from the residents, while state involvement in criminality sustains the presence of the drug gang. Hence, in interaction between police, gang and residents an environment of violence, fear, and insecurity is created and constantly reproduced. Faced by these challenging and precarious circumstances, women trying to protect and provide for their children create spaces of security. To create these ‘safe’ spaces mothers cultivate, arrange and create social relations with other actors in the community. I claim that in a context of high-risk and violence, social capital plays an important but limited and ambiguous role in this process of coping. Informal and formal social relations carry and produce social capital and are therefore valuable to the creation of spaces of security. From information exchange, reciprocity, norms, rules and trust constituted through these relations a sense of security can be drawn. Strengthening and employing the relations with their children, relatives and a careful choice of friends therefore contributes to the construction of a sense of safety in the face of violence. At the same time people negotiate their relations with social organizations in order to create spaces of security. Education is considered crucial to ensure a better future for children. It keeps them off the street and ideally provides a way out of the context of violence. Churches also take an important place in the coping strategies of mothers; many women see the church as a safe alternative environment in which to raise their children, a place where they learn ‘the good’. Religion can be seen as a gendered form of oppositional culture; one that keeps youngsters out of gang life, or provides a way out of the traffic. The community center is also seen as a secure space to leave their children, and a place where they are offered alternative activities. In addition, it is platform to meet with other women and discuss problems they encounter. Moreover, the members of the neighborhood association are among the few people in the community challenging violence. Details: Utrecht, The Netherlands: Utrecht University, 2008. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 30, 2010 at: http://www.laruta.nu/files/uploads/23/document_document/between%20trust%20and%20fear.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.laruta.nu/files/uploads/23/document_document/between%20trust%20and%20fear.pdf Shelf Number: 118782 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gang Violence Gangs (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) Security Violent Crime

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed Summary: The illicit drug trade remains a challenge to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces over 90 percent of the world's opium, which competes with the country's licit agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels corruption in Afghanistan. Since 2005, the United States has allotted over $2 billion to stem the production, consumption, and trafficking of illicit drugs while building the Afghan government's capacity to conduct counternarcotics activities on its own. In this report, GAO (1) examines how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has changed; (2) assesses progress made and challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program areas; and (3) assesses U.S. agencies' monitoring and evaluation efforts. To address these objectives, GAO obtained pertinent program documents and interviewed relevant U.S. and Afghan officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy has changed emphasis across program areas over time to align with the overarching counterinsurgency campaign. The 2005 U.S. counternarcotics strategy focused on five program areas: elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and alternative livelihoods. Since then, U.S. Department of Defense (Defense) policy and rules of engagement were changed to allow greater military involvement in Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts due to the ties between traffickers and insurgents. Furthermore, the U.S. counternarcotics strategy has shifted to align more closely with counterinsurgency efforts by de-emphasizing eradication, focusing more on interdiction efforts, and increasing agricultural assistance. The United States' use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure of overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does not capture all aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In recognition of this, the administration is attempting to develop measures that better capture overall counternarcotics success. U.S. agencies have reported progress within counternarcotics program areas, but GAO was unable to fully assess the extent of progress due to a lack of performance measures and interim performance targets to measure Afghan capacity, which are a best practice for performance management. For example, although Defense is training Afghan pilots to fly interdiction missions on their own, this program lacks interim performance targets to judge incremental progress. Furthermore, a lack of security, political will, and Afghan government capacity have challenged some counternarcotics efforts. For example, eradication and public information efforts have been constrained by poor security, particularly in insurgency-dominated provinces. In addition, other challenges affect specific program areas. For example, drug abuse and addiction are prevalent among the Afghan National Police. Monitoring and evaluation are key components of effective program management. Monitoring is essential to ensuring that programs are implemented as intended, and routine evaluation helps program managers make judgments, improve effectiveness, and inform decisions about current and future programming. U.S. agencies in all counternarcotics areas have monitored program progress through direct U.S. agency oversight, contractor reporting, and/or third-party verification. For example, eradication figures were routinely reported by U.S. Department of State (State) officials and contractors, and verified by United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime monitors. U.S. agencies also conducted and documented program evaluations to improve effectiveness in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and public information program areas. However, State has not formally documented evaluations of its justice reform program. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-291: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10291.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10291.pdf Shelf Number: 120492 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drugs Illegal Drug Trade (Afghanistan) Narcotics

Author: Kent, Stephen G. Title: Combat Drug Zone 2010: The United States Southwest Border Summary: Globalization and associated domestic variables such as the economy, energy, weapons proliferation, environmental issues and terrorism, dominate today’s discussions, and resulting priorities. While a majority of Americans can readily identify with the everyday realities and stressors of life, few are cognizant of the looming crisis of narco trafficking. Given the proximity of the major friction points, spill over effects and regional security implications are increasingly amplified which potentially affect every citizen and the security of the nation. This analysis illustrates the precipitating factors contributing to the rise in drug trafficking, discussion on the multiple second and third order effects and an examination on policy alternatives for the U.S. Government. Statistics and experience illustrates that previous and current U.S. policies have not created the desired effect on narco trafficking. Considering the security environment post 9-11, increased counter drug budgets, the illicit drug trade is flourishing requiring radically new strategies. The Mexican Border drug epidemic arguably requires urgent and careful action by the U.S. Government. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategy Research Project: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518085&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518085&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 120497 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs

Author: Lin, Leo S.F. Title: Conceptualizing Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia in the Era of Globalization: Taiwan's Perspective Summary: This paper aims to scrutinize the transnational organized crime (TOC) in East Asia, and Taiwan in particular, in the era of globalization. This paper provides with a conceptual framework which allows us to examine the nature of transnational organized crime in the globalized world. It argues that TOC is a dual dimensional phenomenon—entity and activity dimensions— both dimensions of TOC have been largely affected by globalization. In East Asia, especially People’s Republic of China, where globalization has boosted the economy tremendously, created an unprecedented opportunity for TOC to grow. This paper argues that since most of the non-traditional TOC groups are difficult to classify because it is very much depending on the cases, it would be more clear and effective to profile the traditional type of TOC in East Asia. Several important traditional criminal groups are identified. Regarding the activity dimension, human trafficking and drug trafficking and smuggling are the two most serious and complicated issues in East Asia. This paper also identifies the source, transit and destination countries in human trafficking and drug trafficking and smuggling. As regards the TOC situation in Taiwan and its relations with East Asian countries, this paper analyzes the origin of Taiwan’s organized crime groups, which is both from locality and mainland China. Following globalization and Taiwanese economy recovery, Taiwan’s underworld went into a new stage of development, penetrating political, economic and other aspects in the society. As a result, many traditional organized crime groups vigorously expand their organizations oversees. Human trafficking and drug trafficking and smuggling are the main concerns for Taiwan government. Under the efforts of the government, the situation of both issues is improving. In recent years, with the openness and the increase exchanged with Mainland China, human and drug trafficking from Mainland China has become serious problems in Taiwan. Details: Athens, Greece: Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 146: Accessed December 16, 2010 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122411 Year: 2010 Country: Taiwan URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122411 Shelf Number: 120533 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime (Taiwan) Smuggling

Author: Olson, Eric L. Title: Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime Summary: The research for this volume is the product of a project on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation jointly coordinated by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego. As part of the project, a number of research papers were commissioned that provide background information on organized crime in Mexico, the United States, and Central America, and analyze specific challenges for cooperation between the United States and Mexico, including efforts to address the consumption of narcotics, money laundering, arms trafficking, intelligence sharing, police strengthening, judicial reform, and the protection of journalists. Each chapter in this volume was first released in a preliminary form as part of a “Working Paper Series” throughout 2010. Contents include the following: Introduction, by Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee; Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context by Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk; Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras by Steven S. Dudley; Crossing the Mississippi: How Black Tar Heroin Moved Into the Eastern United States by José Díaz-Briseño; How Can Domestic U.S. Drug Policy Help Mexico? by Peter Reuter; Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Mérida Initiative by Douglas Farah; Justice Reform in Mexico: Change & Challenges in the Judicial Sector by David A. Shirk; Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles by Daniel Sabet; Protecting Press Freedom in an Environment of Violence and Impunity by Dolia Estévez; Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges by Roderic Ai Camp; Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico: What are Mexican and U.S. Strategies? Are They Working? by John Bailey; and U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration: Intelligence Sharing and Law Enforcement Cooperation by Sigrid Arzt. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute: San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Shared%20Responsibility--Olson,%20Shirk,%20Selee.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Shared%20Responsibility--Olson,%20Shirk,%20Selee.pdf Shelf Number: 120552 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime (United States and Mexico)

Author: Transnational Institute Title: Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America Summary: A comparative study on the impact of drug policies on the prison systems of eight Latin American countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay – reveals that drug laws have contributed to the prison crises these countries are experiencing. The drug laws impose penalties disproportionate to many of the drug offenses committed, do not give sufficient consideration to the use of alternative sanctions, and promote the excessive use of preventive detention. The study found that the persons who are incarcerated for drug offenses tend to be individuals caught with small amounts of drugs, often users, as well as street-level dealers. Specifically, the study finds that most of the persons imprisoned for drugs are not high- or medium-level drug traffickers, but rather occupy the lowest links in the chain. According to the report, these laws have overcrowded the prisons – with a high human cost – but have not curbed the production, trafficking, or use of drugs. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute; Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2010. v.p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2010 at: http://www.druglawreform.info/index.php?option=com_flexicontent&view=category&cid=122&Itemid=46&lang=en Year: 2010 Country: Central America URL: http://www.druglawreform.info/index.php?option=com_flexicontent&view=category&cid=122&Itemid=46&lang=en Shelf Number: 120557 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Offenders Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Prisons (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecu

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Global SMART Programme Title: Myanmar: Situation assessment on Amphetamine-Type Stimulants Summary: The Situation Assessment provides a consolidated review of the ATS (Amphetamine-Type Stimulants) situation in Myanmar and the current developments with regard to the illicit manufacturing, trafficking and use of ATS in the country. The Situation Assessment also shows that the impact of methamphetamine and other amphetamine‐type stimulants trafficked from Myanmar extends not only to the immediate neighbouring countries but also to other countries in East and South‐East Asia. Seizures of methamphetamine pills tripled in 2009 – with most seizures being made in China, Thailand, Myanmar and Lao PDR. The increase in seizures has been most pronounced in China and Myanmar itself. But this phenomenon affects most of the countries in the Greater Mekong subregion to some degree, and methamphetamine pills sourced to Myanmar have been reportedly seized even in Oceania. Continuing insecurity and renewed hostilities during the past two years between the government and the ceasefire groups appear to be connected with the observed increase in illicit drug manufacture and trafficking both within and out of the country – primarily from the Shan State of Myanmar. In 2009, the total seizures of methamphetamine pills in Myanmar, Thailand and China amounted to more than 93 million – a rapid three‐fold rise from the approximate 32 million pills seized in 2008. With more than 66 million methamphetamine pills seized in Thailand and Lao People’s Democratic Republic already this year, there is a strong likelihood that total seizures in the region for 2010 will reach, if not surpass, the total seizures recorded in 2009. There are indications that the methamphetamine problem in Myanmar is becoming more severe. In 2009, large seizures of high purity crystalline methamphetamine were made in Myanmar. Authorities in both Myanmar and Thailand confirm that the manufacture of crystalline methamphetamine is now occurring in the Golden Triangle. Although most of the crystalline methamphetamine seized in Myanmar was destined for international markets, the domestic demand for methamphetamine pills in the country continues to grow. Meanwhile, drug‐dependence treatment in Myanmar is under‐resourced and there are no treatment facilities specifically focusing on ATS dependency. The Situation Assessment however notes the need for laws and policies conducive to dealing with synthetic drugs – as opposed to opiates – and the lack of sufficient information‐sharing between relevant agencies, the lack of consolidated information and focused research on ATS use, impede adequate progress. Details: Bangkok: Global SMART Programme, UNODC, 3020. 45p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Accessed December 22, 2010 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/eastasiaandpacific//2010/12/ops-myanmar-ats/Myanmar_ATS_Report_2010_lowres.pdf Year: 3020 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/eastasiaandpacific//2010/12/ops-myanmar-ats/Myanmar_ATS_Report_2010_lowres.pdf Shelf Number: 120586 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Methamphetamines (Myanmar)

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global SMART Programme Title: Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants and Other Drugs: Asia and the Pacific Summary: UNODC launched the Global Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and Trends (SMART)Programme in September 2008. The Programme seeks to enhance the capacity of Member States and authorities in priority regions, to generate, manage, analyse and report synthetic drug information, and to apply this scientic evidence-based knowledge to the design of policies and programmes. The Global SMART Programme is being implemented in a gradual phased manner, with East and Southeast Asia being the first focus region. This annual report is the second regional situation assessment for East and Southeast Asia put forward under the Global SMART Programme. It forms one of the essential key steps, in providing consolidated up-to-date analysis, based on the information shared by the member countries. It is hoped that the information on drug trends presented in this report will make a practical contribution to addressing the significant threat posed by illicit ATS manufacture, trafficking and use in the East and Southeast Asia region, and place policy-makers in a better position to evaluate the drug situation and to make informed decisions on intervention and prevention strategies. This report provides an overview of the ATS situation in the region. It outlines several key issues and emerging threats throughout the region and their implications for neighbouring regions. While the data presented points towards the increased efforts by the countries in the region to tackle the ATS problem, it also highlights the need for continued and joint efforts, both at the national as well as regional levels. It is hoped that this report and the forthcoming national and regional updates, will promote better understanding of the ATS problem and help in designing effective strategies to combat it. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 158p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/ATS_Report_2010_web.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/ATS_Report_2010_web.pdf Shelf Number: 120687 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Control Policies Drug Trafficking Substance Abuse (Asia and the Pacific)

Author: Haken, Jeremy Title: Transnational Crime In The Developing World Summary: This report analyzes the scale, flow, profit distribution, and impact of 12 different types of illicit trade: drugs, humans, wildlife, counterfeit goods and currency, human organs, small arms, diamonds and colored gemstones, oil, timber, fish, art and cultural property, and gold. Though the specific characteristics of each market vary, in general it can be said that these profitable and complex criminal operations originate primarily in developing countries, thrive in the space created by poverty, inequality, and state weakness, and contribute to forestalling economic prosperity for billions of people in countries across the world. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_high-res.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_high-res.pdf Shelf Number: 120716 Keywords: Art Crime Counterfeiting Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Human Trafficking Illicit Trade Offenses Against the Environment Transnational Crime Wildlife Crime

Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence Summary: In Mexico, the violence generated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years has been, according to some, unprecedented. In 2006, Mexico’s newly elected President Felipe Calderón launched an aggressive campaign — an initiative that has defined his administration — against the DTOs that has been met with a violent response from the DTOs. Government enforcement efforts have had successes in removing some of the key leaders in all of the seven major DTOs. However, these efforts have led to violent succession struggles within the DTOs themselves. In July 2010, the Mexican government announced that more than 28,000 people had been killed in drug trafficking-related violence since December 2006 when President Calderón came to office. Although violence has been an inherent feature of the trade in illicit drugs, the character of the drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico seems to have changed recently, now exhibiting increasing brutality. In the first ten months of 2010, an alarming number of Mexican public servants have been killed allegedly by the DTOs, including 12 Mexican mayors and in July, a gubernatorial candidate. The massacres of young people and migrants, the killing and disappearance of Mexican journalists, the use of torture, and the phenomena of car bombs have received wide media coverage and have led some analysts to question if the violence has been transformed into something new, beyond the typical violence that has characterized the trade. For instance, some observers have raised the concern that the Mexican DTOs may be acting more like domestic terrorists. Others maintain that the DTOs are transnational organized crime organizations at times using terrorist tactics. Still others believe the DTOs may be similar to insurgents attempting to infiltrate the Mexican state by penetrating the government and police. The growing security crisis in Mexico including the March 13, 2010, killing of three individuals connected to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, (two of the victims were U.S. citizens) has drawn the attention of the U.S. Congress and has raised concerns about the stability of a strategic partner and neighbor. Congress is also concerned about the possibility of “spillover” violence along the U.S. border and further inland. The 111th Congress held more than 20 hearings dealing with the violence in Mexico, U.S. foreign assistance, and border security issues. The 112th Congress is likely to be interested in progress made by the Calderón government in quelling the violence and asserting its authority in DTO strongholds, and in the implications for the United States. Members are also likely to continue to conduct close oversight of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and other related bilateral issues. This report provides background on drug trafficking in Mexico, identifies the major drug trafficking organizations operating today, and analyzes the context, scope, and scale of the violence. It examines current trends of the violence, analyzes prospects for curbing violence in the future, and compares it with violence in Colombia. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report No. 7-5700: Accessed February 8, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 120722 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Violence

Author: Mejia, Daniel Title: Cocaine Production and trafficking: What Do We Know? Summary: The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the information currently available on cocaine production and trafficking. The paper starts by describing the available data on cocaine production and trade, the collection methodologies (if available) used by different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. Next, it states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data match these hypotheses. The paper states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should guide future research on the key determinants of illicit drug production and trafficking. Finally, the paper studies the different policies that producer countries have adopted to fight against cocaine production and the role consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth Team, 2008. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research Working Paper 4618: Accessed February 9, 2011 at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/05/13/000158349_20080513084308/Rendered/PDF/wps4618.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/05/13/000158349_20080513084308/Rendered/PDF/wps4618.pdf Shelf Number: 120727 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Policies Drug Markets Drug Trafficking

Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010 Summary: Since the 1990s, Mexico has experienced a persistent public security crisis involving high rates of violent crime and increased violence among organized crime syndicates involved in drug trafficking and other illicit activities. In recent years, this violence has become so severe that officials in Mexico and the United States have expressed uncertainty about the Mexican state's ability to withstand the effects of this violence. Indeed, 2010 was the worst year on record for such violence, and was marked a sharp increase in politically targeted violence that included numerous assassinations and kidnappings of public officials. Until recently, there has been little detailed data or analysis available to gauge Mexico's drug related violence. Until January 2011, the Mexican government released only sporadic and unsystematic data on drug violence, and tracking by media sources produced widely varying estimates. In the absence of reliable information, sensationalistic reporting and government statements contributed to considerable confusion and hyperbole about the nature of Mexico's current security crisis. Fortunately, in recent months, greater public scrutiny and pressure on Mexican authorities resulted in a wealth of new data on Mexico's drug violence. This report builds on previous research by the Trans-Border Institute's Justice in Mexico Project (www.justiceinmexico.org), compiling much of this new data and analysis to provide a more complete picture of Mexico's drug war and the challenges it presents to both Mexico and the United States. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, 2011. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/2011-tbi-drugviolence2.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/2011-tbi-drugviolence2.pdf Shelf Number: 120749 Keywords: Assassinations Cartels Drug Trafficking Homicides Kidnappings Organized Crime Violent Crime (Mexico)

Author: Moran, Patrick Title: El Salvador and Guatemala: Security Sector Reform and Political Party System Effects on Organized Crime Summary: Since the signing of peace treaties in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1992 and 1996 respectively, both countries have experienced exploding levels of crime and violence as a result of gangs, drug trafficking organizations, and organized crime. Because both nations share many common traits, a general perception is that the causes and effects of criminal activity are similar in both countries. The patterns, causes, and effects of criminal activity, however, vary significantly between El Salvador and Guatemala. Specifically, organized crime - with its hallmarks of violence, corruption, and penetration of state institutions - is a problem that afflicts Guatemala much more than in El Salvador. Security sector reforms and the demilitarization of security forces in El Salvador prevented organized crime from gaining hold over time whereas police reform in Guatemala failed to purge the security apparatus of former militarized forces with ties to organized crime. A strong political party system in El Salvador acts as a gatekeeper in preventing many organized crime elements from penetrating the state while a weak party system in Guatemala allowed for much greater infiltration of illicit entities. Future policy regarding both countries should give greater attention to organized crime and political party systems. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 17, 2011 at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA501879 Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA501879 Shelf Number: 120812 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs Organized Crime (El Salvador and Guatemala)

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence Center Summary: The border between the United States and Mexico presents a long-standing challenge to U.S. law enforcement. Criminal organizations smuggle illicit drugs, undocumented aliens, and other contraband across the border into the United States, and cash and weapons into Mexico. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) led and funded intelligence center, located in El Paso, Texas, near Juarez, Mexico. EPIC focuses its programs on the collection and dissemination of tactical intelligence. EPIC provides federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies information they can use in investigations and operations that target smuggling and other criminal activities. When it was established in 1974, EPIC focused primarily on Mexican heroin traffickers and illegal alien and weapon smugglers. EPIC’s focus today is broader, providing an intelligence resource that targets a wider range of criminal activity. EPIC’s mission has evolved in response to a shift in focus to Southwest border smuggling and associated violence, and the need for improved collaboration and timely information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. EPIC currently hosts representatives from 21 different agencies and provides information to over 19,000 law enforcement officers and analysts who are approved EPIC users. This review by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined the roles and functions of EPIC and its analysis and dissemination of intelligence in support of federal, state, and local law enforcement investigations and interdiction operations. In this review, we interviewed representatives of investigative agencies that obtain intelligence from EPIC. We also conducted site visits at EPIC and several law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border and elsewhere, analyzed EPIC data and its performance measures, and reviewed U.S. national counter-drug strategy and policy materials. In addition, we administered a nationwide survey of EPIC users to obtain their perspectives on EPIC’s products and services. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2010. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: I-2010-05: Accessed February 18, 2011 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a1005.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a1005.pdf Shelf Number: 120826 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Smuggling

Author: Willis, Katie Title: Measuring the Effectiveness of Drug Law Enforcement Summary: Seizing drugs and arresting those who import, manufacture, grow and/or distribute these drugs is often viewed as the most important purpose of drug law enforcement. This view is certainly strong in popular media depictions of organised drug criminals. Unfortunately, the reality is perhaps far less entertaining or straightforward, although just as, if not more, important. While there is no doubt that a key role of drug law enforcement is to remove drugs and high-risk offenders from the community, the most critical factor is what this actually achieves in the longer term. That is, a community that is less burdened by the impact of drugs, such as crime, illness, injury and death. Increasingly, there is both internal and external pressure on drug law enforcement to demonstrate not just how much work they do (the seizures and arrests), but how well they do it (the community impacts)—something that has so far proven very difficult. This paper outlines the nature of these challenges and summarises findings from a national project that shows a practical and effective way forward in measuring the impacts of drug law enforcement. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 406: Accessed February 24, 2011 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/7/C/3/%7B7C3C0834-EE1D-4013-88D1-938A0D934782%7Dtandi406.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/7/C/3/%7B7C3C0834-EE1D-4013-88D1-938A0D934782%7Dtandi406.pdf Shelf Number: 120875 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Enforcement Drug Offenders (Australia) Drug Trafficking

Author: Vogel, Augustus Title: Investing in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges Summary: A growing number of Africa’s security challenges – narcotics trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, and armed robberies, among others – take place at sea. Illicit actors exploit Africa’s maritime space given its expansiveness and the limited number of vessels African governments can field to interdict this activity. In this Africa Security Brief, Augustus Vogel argues that technology can dramatically improve Africa’s maritime security coverage. However, to do so will require engaging Africa’s scientists who can guide and sustain these efforts. This will yield not only security but environmental and meteorological benefits for the continent. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 10: Accessed March 15, 2011 at: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/ACSS-Research-Papers/ACSS-10.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/ACSS-Research-Papers/ACSS-10.pdf Shelf Number: 120917 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Fishing Kidnappings Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy/Pirates Violence (Africa)

Author: Haddal, Chad C. Title: Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol Summary: The United States Border Patrol (USBP) has a long and storied history as our nation’s first line of defense against unauthorized migration. Today, the USBP’s primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals along the border. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed the USBP within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the USBP forms a part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. During the last decade, the USBP has seen its budget and manpower more than triple. This expansion was the direct result of congressional concerns about illegal immigration and the agency’s adoption of “Prevention Through Deterrence” as its chief operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry. Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy. In addition to a workforce of over 20,000 agents, the USBP deploys vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, and many different technologies to defend the border. In the course of discharging its duties, the USBP patrols 8,000 miles of American international borders with Mexico and Canada and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. However, there are significant geographic, political, and immigration-related differences between the northern border with Canada and the Southwest border with Mexico. Accordingly, the USBP deploys a different mix of personnel and resources along the two borders. Due to the fact that approximately 98.7% of unauthorized migrant apprehensions by the USBP occur along the Southwest border, the USBP deploys over 85% of its agents there to deter illegal immigration. The northern border is more than two times longer than the Southwest border, and features far lower numbers of aliens attempting to enter illegally, but may be more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. As a consequence of this, the USBP has focused its northern border efforts on deploying technology and cooperating closely with Canadian authorities through the creation of International Border Enforcement Teams. Some issues for Congress to consider could include the slow rate of integration between the USBP’s biometric database of illegal aliens and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) biometric database of criminals and terrorists; the number of unauthorized aliens who die attempting to enter the country each year; the increasing attacks on Border Patrol agents, and the threat posed by terrorists along the sparsely defended northern border as well as the more porous Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: RL32562: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Shelf Number: 121027 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Contraband Drug Trafficking Illegal Aliens Illegal Immigration Smuggling

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Caribbean Regional Office Title: The Value of Illegal Drug Exports Transiting the Caribbean - 1981-2000 Summary: What is the contribution of the trade in illegal drugs to the Caribbean economy? Given the inflation of data and figures presented in the mass media, it may seem that it is not difficult to estimate this contribution. A partial review of the mass media and scientific articles produces several dozen estimates for different concepts and countries. The variations between these estimates are so large that they cannot be explained solely in terms of the concepts employed or of methodological variations. In order to overcome the methodological weaknesses found in most estimates, this study will attempt to carry out a methodologically more refined experiment to calculate the value of the illicit drug exports from the Caribbean region. This quantification will be limited to the main export substances - cocaine and marijuana - ignoring the value of other illicit drugs that are reexported from the Caribbean, such as heroin or the various forms of amphetamine-type substances (ATS) for which the calculation is much more difficult and the significance in economic terms much lower for the time being. This academic experiment will use a demand-based methodology. In other words, starting with the value of demand in the countries that are importing drugs from the Caribbean, the model will try to infer the amount of drugs leaving the Caribbean. While the weakness of this focus and the limited reliability of the data on which the calculation is based cannot be ignored - and this shortcoming will be borne in mind throughout the paper - a demand-based methodology is preferred to other models based on capital or merchandise flows. Moreover, the annual corrections to these figures have tended to be quite significant. This trend in revising figures, apart from adding further doubts about the reliability of the data, prevents the use of historical data. Finally, the overstatement of these figures, perhaps with the intention of externalising the drug problem from the consumer to producing countries, has been conspicuous. Present estimates of illegal drug exports from the Caribbean will take into account only the amount of a drug that passes through a jurisdiction in the region and will ignore the quantities of drugs that merely transit the Caribbean Sea on the way from the producing to the consuming countries. The assumption in this choice is that drugs that go through the Caribbean Sea without stopping in a Caribbean jurisdiction have no substantive influence on the local economies. In addition, the analysis will be divided between substances, cocaine and marijuana, and exporting markets - the North American market, including both the United States and Canada, and the European market. Details: Bridgetown, Barbados: UNODC, Caribbean Regional Office, 2004. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2011 at: www.kfda.go.kr Year: 2004 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 121230 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs (Caribbean)

Author: Thouni, Francisco E. Title: The Impact of Organized Crime on Democratic Governance in Latin America Summary: Organized crime in Colombia is today more complex, diversified and sophisticated than when the cocaine industry started. Indeed, the illegal industry has been a catalyst that aggravated many of the main social conflicts of the country and encouraged the growth of organized crime. Organized crime has become a great obstacle to democratic governance in Colombia. We can say that the Mexican state is losing the war against drug trafficking and that therefore it must radically change its strategy because of the following: the spike in executions, the exponential increase in U.S. aid, the increased presence of the armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking and in public security in high risk cities, the transformation of Juarez into the most dangerous city in the world, increasing cocaine consumption and the sentiments that Mexico could become a failed state. The management, administration and overall control of public security matters and, amongst these, combating organized crime, as well as the organization and running of the police system remain in the hands of the police themselves, generating a sort of "police-ification" of public security. In Brazil, Paraguay and to a lesser extent in Uruguay this process has also included a strong tendency to incorporate the Armed Forces in the "war on organized crime", all prompted by the failings of the police system in tackling the problem. If Unasur is to be defined as an integration scheme and a successful one, certain basic questions have to be answered in the short-term: how is integration being defined-what are we talking about? The promotion of inter-regional dialogues, for instance between Unasur and the EU, could contribute to this process regarding three main issues: security and defense; security and democratic governance; and security, organized crime and transnational violence. Details: Berlin: Department for Latin America and the Caribbean, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2011 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07386.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Latin America URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07386.pdf Shelf Number: 121237 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Public Security Violence Violent Crime

Author: Maass, Citha D. Title: Afghanistan’s Drug Career: from War to Drug Economy Summary: This new AAN thematic report (with SWP Berlin) looks into the beginnings and the evolution of drug production in Afghanistan during its three decades-long war. Starting with the Western-supported anti-Soviet jihad in 1979, drug production became a major base for the country’s war economy. After the fall of the Taleban regime in 2001, the US rehabilitated the former mujahedin leaders who – as the Taleban regime had done – funded themselves to a large extent by trafficking drugs and turned into ‘war entrepreneurs’. From 2002 onwards, President Hamed Karzai co-opted these war entrepreneurs into the new political system. As a result, a new drugs economy consolidated, beginning in 2005, resulting in a new regulative system in post-war Afghanistan which the author terms a ‘criminalized peace’. Details: Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2011. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 5, 2011 at: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/20110401CithaM-Afghanistans_Drug_Career--FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/20110401CithaM-Afghanistans_Drug_Career--FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 121248 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drugs (Afghanistan)

Author: Killebrew, Bob Title: Security Through Partnership: Fighting Transnational Cartels in the Western Hemisphere Summary: The most dangerous threat to the United States and its allies in the Western Hemisphere is the growth of powerful transnational criminal organizations that threaten law, order and governance in Mexico and the seven states of Central America. Over 35,000 Mexicans have died in drug-related violence since 2006 when Mexican President Felipe Calderón began to crack down on the cartels; in 2010 more than 3,100 have died in Ciudad Juarez alone. In neighboring Guatemala, the government declared an official “state of siege” along its northern border with Mexico to permit its military to fight the los Zetas cartel. Unfortunately, efforts to counter cartels and drug trafficking have largely failed thus far. Worsening violence and instability in the region threaten U.S. national security interests and demand a stronger response. To address this threat, the United States and its partners in the region should look to Colombia for guidance and assistance. Colombia has fought similar threats with some success and is emerging from three decades of crisis fueled by drug trafficking organizations and violent cartels. While Colombia will face many challenges for some time to come, it is increasingly secure, democratic and able to help its neighbors. The United States and its partners throughout the Western Hemisphere stand the best chance of securing the region against the most dangerous cartels by attacking them together. A regional security framework such as the “Mesoamerican Security Corridor,” proposed by the U.S. Department of State, offers a new opportunity to link U.S. and Colombian assistance and counternarcotics programs in Mexico to address challenges in the Central American states to Mexico’s south. Such a regional security framework will be necessary to defeat the cartels and reinstitute the rule of law and justice. A key element of the framework should be greater synergies between major U.S. security assistance programs including the Mérida Initiative, Plan Colombia and nascent bilateral Colombian-Mexican cooperation. Details: Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 7, 2011 at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Partnership_KillebrewIrvine.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Partnership_KillebrewIrvine.pdf Shelf Number: 121268 Keywords: Cartels Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Transnational Crime

Author: Metaal, Pien Title: Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America Summary: A comparative study on the impact of drug policies on the prison systems of eight Latin American countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay – reveals that drug laws have contributed to the prison crises these countries are experiencing. The study Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America, published by the Transnational Institute (TNI) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), found that the persons who are incarcerated for drug offenses tend to be individuals caught with small amounts of drugs, often users, as well as street-level dealers. The drug laws impose penalties disproportionate to many of the drug offenses committed, do not give sufficient consideration to the use of alternative sanctions, and promote the excessive use of preventive detention. The weight of the law falls on the most vulnerable individuals, overcrowding the prisons, but allowing drug trafficking to flourish. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America; Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2011. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 8, 2011 at: http://www.druglawreform.info/images/stories/documents/Systems_Overload/TNI-Systems_Overload-def.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://www.druglawreform.info/images/stories/documents/Systems_Overload/TNI-Systems_Overload-def.pdf Shelf Number: 121288 Keywords: Drug Control Policy (Latin America) Drug Offenses Drug Trafficking Drugs Prison Overcrowding

Author: Nicholas, Roger Title: The Impact of Social Networks and Not-for-Profit Illicit Drug Dealing on Illicit Drug Markets in Australia Summary: This paper focuses on some of the dynamics at play in the lowest level of illicit drug retailing in Australia. It is not the purpose of this paper to fully document the functioning of these illicit drug markets. Rather, the aim is to point out some changes that appear to have occurred in the markets in recent years and to highlight some potential gaps in the knowledge base of the law enforcement sector concerning the functioning of these markets. The trafficking and retail sale of illicit drugs is, by definition, an illegal activity. The structure of illicit drug markets is often conceptualised as pyramidal, with a relatively small number of importers or producers of drugs at the top who sell their drugs to intermediaries, who on-sell them in ever decreasing quantities (perhaps involving some cutting of the drugs) until ultimately the drugs are sold at the retail level to consumers. The extent to which the supply pyramids are taller or flatter, and have longer or shorter supply chains, probably varies between different drugs and depends upon the modus operandi of the individuals and organisations involved in this trade. Some drugs such as cocaine, for example, appear to have very short, flat supply chains. Given that the supply of illicit drugs is illegal and can attract severe sanctions, it is reasonable to assume that, for the trade to occur,, there needs to be some combination of three factors present. The first of these is some form of motivation which, in the view of the offender, outweighs the severity of the sanctions which are likely to be imposed in the event of being apprehended for this offence. The second condition is a perception that the likelihood of being apprehended is such that the risk of involvement in the activities is considered reasonable. The third is a perception that the trafficking behaviour has become normalised and is not seen as criminal activity at all, or at least not an action with serious consequences. The most obvious motivation for trafficking and selling drugs is financial gain. This is clearly an important motivation for a large proportion of the (particularly upper level) supply chain. The major focus of this paper is the extent to which this profit motivation applies equally to all levels of the retail drug markets and to all drugs. Specifically, what is at issue are the motivations and dynamics that sit behind the transactions that occur at the lowest or retail level of the supply chain of illicit drugs in Australia. Without a good understanding of the motivations and modus operandi of all levels of the supply chain, it is very difficult for the law enforcement sector to effectively target its efforts. Details: Hobart, Tasmania: National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund, 2008. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper: Accessed April 12, 2011 at: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/pub/The%20impact%20of%20social%20networks.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/pub/The%20impact%20of%20social%20networks.pdf Shelf Number: 121316 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs (Australia) Social Networks

Author: Serrano-Berthet, Rodrigo Title: Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge Summary: Central America’s spiraling wave of crime and violence is threatening the region’s prosperity as countries face huge economic and human losses as a result of it. Aside from the pain and trauma inflicted upon victims, violence can cost the region up to 8 percent of its GDP when taking into account law enforcement, citizen security and health care costs. This is no small change for a region that in 2010 grew around 2 percent of GDP, while the rest of Latin America grew around 6 percent. To make matters worse, crime and violence also hampers economic growth, not just from the victims’ lost wages and labor, but by polluting the investment climate and diverting scarce government resources to strengthen law enforcement rather than promote economic activity, argues Crime and Violence in Central America: a Development challenge. But, in a redeeming twist, the study also suggests that a ten percent reduction of murder rates in the region’s most violent countries could boost annual economic growth by as much as a full one percent. Crime rates in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are among the top five in Latin America. In the region’s other three countries — Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama — crime and violence levels are significantly lower, but a spike in recent years has raised serious concerns. Some perspective may help gauge the extent of the problem. While Central America's population is roughly the same size as Spain's, Spain only registered 336 homicides in 2006, in sharp contrast with Central America’s 14,257 homicides – an average of 40 per day. Drug trafficking and a decades-long culture of violence emerge as the main culprits in Central America’s crime predicament. Easy access to firearms and weak judicial institutions are also to blame for the region’s violent state of affairs, according to the report. Narco trafficking ranks as the top cause for the rising crime rates and violence levels in Central America, a reflection in part of the sheer volume of narcotics flows through the area –90 percent of US-bound drugs, according to the study. Inherent traits of drug cartel operations, such as turf wars and vendettas between rival gangs, seem to fuel the region’s murder rates. The complexity of this situation calls for a regional approach and greater emphasis on prevention, at the expense of interdiction, which has proven insufficient to diminish the traffickers’ capacity. Also, successful strategies require actions along multiple fronts, combining prevention and criminal justice reform. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_ENGLISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_ENGLISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf Shelf Number: 121323 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drugs Gangs Gun Violence Homicides Violent Crime (Central America)

Author: Kego, Walter Title: Europe and Afghan Heroin Summary: As the war in Afghanistan reaches the decade mark, the effort to stem opium poppy cultivation has taken a turn for the worse. International efforts to defeat the Taliban have tapered into a regressed response to the problem that drugs play in this conflict. Anti-drug campaigns are floundering as opium prices rise, which acts as an incitement to continued and renewed farming. This could potentially further destabilize the previous efforts in a war in which there is a desperate need to show progress. Perhaps Europe can recognize a problem of which they are a part and find an alternative way to effectively address the issue at hand. Details: Stockholm: The Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2011. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: ISDP Policy Brief, No. 57: Accessed April 14, 2011 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2011_kego-hedlund_europe-and-afghan-heroin.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2011_kego-hedlund_europe-and-afghan-heroin.pdf Shelf Number: 121339 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financing Terrorism Heroin (Afghanistan) Opium

Author: Australian Crime Commission Title: Organised Crime in Australia 2011 Summary: The Organised Crime in Australia 2011 report is the third and largest report of its kind that the Australian Crime Commission has produced since 2008. The latest edition provides the most comprehensive unclassified profile of organised crime in Australia, including the characteristics of those involved, what drives them, the activities they are involved in and the extent and impact of organised crime. Most organised criminal activities in Australia are focused on illicit drug markets, although organised crime groups also engage in a wide variety of associated criminal activity including tax evasion, money laundering, fraud, identity crime and high tech crime. The impact of organised crime in Australia is serious and far exceeds the direct harm caused by the specific offences. In fact, the activities of high-threat serious and organised criminal enterprises result in significant harm to the Australian community. There are significant losses to the economy, including the redirection of resources that might otherwise be invested in legitimate business, reductions in tax revenue and increasing costs of law enforcement and regulation. The widespread impact extends to costs associated with longer-term health and social harm. The activities of organised criminal enterprises can also undermine public confidence in the integrity of key business sectors and government institutions. Details: Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2011. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2011 at: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/oca/_files/2011/oca2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/oca/_files/2011/oca2011.pdf Shelf Number: 121465 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Fraud Identity Theft Money Laundering Organized Crime (Australia) Tax Evasion

Author: Brown, Matthew M. Title: Engaging the Borderlands: Options for the Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations Summary: The security of the U.S.-Mexican border is an issue of considerable interest for both countries. The North American Free Trade Agreement has created a web of symbiotic links between the two countries. Unfortunately, this has also presented opportunities for illegal transit. These opportunities are increasingly exploited by Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) whose actions are destabilizing Mexico and increasingly penetrating into the United States. Increasing levels of violence, intimidation, and influence have rapidly become intolerable, demanding a government response. While widespread use of the U.S. military remains an option, the costs both economic and operational, make the use an unviable one. Rather a mixed approach of U.S. and Mexican capacity building and economic assistance is a preferred alternative. The increased capacity of U.S. and Mexican security and law enforcement organizations will over time disrupt, then dismantle the Mexican DTOs. Simultaneously, economic assistance aimed at developing impoverished Mexican regions will both legitimize the Mexican government while marginalizing the influx of narco-dollars. This combined approach provides stability to the region, increases cooperation between neighboring governments, and fosters further legitimate economic growth in the region. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2010. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2011 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136619&coll=limited Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136619&coll=limited Shelf Number: 121487 Keywords: Border Security Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Texas Border Security Council Title: Texas Border Security Council Report to Governor Rick Perry Summary: During the 80th Texas State Legislative Session, Governor Perry requested that the Texas Legislature appropriate $100 million to support border security operations along the 1,254 miles of Texas/Mexico Border. The 80th Texas State Legislature allocated $110 million for border security and created the Border Security Council through Senate Bill 11. The Council was formed to make recommendations to the Governor on reporting requirements, performance standards and audit measures for the use of state funds appropriated for border security, and to advise the Governor on the allocation of discretionary state homeland security funds. The Border Security Council held a series of five public hearings in the fall of 2007 and received testimony from business owners, law enforcement officers, local elected officials and private citizens. Throughout their five public hearings and three open meetings, the Border Security Council found the following: General Findings: Powerful and ruthless Mexican crime cartels dominate the U.S. drug and human smuggling business, and they use former military commandos and transnational gangs to support their operations on both sides of the border. The citizens who live in the smuggling corridors along the border suffer the daily consequences of smuggling-related violence, burglary, vandalism, and trespassing. Drug and human smuggling organizations victimize illegal aliens in search of economic opportunities in the U.S. A porous Texas/Mexico border threatens every region in the state and the nation. An unsecured border provides potential terrorists and their supporters an opportunity into enter the U.S. undetected. The federal government has not yet sufficiently staffed and equipped the Border Patrol to secure the Texas/Mexico border between the ports of entry. Border Security operations require substantial coordination, hard work and sacrifice by dedicated local and state law enforcement officers, Customs and Border Protection and other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard. The Council found that an exceptional level of coordination and cooperation among the local, state, and federal law enforcement community is essential for success. The federal government has not sufficiently staffed and equipped the Office of Field Operations at the ports of entry to prevent smuggling at the ports of entry, nor have they provided for the secure and efficient movement of people and commodities to and from Mexico. Until the federal government is able to secure the border, the State of Texas has an obligation to work closely with its local and federal partners to acquire and maintain operational control of the Texas/Mexico border. The Texas Border Security Strategy established by Governor Perry in February 2006, has been successful in reducing crime and enhancing border security. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Border Security Council, 2008. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 26, 2011 at: http://governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/Border-Security-Report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/Border-Security-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 121497 Keywords: Border Security (Texas/Mexico) Cartels Drug Trafficking Illegal Aliens Smuggling

Author: de Coning, Eve Title: Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry. Focus on: Trafficking in Persons; Smuggling of Migrants; Illicit Drugs Trafficking Summary: The study posed the questions whether there is transnational organized crime and other criminal activity in the fishing industry and, if so, what the vulnerabilities of the fishing industry are to transnational organized crime or other criminal activity. The research took the form of a six-month desk review of available literature, supplemented by ad hoc consultations and a two-day expert consultation held in Vienna, Austria. Importantly the study did not set out to tarnish the fishing industry. Rather, the study sought to determine whether criminal activities take place within the fishing industry to the detriment of law-abiding fishers, the legitimate fishing industry, local fishing communities and the general public alike. The study considered the involvement of the fishing industry or the use of fishing vessels in trafficking in persons (Chapter 2); smuggling of migrants (Chapter 3); illicit traffic in drugs (Chapter 4); and other forms of crime such as marine living resource crime, corruption, and piracy and other security related crimes (Chapter 5). Details: Vienna: United Nations, 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 9, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_in_the_Fishing_Industry.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_in_the_Fishing_Industry.pdf Shelf Number: 121659 Keywords: Child Trafficking Drug Trafficking Forced Labor Human Trafficking Illegal Fishing Illegal Migrants Maritime Crime Offenses Against the Environment Organized Crime Pirates/Piracy

Author: Delicato, Vincenzo Title: Maritime Security and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Approaches Summary: The Mediterranean Sea is particularly affected by illicit trafficking in drugs. Italy’s Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for all initiatives aimed at preventing and combating illicit drug trafficking in Italy and is also entrusted with planning and coordinating sea activities. In the last few years, a set of international rules has been drawn up to facilitate intervention at sea and standardize control procedures. In the field of drug trafficking, ad hoc European regulations have been developed and two centers for analysis and coordination in operations against drug trafficking at sea set up. However, Italy — while participating in the most recent operational cooperation initiatives — has not yet ratified the Council of Europe agreement implementing article 17 of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. It would be desirable to adopt more comprehensive legislative measures and establish intervention criteria for all law enforcement actors involved. Details: Washington, DC: Th e German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Mediterranean Paper Series 2010: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Delicato_drugs_final_Sept10.pdf;jsessionid=aJAqWaBkuOX8Pfhoia Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Delicato_drugs_final_Sept10.pdf;jsessionid=aJAqWaBkuOX8Pfhoia Shelf Number: 121761 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Maritime Crime Maritime Security

Author: Europol - European Police Office Title: EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2011 Summary: This report’s key finding is that organised crime is changing, having become more diverse in its activities and impact on society over the last two years. Notable features of this development include greater levels of collaboration between criminal groups, greater mobility in and around the EU, a diversification of illicit activity, and a growing dependence on a dynamic infrastructure, anchored in key locations and facilitated by widespread use of the Internet, in particular. Building on the findings of the 2009 OCTA, this year’s report includes findings from three perspectives: criminal commodities, criminal groups, and their geographical areas of operation. It confirms the prevalence of five criminal hubs in the EU, highlighting the particular impact of the South-East hub and the Western Balkans region. In the drugs trade, cocaine poses an increasing threat across the EU, with new supply routes emerging, while in other criminal sectors also, especially in regard to fraud, illegal immigration, and the rapidly growing emergence of the Internet as a key facilitator for criminal activity, the changing face of organised crime carries a big impact on society. Already a key component of the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM), the OCTA takes on added significance since the adoption of Council Conclusions on the creation and implementation of an EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime. This policy cycle identifies the OCTA as the basis for the identification of EU crime priorities and, thereafter, a coherent EU response to address those priorities. Targeted law enforcement action is needed to tackle the most dangerous criminal groups operating in Europe. Details: The Hague: Europol, 2011. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCTA)/OCTA_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCTA)/OCTA_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 121765 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Internet Crimes Organized Crime (Europe)

Author: Mannava, Priya Title: Dependent on Development: The Interrelationships Between Illicit Drugs and Socioeconomic Development Summary: In spite of the complex interrelationships between illicit drug production, trade and use and socioeconomic development (SED), drug control and development policies tend to occur in isolation of each other, as exemplified by the lack of inclusion of illicit drugs in the Millennium Development Goals. A failure to acknowledge the interconnections between these two areas hinders the effectiveness of both drug and development policies and also undermines a human rights based approach to both illicit drug policy and development policies and programs. 1.1 Aims of the report This report highlights the multifaceted relationships between illicit drug production, trade and use, and SED, and then demonstrates the ways in which the implementation of illicit drug control policies often hinders development sector gains; and furthermore, the ways in which many development sector policies actually increase vulnerability to illicit drug production, trade and use. By raising awareness on the links between drugs, drug policy, and SED, this paper aims to facilitate future research as well as initiate dialogue and collaboration between development and drug control agencies. 1.2 Approach & Terminology The report is based on the hypothesis that ‘Equitable SED is necessary for successful control of illicit drugs, while effective and human rights based illicit drug control is required to foster sustainable SED’. To test this hypothesis, we begin by examining the impact of SED on illicit drug production, trade, and consumption, and then conversely the affect of the three processes on SED. In so doing, we consider ‘illicit drug production/trade/consumption’ and ‘SED’ as independent variables, and expect that outcomes will hold true for diverse settings at various times and for different drugs. We also note that we are exploring associations rather than causality, expecting that there will be limited, and largely anecdotal, evidence available – at least these early formative research stages. Here, we define ‘socioeconomic development’ as the processes of social and economic development in a society, whereby the ‘socio-’ in socioeconomic development consists of “social change designed to promote the well-being of a population as a whole” (Midgley 2005) while the ‘economic’ refers to “qualitative change and restructuring in a country’s economy in connection with technological and social progress” (World Bank definition). ‘Control’ is referred to here as the processes undertaken in order to minimize the harms associated with the availability and use of drugs in a community at a given point of time. In line with the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ‘illicit drugs’ are defined as drugs produced, traded, and consumed for purposes prohibited by law, as outlined by the international drug control conventions. 1.3 Methods We conducted a review of formal and non-formal English language literature published between 1990 and 2010 on the relationships between illicit drug production, trade, and consumption, illicit drug policies, SED, and human rights. 2. Sizing the problem: illicit drugs – an overview 2.1 The need to control Policies and programs that aim to control or eradicate illicit drugs have been justified by the real and potential harms associated with illicit drugs: health problems, crime, decreased productivity, unemployment, and poverty. An international drug control system, based on three international conventions, specifies the types of illicit drugs and how these should be regulated. Despite control efforts, supply and demand of illicit drugs continue to be widespread. 2.2 The extent of illicit drug use, production, and trading. Noting the difficulties in measuring indicators related to illicit drugs, it is estimated that around 3.5% to 5.7% of the world’s populations aged between 15 to 64 years (155 to 250 million) consumes illicit drugs. Consumption continues to be higher in the wealthier regions of North America, Western Europe, and Oceania, though sharp rises in use are being witnessed in East and West Africa, the Middle East, and South America. Production of opium, which increased by 80% between 1998 and 2009, is highest in Afghanistan, which accounted for 60% of the world’s supply during the same period. Supply of cocaine, largely produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, was reported to have increased during the period of 2004 to 2007 as compared to earlier years, though the increase was not as dramatic as that of opium. Production of cannabis, the most widely produced illicit drug globally, and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) is prevalent in countries world-over. The illicit drug trade is also widespread, though data on seizures suggest the problem is more acute in those surrounding nations where illicit drug production or consumption is high. 2.3 Understanding demand and supply Demand and supply of illicit drugs are influenced by many interrelated and complex factors. Various intrapersonal, micro-environmental, and macro-environmental elements create vulnerabilities to the use of illicit drugs, while the employment opportunities and profits arising from illicit drug production and trading act as incentives to supply. There are thus broader socioeconomic issues which impact on engagement with illicit drug economies. 3. The interrelationships between socioeconomic development and illicit drugs 3.1 Impact of socioeconomic development on illicit drugs Both poor SED and enhanced SED can fuel illicit drug production, trade and consumption. Rural underdevelopment, conflict and economic crises are all factors that contribute to farming of illicit drug crops. Characteristics of plant-based illicit drugs mean that these crops are often a more viable option than licit ones in settings of poor SED. In countries ranging from Afghanistan to Colombia, to Morocco and Myanmar, evidence suggests that regions cultivating illicit drug crops are geographically and/or socially isolated, underdeveloped with few economic opportunities, and may also be plagued by violent conflict. Conflict, and the resultant instability, not only helps to facilitate and proliferate illicit drug economies, but in turn, often sustains the conflict – creating a mutually reinforcing cycle. In countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Myanmar, rebel and pro-government forces have used illicit drug economies to finance their activities. Conditions which contribute to weak SED such as unemployment, poverty, and marginalization may also create vulnerable environments for illicit drug use in both wealthy and less developed countries. For example, in the United States and United Kingdom, illicit drug use has been linked to socially and economically deprived urban settings. Similarly, studies in various countries of South America found that drug users were generally poorer, unemployed, and less educated. On the flip side, processes such as trade liberalization may in fact facilitate the flow of illicit drugs across borders. Though the type of association that exists between free trade and illicit drugs is yet to be understood, a modeling study suggests that in consuming countries, efforts to control trading may be hindered by free-trade policies. Modernization and the resultant change in values or norms that often accompanies SED may also lead to increased consumption of illicit drugs. In Indonesia and Pakistan, for instance, illicit drug use increased with newfound wealth and youth identifying themselves with images of Western popular culture. Within the socially marginalized Akha tribe in Laos, consumption of heroin and ATS increased following participation in the country’s market economy and in parallel with the country’s opium eradication program. 3.2. Impact of illicit drugs on socioeconomic development Simultaneously, illicit drug production, trade and consumption also affect SED. In the short-term, farmers and other members of impoverished communities benefit from illicit drug production and trade due to increased disposable income. At the national level, there may be a boost in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), reduced unemployment, and multiplier effects in other sectors, either due to increased expenditure in local markets or increased demand for production inputs of illicit drugs. For instance, a study dating back to the early 1990s found that a 10% increase in cocaine production in Bolivia resulted in a 2% increase in GDP and 6% decrease in unemployment. In Colombia, multiplier effects arising from the illicit drug economy helped to fuel growth in the property market. However, most of these short-term benefits are offset by the myriad of long-term adverse affects triggered by illicit drug economies. Firstly, the sheer volumes of money flowing from illicit drug economies help to encourage corruption. In several settings, there are reports of government and law enforcement officials turning a blind eye to illicit drugs in exchange for bribes. Secondly, social structures are disrupted as carers, such as single mothers or the income earner of the family, engage in risky trading of illicit drugs. As members of communities who participate in drug economies become richer, tensions in traditional power dynamics are created, thereby disrupting social harmony. Macroeconomic instability may also occur as a result of decreased investment in licit sectors, strengthening of the real exchange rate, and weakened effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies. The evidence to support these findings, however, is more limited. Violence and conflict between drug gangs, as well as between gangs and members of law enforcement, causes substantial mortality and morbidity while also isolating communities. In Mexico for example, drug-related killings have reached 28,000 over the past four years. In the United States, homicide rates have fluctuated in tandem with crack cocaine markets in cities where consumption is high and market sizes are substantial. There are considerable health costs associated with illicit drug use; for example, injecting drug use accounts for 10% of all HIV infections worldwide, and 30% outside sub-Saharan Africa. Drug users are also likely to be less productive; a study by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 5 different countries found that occupational injuries were 2-4 times higher and absenteeism 2-3 times greater amongst drug users as compared to non-drug users. The relationships between illicit drug economies and SED are thus two-way and simultaneous. Causality is more difficult to determine given that illicit drug economies and factors that contribute to SED can interact in a mutually reinforcing cycle. Corruption, violence and conflict can for example facilitate illicit drug production, trade and consumption, which in turn can sustain corruption, violence and conflict. 4. Paradox on paradox: effects of illicit drug control policy on socioeconomic development International and national illicit drug control policies have traditionally focused on reducing demand and supply of illicit drugs. Policies that focus on minimizing the harms associated with drug use are increasingly being adopted by many nation states. Supply side policies comprise traditional law enforcement approaches, including attempts to eradicate illicit drug cultivation and production; this latter approach sometimes accompanied by ‘alternative development’ programs that focus on providing other economic opportunities to communities that farm illicit drugs. To date, evidence suggests that these policies have been largely ineffective in deterring cultivation of illicit drug crops, as supply of various drugs has either been maintained or increased. In response to eradication programs in Colombia and Mexico, for instance, farmers simply shifted to farming opium on smaller and more dispersed fields. These policies have largely been unsuccessful in part because of the weak acknowledgement of the fact that illicit drugs and associated harms are often a result of a broader range of political, cultural and socioeconomic factors. By adopting approaches that are guided by narrowly defined goals and are not based on the political, social or cultural realties of a particular development context, law enforcement and eradication attempts actually cause further, multiple, harms and thereby weaken SED in communities. Examples from coca-producing Andean countries, as well as from Afghanistan and Myanmar where opium poppy cultivation is widespread, show how law enforcement and eradication programs actually wipe out the livelihoods of poor farmers social and economically disadvantaged communities. With few viable economic opportunities available, these households often resort again to farming of illicit drugs, simply from survival necessity. Successful alternative development programs are rare, although in Thailand a long-term (highly subsidized) approach has met with some success. Interdiction – programs aimed at reducing or stopping trading – has contributed to a diversification of smuggling routes, often to countries where law enforcement is weak. For example, the low-income country of Guinea Bissau has become a new trading corridor for drugs being smuggled to Europe. Ironically, a systematic review that found a positive correlation existed between increased law enforcement and increases in violence and crime. This is explained in part by the fact that law enforcement activities can create a riskier environment in which illicit drug trading and dealing occurs, making the situation more volatile and prone to drug gang power dynamics when members or leaders are arrested. There is even less evidence available on the impacts of demand side policies, which include primary prevention of drug use (mass media campaigns, community based programs, and education), treatment (secondary prevention), and law enforcement. While studies on the effectiveness of treatment for drug users have found that it helps reduce crime and risky injecting behavior, stringent law enforcement practices directed against drug users have only served to increase risky behavior, shift patterns in drug use, and deter health seeking. Studies examining the impact of law enforcement on drug use in Vancouver and Sydney found that drug use did not decrease, but riskier forms of use did. Following a ‘war on drugs’ campaign in Thailand, drug users reported increased reluctance to seek healthcare. Thus, social and economic costs to society are only sustained or even intensified, and are therefore likely to negatively impact SED. Harm reduction (policies and programs aimed at reducing harms associated with drug use) encompasses many components in immediate impact, harm reduction as currently defined is cost effective and has positive impacts on social development. There is a need for harm reduction approaches to be further developed and integrated, and be more broadly defined so they can have more impact across the range of drug issues. Studies suggest that benefits include: reduced risky drug use behavior, decreased transmission of HIV, safer disposal of injecting equipment, and less public nuisance. These findings indicate that social and health costs to societies may thus be reduced, thereby helping to enhance SED. 5. The forgotten victim: human rights Not only do some illicit drug policies have potential negative impacts on SED, but they also lead to violation of human rights. Eliminating families’ main source of income without creating viable alternatives robs them of their livelihood and dignity. Harsh law enforcement and militaristic approaches to controlling supply and demand of illicit drugs have had serious human rights implications, with physical abuse, sexual assault, public humiliation, denial of legal representation, and mortality being reported in the name of law enforcement. Moreover, in many countries, drug users are forced to undergo ‘treatment’ which is not evidenced-based. Stringent drug laws have often been used as an excuse to discriminate against poor and marginalized groups of society, especially ethnic minorities. Worldwide, drug users continue to be discriminated against, and are denied treatment and other social rights on the basis of their consumption of drugs. 6. Conclusions The interrelationships between illicit drug economies and SED are real and complex. Factors linked to SED may lead to or deter engagement with illicit drugs, while illicit drug economies negatively impact on SED in the long-term, despite possible shortterm benefits. By not acknowledging these linkages, illicit drug policies which focus solely on reducing demand and supply through law enforcement or forceful measures have often had consequences that adversely impact on SED, and also violate human rights – causing more harm than the drugs themselves. Thus, our original hypothesis that illicit drug policies are development policies are interdependent holds true based on the evidence available. The limitations of our review must be recognized. Our findings are based on limited evidence, which includes very few quantitative and detailed studies on the interrelationships, as well as a lack of rigorous evaluations of drug control programs. Our expectation of limited data availability was therefore also validated. In addition, there are inherent issues with determining impact of and on SED, and in this study we have assumed impact based on anecdotal and qualitative information rather than modeling or quantitative analyses. Having said this, our review substantiates the need for greater collaboration between illicit drug control and development agencies. It is imperative for development agencies and governments of developing and transitional countries to investigate and account for the impact of development on vulnerabilities to drug production, trade, and use. All aspects of development, ranging from infrastructure projects to education programs, especially if donor funded, must consider implications for illicit drug production, trade, and use, as is currently done with respect to poverty, the environment or gender dynamics. At the same time, current illicit drug policies need review in light of their inequitable and damaging effects in relation to social development. While acknowledgement of the link between both fields has been increasing, further research in the area will help to provide a stronger base for advocacy to ensure that theory is translated into practice. Details: Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Dependent-on-Development.pdf Year: 0 Country: International URL: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Dependent-on-Development.pdf Shelf Number: 121880 Keywords: Drug Control Policies Drug Enforcement Drug Trade Drug Trafficking Drugs Abuse and Addiction Economics and Crime Gangs Poverty Socioeconomic Development

Author: Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas Title: Coverage of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Latin American and the Caribbean Summary: This report provides a summary of the discussions of nearly 50 journalists and academics from Latin America and the Caribbean on media coverage of organized crime and drug trafficking in the continent. Details: New York: Open Society Foundations, 2011. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/media/articles_publications/publications/austin-forum-20110515/austin-forum-20110515-en.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/media/articles_publications/publications/austin-forum-20110515/austin-forum-20110515-en.pdf Shelf Number: 121941 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Media Organized Crime (Latin America; Caribbean)

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Studies and Threat Analysis Section Title: The Transatlantic Cocaine Market Summary: Key Findings of this report include: Global demand for cocaine has shifted. Demand in the United States was more than four times as high as in Europe in 1998, but just over a decade later, the volume and value of the West and Central European cocaine market (US$33 billion) is approaching parity with that of the US (US$37 billion). Two thirds of European cocaine users live in just three countries: the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. With Germany and France, these countries represent 80% of European cocaine consumption.  European cocaine seizures increased rapidly between 1998 and 2006, peaking at some 121 tons. They have dropped off sharply since then, to some 53 tons in 2009, while at most, European demand has stabilized. There have been increases in seizures in South America, but the price of pure cocaine has not increased greatly in Europe, suggesting that traffickers have found new ways of evading law enforcement.  In the last decade, most (about 60%) of the cocaine seized was taken at sea or in ports. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was the most prominent country of origin for direct cocaine shipments to Europe, with the cocaine coming mainly from Colombia.  It appears that most of Europe’s cocaine enters by sea, primarily via Spain. Nearly half the cocaine seized in Europe was taken by Spanish authorities, two-thirds of which was detected in international waters and 11% in containers.  Excluding what is imported for local consumption, it is estimated that about 21 tons of cocaine were trafficked from West Africa to Europe in 2009. This is down sharply from two years before, when the total could have been as high as 47 tons.  Much of the trafficking to West Africa used to be carried out by large ‘mother ships’ that unloaded the drugs on to smaller, local vessels off the West African coasts. Today, large maritime shipments have virtually disappeared, suggesting that traffickers have changed their tactics. There is evidence of shipments in large commercial aircraft purchased second-hand by traffickers for this purpose. There are also indications that containerized shipping is being utilized, but very few of these shipments have been detected.  Most of the recently reported seizures of cocaine from container consignments from South America to West Africa had Nigeria or Ghana as their destination. Most of these containers originated in Peru or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  Commercial air flights used to be the most common vector for trafficking cocaine from West Africa to West and Central Europe (97% of seizure cases over the last decade, or 58% of all cocaine seized). But the number of detections have declined drastically in recent years, suggesting again that traffickers have changed their tactics.  There appears to be some trafficking of cocaine from West Africa to Europe across the Sahara to countries in northern Africa, although very few seizures have been made. There is some evidence of use of the traditional cannabis resin trafficking routes from Morocco to Spain.  Although it appears that Colombian organized crime groups still dominate trafficking of cocaine to Europe, domestic markets are often in the hands of traffickers of other nationalities.  In addition to the health consequences of cocaine use, the impact of cocaine trafficking includes drug-funded violence, political instability and corruption in many areas.  In line with the principle of shared responsibility and a balanced approach to the drug problem, the expansion of the cocaine market across the Atlantic and, more recently, in South America, highlights the importance of developing strategies on the scale of the cocaine threat. Efforts must be increasingly coordinated and integrated into an international approach that adapts to new developments as quickly as the traffickers. There are many reasons to be optimistic about the capacity of the international community to achieve a significant reduction of the global cocaine market during the present decade. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 15, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Transatlantic_cocaine_market.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Transatlantic_cocaine_market.pdf Shelf Number: 122077 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Transnational Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Organized Crime and its Threat to Security: Tackling a Disturbing Consequence of Drug Control Summary: Over time, international controls have limited the number of people who take illicit drugs to a small fraction of the world’s adult population, much smaller than those who use other addictive substances, like tobacco and alcohol. This undeniable success has also had a dramatic unintended consequence: a criminal market of staggering proportions. If unattended, this criminal market will offset the many benefits of drug control. In fact, the crime and corruption associated with the drug trade are providing strong evidence to a vocal minority of pro-drug lobbyists to argue that the cure is worse than the disease, and that drug legalization is the solution. This would be an historical mistake, one which United Nations Member States are not willing to make. The reason is straightforward: there is no need to choose between health (drug control) and security (crime prevention). They are complementary, and not contradictory commitments. Yet, because drug trafficking enriches criminals, destroys communities and even threatens nations, it has to be dealt with urgently and forcefully. Policy change is required against crime, not in favour of drugs. This paper focuses on three requirements, as a way to map the road ahead. The need for an integrated strategy. Crime control measures must integrate all elements of the drug chain: supply, trade and demand. So far governments have mostly pursued disjointed interventions that have displaced the problem (from one country to another and/or from one substance to another); have addressed only some aspects (fighting illicit crops, instead of mass poverty); or have used a sledge-hammer instead of a more appropriate chisel (criminalizing addiction, instead of treating addicts). Also measures have been incoherently applied over time (with uneven political commitment), and over space (without the coordination promoted by international agreements). For example, the UN legal instrument against Organized Crime and its protocol on Fire Arms provide platforms for joint, rapid-impact action: yet, they not been implemented in a way robust enough to impact the drug trade. As a result, a number of countries now face a crime situation largely caused by their own choice. This is bad enough. Worse is the fact that, quite often their vulnerable neighbours pay an even greater price. The need for community resistance. Drugs infect especially certain segments of society. Ghettos, even entire regions controlled by crime cartels, are breeding grounds of both drug supply (trafficking) and demand (addiction). Exploitation, instability, even terrorism are their direct cause and consequence. Yet, like addiction, violence can be cured: it is indeed possible to regain control of places that today are hospitable only to anti-social behaviours. The challenge is to re-integrate marginalized segments of society and draw them into, rather than push them out of the law. From the Andes to South East Asia, this has been done with farmers who have been assisted to switch from illicit to licit crops – despite the war conditions surrounding them. From Europe to Australia this has been done with addicts who have been helped to abandon their drug dependence – despite largely adverse social settings. The world over, drug farmers and drug addicts have benefited from targeted assistance: why not duplicate this winning model in the heart of ghettos and in areas out-of-control? Why do states abandon masses of unemployed, illiterate youth that face no other option than a day of money, notoriety and death as foot-soldiers in rag-tag armies of mafias and rebels? The need for a shared commitment. The drug trade not only infects people in so many lands. It also corrupts governments, together with business and finance. Nations need to strengthen integrity in governance (public and private) and resistance to drug cartels, armed with war chests worth billions of dollars. This is not happening. Money laundering is rampant and practically unopposed: honest citizens, seeing the expensive cars, yachts and mansions of untouchable mafias and their cronies, wonder why proceeds of crime are not seized. The internet supplies drugs, arms, even people and their organs, on-line. One of humanity’s biggest capital assets, the web, when perversely used is turned into a weapon by criminals and terrorists. Surprisingly, calls for international agreements against cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism remain unanswered. Even existing international legal instruments are not adequately applied, their rules of engagement not yet agreed upon years after their entry into force. In fact, the Conferences of the Parties for the implementation of the UN Conventions against Corruption and against Organized Crime have repetitively failed to deliver – focussed on processes rather than on the substance of fighting organized crime. The drug control conventions – so effective in reducing the health impact of illicit substances – are under attack for a collateral damage the founding fathers could not anticipate: the emergence of drug cartels powerful enough to affect politics and business. This may be an unintended consequence of the drug conventions: above all, it is the inescapable result of inadequate implementation of existing crime control agreements and unwillingness to develop new ones, despite the sacrifice – often the ultimate sacrifice – of law enforcement officers. The overall context has weakened further the respect for human rights. Although drugs and crime kill, societies should not kill because of them. There cannot be disagreement on this. Yet, under the (no doubt emotional) pressure of a concerned public opinion, efforts to preserve public health (by controlling drugs) and to maintain public order (by preventing crime) are not always conducted with respect for the rights of other human beings. Still worse, when the law is not observed, when drug mafias challenge the state, when vast income inequalities are the result of crime rather than honest work, the call is inevitable: an eye for an eye. Governments must oppose this frightening cycle. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2009. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 21, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/CND_09ED_final%20paper.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/CND_09ED_final%20paper.pdf Shelf Number: 122134 Keywords: Corruption Drug Control Policies Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Title: Cocaine Smuggling in 2009 Summary: This report presents statistics and information on cocaine smuggling in 2009. For the second year in a row, the amount of cocaine departing South America continued to decrease. Nonetheless, drug trafficking organizations continued to move large quantities of cocaine. Data from the US Government interagency Consolidated Counterdrug Database that documents the movement of cocaine suggest a 12-20 percent decrease in the amount departing South America toward the US in 2009. However, production-based flow estimates, which calculate the amount of cocaine available to depart South America, showed a more modest 3 percent decrease. Estimates of potential cocaine production in the Andean region, expressed in metric tons, showed a significant decrease of 14.5 percent in 2008—the most recent year for which data was available. Furthermore, the purity of bulk cocaine shipments dropped to a record low of 76 percent, indicating extensive use of cutting agents to bulk up the cocaine in South America prior to departure and mitigating the impact of the decreased production on the gross volume of product available for export. Details: Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2010. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2011 at: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/Cocaine_Smuggling_in_2009.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South America URL: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/Cocaine_Smuggling_in_2009.pdf Shelf Number: 122147 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control

Author: Solis Rivera, Luis Guillermo Title: Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: Summary of Articles Summary: This document is both a summary and translation of the book Crimen Organizado en América Latina y el Caribe, which was edited by MA. Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera and PhD. Francisco Rojas Aravena. The book was developed by the General Secretariat of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO after its initials in Spanish) and the Open Society Institute (OSI). It was originally published by Editorial Catalonia and the General Secretariat of FLACSO in 2008. The book is made up of 12 essays and it has 379 pages. The essays have been written by a group of distinguished authors from different backgrounds and each one contributed in the area of his or her expertise. The 12 essays are characterized by their diversity because each of them addresses different aspects of organized crime. And even though most authors agree that the strongest manifestation of organized crime is drug trafficking, they also analyze other intimately related issues such as human trafficking, arms trafficking, the smuggling of various goods, juvenile gangs, and money laundering. They also agree on some of the most important consequences of organized crime such as the corruption of many public officials, violence, insecurity, problems with democratic governance and the gradual erosion of the democratic system as a whole. The authors agree on the above aspects, but they each analyze the problem from a different perspective. Some essays address the issue from a general perspective and the perspective of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, while other essays focus on certain case studies like the current situation in Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, among others. Aside from this geographic variety, there is a methodological variety as well. Some authors focus on the definition of organized crime and other concepts that are linked with it such as public safety, democracy, corruption, and democratic governance. Other essays, however, evaluate empirical facts and current data for various countries of the region. Some authors explore the regional history, and why the particular histories of some countries have made them vulnerable to organized crime. Others reflect mainly on the current situation and search for answers to this serious problem. What they have in common is that, both from a past or present perspective, they analyze organized crime in its entire context and how the multiple economic, social, political, and cultural structural deficiencies have made Latin America prone to these criminal activities. This book provides solutions for the problem such as the need to strengthen international cooperation, transparency and governance, participation of civil society, and the importance of not attacking violence with violence, but concentrating on solving the structural and systemic problems. In sum, it analyzes organized crime from an integral and multidimensional perspective. Details: San Jose, Costa Rica: FLACSO, 2009. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed July 27, 2011 at: http://www.flacso.org/uploads/media/Organized_Crime.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://www.flacso.org/uploads/media/Organized_Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 122180 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs Human Trafficking Organized Crime (Latin America and Caribbean) Smuggling Violent Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment Summary: Over the last decade, the global trade in illicit Afghan opiates has been one of the world’s greatest transnational drug and crime threats – with severe consequences for health, governance and security at national, regional and international levels. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, transnational organized crime groups were the main beneficiaries of the US$68 billion trade in 2009, which they supplemented with other forms of crime such as arms trafficking and human smuggling. In 2009, the Afghan Taliban was estimated to have earned around $150 million from the opiate trade, Afghan drug traffickers $2.2 billion, and Afghan farmers $440 million. While the findings suggest that most insurgent elements content themselves with taxing the trade rather than attempting to become active participants, it now appears that some insurgents involve themselves directly in the heroin supply chain, including in the procurement of acetic anhydride. Anti-government elements based in Afghanistan and Pakistan may gain access to only a fraction of the value of Afghan opiate exports, but this is nonetheless enough to support logistics, operations and recruitment. Areas under insurgent influence, such as the border between Iraq and Turkey and the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, also provide a key competitive advantage for organized crime groups as those areas lie beyond the reach of law enforcement. If global organized crime groups managing the opiate trade pocketed only 10 per cent of the profit, they would have earned at least $7 billion in 2009. All these illicit profits are laundered in one way or another, a process that undermines the vulnerable economies of areas such as the Balkans and Central Asia. Traffickers tend to shift routes and change their modus operandi as law enforcement pressure increases. Traditional methods of land border control may not be sufficient to stem the flow of opiates into destination markets. Details: Geneva: UNODC, 2011. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf Shelf Number: 122312 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Heroin Illegal Drugs Opium (Afghanistan) Organized Crime

Author: Kaczynski, Vlad M.. Title: Illegal Activities in Marine Protected Areas: The Case of Guinea-Bissau, West Africa Summary: At the time when many industrialized economies enjoy healthy economic growth, many developing countries including these located in Sub-Saharan Africa suffer an outright decline in welfare, economic crisis and deterioration of their natural environments. In many poor countries, in spite of great potential of their coastal resources, technological, economic and managerial capabilities to use them do not exist or in order to gain badly needed hard currency they export or allow to take away by foreigners their natural resources thus feeding other markets including these in rich industrialized countries. As a result deficit of food and malnutrition is deepening in the developing countries and Africa is the most appealing example of this trend. Coastal lands in poorest African countries are increasingly cleared of mangroves, their fishery resources are exploited by foreign operators and drug trafficking is expanding because of weak or absent capabilities of these states to control these pressures and activities. The United States interests in successful economic growth and good governance in developing countries of Africa are multifaceted. Some of these interests are economic: the economic success or failure of these countries determine the gains from trade and investment that the United States reaps in its economic relations with many African countries. Other US interests are of security nature and illegal resource exploitation combined with growing smuggling of drugs to Europe and the US are of great concern for the US Home Security Department as well as to the US development and aid programs. The poor state’s failure is both the cause and consequence of international criminality, including pirate operations and international drug trafficking. Such states are easy prey for criminal groups, pirates and drug smugglers. The poor coastal African country of Guinea-Bissau cannot afford to establish or maintain necessary controls and surveillance system to prevent these negative trends and these include environmental degradation that is caused by tropical deforestation, overfishing, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity and long-term climate change. Additional challenge this country faces is quickly growing drug trafficking that transits through Guinea-Bissau waters and land routes to push drugs from Africa and South America to the industrialized markets, particularly Europe and the United States. Is there a strategic significance of inequities in income levels, economic growth and, in capabilities of poor nations to assure good governance and sustainable use of their natural resources and if so, which policy might the industrialized countries pursue to address those strategic concerns? The similar question may be posed in regard to ther ocean policy toward developing countries having in mind continuing deterioration of their marine and coastal environments and declining possibilities to produce food of aquatic origin for their growing populations. Details: Seattle, WA: School of Marine Affairs and Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington; Republic of Guinea-Bissau, West Africa: Ministry of Interior, 2006. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 15, 2011 at: http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/~trusek/globalization/papers/kaczynski-djassi.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/~trusek/globalization/papers/kaczynski-djassi.pdf Shelf Number: 122390 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Fishing Illegal Logging Maritime Crime Offenses Against the Environment (Guinea-Bissau)

Author: Naranjo R., Alberto J. Title: Drugonomics : Industrial Organization of Illegal Drug Markets Summary: Insurgents, drug lords and anti-drug supply policies in the Andes. The United States has spent enormous resources on supply policies to decrease illegal drug production in the Andes and availability in the U.S. market. However, evidence suggests increased drug production and availability over time. Moreover, insurgent activities in the region have also increased. We present an explanation for these unexpected trends by analyzing an illicit drug market where drug lords and insurgents interact. The analysis suggests that supply policies increase drug production and insurgent activity while having no effect on drug availability and prices. Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States. In spite of the increase in domestic law enforcement policies in the U.S., illegal drug distribution activities have followed a non-monotonic trend and cocaine and heroin prices have been dropping or have remained stable over time. This paper provides an explanation for these counter-intuitive effects. We model how drug lords respond to this type of policy and predict distribution activities, prices and drug consumption in the United States. Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies. Independent efforts by local and state governments in the United States to combat illegal drug markets are in contrast with a global market where drugs are sold and distributed simultaneously in different locations. We study the effect that domestic law enforcement policies may have on this global context. The external effects of these policies induce overspending by governments, but a low level of global drug consumption. Competition effects are also studied. Drive-by competition? Violence in the drug market. Today, the retail distribution of most illegal drugs is mainly in the hands of street gangs that also account for most of the drug related violence in many states and cities in the United States. Interestingly, the level of violence in drug markets appears to vary with the type of drug. Based on the notion that gangs use violence strategically to compete for customers we find that both the effectiveness of violence in shifting demand and the cost of switching supplier by users affect the level of violence in the market. Indirect effects of anti-drug policies are discussed. Details: Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2007. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 2, 1011 at: http://www.avhandlingar.se/avhandling/c2a2c5909c/ Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://www.avhandlingar.se/avhandling/c2a2c5909c/ Shelf Number: 122609 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Illegal Drug Markets Illegal Drugs Violent Crime

Author: Nilsson, Robert Title: The Impact of Drugs Trafficking, Corruption and Organized Crime: How to Strengthen Regional Cooperation around the Baltic Sea Summary: The need for expanded and improved regional cooperation among the states around the Baltic Sea in countering the illicit drugs trade and organized crime is something which has been emphasized by papers previously published by ISDP within this research project. However, this is the first major attempt to put the acute need for regional cooperation among the wider spectrum of law enforcement offices and research communities at the very forefront of the policy debate. The reasons are manifold and ever more pressing in the rapidly changing context of closer European integration both within the Union itself and with the countries just east of the common border. The by far most profitable and, at the same time, most serious business for organized criminal networks operating in the Baltic Sea region is that of narcotics, through the entire chain from production to distribution. Even though the drug problem has been described by UNODC as contained in the sense that the demand has been stabilized, recent figures show that this containment is under threat. On the supply side the situation looks very different with increases both in production and trafficking. Similar to any legal market, the balance between supply and demand is the main determinant for pricing as well as the development of new business strategies for the drug lords within organized criminal networks. Together with these basic underlying factors of the narcotics trade, there are a number of recently emerged and decisive variables which have to be accounted for in the analysis of the future impact on cooperation among the states in the Baltic Sea region and its immediate neighbors. One such important factor is last year’s decision to enlarge the Schengen area, raising a number of pertinent questions and challenges of how to adapt to the radically changing environment where the borders of the EU have now been brought “closer to regions and territories which are unstable, uncontrolled and hence should be a source of concern due to the crime trends visible in geographical areas such as the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia.” Another such factor of which we still know very little about is the impact of the financial crisis. Most likely, this crisis will have effects on the narcotics trade as on any other legal or illegal trade. These effects are difficult to predict at the moment, but just as a strong and well-monitored banking system carries the necessary preconditions for controlling and securing financial transfers, the weakened state of the banks in the region could provide increased opportunities for organized criminal networks in their continuous search for expanded business opportunities. But apart from these two politico-economic changes of great import, what are the more imminent challenges to be met in the common fight against the proliferation of narcotics and growth of organized crime in the Baltic Sea region? Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2009. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2009_nilsson-kego_the-impact-of-drugs-trafficking.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2009_nilsson-kego_the-impact-of-drugs-trafficking.pdf Shelf Number: 122626 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Drugs Organized Crime

Author: Navarro, Ignacio A. Title: Cocaine Cities Exploring the Relationship between Urban Processes and the Drug Trade in South America Summary: The relationship between the cocaine trade and urban land markets in South America has been overlooked by the mainstream economics and urban studies literature. This paper examines two avenues through which the cocaine trade can have a large impact on urban development in producer countries: (i) through an employment multiplier effect similar to that of other legal exports, and (ii) through money laundering using urban real estate. We test our hypotheses using the Bolivian case and find that urban growth patterns are closely related to fluctuations in cocaine production. Further, even though our estimates suggest that the cocaine trade affects urban growth through the two avenues presented in the paper, we find that formal urban employment generated by the cocaine trade has a modest effect on urban growth and most of the effect seems to be explained by money laundering using real estate and other paths. Details: Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2011. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 2011/09: Accessed September 21, 2011 at: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2011/en_GB/wider-working-papers-2011/ Year: 2011 Country: Bolivia URL: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2011/en_GB/wider-working-papers-2011/ Shelf Number: 122802 Keywords: Cocaine (Bolivia) Drug Trafficking Drugs Money Laundering Urban Areas

Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: A Dangerous Journey through Mexico: Human Rights Violations against Migrants in Transit Summary: The August 2010 massacre of 72 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico was not an isolated event but rather an alarming example of the daily abuses suffered by migrants in transit in the country, concludes a report published today by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center (Center Prodh). The report, A Dangerous Journey Through Mexico: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants in Transit, documents how migrants, primarily Central Americans, are often beaten, extorted, sexually abused, and/or kidnapped by criminal groups while they travel through Mexico on their way to the United States. It discusses the failure of the Mexican government to protect migrants in transit and the direct participation or acquiescence of Mexican authorities in several cases of abuse. Drawing from work of migrants' rights organizations, the report includes testimonies of three migrants who were kidnapped by criminal groups in Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2010. 12p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2011 at: http://www.wola.org/publications/a_dangerous_journey_through_mexico_human_rights_violations_against_migrants_in_transit Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wola.org/publications/a_dangerous_journey_through_mexico_human_rights_violations_against_migrants_in_transit Shelf Number: 122936 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Human Rights Immigration Kidnappings Migrants (Mexico)

Author: Washington Office on Latin America Title: Tackling Urban Violence in Latin America: Reversing Exclusion through Smart Policing and Social Investment Summary: The report discusses the relative effectiveness of strategies to reduce violence in four different Latin American cities: Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, Medellín in Colombia, Ciudad Juárez in Mexico, and Santa Tecla in El Salvador. The four cities are attempting to improve citizen security by combining smart policing strategies and social investment in marginalized communities most affected by crime. In Rio de Janeiro, the government sent a new community police force into favelas long dominated by criminal gangs, and then began to bring in city services. These are new efforts, in a few targeted areas. While there are some complaints about police behavior, many residents report a sense of hope about the future. Time will tell whether government investment will be sustained enough to reduce crime in the long term. In Medellín, an ambitious effort by municipal authorities to increase policing and invest in marginalized hillside communities took place during a lull in the violent competition between criminal gangs. Dramatic reductions in crime were seen for several years. Competition between drug-trafficking groups then reignited, and violence levels have crept back up, but city efforts appear to have kept the violence from returning to earlier levels. In Ciudad Juárez, the government turned to social investment when police and military intervention failed to reduce alarming levels of violence. Social programs are just beginning, and implementation has been troubled and lacks cohesion. But authorities and community groups agree that this is the direction to pursue, only with more resources and better leadership. In Santa Tecla, a multi-year effort led by the city’s mayor has developed community councils and local violence prevention programs. Homicide levels, while still high, have dropped below those of neighboring communities. Among its findings, the report highlights: •The mano dura (iron fist) anti-crime approaches that have been employed by many governments in the region don’t work. Sending police or security forces into communities that have little or no state presence and have long been plagued by violence can often make the situation worse. This is particularly true when officers act with impunity. •Policymakers must take into account that social, political and economic exclusion are the context in which crime and violence take root. Therefore, comprehensive approaches that give attention to “reversing exclusion” by bringing in social services as well as law enforcement are in order. •Citizens whose daily lives are most affected by violence must be involved in designing and implementing solutions for their communities. This means that coordination between government agencies, community groups, service providers and residents is key to developing long-term plans that will achieve a lasting reduction in violence and improvement in residents’ livelihoods. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2011. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2011 at: http://www.wola.org/publications/tackling_urban_violence_in_latin_america_reversing_exclusion_through_smart_policing_and Year: 2011 Country: South America URL: http://www.wola.org/publications/tackling_urban_violence_in_latin_america_reversing_exclusion_through_smart_policing_and Shelf Number: 122937 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Policing Urban Areas Violence (Latin America) Violent Crime

Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Calderon's Caldron: Lessons from Mexico's Battle Against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Michoacan Summary: Over the past several years Mexico has suffered from drug-trade-related violence, extraordinarily intense and grisly even by criminal market standards. Its drug trafficking organizations have been engaged in ever-spiraling turf wars over smuggling routes and corruption networks, turning the streets of some Mexican cities into macabre displays of gun fights and murders. The criminal groups have shown a determined willingness to fight Mexican law enforcement and security forces and an increasing ambition to control other illicit and informal economies in Mexico and to extort legal businesses. Finding Mexican police forces pervaded by corruption and lacking the capacity to effectively deal with organized crime, President Felipe Calderón dispatched the military into Mexico’s streets. Yet while scoring some successes in capturing prominent drug traffickers, the military too has found it enormously difficult to suppress the violence and reduce the insecurity of Mexican citizens. Institutional reforms to improve the police forces and justice system, although crucial for expanding the rule of law in Mexico, have been slow and will inevitably require years of committed effort. Meanwhile, patience among many Mexicans with the battle against the criminal groups is starting to run out. To a degree unprecedented in the history of U.S.-Mexican relations, Mexico has welcomed U.S. cooperation in combating organized crime. An assistance package approved in 2008 by the U.S. Congress and called The Merida Initiative first focused on beefing up Mexican law enforcement agencies through technological transfers and intelligence sharing. A subsequent iteration of the U.S. approach adopted in 2009 and referred to as Beyond Merida emphasized deeper institutional reforms. It also expanded the scope of policies to combat illicit economies in Mexico by emphasizing socio-economic approaches to strengthen the resilience of communities against organized crime. But the government of Mexico has found the U.S. partnership lacking and has complained about the persistence of demand for drugs in the United States and the flows of guns and criminal money from the United States to Mexico. This monograph explores the effectiveness of the security and law enforcement and socio-economic approaches adopted in Mexico over the past several years to combat the drug trafficking organizations. It also analyzes the evolution of organized crime in Mexico, including in reaction to anti-crime actions taken by the Mexican government. It is based on fieldwork I undertook in Mexico in October 2009 and particularly in March 2011. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Latin America Initiative, 2011. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 3, 2011 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/09_calderon_felbab_brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/09_calderon_felbab_brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf Shelf Number: 122966 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime (Mexico) Political Corruption

Author: Kan, Paul Rexton Title: Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security Summary: Since 2006, when Mexican president Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels, there has been a rise in the number of Mexican nationals seeking political asylum in the United States to escape the ongoing drug cartel violence in their home country. Political asylum cases in general are claimed by those who are targeted for their political beliefs or ethnicity in countries that are repressive or failing. Mexico is neither. Nonetheless, if the health of the Mexican state declines because criminal violence continues, increases, or spreads, U.S. communities will feel an even greater burden on their systems of public safety and public health from “narco-refugees.” Given the ever-increasing brutality of the cartels, the question is whether and how the United States Government should begin to prepare for what could be a new wave of migrants coming from Mexico. Allowing Mexicans to claim asylum could potentially open a floodgate of migrants to the United States during a time when there is a very contentious national debate over U.S. immigration laws pertaining to illegal immigrants. On the other hand, to deny the claims of asylum seekers and return them to Mexico, where they might very well be killed, strikes at the heart of American values of justice and humanitarianism. This monograph focuses on the asylum claims of Mexicans who unwillingly leave Mexico, rather than those who willingly enter the United States legally or illegally. To navigate wisely in this sea of complexity will require greater understanding and vigilance at all levels of the U.S. Government. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 4, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1083.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1083.pdf Shelf Number: 0 Keywords: Border Security Drug Cartels (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Homicides Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: The World Bank. Central America Unit, Poverty Reduction Title: Crime and Violence in Central America: Volume II Summary: Central America‘s hopes for a rebirth following the resolution of the region‘s civil wars have been marred by the torrent of violence which has engulfed El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and begun to threaten Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. In addition to the pain and suffering experienced by victims, crime and violence exacts high costs, diverting investment, reducing economic growth, and undermining confidence in the region‘s fragile democracies. Among the key drivers of crime and violence in the region are drug trafficking, youth violence and gangs, the widespread availability of guns, and weak criminal justice institutions. Proven evidence-based prevention measures coupled with criminal justice reform can reduce crime and violence. Key messages and recommendations from the report include the following: 1) Crime and violence should be understood as a development issue. The high rates of crime and violence in the region have direct effects on human welfare in the short-run and long-run effects on economic growth and social development. Estimates of the effect on violence on growth imply that reducing crime could substantially boost growth in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 2) The strongest single explanation for the high rates of violence in the region—and their apparent rise in recent years—is drug trafficking, principally the transport of cocaine from producer nations in the south to the consumer market in the United States. The drug trade contributes to the widespread availability of firearms, generates violence within and between drug cartels, and spurs further lawlessness by undermining criminal justice institutions. Controlling for other factors, areas with intense levels of drug trafficking in Central America have homicide rates 65 percent higher than other areas in the same country. Murder rates are also higher in areas with greater shares of female-headed households and larger populations of young men. Overall crime victimization rates are at their most extreme in the region‘s capitals and other large cities. 3) The countries of the region have under-invested in prevention approaches which have proven effective in reducing crime and violence elsewhere. A public expenditure analysis on crime and violence prevention undertaken for this study in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama shows that spending has been modest for crime prevention measures. Crime prevention through environmental design and urban renewal programs can generate rapid decreases in property crime and inter-personal violence. Integrated citizen security approaches, combining modern methods of policing with prevention interventions by both government and non-governmental organizations, have seen initial success in El Salvador and should be tried elsewhere. The public health approach, which focuses on addressing risk factors for violent conduct, is especially promising for addressing violence against women and youth violence. 4) The criminal justice systems of several countries in the region have been deeply corrupted by drug trafficking, enabling traffickers to take advantage of existing institutional weaknesses, and the mano dura (―iron fist‖) approach has proven largely ineffective and possibly counterproductive. In some countries, the police have largely lost the trust of citizens; nearly half of Salvadorans and Hondurans and 2 out of 3 Guatemalans believe their local police are involved in crime. Clearly, improving criminal justice systems is essential. This includes reforming the judiciary, attorneys generals offices, and police forces. An especially urgent priority is ensuring strong accountability of the criminal justice system to citizens. This should be done through an inter-institutional approach, focusing on transparent selection, promotion, and sanctioning mechanisms. The optimization of court administration and case management with internal processes reengineering—such as the development of management information systems and performance indicators—provide important mechanisms to better diagnosis problems, track system outputs, monitor reform programs, and rationalize resources. 5) There are multiple possible entry points to integrate violence and crime prevention into policy. In one instance, the most promising approach may be in the context of a slum upgrading or municipal development project. In another, it may be in the context of reform of the health service. In a third, it may be in the context of reform of the criminal justice system. There is no one ―ideal‖ approach. The common denominator is that successful interventions are evidence-based, starting with a clear diagnostic of types of violence and risk factors and ending with a careful evaluation of the intervention‘s impact to inform future actions. 6) Drug trafficking poses a major challenge to Central American governments. The experiences of Mexico and Colombia, economic theory, and the historical record in the United States all suggest that an escalation of interdiction efforts—at any scale the Central American governments could mount, even with assistance from abroad—would most likely increase levels of violence without diminishing the capacities of drug traffickers. Consequently, marginal funds are more likely to reduce violence if devoted to crime prevention efforts and criminal justice reforms. 7) Gun ownership is an outgrowth of the drug trade and the history of civil conflict in some countries. Within these environments, which promote the demand for weapons, reducing gun ownership is a difficult undertaking. Regional and international evidence shows that the implementation and enforcement of firearms legislation, such as a ban on carrying firearms, combined with supply-side measures, such as controlling secondary firearms markets, are the most promising to reduce availability of firearms and reduce armed violence. National firearms policies are unlikely to reduce the availability of weapons unless they are undertaken as part of a regional approach with international efforts to stem the flow of contraband weapons from abroad, particularly Mexico and the United States. 8) The victims and perpetrators of violent crime are largely young men. In Central America as in the rest of the world, men age 15-34 account for the overwhelming majority of homicide victims, and they also comprise the membership of youth gangs. While gangs are doubtless a major contributor to crime in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the very limited evidence indicates they are responsible for only a minority share of violence; multiple sources suggest perhaps 15 percent of homicides are gang-related. To address issues of youth violence, policy makers in the short run should borrow from the evidence-based toolkit of programs from other regions, such as early childhood development and mentoring programs, interventions to increase retention of high-risk youth in secondary schools, and opening schools after-hours and on weekends to offer youth activities to occupy their free time. While many programs to reduce youth violence have been introduced in the region, few if any have been subject to rigorous impact evaluation. Impact evaluations should systematically document what works in youth violence prevention in Central America. 9) Major data gaps hinder policy making. Several countries of the region have made substantial progress in recent years in improving their mechanisms for recording crime, particularly homicides. Such efforts should be continued and paired with expanded use of crime information systems, which experience in other areas has shown can be a valuable tool to direct criminal justice efforts. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010. 187p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 56781-LAC: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Eng_Volume_II_Crime_and_Violence_Central_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Central America URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Eng_Volume_II_Crime_and_Violence_Central_America.pdf Shelf Number: 123152 Keywords: Criminal Cartels Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Gang Violence Gun Control Homicides Violent Crime (Central America)

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes: Research Report Summary: “Always follow the money” has been sound advice in law enforcement and political circles for decades. Nevertheless, tracking the flows of illicit funds generated by drug trafficking and organized crime and analysing the magnitude and the extent to which these are laundered through the world’s financial systems remain daunting tasks. UNODC’s research report, Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes, attempts to shed light on the total amounts likely to be laundered across the globe, as well as the potential attractiveness of various locations to those who launder money. As with all such reports, however, the final monetary estimates are to be treated with caution. Further research and more systematic collection of data on this topic are clearly required. Prior to this report, perhaps the most widely quoted figure for the extent of money-laundering was the IMF’s ‘consensus range’ of between 2-5 per cent of global GDP, made public in 1998. A study-of-studies, or metaanalysis, conducted for this report, suggests that all criminal proceeds are likely to have amounted to some 3.6 per cent of GDP (2.3 - 5.5 per cent) or around US$2.1 trillion in 2009. The resulting best estimate of the amounts available for money-laundering would be within the IMF’s original ‘consensus range’, equivalent to some 2.7 per cent of global GDP (2.1 – 4 per cent) or US$1.6 trillion in 2009. From this figure, money flows related to transnational organized crime activities represent the equivalent of some 1.5 per cent of global GDP, 70 per cent of which would have been available for laundering through the financial system. The largest income for transnational organized crime seems to come from illicit drugs, accounting for a fifth of all crime proceeds. Research in the area of illicit financial flows generated by one key transnational organized crime sector, the global market for cocaine, was also conducted for this report. The gross profits out of cocaine sales (totaling US$85 billion) were estimated at US$84 billion for the year 2009, compared with about US$1 billion earned by the farmers in the Andean region. Most of the gross profits (retail and wholesale) were generated in North America (US$35 billion) and in West and Central Europe (US$26 billion). The report also reminds us that, contrary to the common misperception that money is neither good nor bad, investments of ‘dirty money’ into licit economies can create problems ranging from distortions of resource allocation to the “crowding out” of licit sectors. In some cases, the influx of tainted money undermines the reputations of local institutions. Significantly, these investments can hamper investment and economic growth. While the situation is less clear for financial centers receiving illicit funds, the long-term consequences may be negative if they fail to actively fight money-laundering. Research also indicates that the socio-economic costs related to drug abuse are twice as high as the illicit income generated by drug trafficking. Indeed, in some countries (for example, the United States and the United Kingdom) the ratio is 3:1. This report argues that the severest consequence of criminal funding is that they perpetuate and promote criminal activities, creating a cycle of organized criminal activity and drug trafficking that leeches off societies. Less than 1 per cent of global illicit financial flows are currently seized and frozen. UNODC’s challenge is to work within the UN system and with Member States to help build the capacity to track and prevent money laundering, strengthen the rule of law and prevent these funds from creating further suffering. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 29, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf Shelf Number: 123169 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center Title: Cities Where Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Operate Within the United States Summary: (LES) The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) assesses with high confidence that in 2009, Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) were operating in the United States in at least 1,286 cities spanning all nine Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) regions, based on law enforcement reporting. Moreover, NDIC assesses with high confidence that Mexican DTOs in at least 143 of these U.S. cities were linked to a specific Mexican Cartel or DTO based in Mexico — the Sinaloa Cartel (at least 75 cities), the Gulf Cartel/ Los Zetas (at least 37 cities), the Juárez Cartel (at least 33 cities), the Beltrán-Leyva DTO (at least 30 cities), La Familia Michoacán (at least 27 cities), or the Tijuana Cartel (at least 21 cities). NDIC assesses with high confidence that Mexican DTOs will further expand their drug trafficking operations in the United States in the near term, particularly in the New England, New York/New Jersey, Mid-Atlantic, and Florida/Caribbean Regions. NDIC also believes that Mexican DTOs will maintain the present high level of availability for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine because the conditions in Mexico and in the United States that enabled and motivated the DTOs to increase production and availability of those drugs have not significantly changed. Details: Johnstown, PA: National Drug Intelligence Center, 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2011 at: http://www.9news.com/pdfs/gangs%20and%20cities.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.9news.com/pdfs/gangs%20and%20cities.pdf Shelf Number: 123219 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Mexican Drug Cartels Organized Crime

Author: Title: Moving Beyond Easy Wins: Colombia’s Borders Summary: Improved relations between Colombia and its neighbours have not alleviated the plight of border communities. For fifteen years, porous borders that offer strategic advantages to illegal armed groups and facilitate extensive illicit economies have exposed them to an intense armed conflict that is made worse by the widespread absence of public institutions. The warfare triggered a humanitarian emergency and worsened relations especially with Ecuador and Venezuela, the most affected neighbours. Spurring development in the periphery and reconstructing diplomatic ties are priorities for President Juan Manuel Santos. A little over a year into his term, his new policies have paid undoubted diplomatic and some security dividends. But the hard part is still ahead. Efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and build civilian state capacity must be scaled up, tasks that, amid what is again a partially worsening conflict, have been neglected. Otherwise, pacifying the troubled border regions will remain a chimera, and their dynamics will continue to fuel Colombia’s conflict. Border regions were drawn into the armed conflict by the mid-1990s, when they became main theatres of operations for illegal armed groups, often financed by drug trafficking. A crackdown under Álvaro Uribe, Santos’s predecessor, brought only elusive gains there. The illegal armed groups have been pushed deeper into the periphery but not defeated. Coca cultivation and drug trafficking remain significant. Violence has come down in most regions, but remains higher along the borders than in the nation as a whole, and security has begun to deteriorate in some zones, as New Illegal Armed Groups and paramilitary successors (NIAGs) extend their operations, and guerrillas gain new strength. The Uribe approach also carried high diplomatic costs. Relations with the neighbours became toxic over a 2008 Colombian airstrike on a camp of the main rebel group, FARC, located just inside Ecuador and over allegations that Venezuela was harbouring guerrillas. Fixing the border problems has been a priority for Santos. He has moved quickly to restore diplomatic relations with Ecuador and Venezuela, and bilateral platforms are in an early stage of either being revived or created. There is a strong political commitment on all sides to preserve the restored friendships, despite the continuing presence of illegal armed groups in both neighbouring countries. Security cooperation is improving. The Colombian Congress has passed a constitutional reform to redistribute royalties from oil and mining concessions, a measure that should increase funds for public investment in many peripheral regions that currently do not benefit from that bonanza. In an effort to produce tangible results fast, the foreign ministry is leading implementation of projects aimed at boosting social and economic development in border municipalities. The Santos agenda represents a substantial policy shift, but as the conflict continues unabated in the border regions and has increasing repercussions on Venezuelan and Ecuadorian soil, problems remain. Three sets of issues need to be tackled. First, more must be done to increase the civilian state presence in the destitute border areas. Militarisation of the borders has failed to deliver durable security gains, and efforts by security forces to increase their standing with local communities continue to stumble over human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. With dynamics along their borders increasingly resembling the situation in Colombia, similar problems are fast emerging in Ecuador and Venezuela. The security forces of all three countries must play by the book and focus more on citizen security, and their civilian authorities must take the lead in providing services. Secondly, more effective responses to the severe humanitarian problems are needed. Colombia continues to struggle to attend to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other victims of the conflict, a large number of whom cross the borders in search of protection. But protecting them has not been a priority in Venezuela, leaving an estimated 200,000 highly vulnerable. This contrasts with the response in Ecuador, which has recognised and provided documentation to some 54,000 Colombian refugees. But Ecuador has tightened its policy since January 2011, exposing such individuals to new risks. Governments are hesitant to give more weight to a potentially divisive issue in bilateral relations, but looking the other way will only make matters worse over the long run. Thirdly, efficient forums to solve problems jointly and promote border development are still lacking. This partly reflects the neighbours’ reluctance to acknowledge any responsibility for a conflict they consider a domestic matter of Colombia but that in fact is sustained by transnational criminal networks and is increasingly creating victims on all sides of the borders. The high diplomatic volatility has also been damaging efforts to institutionalise cooperation that needs to be grounded in buy-in and participation of local authorities, civil society and the private sector. In a region where the next diplomatic crisis is often not far away, the current improved political climate offers the governments a chance to boost civilian state presence, improve the humanitarian situation and put relations on a more sustainable footing. They should seize it. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 40: Accessed November 4, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/40%20Moving%20Beyond%20Easy%20Wins%20---%20Colombias%20Borders.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/40%20Moving%20Beyond%20Easy%20Wins%20---%20Colombias%20Borders.pdf Shelf Number: 123224 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Organized Crimes Violence (Colombia)

Author: Steinberg, Nik Title: Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s “War on Drugs” Summary: Five years since President Felipe Calderón declared “war” on organized crime in Mexico and dispatched the military to confront the country’s drug cartels, the government’s policy is failing on two fronts. It has not succeeded in reducing violence, and has resulted in a dramatic increase in grave human rights violations, which have only exacerbated the climate of violence, lawlessness, and fear that exists in many parts of the country. Based on extensive research in five states — Baja California, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Nuevo León, and Tabasco — Neither Rights Nor Security presents compelling evidence of the systematic use of torture by Mexican security forces, as well as the involvement of police and soldiers in scores of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. These are not isolated acts. Rather as the testimonies of victims, eyewitnesses, and evidence from public information requests and official government statistics show, these abusive tactics are endemic to Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts. The violations persist in large part because the members of security forces who commit them are virtually never held accountable. Many cases languish in the military justice system. And even when investigations are opened in the civilian justice system, prosecutors repeatedly fail to take basic steps such as identifying and interviewing witnesses. Nevertheless, government officials are often quick to dismiss victims’ allegations as false and to cast victims as criminals. Such accusations compound the suffering already inflicted by these serious violations and place the burden on victims and their families to conduct investigations themselves. Neither Rights Nor Security demonstrates how this pattern of abuse and impunity is undercutting Mexico’s efforts to reduce violence, dismantle criminal networks, and restore the rule of law in parts of the country where it has been badly damaged. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011. 218p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2011 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf Shelf Number: 123278 Keywords: Disappearances Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Homicides Human Rights (Mexico) Organized Crime Police Use of Force Torture Violence

Author: U.S. Senate. Caucus on International Narcotics Control Title: Responding to Violence in Central America Summary: Violence in Central America has reached crisis levels. Throughout Central America, Mexican drug trafficking organizations, local drug traffickers, transnational youth gangs, and other illegal criminal networks are taking advantage of weak governance and underperforming justice systems. This report outlines a series of concrete steps that the United States can take to support the seven countries of Central America as they try to improve security. The report does not call for large amounts of new money but instead recommends investments in key programs with host country partners. Our report synthesizes information gathered by Caucus staff through visits to Guatemala and Honduras, briefings, interviews, and a review of documents from both government and non-government subject matter experts. The report describes the current strategy and provides important recommendations for policymakers in Congress and the Administration. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 2011. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 19, 2011 at: http://www.grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/Drug-Caucus-09-22-11-Responding-to-Violence-in-Central-America-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://www.grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/Drug-Caucus-09-22-11-Responding-to-Violence-in-Central-America-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 123407 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Trafficking Homicides Violence (Central America) Violent Crime Youth Gangs

Author: Derks, Maria Title: A Community Dilemma: DDR and the Changing Face of Violence in Colombia Summary: Colombia has stood at the forefront of debate across Latin America and the world on how chronic armed violence can be combated. Its programmes of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) have aimed to put over 50,000 ex-combatants from paramilitary forces and guerrilla movements back into civilian life. But a rising tide of criminal violence has swept up former paramilitary fighters and is seizing control of Colombia’s many sources of illicit wealth, with cocaine production and trafficking at their heart. While thousands are still enrolled in reintegration courses, this paper asks what more the Colombian government, civil society and the international community can do to ensure that the demobilization process does not end in failure. The paper, based on extensive field research, argues that an essential first step is to ensure local communities are engaged, respected and protected. Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael', 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2011 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/news/2011/20110707_a_community_dilemma_ddr_and_the_changing_face_of_violence_in_colombia.html Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/news/2011/20110707_a_community_dilemma_ddr_and_the_changing_face_of_violence_in_colombia.html Shelf Number: 123489 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Paramilitary Groups Violence (Colombia) Violent Crime

Author: Amnesty International Title: Addicted to Death: Executions for Drug Offences in Iran Summary: Since mid-2010, the execution rate in Iran has soared. up to 80 per cent of those executed are accused of drug-related offences – offences that do not meet the international criterion of “most serious crimes” for which the death penalty may be imposed. hundreds of alleged drug offenders are being executed in secret mass executions after grossly unfair trials. those executed are often from amongst the most disadvantaged sectors of society, and have included juvenile offenders, whose execution is strictly forbidden under international law. This report highlights the Iranian authorities’ use of execution as a catch-all solution to social ills, even though there is no conclusive evidence that the death penalty has any deterrent effect on crime. Despite the long history of executions for drug offences, Iran’s internal drug problem continues to grow and drug-trafficking across Iran’s borders shows no sign of abating. The report urges the Iranian authorities to immediately end the use of the death penalty for drugs offences, and calls on the international community to ensure that aid to Iran for counter-narcotics measures is not used to commit human rights violations. Details: London: Amnesty International, 2011. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 10, 2012 at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/090/2011/en/0564f064-e965-4fad-b062-6de232a08162/mde130902011en.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Iran URL: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/090/2011/en/0564f064-e965-4fad-b062-6de232a08162/mde130902011en.pdf Shelf Number: 123549 Keywords: Capital Punishment Death Penalty Drug Offenders (Iran) Drug Trafficking Executions

Author: Yeh, Brian T. Title: Drug Offenses: Maximum Fines and Terms of Imprisonment for Violation of the Federal Controlled Substances Act and Related Laws Summary: This is a chart of the maximum fines and terms of imprisonment that may be imposed as a consequence of conviction for violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and other drug supply and drug demand related laws. It lists the penalties for: heroin, cocaine, crack, PCP, LSD, marihuana (marijuana), amphetamine, methamphetamine, listed (precursor) chemicals, paraphernalia, date rape drugs, rave drugs, designer drugs, ecstasy, drug kingpins, as well as the other substances including narcotics and opiates assigned to Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III, Schedule IV, and Schedule V of the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (Title II and Title III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act). Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: RL30722: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30722.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30722.pdf Shelf Number: 123561 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Offenses Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking Fines Imprisonment Punishment

Author: Transform Drug Policy Foundation Title: The War on Drugs: Creating Crime, Enriching Criminals Summary: The global war on drugs has been fought for over 50 years, to achieve its stated goal of a “drug-free world”. Yet despite the ever increasing resources spent on police and military efforts to suppress the illicit drug trade, supply has more than kept pace with rising global demand. Indeed, most indicators suggest drugs are cheaper and more available than ever before. This briefing summarises the crime-related costs stemming from the war on drugs, which include: • Organised crime arising from the illicit drug trade, and its knock-on effects in terms of money laundering, corruption and violence • Street-level crime committed by drug gangs and by dependent drug users attempting to support their habits • The criminalisation of users, excessive levels of incarceration, and crimes committed by governments under the banner of the drug war • The economic costs of drug war-related crime, and the criminal justice response to it There is overlap with other areas of the Count the Costs initiative – human rights (including a detailed discussion of prison issues), security and development, discrimination and stigma, public health, the environment and economics. Details: London: Transform Drug Policy Founcation, 2011. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: Year: 2011 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 123567 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: Moloeznik, Marcos Pablo Title: Final Report: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Municipal Police of Ciudad Juárez Summary: On September 26, 2011, the Justice in Mexico Project presented the results of its latest Justiciabarómetro survey, titled: Diagnóstico integral de la policía municipal de Ciudad Juárez (in Spanish), which was developed in collaboration with the Colegio de Chihuahua, the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and the Comisión Nacional Para Prevenir y Erradicar la Violencia Contra Las Mujeres de la Secretaría de Gobernación. The survey builds on the findings of a similar study conducted one year earlier in Guadalajara, and was implemented for the Justice in Mexico Project by the polling firm Data Opinión Pública y Mercados (DATA-OPM). Along with the Guadalajara survey, this study of the Ciudad Juárez police department, conducted in represents one of the largest independent studies of a police force ever published in Mexico. Focusing on the border city of Ciudad Juárez, adjacent to El Paso, Texas, this study focuses on one of the country’s most important industrial cities and, at the time the survey was implemented, the most violent municipality in Mexico. This study surveyed 75% of the 3,146 municipal police officers serving the roughly 1.3 million inhabitants of Ciudad Juárez. This survey was conducted in June 2010, during the worst year of violence since rival organized crime groups began fighting for control of drug trafficking routes through this major trade corridor. In October 2010, a new mayoral administration took office, introducing new measures to improve the local police department. This study therefore provides a snapshot of the department as the new administration took over, and a useful baseline for evaluating what progress has been made over the last year. Among the key findings of the survey were severe deficiencies in training and equipment, a lack of merit-based hiring criteria and civil service protections, high levels of distrust among law enforcement personnel, and severe problems of coordination with state and federal law enforcement agencies. Over half the force indicated that they do not have the equipment that they need to do their job, including adequate police uniforms, and half said that the condition of available equipment was bad (33%) or very bad (17%). Respondents demonstrated a basic knowledge of proper law enforcement protocols, but also expressed a strong demand (47%) for more training. 85% said that they have no opportunity to practice the proper use of a firearm on a regular basis, 55% indicated that they do not receive any breaks during their shift, and a significant portion (47%) indicated that they do not have adequate time to exercise during their shift. Among various questions on law enforcement integrity, 60% of respondents indicated that honesty is the most important virtue of a police officer, but only 40% believed that it was the virtue most present on the force. Notably, on a scale of 0 to 4, roughly 65% indicated that the the level of corruption was at 2 or higher and 36% of respondents felt that the level was above 3. In terms of where corruption is located, 44% of respondents indicated that it was found at the highest levels, 29% indicated that corruption was found at all levels, and the remainder indicated corruption was found only in at lower or middle management levels. Such problems reflect systemic problems common in police departments in Mexico (as evidenced by the aforementioned survey in Guadalajara), and will no doubt take considerable time to redress. In the meantime, monitoring by the Justice in Mexico Project suggests that the security situation has improved moderately in Ciudad Juárez, with at least a 30% decline in homicides in 2011 compared to 2010. Many credit Ciudad Juárez’s newly appointed police chief, Julian Leyzaola, for achieving a dramatic drop in drug violence. As chief of Tijuana’s police department during 2007-2010, Leyzaola presided over a dramatic decline in drug related violence during his tenure in office, an achievement that many hope will now be replicated in Ciudad Juárez. This survey helps to measure many of the challenges the department faces, and sets a baseline for evaluating reform efforts over the coming years. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute , University of San Diego, Justice in Mexico Project, 2011. 52p. Source: Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 123643 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Police (Mexico) Police Agencies Policing Violence

Author: Carpenter, Ted Galen Title: Undermining Mexico's Dangerous Drug Cartels Summary: Since President Felipe Calderón launched a military-led offensive against Mexico's powerful drug cartels in December 2006, some 42,000 people have perished. The situation is so bad that the Mexican government's authority in several portions of the country, especially along the border with the United States, is shaky, and the growing turbulence creates concerns that Mexico is in danger of becoming a failed state. Although such fears are excessive at this point, even that dire scenario can no longer be ruled out. U.S. political leaders and the American people also worry that Mexico's corruption and violence is seeping across the border into the United States. That danger is still fairly limited, but the trend is ominous. Both the number and severity of incidents along the border are rising. Experts propose several strategies for dealing with Mexico's drug violence. One suggestion is to apply the model used earlier to defeat the Colombian drug cartels. But the victory in Colombia is not as complete as proponents contend, and the situation in Mexico is far less favorable to using that strategy. Another suggested approach is to try to restore Mexico's status quo ante, in which the government largely looked the other way while drug traffickers sent their product to the United States. But too much has changed politically in Mexico for that approach, which would be only a temporary Band-Aid solution in any case. The only lasting, effective strategy is to defund the Mexican drug cartels. Reducing their billions of dollars in revenue requires the United States, as the principal consumer market for illegal drugs, to abandon its failed prohibition policy. That move would eliminate the lucrative black-market premium and greatly reduce the financial resources the cartels have available to bribe officials or hire enforcers to kill competitors and law enforcement personnel and intimidate the Mexican people. A refusal to abandon prohibition means that Mexico's agony will likely worsen and pose a significant security problem for the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2011. 20p. Source: Policy Analysis No. 688: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA688.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA688.pdf Shelf Number: 124075 Keywords: Border Security (U.S. and Mexico) Drug Cartels (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Violence

Author: Danelo, David J. Title: Toward a U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: The Geopolitics of Northern Mexico and the Implications for U.S. Policy Summary: Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006, Mexico’s drug war has taken over 30,000 lives, destabilized the U.S.-Mexico border, and become a security crisis for the North American continent. Two years ago, a December 2008 Pentagon report warned about the strategic consequences for the United States of a rapid collapse of two nations: Pakistan and Mexico. “The Mexican possibility might seem less likely,” said the report, “but the government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault by drug cartels.” Any sudden collapse would require a U.S. response “based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.” This scenario has not come to pass, and a full scale collapse of Mexico remains unlikely. That said, Mexico’s security situation has direct consequences in the United States. Along the U.S.-Mexico border, coalitions of sheriffs, agents, activists and concerned citizens have rallied to increase public awareness. According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, Mexican drug cartels maintain distribution networks in 295 U.S. cities through brutal gang activity. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has joined a chorus of policy analysts and terrorism experts by referring to Mexico’s drug war as a “criminal insurgency.” In recent visits to Mexico, both President Barack Obama and the Secretary of State have acknowledged U.S. responsibility to reduce drug demand and invest in “partnership.” As the joint response to the 2009 H1N1 flu virus by U.S. and Mexican health officials illustrated, United States and Mexico policy responses are inextricably linked. Beyond Mexico City’s federal government, which does not appear in imminent danger of collapse, the United States should be most concerned about conditions in the six northern Mexican states. Because of the current structure of the U.S. and Mexican economies, security in the Mexican states bordering the United States represents an enduring U.S. strategic interest. Averaging $320-340 billion, Mexico and China annually alternate as America’s second largest trading partner. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was ratified in 1994, the Mexican states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California have tripled in population. The 50 km free trade zone—extending on both sides of the border—represents the partnership that has fused the economies of both nations together. Given the degree of economic, cultural and physical connectivity, the ten states along the U.S.-Mexico frontier should be treated in many ways as a “Border Nation” when developing national security policy. The term “Border Nation” describes the region where U.S. government institutions can—and should—focus capacity building efforts, which will make a broader increase of stability more likely throughout Mexico. The Border Nation approach advocated in this monograph will produce better solutions for two reasons. First, analyzing both the U.S. southwest and northern Mexico as a separate region acknowledges the enduring economic connectivity between northern Mexico and the United States. While post-NAFTA economic growth has made the six northern states the most prosperous in Mexico, persistent violence has mortgaged these gains to drug cartels. Second, and most important, a Border Nation concept encourages U.S. officials to use an enduring geopolitical framework to develop partnerships that extend beyond diplomatic courtesies and translate into on-the-ground actions. In order to develop a practical strategic framework for partnership with Mexico in defeating the threats of the drug-fuelled criminal insurgency—which this monograph refers to as “land piracy”—the U.S. government must achieve a greater understanding of the local and regional dynamics of the six Mexican border states. Although the Merida Initiative represents a step forward in developing a viable strategic partnership, this agreement does not present operational or tactical solutions. Unless a better understanding of this area is achieved, and unless specific prescriptions are developed, the security situation throughout Mexico is unlikely to improve. This project has studied security, economic and political trends in northern Mexico and the U.S. southwest in order to develop a strategy for actions the U.S. government can take at the federal level to best support state and local security partnerships between the four U.S. and six Mexican border states to defend and deter the violence and address enduring security issues on both sides of the border. David Danelo has spent extensive time on the ground in Mexico researching conditions in the six northern Mexican states and examining methods for increasing local partnerships between U.S. and Mexican authorities. His field research frames the recommended changes in U.S. policy. No relationship in the Western Hemisphere is fraught with more geopolitical complexity than the one between Mexico and the United States. The two nations are both partners and competitors. Given the economic, social and cultural rivalries, security partnerships between the United States and Mexico have been difficult to create. Failure to build capacity and structure partnerships will enhance the strength of drug cartels and fuel instability and violence. The purpose of this project is to examine the one region—Border Nation—where an enduring security partnership is most vital to long term stability on the North American continent. Details: Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2012 at http://www.fpri.org/pubs/201102.danelo.geopoliticsofnorthernmexico.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.fpri.org/pubs/201102.danelo.geopoliticsofnorthernmexico.pdf Shelf Number: 124096 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.) (Mexico) Cartels Criminal Justice Policy Drug Trafficking

Author: DuPée, Matthew C. Title: The Narcotics Emirate of Afghanistan: Armed Polities and Their Roles in Illicit Drug Production and Conflict 1980-2010 Summary: The production of illicit narcotics in low-intensity conflict environments remains a serious concern for U.S. policymakers. Afghanistan is a solid example where the intersection of crime, narcotics production and insurgency has successfully thwarted U.S. stabilization and security efforts despite a 10-year military engagement there. This study seeks to examine the role of crime better, particularly narcotics related criminal enterprise, and its effect on the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan. This study explores political, economic and conflict related factors that facilitate the narcotics industry and forges cooperation between drug trafficking organizations and insurgent movements. A key argument of this study is that nontraditional participants in narcotics production, such as insurgent groups or state representatives and institutions, acquire more than just profit and resources. Participants stand to gain political leverage, the social and political legitimacy derived from “protecting” the livelihoods of rural farmers, as well as “freedom of action;” the ability to operate unimpeded within a given territory or space because of public support. This study also suggests that one additional factor, social control, is a key motivator for an actor’s participation in the narcotics industry. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 143p. Source: Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2012 at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada536901.pdf&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada536901.pdf&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 124110 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Narcotics (Afghanistan) (Pakistan) Opiates Organized Crime Taliban

Author: Victor, Kain Sebastian Title: CIA and the Contras' cocaine connection: Funny Farm and the Coca Cultivation Program - a true story how CIA used cocaine to finance an insurgency Summary: The evidence shows that the government knew that the Contras’ decided to traffic cocaine to finance themselves. The government participated in the drug trafficking by not interrupting it. CIA ordered the Contras to traffic drugs. Traffickers were protected from prosecution and received government contract. The government knew and sanctioned the drug trafficking into the US to support the Contras. The White House urged lenience for at least one convicted trafficker and terrorist. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) protected major drug traffickers, who diverted drug proceeds to finance the Contras. When former Contra mercenaries accused the CIA run Contras of being involved in drug trafficking the Senate started to investigate. Confidential memos and papers were leaked to the State Department, the Justice Department, the White House and CIA, who in a joined effort tried to sabotage the investigation. Documents were withheld, witnesses labelled as terrorist threats and put under surveillance, and the credibility of the Senatorial subcommittee’s members was questioned in the press. The conclusion of the investigation was that CIA had allowed the Contras to traffic cocaine and had protected them from prosecution. The conclusion went unnoticed in the media. When the drug connection came to the media’s attention a decade later, they focused on how the media covered the news, not news that the government had sanctioned drug trafficking. It were three small articles in San Jose Mercury News that sparked it all, and caused the Senate to force DOJ and CIA to investigate. When the official investigations were finished two years later and the reports release, the media’s attention had turned to Monica Lewinsky affair. All the reporters did was to quote from the conclusions of the reports. The mainstream media reported that the US Government had not sanctioned drug trafficking, but the media missed the scoop. The reports confirmed that the government knew about the Contras involvement in drug trafficking, that the government protected traffickers from prosecution, that the government granted contracts to trafficker whom they knew were drug trafficker, and that the Contras in part was funded by drug proceeds. The conclusions in the official reports denied what their reports confirmed. What evidence does exists, which shows that the government knew about and was involvement in the Contras’ drugs trafficking? This is the report about the evidence. Details: Denmark: Roskilde University, 2006, Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2012 at http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/1978/1/CIA%20and%20the%20Contras%E2%80%99%20cocaine%20connection%20(RUB%20version).pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/1978/1/CIA%20and%20the%20Contras%E2%80%99%20cocaine%20connection%20(RUB%20version).pdf Shelf Number: 124165 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Political Corruption

Author: Porio, Emma Title: The Use of Children in the Production, Sales and Trafficking of Drugs: A Synthesis of Participatory Action-Oriented Research Programs in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand Summary: Since the 1990s, the use, sale, and production of illegal drugs have become a major issue in the region. In Jakarta, Indonesia, about 70 locations in the city have been pinpointed by the police as centers or “hot spots” for drug supply/trade. In the early 1990s, the Philippines was just a major transshipment point for drugs but became a net producer and exporter by the late 1990s. Thailand is one of the world’s major producing regions in the world, with the infamous “Golden Triangle” in the north bordering Myanmar and Laos has been the center for drug trade and production for generations. Reports have found a significant number of children have been found to be engaged in illicit drug use, sale, and trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region particularly in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. ILO Convention 182 (on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour) considers the use of children in illicit activities, such as the use of children in the production, sales, and trafficking of drugs, as one of the worst forms of child labour (WFCL). Dangers and risks faced by children engaged in the drug trade go beyond the physical, psychological and mental disorders prevalent among drug-addicted children. Children in the drug trade/trafficking (CDT) are exposed and initiated to the world of illegal activities and criminality. Once involved, they are inextricably linked to situations of tensions, fear, suspicion and conflicts and are quite vulnerable to harassment and exploitation by both drug dealers and the police. Aside from the oppressive conditions of criminality, the engagement of children in drug-related activities is also linked to problems and tensions in their families, peer networks, and communities. Ultimately, the engagement of children/youth in the WFCL like drug sales/ trafficking, compromises their future and that of the nation. Children involved in drug sales and trafficking are difficult to trace and identify, as is often the case with other worst forms of child labour. Social and political sensitivity to the issue, the illegal and hidden nature of the trade, and the associated security risks and the potential difficulties in addressing the problem, make it necessary to use a cautious and processbased approach. ILO Convention 182 calls for ILO member countries to take steps to eliminate the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency. Yet, timely and appropriate interventions can only come about if there is already sufficient understanding of this problem. To this end, the International Labour Organization’s International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO-IPEC), started executing a participatory action-oriented research (PAOR) project (hereinafter, the project) in Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand in September 2002.1 The project aimed to develop and demonstrate an action-oriented research methodology that provides better understanding and information on the use of children in the production, sales, and distribution of illegal drugs. In the course of conducting the research, the project also aimed to reach children at risk as well as those involved in drugs through community organizing/ mobilization, training, advocacy, counseling, referrals, and networking/ linkages. At the end of the project, it also aimed to propose models of interventions for future replication or adaptation in other areas. Details: International Labour Office, International Program on the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO/IPEC), 2004. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2012 at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_bk_pb_24_en.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Asia URL: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_bk_pb_24_en.pdf Shelf Number: 98315 Keywords: Child Exploitation Child Labor (Indonesia) (the Philippines) (Thailan Drug Trafficking Forced Labor, Children

Author: International Drug Policy Consortium Title: TNI-IDPC-Sentencing Council: Expert Seminar on Proportionality of Sentencing for Drug Offences Summary: The Expert Seminar on Proportionality of Sentencing for Drug Offences was an initiative of the Transnational Institute working together with the International Drug Policy Consortium (‘IDPC’) and co-hosted by the Sentencing Council of England and Wales. The seminar was funded by the European Commission and the Open Society Institute and took place in London, England in May 2011. This seminar is the third in a series of expert discussions on drug policy designed to feed into moments of opportunity for policy and law reform at national and international level with detailed technical analysis and through examples of best-practice from across different jurisdictions. The moment of opportunity in this case was the Sentencing Council’s consultation on sentencing for drug offences which is due to produce definitive sentencing guidelines for England and Wales in the next year. A total of 31 people attended and comprised a mixture of domestic and international policy officials, the judiciary, and practitioners as well as representatives from non-governmental organisations and academic institutions. Four themes were covered over the course of the day: proportionality, the International Human Rights Perspective; the UK Experience and Consultation on Sentencing for Drug Offences; the Concept of Proportionality with a Focus on Different Levels of Involvement in Drug Offences; and drug ‘mules.’ Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2012 at http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/IDPC-TNI%20Proportionality%20Report%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/IDPC-TNI%20Proportionality%20Report%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 124198 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Human Rights Sentencing Guidelines

Author: Arnson, Cynthia J. Title: Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle Summary: Incidents such as the May 2011 massacre on a farm in Guatemala’s Petén region, resulting in the murder and decapitation by drug gangs of 27 peasant farmers and their families, serve to underscore the serious threat to human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law posed by organized crime in Central America. The international community has begun to address the burgeoning crisis and commit significant resources to the fight against crime and violence; indeed, not since the Central American wars of the 1980s has the region commanded so much attention in the international arena. To better understand the nature, origins, and evolution of organized crime in Central America and the challenges it poses—and thereby contribute to the efforts of policy-makers and civil society to address it—the Latin American Program commissioned original research on the dynamics of organized crime in the three countries of the so-called Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—and on the broader regional context that links these case studies. This publication includes essays by Douglas Farah (El Salvador), Julie López (Guatemala), James Bosworth (Honduras), Steven Dudley, and Cynthia Arnson and Eric Olson (regional overviews) and is part of a series on the sub-regional dynamics of organized crime, focusing especially on the linkages between Central America, Mexico, and the Andean region as well as the growing insertion of Latin America in global transnational crime networks. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin America Program, 2011. 254p. Source: Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas #29: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_single_page.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_single_page.pdf Shelf Number: 124216 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Organized Crime (Central America) Violent Crime

Author: Bosworth, James Title: Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Chaos Summary: Honduras’ geographic features and location make it an ideal midway point between the drug producers in South America and drug consumers in North America. Nobody has a precise number, but the best estimates predict that several hundred tons of cocaine will transit Honduras this year, of which less than 10 percent will be seized by authorities. In its wake, well-funded transnational criminal organizations combined with local gangs are destabilizing the country’s democratic institutions and making it one of the most dangerous countries in the world in terms of violent crime. Since the 1970’s, Honduran criminal organizations focused on getting drugs - particularly cocaine - in, around and through Honduras, taking a cut of the profit along the way. Honduran Juan Ramoìn Matta Ballesteros ran a key organization trafficking cocaine in the early 1980’s between Colombia and Mexico. At times in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, Colombian groups such as Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) exercised management, influence and oversight in the trafficking in Honduras, but the power generally remained with the Honduran transportistas. In the past decade, a crackdown on drug trafficking organizations in Colombia combined with the rise of increasingly powerful Mexican cartels stretching their influence into Central America has impacted the trafficking situation in Honduras. Illicit flights from South America and boats with cocaine moving up both coasts have increased. Youth gangs in Honduras provide the traffickers with organizations that can intimidate and murder for cheap. The Sinaloa Cartel bought or forced its management influence over a number of previously Honduran controlled trafficking routes. The Zetas followed suit. The public security situation in Honduras is among the worst in the world, ranking among the top five nations with the highest number of violent crimes and murders per capita. The government estimates that one person is killed every 88 minutes. The UNODC reported that the province of Atlántida, which includes the port city of La Ceiba, may be among the most violent in the Western Hemisphere with 1 person out of every 1,000 killed in violence crimes. Various press rights organizations believe Honduras, along with Mexico, will be one of the two most dangerous countries for journalists this year. In the past year, the country’s counter-drug czar was killed by a Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and a plot was broken up to assassinate the country’s Minister of Security. To complicate matters, the turmoil in Honduras’ political system over the past two years has opened space for increased organized crime activity. An institutional battle, a military coup, and ongoing complications about the international recognition of Honduras’s government have dissuaded the aid and cooperation believed necessary to fight organized crime. While the following sections of this paper describe the specific influence of the Mexican DTOs and other international organizations, there remains a thriving “independent” industry of transportistas in which people unassociated with specific DTOs move cocaine up the coast and sell it at a higher price to DTOs further north. Groups as small as 2 and as large as 25, usually composed of Nicaraguans or Hondurans, will purchase cocaine in southern parts of Central America (Panama, Costa Rica or Nicaragua) from organizations managed by Colombian and Venezuelan DTOs. They then move the cocaine up the coast to Honduras or Guatemala, where they sell it at a profit on the black market that is run by the Sinaloa, Gulf and Zetas organizations. One such micro-DTO, the Reñazcos, is a Honduran family that operates mostly on the Nicaraguan side of the border, transporting cocaine by land and sea through Nicaraguan territory and into Honduras. Once they move the cocaine into Honduras, they transfer control of the drugs to the Mexican DTOs. Although small in size, the organization has been operating for almost a decade. In 2004 they killed several police officers in the Nicaraguan Caribbean city of Bluefields. The Nicaraguan government claimed in late 2010 that the group tried to break several drug traffickers out of prison in that region. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2010. 33p. Source: Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf Shelf Number: 124218 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime (Honduras)

Author: Zander, Markus Title: Dynamic in land tenure, local power and the peasant economy: the case of Peten, Guatemala Summary: This article analyses the ongoing process of land grabbing by cattle farmers and drug traffickers in south-eastern Petén, Guatemala and its socio-economic consequences. In the last decade, this process has strongly accelerated due to several factors, which made investment in land more attractive and resulted in sharply increasing land prices. In the 236 communities included in the field study, 30% of all peasant families have already sold their land, some of them hoping to escape poverty, others under often violent pressure from buyers mostly related to the drug trade, who are securing control over large territories. For lack of economic alternatives the landless families end up leasing plots for cultivation from their neighbours, working as day labourers on big cattle ranches or occupying land in the protected areas in northern Petén, with poverty and conflicts about resources on a steady rise. Value chain analysis shows that the conversion from small scale peasant agriculture to extensive livestock production reduces land productivity and diminishes local added value and employment, thus providing further arguments for changes in agricultural politics to halt or reverse the process. Details: Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) Source: Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.future-agricultures.org/papers-and-presentations/doc_download/1095-dynamics-in-land-tenure-local-power-and-the-peasant-economy-the-case-of-peten-guatemala Year: 0 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.future-agricultures.org/papers-and-presentations/doc_download/1095-dynamics-in-land-tenure-local-power-and-the-peasant-economy-the-case-of-peten-guatemala Shelf Number: 124219 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Political Corruption Property Theft (Guatemala)

Author: Espach, Ralph Title: Criminal Organizations and Illicit Trafficking in Guatemala’s Border Communities Summary: Contraband routes in Guatemala traditionally controlled by local groups are coming ever more under the control of the Mexican cartels. Around half of the nation’s territory is believed to be under the control of criminal organizations. Local criminal organizations have long penetrated the Guatemalan police, army, courts and government, and Guatemala’s gangs are extremely violent. However, the Mexican cartels with their financial resources, military grade weapons, and reputation for indiscriminate killing and brutality have elevated these threats. Today Guatemala and its neighbors Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador, have homicide rates among the highest in the world. Guatemala’s murder rate is as high as those during the worst years of the civil wars in the 1980’s. Impunity for traffickers and murderers is the rule, not the exception. Drug trafficking networks operate most intensely in communities along or near smuggling routes, many of which are located in border regions. Guatemala has more than 800 miles of borders which cross forests and mountain ranges and are seldom monitored or even marked. The communities close to the borders tend to be rural and engaged in subsistence farming often with little or no government presence in the form of clinics, schools, or police. Without the presence of state institutions, these communities are left vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of criminal groups which use a variety of tactics, including not only threats and violence but also the distribution of money, public services, and other benefits to obtain compliance, acceptance, and even the support of local residents. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2011. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IPR%2015225.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IPR%2015225.pdf Shelf Number: 124277 Keywords: Border Security Counternarcotics Criminal Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime (Guatemala; Latin America; Central

Author: Madeira, Luis Filipe Title: The international cocaine trade in Guinea-Bissau: current trends and risks Summary: This paper analyses the international, West African and national conditions that fuel the spread of the international drugs trade in West Africa, particularly in Guinea-Bissau, and examines the impact of the international cocaine trade at a social, economic and governance level in this small West African country. Although drug trafficking has a long history in West Africa, over the past five years the region has increasingly attracted international attention as a new hub for the illicit cocaine trade between Latin America and Europe. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, that attention has been all the greater for a number of reasons: a) the visibility of the authorities’ involvement in trafficking, causing international agencies and the media to dub it the “world’s first narco-state”; b) the amount of drugs seized on its territory and the increasing presence of South Americans, to whom this type of activity is attributed; and lastly c) because the country is totally dependent on aid and uses the media attention given to drug trafficking as an argument for keeping aid flowing into the country. Following significant seizures of cocaine in 2006 and 2007, the trade appeared to go into decline in 2008 and 2009, for which the authors outline four possible scenarios, the most likely being that it is continuing but through the employment of other less visible methods, with the traffickers having made only a temporary tactical retreat. Both the global operation of the cocaine market and a number of specific national conditions favour the development of drug trafficking in West Africa and especially Guinea-Bissau. At the systemic level, the enforcement of the global drug-control system tends to push traffickers to select transit routes through states that are already weakened by internal conflict, poverty or both. In recent years, the Latin American drug cartels appear to have shifted their attention to supplying the lucrative European market by developing networks in West Africa, focused around Ghana in the south and Guinea-Bissau in the north. From there the drugs are smuggled into Europe on commercial flights by mules. At the same time, by paying local collaborators in both cash and cocaine, the traffickers are creating a local consumer market for the drug. The geography of Guinea-Bissau, with its myriad of coastal islands, makes it the perfect destination for unloading drugs that have been transported by sea, often from Brazil or Venezuela. The virtual collapse of the country’s administration, the inadequacies of the police and justice sector, impunity, endemic corruption and widespread poverty create fertile conditions for the flourishing of the cocaine trade which, in turn, has further adverse consequences at the social, economic and governance levels. The presence of resourceful and potentially violent South American cartels in Guinea-Bissau has aggravated a situation that was already unsustainable, and drug-related incidents are on the rise. After reporting the involvement of the military and their civilian allies in drug trafficking, several journalists and activists have had to flee the country or go into hiding. Drugs have been discovered at military bases, and seizures made by the police have disappeared after being confiscated by the military. Senior government officials have also reportedly received death threats when seeking to investigate cocaine seizures. The influence that cocaine-trafficking is having on the country’s economy is not yet clear but, as it gains in importance, it is likely to soon generate more wealth than traditional legal activities and thus be more attractive to the local population. The extent of the impact will depend on whether Guinea-Bissau’s role in the trafficking chain is predominantly active or passive. At the social level, domestic drug use is growing, with the resultant addiction and violent crime; addiction to cocaine, and especially crack, is reportedly rampant. Guinea-Bissau lacks the material resources, expertise and experience to address these problems. From a long-term perspective, the attraction of the drugs trade for disenfranchised youth may also undermine social control mechanisms that prevent crime and violence. So far, however, Bissau’s youth, though faced with unemployment and few opportunities, have shown little desire to go down that route. Nevertheless, the consequences of globalisation, the food crisis and the inability of external aid to respond to such problems could quickly change the situation. The authors argue that, in the long term, in order to tackle the enormous challenges that the drug trade poses in route countries, a less securitizing agenda needs to be put in place globally, and the prohibition-based international consensus should be debated and reconsidered. In the meantime, a number of shorter-term measures need to be taken urgently to halt the negative effects of this activity at international and national level. These include improving the coordination of efforts at national, sub-regional, regional and international level, reforming the country’s institutions, supporting civil society, rehabilitation initiatives and conducting further research to gain an accurate understanding of the scale of the problem. Details: Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (Noref), 2011. 18p. Source: Noref Working Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed March 14, 2012 at http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/7563aa361160ef275ddd4f0812c6f41e.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/7563aa361160ef275ddd4f0812c6f41e.pdf Shelf Number: 124539 Keywords: Cocaine (Guinea-Bissau) Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking

Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction Title: A Definition of 'Drug Mules' for Use in a European Context Summary: The trafficking of drugs and, in particular, the use of human carriers (often called ‘drug mules’) remains a relatively hidden phenomenon, on which limited information is available. This latest EMCDDA Thematic paper explores whether a common definition of ‘drug mules’ can be developed in the European context and assesses the implications of this for data gathering and future research. The paper has its roots in a questionnaire launched by the EMCDDA in 2010 to test a proposed conceptual framework of drug couriers. Taking part in the survey were experienced professionals, academics and practitioners from a variety of countries, legal traditions and law-enforcement practices. Drug mules are reported to be transporting all of the major illicit drug types through Europe and making full use of all European transport routes. This paper draws a number of conclusions and recommendations for further investigation into drug markets and related responses. Details: Lisbon: EMCDDA, 2012 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2012 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_150421_EN_EMCDDA_ThematicPapers_DrugMules.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_150421_EN_EMCDDA_ThematicPapers_DrugMules.pdf Shelf Number: 124787 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Mules (Europe) Drug Trafficking

Author: Shifter, Michael Title: Countering Criminal Violence in Central America Summary: Violent crime in Central America—particularly in the "northern triangle" of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala—is reaching breathtaking levels. Murder rates in the region are among the highest in the world. To a certain extent, Central America's predicament is one of geography—it is sandwiched between some of the world's largest drug producers in South America and the world's largest consumer of illegal drugs, the United States. The region is awash in weapons and gunmen, and high rates of poverty ensure substantial numbers of willing recruits for organized crime syndicates. Weak, underfunded, and sometimes corrupt governments struggle to keep up with the challenge. Though the United States has offered substantial aid to Central American efforts to address criminal violence, it also contributes to the problem through its high levels of drug consumption, relatively relaxed gun control laws, and deportation policies that have sent home more than a million illegal migrants with violent records. In this Council Special Report, sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action, Michael Shifter assesses the causes and consequences of the violence faced by several Central American countries and examines the national, regional, and international efforts intended to curb its worst effects. Guatemala, for example, is still healing from a thirty-six-year civil war; guns and armed groups remain common. El Salvador's ironfisted response to widespread gang violence has transformed its prisons into overcrowded gang-recruiting centers while doing little to reduce crime. Even relatively wealthy countries like Costa Rica and Panama are threatened by poor police capacity and significant problems with smuggling and money laundering. Virtually all countries are further plagued by at least some level of public corruption. While hard-hitting or even militarized responses to criminal violence often enjoy broad public support, Shifter writes, Nicaragua's experience with crime prevention programs like community policing and job training for youth suggests that other approaches can be more effective at curbing crime. Shortages of local funding and expertise remain problematic, however, and only large-scale, national programs can effectively address national-level problems with corruption or the quality of the legal system. Moreover, many of the root causes of the region's violence are transnational—the international trade in drugs, guns, and other contraband being only the most obvious example. Multilateral organizations have stepped in to support national-level responses, as have Central America's neighbors. The UN's flagship effort, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, supports domestic prosecutions of organized criminal gangs and their allies in Guatemala's government. In recent years, the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to efforts to improve regional collaboration on anticrime initiatives; last year they pledged $1.5 billion more over the next few years. Colombia and Mexico have both provided advice and training for Central America's police services and judiciary. The United States is also contributing significant resources. Washington now provides about $100 million annually, targeted mainly at drug interdiction and law enforcement, though some funding also goes toward institutional capacity building and violence protection. Still, much more remains to be done, and Shifter offers several recommendations for U.S. policymakers. Strengthening the judiciary and law enforcement services should, he says, be a central goal; the region's ineffective and corrupt legal systems are severely hampering efforts to curb the violence. He also advocates rethinking U.S. policies that contribute to violence in Central America, including drug laws, gun control policies, and immigration rules regarding violent offenders. Countering Criminal Violence in Central America provides important insights into the varied causes of criminal violence in the region. Its authoritative and nuanced analysis acknowledges the strengths and weaknesses of ongoing efforts to address the problem, and it offers thoughtful recommendations on how those efforts might be built on and improved. Despite the daunting complexity of the challenges underpinning the region's growing violence, this report successfully argues that this trend can—and should—be reversed. Details: Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Council Special Report No. 64: Accessed April 4, 2012 at: http://www.cfr.org/central-america/countering-criminal-violence-central-america/p27740 Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.cfr.org/central-america/countering-criminal-violence-central-america/p27740 Shelf Number: 124814 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs Gun Violence Homicides Police Corruption Violence (Central America) Violent Crime

Author: Dickenson, Matthew Title: Leadership Transitions and Violence in Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations, 2006-2010 Summary: Since President Felipe Calderon took office, over 34,000 murders have been tied to drug tracking organizations (DTO's) in Mexico. In response, the Mexican government -- with assistance from the US -- has targeted DTO leaders for removal. This study identifies 25 leadership removals between 2006 and 2010, and analyzes subsequent changes in drug-related murders using auto-regressive distributed lag (ADL) regression (OLS) models in a monthly time series of 11 states. Persistence dynamics for longer-term effects are also analyzed. Leadership removals generally precede increases in violence. However, the predicted effects of removal differ by the leadership role that the individual performed. Killing leaders is followed by more violence than capturing them. There is no significant change in levels of drug trafficking, as proxied by seizures and retail prices. Public opinion is increasingly dissatisfied with the Calderon administration's approach. Together, these results suggest the ineffectiveness of DTO leadership targeting. Details: Unpublished paper, 2012. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001405 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001405 Shelf Number: 124854 Keywords: Cartels Drug Trafficking Drugs and Violence (Mexico) Homicides

Author: Acevedo, Beatriz Title: Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytic Assessment Summary: Over the last decade Plan Colombia has been the principal strategy addressing the complex dynamics of illicit drugs production within that country. It is based on the assumption that a reduction in the illicit drugs market worldwide can be tackled by focusing on supply control measures. Plan Colombia was originally proposed as a peace programme, but soon became a military strategy aimed at weakening the link between illicit drugs and insurgency. The results of this approach in terms of the decline of illegal armies, particularly guerrilla groups, may be considered as a success. In relation to coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking, however, the results show otherwise. The latest United Nations World Drug Report estimates that there has been a 27% increase in the area cultivated with coca in the period 2006-2007(UNODC, 2008), and Colombia remains one of the major producers of cocaine in the world (See Graph and Table 1). This contradiction leads to a number of questions about the effectiveness of a predominantly military approach in tackling the drugs problem and the real impact of the supply control strategy on the international market of illicit drugs. This briefing paper consequently aims to present a critical assessment of Plan Colombia over the past ten years. It is argued that the strategy has failed to address the structural causes of illicit drugs cultivation: poverty, lack of opportunities and on-going conflict. In particular it discusses how the current emphasis on fumigation has a negative impact on the fragile and strategic eco-system of the Amazonian region, as well as potential health problems for people who live in these areas. Moreover, it is also suggested that a militaristic approach to drug trafficking seems to contribute to the development of what can be called the ‘markets of violence.’ These are reflected in the increasing power of warlords, the growth of diverse business associated with security and protection and disputes amongst illegal armies for control of activities related to illegal drugs. Finally, it is argued that while the power of guerrilla groups2 - particularly the 40-year-old FARC group that controls some phases of the drug trafficking business - may be in decline, this situation needs to be analysed as part of their lack of political coherence and popular support. Indeed, as is discussed here, increased attention should be given to the developing power of paramilitary groups3 within Colombian politics and the emergence of a phenomenon that has become to be known as ‘para-politics’. Details: Oxford, UK: Beckley Foundation, Drug Policy Programme, 2008. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper Sixteen: Accessed April 11, 2012 at: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BriefingPaper_16.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BriefingPaper_16.pdf Shelf Number: 124922 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs (Colombia) Plan Colombia

Author: Kego, Walter Title: Russian Organized Crime: Recent Trends in the Baltic Sea Region Summary: A new criminal landscape is emerging in Europe. A key factor behind the dramatically increasing crime levels is Russian organized crime. While these groups are often comprised of Russians, they are not based solely on eth-nicity, often members are also from former Soviet repub-lics. According to Europol, these groups are among the most dangerous criminal groups operating in Europe to-day. They are involved in every type of illegal activity and excel in exploiting new opportunities in the economic and financial sectors. They make exorbitant amounts of money from illegal activities such as money laundering, human and drug trafficking, smuggling and extortion. Their activities have grown and spread to other countries to such an extent that they pose a serious problem affect-ing all EU member states. This report documents recent trends. Details: Nacha, Sweden: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2012. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2012 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2012_kego-molcean_russian-organized-crime-recent-trends.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2012_kego-molcean_russian-organized-crime-recent-trends.pdf Shelf Number: 124923 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extortion Money Laundering Organized Crime (Europe) Russian Organized Crime Smuggling

Author: Trimble, Meridee Jean Title: U.S. Policy Options Toward Stopping North Korea’s Illicit Activities Summary: North Korea began its involvement in illicit activities in the 1970s, but it took the United States until the new millennium to develop a series of major law enforcement approaches to counter these activities. North Korea’s illicit activities are purportedly the funding input for the development of its nuclear weapons program, which constitutes the output. The main illicit activities to be discussed include drug production and trafficking, the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, missile sales and human trafficking. The United States has aggressively addressed the nuclear threat that North Korea poses, but has been slow to address the inputs that fund the outputs. This thesis seeks to answer the question of why it took the United States over three decades to address the illicit activities of North Korea that purportedly fund its nuclear program. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed April 18, 2012 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a475783.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Korea, North URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a475783.pdf Shelf Number: 125018 Keywords: Counterfeiting Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Illegal Activities (North Korea) Illicit Goods

Author: Weber, Samantha, ed. Title: Continued Cultivation of Illegal Marijuana in U.S. Western National Parks Summary: Since 1998, at least 10 western national parks were used as illegal marijuana cultivation sites by Mexican-national drug traffic organizations. This paper documents the continued use of national park lands as illegal cultivation sites through 2011. During the grow season of 2010, the Drug traffic organizations began scouting the hills of Whiskeytown in mid-winter. Supplies and personnel to manage the sites were in place as early as March. Rangers detected six grow sites within Whiskeytown National Recreation Area boundary, and several sites immediately adjacent to the park. Rangers eventually removed 26,028 plants, which had a street value of $78,840,000. Six foreign nationals were arrested, some with weapons, and all believed to be associated with the Mexican drug traffic organizations. Similar situations occur at Sequoia and Kings Canyon Na - tional Parks, Yosemite National Park, Golden Gate National Recreation Area, Pt. Reyes National Seashore, Santa Monica National Recreation Area, Lake Mead National Recreation Area, and North Cascades National Park. The drug trafficking organizations are operating year round within the parks. Added to this problem is the increasing number of quasi-legal medical marijuana grow sites operating on remote private land surrounding the parks, often within the same watersheds. Details: Hancock, MI: The George Wright Society, 2012. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2012 at: http://www.georgewright.org/1138milestone.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.georgewright.org/1138milestone.pdf Shelf Number: 125119 Keywords: Drug Traffickers Drug Trafficking Marijuana (U.S.) National Parks Park Rangers

Author: McCaffrey, Barry R. Title: Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment Summary: During the past two years the state of Texas has become increasingly threatened by the spread of Mexican cartel organized crime. The threat reflects a change in the strategic intent of the cartels to move their operations into the United States. In effect, the cartels seek to create a “sanitary zone” inside the Texas border -- one county deep -- that will provide sanctuary from Mexican law enforcement and, at the same time, enable the cartels to transform Texas’ border counties into narcotics transshipment points for continued transport and distribution into the continental United States. To achieve their objectives the cartels are relying increasingly on organized gangs to provide expendable and unaccountable manpower to do their dirty work. These gangs are recruited on the streets of Texas cities and inside Texas prisons by top-tier gangs who work in conjunction with the cartels. Details: Mico, TX: Colgen, 2011. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2012 at: http://mccaul.house.gov/uploads/Final%20Report-Texas%20Border%20Security.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://mccaul.house.gov/uploads/Final%20Report-Texas%20Border%20Security.pdf Shelf Number: 125122 Keywords: Border Security (Texas) Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Beyond the Border Buildup Security and Migrants Along the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: Once relatively quiet and neglected, the U.S.-Mexico border zone is a very different place than it was twenty years ago, or even ten years ago. Today, border communities are separated by both security measures and security conditions. South of the borderline, a spiral of organized crime has made Mexico’s northern states one of the world’s most violent regions. North of the borderline, a “war on drugs,” a “war on terror,” and rising anti-immigrant sentiment have encouraged a flurry of fence-building and a multiplied presence of guards, spies, and soldiers. Together, both sides comprise one of the world’s principal corridors for the transshipment of illegal drugs and weapons. The population most affected by this sharp change in threats, vigilance, and attitudes is the hundreds of thousands of undocumented people who seek every year to migrate into the United States. Some come because of the promise of economic opportunity, or the lack of it in their countries of origin, mostly Mexico and Central America. Some come to escape violence or poor governance. A growing proportion comes to be reunited with loved ones already in the United States. The number of migrants is less than it used to be, for reasons that this report will explore. But after the changes of the past several years, migrants face a much greater risk of being kidnapped and extorted by criminals and corrupt officials in Mexico; finding themselves mired in the U.S. criminal justice system; or even dying in a desert wilderness. This report is the product of a yearlong study of border security policy and its impact on the migrant population. On the U.S. side, we visited three border regions and carried out extensive research in Washington. In Mexico, we conducted surveys of migrants, and met with Mexican officials and representatives of civil society and migrant shelters. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2012 at: http://justf.org/files/pubs/120419_WOLA_Beyond.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://justf.org/files/pubs/120419_WOLA_Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 125124 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Illegal Aliens Illegal Immigrants Illegal Migration Organized Crime

Author: Winter, Brian Title: Brazil's 'Gringo' Problem: Its Borders Summary: For the first 500 years of Brazil's history, pretty much anything that wanted to cross its borders could do so in relative peace, whether cattle, Indians or intrepid explorers. That era is now drawing to a close. Brazil's economic rise is forcing it to deal with a problem it long regarded as the sole concern of rich countries like the United States: the need to secure its borders and slow down a flood of drugs, illegal immigrants and other contraband. Brazil's prosperity has created a new consumer class of tens of millions of people who happen to live right next to the world's three biggest producers of cocaine: Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Brazil is now the world's No. 2 cocaine consumer, behind only the United States, according to U.S. government data. It is also a booming consumer of marijuana, ecstasy, and other narcotics. Details: New York: Thomson Reuters, 2012. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2012 at: http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/04/BrazilBorders.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/04/BrazilBorders.pdf Shelf Number: 125150 Keywords: Border Security Cocaine Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking Illegal Aliens Illegal Immigrants (Brazil) Immigration

Author: Hakim, Peter Title: Rethinking US Drug Policy Summary: Most Americans believe that their country’s forty-year “war on drugs” has failed. Yet, instead of a serious national discussion of how to reform US drug control strategies, there remains a silent tolerance of ineffective, socially harmful laws, institutions, and policies. What is most needed now is a farreaching debate on alternative approaches that could reduce the risks and damage from the trafficking and abuse of illegal drugs. That was also the conclusion of a highly-regarded report prepared by a distinguished group of Latin American presidents and other leaders. This Inter-American Dialogue report proposes six US government initiatives that would set the stage for a thorough rethinking of US drug policy. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, The Beckley Foundation, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/OCO-IM/pdf/Rethinking_US_Drug_Policy_feb2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/OCO-IM/pdf/Rethinking_US_Drug_Policy_feb2011.pdf Shelf Number: 125206 Keywords: Criminal Justice Administration Criminal Justice Policy Drug Abuse Drug Policy (U.S.) Drug Trafficking Legislation

Author: Williams, Phil Title: Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability Summary: The rationale for this series is a reflection of the ways in which the world of armed groups has changed and is continuing to change, and the impact of these changes on threats and challenges to national and global security. Although challenges posed by various kinds of violent armed groups initially appear highly diverse and unrelated to one another, in fact they all reflect the increasing connections between security and governance—and, in particular, the relationship between poor governance and violent armed groups. The growth in the number of states with capacity gaps, functional holes, and legitimacy deficits helps to explain the resurgence of a new medievalism, and the rise of illegal quasi-governments in localized areas. The irony is that after several decades in which the number of sovereign states represented in the United Nations (UN) has increased significantly, relatively few of these states can truly claim a monopoly on force within their territorial borders. Violent challengers to the Westphalian state have taken different forms in different parts of the world. These forms include tribal and ethnic groups, warlords, drug trafficking organizations, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations. In many cases, these groups are overtly challenging the state; in others they are cooperating and colluding with state structures while subtly undermining them; in yet others, the state is a passive bystander while violent armed groups are fighting one another. The mix is different, the combinations vary, and the perpetrators of violence have different motives, methods, and targets. In spite of their divergent forms, however, nonstate violent actors share certain viii qualities and characteristics. As Roy Godson and Richard Shultz have pointed out, “As surprising as it may seem, pirate attacks off Somalia, militias in Lebanon, and criminal armies in Mexico are part of a global pattern and not anomalies.” Indeed, these violent armed groups or, as they are sometimes called, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) represent a common challenge to national and international security, a challenge that is far greater than the sum of the individual groups, and that is likely to grow rather than diminish over the next several decades. Although the U.S. military—especially the Air Force and the Navy—still place considerable emphasis on the potential emergence of peer competitors among foreign armed forces, more immediate challenges have emanated not from states but from various kinds of VNSAs. This monograph, “Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability,” focuses on the complex relationship between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement. It also seeks to disentangle the linkages between insurgency on the one hand and drug trafficking and organized crime on the other, suggesting that criminal activities help sustain an insurgency, but also carry certain risks for the insurgency. Subsequent monographs will focus on specific areas where violent armed groups operate, or they will delve into specifics about some of those groups. Some works will be descriptive or historical, while others are more analytical, but together they will clarify the security challenges that, arguably, are the most important now faced by the United States and the rest of the world. The series will include monographs on Mexico, the Caribbean, and various kinds of violent armed groups. Details: Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Securities Studies; Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2012. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2012 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1101.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1101.pdf Shelf Number: 125243 Keywords: Criminal Organizations Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Terrorists Violence Violent Crime Youth Gangs

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment Summary: This report describes the illicit trade of opiates along the Northern route from northern Afghanistan to Central Asia up to the borders of the Russian Federation. It has been organized in three sections. The first section begins by addressing the dynamics of trafficking in northern Afghanistan, including the groups involved, the volumes of opiate flows and opiate consumption, as well as the share that southern Afghanistan production takes in Northern route trafficking. A second section explores trafficking dynamics through Central Asia, including the methods involved and the groups managing the trade. Lastly, the final section briefly analyzes the regional capacity to respond to the threat of Afghan opiates. For the purposes of this study, ‘northern Afghanistan’ refers to both north Afghanistan and north-east Afghanistan, following the regional grouping of provinces used in the UNODC annual Opium Poppy Survey. The north Afghanistan region consists of the provinces of Baghlan, Samangan, Faryab, Sari-pul, Jawzjan, Bamyan and Balkh, while north-east Afghanistan consists of Kunduz, Badakhshan and Takhar provinces. Details: Geneva: UNODC, 2012. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf Shelf Number: 125301 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Opiates (Asia) Opium Organized Crime

Author: Osler, Mark Title: What Would It Look Like If We Cared About Narcotics Trafficking? An Argument to Attack Narcotics Capital Rather Than Labor Summary: As the failure of the “War on Drugs” becomes ever more obvious, alternative strategies are coming to the fore. This article adds to that movement with a novel suggestion: That we cause drug networks to fail as a business through the tactic of focusing resources on the seizure of cash flow traveling back to source countries. To date, federal narcotics interdiction has centered on restricting the labor supply to drug traffickers by incarcerating street dealers, mules, and middle managers. It shouldn’t be surprising that this has not worked, because low-wage labor is in ready supply, and those workers are easily replaced. Instead, we should leverage the skills we have gained in interdicting cash flowing to terrorist organizations and apply it to drug networks. The result could be a self-financing law enforcement effort, a federal effort that is more consistent with the core values of federalism and a belief in markets, and an actual chance to succeed at the task of restricting the flow of narcotics. Details: Minnesota: University of St. Thomas - School of Law, 2011. 17p. Source: Working Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2012 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800370 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800370 Shelf Number: 125365 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Economics and Crime Narcotics War on Drugs

Author: Goddard, Terry Title: How to Fix a Broken Border. A Three-Part Series Summary: If the United States wants effective border security, then more effective law‐enforcement measures must be taken. The first step is to identify the right target: the increasingly sophisticated smuggling organizations known as the “cartels.” By attacking the money laundering which is the life blood of the cartels, and making the bi‐national criminal investigation and prosecution of cartel bosses a priority, the border can be made significantly more secure. In the process, the violence in Mexico and the smuggling of drugs and people into the United States will be reduced. But this requires a unified focus, with state and federal law‐enforcement agencies cooperating to target organized criminal activity rather than economic migrants. As described in the How to Fix a Broken Border series of papers, written by former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard, an effective border‐enforcement strategy must do the following: Adopt a Coordinated, Multi‐dimensional, Bi‐national Approach • We must stop compartmentalizing border objectives by illegal activity. Current agency efforts are incorrectly focused on stopping particular kinds of contraband. But a successful effort cannot be about unauthorized immigrants alone (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), or drugs alone (Drug Enforcement Agency), or guns alone (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). It must address, disrupt, and destroy the total business of the cartels. • We need a comprehensive, bi‐national, border‐wide strategy that includes federal authorities and Mexican law enforcement, as well as state and local police. Target Cartel Money • A more effective border‐enforcement strategy starts with the money. Billions of dollars in illegal revenue from the sale of drugs and other contraband flows into cartel pocketbooks each year. This revenue crosses the border, from the United States into Mexico, by many means, ranging from bulk cash shipments and wire transfers to funnel bank accounts and stored value devices. • Any serious border defense must go after the cartel’s money, but that is not happening. U.S. Treasury Department officials who observe and regulate the international movement of currency remain unwilling or unable to go after money laundering across the Mexican border. • Generally speaking, the failures of the anti‐money laundering effort are not because of inadequate statutes, but a failure of enforcement. Again and again, huge amounts of funds flowing illegally out of this country could be stopped if financial institutions and government agencies focused on the problem and aggressively policed unlawful or questionable behavior. • Current federal law limits the circumstances under which prosecutors can seize the cash they believe to be part of a criminal scheme. In contrast, Arizona law makes it far easier to hold suspected funds pending further examination of their source. Expanding federal authority, with appropriate safeguards, would enhance anti‐money laundering efforts. Close Money‐Laundering Loopholes • The cross‐border movement of “stored value” devices is a particularly critical problem. These innocent‐looking plastic cards can contain thousands if not millions of dollars and are not covered by any currency disclosure requirements at the border. 􀂾 Under U.S. law, no traveler may take over $10,000 in cash or cash equivalents, called “monetary instruments,” into or out of the United States without declaring that money at the border. 􀂾 However, stored value devices are not listed as monetary instruments or otherwise subject to declaration at the border, even though they could contain many times the $10,000 disclosure threshold. 􀂾 This loophole, clearly identified by federal authorities over five years ago, provides smugglers with a massive opportunity to evade anti‐money laundering security at the border. • The U.S. government must enforce existing anti‐money laundering provisions, and quickly close existing loopholes, to stop (or at least slow down) the cash flowing to the cartels. Until government agencies, especially Treasury, get more serious about cutting off the illegal international flow of funds, we can never say we have a “secure” border. Go After Cartel Bosses • Current law‐enforcement efforts primarily target low‐level subcontractors for the cartels. • This country must focus on the arrest and incarceration of cartel leaders. We need to send a clear message that it will be extremely hazardous for anyone to take a fallen leader’s place. • For example, the arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of Chapo Guzman, the notorious leader of the Sinaloa cartel, would significantly boost our border‐enforcement efforts. • Ultimately, going after the cartel bosses will require federal leadership and close cooperation with the law enforcement of Mexico. The lack of bi‐national coordination, in effect, provides cartel leaders a sanctuary south of the border. Protect Ports of Entry • One of the consequences of the hysteria about border security is the buildup of the Border Patrol at the expense of customs enforcement. With the de‐emphasis on customs inspections, more contraband gets through the ports. • By appearing tough—making fortification of the border with additional Border Patrol the top priority, while deemphasizing the ports of entry—it is now easier for the criminals to come through our front door. • Most of the criminal activity has shifted to the border crossings, not the places in between. We need more resources for inspections at ports of entry. If this country wants to stop smuggling, we must take a broader and more analytical approach to what motivates the smugglers—and the means by which they illegally move drugs, money, guns, and people in such large volumes with such impunity. Going after the contraband product or smuggled people, as this country has been doing for years, is destined to be an endless chase. The cartels will just regroup and continue operations, learning from their mistakes. If we are serious about stopping the threat on the border, we have to dismantle the criminal organizations that carry the contraband and take away the tools that make them so effective. Anything less will fail. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011. 3 parts Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2012 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series Shelf Number: 125429 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.) Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Smuggling

Author: Rodriguez Cuevas, Jose A. Title: The Balloon Effect and Mexican Homeland Security: What it Means to be the Weakest Link in the Americas’ Security Chain Summary: The sudden increase in crime and violence in some Mexican cities and regions has raised security concerns not only in Mexico, where President Felipe Calderon categorized these crimes as a threat to Mexican society, but also in the United States, where Department of Homeland Secretary head Janet Napolitano referred to stemming the violence as “vital to core U.S. national interests.” Mexico is concerned with the latent threat of violence spreading all over the nation, while the U.S. is trying to guard against spillover. Both governments are concerned by the increased violence and its impact on communities along the U.S.–Mexican border. Because of its geopolitical location along the southern U.S. border, Mexico is susceptible to possible undesired effects of U.S. strategies. These unintended, second-degree consequences are known as “balloon effects,” after the airflow inside a balloon when constriction applied to one area sends pressure to another area in the balloon, thinning and weakening its wall. Since 2006, Mexico’s strategy for countering transnational organized crime and related activities has sent the balloon effect in two directions: first, inside Mexico, where government actions have unbalanced the criminal structure, creating balloon effects inside Mexican territory; and second, within the U.S. while asking to escalate the Mexican effort to improve its anti-crime strategy with U.S. assistance has escalated conflict and led to a holistic strategy against transnational organized crime and related activities in the Americas. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 85p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Thesis: Accessed July 3, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Shelf Number: 125464 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Homeland Security Organized Crime (Mexico)

Author: Pew Research Center. Global Attitudes Project Title: Mexicans Back Military Campaign Against Cartels: Despite Doubts About Success, Human Rights Costs Summary: As Felipe Calderón’s term as Mexico’s president draws to a close, Mexicans continue to strongly back his policy of deploying the military to combat the country’s powerful drug cartels. Eight-in-ten say this is the right course, a level of support that has remained remarkably constant since the Pew Global Attitudes Project first asked the question in 2009. Support for Calderón’s strategy continues despite limited confidence that the government is winning the drug war, and widespread concerns about its costs. Just 47% believe progress is being made against drug traffickers, virtually identical to the 45% who held this opinion in 2011. Three-in-ten today say the government is actually losing ground against the cartels, while 19% see no change in the stand-off between the authorities and crime syndicates. At the same time, the public is uneasy about the moral cost of the drug war: 74% say human rights violations by the military and police are a very big problem. But concern about rights abuses coexist with continued worries about drug-related violence and crime – both of which strong majorities describe as pressing issues in Mexico. President Calderón himself remains popular. A 58%-majority has a favorable opinion of Mexico’s current leader. Although down from a high of 68% in 2009, this rating nonetheless puts him on par with the 56% who have a positive view of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI’s) Enrique Peña Nieto, whose ratings clearly topped those of his opponents when the poll was conducted between March 20 and April 2 of this year. Whether Peña Nieto or any of the other presidential candidates have a solution to Mexico’s drug problems is an open question for the Mexican public. When asked which political party could do a better job of dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers, about equal numbers name Calderón’s National Action Party (PAN) (28%) and Peña Nieto’s PRI (25%), while only 13% point to the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Fully 23% volunteer that none of the parties is particularly capable of dealing with this critical issue. These are the principal findings from the latest survey in Mexico by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Conducted face-to-face with 1,200 adults from across the country, the poll also finds that most Mexicans (61%) blame both the United States and their own country for the continued drug violence within their borders. While solid majorities would welcome U.S. assistance in combating the cartels if the aid came in the form of training, equipment or intelligence support, only a third would approve deploying U.S. troops on Mexican soil. Overall, a majority (56%) of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the United States, with about the same number (53%) convinced that Mexicans who migrate to the U.S. have a better life. Despite this perception, most Mexicans have no interest in migrating north across the border, although the percentage who say they would move to the U.S. if they had the means and opportunity has remained fairly steady since 2009. Details: Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2012. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Mexico-Report-FINAL-Wednesday-June-20-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Mexico-Report-FINAL-Wednesday-June-20-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 125627 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug War (Mexico) Organized Crime

Author: Tanner, Murray Scot Title: China Confronts Afghan Drugs: Law Enforcement Views of “The Golden Crescent” Summary: The rising flow of illegal drugs from the “Golden Crescent” region—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran—into western China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has caused increasing concern to Chinese law enforcement officials and analysts. This study seeks to strengthen understanding of Chinese law enforcement perceptions of the Golden Crescent drug problem by making use of previously underexploited Chinese law enforcement publications. Key Findings • Chinese law enforcement officials and analysts now see Golden Crescent trafficking as a major and rapidly growing threat to society. This view reflects a major shift from China’s earlier exclusive focus on the “Golden Triangle” region drug threat. • Chinese law enforcement analysts blame the rise in Golden Crescent drug smuggling on the increase in foreign supply rather than Chinese demand. These analyses tend to understate Chinese domestic problems, such as police corruption, ethnic tensions, and rising drug prices and demand, which may have made China a more attractive drug shipping route. • Chinese analyses of popular Golden Crescent smuggling routes emphasize highway, air, and rail routes through Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. If correct, these analyses indicate that these four important security partners of Beijing may be failing to prevent trafficking into China across their territory. • The Chinese law enforcement writings reviewed indicate that China has serious weaknesses in its counternarcotics intelligence capabilities and is anxious to overcome them. Problems include meager clandestine intelligence on Asian drug networks, weak data on trafficking by ethnic separatists, and poor intelligence networking and sharing across jurisdictions. • Increasingly sophisticated trafficker techniques coupled with greater linguistic diversity among traffickers are frustrating Chinese law enforcement officials, who find these traffickers more difficult to investigate, detect, and interrogate. • Even though law enforcement analysts confidently assert a significant link between terrorism and drug trafficking, sources reviewed for this study provide very little solid evidence that the two are connected. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2011. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/China%20Confronts%20Afghan%20Drugs...%20D0024793.A1_1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: China URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/China%20Confronts%20Afghan%20Drugs...%20D0024793.A1_1.pdf Shelf Number: 125635 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Illegal Drugs (China and Afghanistan)

Author: Maftei, Loredana Title: Illegal Drug Markets in Europe: The Negative Consequences of Globalization Summary: Globalizing processes have profoundly shaped the European drugs situation. The illegal drug markets have reached to evolve and to transform all the advantages of this phenomenon, in their favor. Based on globalization aspects, the paper purpose is to present the main characteristics of illicit drugs market within European countries, from the last years. Furthermore the article is focused on the analysis of theoretical and empirical drugs literature, especially on the current reports and studies of EMCDDA and UNODC, which indicated certain drug sectors. Due to its richness, position and high demand of illegal drugs, Europe is viewed by criminal organizations as a transit area for heroin, cocaine, cannabis and synthetic drugs, and a big customer which continued to sustain this profitable enterprise, over the last decades. Regarding the drug problem, the governance needs to be reframed and to take account of economical, social and moral character. The simple connection of illegal drug markets with globalization, gives the originality note of the paper, which leads to some important new insights for future research and policy. Details: Romania: Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași,, 2012. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2012 at: http://www.cse.uaic.ro/WorkingPapers/articles/CESWP2012_IV2_MAF.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.cse.uaic.ro/WorkingPapers/articles/CESWP2012_IV2_MAF.pdf Shelf Number: 125685 Keywords: Cannabis Cocaine Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Heroin Illegal Drugs (Europe)

Author: Zedillo, Ernesto Title: Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism Summary: The papers contained in this book are based on presentations from the conference Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, organized by the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut on May 12 and 13, 2011. The motivation for the conference reflected in this volume stems from our belief that the existing framework for dealing with drug policies does not work. As part of our ongoing effort to support the creation and dissemination of ideas toward preserving international peace and security, we organized a forum at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization in which we could take stock and distill the relevant research and empirical evidence generated over the years with regard to the present drug policies and make an effort to determine whether there is some potential for alternative policies. We elected to confront the research and existing policies with the state of affairs on this issue as seen through the prism of Mexico and the US. Details: New Haven, CT: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization at Yale University, 2012. 175p. Source: Internet Resource: A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook: Accessed July 20, 2012 at: http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/rethinking-war-on-drugs.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/rethinking-war-on-drugs.pdf Shelf Number: 125710 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug Violence War on Drugs (Mexico and U.S.)

Author: Title: Police Reform in Guatemala: Obstacles and Opportunities Summary: The 25,000 members of the National Civil Police (PNC) are on the front lines of Guatemala’s battle against crime. But all too often citizens distrust and fear the police – widely dismissed as inefficient, corrupt and abusive – as much as the criminals. Underfunded, poorly trained and often outgunned, they are frequently incapable or unwilling to confront criminals and gain the public trust needed to build a state based on rule of law. Drug traffickers, including Mexican cartels, move at will across porous borders, while criminal gangs dominate many urban areas. The government of President Otto Pérez Molina must reboot and revitalise police reform, as part of an overall effort to strengthen justice and law enforcement, with financial support from the U.S. and other countries interested in preventing Guatemala from becoming a haven for organised crime. Progress has been made, but achievements are fragile and easily reversed. Since the 1996 peace accords that ended 36 years of armed conflict, donors have poured tens of millions of dollars into police and justice sector reform. But despite these efforts, Guatemala, with its neighbours in the Northern Triangle of Central America, remains one of the most violent countries in the world. Governments have repeatedly promised reform, including the Pérez administration that took office in January 2012. The new president, a retired general, campaigned on the promise that his government would combat crime with an “iron fist”. Since then, he has deployed troops to help patrol high-crime areas, reinforced the military in border regions to fight drug trafficking and declared a state of siege to quell a local protest. He has also promised to strengthen the police by adding thousands of recruits, while restarting stalled efforts to overhaul the institution. The question is whether his government will be able to muster the resources and will to bolster institutional reform or will rely primarily on militarised crime-fighting operations that provide short-term gains without solving long-term problems. Some projects may provide templates for broader institutional change. Certain investigative units have demonstrated that the police can – given the proper resources, training and supervision – solve complex crimes. The UN-sponsored Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is providing training to both police and prosecutors. There are also encouraging developments within the area of preventive or community-oriented policing. In two municipalities outside Guatemala City, Villa Nueva and Mixco, activist mayors are trying to combat gangs and create stronger ties between the local communities and law enforcement. Those cities are also the location of two “model precincts”, supported by the U.S. government, which finances the vetting and training of police and supports programs designed to strengthen police-community collaboration. But these efforts are dependent on the financial aid and political backing of donors. The initiatives in Villa Nueva and Mixco rely on local politicians whose successors may not share their commitment. It is unclear whether reform efforts have enough support within the PNC hierarchy to survive over the long term. Without strong and consistent backing from the national government, business, civil society and the international community, the lessons learned from these pilot projects may be lost before they can be perfected and replicated. Compounding the difficulties reformers face is that change must take place following a decade of rising violence, much of it fuelled by organised crime, including Mexican drug cartels. High crime rates tend to overwhelm incremental progress, making it harder to resist calls for tough solutions that rely on the superior strength and discipline of the army. Using the army to fight crime, however, further demoralises and weakens the police, especially when the military’s role is poorly defined. This makes it harder in the long run to build the competent civilian forces needed to enforce the law under stable, democratic regimes. There is no single, fail-safe formula for reshaping an institution as complex as the police. Nor do police exist in a vacuum; permanent change can only take place within broader efforts to battle corruption and favouritism within the justice system as a whole. Nonetheless, there are steps that the government, with international backing, should undertake to ensure that the PNC becomes a professional force capable of investigating and preventing the crime that threatens Guatemalan democracy. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report N°43: Accessed July 25, 2012 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/43-police-reform-in-guatemala-obstacles-and-opportunities Year: 2012 Country: Grenada URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/43-police-reform-in-guatemala-obstacles-and-opportunities Shelf Number: 125764 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Police Reform Policing (Guatemala) Violence

Author: Helbling, Cadet Erringer Title: Modeling Honduran Illicit Drug Networks Summary: In 2009, U.S. assistance to Honduras was suspended due to a staged coup d’état by the Honduran military. As a result, drug trafficking activity steadily increased in Honduras, as police and military forces within the country became less effective in combating this cartel-related activity. Several other factors, including physical location and limited resources, contribute to Honduras’ growing problem which poses a threat both to its stability and to the United States’ national interests in Honduras. A West Point senior capstone, sponsored by the Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) Construction Engineering Research Lab (CERL) and the Center for Nation Reconstruction and Capacity Development (CNRCD) at West Point, is investigating whole of government approaches in support to Civil-Military Operators (CMO) that address the illicit ground trafficking problem. The capstone team is specifically focused in two distinct areas: network flow modeling and system dynamics modeling. Using these approaches, we present a holistic assessment of the complex illicit trafficking networks operating within and throughout Honduras. We argue that by using network flow modeling and system dynamics we can provide insights into interdiction strategies for illicit ground trafficking in Honduras that operate on a holistic scale. Details: West Point, NY: Center for Nation Reconstruction and Capacity Development Department of Systems Engineering, United States Military Academy, 2012. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 30, 2012 at: http://www.usma.edu/cnrcd/CNRCD_Library/Modeling%20Illicit%20Networks.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.usma.edu/cnrcd/CNRCD_Library/Modeling%20Illicit%20Networks.pdf Shelf Number: 125806 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drugs (Honduras) Illicit Drugs

Author: Moreno Gómez, Edgar Title: Staging the War on Drugs: Media and Organised Crime in Mexico Summary: The steep upsurge in the number of drug‐related homicides in Mexico has been matched by an even greater increase in the news coverage of violence and organised crime. However, both journalists and scholars have overlooked how organised crime makes use of the media and vice versa. By drawing on previous research on the relationship between the media, terrorism and public opinion this Working Paper looks into the rise of mass‐mediated organised crime in Mexico. Based on a quantitative analysis of the news coverage of violence and organised crime in three major newspapers as well as a qualitative study of selected events, the paper offers an insight to understand the political ramifications of the news coverage of violence. Even when drug trafficking organisations are not terrorists who seek the publicity of the press to advance a political cause, this paper shows that they have important goals related to the media, the impact of news on public opinion and the consequent influence over policy making. Details: Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2012. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Elcano Royal Institute Working Papers No. 8: Accessed August 2, 2012 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=147776 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=147776 Shelf Number: 125843 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Homicides Organized Crime (Mexico) Violence Violent Crime

Author: Daly, Catherine Title: Armed with Impunity: Curbing Military Human Rights Abuses in Mexico Summary: This report examines the current context and possible remedies to protect against human rights abuses in Mexico. The report then provides documentation and analysis of the pattern of human rights complaints that have been formally registered against the military since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and through mid-2012. • The military has played a constantly expanding role in efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, and to provide domestic security more generally. As Calderón deployed tens of thousands of troops to regions and cities known to be drug-trafficking routes and hubs at the outset of his term. Calderón also significantly increased the size of the Mexican army, as well as military spending overall. • The Mexican public holds mixed feelings about the Calderón administration’s strategy. On the one hand, in a March 2012 poll by Consulta Mitofsky, 43% of respondents indicated that they viewed the Mexican government’s strategy as a “failure,” and 53% thought that organized crime was winning the fight against government forces. Only 28% felt Calderón’s strategy had been successful. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of those surveyed support using the military to combat organized crime. • The massive deployment of the Mexican military has increased civilian exposure and vulnerability to military personnel. In this context, there has been a surge of formal complaints (quejas) of military abuses submitted to National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the ombudsman that generates formal reports or “recommendations” (recomendaciones) for the government agency against which a complaint has been levied. • All told, since the organization was created in 1990 through July 22, 2012, CNDH received 140,699 written complaints, out of which the agency was able to establish that there were reasonable claims of abuse in 34,651 cases, or about one in four cases. A growing number of complaints against the Mexican army (SEDENA) were recorded since the deployment of troops after Calderón took office: 367 in 2007; 1,230 in 2008; 1,800 in 2009; 1,415 in 2010; 1,626 in 2011. As for the current year, SEDENA reported that there were 479 reports as of May 3, 2012. • Alleged military human rights violations represent a fraction of the total number of complaints in any given year. For example, in 2011, even as SEDENA reportedly held the largest number of complaints for a given agency, it accounted for only 6% of all complaints to CNDH. Still, CNDH reports that during the 12 years that it has been documenting human rights abuses, SEDENA is one of the top three institutions with the most filed complaints against it. In 2011, SEDENA reportedly led the list with 1,626 complaints. • The Mexican government points out that, as of May 3, 2012, only about 100 (less than 2%) of the 6,544 complaints against SEDENA that CNDH received since December 1, 2006 have resulted in CNDH reports of credible abuses. Moreover, SEDENA reports that 5,661 complaints have been resolved, meaning that they have This report examines the current context and possible remedies to protect against human rights abuses in Mexico. The report then provides documentation and analysis of the pattern of human rights complaints that have been formally registered against the military since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and through mid-2012. • The military has played a constantly expanding role in efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, and to provide domestic security more generally. As Calderón deployed tens of thousands of troops to regions and cities known to be drug-trafficking routes and hubs at the outset of his term. Calderón also significantly increased the size of the Mexican army, as well as military spending overall. • The Mexican public holds mixed feelings about the Calderón administration’s strategy. On the one hand, in a March 2012 poll by Consulta Mitofsky, 43% of respondents indicated that they viewed the Mexican government’s strategy as a “failure,” and 53% thought that organized crime was winning the fight against government forces. Only 28% felt Calderón’s strategy had been successful. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of those surveyed support using the military to combat organized crime. • The massive deployment of the Mexican military has increased civilian exposure and vulnerability to military personnel. In this context, there has been a surge of formal complaints (quejas) of military abuses submitted to National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the ombudsman that generates formal reports or “recommendations” (recomendaciones) for the government agency against which a complaint has been levied. • All told, since the organization was created in 1990 through July 22, 2012, CNDH received 140,699 written complaints, out of which the agency was able to establish that there were reasonable claims of abuse in 34,651 cases, or about one in four cases. A growing number of complaints against the Mexican army (SEDENA) were recorded since the deployment of troops after Calderón took office: 367 in 2007; 1,230 in 2008; 1,800 in 2009; 1,415 in 2010; 1,626 in 2011. As for the current year, SEDENA reported that there were 479 reports as of May 3, 2012. • Alleged military human rights violations represent a fraction of the total number of complaints in any given year. For example, in 2011, even as SEDENA reportedly held the largest number of complaints for a given agency, it accounted for only 6% of all complaints to CNDH. Still, CNDH reports that during the 12 years that it has been documenting human rights abuses, SEDENA is one of the top three institutions with the most filed complaints against it. In 2011, SEDENA reportedly led the list with 1,626 complaints. • The Mexican government points out that, as of May 3, 2012, only about 100 (less than 2%) of the 6,544 complaints against SEDENA that CNDH received since December 1, 2006 have resulted in CNDH reports of credible abuses. Moreover, SEDENA reports that 5,661 complaints have been resolved, meaning that they have This report examines the current context and possible remedies to protect against human rights abuses in Mexico. The report then provides documentation and analysis of the pattern of human rights complaints that have been formally registered against the military since Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and through mid-2012. • The military has played a constantly expanding role in efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, and to provide domestic security more generally. As Calderón deployed tens of thousands of troops to regions and cities known to be drug-trafficking routes and hubs at the outset of his term. Calderón also significantly increased the size of the Mexican army, as well as military spending overall. • The Mexican public holds mixed feelings about the Calderón administration’s strategy. On the one hand, in a March 2012 poll by Consulta Mitofsky, 43% of respondents indicated that they viewed the Mexican government’s strategy as a “failure,” and 53% thought that organized crime was winning the fight against government forces. Only 28% felt Calderón’s strategy had been successful. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of those surveyed support using the military to combat organized crime. • The massive deployment of the Mexican military has increased civilian exposure and vulnerability to military personnel. In this context, there has been a surge of formal complaints (quejas) of military abuses submitted to National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the ombudsman that generates formal reports or “recommendations” (recomendaciones) for the government agency against which a complaint has been levied. • All told, since the organization was created in 1990 through July 22, 2012, CNDH received 140,699 written complaints, out of which the agency was able to establish that there were reasonable claims of abuse in 34,651 cases, or about one in four cases. A growing number of complaints against the Mexican army (SEDENA) were recorded since the deployment of troops after Calderón took office: 367 in 2007; 1,230 in 2008; 1,800 in 2009; 1,415 in 2010; 1,626 in 2011. As for the current year, SEDENA reported that there were 479 reports as of May 3, 2012. • Alleged military human rights violations represent a fraction of the total number of complaints in any given year. For example, in 2011, even as SEDENA reportedly held the largest number of complaints for a given agency, it accounted for only 6% of all complaints to CNDH. Still, CNDH reports that during the 12 years that it has been documenting human rights abuses, SEDENA is one of the top three institutions with the most filed complaints against it. In 2011, SEDENA reportedly led the list with 1,626 complaints. • The Mexican government points out that, as of May 3, 2012, only about 100 (less than 2%) of the 6,544 complaints against SEDENA that CNDH received since December 1, 2006 have resulted in CNDH reports of credible abuses. Moreover, SEDENA reports that 5,661 complaints have been resolved, meaning that they havebeen settled through reconciliation or closed for other seemingly justifiable reasons. Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses. Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses.Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses. Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses.Since Calderón took office in December 2006, CNDH has issued 101 formal reports or “recommendations” to the Mexican army (SEDENA) and 17 to the Mexican marines (SEMAR). The first recommendation filed by CNDH under Calderón was issued on May 23, 2007, and the most recent recommendation came on July 11, 2012, just weeks before this report was filed. • While there were 6 recommendations to the military from 2004-2006, all prior Calderón’s inauguration. There were 7 registered in 2007, 15 in 2008, 31 in 2009, 27 in 2010, and 31 in 2011. In 2009, 40% of the recommendations issued by CNDH were directed to the military, SEDENA accounting for 38% and SEMAR for 2%. By mid-2012, the proportion of CNDH recommendations made to the military was less than half that registered in each of the previous two years, representing only 21%. This trend may indicate that the scaling back of military involvement in key cities, such as Chihuahua, has helped to reduce the number of violations by military personnel. • Of the 118 CNDH recommendation reports directed to SEDENA since Calderón took office, physical abuse is the most common documented human rights violation, followed by obstruction to access to justice, verbal/mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention. When broken down by year, the number and type of abuses increased most substantially in 2008 and 2009, at the height of military deployments. • While the frequency with which torture occurs has decreased since its initial spike in 2008 cases, it is still involved in just over half of all recommendations CNDH issues to the military. Thus, as the proximity with which troops interact with the public has increased over the past sexenio, so too has problem of physical abuse, whether loss of life, torture, or physical injury, the last of which was present to some extent in 95 of 118 CNDH recommendations, representing 81% of cases. • Abuses documented by CNDH occurred in 21 of Mexico’s 31 states, as well as in the Federal District. 13 states and districts comprised 92% of all violations, and just under two thirds occurred in only six states (61%), and almost half occurred in northern states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Considering Chihuahua and Michoacán, the two states that account for 36% of all human rights abuse cases reported by CNDH (29 and 13 cases, respectively), it is clear that the surge in troop deployment to these areas clearly brought an increase in documented abuses. Males above the age of 18 constitute the population mostly likely to be abused by the military in its public security efforts. Out of the 516 victims involved in cases recommended to the military, roughly 10% (51) were women and 7% (35) were minors. • Up until June 2011, the military maintained jurisdiction over all criminal cases and alleged human rights violations involving military personnel, and critics also charged that CNDH was ineffective in following up on and ensuring compliance with its recommendations. In 2011, legislative initiatives in the Mexican Senate, as well as a landmark ruling by the Mexican Supreme Court, emphasized the need for binding civilian court judgments regarding confirmed abuses by military personnel and domestic compliance with international human rights treaty obligations. It is believed that these developments will greatly bolster the ability of CNDH to protect against human rights abuses. • It still remains unclear whether recent legislation and court decisions will significantly curb military violations. The crux of the human rights issue hinges on whether the civilian court system will achieve unequivocal jurisdiction over cases of human rights abuse that involve the military and civilians, and supporting legislation to this effect has not yet been passed. Specifically, further legislative efforts are needed to revise Mexico’s code of military justice. As the Calderón administration comes to a close, the prospects of these reforms and what lies ahead under the next administration. • After PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto was declared the victor in Mexico’s July 1 elections, he affirmed the continued role of the military in domestic security operations. Yet, Peña Nieto has professed a commitment to uphold and preserve the human rights of Mexican citizens “first of all, through the real, objective application of [human rights] protocols to agencies that are dedicated to public security.” • When Peña Nieto takes office in December 2012, it will be important to evaluate how the incoming president will handle pending cases before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. One of the most notable cases involves the 2006 rape of 11 women by police forces in Atenco in the State of Mexico that was brought before the commission in November. Since he was the sitting governor of the State of Mexico when this incident occurred, Peña Nieto's handling of this case as president will be an important indicator of the new administration’s approach to human rights. • Ongoing concerns about human rights abuses in Mexico raise questions about what can be done to address these issues under the framework of the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year U.S.- Mexico collaboration initiative launched in 2007. The United States is therefore in a powerful position to support Mexico’s efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations, but it also has an obligation to make sure that human rights are respected in the process. If the war on drugs is a joint task, then protecting against human rights violations and other unintended consequences also should be a shared responsibility. • The authors offer several recommendations to strengthen human rights protections in Mexico, including reducing overall reliance on military deployments in Mexican counter-drug efforts, investing in greater human rights training for military and judicial sector personnel, implementing reforms to transfer all military abuse cases to civilian courts, bolstering the CNDH to fulfill its new responsibilities, strengthening civil society to combat abuses and improve security, and reframing U.S.-Mexico security collaboration to better protect human rights. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, 2012. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Justice in Mexico Project: Accessed August 6, 2012 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/12_07_31_armed-with-impunity.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/12_07_31_armed-with-impunity.pdf Shelf Number: 125864 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Rights (Mexico) Organized Crime Violence

Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: To Be or Not To Be a Drug Trafficker: Modeling Criminal Occupational Choices Summary: Violent deaths, kidnapping and extortion have spiked in Mexico’s border towns since 2004. Using a formal model and case studies from Mexico, I argue that such phenomena are partially explained by (a) a change in the politics of organized crime, (b) changes in the composition of illegal labor markets, and (c) the incentives generated at legal labor markets. With democratization, Mexico’s government became unable to keep performing its role as central enforcer of territorial boundaries between drug cartels. As cartels became guardians of their own territories, a need to recruitment new cartel members to form private armies emerged. As a result, an illegal labor market –so far closed to non-blood-related individuals– opened and modified the incentives to join/remain in the legal labor markets. The outcome was the emergence of a new generation of drug employees that (a) disdain old mafia laws, (b) are more violent and (c) are also more prone to take part of other forms of “entrepreneurial” illegal occupations such as kidnapping and extortion. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2012 at: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_MPSA2010_TobeOrNotToBe.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_MPSA2010_TobeOrNotToBe.pdf Shelf Number: 125872 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug Violence (Mexico) Extortion Kidnappings Organized Crime

Author: Bagley, Bruce Title: Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty-First Century Summary: What are the major trends that have characterized the evolution of illicit drug trafficking and organized crime (organized criminal networks) in the Americas over the last quarter of a century? What have been the principal transformations or adaptations – economic, political, and organizational - that have taken place within the region’s vast illegal drug economy during the first decade of the twenty-first century? This essay identifies eight key trends or patterns that typify the ongoing transformation of the drug trade and the organized criminal groups it has spawned as of mid-2011. They are: 1) The increasing globalization of drug consumption; 2) The limited or “partial victories” and unintended consequences of the U.S.-led ‘war on drugs,’ especially in the Andes; 3) The proliferation of areas of drug cultivation and of drug smuggling routes throughout the hemisphere (so-called “balloon effects”); 4) The dispersion and fragmentation of organized criminal groups or networks within countries and across sub-regions (“cockroach effects”); 5) The failure of political reform and state-building efforts (deinstitutionalization effects); 6) The inadequacies or failures of U.S. domestic drug and crime control policies (demand control failures); 7) The ineffectiveness of regional and international drug control policies (regulatory failures); and 8) The growth in support for harm reduction, decriminalization, and legalization policy alternatives (legalization debate). Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2012. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2012 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/drug-trafficking-and-organized-crime-the-americas-major-trends-the-twenty-first-century Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/drug-trafficking-and-organized-crime-the-americas-major-trends-the-twenty-first-century Shelf Number: 125874 Keywords: Drug Control Policies Drug Trafficking Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results Summary: Hundreds of metric tons of cocaine flow annually from South America to the United States, threatening the security and well-being of U.S. citizens. South American cocaine production and trafficking is centered in the five countries in the Andean region. State, USAID, DOD, and DEA provide counternarcotics assistance to stem production and trafficking of narcotics in these countries. ONDCP oversees and coordinates this assistance. In this report, GAO (1) describes the U.S. strategic approaches to counter- narcotics assistance in the Andean countries; (2) identifies amounts allotted for such assistance by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in fiscal years 2006 through 2011; and (3) reviews the agencies’ reporting on their performance. GAO reviewed agency and U.S. strategy documents, analyzed available agency data, and interviewed agency officials. What GAO Recommends -- The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD submits performance summary reports to ONDCP including the Inspector General’s attestation that the reported information is reliable to facilitate good management and oversight. DOD concurred with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-824: Accessed August 13, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592241.pdf Year: 2012 Country: South America URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592241.pdf Shelf Number: 126009 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Narcotics

Author: Garzon Vergara, Juan Carlos Title: The Rebellion of Criminal Networks: Organized Crime in Latin America and the Dynamics of Change Summary: Organized crime in Latin America is undergoing constant and substantial changes, positioning itself as a relevant strategic actor in the hemisphere, reconfiguring geographic borders, penetrating political and social structures, playing a significant role in the economy, and threatening progress in building the state and strengthening democratic systems. Although its manifestations differ from place to place, organized crime is present in every country in the region and has become one of the biggest challenges governments face. To combat organized crime governments debate whether to employ traditional—mostly “iron first”—policies or adopt newer—and largely unproven—alternatives. In light of the constant changes in criminal structures and their capacities to learn, innovate, and adapt, it is useful to examine the factors that explain these constant shifts as well as how such organizations have managed to expand their influence and presence despite the efforts and policies implemented by Latin American states. This essay introduces a concept—the “rebellion” of criminal networks—to explain the current dynamic of and context within which organized crime operates. The essay concludes with ten recommendations for addressing this challenge. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2012. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas: Accessed August 13, 2012 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Garzon.Rebellion.ENG_.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Garzon.Rebellion.ENG_.pdf Shelf Number: 126011 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Organized Crime (Latin America)

Author: Sidibé, Kalilou Title: Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Summary: The three principle and intertwining security threats in the North of Mali are trafficking (drugs, arms, cigarettes, cars, etc.), rebellious uprisings and terrorist activity. Any attempts at maintaining law and order are undermined by the fragility of state structures, and the lack of equipment and infrastructure for the armed forces. These threats also weaken the socioeconomic fabric of local communities and Malian national and territorial unity. The Malian government endeavours to address these challenges by adopting and implementing security and anti-terrorism policies, as well as social and economic development programmes. External partners support the Malian government in its efforts through a variety of joint anti-terrorism and development policies aiming to strengthen the state’s operational capacity in the region. Furthermore, local communities work alongside state actors in the development and securitisation of Northern Mali by employing traditional conflict-management mechanisms (intercommunity and interclan solidarity systems). This strategy builds strong links that considerably reduce the risk of open conflict and contributes to the establishment of a multilevel shared governance system. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2012. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report Vol. 2012, No. 77: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mali URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf Shelf Number: 126041 Keywords: Anti-Terrorism Policies Conflict-Management Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Security Smuggling

Author: Molzahn, Cory Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011 Summary: This is the third annual report by the Trans-Border Institute (TBI) on drug violence in Mexico. As with previous reports, the purpose of this study is to examine the available data, specific patterns, contributing factors, and policy recommendations related to growing toll of the drug war in Mexico. The report draws from the extensive research and analysis of the TBI Justice in Mexico Project (www. justiceinmexico.org), which in the past year has benefited from the generous financial support of The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, The Tinker Foundation, and the Open Society Initiative. This report was also informed by conferences and workshops hosted by Brown University in April 2011, the United Nations Social Science Research Council in June 2011, Stanford University in October 2011, and the Guggenheim Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson Center in December 2011. Details: San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2012 at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/2012-tbi-drugviolence.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/2012-tbi-drugviolence.pdf Shelf Number: 126086 Keywords: Assassinations Cartels Drug Trafficking Homicides Kidnappings Organized Crime Violent Crime (Mexico)

Author: U.S. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Title: U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History Summary: This hearing examined the money laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorist financing risks created in the United States when a global bank uses its U.S. affiliate to provide U.S. dollars and access to the U.S. financial system to a network of high risk affiliates, high risk correspondent banks, and high risk clients. The hearing focused on a case study involving HSBC, one of the largest banks in the world. Headquartered in London, HSBC has a network of over 7,200 offices in more than 80 countries, 300,000 employees, and 2011 profits of nearly $22 billion. HSBC has been among the most active banks in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. It first acquired a U.S. presence in the 1980s; today its leading U.S. affiliate is HSBC Bank USA, known as HBUS. HBUS has more than 470 branches across the United States and 4 million customers. HBUS is the key U.S. nexus for the entire HSBC worldwide network. In 2008, it processed 600,000 wire transfers per week; in 2009, two-thirds of the U.S. dollar payments HBUS processed came from HSBC affiliates in other countries. One HSBC executive told us that a major reason why HSBC opened its U.S. bank was to provide its overseas clients with a gateway into the U.S. financial system. Add on top of that, HBUS’ history of weak anti-money laundering controls, and you have a recipe for trouble. In 2003, the Federal Reserve and New York State Banking Department took a formal enforcement action requiring HBUS to revamp its AML program. HBUS, which was then converting to a nationally chartered bank under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or OCC, made changes, but even before the OCC lifted the order in 2006, the bank’s AML program began deteriorating. In September 2010, the OCC issued a Supervisory Letter, 31-pages long, describing a long list of severe AML deficiencies, and followed in October 2010, with a Cease and Desist order requiring HBUS to revamp its AML program a second time. The OCC cited, among other problems, a massive backlog of unreviewed alerts identifying potentially suspicious activity; a failure to monitor $60 trillion in wire transfers and account activity; a failure to examine risks at HSBC’s overseas affiliates before providing them correspondent banking services; and a failure, over a three-year period, to conduct anti-money laundering checks on more than $15 billion in bulk-cash transactions with those same affiliates. To examine the issues, the Subcommittee issued subpoenas, reviewed more than 1.4 million documents, and conducted extensive interviews with HSBC officials from around the world, as well as officials at other banks, and with federal regulators. HSBC has cooperated fully with the investigation. The Subcommittee’s work identified five key areas of vulnerability exposed by the HSBC case history. The five areas involve: •Providing U.S. correspondent accounts to high risk HSBC affiliates without performing due diligence, including a Mexican affiliate with unreliable AML controls; •Failing to stop deceptive conduct by HSBC affiliates to circumvent a screening device designed to block transactions by terrorists, drug kingpins and rogue nations like Iran; •Providing bank accounts to overseas banks with links to terrorist financing; •Clearing hundreds of millions of dollars in bulk U.S. dollar travelers cheques, despite suspicious circumstances; and •Offering bearer-share accounts, a high risk account that invites wrongdoing by facilitating hidden corporate ownership. Details: Washington, DC: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012. 340p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 27, 2012 at: www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126117 Keywords: Banking Industry Drug Trafficking Money Laundering (U.S.) Terrorist Financing

Author: United Nations Title: Action Against Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking, Including Drug Trafficking (2011-2013). Thematic Programme Summary: This Thematic Programme on Action Against Transnational Organized Crime provides the framework for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) work against organized crime for the period 2011-2013. It outlines the context, the problems addressed and the challenges faced in preventing and combating organized crime in a globalized world. It describes the work of UNODC to assist countries in developing strategies, policies, action plans, programmes and projects in relation to all aspects of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)and its three Protocols, as well as the three Universal Drug Conventions. This Thematic Programme develops responses to the six primary threats that have been identified. This response builds upon the Office’s core comparative advantages and expertise as a criminal justice sector provider, to close the loop on organized crime, challenging its perpetrators, disrupting its flows and its proceeds, whilst simultaneously building a culture of prevention and zero tolerance for crime and corruption, both nationally, regionally and internationally. The proposed programme strikes a balance between supporting long-term institutional capacity development objectives (for example, through building legislative and regulatory frameworks in line with international conventions, standards and norms) and working in partnership with the Governments of Member States to implement their policy priorities and strategies in a tangible and impact-orientated way. The programme presented here has three sub-programmes: • Sub-Programme 1: International Policy, Knowledge and Trends deals with UNODC’s normative role in support of the Conference of the Parties (COP) of UNTOC and the International Drug Conventions. This sub-programme drives forward critical international planning and policy making towards the framework of a coordinated and comprehensive international response. In addition, given the dynamic, opportunistic nature of organized crime, UNODC will utilize its expertise and experience to develop an evidence-based understanding of organized crime, monitor new and emerging forms of organized crime and the challenges that they present. • Sub-Programme 2: Regional and National Capacity Building and Technical Assistance guides the work of UNODC in ensuring the effective implementation of UNTOC and its Protocols through the provision of expert technical assistance, the creation of global tools (such as model laws, guides) and standardize proven approaches (through handbooks, case studies and international standards) which can serve as a platform for the customization of technical assistance and programme development via the Regional or Country Programmes which UNODC has already launched. These Programmes serve as an effective vehicle for Member States to promote international cooperation mechanisms, and build regional capacity in priority areas. • Sub-Programme 3: Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling describes the UNODC response to two heinous forms of organized crime most frequently characterized by human rights violations. As both phenomena are complex, so too are the approaches required in response. In responding to the mandate offered to UNODC through the UNTOC Protocols against Trafficking in Persons and with clear political momentum provided by the Global Plan of Action, UNODC seeks to position itself as a policy lead and central hub for the international anti-human trafficking community, and to build capacity for coordinated action around the four pillars of both the Protocol and the Global Plan of Action: prevention, protection, prosecution and partnership. The implementation of the Thematic Programme on Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking, including Drug Trafficking, is a holistic exercise for all of UNODC, given the close inter-linkages and interdependencies of its mandates. However, the strategic leadership and accountability for delivery against this Thematic Programme is vested within the Division for Treaty Affairs, specifically the Organized Crime and Trafficking Branch (OCB) within UNODC, in close partnership and cooperation with the other substantive and geographical divisions of the Office. Details: Vienna: United Nations, 2011. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/Thematic_Programme_on_Organised_Crime_-_Final.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/Thematic_Programme_on_Organised_Crime_-_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 126257 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Finlay, Brian Title: Beyond Boundaries in the Andean Region: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance Summary: As a direct result of globalization and expanded economic opportunity, the last half century has yielded the most remarkable exodus from poverty in human history. Yet despite this remarkable improvement in the human condition, not everyone has benefitted equally. While much advancement has been witnessed across the Andean region-Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru-these countries continue to face significant security and development threats that threaten the foundations of progress, including the intersecting challenges of lack of public health capacity, illicit trafficking in arms and drugs, and terrorism. Details: Washington, DC: The Stimson Center and The Stanley Foundation, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2012 at: Beyond Boundaries in the Andean Region: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance Year: 2012 Country: South America URL: Shelf Number: 126391 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Arms Organized Crime Terrorism Violence

Author: McGee, Sibel Title: Mexico's Cartel Problem: A Systems Thinking Perspective Summary: The unprecedented increase in recent years of cartel-related violence has presented growing challenges both to Mexico’s socio-political stability and to the United States’ (US) National interests. Current efforts to address Mexican cartels treat these organizations as only drug-trafficking networks and focus on law enforcement measures to interdict their operations. In this paper, we approach the cartel problem from a systems thinking perspective and present a holistic assessment of these complex criminal networks operating in multiple domains. By highlighting the dynamic relationships and complex feedbacks between critical variables involved in different domains of cartel operations, we identify the inherently systemic causal factors contributing to the problem situation. We argue that the efforts that rely purely on law enforcement measures will fail to produce lasting change unless they are coupled with high leverage strategies that address the root causes of illicit activities in Mexico. Details: Arlington, VA: Applied Systems Thinking Institute, Analytic Services, Inc., 2011.10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://www.anser.org/docs/asyst-doc/Mexican_Cartels.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.anser.org/docs/asyst-doc/Mexican_Cartels.pdf Shelf Number: 126577 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Law Enforcement Violence

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment Summary: This study finds that while cocaine trafficking has undeniably catalyzed violence in some areas, the security problem in the region is much deeper, rooted in weak governance and powerful sub-state actors. According to the study, cocaine has been trafficked through Central America for decades, but the importance of the region to this flow increased dramatically after 2000 and again after 2006, due to an escalation in Mexican drug law enforcement. The resulting displacement effect underscores the importance of coordinated strategies to addressthe entire contraband flow, so that one country’s success does not become another’s problem. The implementation of the new Mexican security strategy in 2006 has disrupted cocaine supply to the United States market, forcing dealers to cut purity and raise prices. These changes have deeply undermined United States demand for the drug, but not yet reduced the violence associated with the flow. In response to an increasingly inhospitable environment in Mexico, traffickers have shifted their focus to new routes along the Guatemalan/Honduran border and contesting new “plazas” throughout the region. Displacement to the Caribbean remains a threat. The contest today is between longstanding organized crime families that effectively govern the remote areas of the countries in which they operate. In addition to cocaine trafficking, these groups are involved in a wide range of organized crime activities, and manipulate local politics. If cocaine flows abate, they will seek revenuesfrom other forms of acquisitive crime, such as extortion, which may cause violence levels to increase. The Zetas, the Maras, and other territorial groups appear to be involved in migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and the firearms trade. This involvement may increase if cocaine revenues decline. Addressing transnational flows requires international cooperation. Full implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols and the UN Convention against Corruption is critical. National police services cannot resolve the organized crime problems of this region alone, because reducing the contraband flows requires tools they do not possess. Development actors must cooperate in a global strategy to address the problems of drugs and illicit markets. Programmes to build capacity among local law enforcement cannot bring about the rapid results required, due to widespread corruption. The temporary use of armed forces for some law enforcement tasks should not delay police development and reform, including the promotion of civilian oversight. The international community should do what it can to supplement local criminal justice capacity. Cross-sectoral crime prevention strategies must be explored. Crime affects all aspects of life, and so a multiagency crime prevention plan, involving the participation of the private sector, should be developed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2012. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_Exsum_english.pdf (executive summary) Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_Exsum_english.pdf (executive summary) Shelf Number: 126657 Keywords: Cocaine Trafficking Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Organized Crime (Central America, Caribbean) Violence

Author: Bjerk, David Title: The Market for Mules: Risk and Compensation of Cross-Border Drug Couriers Summary: This paper uses a unique dataset to shed light on the economics of cross-border drug smuggling. Our results reveal that loads are generally quite large (mean 56 Kg) and of high wholesale value (mean $73,348). We also find that mule compensation is substantial (mean $1,601), and most interestingly, that mules appear to be paid compensating wage differentials for loads that carry a higher sentencing risk if detected and for loads that carry an arguably higher likelihood of detection. This suggests that this underground and unregulated labor market generally acts like a competitive labor market, with an equilibrium in which risk-sensitive, reasonably well informed workers are compensated for taking on higher risk tasks. Details: Unpublished Paper, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881212 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881212 Shelf Number: 126660 Keywords: Drug Couriers Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking Underground Markets

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment Summary: Over the last decade, economic relations between countries in Western and Central Asia have greatly improved. The introduction of a number of trade agreements that have removed or reduced trade barriers has resulted in a marked increase in trade in the region. Dry ports play a key role in regional trade and in particular in facilitating the movement of goods between different forms of transportation within the Western and Central Asian transport network. Goods arrive at and depart from dry ports by a range of modes of transport, including by road, rail, inland waterways and airports, and the ports provide services for the handling and temporary storage of containers and general and/or bulk cargo. For countries in the region with no direct access to the sea, such as Afghanistan, dry ports are crucial hubs for commercial trade. In order to facilitate the movement of goods across borders, a number of trade agreements have been implemented to reduce the level of customs inspections at dry ports and border control points and to standardize transport regulations. However, while the volume of trade handled at dry ports in the region has increased, there has been no corresponding expansion in the level of law enforcement in these locations. This report analyses the role of dry ports in the regional trade network and highlights the risk of their abuse by drug traffickers. It also contains an in-depth analysis of the ways in which drug traffickers abuse the trade network to smuggle opiates. Many of the problems and risks that are identified in relation to trade agreements, dry ports and the transportation network in Western and Central Asia can also be applied to many other regions in the world. The report is divided into three sections. The first section contains an overview of the major trade routes used to transport goods in Western and Central Asia, and an explanation of the role of dry ports in the regional transportation network. The second section contains an overview of the eight major bilateral and regional trade and transit trade agreements that Afghanistan has entered into over the last 10 years. Each overview is broken down into five parts, comprising: A brief introduction of the trade agreement; An outline of the trade and/or transit trade levels and routes used in the relevant countries; A description of the transportation and customs regulations contained in the agreement; An analysis of the functions, trade capacity and law enforcement capacity of dry ports along the specific trade routes; and, An overview of opiate and chemical precursor trafficking at trade and transit routes and dry ports. The third section contains a discussion of the ways in which opiates are trafficked by sea from South-West Asia to East Africa. Details: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2012 at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Opiate_Trafficking_and_Trade_Agreements_english_web.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Opiate_Trafficking_and_Trade_Agreements_english_web.pdf Shelf Number: 126689 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Licit Trade, Misuse Opiates

Author: Dietz, Rebekah K. Title: Illicit Networks: Targeting the Nexus Between Terrorists, Proliferators, and Narcotraffickers Summary: Globalization and the liberal international marketplace have provided fertile ground for the rise of transnational and non-state actors. Unfortunately, while states and businesses have profited from the increased fluidity of borders and the rise of global commerce, so have the criminal organizations that threaten national and international security. These illicit networks are stateless; they conduct their business in failed or failing states, under the guise of legitimate commerce, and without regard to sovereign borders or even human life. They are the main facilitators of proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics around the world—undeterred and, perhaps, undeterrable. This thesis offers a comparative analysis of three main types of illicit networks: terrorist, proliferation and narcotics networks. Using Jemaah Islamiyah, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and the Medellín drug ‘cartel’ as case studies, it examines their typologies, motivations, structures, characteristics, and sources and patterns of funding. It examines if and how illicit networks overlap, with special attention to intra-network (e.g., terrorist networks with other terrorist networks) and inter-network (e.g., terrorist networks with narcotics networks) overlap. It then explores how this information can inform U.S. counter-network activity. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899 Shelf Number: 126752 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Illicit Networks Medellin Cartel Social Network Analysis Terrorism Terrorist Networks

Author: Yap, Renee Title: Coca, Bolivia, and the War on Drugs: the Tension between Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want Summary: This thesis aims to demonstrate the tension between human security’s core categories of freedom from fear and freedom from want. The two core categories of human security are often held to be complementary to each other. However, by applying a human security analysis to the War on Drugs in Bolivia, particularly with reference to the ideas of freedom from fear and freedom from want, it can be seen that the War on Drugs in Bolivia typifies a freedom from fear approach. This is illustrated through the War on Drugs focus on protecting individuals from physical violence and human rights abuses relating to situations of conflict, as well as its use of coercion strategies, such as sanctions or non-unilateral force; all of these of which are usual to a freedom from fear approach. An examination of how the War on Drugs has impacted upon the individuals of Bolivia reveals that despite the desired outcome of protecting individual safety and well-being, the War on Drugs has actually compromised the safety and well-being of Bolivians. In addition, in typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs in Bolivia has also challenged freedom from want by marginalising or threatening economic, community, food and health security, and thus defying claims that freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary. This thesis concludes that by pursuing political and personal security, freedom from fear marginalises and even contests food, health, environmental and most especially economic and community security – the focal points of freedom from want. Security policies adopted to address transnational threats in developing countries must ensure that they not only account for the freedom from fear and freedom from want components of human security, but that they also account for, and manage, the potential for freedom from fear to undermine the wider goals of freedom from want. Details: Wellington, NZ: Victoria University of Wellington, 2010. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 24, 2012 at: http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10063/1424/thesis.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2010 Country: Bolivia URL: http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10063/1424/thesis.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 126784 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Trafficking Drug Violence War on Drugs (Bolivia)

Author: Leiken, Robert S. Title: Mexico's Drug War Summary: Mexico’s President Felipe Calderón staked his presidency on a military campaign against the country’s crime syndicates, deploying half of Mexico’s combat ready troops and tens of thousands of federal police in 18 states. The conflict has caused 50,000 deaths, more than five times what America has lost in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. In Washington, several high officials and political leaders assert that Mexico faces an insurgency that may require American military assistance. But is Mexico’s “war” a low intensity conflict or a high intensity crime scene? Does Mexico face a “criminal insurgency” or a turf war? Does the situation present a national security threat or a law enforcement crisis? Should it be addressed primarily by the military or the police? Should the U.S. be sending military or police advisors? Is the current death toll an inevitable by-product of strategic progress or a signal of failure? Details: Washington, DC: Center for the National Interest, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.cftni.org/42460_CNI_web.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.cftni.org/42460_CNI_web.pdf Shelf Number: 126798 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Cartels Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drug War (Mexico) Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Digest of Terrorist Cases Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) brought together senior criminal justice experts—including Attorney-Generals and Chief Prosecutors—to share experiences and good practices on how to deal with terrorism cases. The outcome is this Digest of Terrorist Cases, giving policymakers and criminal justice officials practical ideas and expert insights on how to deal with a relatively new field of jurisprudence. It complements other UNODC tools that provide guidance on how to address acts of terrorism within a legal framework, like legislative guides. The judicial cases featured in this Digest cover relevant aspects of the international legal regime against terrorism. It provides a comparative analysis of national statutory frameworks for terrorism prosecutions, and it identifies legal issues and pitfalls encountered in investigating and adjudicating relevant offences. In addition, it identifies practices related to specialized investigative and prosecutorial techniques. It also addresses the links between terrorism and other forms of crime (like organized crime, the trafficking of drugs, people and arms), as well as how to disrupt terrorist financing. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Shelf Number: 126803 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Prosecution, Terrorist Cases Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: American Land Forces Institute Title: Transnational Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Network-Centric Enterprise Summary: The purpose of this study is to understand the networks involved in transnational criminal organizations across Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. This study uses Social Network Analysis and general socio-cultural analysis techniques to analyze information gathered from open source news media, secondary data collections, analyses conducted by academics and nonprofit organizations, and interviews with former law enforcement officials. . This study analyzes the criminal organizations of each region (Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean) in terms of their (1) historical background, (2) hierarchy and composition, (3) alliances and rivalries with other regional criminal organizations, (4) major criminal activities, (5) recruitment methods and sources, and (6) weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Details: Mico, TX: American Land Forces Institute, 2012. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2012 at: http://alfinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Crime-Families.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://alfinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Crime-Families.pdf Shelf Number: 126810 Keywords: Criminal Cartels Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Gangs Organized Crime Social Network Analysis Transnational Crime (Latin America, Caribbean)

Author: International Drug Policy Consortium Title: IDPC Response to the UNODC World Drug Report 2012 Summary: 26 June 2012 saw the launch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s flagship publication, the World Drug Report. This IDPC response provides an overview of the data and topics presented in the Report and where appropriate, within the broader context of the current state of the UN drug control framework, offer a critical analysis of both. This year’s publication represents an impressive and wide-ranging set of data collated and analysed by UNODC and provides an overview of recent trends and the current situation in terms of production, trafficking, consumption and the consequences of illicit drug use for treatment, drug-related diseases and drug-related deaths. Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2012. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2012 at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-response-to-the-UNODC-world-drug-report-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-response-to-the-UNODC-world-drug-report-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 126930 Keywords: Crime Statistics Crime Trends Drug Trafficking Drug Use and Abuse Drugs and Crime

Author: Espach, Ralph Title: Border Insecurity in Central America's Northern Triangle Summary: The recent surge in drug trafficking and violent crime in Central America has drawn a spotlight to the perennial problem of lawlessness along the borders of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Throughout their histories, governments in these countries have neglected their peripheries, especially the jungle-covered region along the Caribbean coast, across the Peten and Yucatan high plains that border Mexico, and within the central mountain chain. Those communities, isolated due to their difficult topography and, in many cases, their ethnic differences, generally remain impoverished and isolated from national services or politics. Today, these borders are unmarked and largely unrecognized across most of their length. Public security and military forces can only afford to monitor borders in urban areas or at points where major highways cross. Away from these spots, borders are by and large meaningless except for the opportunities they present for residents to arbitrage differences in the supply, demand, and costs of various goods and services, including some that are illegal. Indeed, illicit trafficking provides income, and border communities appear to be benefiting economically from the recent surge in drug trafficking through the region. Governments regularly announce new policies to address border insecurity, but these rarely have any impact - for several reasons, including: A chronic and region wide shortage of funding, reflecting these countries' deficient tax systems; Weak, dysfunctional government institutions, particularly in the area of public security; Periodic changes in border security strategies and policies, due to the lack of independent administrative agencies; Corruption within legislatures, local and national government agencies, and security forces that allow organized criminal groups and their partners to influence and stymie policymaking. We recommend that the governments of the region and their international partners refocus their efforts in the following ways: Differentiate, conceptually and strategically, among the problems of illicit trafficking, organized crime, and violence, and tailor policies and strategies to priorities; Focus on improving public security within border communities and border regions, instead of border controls; Create new, functional national and regional security frameworks to support interagency and international coordination on public security and border security; Improve systems for information sharing and coordination; Involve local governments in security-related policymaking and policy execution. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 23, 2012 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-NorthernTriangle.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-NorthernTriangle.pdf Shelf Number: 126948 Keywords: Border Security (Central America) Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Miraglia, Paula Title: Transnational Organised Crime and Fragile States Summary: Transnational organised crime (TOC) refers to a fluid and diversified industry that engages in illicit activities ranging from drug and human trafficking to drug smuggling, piracy and money laundering. Although it may affect strong states, conflict-affected and fragile states are especially vulnerable to the dynamics of TOC and may provide more favourable conditions for its development. The implications for those states are many and serious. This paper outlines the ways in which TOC has evolved in recent years and how policy might be adapted to take account of this evolution. It emphasises that TOC today is less a matter of organised cartels established in producer or end-user states, but increasingly characterised by fluid, opportunistic networks that may for example specialise in transport and logistics. The paper recommends tackling the problem through a comprehensive approach that considers TOC as but one element within a greater complex of cause and effect. This would entail a re-evaluation of many current assumptions about TOC and a reformulation of current policies. Details: Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2012. 36p. Source: Internet Resource:OECD Development Co-Operation Working Papers, WP 3/2012: Accessed November 24, 2012 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/20121026_briscoe_transnational_organised_crime.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/20121026_briscoe_transnational_organised_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 126988 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Money Laundering Piracy Transnational Organized Crime

Author: Dudley, Steven Title: Transnational Crime in Mexico and Central America: Its Evolution and Role in International Migration Summary: The growth of organized crime in Mexico and Central America has dramatically increased the risks that migrants face as they attempt to cross the region. Encountering rising threats posed by Mexican drug traffickers, Central American gangs, and corrupt government officials, migrants increasingly are forced to seek the assistance of intermediaries known as polleros, or “coyotes.” Those unable to afford a coyote are more likely to be abused or kidnapped, and held for ransom along the way. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2012 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-TransnationalCrime.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-TransnationalCrime.pdf Shelf Number: 127114 Keywords: Coyotes Drug Trafficking Gang Violence Immigration Migration Organized Crime (Mexico/Central America)

Author: Ten Velde, Liza Title: The Northern Triangle’s Drugs-Violence Nexus: The role of the Drugs Trade in Criminal Violence and Policy Responses in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras Summary: Mexico has occupied the limelight when it comes to media attention focusing on drug-related violence in Latin America. However, it is actually Central America's Northern Triangle – consisting of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – currently experiencing much higher rates of violence and increasing Drug Trafficking Organization (DTOs) activity, thus providing an illustration of the 'balloon effect' previously experienced by Mexico itself after the implementation of Plan Colombia which was conceived at the end of the 90's. Together the countries of the Northern Triangle now form one of the most violent regions on earth. Although it is clear that the violence in Honduras,El Salvador and Guatemala is pervasive and able to destabilize these Central American societies to a large extent, no consensus seems to exist on its exact causes. As in Mexico, much of the violence is attributed to the increased role of Central America as a transit region for controlled drugs destined for the US. This paper will address the particulars of the high levels of criminal violence in the Northern Triangle, and try to assess to what extent the drugs trade is responsible for this violence. The recently reinvigorated debate on alternative approaches to drug control strategies in the Americas suggests changes in drugs policies can be expected from the central American region, but in spite of the similarities of the challenges posed to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras when it comes to drug-related problems and criminal violence, the positions occupied by the political leaders of these countries in this incipient debate differ considerably. Concluding remarks It is clear that the upsurge in levels of criminal violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle can be attributed to a considerable extent to the growing importance of this region for drug trafficking operations. The increased presence of Mexican DTOs and the threat they pose to local criminal organizations is a notable source of violent conflict. Meanwhile, the ties between DTOs and local transportistas and gangs have also strengthened, with the latter groups becoming better organized and increasingly involved in the drug trade. As noted, determining with any precision to what extent drug-related issues are responsible for growing criminal violence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras is as yet impossible. Even determining precisely the role of the much broader category of organized crime has proved to be unfeasible. The correlation between growing violence and intensified drug operations in the Northern Triangle, however, is striking. In itself, this could mean that the call for alternative approaches from one of these countries’ leaders might not come as such a surprise, given the extent to which the violence and drug trade are destabilizing the region. What should not be overlooked, however, is the extent to which the mano dura approaches and accompanying strategy of militarization as pursued by the Northern Triangle’s governments are in themselves sources of severe destabilization and of rising levels of violence. This, combined with the alleged use of drug trafficking as a pretext for increasing state control over areas with conflicts between local citizens and the authorities further complicates the situation. Notwithstanding, these difficulties should not lead us to disregard the fact that the call for a discussion on alternative approaches by Guatemala’s president is a remarkable development, which has significantly contributed to and broadened the wider regional debate on a departure from the prevailing war-on-drugs strategies. In the face of US opposition and disagreement of some of the other Central American countries, this has been no small feat. The current discrepancy between repressive drug control legislation in the Northern Triangle combined with the mano dura approaches of the region’s authorities to criminal violence and drug trafficking, and the proposed alternative measures is enormous, but the Guatemalan government seems to be serious about its desire to learn more about potential alternative policy options. While it is of course not realistic to expect a fundamental redirecting of the region’s strategies to counter drug trafficking and criminal violence in the short term, some cautious optimism in assessing the possibility of changes towards more effective and humane drug policies in the Northern Triangle might not be entirely misplaced. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2012. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Debate Paper No. 19: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/debate19.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/debate19.pdf Shelf Number: 127146 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Violent Crime (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras)

Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: Why Are Mexican Traffickers Killing Each Other? Government Coordination and Violence Deterrence in Mexico's Drug War Summary: Mexico’s Drug War was a drug war between criminal organizations ignited by a state that enforced the law without coordinating with its different levels of government. In this paper, I show why. In doing so, I provide a theory of how political institutions induce competing groups to either peacefully cooperate or go to war. I argue that when formal and informal institutions lead to coordination among different levels of government, such that they act as a single coordinated entity, criminal organizations behave and organize in ways that are less prone to violence, and thus, less damaging to citizens. A time-variant data-set of Mexico’s cocaine markets at the sub-national level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions are used to test my argument. I provide empirical evidence that the propensity of criminal organizations to engage in damaging criminal activities increases when municipal and state governments are not coordinated (i.e. are ruled by different political parties). A detailed description of corruption dynamics within Mexico’s drug trafficking industry is also presented to show how lack of government coordination caused a war of 51,000 casualties on the US-Mexico border. Details: Cambridge, MA: Department of Government, Harvard University, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2012_CoordinationCriminality.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2012_CoordinationCriminality.pdf Shelf Number: 127267 Keywords: Deterrence Drug Trafficking Drug Violence (Mexico) Violent Crime War on Drugs

Author: Ferragut, Sergio Title: Organized Crime, Illicit Drugs and Money Laundering: the United States and Mexico Summary: Organized crime permeates the life of every single country in the 21st century: its global revenues are well above a trillion dollars a year and illicit drugs are a major component of this. Drug prohibition, in effect for almost a century, has not been the deterrent to consumption it was intended to be, and the illicit drug trade has become the most profitable source of revenue for criminal organizations in many countries. This paper reviews the US-Mexican illicit drug landscape and documents the importance of this criminal activity in both countries. The United States is the primary market for illicit drugs in the world and, because of their shared 2,000-mile border, Mexico has become the number one provider of illicit drugs. More than 40 years after a ‘war on drugs’ was declared by President Richard Nixon in 1971, the flow of drugs into the United States has not been eliminated or even reduced. The law of supply-and-demand has prevailed, as should have been expected. The illicit proceeds from drug trafficking in the United States and Mexico, as with those from any criminal activity, must be laundered by criminal organizations so that their assets cannot be traced back to their origins. In recent times anti-money laundering (AML) initiatives have been at the core of the fight against organized crime around the world. Back in the 1980s it was not unusual for a drug trafficker in the United States to walk into a bank with a suitcase full of cash and have it immediately deposited into an account. At that point the money would start a journey from bank to bank and country to country, and tracing its origins became very difficult – the money was effectively laundered. During the past two decades the international financial system has been tightened and today it is much more difficult to launder money through it. However, dirty money continues to be laundered through other channels. The current controls and best practices implemented within the financial system are a necessary condition to combat money laundering; nevertheless, they are not sufficient to curtail it effectively. It is crucial that the authorities look beyond the financial system and into enterprises that accept cash as tender if AML initiatives are to be successful in depriving organized crime of the fruits of its crimes. For at least three decades the laundering of drugs-trade proceeds in Mexico has been transferring economic and political power into the hands of individuals and groups with questionable credentials; billions of dollars have been laundered in the country by drug traffickers and their business partners. This phenomenon poses a potentially serious threat to public and national security in Mexico and the United States; the newly acquired economic strength of these criminal groups positions them to influence the political landscape and acquire significant ownership positions in strategic industries. This paper illustrates how it happens and highlights some of the options available to the authorities to address the challenge. Details: London: Chatham House, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document’s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. International Security Programme Paper 2012/01: Accessed January 23, 2013 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/1112pp_ferragut.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/1112pp_ferragut.pdf Shelf Number: 127370 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs (U.S. and Mexico) Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Selee, Andrew Title: Crime and Violence in Mexico and Central America: An Evolving but Incomplete U.S. Policy Response Summary: Amid dramatic increases in crime and violence in Mexico and Central America, the US government has significantly increased its attention to public security issues in the region since 2007, with the Merida Initiative and the Central American Regional Security Initiative. The US policy response has been hampered to an extent, however, by US and regional obstacles. The authors suggest the policy emphasis has begun to shift in important ways, with more attention paid to addressing the citizen security crisis — a move away from the earlier near-total focus on combating drug trafficking and transnational crime. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Migration Policy Institute, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2013 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-EvolvingPolicyResponse.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-EvolvingPolicyResponse.pdf Shelf Number: 127404 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Transnational Crime (Central America and Mexico) Violence Violent Crime

Author: Yong-an, Zhang Title: Asia, International Drug Trafficking, and U.S.-China Counternarcotics Cooperation Summary: The end of the Cold War may have heralded an end to certain tensions, but among other unforeseen effects it also precipitated a significant increase in the flow of illegal drugs across traditional national boundaries. International travel has become easier in an increasingly borderless world, and―although international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have never respected national boundaries―newly globalized markets for drug production and exportation, along with changing patterns of consumption in some societies, have had an enormous impact on drug trafficking. In short, the global market for illicit drugs, and the capacity of providers to deliver to this market, is expanding inexorably around the world. What was once called “the American disease” has become a global one. The international community first took an interest in the Asian drug trade at the beginning of the 20th century. The Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 was the first attempt at regulating drug trade in the region, as countries including the United States, Great Britain, China, Japan, and Russia convened to discuss the growing trafficking of opium. Since then, numerous measures have been adopted by individual countries and collectively to curb the illegal drug trade. This has been especially true since the launch of the “war on drugs.” In spite of these enhanced efforts, the global opiate market has nevertheless exhibited increased growth since 1980. Data gathered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicate global opium production increased by close to 80 percent between 1998 and 2009. The UNODC reports that nearly all of the world’s illicit opium and heroin production is concentrated in “Afghanistan, South-East Asia (mostly Myanmar) and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia). Afghanistan stands out among this group, accounting for around 90 percent of global illicit opium production in recent years.” Upwards of 90 percent of the global heroin and morphine production is provided by Afghanistan and Myanmar. Clearly, the global opiate market has neither been eliminated nor significantly reduced since 1998. Asian drug trafficking remains a serious threat to both China and the United States. In order to confront this common threat, since 1985 China and the United States have taken numerous steps to cooperate in the interdiction of cross-border drug trafficking. Together, they have made outstanding achievements in the prevention of Asian drug trafficking and in the eradication of opium poppy cultivation in the Golden Triangle region that comprises parts of Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Bilateral cooperation, however, has not been wholly successful, and Beijing and Washington face a daunting set of challenges regarding cross-border drug trafficking. The two nations must reconsider both new and old challenges in both regional and global contexts in their efforts to promote counternarcotics cooperation. This paper will assess the various threats and challenges that China and the United States face from international Asian drug trafficking. It will examine the historical roots of counternarcotics cooperation between China and the United States, will analyze the limits of this bilateral cooperation, and will provide policy recommendations for the two governments on how to better confront these threats. Details: Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution 2012. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2013 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/2/drug%20trafficking%20zhang/02_drug_trafficking_zhang_paper.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/2/drug%20trafficking%20zhang/02_drug_trafficking_zhang_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 127442 Keywords: Border Security Drug Abuse and Crime (Asia) Drug Trafficking Opium

Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Border Security and Migration: A Report from South Texas Summary: Since 2011, WOLA staff have carried out research in six different zones of the U.S.-Mexican border, meeting with U.S. law enforcement officials, human rights and humanitarian groups, and journalists, as well as with Mexican officials and representatives of civil society and migrant shelters in Mexico. As part of this ongoing work, the authors spent the week of November 26-30, 2012 in south Texas, looking at security and migration trends along this section of the U.S.-Mexico border. Specifically, we visited Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, Texas, and Matamoros, Mexico. We found that unlike other sections of the border, the south Texas sections have seen an increase, not a decrease, in apprehensions, particularly of non-Mexican migrants; migrant deaths have dramatically increased; and there are fewer accusations of Border Patrol abuse of migrants. We also found that the Zetas criminal organization's control over the area may be slipping and drug trafficking appears to have increased, yet these U.S. border towns are safer than they have been in decades. Lastly, in spite of the ongoing violence on the Mexican side of the border and the failure of the Mexican government to reform local and state police forces, U.S. authorities are increasing repatriating Mexicans through this region, often making migrants easy prey for the criminal groups that operate in these border cities. Details: Washignton, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2013. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2013 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2013/Border%20Security%20and%20Migration%20South%20Texas.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2013/Border%20Security%20and%20Migration%20South%20Texas.pdf Shelf Number: 127462 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Illegal Immigration Migrants

Author: Mansfield, David Title: All Bets are Off! Prospects for (B)reaching Agreements and Drug Control in Helmand and Nangarhar in the run up to Transition Summary: The issue of illicit drug production has largely fallen off the policy agenda in Afghanistan. In addition to the increasing focus on the part of Afghanistan’s foreign partners on an exit strategy, this has been to a considerable extent due to a favourable trend in the short-term metrics by which the drugs issue is typically judged. Levels of opium poppy cultivation have seen a reduction from their peak of 197,000 hectares (ha) in 2007 to 123,000 ha in 2010. There has also been a steady increase in the number of provinces where cultivation is negligible and which are classified as “poppy free.” Even a slight increase in cultivation in 2011 to 131,000 ha went largely unnoticed, as did the recurrence of cultivation in the provinces of Kapisa, Baghlan, and Faryab after years of being “poppy free.” It is plausible that even the 2012 figures, and the estimated 18 percent increase in the area under cultivation, can be “handled” by emphasising the 36 percent fall in opium production between 2011 and 2012 - even if it was due to an unprecedented cold snap in March 2012. It seems that amidst the plans for transition by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), concerns over the electoral process, and the cumulative impact of the war, with increases in both civilian casualties and the number of Western soldiers being killed, the uptick in cultivation continues to be of little immediate concern to Western policymakers and politicians. Drawing on in-depth fieldwork in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar, this report reveals that unfortunately such complacency is completely unjustified. In the simplest terms, this report reveals that cultivation in both Helmand and Nangarhar has risen in the 2011-12 growing season, raising doubt as to whether both provinces have an effective model for longterm drug control in Afghanistan. Of far greater concern are the different socioeconomic and political processes that lie behind this rise in cultivation, and what it means for both opium production and stability in the run up to transition, as well as beyond then, after Western combat operations have ceased in December 2014. The report highlights the fragility of the recent reductions in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Then, through an analysis of the different factors that have led to an increase in cultivation in Helmand and Nangarhar in the 2011-12 growing season, it offers insight into how important the illegal drugs trade will to be in the political economy of a post-transition Afghanistan. In particular, the report illustrates just how closely opium poppy cultivation is entangled in the socioeconomic and political fabric of the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar. It highlights how difficult it is to maintain the kinds of bargains that provincial governors have made with the rural elite to elicit their support to reduce opium poppy in areas where the welfare of the rural population is deteriorating and where the government does not have preponderant control over the means of violence. The report shows that it is under these very conditions that the current administration’s desire to ban opium poppy has led to “over-governing”—striving to extend its reach into physical space where it has little history of direct engagement, where the relationship between the state and the rural elite has been at its most fragile, and where past attempts to impose central rule on the population have led to violent repercussions. Ultimately, the report outlines two very different trajectories involving different populations in both provinces. One trajectory applies to populations in areas where the Afghan state has a history of effective control over the rural population, achieved through the rural elite whose interests largely align with those in state power. In these areas, resource endowments and market opportunities permit a sustained shift out of opium production, and it is in these areas that the state and its ban on poppy can prevail. The second trajectory charts a very different course. It applies to populations that have a history of armed resistance against state intervention, an egalitarian tribal system, and an internally divided, competing, and unstable rural elite that includes political adversaries who are keen to capitalise on the failures of their opponents. These are areas where livelihood opportunities are severely constrained by terrain, an effective distance from markets, and have limited resource endowments. In these areas, imposing a ban on opium production has presented the provincial and local political leadership with a significant challenge given that such bans have impoverished the rural population and compelled them to pursue coping strategies that expose them to physical risks, and have led to growing hostility toward the Afghan government and its foreign backers. It is in these areas that, in the absence of foreign military support after December 2014, if not before, the state will have little choice but to rescind its opium ban, retreat to the lowland valleys, and explore new ways to engage with the population and rural elite if it is not to find itself incre asingly besieged. The report shows that based on the evidence from Helmand and Nangarhar, rather than extending the writ of the Afghan government, as some suggest has happened, expanding bans on opium across an ever increasing geographical area, regardless of the socioeconomic and political conditions, has in fact undermined state formation, increased rural discontent, and presented new opportunities for the insurgency. This process, and the resurgence of opium poppy cultivation post-2014, will have major implications for the Afghan state and in turn implications for Western nations who plan to continue to provide development assistance and support to the Afghan state. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2013 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1302%20Opium%2023%20Jan-Final.pdf Shelf Number: 127466 Keywords: Drug Control (Afghanistan) Drug Trafficking Opium Trade Poppy Cultivation

Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction Title: EU Drug Markets Report: A Strategic Analysis Summary: The EU drug markets report is the first comprehensive overview of illicit drug markets in the European Union. It covers issues such as production, consumer markets, trafficking, organised crime and policy responses, along with a review of the markets for heroin, cocaine, cannabis, amphetamine, methamphetamine, ecstasy and new psychoactive substances. It concludes with concrete action points for the areas where the current EU response to the drug market and its consequent harms may be improved. An essential reference tool for law enforcement professionals, policymakers, the academic community and the general public, the report combines Europol’s strategic and operational understanding of trends and developments in organised crime with the EMCDDA’s ongoing monitoring and analysis of the drug phenomenon in Europe and beyond. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013. 155p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2013 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/drug-markets Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/drug-markets Shelf Number: 127467 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Illegal Drug Markets (Europe) Organized Crime

Author: Rush, Mathew C. Title: Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in Texas: Political Discourse and an Argument for Reality Summary: In 2006, Mexico President Felipe Calderon, with U.S. assistance, launched a military campaign to combat Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in attempt to disrupt the growing violence throughout Mexico. The result has been an uncontrollable drug war that has claimed more lives within Mexico than the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq combined. From the U.S. perspective, the threat of spillover violence emanating from Mexico is a wicked problem and one that polarizes the political discourse. Conflicting opinions about the meaning of spillover violence has driven misrepresentation of events and evidence that fuel the political narrative. Therefore, no metric for analysis can be put in place to accurately document and monitor the threat to the U.S. homeland. The term spillover violence, instead, has become the focal point. This research seeks to find a broader framework outside of political agendas that provides analysis in a systematic manner rather than focusing on semantics. This research identifies gaps in the understanding of how spillover violence is defined and captured within the current construct; examines current criminal metrics used to classify and report violent crime statistics; and evaluates the scope of Texas border operations dedicated toward violent crime crossing the Southwestern border. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 153p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 5, 2013 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA567362 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA567362 Shelf Number: 127478 Keywords: Criminal Cartels Drug Trafficking Homeland Security Organized Crime Violent Crime (Texas, U.S.)

Author: Hutcherson, Donald T., II Title: Street Dreams: The Effect of Incarceration on Illegal Earnings Summary: Theory and research on the employment lives of the ex-incarcerated suggests that imprisonment can decrease earnings in the conventional labor market for young adults (e.g., Sampson and Laub, 1993; Sampson and Laub, 2003; Western, 2002; Western, 2006). However, little is known about the influence of imprisonment on criminal earnings. To fill this gap, the research reported below addresses the following question: How does incarceration influence criminal earnings for adolescents and young adults? Drawing on theories regarding stigma, social and human capital, and opportunity structure, I develop an argument to explain how incarceration can yield returns in the form of greater illegal earnings. Briefly, the case is made that due to failures in the conventional labor market, the ex-incarcerated are forced to rely on criminal earnings from illegal opportunity structures during the life course. Thus, illegal earnings will be greater for this group than for their counterparts who have not been incarcerated. To assess the role of prior incarceration on illegal earnings, this study estimates random-effects models for adolescents and young adult male ex-offenders and non-offenders using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) for 1997-2005. Consistent with the theoretical arguments, the findings reveal that individuals with an incarceration history earn significantly higher annual illegal earnings than those who do not have such a history. This is true net of a variety of predictors of illegal income, including factors related to 'persistent heterogeneity'. The analyses also reveal an interaction effect of prior incarceration and African-American racial status on illegal earnings, whereby formerly incarcerated African-American males earn much higher predicted illegal income than former incarcerees from other race/ethnic backgrounds. To assess the role of different sources of illegal earnings, I also investigated the influence of prior incarceration on illegal earnings from drug trafficking. These analyses demonstrated a strong positive relationship between incarceration history and annual illegal income from this source. Further, interaction models revealed that ex-incarcerated African-American males earn significantly higher predicted logged income from drug trafficking than Hispanic and White ex-offenders and those never incarcerated. There is also an interaction between prior incarceration and hardcore drug use for this outcome. Formerly incarcerated individuals who use hardcore drugs earn much higher predicted logged annual illegal income from drug sales than ex-incarcerated non-drug users, non-incarcerated drug users and non-incarcerated individuals that do not use drugs. Details: Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 2008. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 5, 2013 at: http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=osu1218205841 Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=osu1218205841 Shelf Number: 127513 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Illegal Income Imprisonment Incarceration

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2001-2010 Summary: The developing world lost US$859 billion in illicit outflows in 2010, an increase of 11% over 2009. The capital outflows stem from crime, corruption, tax evasion, and other illicit activity. The report finds that illicit financial flows. From 2001 to 2010, developing countries lost US$5.86 trillion to illicit outflows. Conservatively estimated, illicit financial flows have increased in every region of developing countries. Real growth of illicit flows by regions over study period is as follows: •Africa 23.8 percent, •Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 26.3 percent, •developing Europe 3.6 percent, •Asia 7.8 percent, and •Western Hemisphere 2.7 percent. Top 10 countries with the highest measured cumulative illicit financial outflows between 2001 and 2010 were: 1.China: US$2.74 trillion 2.Mexico: US$476 billion 3.Malaysia: US$285 billon 4.Saudi Arabia: US$210 billion 5.Russia: US$152 billion 6.Philippines: US$138 billion 7.Nigeria: US$129 billion 8.India: US$123 billion 9.Indonesia: US$109 billion 10.United Arab Emirates: US$107 billion. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: accessed February 7, 2013 at: http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html Shelf Number: 127521 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Tax Evasion

Author: Guerrero-Gutiérrez, Eduardo Title: Security, Drugs, and Violence In Mexico: A Survey. 7th North American Forum, Washington, DC, 2011 Summary: The survey is composed by five sections. The first one is a diagnosis with two components. The first one is a brief description of Mexico’s security institutions. The survey includes a brief update of the most significant changes on these institutions during the last year, especially a report on the current situation of the police forces. The second component has to do with the present dynamics of Mexican organized crime. Here, the survey provides an account of Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations, including the different criminal activities these organizations perform, their geographic distribution, and the relationships among them. Also, the fragmentation of some of these organizations is described, and a new typology of cartels is included. The second section is about organized crime violence. Considering that violence trends are changing quickly this survey includes a general update of the phenomenon. In addition to the factors that explain increases of violence, the survey also points out the main factors that explain the geographic dispersion of violence as well as its regional specifics. The third section reviews the government’s strategy and actions against organized crime. This section includes an analysis of the outcomes of the Federal Government’s deployment of the force against organized crime through “joint operations” (operativos conjuntos), and an assessment of the government’s security policy impact on violence levels. The fourth section describes the general traits of the Mexican and North American drug markets. Finally, the fifth section addresses Mexican public opinion; it brings together the results of recent polls regarding security and government actions against organized crime, and provides an account of the government’s communication strategy on security issues. This Survey’s Data Sources The survey exhibits extensive public data from Mexican government agencies, and from American and international agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and United Nations. Some tables and figures derive from two databases constructed by the author, through the systematic recollection of information in newspapers, weekly magazines, and press releases from official agencies. The first database shows the number of organized crime executions. For its construction more than 30,000 news articles related to organized crime homicides were collected. These articles were taken from the following 19 national and regional newspapers: Crónica, El Economista, El Financiero, El Gráfico, El Norte, El Sol de México, El Universal, Excélsior, Imagen, Impacto, La Jornada, La Prensa, La Razón, La Segunda de Ovaciones, Metro, Milenio, Ovaciones, Reforma, and UnoMásUno. This database is complementary to the official one, which has not been updated since December 2010. The second database contains information on 1,029 messages placed by criminal organizations next to corpses of executed individuals. Details: Mexico: Lantia Consultores, S.C., 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Shelf Number: 127617 Keywords: Criminal Cartels Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Trafficking Organized Crime (Mexico) Violence Violent Crime

Author: Carvalho, Leandro Title: Living on the Edge: Youth Entry, Career and Exit in Drug-Selling Gangs Summary: We use data from a unique survey of members of drug-trafficking gangs in favelas (slums) of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to characterize drug-trafficking jobs and study the selection into gangs, analyzing what distinguishes gang-members from other youth living in favelas. We also estimate wage regressions for gang-members and examine their career path: age at entry, progression within the gangs’ hierarchy, and short- to medium-term outcomes. Individuals from lower socioeconomic background and with no religious affiliation have higher probability of joining a gang, while those with problems at school and early use of drugs join the gang at younger ages. Wages within the gang do not depend on education, but are increasing with experience and involvement in gang-related violence. The two-year mortality rate in the sample of gang-members reaches 20%, with the probability of death increasing with initial involvement in gang violence and with personality traits associated with unruliness. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2013. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Working Discussion Paper No. 7189: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7189.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7189.pdf Shelf Number: 127627 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Favelas Gang Violencd Gangs (Brazil)

Author: Isacson, Adam Title: An Uneasy Coexistence: Security and Migration Along the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Border Summary: In September 2011, three WOLA staff members — Senior Associate Adam Isacson, Senior Fellow George Withers, and Program Assistant Joe Bateman — paid a five-day visit to El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Isacson returned to El Paso for three days in October. We found two cities that, while separated only by a narrow river, are rapidly growing further apart. Ciudad Juárez is undergoing wrenching change as dysfunctional state institutions confront powerful, hyper-violent criminal groups. El Paso has witnessed an unprecedented buildup of the U.S. government’s security and law enforcement apparatus. The results have been mixed. Violence has not spilled over into El Paso, in part because the drug traffickers do not want it to do so. The flow of migrants from Mexico into the El Paso region has nearly ground to a halt due to greatly increased U.S. security-force presence, the poor U.S. economy, and the danger that organized-crime groups pose for migrants on the Mexican side of the border. The flow of drugs, meanwhile, continues at or near the same level as always. What we saw in El Paso raised concerns about U.S. policy. Present levels of budgets and personnel may not be sustainable. Nor may they be desirable until a series of reforms are implemented. These include human rights training for law enforcement, improved intelligence coordination, reduced military involvement, stronger accountability mechanisms, increased anticorruption measures, and greater attention to ports of entry. They also include a much sharper distinction between violent threats like organized crime or terrorism, and non-violent social problems like unregulated migration. Any reforms, however, need to be guided by a coherent policy, and for the moment the U.S. government still lacks a comprehensive border security strategy. In El Paso, WOLA found that this lack of clarity amid a security buildup has hit the migrant population especially hard. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://www.wola.org/files/111219_uneasy_coexistence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.wola.org/files/111219_uneasy_coexistence.pdf Shelf Number: 127636 Keywords: Border Law Enforcement Border Security (U.S.) Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Illegal Immigrants Immigration

Author: Barry, Tom Title: Policy on the Edge: Failures of Border Security and New Directions for Border Control Summary: Ten years after America’s rush to secure our borders, we must review, evaluate and change course. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 set off a multibillion-dollar border security bandwagon and distinctly altered the way the Border Patrol operates. Yet, despite massive expenditures and the new commitment to “border security,” our border policy remains unfocused and buffeted by political forces. In the absence of a sharp strategic focus, the management of the U.S.-Mexico border continues to be the victim of the problems and pressures created by our failed immigration and drug policies. Over the past decade, the old politics of immigration enforcement and drug control—not counterterrorism or homeland security—are still the main drivers of border policy. “Policy on the Edge” is an International Policy Report published by the Center for International Policy. The report examines the failures, waste and misdirection of the border security operations of the Department of Homeland Security. “Policy on the Edge” concludes that there has been more continuity than change in U.S. border policy. The final section of the report describes a policy path that charts the way forward to regulatory solutions - for immmigration, drugs, gun sales, border management - that are more pragmatic, effective and cost-efficient than current policies. Specific recommendations to improve border policy are included. Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2013 at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Barry_IPR_Policy_Edge_Border_Control_0611.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Barry_IPR_Policy_Edge_Border_Control_0611.pdf Shelf Number: 127655 Keywords: Border Control (U.S.) Border Security Drug Trafficking Gun Trafficking Illegal Immigration Immigrants

Author: Norris, John Title: Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia Summary: The disastrous famine in Somalia is the worst the world has seen in 20 years, and it again casts a harsh spotlight on the situation in that country. With millions of people now at risk of starvation, and appalling stories of human hardship dominating the evening news, the name “Somalia” once again conjures images of crisis and despair—a famished, suffering country peopled by pirates, terrorists, and warlords. Somalia is best known for the civil war and famine of the early 1990s, which killed some 250,000 people and triggered a massive, U.S.-led humanitarian intervention that culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1994. More recently, the rise of indigenous Islamist movements in southern Somalia has rekindled fears that the anarchic territory could—or has—become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist movements. Western and regional efforts to reduce the terror threat by establishing a central government in Somalia have failed to improve governance. A recent confidential audit of the Somali government suggests that in 2009 and 2010 some 96 percent of direct bilateral assistance to the government had simply disappeared, presumably into the pockets of corrupt officials.19 The repeated failure of international efforts to produce positive change in Somalia has generated fatigue among donors at a time when Somalia’s needs have never been greater. “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” is rightfully a well-worn adage. Yet in the world of foreign policy it is an exceedingly difficult credo to translate from convenient talking point into practice. As much as policy experts and others, including the U.S. secretary of defense, call for sensible investments in crisis prevention, international development, and expanded diplomatic capabilities, the default setting of the U.S. government and its partners in the international community is to scrimp on crisis prevention while pouring money into crisis response and containment. By and large, the U.S. government ends up spending far more time and money responding to crises or tinkering with tactical responses than preventing crises or nurturing effective peacebuilding efforts. This paper explores the staggeringly high cost of this approach by looking at the case of Somalia. This research tries to determine—using a variety of official and unofficial sources and some educated guesswork—a reasonable estimate of the financial cost of Somalia’s conflict since 1991. We tried to be as exhaustive as possible in determining the money spent on Somalia by the international community, regional actors, and the Somali diaspora, regardless of the specific intentions of spending and whether these expenditures were sensible and effective or not. It is our hope that the data explored in this paper can provide the foundation for a useful cost-benefit analysis of what has and has not worked in Somalia. We welcome any additional insights into our methodology and findings. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2011. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf Shelf Number: 127696 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Maritime Crime Piracy/Pirates Terrorism (Somalia)

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment Summary: Key Findings • The flow of cocaine through West Africa appears to have declined to about 18 tons, down from a peak of 47 tons in 2007. These 18 tons would be worth US$1.25 billion at wholesale in Europe, providing West African traffickers with substantial income. • Modes of conveyance for cocaine from South America to Europe via West Africa have shifted over time in response to enforcement efforts. Much of the cocaine headed to West Africa today comes from Brazil, where Nigerian crime groups are exporting the drug. Recently, these groups have been moving into containerized consignments and maritime shipping, adopting these methods in addition to their traditional methods of air couriering and postal shipments. From West Africa, an increase in the use of Benin as a departure point for air couriers has been noted. • Methamphetamine production in the region is a growing concern, with two methamphetamine laboratories detected in Nigeria in 2011-2012. The main market for West African-made meth is East Asia, and to a lesser extent, South Africa. The income from trafficking West African-made methamphetamines to East Asia is remarkably high for such a new flow, but the long-term prospects are limited in light of competition from producers located in the destination markets. • Due to the economic downturn, the flow of smuggled migrants from West Africa to Europe has declined in recent years. The prominence of the many routes has shifted significantly, with routes moving eastwards. • Given the number of weapons still circulating from past conflicts in the region, there is very little need to import large numbers of weapons into West Africa. Most of the illicit flow of weapons in the region is diverted or stolen from licit national stocks held by to 20,000 firearms from Libya does represent a serious threat to stability in the region, a threat that appears to have been realized in northern Mali. • The prevalence of fraudulent medicines is highest not in the markets where profits would be the greatest, but in those where chances of detection are lowest. At least 10% of the imported medicines circulating in West Africa are fraudulent, posing a grave threat to public health and safety. • Maritime piracy has generated renewed attention in the Gulf of Guinea, with 22 pirate attacks occurring off the coast of Benin in 2011. In 2012, Togo became the new hotspot for attacks on petroleum tankers. These vessels are attacked because there is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa. • Unless the flows of contraband are addressed, instability and lawlessness will persist, and it will remain difficult to build state capacity and the rule of law in the region. Each of these flows requires a tailored response, because the commodities involved respond to distinct sources of supply and demand. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 127736 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Firearms Trafficking Fraudulent Medicines Human Smuggling Maritime Crime Methamphetamines Organized Crime (West Africa) Piracy/Pirates

Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, DRug Trafficking and Organised Crime: Concepts and Practicalities Summary: Organised crime and illicit economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. Yet, goals such as a complete suppression of organised crime may sometimes be unachievable, especially in the context of acute state weakness where underdeveloped and weak state insti­tutions are the norm. Focused-deterrence strategies, selective targeting, and sequential interdiction efforts are being increasingly embraced as more promising law enforcement alternatives. They seek to minimise the most pernicious behaviour of criminal groups, such as engaging in violence, or to maximise certain kinds of desirable behaviour sometimes exhibited by criminals, such as eschewing engagement with terrorist groups. The focused-deterrence, selective targeting strategies also enable overwhelmed law enforcement institutions to overcome certain under resourcing problems. Especially, in the United States, such approaches have produced impressive results in reducing violence and other harms generated by organised crime groups and youth gangs. Such approaches have, however, encountered implementation difficulties elsewhere in the world. This report first outlines the logic and problems of zero-tolerance and undifferentiated targeting in law enforcement policies. Second, it lays out the key theoretical concepts of law-enforcement strategies of focused-deterrence and selective targeting and reviews some of their applications, as in Operation Ceasefire in Boston in the 1990s and urban-policing operations in Rio de Janeiro during the 2000s decade. Third, the report analyses the implementation challenges selective targeting and focused-deterrence strategies have encountered, particularly outside of the United States. And finally, it discusses some key dilemmas in designing selective targeting and focused-deterrence strategies to fight crime. Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Modernising Drug Law Enforcement Report 2, Accessed March 5, 2013 at: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/64663568/library/MDLE-report-2_Focused-deterrence.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/64663568/library/MDLE-report-2_Focused-deterrence.pdf Shelf Number: 127836 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Drugs and Crime Organized Crime

Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety Summary: The ICPC’s 2012 International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety presents key subjects on the international agenda regarding crime and violence, highlighting forms in which prevention can address these issues to generate more resilient and cohesive communities around the world. The third edition of the Report focuses on five topics of significance for crime prevention policymaking at the international level: Human Trafficking, Informal Settlements, Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Areas, Drug Production in Developed Countries and ICPC’s own Global Survey on Safety in Cities. It analyses these issues from the prevention perspective and contributes to the larger debate on responses to crime using ICPC’s 18 years of expertize in the field. The International Report provides information and tools to help governments, local authorities, international organizations and other actors implement successful crime prevention policies in their countries, cities and communities. Details: Montreal: ICPC, 2012. 180p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2013 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/en/publications/report/report/article/translate-to-english-rapport-international-2012-sur-la-prevention-de-la-criminalite-et-la-secu.html Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/en/publications/report/report/article/translate-to-english-rapport-international-2012-sur-la-prevention-de-la-criminalite-et-la-secu.html Shelf Number: 128012 Keywords: Crime Prevention Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Human Trafficking

Author: Jovchelovitch, Sandra Title: Underground Sociabilities: Identity, Culture and Resistance in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas. Final Report Summary: Underground Sociabilities investigated pathways of exclusion and social development in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. It examined the lived world of favela communities and the work of two local organisations AfroReggae and CUFA, to systematise and disseminate effective experiences of social development. The project comprised three studies: an investigation of the lifeworld of favela communities, a systematic study of favela organisations AfroReggae and CUFA and an investigation of elite external observers in the wider city. Our approach was psychosocial, ethnographic and multimethod: questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with 204 favela residents analysis of documents pertaining to 130 projects of social development narrative interviews with 10 AfroReggae and CUFA leaders interviews with 16 external observers and partners, with special emphasis on the police Fieldwork was conducted between October 2009 and February 2011 in Rio de Janeiro. Four communities were studied: Cantagalo, City of God, Madureira and Vigário Geral. They were selected considering location in the city and link with AfroReggae and CUFA. Cantagalo and Vigário Geral fit the accepted definition of favelas, whereas City of God was built as a planned area for relocating favela-dwellers displaced from the city centre during the 1960s. Madureira is a formal neighbourhood surrounded by favelas. Theoretical inspiration was drawn from the concepts of sociability, social representations, imagination and psychosocial cartographies. Findings enabled the development of the concept of psychosocial scaffoldings. THE CONTEXT AND RESEARCH PROBLEM Rio is an unequal city; more than 20% of its population live in favelas. Residence in a favela impacts negatively on income, education, teenage pregnancy, literacy and mortality at young age. The rooting of drug trading in the favelas during the 1970s and 80s created parallel norms and regulations in favela communities and triggered a territorial war between drug trade factions and the police. Favela-dwellers were caught in-between. Violence, lack of services and socioeconomic deprivation in the favelas created social exclusion and separation between the favelas and the asphalted areas of Rio, known in the city as the division morro/asfalto (hill/asphalt). Favelas were pushed underground and became invisible, their diverse community life shut off by geographical, economic, symbolic, behavioural and cultural barriers. Since the 1990s new actors – young, mainly black, favela dwellers – entered the public sphere to organise responses to poverty, violence and segregation challenging the traditional model of the NGO and repositioning favela populations in the Brazilian public sphere. Details: London: London School of Economics and Political Science, Institute of Social Psychology, 2012. 158p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2013 at: http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/undergroundsociabilities/pdf/Underground_Sociabilities_Final_Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/undergroundsociabilities/pdf/Underground_Sociabilities_Final_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 128141 Keywords: Cultural Activities Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Trafficking Favelas (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Urban Communities

Author: Sullivan, Mark P. Title: Latin America: Terrorism Issues Summary: U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. In its 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in July 2012), the State Department maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. It reported that the majority of terrorist attacks in the hemisphere were committed by two Colombian terrorist groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and other radical groups in the Andean region. With regard to Mexico, the report asserted that there was no evidence of ties between Mexican drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups, and no evidence “that these criminal organizations had aims of political or territorial control, aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity with which they conduct their criminal activity.” Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and potential support for Colombian terrorist groups, although improved Venezuelan-Colombian relations have resulted in closer cooperation on antiterrorism and counter-narcotics efforts and border security. Over the past several years, policymakers have been concerned about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America. Concerns center on Iran’s attempts to circumvent U.N. and U.S. sanctions, as well as on its ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah. Both Iran and Hezbollah are reported to be linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. As in past years, the State Department 2011 terrorism report maintains that there are no known operational cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah in the hemisphere, but noted that “ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.” Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: RS21049: Accessed April 12, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Shelf Number: 128342 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorists (Latin America)

Author: EastWest Institute. Joint U.S. - Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking Title: Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment Summary: Despite the most recent tensions in the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States, cooperation on counternarcotics has endured, developing slowly but steadily. The EastWest Institute’s report Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment focuses on the serious threats these two countries face from the flow of drugs from Afghanistan and its corrosive impact on Afghanistan itself. The contributors to the report point out that preventing an explosion in this opium trade is a prerequisite for improving the security of Afghanistan and its neighbors after the withdrawal of foreign troops next year. Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment is a product of the Russian and American experts who participated in a working group convened by EWI. Leaders in this field from both countries, including representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, provided briefings and other assistance to the group. According to EWI Senior Associate Jacqueline McLaren Miller, the project’s main coordinator, “This report demonstrates that cooperation between Russia and the United States is still possible when both countries are willing to focus on a common challenge.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed the same sentiments at the February 2, 2013 Munich Security Conference when he stated the need for “closer cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan.” There are about 30,000 heroin-related deaths in Russia every year, and most of the heroin comes from Afghanistan. Cooperation between the two countries is necessary to stem predicted growth of opium production in a post-2014 Afghanistan. The report includes a clear warning: “As NATO and U.S. troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, which is still struggling with a highly volatile security situation, weak governance, and major social and economic problems, the size of the opium economy and opiate trafficking are likely to increase and pose an even greater challenge to regional and international security.” This paper will be followed shortly by a Joint Policy Assessment report, which will offer specific policy suggestions for both Russia and the United States to curtail the flow of opiates from Afghanistan. Details: New York: EastWest Institute, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Report 2013-1: Accessed April 12, 2013 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/20526994/JTA%20final%204-11.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/20526994/JTA%20final%204-11.pdf Shelf Number: 128348 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Narcotics (Afghanistan) Narcotrafficking Opium

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Global SMART Programme Title: The Challenge of New Psychoactive Substances Summary: UNODC launched the Global Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and Trends (SMART) Programme in September 2008. The Programme seeks to enhance the capacity of Member States and authorities in priority regions, to generate, manage, analyse and report synthetic drug information, and to apply this scientific evidence-based knowledge to design the policies and programmes. The Global SMART Programme is being implemented in a gradual phased manner, with East Asia being the first focus priority region. Operations in Latin America started in 2011. This report is the first global situation assessment on new psychoactive substances put forward under the Global SMART Programme and pursuant to Commission on Narcotic Drugs Resolution 55/1 on “Promoting international cooperation in responding to the challenges posed by new psychoactive substances”, which requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to provide an update to its 2011 report entitled “Synthetic cannabinoids in herbal products”, addressing a wider range of new psychoactive substances, in addition to synthetic cannabinoids, and to take into consideration the creation of a compilation of new psychoactive substances encountered by Member States, to serve as an early warning advisory. It constitutes the first step in providing consolidated up to-date analysis, based primarily on the information shared by Member States and the International Collaborative Exercise network of drug analysis laboratories. It is hoped that the information on new psychoactive substances presented in this report will make a practical contribution to addressing the significant threat posed by the manufacture, trafficking and use of these substances throughout the world, and place policymakers in a better position to evaluate the drug situation, and to make informed decisions on intervention and prevention strategies. This report provides an overview of the situation throughout the world. It outlines the emergence of different groups of new psychoactive substances in the regions and highlights several key issues associated with these substances, including reported adverse effects associated with their use, the challenges for the identification of these substances and their subsequent control through legislation. While the information presented points towards increasing efforts by the countries to address the NPS problem, it also highlights the need for continued and joint efforts, both at the national as well as regional levels. It is hoped that this report will contribute to a better understanding of the NPS problem and in developing effective strategies to address it. Details: Vienna: Laboratory and Scientific Section United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013. 122p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/NPS_2013_SMART.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/NPS_2013_SMART.pdf Shelf Number: 128358 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Control Policies Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Psychoactive Drugs

Author: Hartelius, Jonas Title: Narcoterrorism Summary: The concept of “narcoterrorism” was introduced in 1983 by the Peruvian President Belaunde Terry to designate terrorist‐like attacks against his country’s drug enforcement police. Drug criminals utilized methods from political assailants to influence the politics of the country by causing terror and obstructing justice. Later, ideology-driven terrorist organizations took up illegal drug trade as a source of income. Over the years, several definitions of “narcoterrorism” have been introduced. The widest definition is given by the Oxford dictionary (1999): “Terrorism associated with the trade in illicit drugs”. It does not indicate whether ideological and political or, criminal and commercial motives are the main driving factors. The simplest way of describing narcoterrorism is, perhaps, as a part of an illegal complex of drugs, violence and power, where the illegal drug trade and the illegal exercise of power have become aggregated in such a way that they threaten democracy and the rule of law. The manifestations of narcoterrorism are manifold and far reaching: increased drug production; wide spread abuse of drugs; serious drug-related crime; threats to the rule of law, public security, and public health; money laundering; infiltration of the legal economy; and financing of terrorism. It has been estimated that the FARC guerilla of Colombia has a net profit from drugrelated crime (including the “taxation” and “protection” of the illegal cocaine trade) of at least 300 million USD every year. The annual total income from the drug trade for movements such as al‐Qaeda has been estimated by the U.N. to be 2.4 billion USD. Twelve of the 28 organizations, which in October 2001 were listed as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department, were stated to be involved in the illegal drug trade, ranging from Sendero Luminoso of Peru to the “Tamil Tigers” of Sri Lanka. Narcoterrorism represents another step in the development of organized drug crime in the postwar period. It surpasses the traditional drug syndicates and drug cartels in being much more autonomous and having paramilitary strength. Yet another step is represented by “narcostates”. A narcostate is a state (or region), where the operators of the drug trade through their economic, political and paramilitary strength influence the exercise of power by the central government. Current examples are Afghanistan and Colombia. The debate on countermeasures against narcoterrorism is parallel to the debate on countermeasures against the global illegal drug trade. The consumer countries, who are mainly industrial or post-industrial countries, locate the problem with the producer countries and their production and distribution of illegal drugs. They call for elimination of the problem “at source”, e.g. by crop replacement or by police and customs action against the illegal production and distribution of drugs. The producer countries, who mainly are developing countries, point to the demand in the consumer countries as the driving force for the illegal trade. They call for the consumer countries to reduce their demand in order to dry up the industry, e.g. by prevention, treatment and local drug enforcement. Details: New York: EastWest Institute; Stockholm, Swedish Carnegie Institute, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper 3/2008: Accessed April 16, 2013 at: mercury.ethz.ch Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128380 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Illegal Drug Trade Narcoterrorism Terrorism

Author: U.S. Congress. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control Title: The Buck Stops Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices Summary: A bipartisan report entitled The Buck Stops Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices that provides recommendations for Congress and the Obama Administration to strengthen anti-money laundering laws and regulations in the United States. “Drug traffickers are motivated by one thing: money. The illicit proceeds from their crimes are blood money, and blood money has no place in our financial system.” said Senator Feinstein. “Money laundering—very often through U.S. businesses and financial institutions—must be stopped if we are to make real progress in curtailing the drug trade. Improving our anti-money laundering laws will help better combat transnational organized crime and return revenue to the U.S. Treasury.” “Our report has common-sense recommendations to curb key shortcomings in anti-money laundering statutes and enforcement practices.” said Senator Grassley. “By cutting off financing, we can get at the criminals who misuse legitimate institutions to fuel their illegal activities. Congress and the Obama Administration should take a close look at these recommendations.” The report recommends: •Stronger enforcement of anti-money laundering laws by the Justice Department, particularly in cases where banks are accused of improperly monitoring billions of dollars in illicit proceeds; •Making pre-paid cards (known as stored value) subject to cross-border reporting requirements; •Closing a loophole that makes armored cash carriers exempt from reporting requirements; •Passage of the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act to make it more difficult for criminal organizations to hide behind shell companies; •Passage of the Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act to close gaps in anti-money laundering laws; and •Enforcement of the 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy, including the requirement that all money service businesses register with the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Details: Washington, DC: Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 2013. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 1, 2013 at: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee Shelf Number: 128503 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Money Laundering (U.S.) Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific A Threat Assessment Summary: East Asia and the Pacific have experienced rapid economic and social changes during the past few decades and faced the considerable regulation challenges these changes create for public authorities. This report takes a look at the manner in which criminal enterprises have developed alongside legitimate commerce in recent years. Drawing on official statistics, academic studies, and interviews with law enforcement officials, it attempts to outline something about the mechanics of illicit trade: the how, where, when, who, and why of selected contraband markets affecting the region. It also endeavours to give the best reading of the available data on the size of these markets. Though the list of contraband markets discussed is not comprehensive and it is impossible to quantify the value of these markets with any precision, these estimates are offered to prompt public debate on areas of great public policy significance. The mechanics of trafficking are discussed for a nonexhaustive list of 12 illicit flows, which themselves are organized under four headings: 1. Human trafficking and smuggling of migrants 2. Illicit drugs (heroin and methamphetamine) 3. Resources (wildlife, wood products) and pollution crime (e-waste, ozone-depleting substances) 4. Products (counterfeit goods, fraudulent medicines). Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 192p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 1, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf Shelf Number: 128580 Keywords: Counterfeit Goods Drug Trafficking Fraudulent Medicines Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Offenses Against the Environment Organized Crime (East Asia, Pacific) Wildlife Crime

Author: Title: Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Law in Mexico Summary: After years of intense, cartel-related bloodshed that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and shaken Mexico, new President Enrique Peña Nieto is promising to reduce the murder rate. The security plan he introduced with the backing of the three biggest parties gives Mexico a window of opportunity to build institutions that can produce long-term peace and cut impunity rates. But he faces many challenges. The cartels have thousands of gunmen and have morphed into diversified crime groups that not only traffic drugs, but also conduct mass kidnappings, oversee extortion rackets and steal from the state oil industry. The military still fights them in much of the country on controversial missions too often ending in shooting rather than prosecutions. If Peña Nieto does not build an effective police and justice system, the violence may continue or worsen. But major institutional improvements and more efficient, comprehensive social programs could mean real hope for sustainable peace and justice. The development of cartels into murder squads fighting to control territory with military-grade weapons challenges the Mexican state’s monopoly on the use of force in some regions. The brutality of their crimes undermines civilian trust in the government’s capacity to protect them, and the corruption of drug money damages belief in key institutions. Cartels challenge the fundamental nature of the state, therefore, not by threatening to capture it, but by damaging and weakening it. The military fight-back has at times only further eroded the trust in government by inflicting serious human rights abuses. Some frustrated communities have formed armed “selfdefence” groups against the cartels. Whatever the intent, these also degrade the rule of law. There has been fierce discussion about how to legally define the fighting. The violence has been described as a low-intensity armed conflict, a kind of war, because of the number of deaths and type of weapons used. The criminal groups have been described as everything from gangs, drug cartels and transnational criminal organisations, to paramilitaries and terrorists. The Mexican government, much of the international community and many analysts reject the idea there is anything other than a serious criminal threat, even though those criminal groups use military and, at times, vicious terror tactics. The army and marines, too, thrown into the breach with limited police training and without efficient policing methods, have often used intense and lethal force to fight the groups, killing more than 2,300 alleged criminals in a five-year period. Within the grey world of fighting between rival cartels and security forces, there is much confusion as to who the victims of the violence are, and who killed them or made them disappear. Estimates of the total who have died in connection with the fighting over the last six years range from 47,000 to more than 70,000, in addition to thousands of disappearances. Cartel gunmen often dress in military uniforms and include corrupt police in their ranks, so people are unsure if they are facing criminals or troops. A victims movement is demanding justice and security. Mexico has also lost hundreds of police and army officers, mayors, political candidates, judges, journalists and human rights defenders to the bloodshed that is taking a toll on its democratic institutions. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2013. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 48: Accessed May 13, 2013 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/mexico/048-pena-nietos-challenge-criminal-cartels-and-rule-of-law-in-mexico.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/mexico/048-pena-nietos-challenge-criminal-cartels-and-rule-of-law-in-mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 128724 Keywords: Drug - Related Violence (Mexico) Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Homicides Kidnappings Organized Crime Violent Crimes

Author: Insulza, Jose Miguel Title: The Drug Problem in the Americas Summary: The Heads of State and Government of the Americas, gathered at the Sixth Summit in Cartagena, Colombia, entrusted the OAS with the task of preparing a study on the drug problem in the Americas. In keeping with the wishes of the dignitaries, that study will examine the results of current policy in the Hemisphere and explore new approaches for responding more effectively to the problem. Under the leadership of OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, this study aims to carry out a comprehensive analysis of policies applied in the Americas, and, based on the evidence found, highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and challenges in the implementation of those policies. The findings of the study will provide the basis for a scenario analysis with a view to examining new approaches. The Secretary General is coordinating with the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the CAF (Development Bank of Latin America), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The CICAD Executive Secretariat is providing technical and administrative support for the study. Two tracks The study consists of two separate, but interconnected reports: An analytical report will survey the current drug policy landscape by drawing on existing expertise (governments, civil society, academia or think tanks) and synthesizing lessons learned and a spectrum of policy options. A scenarios report aims to map out potential outcomes of several sets of policy options when exposed to a broad discussion of stakeholders in the drug problem in the Americas The technical secretariat will compile and analyze the information for the study, which will be divided into the following chapters consistent with the different areas of the problem targeted by the study: a.The relationship between drugs and public health; b.The relationship between drugs and economic and social development; c.The security challenges as reflected in the nexus between drugs, violence and organized crime; d.Production and supply of plant-based and synthetic drugs, pharmaceuticals, and chemical precursors; and e.The alternative legal and regulatory approaches to the drug problem. Each chapter will provide baseline analysis of the current state of play in the region, examine best practices and promising new approaches being pursued by different countries, with the point of departure being the Hemispheric Drug Strategy, and outline challenges and obstacles to improved results. Based on the findings of the Analytical Report, an exercise will be undertaken to identify diverse approaches to the problem. To that end, potential scenarios will be developed, capable of providing the Heads of State and Government of the Americas with courses of action for tackling the drug problem. Details: Washington, DC: Organization of American States, General Secretariat, 2013. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: South America URL: http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 128764 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime (America)

Author: Organization of American States. Scenario Team Title: Scenarios for the Drug Problem in the Americas 2013 – 2025 Summary: These scenarios are stories about what could happen in the future – not what will happen (forecasts) or what should happen (policy recommendations) but what could happen over the coming years in and around the hemispheric drug ‘system’, based on current trends and including relevant political, economic, social, cultural, and international dynamics. For the construction of these “Scenarios for the Drug Problem in the Americas, 2013 – 2025,” a team of outstanding individuals from security, business, health, education, indigenous cultures, international organizations, the justice system, civil society, and politics, including former and current government officials from across the Americas, gathered together for two meetings of intense conversation. They created four scenarios based on their own diverse experiences and understandings; on an Analytical Report prepared by a team of leading experts; and on a set of interviews of 75 leaders from across the Hemisphere, including current and former Heads of Government. These very different stories of the possible evolution of the current situation are intended to be relevant, challenging, credible, and clear in order to be useful in strategic conversations of leaders about the best ways to address the problems of drugs in the Americas. The purpose of the stories is to provide a common framework and language to support dialogue, debate, and decision-making among Heads of Government and other actors, within and across countries. They are intended to support an open and constructive search for answers to core questions of drug policy and strategy: What opportunities and challenges are we and could we be facing? What are our options? What shall we do to better respond to the drug problem in the Americas? Scenarios play a very particular role in strategic planning. Because they are stories – that is, fictions – and because they come in sets of two or more different, plausible stories, they offer the political advantage of supporting informed debate without committing anyone to any particular policy position. Scenarios enable us to deal with the reality that although we cannot predict or control the future, we can work with and influence it. More specifically, scenarios are used to support the formation of policy and strategy through the use of scenario-based dialogues. The purpose of such dialogues is not to redo the construction of the scenarios, but rather to use the scenarios as they are written to discover what can and must be done. The most fruitful dialogues of this kind involve a representative group of interested and influential actors from all across the whole system in question. (This system can be a government, city, sector, community, nation, or region, for example.) Diversity is important – not just friends and colleagues but also strangers and opponents. There are four key steps for this kind of scenario-based dialogue. First, the scenarios are presented through text, slide presentation, storytelling, or video. Second, for each scenario the group addresses the question, “If this scenario occurred, what would it mean for us?” and works out the opportunities and challenges the scenario poses. Third, the group deals with the question, “If this scenario occurred, what could we do? What options do we have?” Finally, the group steps back to the present and considers the question, “Given these possible futures, what shall we do next?” Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2013. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Scenarios_Report.PDF Year: 2013 Country: South America URL: http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Scenarios_Report.PDF Shelf Number: 128768 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addictions (Americas) Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Control Drug Trafficking

Author: Brown, David E. Title: The Challenge of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human Security in West Africa Summary: International criminal networks mainly from Latin America and Africa—some with links to terrorism—are turning West Africa into a key global hub for the distribution, wholesaling, and production of illicit drugs. These groups represent an existential threat to democratic governance of already fragile states in the subregion because they are using narco-corruption to stage coups d’état, hijack elections, and co-opt or buy political power. Besides a spike in drug-related crime, narcotics trafficking is also fraying West Africa’s traditional social fabric and creating a public health crisis, with hundreds of thousands of new drug addicts. While the inflow of drug money may seem economically beneficial to West Africa in the short-term, investors will be less inclined to do business in the long-term if the subregion is unstable. On net, drug trafficking and other illicit trade represent the most serious challenge to human security in the region since resource conflicts rocked several West African countries in the early 1990s. International aid to West Africa’s “war on drugs” is only in an initial stage; progress will be have to be measured in decades or even generations, not years and also unfold in parallel with creating alternative sustainable livelihoods and addressing the longer-term challenges of human insecurity, poverty, and underdevelopment. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: The Letort Papers: Accessed May 23, 2013 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1151 Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1151 Shelf Number: 128785 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Organized Crime (West Africa)

Author: Organization of American States Title: The Drug Problem in the Americas: Studies. The Economics of Drug Trafficking Summary: Summary and Findings:  While estimating the size of global and hemispheric drug markets presents tremendous challenges, evidence suggests that some two thirds of total revenues are earned at the final, retail level in consuming countries.  Wholesalers and traffickers through transit countries account for another 20-25 percent of revenues, while just under 1 percent of total retail sales finds its way to drug cultivators in the Andes.  In terms of the size of overall drug markets, the most recent UN estimates place total retail sales of illicit drugs at some $320 billion or 0.9 percent of GDP. Other estimates are lower.  The UN estimates annual drug revenues in the Americas at $150 billion or just under half the global total, though other estimates are lower. North America currently occupies a dominant share of the hemispheric total, reflecting higher prices as well as higher drug prevalence, though this could change in future years.  Cocaine estimates enjoy better consensus, with U.S. sales accounting for some $34 billion out of a global retail cocaine market of about $85 billion. Cocaine estimates for the rest of the hemisphere are a small fraction of this figure, but this could change when revised Brazilian data become available.  Estimates of marijuana and methamphetamine revenues suffer particularly high rates of uncertainty. Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 25, 2013 at: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/laEconomicaNarcotrafico_ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/laEconomicaNarcotrafico_ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 128797 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Economics of Crime Illicit Drugs Money Laundering

Author: Organization of American States Title: The Drug Problem in the Americas: Studies. Drugs and Security Summary: The relationship between the drug problem and security can be explained principally by the state’s weakness in performing its law and order functions, property protection and crime prevention. The varying capabilities of different states in the region to guarantee protection for their citizens and effective law enforcement constitute a key variable in understanding why in some countries the drug problem is viewed as a major security threat, while in others its effect is less intense. While drug use tends to be high among people who have committed crimes, this does not mean that the majority of drug users commit crimes. The relationship between drug use and the occurrence of crime tends to be highest in specific urban spaces, and is generally associated with drug use by socially marginalized groups. Drug trafficking is an important factor behind the high mortality rates of some countries in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, there is not enough evidence to conclude that recent changes in drug trafficking routes have resulted in a decline in violent deaths, suggesting that other underlying factors may be driving this violence. The relationship between the drug problem and organized crime works both ways: Illegal drugs provide resources that fuel crime, while organized crime serves as the engine to sustain much of the drug market. From a security perspective, the problem is more about organized crime than drugs. Illegal firearms trafficking is a major problem throughout the hemisphere, exacerbated by the relationship between illegal drugs and organized crime. Illegal drugs drive crime, violence, corruption, and impunity. These four factors are key to understanding the interaction among prohibition, criminal organizations, and state institutions. The drug problem accentuates corruption within countries, taking advantage of institutional weaknesses, lack of controls and regulations, and lack of judicial independence. Institutional responses to address the drug problem may trigger reactions that further aggravate levels of violence and crime. Often times, State attempts to combat criminal factions simultaneously and head-on lead to fragmentation and power vacuums that exacerbate violence. Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 25, 2013 at: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/drogasSeguridad_ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/drogasSeguridad_ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 128798 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Organized Crime Political Corruption

Author: Robles, Gustavo Title: The Economic Consequences of Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico Summary: The levels of violence in Mexico have dramatically increased in the last few years due to structural changes in the drug trafficking business. The increase in the number of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) fighting over the control of territory and trafficking routes has resulted in a substantial increase in the rates of homicides and other crimes. This study evaluates the economic costs of drug-­‐related violence. We propose electricity consumption as an indicator of the level of municipal economic activity and use two different empirical strategies to test this. We utilize an instrumental variable regression using as exogenous variation the instrument proposed by Castillo, Mejía, and Restrepo (2013) based on historical seizures of cocaine in Colombia interacted with the distance of the Mexican border towns to the United States. We find that marginal increases of violence have negative effects on labor participation and the proportion of unemployed in an area. The marginal effect of the increase in homicides is substantive for earned income and the proportion of business owners, but not for energy consumption. We also employ the methodology of synthetic controls to evaluate the effect that inter-­‐narco wars have on local economies. These wars in general begin with a wave of executions between rival criminal organizations and are accompanied by the deterioration of order and a significant increase in extortion, kidnappings, robberies, murders, and threats affecting the general population. To evaluate the effect that these wars between different drug trafficking organizations have on economic performance, we define the beginning of a conflict as the moment when we observe an increase from historical violence rates at the municipal level beyond a certain threshold, and construct counterfactual scenarios as an optimal weighted average from potential control units. The analysis indicates that the drug wars in those municipalities that saw dramatic increases in violence between 2006 and 2010 significantly reduced their energy consumption in the years after the change occurred. Details: Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 28, 2013 at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24014/RoblesCalderonMagaloni_EconCosts5.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24014/RoblesCalderonMagaloni_EconCosts5.pdf Shelf Number: 128839 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime (Mexico, U.S.) Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Economics of Crime Homicides Kidnappings Organized Crime Violent Crimes

Author: Russo, Francesco Flaviano Title: Cocaine: The Complementarity Between Legal and Illegal Trade Summary: The smuggling cost of an imported illegal good decreases as the volume of legally imported goods increases. First because more imports are typically associated to an increased number of transporters, which is an increased supply of potential smugglers. Second because, as the number of shipments increases, the individual inspection probability decreases, lowering the risk born by the smugglers and thus their compensation. I test this theory using data on the market for cocaine, finding empirical support: in a panel of countries, an increased volume of imports is robustly associated to a decreased price of cocaine. Legal and illegal trade appear to be complementary. Details: Naples, Italy: CSEF - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance, Department of Economics, University of Naples, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 253: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp253.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp253.pdf Shelf Number: 128853 Keywords: Cocaine (Italy) Cocaine Smuggling Drug Trafficking Illegal Trade

Author: Wittens, Stefan Title: Drug Related Violence in Mexico: A literature study from 1985-2011 Summary: The explanations for the escalation of drug-related violence that are found in the literature are diverse as well as numerous. Among these explanations two direct causations dominate: first, Mexican government policy and strategy, primarily since Calderon took office in 2006 and to lesser extent during the Fox administration and second, the competition between and within the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) since 2000. However, when these explanations are compared to the empirical data, the escalation of violence primarily coincides with the policy of Calderon and there are no elevated levels of violence since 2000, which reduces the validity of inter and intra-cartel violence within the timeframe of the literature. The empirical data suggests that since 2004 drug-related violence started rising slightly, with a clear break and an escalation of homicides since 2007. This also adds more weight to two more explanations: first the diversification of DTO modus operandi, a process that has essentially started with the arrival of the Zetas and second, with a decline in demand for Mexican drugs in America since 2006. Furthermore, the findings from the literature study seem best explained by the principle of producer-product, as the direct causality between policy, competition and drug-related violence could hardly exist without the existing environment. Pre-conditions like weak institutional capacity, corruption, availability of weapons, poverty, geography, culture and others are seen as exacerbates and contributors to the escalating levels of drug-related violence. Details: Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2012. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2012-1126-200608/UUindex.html Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2012-1126-200608/UUindex.html Shelf Number: 128891 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence (Mexico) Homicides Organized Crime Zetas

Author: Heyman, Josiah McC. Title: Guns, Drugs, and Money: Tackling the Real Threats to Border Security Summary: The external borders of the United States matter to security, but how and in what ways is neither automatic nor obvious. The current assumption is that borders defend the national interior against all harms, which are understood as consistently coming from outside—and that security is always obtained in the same way, whatever the issue. Some security policies correctly use borders as tools to increase safety, but border policy does not protect us from all harms. The 9/11 terrorists came through airports with visas, thus crossing a border inspection system without being stopped. They did not cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Future terrorists would not necessarily cross a land border. U.S. citizens and residents, and nationals of Western Europe, also represent an important element of the terrorist threat, and they have unimpeded or easy passage through U.S. borders. Fortified borders cannot protect us from all security threats or sources of harm. Moreover, not all border crossers pose security concerns, even ones who violate national laws. The hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border each year have not posed a threat of political terrorism, and external terrorists have not traveled through this border. Enforcement of laws against unauthorized immigration is, in the vast majority of cases, a resource- and attention-wasting distraction from sensible national security measures. That does not mean the U.S.-Mexico border is free from risk of harm, such as increasingly violent drug trafficking organizations operating nearby in Mexico. But that issue needs to be addressed in different ways than current enforcement policy does. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Council, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/guns-drugs-and-money-tackling-real-threats-border-security Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/guns-drugs-and-money-tackling-real-threats-border-security Shelf Number: 128897 Keywords: Border Security (Mexico, U.S.) Drug Trafficking Homeland Security Illegal Immigrants Terrorism

Author: Schwan, Michael J. Title: Border Cracks: Approaching Border Security from a Complexity Theory and Systems Perspective Summary: Presently, U.S. border security endeavors are compartmentalized, fragmented, and poorly coordinated. Moreover, international collaborations are extremely limited; success hinges on effective international cooperation. This thesis addresses U.S. border security management using complexity theory and a systems approach, incorporating both borders and all associated border security institutions simultaneously. Border security research has rarely viewed all stakeholders as a holistic unit up to this point, nor has border security been thoroughly examined using a systems approach. This research scrutinizes the current U.S. border security paradigm in an attempt to determine the systemic reasons why the system is ineffective in securing U.S. borders. Additionally, the research investigates the current level of international cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This thesis increases awareness and will possibly create dissent among established agencies, which is the first step in instituting needed changes that will ultimately increase North American security. The thesis contends that the establishment of a tri-national— United States, Canadian, and Mexican—border security agency, in addition to legalizing drugs and reestablishing a guest worker program, will be more effective and costefficient in securing North American borders. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 153p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732181 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732181 Shelf Number: 128908 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Homeland Security Illegal Immigration

Author: Permal, Sumathy Title: Safe Waters: Malaysia’s Response to Enhancing Security in Southeast Asia’s Maritime Domain Summary: Europe and Asia share a long history of multilateral and bilateral relations. Both regions have many things in common including political, economic and cultural ties which have always been closely interlinked. Despite these long-standing relations, new challenges are currently emerging. Maritime security issues such as piracy, cross-border illegal activities and threats emanating from non state actors are bound to pose challenges to the maritime security environment. Malaysia has bilateral and tri-lateral cooperation mechanisms in place to address these challenges, although stronger initiatives along these lines with the EU are yet to materialise. The same can be said of cooperation between the EU and Asia on this issue, and advancing efforts on maritime security in the region and beyond where Malaysia’s interests are at stake require the development of a comprehensive security framework for Europe and Asia. Maritime piracy is a highly sophisticated crime involving all the activities of legitimate company operations although its profits also underwrite other illegal activities such as human trafficking. As with challenges facing other areas of maritime security, there has been scant cooperation between the EU and Asia on addressing this scourge. This study aims to propose links through comprehensive country studies that would bring the EU and Asia closer together in this area by addressing maritime security challenges in the Southeast Asia region with specific attention to issues affecting Malaysia. Details: Kuala Lumpur Malaysia: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper: Accessed June 4, 2013 at: http://www.eu-asia.eu/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/KAS_Files/documents/Paper_Permal.pdf&t=1370440410&hash=de2d3586ef8d80f7905acda873625de38236203b Year: 2012 Country: Malaysia URL: http://www.eu-asia.eu/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/KAS_Files/documents/Paper_Permal.pdf&t=1370440410&hash=de2d3586ef8d80f7905acda873625de38236203b Shelf Number: 128933 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Maritime Crime (Malaysia) Maritime Security Pirates/Piracy Robbery Smuggling

Author: Edmonds-Poli, Emily Title: The Effects of Drug-War Related Violence on Mexico’s Press and Democracy Summary: This working paper is the product of a joint project on civic engagement and public security in Mexico coordinated by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego. The paper offers an assessment of the impact of criminal violence on journalists and media workers in Mexico, which is now the most dangerous country in the Western Hemisphere for journalists. Dr. Edmonds-Poli concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the Mexican government, Mexican society, and the international community to address the problem of violence against the Mexican media. The wide-ranging recommendations offer concrete steps that individuals and institutions involved may undertake to alleviate the violence, thereby ensuring freedom of expression and public access to information in Mexico, and, ultimately, strengthening Mexico’s democracy. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; San Diego, CA: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, 2013. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2013 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/edmonds_violence_press_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/edmonds_violence_press_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129002 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence (Mexico) Homicides Journalists Media Violent Crime

Author: Taft-Morales, Maureen Title: Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio- Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations Summary: Since the 1980s, Guatemala, the most populous country in Central America with a population just over 14 million, has continued its transition from a centuries-long tradition of mostly autocratic rule toward representative government. A democratic constitution was adopted in 1985, and a democratically elected government was inaugurated in 1986. A 36-year civil war that ravaged Guatemala ended in 1996. This report provides an overview of Guatemala’s current political and economic conditions, relations with the United States, and several issues likely to figure in future decisions by Congress and the Administration regarding Guatemala. With respect to continued cooperation and foreign assistance, these issues include security and governance; protection of human rights and human rights conditions on some U.S. military aid to Guatemala; support for the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala; combating narcotics trafficking and organized crime; trade relations; and intercountry adoption. In November 2011, Otto Pérez Molina won the second-round presidential election run-off with 53.8% of the vote. He took office, along with the 158-member Congress, in January 2012. A former military commander who served during the civil war period, Pérez Molina faces concerns from some regarding his role in the human rights abuses committed during that period. In a landmark case, a Guatemalan court found former dictator Efrain Rios Montt guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity on May 10, 2013. Appeals have been filed. Guatemala continues to be plagued by security issues related to narcotics trafficking and the rise of organized crime, social inequality, and poverty. Upon taking office Pérez Molina announced a controversial position to decriminalize drugs as one policy initiative to address Guatemala’s many problems. Pérez Molina's proposal has failed to garner the support of other Central American leaders, but he seems willing to continue pushing the debate forward. In his view, decriminalization has to be gradual and strongly regulated, and it has to take place in the whole region, including producer and consumer countries. In the meantime, Pérez Molina vows to continue prosecuting and jailing drug-traffickers. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: R42580: Accessed June 18, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf Shelf Number: 129017 Keywords: Criminal Justice Drug Trafficking Human Rights Organized Crime Socio-economic Conditions (Guatemala)

Author: Hampton-Gaines, Berthea G. Title: State Capacity and Effectiveness in Combating Crime: A Comparative Study of El Salvador and Guatemala Summary: Less than two decades after the conclusion of brutal civil wars, El Salvador and Guatemala are once again faced with high levels of violence stemming from drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, and gangs. Overall, El Salvador was more successful in post-war state building. However, despite having stronger institutions and more capabilities, it is not better off when it comes to public security when compared to Guatemala, a state with weaker institutions and fewer resources. In fact, El Salvador’s homicide rates have been consistently higher. According to prevailing conventional wisdom, a country with stronger institutions and more resources should be more capable and effective at maintaining order, but this is not the case. This thesis examines the nature of crime, institutional capacity, and the effectiveness of government responses to reduce violent crime. It argues that decisions made during the transition period set these states on different paths. Furthermore, while strong institutions are important to maintaining order, government policy can strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of the institution. Strong institutions are necessary, but not sufficient. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=719163 Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=719163 Shelf Number: 129145 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs (El Salvador, Guatemala, Central America) Homicides M-18 Mara Salvatrucha MS-13 Organized Crime Violent Crime

Author: Brands, Hal Title: Criminal Fiefdoms in Latin America: Understanding the Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces Summary:  The problems of criminal fiefdoms—alternatively governed spaces (AGSs) in which criminal organizations, rather than formal authorities, effectively control the population and act as the arbiter of internal order—have become a serious security issue in Latin America. In several countries, criminal fiefdoms have taken shape against the backdrop of rampant criminality that has afflicted much of the region over the past two decades, with this phenomenon intensified by competition between rival transnational drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).  In nations as varied as Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Brazil, criminal organizations ranging from youth gangs to sophisticated DTOs control large portions of the national territory. They serve as de facto governments as they collect “taxes” through dues and extortion, demand the loyalty, or at least the acquiescence, of the people under their control, and punish those who interfere with their illicit activities. Such groups wage irregular warfare—defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations”—against their competitors and governments.1  While criminal organizations like MS-13 and the First Capital Command (PCC) of São Paulo sometimes provide order and limited social services, they also exploit and terrorize the populace. Criminal fiefdoms have thus exposed the weakness of governance, showing that states cannot control their territory or protect their citizens. This is having a corrosive impact on the public psyche, material conditions and is undermining democracy.  Addressing this problem will be a difficult and complex task. The issue of criminal fiefdoms is rooted in structural problems—inequality, lack of opportunity, corruption, and above all, weak state capacity. Efforts must concentrate on building broad political compacts in support of holistic anti-crime programs and efforts to strengthening the state. • Within this context, there are several initiatives to consider, including:  Smarter targeting and efforts to develop tools necessary to sustain long-term investigations and successful prosecutions;  Creative policing strategies that focus on policecivilian interaction and protection of the population;  Short and long-term efforts to strengthen honest law enforcement and judicial officials to reduce corruption;  Building the institutional capacity of the agencies and offices charged with combating and prosecuting organized crime;  Macro and micro-economic initiatives to broaden opportunity and stem the stream of recruits for organized crime;  Intensified U.S. efforts to deal with the demand side of the DTO problem and a capacity and willingness for innovation and experimentation. During the Cold War, Latin America was roiled by Marxist insurgencies that, in the process of seeking to overthrow governments, carved out “liberated zones” in which insurgents could operate freely and extract resources from the population. Today, ideological violence has faded, but the problem of alternatively governed spaces (AGSs)—areas in which some groups other than the government are the de facto arbiter of internal order—continues to plague the region. A variety of criminal organizations, ranging from youth gangs to transnational drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), have established “criminal fiefdoms” in which they operate with little or no interference from the authorities and have established a form of dominance—complete with “taxation,” limited social services, and often-brutal punishment—over the population. This phenomenon is most pronounced in Central American countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, but it is also evident in Brazil. Where fiefdoms exist, states are essentially experiencing irregular warfare, as criminal groups compete with established governments for control and influence over the civilian population. This phenomenon has highlighted the weakness of many states, and is having a severely corrosive impact on democratic governance and the rule of law. This paper thus analyzes the origins, manifestations, and ramifications of the problem of criminal fiefdoms. The first section offers an analytical framework for understanding the issue. The second and third sections present case studies, focusing on the current situation in Guatemala and São Paulo, Brazil. The fourth section discusses policy implications. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2010. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 25, 2013 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=whemsac Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 129154 Keywords: Drug Trafficking First Capital Command (PCC) Gangs MS-13 Organized Crime (Latin America) Violence Violent Crime

Author: Monteiro, Joana Title: Drug Battles and School Achievement: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro's Favelas Summary: This paper examines the effects of armed conficts between drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro's favelas on student achievement. To identify the causal effect of violence on education, we explore variation in violence that occurs across time and space when gangs battle over territories. The evidence indicates that these battles are triggered by factors often exogenous to local socioeconomic conditions, such as the imprisonment or release of a gang leader, betrayals and revenge. Within-school estimates indicate that students from schools exposed to violence score less in math exams. The effect of violence increases with conflict intensity, duration, and proximity to exam dates; and decreases with the distance between the school and the conflict location. There is no evidence that the effect of violence persists for more than one year. Finally, we find that school supply is an important mechanism driving the achievement results; armed conflicts are significantly associated with higher teacher absenteeism, principal turnover, and temporary school closings. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Institute of Economics: 2013. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper 006: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://www.ie.ufrj.br/images/pesquisa/publicacoes/2013/TD_IE_006_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.ie.ufrj.br/images/pesquisa/publicacoes/2013/TD_IE_006_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129191 Keywords: Drug Gangs Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Education Favelas Poverty Slums (Brazil) Socioeconomic Conditions

Author: Human Rights Foundation of Monland-Burma Title: Bitter Pills: Breaking the Silence Surrounding Drug Problems in the Mon Community Summary: In late 2012 the New Mon State Party (NMSP) initiated a vigorous anti-drugs campaign throughout various Mon communities in Burma. Arrests of numerous drug smugglers were made, drug-using youth were sent to NMSP rehabilitation centres, and signs were erected in villages calling on residents to resist and combat drug use. This wave of action brought an issue to the table that had thus far been surrounded by silence from relevant authorities. Prior to this, domestic and international discussions of Burma’s drug problems had largely been restricted to regions in Upper Burma, in particular Shan State. However, NMSP action highlighted that drugs were also prevalent in Mon communities and were being abused by Mon youth. With a new focus on this issue, various questions have been raised. Exactly how widespread is the problem? Where are these drugs coming from? What are authorities outside of the NMSP doing to tackle drug use and trading? So far, these and other queries have been met with few adequate responses. The main purpose of this report is to take on some of these questions and begin the process of providing concerned parties with satisfactory answers. Using testimony from a range of sources, HURFOM aims to offer a preliminary account of drug use and trading in Mon communities. The report also serves as a call to action to various authorities, whose co-operation is needed if decisive action is to be taken. Now that the matter has been brought to the table by the NMSP, HURFOM aims to ensure that authorities do not fall back into a pattern of silence and inactivity. We entreat all authorities, in particular the Burmese government and ethnic armed groups, to follow the lead taken by the NMSP and take up the challenge of tackling drug use in their domains of authority. Details: Kanchanaburi, Thailand: Human Rights Foundation of Monland-Burma (HURFOM), 2013. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://rehmonnya.org/upload/Bitterpills.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Burma URL: http://rehmonnya.org/upload/Bitterpills.pdf Shelf Number: 129204 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction (Burma) Drug Dealers Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking

Author: BenYishay, Ariel Title: 1 Homicide and Work: The Impact of Mexico’s Drug War on Labor Market Participation Summary: We estimate the impact of the escalation of the drug war in Mexico on the mean hours worked among the general population. We focus on homicides, which have increased dramatically since 2006. To identify the relationship between changes in homicides and hours worked, we exploit the large variation in the trajectory of violence across states and over time. Using panel and instrumental variables regressions, we find that the increase in homicides has negatively impacted labor force activity. An increase in homicides of 10 per 100,000 in a given state is associated with a decline of 0.3 weekly hours worked among the state’s population. For states most impacted by the drug war, in which homicides per 100,000 inhabitants have increased by 30-50 a year, this implies an average decline in hours worked of one to one and a half hours per week. These impacts are larger for the self-employed and are concentrated among the highest income quartiles. This highlights how the costs of crime tend to be unequally born by certain segments of the population. Details: Unpublished paper, 2013. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://www.colgate.edu/docs/d_academics_departments-and-programs_economics_colgate-hamilton-seminar-series/homicide-and-work-the-impact-of-mexico's-drug-war-on-labor-market-participation-2-27-13.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.colgate.edu/docs/d_academics_departments-and-programs_economics_colgate-hamilton-seminar-series/homicide-and-work-the-impact-of-mexico's-drug-war-on-labor-market-participation-2-27-13.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 129205 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug War (Mexico) Drug-Related Violence Economics and Crime Homicides Labor Force Participation

Author: Negroponte, Diana Villiers Title: The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence Summary: The rising level of violence in Central America, as well as Mexico, has created sensational headlines in the daily press and Hollywood style footage on the nightly news. The focus of this violence has been on the drug cartels and the fights among them for routes to market both in the United States and within the region. However, parallel to the drug related violence caused by the cartels are two distinct, but related issues: a pervasive sense of public insecurity and rising levels of criminal violence. Both are related, but not directly attributable, to the possession and trade in illegal drugs. Intentional homicide, assault, robbery, extortion and fraud have all risen in the last seven years leading us to ask how serious is the problem, what should national governments do to contain, if not prevent their occurrence, and what is the appropriate U.S. contribution. This monograph will examine the reasons for the growth in public insecurity within El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, known as the Northern Triangle, and seek to determine the effectiveness of government policies to restore public trust and security. In the pursuit of greater security, these governments, as well as Mexico, have called upon Washington to assist them.1 The affected governments emphasize a “shared responsibility” to engage in reducing levels of violence, reduce consumption of illegal drugs, regulate the sale of firearms to the cartels and organized crime, as well as to confront corruption and impunity that pervade state institutions.2 The problems are regional, if not global, and to be effective, the response should include both U.S. federal and state authorities. Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2009. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Number 3: Accessed July 1, 2013 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/merida%20initiative%20negroponte/05_merida_initiative_negroponte.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/merida%20initiative%20negroponte/05_merida_initiative_negroponte.pdf Shelf Number: 129221 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Merida Initiative Organized Crime Violence (Central America) Violent Crime

Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia Summary: Since El Salvador‟s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation's emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money, weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador's transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation's political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime ―with gangs vying for control of specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products― and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 29; Accessed July 1, 2013 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: El Salvador URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 129224 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime (El Salvador) Violent Crime

Author: Fraga, Paulo Cesar Pontes Title: Urban Brazil: Drug Trafficking and Violence Summary: Throughout the 1980s, Brazil has gone through a phenomenon classified by experts as an epidemiological transition. In the beginning of this period, infectious-parasitic diseases were the leading cause of mortality in the population. By the end of the 80s, these had fallen to second place, after external causes or violent deaths. At the beginning of the decade, violence was the fourth cause of death. Aside from being a public health problem, the changes in these indicators brought changes in the behaviour of the population and in inter-institutional, cultural and social relations. Violence has become more visible in Brazilian society. A paradoxical aspect of this phenomenon is that increases in violence, most notably criminal violence, intensified at the end of the military dictatorship and the beginning of the transition to democracy. Coincidentally, it was in 1989 – the year of the first free presidential elections since 1960 – that external causes (violence) became the leading cause of death. In other words, the period of the military regime, which maintained its power through a constant and indiscriminate use of extreme violence – such as arbitrary and illegal persecutions and imprisonment, torture of political and common prisoners, assassinations of leftist political leaders and/or those opposed to the regime – had lower rates of violent death than the civilian government administrations that followed. As we will see further on, in the 1990s there was a new upsurge in these indicators. The fact is that the same system of domination by elites was prevalent under both the military and civilian governments. The reestablishment of open elections was not capable of generating effectively democratic institutions in which the people trusted and which could be controlled by society. Analyses point out that, far from legitimate uses of violence and the construction of a consensus, security forces resorted to abuse of power and torture in order to control certain sectors of the population. Further, corruption also became characteristic of police action – a practice that existed in the authoritarian period and intensified after the end of the dictatorship, representing an institutional continuity. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2004. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Drugs and Conflict No. 11: Accessed July 3, 2013 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/crime-docs/RioDC11.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/crime-docs/RioDC11.pdf Shelf Number: 129239 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Violence Violent Crime (Brazil)

Author: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Title: Being Tough Is Not Enough – Curbing transnational organized crime Summary: The devastating effects and challenges linked to organized crime have become ever more visible in recent years. It is no great news that organized crime is a truly globalized, transnational business. Flows of both its »products« and related illegal funds largely ignore national borders. At the same time, the scope, patterns and effects of organized crime vary locally, nationally and regionally. Any strategy to counter organized crime needs to be tailored to the respective level, while building on international collaboration. But while transnational cooperation of criminal networks is increasing and adapting, government and governance responses remain too static and stuck within the confines of national borders. International and transnational cooperation in curbing organized crime is still in its infancy. However, it is not only the transnational dimension that renders organized crime so difficult to tackle. It is also a multifaceted challenge in terms of its patterns and impact. The immediate threats to human security and the violence related to organized crime – as currently most apparent in the Mexican drug war – are the most visible negative impact. Beyond that, however, organized crime severely undermines statehood and democratic governance through corruption, intimidation or even state capture in many parts of the world. It also fuels existing violent conflicts or re-ignites dormant ones. Not only in Colombia or the Sahel region are the increasing interrelations between conflict parties, terrorist organizations and networks of organized crime a source of destabilization and concern. Adding the negative impact that organized crime has on the legal part of the economy, one begins to understand that addressing organized crime is about more than just more effective law enforcement. Tackling organized crime in a sustainable manner requires the development and implementation of intelligent, multidimensional approaches to untangle networks and address the incentive structures and enabling factors of the various business models. In the context of our work to promote peace and security, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims at facilitating a strategic reflection on comprehensive policy responses to curb organized crime. In February and March 2013, a smaller expert and parliamentary meeting in Brussels and a wider international expert conference in Berlin represented milestones in this endeavor. Beyond discussing recent trends and effects of organized crime in general, the meetings zoomed in on two central aspects: the illegal drug market, which is arguably still the most profitable one for organized crime, and money laundering, the bottom line of organized crime. The meetings were part of a continuous engagement and will be systematically followed up. Some of the analysis and suggestions discussed during the meetings were results of FES’ work in the different regions. For instance, the process that led to the studies and drug policy reform proposals from Latin America were initiated within the framework of an FES regional security policy project. The respective dialogs in the various regions will continue. But during the Berlin conference, it became particularly obvious that there is also more work to be done in Germany. Given that organized crime not only operates in Germany but also compromises German and European policies – for instance in the fields of security, foreign affairs, development and health – Germany needs to engage much more pro-actively in the international development and implementation of comprehensive responses. Against this background, this conference documentation is meant not only to summarize past debates, but also to stimulate future ones. FES remains committed to providing input, facilitating dialog nationally and internationally and further strengthening the network of actors addressing the challenge of organized crime from different angles and in different parts of the world. To be sure, there will be no easy responses to the challenges posed by organized crime, as experience has shown. Curbing organized crime is more than a matter of repressive measures and law enforcement. In this sense, the subtitle of the Berlin conference remains a guiding theme of further debates and a reminder to be creative in designing comprehensive strategies and policies: Being tough is not enough. Details: Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Conference Report: Accessed July 9, 2013 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10034-20130603.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10034-20130603.pdf Shelf Number: 129329 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Foundation for the Development of Guatemala Title: Drugs, Guns and Cash: Analysis and Proposals on How To Manage the Crisis in Central America Summary: The most important message extracted from this study is that without intergovernmental and international cooperation and support, primarily between the countries most involved, Guatemala and Central America will soon collapse into failed states dominated by shadow economies and run by Criminal Organizations that buy political power. Without decisive action, these countries will be ―handed to these criminal organizations and groups of people that wish to form their own type of government system and inadvertently create greater regional instability. This scenario must not be permitted. These same groups of people will eventually take control of the agricultural and industrial markets in the region, to which the United States and many other countries depend and, will determine where and at what price they would want to sell their products. Simultaneously, the United States would lose its position and influence in Central America. As a result, the region would begin to foster a unique environment where Narco-Terrorism and quasi-states can flourish. Efforts to stem the momentum of these events from evolving must be instantaneous and holistic to produce the desired effect. The carnage and destruction experienced in Colombia and Mexico is on the doorstep of Central American countries and the criminals have resources that are far greater today. Therefore, this report was developed with the hope of achieving three purposes. First, it is a learning process and a means to bring better understanding about the deteriorating situation in Central America. Secondly, it is to engender a general awareness on the various issues that impact the national security, wellbeing and safety of the citizens of countries in Central America. Thirdly, it is to initiate a deeper and more thoughtful discussion about these topics, recognizing that old debates, paradigms, and historical assumptions must be revisited to better analyze the gravity of the situation as critically and objectively as possible. The forces of organized crime are clashing against the forces of development. This clash impedes the regions ability to develop concrete solutions. Traditional strategies have led to limited results. The type of alternative solutions that should be favored are not based on conventional wisdom but instead of a result-oriented approach. The supporting structural ideas applied throughout this report will attempt to stimulate strategic thinking, debunk myths, understand displacement and its consequences, suggest concrete and cost-effective solutions, and develop an analytical framework, which allows a balanced fact-based approach. The most significant ideas that relate to strategic thinking are cohesive intelligence sharing, combined tactics, operational strategies and a collective initiative without regional borders and barriers. In the case of debunking myths, it is necessary to end the denial phase of the current crisis in the region by confronting the reality that this is a regional problem that requires an Integrated Regional Security Strategy and, unmask numerous erroneous conceptions and assumptions within Guatemala - and other regional countries - in their political, social, and economic arenas. Lastly, to understand the seriousness of displacement and its consequences, especially around the Latin American and Caribbean region. Prioritized allocation of counter-initiative resources must be addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner or the problem will remain being shuffled around the geographic chessboard that haunts the region. Much time and effort has been devoted to the escalating problems of the region with few concrete and cost-effective solutions implemented in a timely manner. In contrast, an integrated analytical framework will guide the type of actionable strategies that are necessary to better approach these critical issues in Central America. In brief, the goal of this study is to promote a new and informed dialogue on these complex and vastly misunderstood matters. The proposed suggestions and recommendations are not meant to be final or conclusive, but rather, they are meant to spark a debate around sustainable solutions and ideas, and their potential results and benefits to the region. Hopefully, with this Central Americans can find common ground within which these findings and recommendations can be formulated and executed. Nonetheless, this report was developed with the intention of finding immediate and strategic regional solutions, underscoring a sense of urgency more so for Guatemala. Details: Ala Sur: Foundation for the Development of Guatemala, 2012. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2013 at: http://www.fundesa.org.gt/cms/content/files/DRUGS,%20GUNS%20AND%20CASH.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.fundesa.org.gt/cms/content/files/DRUGS,%20GUNS%20AND%20CASH.pdf Shelf Number: 129379 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: Murray, Chad Title: Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization Summary: Mexico's drug war has claimed more than 30,000 lives since 2006. The intensity and duration of this violence has produced an environment in which “few Mexican citizens feel safer today than they did ten years ago, and most believe that their government is losing the fight.” However, the problem of drug violence in Mexico is not domestic, but transnational in nature. President Barack Obama recently noted that “we are very mindful that the battle President Calderón is fighting inside of Mexico is not just his battle; it's also ours. We have to take responsibility just as he is taking responsibility.” It is U.S. demand for illicit drugs that provides the primary incentive for Mexican narcotics trafficking. Therefore, there is a possibility that a change in U.S. drug policy could negatively affect the revenues of Mexican DTOs, and even their ability to wage violence. This paper will examine the validity of that argument, as well as several of the issues that would accompany such a fundamental policy shift. The purpose of this report is to evaluate current U.S. policy on marijuana, extract lessons learned from policy changes in other countries, analyze the effects that legalization of marijuana in the United States might have on Mexican DTOs, and provide recommendations for future U.S. policies. Current U.S. laws will serve as a starting point to determine if existing decriminalization or medicinal marijuana reforms have had any impact on Mexican DTOs. After examining what effects, if any, these policies have had, reforms in other countries will be examined. From the case studies of Portugal, the Netherlands, and Mexico, lessons will be drawn to give context to any possible ramifications or benefits of U.S. marijuana legalization. Finally, concrete recommendations will be made on whether recent marijuana policy reforms should be maintained, improved, or repealed. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Elliott School of International Affairs/Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report: Accessed July 13, 2013 at: http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf Shelf Number: 129388 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Legalization Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Marijuana

Author: New Jersey Commission of Investigation Title: Scenes from an Epidemic: A Report on the SCI’s Investigation of Prescription Pill and Heroin Abuse Summary: Stopping regularly in downtown Newark, the nondescript minivans drew a select clientele: homeless Medicaid recipients and drug addicts who had been told by flyers and word-of-mouth where to wait for a ride. Ten miles and 15 minutes later, they arrived at a strip mall “medical center” on Main Avenue in neighboring Passaic where a doctor licensed by the State of New Jersey quickly got down to the business of cursory examinations and bogus diagnoses. Then he wrote prescriptions for powerful painkillers, sedatives and cough syrup, which his “patients” could use themselves or sell on the street, their choice. They also left with $10 cash gift cards as thanks for coming in. The bill for it all went to government health insurance, which funneled a fortune in fraudulent Medicaid reimbursements into the bank accounts of the hidden entrepreneurs the doctor fronted for – associates of Russian organized crime. The flagrant and unbridled operation of this pill mill and others like it, the descent of sworn medical professionals into outright drug dealers, the intrusion of organized crime and other criminal elements into lucrative recesses of the health-care industry to feed an epidemic of demand for drugs: These are among the key findings of the State Commission of Investigation’s ongoing probe of illegal trafficking in and abuse of prescription painkillers and other addictive narcotics. Even as law enforcement authorities, public-health officials, social workers, treatment counselors, schools and families redouble their efforts to combat the purveyors and consequences of this predatory scourge, it continues to evolve in ways that few could have imagined when the so-called war on drugs was launched more than four decades ago. Staggering amounts of legitimate medicines manufactured by major pharmaceutical companies and intended for those needing relief from the pain of disease and injury have been diverted into criminal enterprises founded on drug abuse and addiction. What once was a menacing background narrative centered narrowly around subculture-based substances like opium, morphine and heroin has exploded into a mainstream horror story whose first chapter often begins with pill bottles in the average household medicine cabinet. Some medical management companies with names that incorporate benign terms like “pain management” and “wellness” have transformed street-corner drug-dealing into an orderly and seemingly ordinary business endeavor, except for the hidden financial backing from individuals linked to organized crime, the multiple bank accounts for money-laundering, the expert help of corrupt physicians and the shady characters who recruit and deliver customers and provide security. Meanwhile, conventional drug dealers – those tied to criminal street gangs and similar criminal enterprises – exploit legitimate businesses like used car dealerships, clothing outlets, barber shops, bars and liquor stores to cover their illicit retail commerce. They take advantage of advanced computers, communications and social networking technologies to facilitate criminal activities and thwart law enforcement. And they are finding new ways to profit from a market hungry for addictive drugs stretching well beyond New Jersey’s cities and into the outlying affluence of its suburbs and rural communities. On the demand side, witnesses told the Commission during an unprecedented public hearing that, given the shared properties of pain-numbing, high-inducing substances known as opiates and opioids, the widening abuse of prescription pills containing Oxycodone and related chemical ingredients has triggered a new and sustained rise in use of the original opiate of choice – heroin. Indeed, with high-quality heroin readily available on New Jersey streets today at roughly the same price as a pack of cigarettes – cheaper than painkilling pills of similar strength and effect – it should be no great surprise that the road to addiction has evolved fullcircle. And all too often ensnared in this harrowing, potentially lethal cycle – in many instances before they, or their families, even know it or suspect it – are adolescents, teenagers and twenty-somethings, young people on their way to becoming a new lost generation of what used to be called junkies. Also, much of what used to take place “underground” in the drug milieu is now happening in plain sight. With the advent of instantaneous communication technology and suburban demand, a handful of pills or a bag of heroin is only a text message or cell-phone call away as many dealers now deliver product to customers waiting in shopping-mall parking lots. Former suburban high school students told the Commission that the depth of their prescription pill and heroin dependency played out in full view of teachers and other adults who they said did not seem to have a clue or even care when they nodded off and fell asleep in class, day after day. During a three-week surveillance operation at several major intersections in downtown Trenton, Commission investigators observed a bustling open-air drug market daily during morning rush hour within blocks of New Jersey’s Statehouse. Law enforcement authorities are quite familiar with the spiking collateral damage from this disturbing trend: the thefts and violence, the burglaries, armed robberies, pharmacy holdups and worse. Elsewhere on the frontlines, drug treatment facilities are seeing record numbers of admissions for heroin and other opiate/opioid addictions. Details: Trenton: New Jersey Commission of Investigation, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2013 at: http://www.nj.gov/sci/pdf/PillsReport.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.nj.gov/sci/pdf/PillsReport.pdf Shelf Number: 129390 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Heroin Organized Crime Prescription Drug Abuse (New Jersey, U.S.)

Author: Lopez, Julie Title: Organized Crime and Insecurity in Belize Summary: In this working paper, López offers an in-depth look at the security landscape in Belize, a country too often ignored in regional policy discussions, but one which faces criminal challenges similar to those of its larger Central American neighbors. Combining policy analysis and journalistic accounts based on her recent stint in Belize, López examines the political, social, geographical, and institutional factors that have contributed to Belize’s role as a transit point in the international drug trade. She also discusses the rise of other illicit enterprises, including arms trafficking and human smuggling and looks at the impact of growing gang activity. Finally, López analyzes national policy alternatives being explored in Belize, such as marijuana decriminalization and a state-sponsored gang truce, and the particular challenges the country faces in integrating into the Central American regional security framework. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed July 13, 2013 at: http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9014_Belize_Lopez_Paper_FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Belize URL: http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9014_Belize_Lopez_Paper_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 129393 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Homicides Organized Crime (Belize) Violent Crime

Author: Sullivan, John P. Title: From Drug Wars to Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and Central America. Implications for Global Security Summary: Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a 'criminal insurgency' against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors. This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space -- ranging from 'failed communities' to 'failed regions' -- will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as 'lawless zones,' 'ungoverned spaces,' 'other governed spaces,' or 'zones of impunity') where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or 'criminal enclaves' in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into 'accidental guerrillas' and 'social bandits' will be explored through the lens of 'third generation gang' theory and 'power-counter power' relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels. Details: Paris: Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2012. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Papers Series, No. 9: Accessed July 16, 2013 at: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00694083/ Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00694083/ Shelf Number: 129414 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence (Mexico, Central America) Gang Violence Organized Crime

Author: Harvard University. Institute of Politics Title: The War on Mexican Cartels: Options for U.S. and Mexican Policy-Makers Summary: The situation in Mexico has become increasingly volatile since 2006. After a semester of research, the National Security Policy Group has come up with a list of recommendations that can help reduce the violence in Mexico and further weaken the cartels. Recommendations to Move Forward: · The Mexican government can better use its military and law enforcement personnel by: o Specializing portions of its military forces to deal with specific facets of the war on drugs by significantly reforming military training procedures, departmentalizing the military and integrating these departments into a larger bureaucratic system, and o Launching a more aggressive public relations campaign specifically targeting the major leaders of the cartels in order to reduce the culture of fear and helplessness created by the cartels. · The Mexican government must fight corruption at all governmental levels. It should: o Revise its federal reelection process to create greater accountability mechanisms for politicians in office, o Implement a more transparent fund flow between federal and state governments, o Allow for greater public participation in the selection of judges, and o Reform the wage system, and improve training, resource allocation and accountability mechanisms for law enforcement officers. · The Mexican government should take action to strengthen its community-level efforts by: o Building strong communities in which people have a wide set of options for legitimate careers by greater subsidizing education and focusing on community initiatives o Maintaining the status quo with regards to community-level self-governance and vigilante efforts. · The United States government should reinforce its counter-financing of narcotics efforts by: o Strengthening its intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, and o Drafting the necessary legislation to compel banks to freeze the assets of individuals associated with narcotics activities. · The United States government should strengthen its efforts to prevent U.S.-made weapons from falling into cartel hands by: o Making identification requirements for firearms and ammunition more stringent, and o Creating a task force to help Central American countries locate, document and secure old stockpiles of U.S. weapons that were abandoned in these countries. · The United States should increase the size and scope of the Mérida Initiative by: o Labeling the Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, o Focusing on training and equipping Mexican military personnel, and o Tying Mérida Initiative funds to initiatives by local and state Mexican governments. · Lastly, the United States government should continue to place significant emphasis on treatment, prevention and enforcement measures for domestic drug consumers. Details: Cambridge, MA: Institute of Politics, Harvard University, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2013 at: http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf Shelf Number: 129510 Keywords: Criminal Cartels (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Violent Crime

Author: Reitano, Tuesday Title: The End of Impunity? After the kingpins, what next for Guinea-Bissau? Summary: In April 2013 a successful sting operation and an indictment by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) targeted two of Guinea-Bissau’s most notorious cocaine kingpins: the former chief of the Guinea-Bissau navy, Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, and the head of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces, General António Indjai. This is a victory for the law enforcement response to organised crime. In the decade since the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) first warned that Guinea-Bissau had become a 'narco-state', the country has been caught in an accelerating cycle of political fragility that is driven in part by the desire to control lucrative cocaine connections. Impunity has become part of the fabric of Guinea-Bissau as trafficking is an essential survival strategy for many, which has disintegrated any basis for a society predicated on the rule of law. The DEA intervention is significant because it has ended impunity in a dramatic way, but the risk is that without the proper follow-up Guinea-Bissau will become a flashpoint for further instability and conflict, when the country should instead be preparing for democratic elections.To avoid this, a sustained and comprehensive strategy should be put in place to strengthen the criminal justice system in the country and to build citizens’ confidence that the state has the capacity to deliver justice and uphold the rule of law. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Policy Brief 44: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/the-end-of-impunity-after-the-kingpins-what-next-for-guinea-bissau Year: 2013 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/the-end-of-impunity-after-the-kingpins-what-next-for-guinea-bissau Shelf Number: 129634 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime (Guinea-Bissau) Sting Operation

Author: Carvalho, Ilona Szabo de Title: Latin America Awakes: A Review of the New Drug Policy Debate Summary: Latin America is confronted with astonishing levels of organised and interpersonal violence, much of it connected to illicit narcotics production and trafficking and the so-called "war on drugs". There is evidence, however, of mounting resistance to the global drug control regime and its narrow emphasis on suppressing supply, chiefly through enforcement measures. This report considers how changes under way in Latin America are challenging the foundations of this regime. Over the past decade two independent commissions - the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy and the Global Commission on Drug Policy - have broken the taboo on debating alternative drug policies. Both commissions have emphasised a paradigm shift from repressive approaches to more preventive interventions that focus on harm reduction and citizen security. Emboldened by these commissions' recommendations, Latin American leaders from across the political spectrum are currently discussing a more balanced approach to drug policy. Some governments are experimenting with legislation and regulatory models that are tailored to their countries' local realities and needs. These and other efforts have potentially dramatic implications not just for drug policy in Latin America, but globally. Details: Oslo, Norway: NOREF (Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, 2013. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2013 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/cec0c2d61be4326b2038452c8a98a4f9.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/cec0c2d61be4326b2038452c8a98a4f9.pdf Shelf Number: 131577 Keywords: Drug Policy (Latin America) Drug Reform Drug Related Violence Drug Trafficking War on Drugs

Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Title: Drug Supply Reduction and International Security Policies in the European Union: An Overview Summary: The production and trafficking of illicit drugs poses complex and interlinked problems, which have a negative impact on public health and the security and stability of society. In responding to the dynamics of a globalised drug market, the EU and its partners are involved in actions within and outside the EU. Focusing on actions directed at the EU's internal security situation, this paper elaborates who is involved in setting policy, what legal and funding basis for action has been established, and what the main priorities are. In doing so, the paper looks at the EU institutions (the Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the Commission) and agencies predominately involved in the management of drug supply reduction and internal security issues. The paper explores relevant EU treaties and legislations that provide a means to target the supply of illicit drugs, as well as the financial instruments and programmes supporting this action. Additionally, this paper also discusses how these policy areas are addressed in the EU's strategic planning documents. For example, the Stockholm Programme, the EU internal security strategy, the EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime and the EU drugs strategy 2013-20 and action plan 2013-16. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: EMCDDA Papers: Accessed March 12, 2014 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_220676_EN_TDAU13006ENN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_220676_EN_TDAU13006ENN.pdf Shelf Number: 131878 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Markets Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: U.S. Senate. Caucus on International Narcotics Control Title: Preventing a Security Crisis in the Caribbean Summary: U.S. Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), co-chairs of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, today released a bipartisan report entitled Preventing a Security Crisis in the Caribbean that provides recommendations for Congress and the Obama Administration to enhance current security efforts in the Caribbean. "The Caribbean region has come a long way since it served as the primary transit route for South American drugs entering the United States in the 1980s," said Senator Feinstein. "Despite impressive gains, drug trafficking, local drug consumption and the U.S. demand for illegal drugs remain major causes of crime and violence. As enforcement efforts in Mexico and Central America inevitably move trafficking back to the Caribbean, we must better support our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere to combat the corrosive drug trade and minimize violence." "The Caribbean continues to be a major trans-shipment zone for narcotics." said Senator Grassley. "The recent spike in the use of drug-trafficking submarines there shows the lengths smugglers are taking to get their product to U.S. shores through the area. Drug trafficking and related violence in the Caribbean have a significant impact on our national security and on the lives of the region's people. The United States has to adapt to emerging trends in shipping techniques to help keep illicit drugs out of the United States and continue to help Caribbean nations strengthen their counternarcotics efforts. This report outlines actions the United States can take to help our partners in the Caribbean combat the transshipment of illegal drugs throughout the region." The report recommends: An assessment by the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of where Sensitive Investigative Units are most needed in the Caribbean. Jamaica, with the fourth highest murder rate in the world, should be considered a top candidate for one of these units. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) should send a full criminal history of all deportees to authorities in the Caribbean so they are aware of the return of any criminals or drug traffickers. Caribbean countries' authorities do not currently receive a full criminal rap sheet from ICE on deportees returning home. United States technical assistance to the countries of the Caribbean to support the drafting of asset forfeiture laws and laws controlling precursor chemicals used to make illegal drugs. The integration of Puerto Rico into working level meetings held between the State Department and countries in the Caribbean on security and narcotics issues. Strong support of Haitian counternarcotic efforts. Strengthening of U.S. anti-money laundering laws. Continued extradition of drug kingpins from the Caribbean to the United States. The return of DEA helicopters used in Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos to the Exumas Islands in The Bahamas. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2012. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 15, 2014 at: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=90bb66bc-3371-4898-8415-fbfc31c0ed24 Year: 2012 Country: Caribbean URL: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=90bb66bc-3371-4898-8415-fbfc31c0ed24 Shelf Number: 131926 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control War on Drugs

Author: Llorente, Maria Victoria Title: One Goal, Two Struggles: Confronting Crime and Violence in Mexico and Colombia Summary: Since the mid-2000s, violence related to drug trafficking and other transnational crime has increased exponentially in Mexico. By the end of the decade the public began to seriously doubt the government's strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The nature and intensity of violence in Mexico brought forth memories of the 1980s and '90s in Colombia, when the country was besieged by the Medellin and Cali drug cartels. Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia's security situation has improved dramatically; it has become an "exporter" of security expertise and has trained thousands of military and police personnel in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean as well as around the world. What aspects of Colombia's strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia's steps and missteps offer by way of example or counter-example? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? In One Goal, Two Struggles: Confronting Crime and Violence in Mexico and Colombia, international experts address the utility of comparing Colombia and Mexico's experiences and strategy for combatting organized crime and violence more generally. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2014. 126p. Source: Internet Resource: Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas - #32: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Colombia_Mexico_Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Colombia_Mexico_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 132052 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Gang Violence Organized Crime Transnational Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Regional Programme for Southeast Asia 2014 - 2017. Promoting the Rule of Law and Health to Address Drugs and Crime in Southeast Asia Summary: The Regional Programme (RP) outlines the proposed scope and focus of UNODC's work in Southeast Asia from 2014 to 2017. It provides a framework for delivering a coherent programme of work to: (i) give clear focus to supporting Member States and regional partners in achieving priority crime and drug outcomes in the region; and (ii) increase the responsiveness, efficiency and effectiveness of UNODC's support to the region. The RP focuses primarily on regional crime and drug challenges that are best addressed through coordinated cross-border and intra-regional cooperation. UNODC Country Programs (where they exist) are linked to the Regional Programme and focus on specific national level needs and support requirements. The RP is supported by an expert team that ensures consistency of approach and the sharing of expertise between jurisdictions. The proposed programme of work has been developed in close consultation with countries of the region and other regional partners, and the situation analysis includes: A profile of UNODC's global strategy, governing bodies and mandates A brief description of the broad regional development context An overview of the key drugs and crime challenges facing the region. Particular attention is given to: (i) transnational organised crime and illicit trafficking; (ii) anti-corruption; (iii) terrorism prevention; (iv) criminal justice; and (v) drugs and health, and alternative development A profile of regional institutions and initiatives relevant to UNODC's mandates and work. Details: Bangkok: UNODC, 2014. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2013/SEA_RP_masterversion_6_11_13.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2013/SEA_RP_masterversion_6_11_13.pdf Shelf Number: 132196 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Organized Crime

Author: Giacomello, Corina Title: Women, Drug Offenses and Penitentiary Systems in Latin America Summary: The number of women in prison for drug-related offenses has increased since the 1980s, rising sharply since the 1990s. This has occurred worldwide, and Latin America is no exception. Women increasingly enter drug-trafficking circuits as consumers, low-level dealers and local (including in prison), national and international transporters. In various countries around the world, the female penitentiary population has grown faster than the male, although women are still the minority. This paper analyzes the roles played by women in criminal networks in Latin America and the means by which they become involved, highlighting the ways in which gender relations and socio-economic factors shape the configuration of international drug trafficking networks and women's participation. It also critically examines the main characteristics of the region's penitentiary systems from a gender standpoint. Finally, it offers a series of conclusions and proposals aimed at promoting a review and reform of drug and penitentiary policies. Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2013. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: IDPC Briefing Paper: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://idpc.net/publications/2013/11/idpc-briefing-paper-women-drug-offenses-and-penitentiary-systems-in-latin-america Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://idpc.net/publications/2013/11/idpc-briefing-paper-women-drug-offenses-and-penitentiary-systems-in-latin-america Shelf Number: 132236 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Female Inmates Female Offenders Female Prisoners

Author: Ajzenman, Nicolas Title: On the Distributive Costs of Drug-Related Homicides Summary: Reliable estimates of the effects of violence on economic outcomes are scarce. We exploit the manyfold increase in homicides in 2008-2011 in Mexico resulting from its war on organized drug traffickers to estimate the effect of drug-related homicides on house prices. We use an unusually rich dataset that provides national coverage on house prices and homicides and exploit within-municipality variations. We find that the impact of violence on housing prices is borne entirely by the poor sectors of the population. An increase in homicides equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 3% decrease in the price of low-income housing. In spite of this large burden on the poor, the willingness to pay in order to reverse the increase in drug-related crime is not high. We estimate it to be approximately 0.1% of Mexico's GDP. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series: Working Paper 20067: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20067.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20067.pdf Shelf Number: 132248 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Drugs and Crime Economics of Crime Homicide Housing

Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State Summary: In this joint WOLA-BFDPP policy brief, the authors provide an overview of current and past drug policies implemented by the Mexican government, with a focus on its law enforcement efforts. It analyzes the trends in the increased reliance on the Mexican armed forces in counter-drug activities and the role that the United States government has played in shaping Mexico's counter-drug efforts. It is argued that government responses that are dominated by law enforcement and militarization do little to address the issue in the long term and draw attention away from the fundamental reforms to the police and justice systems that are needed to combat public security problems in the country. The brief also argues that the most effective way to address drug trafficking and its related problem is through increased efforts to curb the demand for illicit drugs in the United States and Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America/Beckley Foundation, 2007. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper 13: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BriefingPaper13.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BriefingPaper13.pdf Shelf Number: 147749 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Illicit Drugs

Author: Eventon, Ross Title: Eyes Wide Shut: Corruption and Drug-Related Violence in Rosario Summary: Drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon in the Argentinian city of Rosario. Since the 1990s, and largely under the public radar, the distribution of illicit drugs in the poor, peripheral neighbourhoods of the city has been managed by family-run gangs and small-time dealers; poverty and social marginalisation have facilitated the trade; young gang members, known as soldados, have fought over territory; local demand for illegal drugs has provided the engine; illicit profits have been laundered in collaboration with local lawyers and financial advisors; and corruption among the police and local officials has ensured that the main traffickers, while their identities are widely known, can operate with few concerns other than threats from rivals. This last element appears to explain why, until the issue was forced into the public domain, there had been a conspicuous lack of political concern with drug trafficking in the city. The change came on New Year's Day 2012. That day, three community activists were shot and killed in the Villa Moreno neighbourhood by gang members who mistook them for rivals. The killings were not unique, but the victims were: unlike the usual casualties, the activists had a movement behind them. Their deaths led to local demonstrations and calls for action. The press and local officials were suddenly impelled to pay attention to drug trafficking and related violence. Since then, a spate of official investigations has deepened public understanding of the nature of the drug trade in the city. They have also provided further evidence of the complicity of the security forces and the negligence of the state that have long been known to facilitate trafficking. Recommendations - Maintain the focus on the leadership of the most powerful and violent gangs, including following the money trail, and reverse the trend where simply increasing the number of security forces in violent areas is considered a sufficient policy response. - Re-focus the judiciary away from a two-tiered approach: recognize underage gang members as a vulnerable population, and that confronting the culture of violence will require special initiatives. - Root out corruption in the local and provincial security forces, recognise the way the state's approach facilitates this complicity, and produce more reliable statistics to better inform policymakers. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Series on Drug Markets and Violence, Nr 1: Accessed May 10, 2014 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv1.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Argentina URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv1.pdf Shelf Number: 132314 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gangs Homicides Illegal Drugs Poverty Violent Crime

Author: Rosen, Liana Title: Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition Summary: Afghanistan is the world's primary source of opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin production, as well as a major global source of cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish). Drug trafficking, a long-standing feature of Afghanistan's post-Taliban political economy, is linked to corruption and insecurity, and provides a source of illicit finance for non-state armed groups. Based on recent production and trafficking trends, the drug problem in Afghanistan appears to be worsening-just as the U.S. government finalizes plans for its future relationship with the government of Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond and reduces its counternarcotics operational presence in the country to Kabul, the national capital. As coalition combat operations in Afghanistan draw to a close in 2014, and as the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces is achieved, some Members of the 113th Congress have expressed concern regarding the future direction and policy prioritization of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in light of diminishing resources and an uncertain political and security environment in 2015 and beyond. According to the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, released in late 2012, the U.S. government envisions a counternarcotics policy future that results in "two simultaneous and parallel transfers of responsibility." Not only does it envision the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces, but also the transfer of counternarcotics programming responsibilities and law enforcement operational activities to the Afghan government. Assuming a reduced U.S. security presence and limited civilian mobility throughout the country, the U.S. government is also increasingly emphasizing a regional approach to combating Afghan drugs. Although some counternarcotics efforts, including eradication and alternative development programming, are already implemented by the government of Afghanistan or by local contractors, others may require a two- to five-year time horizon, or potentially longer, before a complete transition would be feasible, according to Administration officials. Some counternarcotics initiatives are only in their infancy, including the Defense Department's plans to establish a new Regional Narcotics Analysis and Illicit Trafficking Task Force (RNAIT-TF). Other activities, particularly those that required a significant presence at the local and provincial levels, are anticipated to be reduced or limited in scope. The 113th Congress continues to monitor drug trafficking trends in Afghanistan and evaluate U.S. policy responses. Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the topic in early 2014 and included provisions in FY2014 appropriations (P.L. 113-76) that limit the scope of and resources devoted to future counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has also identified narcotics as a "critical issue" for policy makers. This report describes key U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan in the context of the 2014 transition and analyzes policy issues related to these programs for Congress to consider as policy makers examine the drug problem in Afghanistan. The report's Appendix contains historical figures and tables on trends in Afghan drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R43540: Accessed May 19, 2014 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43540.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43540.pdf Shelf Number: 132395 Keywords: Drug Law Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs (Afghanistan) Narcotics Opium

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Corridor of Violence: the Guatemala-Honduras Border Summary: Competition between criminal groups over drug routes has made the frontier between Guatemala and Honduras one of the most violent areas in Central America, with murder rates among the highest in the world. In the absence of effective law enforcement, traffickers have become de facto authorities in some sectors. Crisis Group's latest report, Corridor of Violence: The Guatemala-Honduras Border, examines the regional dynamics that have allowed criminal gangs to thrive and outlines the main steps necessary to prevent further violence as well as to advance peaceful economic and social development. The report's major findings and recommendations are: - The border corridor includes hotly contested routes for transporting drugs to the U.S. Traffickers, with their wealth and firepower, dominate some portions. On both sides of the border, violence, lawlessness and corruption are rampant, poverty rates and unemployment are high, and citizens lack access to state services. - The arrest of local drug lords has been a mixed blessing to local populations, as the fracturing of existing groups has allowed a new generation of sometimes more violent criminals to emerge. - To prevent further violence, an urgent shift in national policies is needed. The governments should send not just troops and police to border regions, but also educators, community organisers and social and health workers. If criminal structures are to be disrupted and trust in the state restored, these regions need credible, legitimate actors - public and private - capable of providing security, accountability, jobs and hope for the future. - Guatemala and Honduras should learn from other countries facing similar security threats. The Borders for Prosperity Plan in Colombia and the Binational Border Plan in Ecuador and Peru can serve as examples for economic and social development in insecure areas. The U.S., Latin American countries and multilateral organisations should provide funds, training and technical support to embattled border communities to help them prevent violence and strengthen local institutions via education and job opportunities. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 52: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf Shelf Number: 132467 Keywords: Border Security Criminal Networks Drug Control Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gangs Organized Crime Violent Crime

Author: Title: Tunisia's Borders: Jihadism and Contraband Summary: Tunisia is embroiled in recurrent political crises whose origins in security concerns are ever more evident. While still of low-intensity, jihadi attacks are increasing at an alarming rate, fuelling the rumour mill, weakening the state and further polarising the political scene. The government coalition, dominated by the Islamist An-Nahda, and the secular opposition trade accusations, politicising questions of national security rather than addressing them. Meanwhile, the gap widens between a Tunisia of the borders - porous, rebellious, a focal point of jihadism and contraband � and a Tunisia of the capital and coast that is concerned with the vulnerability of a hinterland it fears more than it understands. Beyond engaging in necessary efforts to resolve the immediate political crisis, actors from across the national spectrum should implement security but also socio-economic measures to reduce the permeability of the country's borders. The security vacuum that followed the 2010-2011 uprising against Ben Ali's regime - as well as the chaos generated by the war in Libya - largely explains the worrying increase in cross-border trafficking. Although contraband long has been the sole source of income for numerous residents of border provinces, the introduction of dangerous and lucrative goods is a source of heightened concern. Hard drugs as well as (for now) relatively small quantities of firearms and explosives regularly enter the country from Libya. Likewise, the northern half of the Tunisian-Algerian border is becoming an area of growing trafficking of cannabis and small arms. These trends are both increasing the jihadis' disruptive potential and intensifying corruption of border authorities. One ought neither exaggerate nor politicise these developments. Notably, and against conventional wisdom, military equipment from Libya has not overwhelmed the country. But nor should the threat be underestimated. The war in Libya undoubtedly has had security repercussions and armed groups in border areas have conducted attacks against members of the National Guard, army and police, posing a significant security challenge that the return of Tunisian fighters from Syria has amplified. By the same token, the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and of the Libyan war has provoked a reorganisation of contraband cartels (commercial at the Algerian border, tribal at the Libyan border), thereby weakening state control and paving the way for far more dangerous types of trafficking. Added to the mix is the fact that criminality and radical Islamism gradually are intermingling in the suburbs of major cities and in poor peripheral villages. Over time, the emergence of a so-called islamo-gangsterism could contribute to the rise of groups blending jihadism and organised crime within contraband networks operating at the borders - or, worse, to active cooperation between cartels and jihadis. Addressing border problems clearly requires beefing up security measures but these will not suffice on their own. Even with the most technically sophisticated border control mechanisms, residents of these areas - often organised in networks and counting among the country's poorest - will remain capable of enabling or preventing the transfer of goods and people. The more they feel economically and socially frustrated, the less they will be inclined to protect the country's territorial integrity in exchange for relative tolerance toward their own contraband activities. Weapons and drug trafficking as well as the movement of jihadi militants are thus hostage to informal negotiations between the informal economy's barons and state representatives. Since the fall of Ben Ali's regime, such understandings have been harder to reach. The result has been to dilute the effectiveness of security measures and diminish the availability of human intelligence that is critical to counter terrorist or jihadi threats. In an uncertain domestic and regional context, restoring trust among political parties, the state and residents of border areas is thus as crucial as intensifying military control in the most porous areas. In the long term, only minimal consensus among political forces on the country's future can enable a truly effective approach to the border question. On this front, at the time of writing, an end to the political crisis seems distant: discussions regarding formation of a new government; finalising a new constitution and new electoral law; and appointing a new electoral commission are faltering. Without a resolution of these issues, polarisation is likely to increase and the security situation to worsen, each camp accusing the other of exploiting terrorism for political ends. Overcoming the crisis of trust between the governing coalition and the opposition is thus essential to breaking this vicious cycle. Yet the current political impasse should not rule out some immediate progress on the security front. Working together to reinforce border controls, improving relations between the central authorities and residents of border areas as well as improving relations among Maghreb states: these are all tasks that only can be fully carried out once underlying political conflicts have been resolved but that, in the meantime, Tunisian actors can ill-afford to ignore or neglect. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Middle East and North Africa Report N�148: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Tunisia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Shelf Number: 132473 Keywords: Border Security Contraband Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Firearms Trafficking Jihadism Organized Crime

Author: Hughes, Caitlin Title: Evaluating Australian Drug Trafficking Thresholds: Proportionate, Equitable and Just? Summary: Drug trafficking in Australia is deemed a very serious offence, one for which legislators and courts have ruled general deterrence is paramount and 'little mercy' should be shown (Clune [1989] VR 567, O'Bryan and Marks JJ, 576). A principal challenge has been how to effectively differentiate and sanction participants in the drug trade: particularly how to differentiate 'traffickers' from those who solely purchase or consume illicit drugs (people whom legislators and courts have determined ought be sanctioned more leniently). To assist in this endeavour all states and territories have adopted drug trafficking thresholds which specify quantities of drugs, for possession of more than which it is presumed an offender has committed an offence of drug trafficking (or of mid or high level trafficking, depending on the quantity). For numerous reasons the Australian system of drug trafficking thresholds is unique. First, Australia is one of the few countries that specifies quantities as threshold limits for distinguishing between drug offences with different penalty scales. These thresholds vary by drug type and by jurisdiction, and are largely set at 2 to 3 grams in most jurisdictions (see below). The quantity is not the sole factor considered in sentencing. The nature and circumstances of the alleged possession, such as the presence or absence of large sums of money or other indicia of supply often act as mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Yet particularly for thresholds that distinguish trafficking from use, the threshold is often the most important factor affecting prosecution and sentencing. Second, to assist in the successful prosecution of drug traffickers the Australian drug trafficking thresholds are attached to deemed supply laws which reverse the traditional burden of proof from prosecutors onto defendants. Such laws mean that possession of the trafficable threshold amount will constitute a presumption of trafficking placing the onus on the alleged offender to prove that the possessed amount was not for the purposes of trafficking ('deemed supply'). Details: Canberra: Criminology Research Advisory Council, 2014. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2014 at: http://www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/1314/35-1112-FinalReport.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/1314/35-1112-FinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 132488 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking

Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: Getting Real About an Illicit 'External Stressor': Transnational Cocaine Trafficking through West Africa Summary: Concerns over West Africa's increasingly prominent role as transhipment point of South American cocaine en route to Europe are mounting. Gathering pace in the mid-2000s, large-scale drug trafficking has been associated with recent episodes of political instability and violence in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Mali. It is also perceived as a serious threat to democratic institutions, governance and development in other, more stable countries of the region, such as Ghana; and as potentially contributing to reversing the hard-won end to the armed conflicts that ravaged Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet it is crucial to recognise that cocaine trafficking through West Africa has thus far not resulted in levels of violence comparable to those witnessed in several Latin American drug source and transit countries. The big policy challenge for West Africa is therefore not to curb the flow of cocaine through the region in order to reduce trafficking-related violence, but to effectively tackle the negative impacts - both existing and potential - of the illegal trade on governance and development in the region's weak, unstable and impoverished states. Conventional drug control strategies, oriented towards law enforcement, are not well suited to help with this. Bold new policy responses are called for. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2014. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Evidence Report no. 72: Accessed June 18, 2014 at: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3966/ER72%20Getting%20Real%20About%20an%20Illicit%20�External%20Stressor�%20Transnational%20Cocaine%20Trafficking%20Through%20West%20Africa.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3966/ER72%20Getting%20Real%20About%20an%20Illicit%20�External%20Stressor�%20Transnational%20Cocaine%20Trafficking%20Through%20West%20Africa.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 132504 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence

Author: Lavorgna, Anita Title: Transit Crimes in the Internet Age: How new online criminal opportunities affect the organization of offline transit crimes Summary: There is a general consensus that the Internet has expanded possibilities for so-called transit crimes-i.e., traditional trafficking activities. However, the extent to which the Internet is exploited by offenders to carry out transit crimes and the way in which it has changed those offenders' behaviors and the criminal processes remains under-investigated. The aim of this thesis is to understand what kind of criminal opportunities the Internet offers for conducting transit crimes and how these opportunities affect the organization of transit crimes, as concerns both the carrying out of the criminal activity and the patterns of relations in and among criminal networks. In order to achieve this goal, a model of script analysis-a way to highlight the sequence of actions that are carried out for a determinate criminal activity to occur- was developed in order to classify the criminal opportunities that the Internet supplies for selected transit crimes (wildlife trafficking, trafficking in counterfeit medicines, sex trafficking, and trafficking in recreational drugs), to identify cyber-hotspots, and to allow a richer and deeper understanding of the dynamics of Internet-mediated transit crimes. The data were collected by means of case study research and semi-structured interviews to law enforcement officers and acknowledged experts. For each criminal activity considered, through the script framework it has been possible to identify different types of criminal opportunities provided by the Internet. The empirical evidence presented demonstrates that the criminal markets considered have become-even if to a different extent-hybrid markets which combine the traditional social and economic opportunity structures with the new one provided by the Internet. Among other findings, this research indicates that not only has the Internet opened the way for new criminal actors, but it also has reconfigured relations among suppliers, intermediaries, and buyers. Furthermore, results were compared across transit crimes to illustrate whether and to what extent Internet usage impacts them differently. The differences seem to depend primarily on the social perception of the seriousness of the criminal activity, on the place it fills in the law enforcement agenda, and on the characteristics of the actors involved. This study, albeit with limitations, provides an accurate description of the Internet as crime facilitator for transit crimes. It concludes by highlighting the possibilities of environmental criminology as a theoretical framework to investigate Internet-mediated transit crimes, offering some final observations on how relevant actors behave online, and suggesting new directions for research. Details: Trento, Italy: University of Trento, Doctoral School of International Studies, 2013. 212p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed June 19, 2014 at: http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/1185/1/PhD_Dissertation_Lavorgna.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/1185/1/PhD_Dissertation_Lavorgna.pdf Shelf Number: 132532 Keywords: Computer Crime Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Internet Crimes Organized Crime Sex Trafficking Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Harris, Kamala D. Title: Gangs Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime Summary: Gangs Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime, addresses all three emerging pillars of transnational criminal activity: the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings; money laundering; and high-tech crimes, such as digital piracy, hacking and fraud. It is the result of extensive research and consultation with federal, state, and local law enforcement, non-governmental organizations, and academia. The report finds that while transnational organized crime is a significant problem, it is not insurmountable. In California, law enforcement at all levels of government have made major strides against these criminal groups, even in the face of declining resources. Law enforcement in foreign countries have made steady in-roads, as well, as demonstrated by the recent arrest in February 2014 of Joaqu�n "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, the reputed head of Mexico's notorious Sinaloa Federation cartel. The report describes the strategies that are working and sets forth recommendations to combat transnational organized crime. A call for sustained law enforcement funding and collaboration between federal, state, and local governments are at the center of these recommendations. Details: Sacramento: California Attorney General, 2014. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2014 at: https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/toc/report_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/toc/report_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 132534 Keywords: Computer Crimes Digital Crimes Drug Trafficking Gun Trafficking Human Trafficking Internet Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Transnational Crime

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: Through the Lens of the Southwest Border Summary: Federally led law enforcement task forces and intelligence information sharing centers are ubiquitous in domestic policing. They are launched at the local, state, and national levels and respond to a variety of challenges such as violent crime, criminal gangs, terrorism, white-collar crime, public corruption, even intelligence sharing. This report focuses on those task forces and information sharing efforts that respond to federal counterdrug and counterterrorism priorities in the Southwest border region. More generally, the report also offers context for examining law enforcement coordination. It delineates how this coordination is vital to 21st century federal policing and traces some of the roots of recent cooperative police endeavors. Policy makers interested in federal law enforcement task force operations may confront a number of fundamental issues. Many of these can be captured under three simple questions: 1. When should task forces be born? 2. When should they die? 3. What overarching metrics should be used to evaluate their lives? Task forces are born out of a number of realities that foster a need for increased coordination between federal law enforcement agencies and their state and local counterparts. These realities are particularly evident at the Southwest border. Namely, official boundaries often enhance criminal schemes but can constrain law enforcement efforts. Criminals use geography to their advantage, profiting from the movement of black market goods across state and national boundaries. At the same time, police have to stop at their own jurisdictional boundaries. Globalization may aggravate such geographical influences. In response, task forces ideally leverage expertise and resources-including money and manpower to confront such challenges. Identifying instances where geography, globalization, and criminal threat come together to merit the creation of task forces is arguably a process best left to informed experts. Thus, police and policy makers can be involved in highlighting important law enforcement issues warranting the creation of task forces. Task forces, fusion centers, and other collaborative policing efforts can be initiated legislatively, administratively, or through a combination of the two, and they can die through these same channels. While some clarity exists regarding the circumstances governing the creation of task forces, it is less clear when they should die and how their performance should be measured. Two basic difficulties muddy any evaluation of the life cycles of law enforcement task forces. First, and in the simplest of terms, at the federal level no one officially and publicly tallies task force numbers. The lack of an interagency "task force census" creates a cascading set of conceptual problems. - Without such information, it is challenging, if not impossible, to measure how much cooperation is occurring, let alone how much cooperation on a particular threat is necessary. - Concurrently, it may be difficult to establish when specific task forces should be disbanded or when funding for a particular class of task forces (e.g., violent crime, drug trafficking, counterterrorism) should be scaled back. - Additionally, how can policy makers ascertain whether task force programs run by different agencies duplicate each other's work, especially if they target the same class or category of criminals (such as drug traffickers or violent gangs)? For example, do the violent crime task forces led by one agency complement, compete with, or duplicate the work of another's? To give a very broad sense of federal task force activity in one geographic area, CRS compiled a list of task forces and fusion centers operating along the Southwest border, which are geographically depicted in this report. To be included in the list, a task force had to exhibit the possibility of either directly or indirectly combatting drug trafficking or terrorism. Thus, task forces devoted to fighting gangs, violent crime, public corruption, capturing fugitives, and money laundering may be included. Second, there is no general framework to understand the life trajectory of any given task force or class of task forces. What key milestones mark the development and decline of task forces? (Can such a set of milestones even be produced?) How many task forces outlive their supposed value because no thresholds regarding their productivity are established? Though federal law enforcement has embraced the task force concept, it has not agreed on the breadth or duration of such cooperation. Such lack of accord extends to measuring the work of task forces. This report suggests a way of conceptualizing these matters by framing task force efforts and federal strategies tied to them in terms of input, output, and outcome-core ideas that can be used to study all sorts of organizations and programs, including those in law enforcement. An official task force census coupled with a conceptual framework for understanding and potentially measuring their operations across agencies could greatly assist policy making tied to federal policing throughout the country, and particularly along the Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R43583: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Shelf Number: 132554 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Fusion Centers Intelligence Gathering Organized Crime Partnerships Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Coast Guard: Resource Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands Summary: The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the �transit zone��the area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United States�during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 days�a 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measure�the removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zone�once, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets. In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increased�from about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-527: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Shelf Number: 132631 Keywords: Border Security Coast Guard Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Homeland Security Maritime Crime Maritime Security

Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: 'External Stresses' and Violence Mitigation in Fragile Contexts: Setting the Stage for Policy Analysis Summary: Following on from the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on conflict, security and development, a debate has emerged about the role of so-called 'external stresses' in generating 'new' forms of violence and insecurity in poor and fragile countries. The Bank posits that the combination of internal stresses (e.g. low income levels, high youth unemployment) and external stresses (e.g. cross-border conflict spillovers, illicit drug trafficking) heightens the risk of different forms of violence, which are not confined to inter-state and civil war but range from communal conflicts to criminal violence and terrorism. This perspective is useful in as much as it makes explicit that instability and political disorder are not only related to domestic weaknesses of fragile states, but are also conditioned by outside forces. Yet the binary internal-external/fragility-vulnerability model that underpins the World Bank's analysis of external stresses appears to be too limited to inform strategies to address the challenges that arise from pressures as diverse as illicit transnational trafficking, price and resource shocks, and cross-border conflict spillovers. A more comprehensive and nuanced framework for policy analysis is called for, based on the recognition that external stresses: (a) tend to involve external, internal as well as transnational actors and variables that are often interrelated; (b) create both losers and winners, and can promote the interests of powerful state and non-state groups in and outside of the country or world region under 'stress'; and (c) do not all have the same kind of impact on states and societies in terms of generating violence. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute Of Development Studies, 2013. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Evidence Report No. 36: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ER36FinalOnline.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ER36FinalOnline.pdf Shelf Number: 132645 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorism Violence Violence Prevention

Author: Prouse, Carolyn Title: Framing the World cUPP: Competing Discourses of Favela Pacification as a Mega-Event Legacy in Brazil Summary: In November of 2010, Brazilian military and police officers rolled through the streets of Complexo de Alemao, Rio de Janeiro's largest favela, in an effort to 'take back' the community from notorious drug traffickers in time for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Given the pervasive rhetoric that the occupation of favelas by the 'pacifying' Unidade de Policia Pacificadora (UPP) program is for these mega events, what are the effects of this framing, and how is it used and contested by multiple actors? What subjects are called into being as a 'threat' through discourses regarding the UPPs, and how does this rhetoric legitimate violent practices of security by the state? Employing Judith Butler's concepts of framing and the constitutive outside, I argue that there are multiple and competing discourses that frame UPP military police interventions, which have important legacy ramifications for Brazil's mega events. In general, many international popular media accounts highly decontextualize and exoticize the space of the favela, constituting a site of threatening, yet consumable, Otherness. The state tends to construct simplistic dichotomies of space and subjects as threatening in order to legitimate its own actions. However, many favela inhabitants are reframing these constitutions to undermine the state's attempts at legitimation and bring into relief the historical and socio-political continuities of Brazilian militarization. Details: RASAALA, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2012): 17 p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 21, 2014: https://journal.lib.uoguelph.ca/index.php/rasaala/article/view/2219/2714 Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: https://journal.lib.uoguelph.ca/index.php/rasaala/article/view/2219/2714 Shelf Number: 132723 Keywords: Crowd Control Drug Trafficking Favelas (Brazil) Militarization Slums Sporting Events

Author: Rios Contreras, Viridiana Title: How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug War Summary: This work advances a theory about corruption, criminal organizations, and violence to show how political institutions set incentives and constraints that lead criminal organizations behave, organize, compromise or fight one another. It is my argument that the propensity of criminal groups to deploy violence increases when formal or informal political institutions are decentralized because violent criminal organizations are less likely to be punished. Under decentralized institutional environments, understood here as those in which different levels of government fail to act cohesively as a single decision-making body, corruption agreements with one government inhibit law enforcement operations conducted by another. As a result, belligerent criminal organizations that would otherwise be punished remain untouched. My argument sheds light on why many criminal organizations are able to operate profitably without major episodes of violence, and illuminates the causes of Mexico's large increases in drug{related violence. A formal model (Chapter 2), an analytical narrative (Chapter 3), and an empirical test (Chapter 4 and 5) show that Mexican drug trafficking organizations increased their propensity to engage in injurious behavior only recently, responding to incentives set by political decentralization that inhibited Mexico's federal government from controlling the actions of its local governments, and thus from limiting trafficker's propensity to battle for turf. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2012. 233p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 25, 2014 at: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_PhDDissertation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_PhDDissertation.pdf Shelf Number: 132772 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Trafficking Drug Wars (Mexico) Drug-Related Violence Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Financial flows linked to the production and trafficking of Afghan opiates Summary: 1. Drug trafficking is a business, but our understanding of this enterprise and response to it remain limited - less than 0.5% of the total laundered funds are seized. 2. In 2011, the annual volume of the global opiate market was estimated at USD 68 billion (with around USD 60 billion from Afghan opiates). However, no widely agreed method or framework currently exists to map "the business model". Although a number of business modelling methodologies appear to have been created by academics, multilateral bodies and private organisations, the survey responses suggest that it remains unclear if these methodologies have been practically incorporated into law enforcement and FIU's intelligence collection plans and disruption strategies. 3. Terrorists profit from and are engaged in opiate trafficking - over half the Afghan Taliban Senior Leadership listed under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1988 are involved in drug trafficking. 4. The UN Al Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team assesses that opiate-financing will imminently be the leading source of income for the Afghan Taliban and thus enable a major threat to the national security of Afghanistan and wider regional stability. 5. International opiate traffickers rely on the services of financial professionals, either unwitting or complicit, to manage their assets but no global system exists to alert countries or the private sector of these individuals and entities, or to freeze the assets of opiate traffickers. 6. At most stages in the enterprise, opiates and associated financial flows do not follow the same routes. 7. The Afghan opiate business is believed to be a mixture of both cartels and multiple markets. There appears to be no single or small group of cartels that control the global opiate trade; but some groups control significant portions of the trade along various routes. However, detailed and reliable information regarding this issue remains limited and this can be considered a key information gap. 8. Between 50-90% of all financial transactions in Afghanistan are conducted via money or value transfer services (MVTS). Illicit use of MVTS appears to be a critical capability for opiate trafficking networks, not only in Afghanistan but also internationally. 9. The majority of illicit funds are likely moved through, and possibly stored in, financial centres. As the region's leading financial centre, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) financial system appears to be particularly vulnerable to abuse by opiate traffickers, regionally and internationally. 10. Cash, commodity-transfer and MVTS appear to be the leading value transfer instruments at the cultivation and manufacture stages of the enterprise; the formal financial system, MVTS and high-value commodities appear to facilitate international distribution of opiates. 11. Apart from cash, new payment methods (including virtual currencies) are used at consumer and international distribution stages of the Afghan opiate enterprise, albeit less than the above methods but may pose significant challenges to regulators, financial intelligence units (FIUs) and law enforcement agencies. 12. Many similarities exist between financing methodologies of different illicit drugs. Opiate-specific and more generic red flag indicators have been identified and collated. 13. This project was conducted in parallel with the Paris Pact (UNODC) Illicit Financial Flows analysis. The ML/TF threats from illicit groups, vulnerabilities in AML/CFT systems and opportunities identified herein are being used for immediate technical assistance delivery within the framework of the UNODC's current activities. Details: Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2014. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2014 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financial-flows-linked-to-production-and-trafficking-of-afghan-opiates.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financial-flows-linked-to-production-and-trafficking-of-afghan-opiates.pdf Shelf Number: 132781 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Heroin Illicit Drugs Money Laundering

Author: Gomis, Benoit Title: Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016 Summary: In spite of a decades-long 'war on drugs', the global drug trade persists as a significant problem for international security given its scale, the number of deaths related to trafficking and consumption it creates, and the organized crime and corruption it fuels. The international drug control system has been ineffective in reducing the size of the market and in preventing the emergence of new drugs and drug routes that cause and shift instability around the world. Current drug policies have been counter-productive, often causing more harm than the drugs themselves through capital punishment for offences, widespread incarceration, discrimination in law enforcement, violation of basic human rights in forced 'treatment' centres, and opportunity costs. In the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in the previous three decades. There remain a number of political obstacles to making recent developments sustainable ahead of the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 2016, but these should not be used as excuses for continuing with a failed status quo. Details: London: Chatham House, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/0214Drugs_BP2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/0214Drugs_BP2.pdf Shelf Number: 132853 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: Csete, Joanne Title: Telling the Story of Drugs in West Africa: The newest front in a losing war? Summary: Key Points - The emergence of significant drug trafficking routes in West Africa, particularly of cocaine from Latin America to European markets, has drawn a great deal of attention from global drug authorities, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the government of the United States, which sees West Africa as a setting for replicating drug-control interventions used in Latin America. - UNODC and US reports have used limited data on drug seizures, drug consumption and drug-related terrorism in West Africa to weave a narrative of a region 'under attack' by unscrupulous drug dealers and seized by rapidly increasing problematic drug use. - These authorities sometimes admit that these data are sketchy, but they nonetheless use this information to make broad generalisations about the urgent need for more policing and other 'drug war' measures. - Though the link between drug trafficking and terrorism in West Africa is not very well established, the US also energises its arguments for repressive drug interventions in West Africa by highlighting this connection. - West Africa undoubtedly has significant drug-related problems that merit an energetic response. - It is, however, legitimate to question whether the hyped-up narrative that has been constructed of a lethal problem is meant to justify placement of military, surveillance and anti-terrorism hardware and software in the region at a time when the US-led 'war on drugs' is losing support within many Latin American countries. Rather than the simple replication of often harmful and ineffective policy interventions applied in Latin America, the response to illicit drugs in West Africa should benefit from a careful reflection about what has and has not worked in other parts of the world. Details: Swansea, Wales, UK: Swansea University, Global Drug Policy Observatory, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 1: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/GDPO%20West%20Africa%20digital.pdf%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/GDPO%20West%20Africa%20digital.pdf%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 132855 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction (West Africa) Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking War on Drugs

Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2013 Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's 2013 Game Changers, where we have sought to highlight some of the year's most important and illustrative trends in the development of organized crime in the Americas. This year has been a year of contradictions. Large criminal groups that seemed untouchable appear to be on the ropes. Others waded through complicated peace and truce processes with incredible patience. Some of the more notable of these processes were initiated by the criminal groups themselves. At the same time, some dynamics in the underworld remained true to form and some new, ugly criminal economies have surged because of these dynamics. Amidst it all, weak states continued to face challenges from below and above, sometimes from those who simply feel they have no choice but to fight criminal groups on their own. These past 12 months could be termed the year of the negotiations. In Colombia, rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued their historic talks with the Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos. By many accounts, these talks are moving along well, but there is concern that even if the FARC leadership signs a deal, parts of the organization will desert and enter the criminal economy. In El Salvador, the truce between the country's two largest gangs showed severe signs of fraying, if not rupturing completely. Homicides surged at the end of the year, as the presidential campaign shifted into full gear. While the mediators claimed the candidates had sought gang support for their campaigns, the country's security minister sought to undermine the truce via public and private channels. Meanwhile, a few more lasting criminal "pacts" emerged, brokered, it appeared, by the criminals themselves. In Medellin, Colombia, remnants of the old guard, known as the Oficina de Envigado, brokered a cease fire with the now surging Urabenos criminal organization, bringing homicides to their lowest levels in 30 years. In Juarez and Tijuana, Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel's apparent dominance over those trafficking corridors led to equally dramatic drops in homicide rates and other criminal acts, such as car-jackings. The emergence of the Urabenos as the singular, monolithic criminal organization to survive the government's assault on the so-called Criminal Bands or "Bandas Criminales" (BACRIM) may be the biggest development in Latin America's underworld. The Urabenos have developed a sophisticated criminal model, which includes a huge variety of revenue streams. They appear to have overcome the loss of numerous top leaders and have an understanding of when to fight and when to make friends, as noted above. However, the Urabenos, and other groups like them, have also ushered in a new era of drug consumption in the region. The consumers are no longer just in Europe, the United States and Asia. They are in small cities and even rural areas throughout the region. They are poor; they are middle class; and they are the elite. And they are getting their drugs from the local criminal groups who are servicing the larger ones, like the Urabenos, throughout the distribution chain. From Brazil and Argentina, to Costa Rica and Mexico, this new, local criminal economy appears to be at the heart of much of the region's violence. It is this violence that pushed civilians to take up arms in places like Guerrero and Michoacan, two embattled Mexican states where so-called "self-defense" groups have surged to try to replace an inept, corrupted and co-opted state. These groups appear to have a wide range of backgrounds: from the poor peasant farmers to the sophisticated rival criminal groups. Yet, the government seems powerless to deal with them, to the point where many authorities have willingly allowed them to break the law in order to ensure others do not. A similar tension between maintaining the law and ensuring justice is also on the minds of the Bolivians as they try to keep some portions of their coca crop in the legal sphere and eliminate those deemed illegal. The challenge is monumental and, as we have seen this year, virtually impossible. Meanwhile, Bolivia's neighbor Peru, is coming to grips with the fact that it is the largest coca producing country in the world. That reality, which is a return to the 1990s status quo, has meant an influx of foreign criminal groups. Finally, for the second straight year, we need to note what is happening in Honduras. The country continues to open its doors to foreign criminal organizations, even while its homegrown groups continue to gain power. This includes one known as the Cachiros, which the US Treasury Department said had accumulated up to $800 million in assets, or roughly five percent of the country's GDP. A newly elected government, which takes power in January, seems to have little idea of how to combat these organizations, much less the resources. Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132877 Keywords: Corruption Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Gangs Organized Crime Street Gangs Violence

Author: Noriega, Roger F. Title: Honduras Under Siege Summary: As stepped-up counternarcotics policies in Colombia and Mexico have increased pressure on regional drug trafficking networks, organized crime syndicates have relocated operations to Central America, where law enforcement agencies and institutions are ill-equipped to withstand the onslaught. These multibillion-dollar gangs are making common cause with some local politicians who are following a playbook honed by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. The result in Venezuela was the birth of a narco-state, and similar dramas are playing out in Central America. Like Chavez, caudillos are using the democratic process to seek power, weaken institutions, and undermine the rule of law - generating turmoil that accommodates narco-trafficking. Making matters worse for Honduras is that left-wing activists abroad, in support of ousted president and Chavez acolyte Manuel Zelaya, are waging a very public campaign of outlandish claims seeking to block any US assistance to help the Honduran government resist the drug cartels. It is imperative that US policymakers vigorously support democracy, the rule of law, and antidrug programs in Honduras. Details: Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin American Outlook No. 3: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.aei.org/files/2013/09/30/-honduras-under-siege_090033609069.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.aei.org/files/2013/09/30/-honduras-under-siege_090033609069.pdf Shelf Number: 132883 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Gangs Organized Crime (Honduras) Violent Crime

Author: Barrick, Kelle Title: Assessing Crime, Resident Trust, and Police Effectiveness in Tegucigalpa, Honduras Summary: According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Central American countries are faced with some of the highest homicide rates in the world (UNODC, 2007). With more than 87 homicides per 100,000 residents, Honduras is one of the region's most violent countries (Arce, 2012). Honduras's proximity to Mexico makes it highly susceptible to the influences of transnational drug trafficking organizations. Recent enforcement efforts in Mexico have disrupted and displaced drug trafficking patterns and Honduras is increasingly being utilized as a transshipment point for Andean cocaine. According to recent estimates, 42% of all cocaine entering the United States first passes through Central America (INL, 2012). Youth street gangs and concentrated levels of poverty are also assumed to be at the center of the country's ongoing struggle with crime (UNODC, 2007; Seelke, 2011). Moreover, there is evidence that the problems associated with violent crime are increasing in Honduras. Whereas violent crime has decreased in Colombia, a country notorious for its violence, in recent years Honduras has experienced a significant increase in homicides and now has the highest per capita homicide rate in the world (U.S. Department of State, 2012). To assist Honduras in addressing these public safety and security issues, the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), has provided funding to establish a Model Precinct in Tegucigalpa's San Miguel Police District. A review of documents provided by INL indicates that as part of the Model Precinct initiative, INL is working with the Polic�a Nacional de Honduras (PNH) to create a higher level of integrity in the national police force by vetting police officers using background checks and polygraph testing. Police officers will also be trained in management practices, community policing, public relations, report taking, and tactical operations. In addition, police departments will be provided with a variety of equipment, including vehicles, office equipment, tactical and technological equipment, database systems, and street surveillance cameras. INL initiatives are also attempting to prevent and reduce participation in local gangs by providing school-aged children and youth with training in the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) programs. Collectively, these Model Precinct activities are intended to result in a number of benefits for the San Miguel target area in Tegucigalpa. These include reductions in crime and gang activity, enhanced crime fighting and crime prevention capabilities for the police, and improved community perceptions and trust of the police. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2013. 168p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://rti.org/pubs/hte024_baseline_english_final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras URL: http://rti.org/pubs/hte024_baseline_english_final.pdf Shelf Number: 132905 Keywords: Crime (Honduras) Drug Trafficking Homicides Police Effectiveness Police-Community Relations Policing Street Gangs Violent Crime

Author: Wigell, Mikael Title: Transatlantic Drug Trade: Europe, Latin America and the Need to Strengthen Anti-Narcotics Cooperation Summary: - The cocaine business has changed significantly in recent years. Once concentrated in Colombia, it has now expanded to the entire Latin American region with Brazil, Mexico, Central America, and Venezuela having become central corridors for the illegal traffic. - As the market for cocaine has been contracting in North America, Latin American drug networks have switched their attention to Europe, which is now the world's fastest growing market for cocaine. - The cocaine enters Europe mainly by exploiting the legitimate container trade. Most shipments continue to be directed to Western Europe, but recently the illicit trade has been expanding eastward with new entry points opening up in the Black Sea and Balkan area. There are also indications of a possible new entry point in the Eastern Baltic Sea area. - Not only are Latin American criminal organizations expanding their activities on the European drug market, but they are also exploiting the European financial crisis to launder their profits and move into other branches of the economy. - The growing transatlantic cocaine trade calls for improving inter-regional counter-narcotics cooperation. Concrete steps should be taken to promote stronger links between anti-drugs programmes, development cooperation and public security policies on both sides of the Atlantic. Details: Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2012. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: FIIA Briefing Paper 132: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/343/transatlantic_drug_trade/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/343/transatlantic_drug_trade/ Shelf Number: 132969 Keywords: Cocaine Criminal Networks Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Segura, Renata Title: The Global Drug Policy Debate. Experiences from the Americas and Europe Summary: The cultivation, trafficking and consumption of illegal drugs have historically posed a multilayered series of challenges to the state: from how to minimize health risks and provide treatment and support to those who use drugs, to the security and governance threats posed by trafficking groups and networks. While global in nature, the challenges presented by the illicit drug trade are also contextual. Lack of progress in addressing the manifold challenges posed by the illicit drug trade has led to a growing acknowledgement of the need for a serious rethink of global drugs policy. The authors underscore the importance of, and encourage the creation of national and regional commissions that are tasked with reviewing current drug policies and recommending changes. It also examines current calls in Latin American for a review of the so-called 'war on drugs', highlighting the role that outspoken leaders are playing in shaping the debate on drug policy, as well as current shifts from a policing-focused approach to one that accounts for the safety and health of drug users. The paper looks in particular detail at the experiences of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, arguing that other transit regions such as West Africa should consider implementing multi-faceted strategies to respond to drug trafficking and the growing incidence of drug consumption. In this regard, it highlights examples of how exclusive reliance on repressive strategies known as mano dura can often backfire, resulting in the displacement of trafficking routes, an increase in violence, prison overcrowding and further marginalization of vulnerable populations. Finally, it highlights some actions the West Africa Commission on Drugs might adopt for its own advocacy strategy including strategic diplomacy, the development and dissemination of empirically-grounded papers on the impact of drug trafficking, drug consumption and treatment in the West Africa sub-region, and discussions and debates with relevant stakeholders on the findings of such reports; engagement of civil society; and raising of public awareness. The West Africa Commission on Drugs is faced with the difficult task of advocating for policies aimed at preventing or mitigating problems of drug use, criminality, violence, and threats to governability that have been experienced by other countries, without having complete certainty on how -or even if- the same challenges will arise in Africa. Carrier and Klantsching, in their book "Africa and the War on Drugs" argue that historical analysis would indicate that Africa might be spared from the destiny of the Andean countries, and that more harm can be done by implementing a prohibitionist regime that assumes an identical path will be followed. This warning should not fall on deaf ears. However, critics of their argument have underscored the dangers of understating the "growing power of drug money in African electoral politics, local and traditional governance, and security" (Gberie, 2012; Cockayne, 2012). They have also pointed out that having a critical perspective on the existing drug control regime must not mean turning a blind eye to the threats that come with drug trafficking and consumption, such as corruption and the emergence of criminalized states (Kavanagh et al, 2013). Similarly, while drug consumption rates currently remain relatively low in Africa, the situation can change rapidly, as happened in some Latin American countries. As noted by UNODC (2013), there are already strong indications that drug use is on the rise in West Africa. It is naturally easier to achieve the political support needed to implement policies that respond to serious problems, such as a health epidemic or extended violence, than to embrace innovative and data-based policies in order to prevent or mitigate these problems. Explaining to both elites and the population why it is indispensable that West Africa act assertively to pre-empt a situation that may emerge will be a central challenge for the WACD. This paper examines such efforts in the Americas and Europe, drawing lessons for West Africa. It argues that the current drug control regime does provide some leeway for implementing policy reforms that move away from the prohibitionist regime, and provides examples of alternative policies that have been introduced by national and local authorities in different countries. The paper provides examples from Europe to underscore the importance of using empirical research and sound data to design drug policies, highlighting successful examples of harm reduction programs, and examining ways in which governments have moved away from legal frameworks that rely on the criminalization of drug use. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Kofi Annan Foundation and the West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2013. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: WACD Background Paper No. 7: Accessed August 12, 2014 at: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Global-Drug-Policy-Debate-Experiences-2013-11-28.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Global-Drug-Policy-Debate-Experiences-2013-11-28.pdf Shelf Number: 133013 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Reform Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Illicit Trade War on Drugs

Author: Grayson, George W. Title: The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as an Instrument of Cartel Warfare Summary: The United States has diplomatic relations with 194 independent nations. Of these, none is more important to America than Mexico in terms of trade, investment, tourism, natural resources, migration, energy, and security. In recent years, narco-violence has afflicted Mexico with more than 50,000 drug-related murders since 2007 and some 26,000 men, women, and children missing. President Enrique Pena Nieto has tried to divert national attention from the bloodshed through reforms in energy, education, anti-hunger, health-care, and other areas. Even though the death rate has declined since the chief executive took office on December 1, 2012, other crimes continue to plague his nation. Members of the business community report continual extortion demands; the national oil company PEMEX suffers widespread theft of oil, gas, explosives, and solvents (with which to prepare methamphetamines); hundreds of Central American migrants have shown up in mass graves; and the public identifies the police with corruption and villainy. Washington policymakers, who overwhelmingly concentrate on Asia and the Mideast, would be well-advised to focus on the acute dangers that lie principally below the Rio Grande, but whose deadly avatars are spilling into our nation. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1195.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1195.pdf Shelf Number: 133040 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: Diallo, Ismaila Title: A profile of crime markets in Dakar Summary: Several criminal markets - ranging from drug trafficking to human trafficking, piracy and counterfeiting, trafficking of pharmaceuticals, cybercrime and money laundering - can be found in Dakar, Senegal. This paper profiles those criminal markets currently active in the city and its suburbs, analyzing their structures, operations and transnational dimensions. The expansion of these criminal markets is a matter of considerable concern for West Africa's economic and social development. In every case, 'regardless of the criminal market... the common denominator is always exploitation for profit. This exploitation ultimately affects the entire country: its people and institutions; its' economic prosperity; and its social fabric'. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 264: Accessed August 14, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper264.pdf Year: 2014 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper264.pdf Shelf Number: 133050 Keywords: Counterfeit Medicines Criminal Networks (South Africa) Cybercrime Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Pirates/Piracy

Author: Bunker, Robert J. Title: Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico Summary: Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel "enemy intent," a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Letort Papers: Accessed August 21, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf Shelf Number: 130006 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Organized Crime (Mexico)

Author: Anyimadu, Adjoa Title: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean Summary: As rates of piracy emanating from Somalia's coast fall, international attention is shifting towards insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea - the waters off Africa's west coast. Maritime crimes including oil-bunkering, drug-trafficking and illegal fishing are of economic and security concern to the wider international community as well as to local states. There are a number of critical differences between maritime insecurity off Africa's east and west coasts, but the Gulf of Guinea's littoral states and stakeholders further afield can draw valuable lessons from the experience of combating Somali piracy to help shape their responses to West Africa's maritime threats. Early action by policy-makers - regionally and further afield - could do much to ensure that criminality does not evolve and increase to an unmanageable extent. Those who commit illegal acts at sea are highly adaptable, increasingly sophisticated in their methods and often well informed, and so local, regional and global efforts must be flexible and proactive. Timing is especially important, as a number of West African states will go to the polls in 2015, presenting an unprecedented challenge to the region's security and stability and risking maritime security slipping down the agenda. Details: London: Chatham House, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa 2013/02: Accessed August 23, 2014 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0713pp_maritimesecurity_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Guinea URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0713pp_maritimesecurity_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129892 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Fishing Maritime Crime (Guinea) Maritime Security Piracy

Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Time to Listen: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean Summary: The list grows longer: sitting Latin American presidents, including the United States' principal allies; past presidents; the Organization of American States; the Summit of the Americas; civil society leaders from all nations. The clamor for drug policy reform, including for a reformed U.S. drug policy in Latin America, is growing rapidly. But Washington isn't hearing it. The Obama Administration's counternarcotics strategy has continued largely unchanged. In fact, over the past few years the United States has expanded its military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies' direct involvement in counternarcotics operations in the Western Hemisphere. This has been particularly true in Central America, where it has had disturbing human rights impacts. Aid numbers do not tell the whole story. In dollar terms, assistance to most Latin American and Caribbean nations' militaries and police forces has declined since 2010, as Colombia's and Mexico's large aid packages wind down. Today, only aid to Central America is increasing significantly. For its part, the Defense Department is facing cuts and turning most of its attention to other regions. While the Pentagon's current approach to Latin America does not include major base construction or new massive aid packages, however, the United States is still providing significant amounts of aid and training to Latin America's armed forces and police. In addition to large-scale counter-drug operations, the region is seeing an increase in training visits from U.S. Special Forces, a greater presence of intelligence personnel and drones (while countries are obtaining drones, mostly not from the United States), and rapidly growing use of military and police trainers from third countries, especially Colombia. Much of what takes place may not show up as large budget amounts, but it is shrouded by secrecy, poor reporting to Congress and the public, and a migration of programs' management from the State Department to the Defense Department. A lack of transparency leads to a lack of debate about consequences and alternatives, for human rights, for civil-military relations, and for the United States' standing in the region. On human rights, the Obama Administration has been occasionally willing to raise tough issues with allies. It has encouraged trials in civilian, not military, courts for soldiers accused of committing gross human rights abuses, especially in Mexico and Colombia. It has supported the Rios Montt genocide trial in Guatemala, and has sided with countries and human rights groups that seek to maintain, not weaken, the current Inter-American human rights system. Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and Washington Office on Latin America, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2014 at: http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Time_to_Listen-Trends_in_U.S._Security_Assistance_to_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Time_to_Listen-Trends_in_U.S._Security_Assistance_to_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf Shelf Number: 131150 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Human Rights Abuses War on Drugs (Central America)

Author: Chi, Jocelyn Title: Reducing Drug Violence in Mexico: Options for Implementing Targeted Enforcement Summary: Between 2006 and 2012, drug-related violence in Mexico escalated to unprecedented levels. During this time, five of the top ten most violent cities in the world were found in Mexico, and over 60,000 Mexicans were killed at the hands of Violent Drug Trafficking Organizations (VDTOs). This reign of terror has expanded to include other types of violence, such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and spectacular public displays of violence. Most alarmingly, VDTO victims increasingly include ordinary citizens, journalists, law enforcement and military, and other government officials. To date, enforcement efforts in the United States (U.S.) have focused almost exclusively on reducing the flow of drugs from, and through, Mexico. Violence reduction has been a secondary concern, and has been mostly considered as a potential side-benefit of flow reduction policies. Until recently, Mexican authorities have focused their attacks on the upper leadership of major organized crime groups as a method of reducing flows, and in an effort to address threats to public safety. However, freshly elected President Enrique Pena Nieto has indicated that his administration will shift focus away from drug flows, in order to prioritize crime prevention and violence reduction. Given that both the Bush and Obama Administrations have acknowledged that the U.S. market for illegal drugs is largely responsible for fueling the Mexican drug trade, and that the U.S. has a strategic interest in Mexican security, the U.S. may have a currently-unexploited opportunity to reduce violence in Mexico. In this project, we explore whether the adoption of targeted enforcement in the Unites States could theoretically effect a reduction in violence in Mexico, and, if so, what form that strategy might take. We consider the operational and informational requirements for implementation, as well as the information a decision-maker would require in order to elect targeted enforcement as a strategy for addressing the security problem in Mexico. Targeted enforcement is novel in several respects. While it is not inconsistent with flow-reduction goals, the strategy leverages enforcement resources in the United States to effect violence reduction in Mexico. Furthermore, because it is a deterrent strategy, targeted enforcement requires authorities on both sides to clearly and publicly identify the target and communicate that violence will no longer be accepted as a method of conducting business. Finally, the target will encompass entire VDTOs, and not just individual offenders, which increases the cost of individual offending through internal organizational pressure. Keeping in mind current budgetary constraints, we develop four design options for violence-focused U.S.-side targeted enforcement. We evaluate our options with reference to the potential for crime and violence reduction, intelligence demands, implementation and political feasibility, and community impacts. Through a series of interviews with experts in the field, and an exhaustive review of secondary sources, we find that not only is U.S. adoption of targeted enforcement possible within existing frameworks, but that this approach has great potential for reducing Mexican-side violence. Our findings suggest: - First and foremost, we note that the adoption of a targeted violence-reduction approach need not conflict with current U.S. efforts to reduce drug flows; thus, there should be no cost in terms of drug abuse in the U.S. - While a short-term surge in violence is possible, attacking drug-trafficking revenues in the U.S. could incentivize VDTOs away from using violence to advance their drug-trafficking interests. Authorities would need to better understand the revenue portfolios of VDTOs in order to estimate how responsive organizations might be to attacks on revenues, and measure the cost-effectiveness of such a strategy. - Successful implementation requires sophisticated intelligence, and while there is some indication that both the U.S. and Mexico possess the capacity to gather this intelligence, this capacity would likely need to be refined and/or expanded. - The necessary administrative and enforcement infrastructures appear to be in place in the U.S., though resources would need to be reallocated, and additional funding might be necessary. - In the U.S., policies targeting drug flows are popular due to a perception that they decrease drug consumption; a shift towards violence reduction would probably require intensive outreach to educate stakeholders. In Mexico, current distrust in government would require clear and public communication about target selection and the role of Mexican authorities in U.S.-side enforcement. - Finally, a number of possible community impacts exist, and U.S. and Mexican authorities would need to establish mechanisms for collecting data and tracking trends in order to respond to negative externalities. Details: Los Angeles: UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 2013. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2014 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 129923 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence (Mexico) Homicides Kidnappings Organized Crime Targeted Law Enforcement Violence Violence Prevention Violence Reduction Violent Crime

Author: Guerra, Santiago Ivan Title: From Vaqueros to Mafiosos : a community history of drug trafficking in rural South Texas Summary: My dissertation, From Vaqueros to Mafiosos: A Community History of Drug Trafficking in Rural South Texas is an ethnographic study of the impact of the drug trade in South Texas, with a specific focus on Starr County. This dissertation examines drug trafficking along the U.S-Mexico Border at two levels of analysis. First, through historical ethnography, I provide a cultural history of South Texas, as well as a specific history of drug trafficking in Starr County. In doing so, I highlight the different trafficking practices that emerge throughout South Texas' history, and I document the social changes that develop in Starr County as a result of these illicit practices. The second half of my dissertation, however, is devoted to a contemporary analysis of the impact of the drug trade on the border region by analyzing important social practices in Starr County relating to drug abuse, policing and the criminal justice system, youth socialization and family life. Through ethnography I present the devastating effects of the drug trade and border policing on this Mexican American border community in rural South Texas. Details: Austin, TX: University of Texas at Austin, 2011. 244p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 29, 2014 at: http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3036 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3036 Shelf Number: 129918 Keywords: Border Control Border Security Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Mexico's Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America Summary: Mexico's Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America, which examines migration patterns, human trafficking and smuggling, security, and U.S. and Mexican policy at Mexico's southern border. With dozens of images, maps, statistics, and testimonies, the report not only explains what Mexico's "other border" looks like, it shows very clearly that the real humanitarian emergency is not just in shelters and detention facilities in south Texas - it runs along the entire migration route to the United States. Mexico's Other Border also outlines what is at stake for policymakers under pressure to "do something" about the current surge in migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border. Contrary to what some in Washington allege, lax U.S. border security is not to blame for this surge. (In fact, the number of security personnel on the U.S.-Mexico border has doubled in the past eight years.) WOLA found that Mexican authorities and migrant shelters alike have seen a sharp rise in migration from Central America, including the influx of families and unaccompanied children that authorities are now struggling to manage in south Texas and elsewhere on the U.S.-Mexico border. The report documents a modest but accelerating buildup of U.S.-funded security forces and infrastructure on both sides of the Mexico-Guatemala border. In a series of recommendations, authors Adam Isacson, Maureen Meyer, and Gabriela Morales call for an approach that can ease the humanitarian crisis facing Central American migrants in transit, without the risks of a large deployment of undertrained, uncoordinated, and unaccountable military, police, intelligence, and migration forces Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2014. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://www.wola.org/publications/mexicos_other_border Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wola.org/publications/mexicos_other_border Shelf Number: 133260 Keywords: Border Law Enforcement Border Security (U.S.) Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Illegal Immigrants Immigration Smuggling

Author: Brazil Ministry of Justice Title: Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Border Areas Summary: Behind the scenes of the festivities surrounding Brazil's hosting of the football World Cup this summer, vulnerable Brazilians and immigrants were being trafficked into exploitation for many different purposes, including football itself. New research on trafficking in children, women and men at the Brazilian land borders identified forms of exploitation that were previously unknown to policy-makers and researchers. From the Amazon to the Iguazu Falls, a team of researchers conducted field research in the regional capitals of all eleven border states in Brazil - along a land border that is 16,886 km long, and separates Brazil from nine other South American countries and a French overseas territory. The resulting research report, Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Border Areas of Brazil, was launched in Portuguese in Brasilia late last year and has just been published in English and Spanish. Brazil's recent rapid economic growth, largely based on tapping into its vast natural resources, has led to situations of labour and sex trafficking for men, women and children. Both Brazilian and foreign, they are exploited at hydroelectric power plants, in mines, on plantations and on cattle ranches. Some children and adults were also identified as trafficked for exploitation in illegal activities, such as illegal logging, drug cultivation, drug trafficking and the smuggling of contraband goods. Sexual exploitation remains the most common form of trafficking identified, and affects girls, boys, young transgender women and girls, and adult women, both with and without prior experience working in the sex industry. Girls from impoverished rural families are also trafficked into wealthier families under the guise of an informal fostering system that would allow them to receive an education. This system is then abused to exploit the girls through domestic work. Boys are taken to and from Brazil with promises of success as professional footballers, but neither they nor their families receive the promised payments. A clear geographical pattern emerges from this research, which was funded by the Brazilian government and coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), headquartered in Vienna, in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Sexual exploitation was most commonly reported in the Northern border region, whereas forced labour was more commonly identified in the Centre and South Region. The report also reveals a pattern to the profiles of trafficked people; some indigenous groups, women, children and transgender women can be more vulnerable. While there may be some fear of reporting trafficking and exploitation to the authorities, many trafficked people and their families are in such a state of economic and social vulnerability that they see no viable alternative to being trafficked and exploited in order to survive. The Brazilian Minister of Justice, Jose Eduardo Cardozo, who launched the research in Brasilia in October of last year, calls trafficking an "underground" crime, because of the lack of police records. According to Cardozo, 'the research identified a permissive culture that legitimises the commission of the crime. Without numbers, it is difficult to carry out an efficient investigation and to effectively combat trafficking.' Among the recommendations ensuing from the assessment is for Brazil to develop its migration policy with a focus on providing assistance to migrants, including trafficked people, as well as to improve local service provision and public policies to ameliorate the individual, social and situational vulnerability of potential trafficking victims in the border area. Clearly, the opportunity to earn an income through some form of decent work would go a long way in preventing these situations from arising. Details: Brussels: International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2013. . 270p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 11, 2014 at: http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2014/Enafron_IN_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2014/Enafron_IN_web.pdf Shelf Number: 133281 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Forced Labor Human Trafficking (Brazil) Sexual Exploitation Smuggling

Author: Alemika, Etannibi E.O. Title: The Impact of Organised Crime on Governance in West Africa Summary: There are several types of organised criminal activities and operatives in West Africa. These activities include drug trafficking, advanced fee and internet fraud, human trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, money-laundering, arms manufacture, arms trafficking, and armed robbery as well as oil bunkering . Transnational organised criminal activities often involve collaboration among domestic and foreign criminal groups. Organised criminal groups infiltrate governments, businesses, political and economic systems. They undermine the effectiveness of these systems, sometimes through corruption and violence. It is imperative that enough effort is given to the understanding of the impact of organised crime on governance in West Africa. Aim and scope of study In this study, the following issues are addressed: - Variety and trends of organised crime in West Africa; - Impact of organised crime on peace, stability, development and the rule of law; - Transnational linkages of organised crime; and - Linkages between state institutions/politics and organised crime. The focus of the study is different from the prevalent approach to the subject and reports on organised crime in West Africa, which have been more concerned with drug trafficking, human trafficking and scams directed at European and North American countries. Inadequate attention has been paid to other forms of organised crime. More significantly, there has been a lack of attention to the impact of organized crime on the fragile political, economic and social systems of the region. The responses by international, regional and national actors involved in developing and implementing measures against organised crime emphasise developing the capacity of law enforcement and judicial officials to enable effective interdiction and enforce the law. However, experience over the past two decades in many parts of the world indicates that reliance on law enforcement alone may not be an effective and sustainable enough approach. A broader understanding of actors, modes of operation, networks, of the nexus between organised crime and political systems, and the impact of organised criminal activities and actors on the economies and societies of West African countries is a prerequisite for developing a comprehensive and effective response to the activities of criminal networks. Details: Abuji, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office Abuja, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf Shelf Number: 133292 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Human trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime (West Africa) Smuggling Tobacco Smuggling Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Borges Coelho, Joao Paulo Title: African approaches to maritime security : Southern Africa Summary: Jo�o Paulo Coelho highlights the maritime dimension of regional security. He points out that maritime security involves many aspects of conflict germane to Africa as its governance is too weak to absorb the challenges of globalised maritime trade such as piracy, pollution, the illegal trafficking of humans, drugs and weapons, and resource management. He argues that, if these issues are not properly addressed in a comprehensive maritime security framework, some could develop into hard security threats, while others could jeopardise the economies, environments, and public health of countries and societies in the region. Piracy should therefore not merely be regarded as a maritime event to be contained at sea, but as a symptom of broader problems such as extreme poverty and political instability. In line with this approach, the author argues that maritime insecurity is always created ashore, and is too serious to be dealt with by the security sector alone. This study is part of a series of three regional studies on African Approaches to Maritime Security published by the FES peace and security network. Details: Maputo : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mozambique, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: FES peace and security series ; 12: Accessed September 18, 2014 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/10671.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/10671.pdf Shelf Number: 133385 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Maritime Crime (Africa) Maritime Security Pirates/Piracy

Author: Great Britain. National Crime Agency Title: National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2014 Summary: If there is a single cross-cutting issue that has changed the landscape for serious and organised crime and our response against it, it is the growth in scale and speed of internet communication technologies. The online streaming of real-time child sexual exploitation and abuse is a growing threat. Cyber techniques have proliferated and are used ever more extensively by wider serious and organised crime groups to commit 'traditional' crimes (see Section 1: Cross-cutting issues for cyber-enabled crime). As more government services go online, including tax collection, there is an increasing risk of online attacks and fraud against the public sector. Large scale attacks on public as well as private online services erode consumer confidence, which affects the UK's social and economic well-being and reduces the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business. 84% of all cases of identity fraud are delivered by the internet. The pace of development of deployable criminal tools is such that we anticipate an increase in the targeted compromise of UK networked systems, more ransom-ware attacks and distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks against business-critical systems. Corruption is another key cross-cutting issue, the impact of which is disproportionate to the level and frequency at which it occurs, with serious ramifications in terms of confidence towards the public and private sectors and in undermining trust in government. Proceeds of corruption and bribery amounting to millions of pounds from some international politically exposed persons (PEPs) have been laundered through UK financial systems including banks and investment property. The scale of the laundering of criminal proceeds, despite the UK's leading role in developing international standards to tackle it, is a strategic threat to the UK's economy and reputation. Some of the same financial transfer systems used by serious and organised criminals in the UK are also used by terrorist groups both domestically and overseas. The UK and its dependent territories are believed to have been the destination for billions of pounds of European criminal proceeds. We assess that the supply of heroin from Afghanistan, amphetamine processing/production in the UK and the supply of new psychoactive substances are all likely to increase, and that the supply of cocaine from South America is likely to remain at a high rate. The impact of the illegal drugs trade in the countries where they are sourced and those through which they are trafficked can be significant and undermines states and government structures. In some cases it has the potential to damage UK strategic partnerships. Human trafficking is widely recognised as a significant global problem. Work to scope the extent of criminality behind the trafficking of human beings continues in order to improve the understanding of modern slavery. We assess that irregular migrants already in the UK will continue to provide a pool of people that serious and organised criminals can exploit by selling them forged or counterfeit documents to support fraudulent applications for leave to remain in the UK. We also assess that criminal exploitation of the legitimate supply of firearms to the UK marketplace will increase. There is also a concern that weapons, whether from illegal or legitimate sources, might find their way into the hands of extremists. All of the most serious crime threats are transnational. Commodities of all types - including, for example, trafficked people destined for modern slavery, intangibles targeted in fraud and cyber crime - either come from or transit through often unstable countries. Corruption in these countries both feeds off the proceeds of the crime and contributes in turn to instability. The criminal exploitation of corrupt and unstable governments or countries can directly threaten UK national security. Details: London: National Crime Agency, 2014. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2014 at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/207-nca-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime/file Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/207-nca-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime/file Shelf Number: 133466 Keywords: Child Sexual Exploitation Cybercrime Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Illegal Drugs Illegal Guns National Security Online Victimization Organized Crime (U.K.) Violent Crime

Author: Gastrow, Peter Title: Transnational organised crime: The stepchild of crime-combating priorities Summary: Experts continue to argue about an appropriate definition for organised crime, and ordinary citizens and lawmakers do not really know what it means. We tend to feel intense about the crime categories that make up organised crime, such as the trafficking of women and children, the poaching and smuggling of rhino horn and ivory, the selling of fake medicines, abalone poaching, the smuggling of endangered species, trafficking in narcotics, bank fraud or cybercrime. But organised crime as a concept tends to leave most people untouched. Pressure from voters on politicians and the latter's hope of re-election contribute to crime- combating strategies being short term, uncoordinated and confined within national borders. Little attention is paid to transnational organised crime even though it is developing into a major international security threat. It has gone global, but effective global responses have not been developed. Undoubtedly, some of the battles against transnational organised crime are being won, but we are losing the war. The vulnerabilities of developing countries should make the warning lights for Africa go on even stronger than elsewhere. Through its regional organisations and the AU, Africa should start working on a coordinated regional approach towards countering transnational organised crime on the continent, because individual states will no longer be able to do so on their own. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed October 1, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/transnational-organised-crime-the-stepchild-of-crime-combating-priorities Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/transnational-organised-crime-the-stepchild-of-crime-combating-priorities Shelf Number: 133525 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime Wildlife Crime

Author: Kamminga, Jorrit Title: Opium poppy licensing in Turkey: A model to solve Afghanistan's illegal opium economy? Summary: The report analyses the Turkish opium licensing system as a way to illustrate the "normality" of such an industry. The latter function is important for the current debate on using similar systems in other countries. In Afghanistan, for example, the opium poppy is still solely associated with illegal drug consumption, drug trafficking, crime and insurgency. On the contrary, in Turkey, opium poppies are regarded as both traditional medicine and an essential part of a rich cooking tradition. As such, the poppy licensing industry in Turkey should be regarded less a direct example of how to implement a similar model in Afghanistan, but more as an illustration of an alternative, non-politicised way of looking at the opium poppy plant and its potential benefits for Afghanistan. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: International Council on Security and Development, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 2, 2014 at: http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/Opium_Licensing_Turkey_Jorrit_Kamminga.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Turkey URL: http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/Opium_Licensing_Turkey_Jorrit_Kamminga.pdf Shelf Number: 133549 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Heroin Illegal Drugs Opium Poppy Cultivation

Author: Giacomello, Corina Title: Proposals for alternatives to criminal prosecution and incarceration for drug-related offenses in Latin America Summary: Latin America is immersed in a prison epidemic. The so-called "war on drugs" and harsher criminal penalties underlie the increase in the prison population. "One-size-fits-all" policies and severe sanctions have left the region's countries in a prison crisis that threatens future generations. Instead of proposing a single model, therefore, multiple pathways should be explored. This briefing by the International Drug Policy Consortium focuses on the judicial and prison systems, seeking to offer a variety of experiences that demonstrate how various situations can be addressed: occasional and recreational use, dependent or problem use of substances, small-scale drug dealing by vulnerable members of the trafficking chain (dependent users who sell for survival), and differences among the different levels of leadership in dealing and international trafficking. Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: IDPC Briefing Paper: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-briefing-paper_Alternatives-to-incarceration-in-LA_ENGLISH.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-briefing-paper_Alternatives-to-incarceration-in-LA_ENGLISH.pdf Shelf Number: 133565 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Policy (Latin America) Drug Reform Drug Trafficking War on Drugs

Author: Enamorado, Ted Title: Crime and Growth Convergence: Evidence from Mexico Summary: Scholars have often argued that crime deters growth, but the empirical literature assessing such effect is scarce. By exploiting cross-municipality income and crime data for Mexico - a country that experienced a high increase in crime rates over the past decade - this study circumvents two of the most common problems faced by researchers in this area. These are: (i) the lack of a homogenous, consistently comparable measure of crime and (ii) the small sample problem in the estimation. Combining income data from poverty maps, administrative records on crime and violence, and public expenditures data at the municipal level for Mexico (2005-2010), the analysis finds evidence indicating that drug-related crimes indeed deter growth. It also finds no evidence of a negative effect on growth from crimes unrelated to drug trafficking. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 2013. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research Working Paper No. 6730: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6730 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6730 Shelf Number: 133906 Keywords: Crime Rates (Mexico) Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Economic Analysis Poverty Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Violent Crime

Author: Carvajal, Roger A. Title: Violence in Honduras: An Analysis of the Failure in Public Security and the State's Response to Criminality Summary: The incidence of violence in Honduras currently is the highest in Honduran history. In 2014, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported the Honduras homicide rate, at 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, as the highest in the world for nations outside of war. It is the foundation of this thesis that the Honduran security collapse is due to unresolved internal factors - political, economic, and societal - as well as the influence of foreign factors and actors - the evolution of the global illicit trade. Two of the most important areas affecting public security in Honduras are the challenges posed by transnational organized crime and the relative weakness and fragility of the Honduran state to provide basic needs and security to the population. The emergence of criminal gangs and drug traffickers, and the government's security policies, are all factors that have worsened public security. The crime environment has overwhelmed the police, military, judicial system and overcrowded the prison system with mostly juvenile petty delinquents. Moreover, with a high impunity rate of nearly 95 percent for homicides, killing in Honduras has become an activity without consequences. The latest state's response is with re-militarization of security, highlighting the dilemma of the challenges of combatting internal violence and transnational organized crime in a weak state. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 10, 2014 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42596/14Jun_Carvajal_Roger.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42596/14Jun_Carvajal_Roger.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 133901 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gangs Homicides Organized Crime Violence (Honduras) Violent Crime

Author: Salamanca, Luis Jorge Garay Title: Understanding the Structure of Transnational Criminal Networks Operating in the U.S./Mexico Border and the Southeastern Border of the European Union Summary: Systemic crime and systemic corruption, much like any other activity, require the interaction of different agents. Some of those interactions are sporadic and some are permanent. In general, there are "many situations that social actors create and must negotiate in their behavior" (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010, p. 308), and it is possible to model and analyze those situations when arranged as a social network. Additionally several States and multilateral agencies acknowledge Transnational Criminal Networks (TCNs) as one of the most important threats for the domestic and transnational stability. Bearing this in mind, the purpose of this document is to model and analyze situations of crime consisting on Transnational Criminal Network (TCNs) operating in the southern border of The United States and the Southeastern border of the European Union, both regions concentrating some of the most dangerous and powerful TCNs on a global scale. The present document consists of eight sections. The first is the methodological and theoretical framework. The second is an introduction to the current situation of crime in Mexico. The third is the model and analysis of a TCN operating across Mexico and the United States, in which members of "Los Zetas" and "La Familia Michoacana" participate on activities of drug and hydrocarbons trafficking. The fourth section is an analysis of how the modeled Mexican TCN operates inside the United States. Implications for the stability and national security of the United States are also explored in the fourth section. The fifth section is an introduction to the situation of crime and corruption in Bulgaria, herein interpreted as the southeastern border of the European Union. In the sixth section four TCNs are modeled and analyzed: two consisting on crime transiting through Bulgaria, related to Drug Trafficking, and two consisting on exporting human trafficking from Bulgaria to Western Europe and a Skimming network. The final section is a summary of recommendations for improving the confrontation of TCNs. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation; Sophia, Bulgaria: Risk Monitor, 2013. 235p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.informeescaleno.com.ar/images/Understanding_the_Structure_Bulg_grant.pdf Shelf Number: 133820 Keywords: Border Security Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Gang Violence Gangs Human Trafficking Organized Crime Political Corruption

Author: Goodhand, Jonathan Title: Drugs, (dis)order and agrarian change: the political economy of drugs and its relevance to international drug policy Summary: In May 2014 the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) hosted a workshop, co-funded by NOREF and Christian Aid, designed to facilitate dialogue between scholars working on the political economy of drugs, conflict and development in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The workshop explored how political economy perspectives, derived from long-term empirical research on drugs-affected regions, can enhance understanding of, and policy responses to, drug production and trafficking. This approach, rather than seeing drugs as "exceptional" and "criminal", seeks to situate the role of illicit economies within broader processes of state formation and agrarian change. Contributions to the workshop revealed the highly differentiated and context-specific dynamics of drug economies, and how different configurations of institutions and security markets can lead to different kinds of relationships between drugs, state-building, agrarian change and development. This research does not lend itself to simple policy narratives or prescriptions, but it does suggest that there can be no universal and de-contextualised solutions to "the drug problem". Dogmatic and irreconcilable positions, adopted by both those advocating harsher prohibition and those arguing for blanket decriminalisation, fail to reflect sufficiently on the impacts such policies will have on drug-producing countries. A more grounded, comparative perspective is urgently needed in an arena where policies are often anything but evidence based and where data are patchy or politicised. Counter-narcotic (CN) strategies, based on a reification of the perceived linkages between drugs, instability and state fragility, often provide only a partial, and in some cases deeply misleading, insight into the economic and political orders that emerge around drug production. Political economy provides a corrective to these deeply entrenched biases and blind spots, by incorporating an analysis of aspects of drug economies and counter narcotics (CN) strategies that are frequently treated as residual or circumvented, including the varying levels and types of violence surrounding drug economies; the complex motives of those involved in drug production and trafficking; the linkages between licit and illicit commodities in processes of agrarian transformation; the potential developmental outcomes of drugs economies; the relationship between illicit economies and differing configurations of authority and rule; and a socially differentiated account of who gains and who loses from counter-narcotics policies. In doing so, political economy approaches provide a powerful analytical lens for developing a more contextually attuned public policy on drugs. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Publication: Accessed November 4, 2014 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/6ae957894148ed319a377eee7c775065.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/6ae957894148ed319a377eee7c775065.pdf Shelf Number: 133967 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Illegal Drugs

Author: Sacco, Lisa N. Title: Drug Enforcement in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends Summary: The federal government prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, and possession of many intoxicating substances that are solely intended for recreational use (notable exceptions are alcohol and tobacco); however, the federal government also allows for and controls the medical use of many intoxicants. Federal authority to control these substances primarily resides with the Attorney General of the United States. Over the last decade, the United States has shifted its stated drug control policy toward a comprehensive approach; one that focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. In order to restrict and reduce availability of illicit drugs in the United States, a practice referred to as "supply reduction," the federal government continues to place emphasis on domestic drug enforcement. According to the most recent drug control budget (FY2015) released by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), approximately 60% of all federal drug control spending is dedicated to supply reduction, with approximately 37% of the total budget dedicated to domestic law enforcement. Federal agencies, primarily the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), enforce federal controlled substances laws in all states and territories, but the majority of drug crimes known to U.S. law enforcement are dealt with at the state level. In the United States in 2012, the DEA arrested 30,476 suspects for federal drug offenses while state and local law enforcement arrested 1,328,457 suspects for drug offenses. In many cases, federal agencies assist state and local agencies with drug arrests, and suspects are referred for state prosecution, and vice-versa. Most drug arrests are made by state and local law enforcement, and most of these arrests are for possession rather than sale or manufacture. In contrast, most federal drug arrests are for trafficking offenses rather than possession. Over the last 25 years the majority of DEA's arrests have been for cocaine-related offenses. Trends in federal drug enforcement may reflect the nation's changing drug problems and changes in the federal response to these problems. They also may reflect the federal government's priorities. Drug cases represent the second highest category of criminal cases filed by U.S. Attorneys; however, federal drug cases have steadily declined over the last decade. This report focuses on domestic drug enforcement. It outlines historic development and major changes in U.S. drug enforcement to help provide an understanding of how and why certain laws and policies were implemented and how these developments and changes shaped current drug enforcement policy. In the 19th century federal, state, and local governments were generally not involved in restricting or regulating drug distribution and use, but this changed substantially in the 20th century as domestic law enforcement became the primary means of controlling the nation's substance abuse problems. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R43749: Accessed November 12, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43749.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43749.pdf Shelf Number: 134066 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Enforcement (U.S.) Drug Offenders Drug Policy Drug Regulations Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs

Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Changing the Game or Dropping the Ball? Mexico's Security and Anti-Crime Strategy under President Enrique Pena Nieto Summary: ANALYSIS - Even as the administration of Mexico's President Enrique Pena Nieto has scored important reform successes in the economic sphere, its security and law enforcement policy toward organized crime remains incomplete and ill-defined. Preoccupied with the fighting among vicious drug trafficking groups and the rise of anti-crime vigilante militias in the center of Mexico, the administration has for the most part averted its eyes from the previously highly-violent criminal hotspots in the north where major law enforcement challenges remain. - The Pena Nieto administration thus mostly continues to put out immediate security fires - such as in Michoacan and Tamaulipas - but the overall deterrence capacity of Mexico's military and law enforcement forces and justice sector continue to be very limited and largely unable to deter violence escalation and reescalation. - Identifying the need to reduce violence in Mexico as the most important priority for its security policy was the right decision of the Pena Nieto administration. But despite the capture of Mexico's most notorious drug trafficker, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, much of the security policy reform momentum that surrounded the Pena Nieto administration at the outset of its six-year term has prematurely dissipated. Key pillars of the policy are plodding along meekly, including the national gendarmerie, the new intelligence supercenter, and the mando unico. The October 2013 deadline to vet all police units for corruption and links to organized crime was missed once again and extended until October 2014. As with many institutional reforms in Mexico, there is large regional variation in the quality and even design of the reforms being implemented. At least, however, the Mexican Congress, overall a weak player in setting and overseeing anti-crime policy in Mexico, approved a new criminal code in the spring of 2014. The so-called National Code of Penal Procedure (Codigo Nacional de Procedimientos Penales) will be critical in establishing uniform application of criminal law across Mexico's thirty-one states and the Federal District, and standardizing procedures regarding investigations, trials, and punishment. - Instead of pushing ahead with institutional reforms, the Pena Nieto administration has highlighted poor coordination among national security agencies and local and national government units as a crucial cause of the rise of violent crime in Mexico. It has thus defined improving coordination as a key aspect of its anti-crime approach. - Despite its rhetoric and early ambitions, the Pena Nieto administration fell straight back not only into relying on the Mexican military in combination with the Federal Police to cope with criminal violence, but also doing so belatedly and with an essentially analogous lack of planning and prepositioning, and with essentially the same operational design as the previous Felipe Calderon administration. - Although homicides, including those perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), have decreased in Mexico, the drop did not reach the 50% reduction in the first six months in office that the Pena Nieto administration had promised. Moreover, in various parts of Mexico, the violence reduction cannot be necessarily attributed to government policies, but rather is the outcome of new balances of power being established among criminal groups in previously highly contested hotspots. Many of these balances of power among the DTOs had emerged already in the last years of the Felipe Calderon administration. In these areas of newly established criminal control and deterrence, even kidnapping and extortion might be leveling off and becoming more predictable, even as they are overall on the rise in Mexico. - In its security and law enforcement efforts, the Pena Nieto administration has largely slipped into many of the same policies of President Felipe Calderon. In particular, the current administration has adopted the same non-strategic high-value targeting that defined the previous administration. Perhaps with the exception of targeting the Zetas and Los Caballeros Templarios, this interdiction posture mostly continues to be undertaken on a non-strategic basis as opportunistic intelligence becomes available and without forethought, planning, and prepositioning to avoid new dangerous cycles of violence and renewed contestation among local drug trafficking groups. This development is partially the outcome of institutional inertia in the absence of an alternative strategy, and of operational simplicity, compared to, for example, a more effective but also more demanding policy of middle-level targeting. - Importantly, the Pena Nieto administration has sought to pay greater attention to and respect for human rights issues, such as by allowing civilian claims of human rights violations by Mexico's military forces to be tried in civilian courts and establishing a victims' compensation fund. But the efforts to increase rule of law, justice, and the protection of human rights and to reduce impunity and corruption remain very much a work in progress, with the government's resolve, policies, and outcomes varying widely among Mexico's states. - The Pena Nieto administration's focus on socio-economic anti-crime policies and other crime prevention measures is highly laudable. But its signature anti-crime socio-economic approach - the so-called poligonos program - has not been well-operationalized and is not integrated with law enforcement efforts. The discreet efforts remain scattered. The theory, implementation, and monitoring parameters of the national crime prevention strategy are not yet adequately worked out. These deficiencies undermine the program's effectiveness and risk dissipating the dedicated yet relatively small resources allocated to the effort as well as the effort's energy. Monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of socio-economic anti-crime efforts, including the poligonos approach, is particularly weak and nebulous. Details: Washington, DC: Latin American Initiative, Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20felbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20felbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf Shelf Number: 134070 Keywords: Criminal Justice Policy Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gangs Homicides Kidnapping Organized Crime Violence (Mexico) Violent Crime

Author: Farabee, David Title: It Came from the North: Estimating the Flow of Methamphetamine and Other Synthetic Drugs From Quebec, Canada Summary: The focus of this study was to estimate the size of synthetic drug production (methamphetamine in particular) in Quebec, Canada, assess its export potential, and explore implications for counter-narcotics policies. Research on drug trafficking in the U.S. has mostly centered on Latin America-particularly Mexico-in recent years due to widely publicized violence. However, there have been well documented cases of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Canada, such as the Hells Angels and Asian gangs, that produce and transport large quantities of cannabis and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) into the U.S. Official reports from both countries and the United Nations suggest that Canada is becoming a major global supplier of synthetic drugs. But little empirical research has been conducted to verify these claims or to estimate the size of the drug trade. Estimating the production and trafficking of any illicit drugs is a daunting endeavor because conventional sampling or statistical procedures are inadequate. However, without reliable empirical knowledge, policy making becomes problematic. Innovative methods therefore must be used to acquire the information in a systematic, albeit incremental, manner. In this study, we used capture-recapture sampling and multiple data sources to gauge this "hidden market" and its impact on the U.S. drug market. The scientific as well as policy implications of this empirical effort cannot be overstated at a time when there is a resurgence of high-quality synthetic drugs in the U.S. Policy makers and law enforcement agencies are searching for valid empirical measures to marshal resources to mount counter measures. The specific objectives of this study were as follows: 1. What is the scale of production and consumption of ATS in Quebec Canada, based on capture-recapture sampling and analysis of official data? 2. What is the difference between production and consumption, assuming any surplus is intended for export to other North American markets? 3. How are these drugs manufactured in Quebec (using lab records of chemical composition assays of seized drugs to establish the origin of production)? 4. What are the organizational characteristics of those involved in the production and distribution of methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs in Quebec? 5. What threats do these criminal organizations pose to both the U.S. and Canada, and what policy implications can be drawn from our impact estimates? This study capitalized on existing data sources and field research opportunities already established by our Canadian colleagues. We had access to data sources of multiple years, which are necessary for repeated sampling of the target population. The capture-recapture method specified in this proposal has been around for many years but have rarely been applied to organized crime research, particularly impact assessment. Based on our findings, it appears that the same method can be applied to assess the impact of other illicit commodities or enterprising activities because inference to larger populations is possible under theoretical and empirical assumptions. Findings from this joint effort by U.S.- and Canada-based researchers provide much needed empirical guidance to policy makers of federal and local governments of both countries. Details: Final Report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2014. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248134.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248134.pdf Shelf Number: 134076 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Policy Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Methamphetamine (U.S.; Canada) Organized Crime

Author: Maiga, Aissata Title: New Frontiers: Russian-Speaking Organized Crime in Latin America Summary: Russian-speaking organized crime is capitalizing on and flourishing in the "permissive environment" of Latin American countries. Principally involved in drug trafficking and money laundering, it is also colluding effectively with local criminal cartels. The Kremlin has initiated collaborative steps to counter organized crime in the region, but initiatives from EU countries are so far largely lacking in a domain that requires greater international cooperation. Details: Nacka, Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2013. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 133: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-maiga-kego-new-frontiers-russian-organized-crime-in-latin-america.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-maiga-kego-new-frontiers-russian-organized-crime-in-latin-america.pdf Shelf Number: 134086 Keywords: Criminal Cartels Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime (Latin America)

Author: Vargas Meza, Ricardo Title: Drugs, Armed Conflict and Peace. How does the agreement on drugs between the government and the FARC help to put an end to the armed conflict in Colombia? Summary: This policy briefing analyses the results of the partial agreement on drugs reached at the talks being held in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, and the Colombian government. analysis is based on the joint communique issued on 16 May 2014, the eve of the first round of the presidential election in Colombia. Following a brief introduction to the drugs issue in the broader framework of the peace talks, the briefing looks at how the subject of illicit crops, drug use and trafficking is dealt with in the agreement. It concludes with an assessment of the progress that the agreement represents in terms of the link between drugs and armed conflict. Key Points - The diversity of participants in the war who are involved in drug trafficking has led to a complex scenario in which the guerrilla groups are only one part of the problem. The criminal economy is able to continue operating regardless of who controls security in the producer regions. - The territorial approach that the agreement rhetorically claims to adopt is weak. It is not based on an integrated view of the territory and reduces it to the coca situation. A genuinely territorial approach would open the door to participation by rural settlers, indigenous and African-descent communities and give them a say in their territory's future. - The agreement is a ratification of the ongoing relevance of the current approach to drugs, which is based on prohibition. In this case, the objective is the total elimination of both coca and drug trafficking. To insist on "eradicating drug trafficking" is to repeat old recipes in new packaging because it leaves intact the very mechanism that makes the drug trade competitive: continued prohibition. - The agreement ignores the significant level of progress made in processes that have become stronger and currently represent a critical mass in favour of a regulation scenario. These processes include the development of harm reduction models. These models are based on the understanding that drugs must be accepted as a reality that must be lived with, while preventing or minimising the harm that drugs may cause to users. - The agreement fails to envisage a strategic approach to the problem, including the seeking of commitments from other countries to rethink the current policy on drugs. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2014. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Drug Policy Briefings Nr 42: Accessed November 25, 2014 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dpb_42_eng_072014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dpb_42_eng_072014.pdf Shelf Number: 134252 Keywords: Armed Conflict Drug Abuse and Addiction (Colombia) Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Illicit Crops

Author: Kavanagh, Camino Title: Harmonizing Drug Legislation in West Africa - A Call for Minimum Standards Summary: In 2008 ECOWAS produced a Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan to address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse. In 2013, the Action Plan was formally extended, and priority was placed on the conduct of an extensive review "of existing Member states - legislation with a view to achieving a common minimum standard to ensure sufficient deterrent against illicit trafficking and enhance the use demand reduction strategies to address problem associated with drug use in line with relevant regional and international conventions." As part of that process, the Heads of ECOWAS Drug Control Committees called on the ECOWAS Commission "to harmonize ECOWAS legal texts into a single and up to date regional protocol on drug control and prevention of organized crime." In addition to the ECOWAS initiative, other efforts are underway in the region to harmonize drug legislation. The latter include: i. The Dakar Initiative, a sub-regional initiative signed by seven countries in February 2010. The Initiative intends to support the implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan and the Political Declaration. One of the main outcomes of the Dakar Initiative to date is an effort by the Senegalese Ministry of Interior to draft "a document [aimed at] harmoniz[ing] existing national legal instruments at a sub-regional level to fight drug trafficking in a coordinated and more efficient manner." A first draft of the 'harmonization law' was tabled in November 2012. ii. The West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors (WACAP), a UNODC-backed initiative aimed at improving cooperation in criminal matters in the West African region and serving as a basis for capacity building. The first meeting of the Network was held in May 2013 in Abidjan, Cote d�Ivoire. In January 2013 the West Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD) was launched with the purpose of inter alia mobilizing public awareness, and developing evidence-based policy recommendations around drug trafficking and drug consumption and related impacts. Throughout its country visits and in the background papers commissioned to inform its work, WACD Commissioners were repeatedly informed of the significant challenges that persist with regard to drug related legislation in the sub-region, as well as challenges regarding the effective implementation of the legislation. Beyond a range of technical challenges cited, and the lack of the necessary expertise on the part of law enforcement and the judiciary for implementing drug-related legislation, the Commissioners were also informed on repeated occasions that people who use drugs and low-level drug dealers tend to be the ones who feel the brunt of the law, while high-level actors in the drug market tend to benefit most from legal inconsistencies or loopholes, corruption or political interference in due process. In addition, despite the human right protections directly or indirectly provided for in national legislation, these are rarely respected when it comes to providing treatment for people who have come into conflict with the law for drug-related offences. In this regard, and cognizant of the fact that different initiatives are already underway in West Africa, the WACD commissioned an empirically informed paper on a sampling of national drug laws and related legislation in four (4) countries in West Africa. As a means to better understand how legislation is being applied in practice, the paper was also informed by interviews with law enforcement and prison officials as well as a sampling of people in pre-trial detention or serving sentences for drug offences in the same four countries. The four countries selected for the case studies are Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Guinea (the questionnaires for the prison sampling dimension of the case studies can be found in Annex B and C). The findings of the four case studies were presented to the WACD at its third meeting held in Accra, Ghana in October 2013. Subsequently, a small expert group drew from the case study findings, analysis of legislation in other countries (particularly Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia), and the findings from other background papers commissioned by the WACD to develop this synthesis report which puts forward a series of recommendations for minimum standards for drug related legislation in the region. It is hoped that the findings and recommendations of this synthesis report will fuel further discussion and serve as constructive input to ECOWAS and national policy makers as they move toward reviewing and harmonizing national drug legislation in West Africa. Details: West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2014. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: WACD Background paper No. 9(1): Accessed November 26, 2014 at: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Harmonizing-Drug-Legislation-in-West-Africa-2014-06-05.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Harmonizing-Drug-Legislation-in-West-Africa-2014-06-05.pdf Shelf Number: 134256 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Policy (West Africa) Drug Regulation Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Mejia, Daniel Title: The Economics of the War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking Summary: We model the war on drugs in source countries as a conflict over scarce inputs of successive levels of the production and trafficking chain. We explicitly model the vertical structure of the drug trade as being composed of several stages, and study how different policies aimed at different stages affect the supply, prices and input markets. We use the model to study Plan Colombia, a large scale intervention in Colombia aimed at reducing the supply of cocaine by targeting illicit crops and illegal armed groups' control of the routes used to transport drugs outside of the country - two of the main inputs of the production and trafficking chain. The model fits many of the patterns found in the data and sheds light on certain puzzling findings. For a reasonable set of parameters that match well the data on the war on drugs under Plan Colombia, our model predicts that the marginal cost to the U.S. of reducing the amount of cocaine transacted in retail markets by one kilogram is $1,631.900 if resources are allocated to eradication efforts; and $267.450 per kilogram if resources are allocated to interdiction efforts Details: Bogota, Colombia: Universidad De Los Andes-Cede, Department of Economics, 2013. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Documento CEDE No. 2013-54 : Accessed November 26, 2014 at: http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/dcede2013-54.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/dcede2013-54.pdf Shelf Number: 134261 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Drug Trafficking Economics of Crime Plan Colombia War on Drugs (U.S.)

Author: Hollist, Dusten Title: An Examination of Economic Analyses Approaches for Montan's Severn Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Forces Summary: - Drug abuse and associated crime continue to be one of the largest social problems in the U.S. Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Forces (MJDTFs) emerged in the 1970's, in order to emphasize and provide greater levels of drug law enforcement. - The Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1998) provided funding for the Bureau Justice Statistics to administer the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program (JAG). - JAG is used to fund state-level programs that address problems resulting from crime, addiction, and drug trafficking. MJDTFs across the country are funded through the JAG mechanism. - This report outlines the development of a research design to conduct an economic analysis of Montana's seven MJDTFs. - It includes a review of the existing literature that has been published on economic assessments of MJDTFs, the feasibility and factors that will be needed to complete an economic assessment, and a review of the importance of existing data needed to conduct the analysis. Details: Missoula, MT: Criminology Research Group, Social Science Research Laboratory, University of Montana, Missoula, 2014. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 15, 2015 at: http://mbcc.mt.gov/Data/SAC/DTF/2014DTFEconAssessDevlReport.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://mbcc.mt.gov/Data/SAC/DTF/2014DTFEconAssessDevlReport.pdf Shelf Number: 134411 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Economic Assessment Economics of Crime (Montana)

Author: Mounteney, Jane Title: The Internet and drug markets: Summary of results from an EMCDDA Trendspotter study Summary: The speed with which the Internet is transforming drug markets poses a major challenge to law enforcement, public health, research and monitoring agencies. This study aims to raise understanding of the current online supply of drugs and to map the range of Internet markets in existence. Details: Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2015. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 5, 2015 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_234684_EN_Internet%20and%20drug%20markets%20study.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_234684_EN_Internet%20and%20drug%20markets%20study.pdf Shelf Number: 134550 Keywords: Drug Markets (Europe) Drug Trafficking Internet Crimes Social Media

Author: Beltran, Isaac De Leon Title: Urban drug markets and zones of impunity in Colombia: The assumptions and the facts behind the retail drug trade and the responses to it Summary: On 1 April 2013, after visiting the Bronx, one of Bogota's main enclaves of crime and drug dealing, President Juan Manuel Santos announced that the authorities would be dismantling 24 drug outlets in 20 cities around the country in the space of 60 days. "War unleashed against Colombia's 'ollas' (drug dens)" was the headline in one of the country's leading newspapers. One year later, the national news channels broadcast images of bulldozers literally demolishing the buildings where the drug dens functioned, in joint operations by the police and the public prosecutor's office. The measure looked like a publicity coup in the midst of the election contest, but several organisations and analysts warned that it would do nothing to solve a problem that has multiple causes. Those narratives and explanations that place the local drug market alongside violence and crime - especially in urban settings - have gained strength in the last decade. This is despite the fact that drug trafficking in cities and the influence of criminal organisations in the local urban economy is nothing new. On the contrary, although the major trafficking networks have given priority to exporting the drugs produced in the country, they have also shown interest in the local market, which has allowed them to gain control of urban territory. The retail drug trade has been identified by the authorities as a strategic priority, under the hypothesis that it is one of the main triggers of violence and crime, as well as a response by the criminal organisations to their loss of influence in global markets. How valid is this argument? The interaction of local drug markets with violence and crime is complex and goes in more than one direction. Furthermore, at least in the case of Colombia's cities, it is very difficult to separate it off from other types of criminal economies. The aim of this briefing is to put to the test the starting points and assumptions underlying the definition of this 'new' threat, and provide an overview of local drug markets and their relationship with violence and crime in Colombia's cities. It will therefore analyse recent developments in criminal activity, how the criminal organisations have adapted in response to interventions by the state, and the forces involved in shaping the local drug market. In particular, it will analyse the retail drug trade in two of Colombia's cities, Cali and Barranquilla, in order to connect this illegal market to the presence of criminal organisations and high-impact crimes. These two cases will provide important evidence regarding the spatial dynamics of the retail drug trade and its implications for urban security. Finally, the main findings will be contrasted with government proposals to tackle the problem, offering some lessons learned and recommendations. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute (TNI), 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Series on Drug Markets and Violence Nr 2: Accessed February 27, 2015 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv2.pdf Shelf Number: 134725 Keywords: Drug Addiction and Crime Drug Markets (Colombia) Drug Related Violence Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2014: Lao PDR, Myanmar Summary: This year's Southeast Asia Opium Survey shows that despite continued eradication efforts, opium production remains a significant challenge to sustainable development in the region. Poppy cultivation in the 'Golden Triangle' of Myanmar and Lao PDR rose in 2014 to 63,800ha, compared with 61,200ha in 2013. The estimated total amount of opium produced in the area in 2014 is approximately 762 tons, with the overwhelming majority of cultivation continuing to take place in Myanmar. The data further emphasize the urgent need to address root causes of cultivation and promote alternative development. Surveys of farmers indicate that, for many, the money made from poppy cultivation is an essential part of family income and support. Villages threatened with food insecurity and poverty need sustainable alternatives, or they will have little choice beyond growing this cash crop out of desperation. Indications of high levels of consumption of the refined form of opium - heroin - in parts of the region also represent a clear danger to health and development, underscoring the need for evidence-based, health-centred approaches to prevention and treatment. Efforts to tackle the trafficking of heroin and essential precursor chemicals by criminal groups must also be supported. Most of the heroin trafficked from Myanmar goes to neighbouring countries to meet demand in large population centres, but it is also trafficked to other parts of the region and to global markets. Meanwhile, precursors required to produce heroin are trafficked into Myanmar from neighbouring countries. This two-way trade in and out of the Golden Triangle needs to be halted. Traffickers also appear to be exploiting well-intended regional connectivity and integration plans, including the ASEAN Economic Community and supporting initiatives of international financial institutions. Efforts need to be made to strengthen the capacity and coordination of border, justice and health authorities to counter this transnational challenge. A balanced approach addressing opium production through alternative livelihood initiatives, preventing drug use and providing evidence-based treatment, while countering trafficking of heroin and related precursor chemicals, in line with the international drug control conventions and compliance with human rights standards, should be prioritized by states and international partners to safeguard and promote the region's sustainable development. Details: Bangkok: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2014. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 11, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/sea/SE-ASIA-opium-poppy-2014-web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/sea/SE-ASIA-opium-poppy-2014-web.pdf Shelf Number: 134897 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Heroin Opium (Asia) Organized Crime

Author: Transform Drug Policy Foundation Title: Ending the War on Drugs: How to win the global drug policy debate Summary: This is a guide to making the case for drug policy and law reform from a position of confidence and authority, with a particular focus on the issue of legal regulation of currently illegal drug markets - an issue that is now core to the drugs debate. It is for every policymaker, media commentator, and campaigner who not only recognises that the 'war on drugs' is a counterproductive failure that is creating catastrophic unintended consequences, but who also wants to convince others to back reform. It will equip you with the constructive arguments, different approaches and nuanced messaging needed to address the concerns and interests of diverse audiences. This will enable you to not just win the argument, but make the new allies needed to turn the current unparalleled momentum for reform into concrete policy change nationally and internationally. Details: London: Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2015. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2015 at: http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/ending-war-drugs-how-win-global-drug-policy-debate Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/ending-war-drugs-how-win-global-drug-policy-debate Shelf Number: 134951 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Reform Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Illicit Trade War on Drugs

Author: Goodman, Mary Beth Title: To Stem the Flow of Illicit Drugs from Afghanistan, Follow the Money Summary: Corruption poses an existential challenge to Afghanistan's stability, as well as its political and economic development. Under the leadership of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, there is an opportunity for the United States to capitalize on the newly expressed political will of Afghanistan's elected leaders to curb corruption. Afghanistan's national unity government has prioritized the fight against the epidemic of graft plaguing the country, and this fight is intricately tied to the production and flow of drugs. Although the United States has invested $8 billion-as of December 30, 2014-in counternarcotics efforts, Afghanistan still leads the world in opium production, and its farmers are growing more opium than ever before. The sale of opium and cannabis - another drug of which Afghanistan is a leading cultivator on the international market - produces huge sums of cash that must be laundered, or made clean, so it can appear legitimate. This parallel market and the illicit financial transactions that sustain it have a debilitating impact on the rule of law in Afghanistan; undermine the legitimacy of government institutions; and ultimately impede the ability of the Afghan government to provide basic services to its citizens. Because no bank outside of Afghanistan denominates in the Afghani-the country's national currency-the state's drug trade runs on the flow of international currencies such as U.S. dollars, euros, and British pounds. Moreover, the weak oversight of anti-money laundering controls coupled with the systemic corruption plaguing Afghan institutions serves to compound the narcotics conundrum. The Afghan drug trade poses an immediate and urgent threat to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and to the integrity of the Afghan state itself. Greater efforts must be made to stem the flow of money derived from the narcotics trade in order to significantly reduce Afghanistan's narcotics production and curb corruption. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2015. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2015 at: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AfghanistanNarcotics-brief.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AfghanistanNarcotics-brief.pdf Shelf Number: 134975 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trade Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Money Laundering Narcotics (Afghanistan)

Author: Australian Crime Commission Title: The Australian methylamphetamine market: the national picture Summary: This report aims to provide a concise understanding of the nature of organised crime involvement in the Australian methylamphetamine market. The ACC monitors all illicit drug markets through its High Risk and Emerging Drugs Special Operation. Through this work, the ACC has assessed that methylamphetamine poses the greatest threat to the Australian public of all illicit drug types. The ACC's annual Illicit Drug Data Report provides a detailed and comprehensive statistical picture of the illicit drug threat to Australia and provides an in-depth statistical analysis of the illicit drug market. The Australian Methylamphetamine Market: The National Picture is a complementary intelligence report. This report provides a brief summation of the national picture of the methylamphetamine threat. It explores the international and national dimensions of the methylamphetamine market, outlines the role of organised crime in driving the Australian market, the nature of the market, and the harms associated with methylamphetamine use. It also examines the diversion of precursor chemicals required to produce methylamphetamine in clandestine laboratories. It does this by consolidating open source information with operational and strategic intelligence collected by the ACC and Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies. The release of this report is designed to: �inform the widest possible audience, including those who are not privy to classified law enforcement intelligence; �generate discussion and dialogue about what can be done to tackle the methylamphetamine problem; �enable individuals, friends and families to understand the nature of the harms; caused by methylamphetamine and influence those around them to minimise harm �inform the national response to the methylamphetamine market. Details: Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2015 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/acc_theaustralianmethylamphetaminemarket_mar_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/acc_theaustralianmethylamphetaminemarket_mar_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 135060 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Markets (Australia) Drug Trafficking Methamphetamine Organized Crime

Author: Day, Marcus Title: Making a mountain out of a molehill: myths on youth and crime in Saint Lucia Summary: This report reflects a short summary of one year (2012) of ethnographic observations and 'informal conversations' with various stakeholders across Saint Lucia, a small Caribbean nation. The effort was undertaken to assess the profile of youth gangs and their members in order to add depth to existing analysis on gangs in the Caribbean by using one country as a model. This summary of the report focuses on the interaction between the cannabis and cocaine markets, and the role of youth in that trade on the one hand, and the increase in violence indicators on the other. The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and individual member states face shared challenges of youth involvement in crime, violence, gangs and other anti-social activities. It is not uncommonly heard the "drug problem" is to be blamed for this. This briefing wants to show this relation is far more complex and often misunderstood. Saint Lucia is a small island state, one of the fifteen members of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). It became independent from the United Kingdom in 1979, and is situated in the south eastern part of the Caribbean and has a population of around 180 thousand. The Caribbean region, due to its proximity to cocaine producers in the South and its well established trading links with Europe and North America is well positioned as a transit zone, accounting for an estimated 25-30 per cent of cocaine reaching Europe. The main destination for the bulk of cocaine transiting Saint Lucia is Martinique and onward to Paris and beyond. The isolated coast lines and island geography contribute to the popularity of the sub region for the transhipment of cocaine. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Series on Drug Markets and Violence, Nr 3: Accessed April 6, 2015 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv3-e.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Caribbean URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv3-e.pdf Shelf Number: 135160 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence

Author: O'Neill, Emma Title: Major drug offences: current sentencing practices Summary: This report examines current sentencing practices for the three reference offences: - cultivating a commercial quantity of narcotic plants; - trafficking in a drug of dependence in a commercial quantity; and - trafficking in a drug of dependence in a large commercial quantity. The report covers the five-year reference period from 2008-09 to 2012-13. In total, over 600 cases have been analysed in order to present the following information for each of the reference offences: - a profile of sentencing factors (for example, plea entered, prospects of rehabilitation); - high-level sentencing outcomes for the offence as a whole; and - profiles of particular sub-groups of cases and their sentencing outcomes. This report is the Council's third on current sentencing practices. The Council is also examining current sentencing practices for major driving offences in an upcoming report. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, 2015. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2015 at: https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/Major%20Drug%20Offences%20Current%20Sentencing%20Practices.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/Major%20Drug%20Offences%20Current%20Sentencing%20Practices.pdf Shelf Number: 135241 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Sentencing (Australia)

Author: Lessing, Benjamin Title: The Logic of Violence in Drug Wars: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia Summary: Why have militarized interventions to curtail violence by drug cartels had wildly divergent results? In the past six years, state crackdowns drove a nine-fold increase in cartel-state violence in Mexico, versus a two-thirds decrease in Brazil. Prevailing analyses of drug wars as a criminal subtype of insurgency provide little traction, because they elide differences in rebels' and cartels' aims. Cartels, I argue, fight states not to conquer territory or political control, but to coerce state actors and influence policy outcomes. The empirically predominant channel is violent corruption-threatening enforcers while negotiating bribes. A formal model reveals that greater state repression raises bribe prices, leading cartels to fight back whenever (a) corruption is sufficiently rampant, and (b) repression is insufficiently conditional on cartels' use of violence. Variation in conditionality helps explain observed outcomes: switching to conditional repression pushed Brazilian cartels into nonviolent strategies, while Mexico's war "without distinctions" inadvertently made fighting advantageous. Details: Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development, Stanford University, 2013. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper no. 145: Accessed April 20, 2015 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/145.Violent_Corruption_CDDRL_Working_Paper.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/145.Violent_Corruption_CDDRL_Working_Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 135319 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug Wars Drug-Related Violence

Author: Kasang, Nicholas Title: Socio-spatial violence prevention: Inhibiting violence in Caracas, Venezuela through spatial planning Summary: Contemporary urban growth in many cities in Latin American and Africa has been accompanied by unprecedented levels of urban violence. Latin America epitomizes this trend as three of the world's most dangerous cities, Ciudad Juarez, San Pedro Sula, and Caracas, are located within this region (JACOME; GRATIUS, 2011, p. 2). Of these three, Caracas is notable because its exorbitant homicide rate cannot be explicitly attributed to the illicit drug trade-cartel wars that consume Mexico, nor is it represented by the civil conflict-gang violence that afflicts Central America. Moreover, the Venezuelan context is further distinguished as inequality, which is consistently cited as the primary catalyst for the emergence of everyday reactionary violence, is not overtly characteristic of the contemporary situation. Rather, caraque�o insecurity has largely been attributed to the exacerbation of social factors that perpetuate violence as "(...) an end in itself or a [mechanism] to injure/ eliminate another person in order to resolve an interpersonal conflict (...)" (SANJUAN, 2002, p. 95). Based on this reality, this work proposes the inclusion of socio-spatial interventions into contemporary prevention initiatives. Spatial interventions have shown a "(...) significant capacity to prevent the occurrence of violence in areas that are either totally or partially excluded from economic development and larger society (...)� (DIAZ; MELLER, 2012, p. 23). Implications of this work have the capacity to augment predominantly technical violence prevention precedent and enhance knowledge on alternative mechanisms to prevent insecurity. This study employs a comprehensive literature review in conjunction with data analyses in the development of a spatial proposal for Caracas. Details: urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestao Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), 2014. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.scielo.br/pdf/urbe/v6n2/07.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Venezuela URL: http://www.scielo.br/pdf/urbe/v6n2/07.pdf Shelf Number: 135421 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Homicides Urban Areas Urban Violence (Brazil) Violent Crime

Author: Dube, Arindrajit Title: Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico Summary: To what extent, and under what conditions, does access to arms fuel violent crime? To answer this question, we exploit a unique natural experiment: the 2004 expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban exerted a spillover on gun supply in Mexican municipios near Texas, Arizona and New Mexico, but not near California, which retained a pre-existing state-level ban. We find first that Mexican municipios located closer to the non-California border states experienced differential increases in homicides, gun-related homicides and crime gun seizures in the post-2004 period. Second, the magnitude of this effect is contingent on political factors related to Mexico's democratic transition. Killings increased substantially more in municipios where local elections had become more competitive prior to 2004, with the largest differentials emerging in high narco-trafficking areas. Our findings are consistent with the notion that political competition undermined informal agreements between drug cartels and entrenched local governments, highlighting the role of political instability in mediating the gun-crime relationship. Details: Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2012. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7098: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7098.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7098.pdf Shelf Number: 135425 Keywords: Assault Weapons Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Gun Control Gun-Related Violence Homicides Violent Crime

Author: Eventon, Ross Title: Justifying Militarisation; 'Counter-Narcotics' and 'Counter Narco-Terrorism' Summary: Three inter-related developments within US foreign policy have emerged in recent years: the militarisation of Central America states under the auspices of confronting drug trafficking organisations and improving human security; the deployment of militarised DEA agents overseas; and the emergence of 'counter narco-terrorism' as a means of justifying such policies. The DEA's Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST) carry out investigations and targeted interdiction operations overseas. They are an upgrade to a similar programme begun in the 1980s and later abandoned, and emerged in their recent form in Afghanistan in 2005 as a funding-focused counter-insurgency initiative. FAST have since been deployed in Central America where agents work alongside repressive security forces and have been implicated in a number of civilian deaths. A surge of US aid to Central American security forces justified largely as 'counter-narcotics' funding continues a well-established trend: 'counter-narcotics' is often a synonym for militarisation. Through its parallel support for 'iron fist' policies, Washington has deepened the repressive capabilities of the local security forces. The concern with drug trafficking and human security is superficial. The overarching aim of US funding is the opening of the local economies to foreign investment, and the support of local political groups amenable to this agenda. In justifying the increased aid to Central America, US officials present a simplistic interpretation of the local situation: drug trafficking and gangs are responsible for violence, and this means the 'cartels' must be 'confronted' militarily. The interpretation is useful in facilitating the fulfilment of strategic goals. In reality, the conditions in Central America - the rising levels of violence and trafficking, the poverty, the economic inequality, marginalisation and political repression - are in large part the result of Washington's intervention. Linking these developments is the use by US officials of 'counter narco-terrorism' as a justification for chosen policies. In Afghanistan, FAST has been touted as such a programme - regardless of the fact that Washington does not officially consider the Taliban a terrorist group. In Central America, officials have publicly offered the same explanation for their policies without providing any substantiating evidence. A strenuous effort to generate such a connection appears to be underway, whether any link exists in reality or not. It is too easy to say 'counter-narcotics' operations are failing or misguided. Washington's policies in Central America may well have disastrous results for many, but through the maintenance of a certain status quo and the improvement of the climate for business and investment, they are undoubtedly a success for others Details: Swansea University, Global Drug Policy Observatory, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Report 3: Accessed May 6, 2015 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/Justifying-Militarisation-Swansea-university.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/Justifying-Militarisation-Swansea-university.pdf Shelf Number: 135514 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Policy Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Vioolence

Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:The Merida Initiative and Beyond Summary: Violence perpetrated by a range of criminal groups continues to threaten citizen security and governance in some parts of Mexico, a country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border and more than $500 billion in annual trade. Although organized crime-related violence in Mexico has generally declined since 2011, analysts estimate that it may have claimed more than 80,000 lives between December 2006 and December 2014. Recent cases - particularly the disappearance of 43 students in Guerrero, Mexico in September 2014 - have drawn attention to the problems of corruption and impunity for human rights abuses in Mexico. Supporting Mexico's efforts to reform its criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality and better protecting citizen security in the country. U.S. support for those efforts has increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Merida Initiative, a bilateral partnership launched in 2007 for which Congress has appropriated some $2.5 billion. U.S. assistance focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. Inaugurated to a six-year term in December 2012, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has continued U.S.-Mexican security cooperation begun during the Felipe Calderon government. Pena Nieto has requested increased assistance for judicial reform and prevention efforts, but limited U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence operations. Despite those restrictions, U.S. intelligence has helped Mexico arrest top crime leaders, including Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman - the world's most wanted drug trafficker - in February 2014.The Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through which Merida training and equipment requests are coordinated and intelligence is channeled. The 114th Congress is continuing to fund and oversee the Merida Initiative and related domestic initiatives. From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress appropriated roughly $2.5 billion in Merida Initiative assistance for Mexico, including some $194 million provided in the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235). That total is $79 million above the Administration's request; it aims to support efforts to secure Mexico's southern border and justice sector programs. As of April 2015, more than $1.3 billion of Merida Initiative assistance had been delivered. The FY2016 request for the Merida Initiative is for $119 million to help advance justice sector reform, modernize Mexico's borders (north and south), and support violence prevention programs. Possible questions for oversight may include the following. 1) How is the State Department measuring the efficacy of Merida programs and improving or eliminating ineffective programs? 2) To what extent is the Mexican government moving judicial and police reform efforts forward, and how is U.S. assistance supporting those reforms? 3) Are Merida-funded programs helping the Mexican government respond to new challenges and priorities, including securing its southern border? 4) Is Mexico meeting the human rights conditions placed on Merida Initiative funding? Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: R41349: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Shelf Number: 135554 Keywords: Border Security Criminal Justice Reform Drug Trafficking Merida Initiative Organized Crime Violence

Author: Applied Research Services, Inc. Title: Georgia Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force Process and Outcome Evaluation 2014 Summary: Applied Research Services, Inc. (ARS) was retained by the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces (MJTFs) in the state of Georgia. In addition to a review of relevant literature and extant studies of MJTFs, considerable process and outcome data were collected and analyzed. We examined both qualitative data (from surveys, interviews and reports) and quantitative data (from state computerized criminal history data and official crime and arrest reports). The research literature can unfortunately be characterized by inconsistent findings as to the degree to which MJTFs, when compared to non-MJTFs, meet their key objectives. These reports describe trends but lack scientific rigor necessary to be considered empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of MJTFs. The fundamental questions often remain unanswered. Do jurisdictions participating in drug task forces outperform jurisdictions that do not participate? Even if task forces appear to outperform non-task force sites in law enforcement collaboration and productivity, do their efforts have any measurable impact on the local, illicit drug market? Are MJTFs cost effective when compared to other strategies? Previous research has also been characterized as employing weak study designs, often failing to compare "similarly situated jurisdictions" with and without task forces. Thus differences in drug arrest activity across jurisdictions can be due to a whole host of reasons, of which having a task force is only one. The present study sought to address such study design issues through the application of advanced statistical procedures (propensity score matching) in an effort to approximate the scientific benefits of random assignment to treatment and control groups (MJTF and non-MJTF jurisdictions). Key evaluation findings include the following: - Crime and arrest data indicate that as the total number of Georgia arrests have fallen, the percentage of arrests involving drugs (whether as the most serious charge or not) has declined as well. - Interview and survey findings indicate that stakeholders participating in MJTFs report experiencing high levels of communication, coordination, and collaboration regarding drug interdiction efforts. The majority of survey respondents also indicated that MJTFs are effective at reducing the availability of drugs in the community and agreed that the task force is an effective way to address the problems of illegal drug activity. Most also agreed that their task force has allowed law enforcement partners to move beyond low-level deals to focus on more highly organized drug activity, a key goal of MJTFs. - Both the survey findings and personal interviews reveal Georgia��s drug task forces in a very positive light. Respondents report that the task forces meet their goals, build strong cases, reduce the amount of drugs in the community, communicate well between partners, provide positive feedback about task force Commanders and receive high levels of task force agent training. The Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory indicates strong collaborative efforts and effectiveness. The main area of concern expressed throughout the surveys and interviews was funding. - A comprehensive analysis of quantitative data revealed few differences between MJTF and non-MJTF counties on key outcome variables of interest, such as arrest rates and overall characteristics of arrestees. Our analysis of statewide computerized arrest data did however reveal a significant finding regarding the age and chronicity of arrestees across MJTF and non-MJTF sites. In particular, MJTF sites were more likely to arrest serious young drug distribution offenders. Findings strongly suggest that the efforts of MJTF jurisdictions were more focused on, and successful in, apprehending young drug offenders who had already accumulated a large number of distribution charges. - It does not appear that the specific efforts undertaken in MJTF jurisdictions are sufficient enough to impact aggregate crime and drug arrest trends. Despite a lack of demonstrated differences in outcomes, it is possible that the drug task forces are actually meeting their stated goals but that current measures remain insensitive to this activity. It is also possible that counties included in the comparison sample may in fact participate in drug task force activities, just not the federally-funded MJTFs included in the present study. Given the existence of county or otherwise funded drug task forces in Georgia, it is not unreasonable to assume that at least some of the comparison counties were in fact part of non-federally funded task forces. As such, they would ostensibly benefit from the collaborative and coordinated efforts noted in the surveys and interviews of MJTF members, thus potentially confounding the matching process. Finally, it is recommended that future evaluations of MJTFs take the maturity level and sophistication level of each unique task force into account, as these factors likely impact directly the level of drug trafficking each MJTF can effectively target. Longitudinal or case study designs are recommended as a means of addressing this critical factor. Details: Atlanta: George Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, 2014. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://cjcc.georgia.gov/sites/cjcc.georgia.gov/files/GA%20MJTF%20Process%20Outcome%20Evaluation%202014_FINAL1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://cjcc.georgia.gov/sites/cjcc.georgia.gov/files/GA%20MJTF%20Process%20Outcome%20Evaluation%202014_FINAL1.pdf Shelf Number: 135684 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Enforcement Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking

Author: Caulkins, Jonathan P. Title: After the Grand Fracture: Scenarios for the Collapse of the International Drug Control Regime Summary: Key Findings - Decriminalizing the possession of amounts of marijuana suitable for personal use has minimal repercussions beyond a nation's borders. But even one country's legalization of a commercial cocaine or heroin industry would affect global markets. - International prohibitions against cocaine and heroin create asymmetries. Production and transshipment concentrate in relatively few places that bear the bulk of the negative externalities created by the illegal production and international trade. - The impact of negative externalities has led to calls for altering the United Nations treaty framework and for individual nations to legalize outside of the existing framework. - Legalization of production in one country would attract productive activities (with their associated externalities) from the remaining illicit producers. This incentivizes current producing countries to encourage others to take the first step. - Legalization of transshipment in one country would attract transportation activities from existing jurisdictions where drugs remain illegal since it would reduce the need for traffickers to assume the risk of covert shipments or armed guards. - The impact of legalized transshipment of cocaine is different for the United States and for other regions of the world. As the United States shares a large porous border with Mexico, current covert smuggling networks would continue to operate. Transshipment to Europe and Asia would take place through regular trade routes, principally containers, given the distances involved. - If a European or Asian state with large porous land borders were to legalize transshipment, it would attract the bulk of cocaine transported to their region, producing covert smuggling networks similar to those currently existing on the U.S.-Mexico border. Details: Washington, DC: Brooking Institute, 2015. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Caulkinsfinal.pdf?la=en Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Caulkinsfinal.pdf?la=en Shelf Number: 135752 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Control Policy Drug Legalization Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking

Author: Jenson, Weston Thayne Title: Breaking bad: U.S.-Mexican counterdrug offensive, the Merida initiative and beyond Summary: In the study of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, there exists a fundamental challenge to counterdrug operations; the underlying socioeconomic foundation of narco-trafficking. I argue that the historical and current practice of merely relying on military and law enforcement aid is not sufficient when it comes to addressing this socioeconomic foundation of narco-trafficking and transnational crime organizations (TCOs). Using a rational policy model, the analysis evaluates the Merida Initiative's effectiveness at inhibiting drug trafficking operations and decreasing drug-related violence. After demonstrating the ineffectiveness of current counterdrugs policies, this project evaluates three options for future U.S.-Mexico security cooperation utilizing the same criteria used to evaluate the Merida Initiative. The prerogative of this project is to demonstrate the need for a comprehensive plan that both addresses bilateral security needs as well as the underlying social foundation of narco-trafficking in order to be successful in the ongoing Mexican Narco-War. Details: Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/13521 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/13521 Shelf Number: 135761 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Merida Initiative War on Drugs

Author: Organization of American States Title: The OAS Drug Report: 16 Months of Debates and Consensus Summary: At the Sixth Summit of the Americas, held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, in April 2012, our Heads of State and Government entrusted the Organization of American States with the task of preparing a Report on the drug problem in the Americas. The instructions, as communicated by the President of the Summit, Juan Manuel Santos, were clear-cut: the Report should be frank, thorough, and shed light on actions taken so far to confront the drug problem, without shying away from sensitive issues and without fear of breaking taboos in order to pave the way for new approaches to the drug phenomenon. One year later the task had been completed. In May, 2013, we delivered the Report on the Drug Problem to the same President of Colombia and, through him, to all the Heads of State and Government. It had a huge, immediate impact. Less than one month later, the OAS General Assembly met in Antigua Guatemala, for the first session ever to address this significant issue that we have lived with for several decades. Its conclusions testified to the pressing need our governments and peoples felt to revisit the policies that had predominated in the Hemisphere and yet had failed to achieve expected outcomes. In just 16 months, the Report managed to open up a discussion as frank as it was unprecedented of all the options available in the quest for more effective policies for dealing with the drug problem in the Hemisphere. The influential North American daily, The New York Times, wrote that the report "effectively breaks the taboo on considering alternatives to the current prohibitionist approach." The Colombia magazine Semana wrote that "this report opens another front in debate between the various alternatives to address the drug business in its various stages, as well as the consequences of its consumption." Details: Washington,DC: OAS, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: http://www.oas.org/docs/publications/LayoutPubgAGDrogas-ENG-29-9.pdf Year: 2014 Country: South America URL: http://www.oas.org/docs/publications/LayoutPubgAGDrogas-ENG-29-9.pdf Shelf Number: 135765 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Control Drug Trafficking

Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Central America's Northern Triangle: A Time of Turmoil and Transition Summary: Transnational Organized Crime Groups with ties to Mexican drug cartels tip the balance of power in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador from fragile and corrupt states to potentially criminalized states. Details: IBI Consultants LLC, 2013.46p. Source: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.ibiconsultants.net/_pdf/turmoil-and-transition-2.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.ibiconsultants.net/_pdf/turmoil-and-transition-2.pdf Shelf Number: 129685 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: University of Washington. Jackson School of International Studies Title: 2013 Task Force Report: Violent Crime Reduction in Rio de Janeiro Summary: Rio de Janeiro is infamous for violence. In many of the city's large, informal settlements known as favelas, violent drug gangs have ruled with impunity while corrupt police officers contribute to distrust of formal government. The introduction of new Pacifying Police Units (UPP) in 2008 has resulted in impressive progress, but much still remains to be done. The focus of this Task Force is to provide recommendations to ensure that the UPP program continues to be successful. Our recommendations are geared toward furthering UPP integration into communities in a way that 1) preserves the progress that has already been made and 2) ensures permanent change, both within Rio's troubled police force and in "pacified" communities. While much has been accomplished already, the task is far from complete. Each of the policy recommendations presented in the following chapters was prepared for the Public Security Secretary of Rio de Janeiro Jose Beltrame, and is tailored to his position and responsibilities. However, we recognize that a systemic problem cannot be solved by one actor, and real change must come from a combination of efforts on the part of government, NGOs, and community members themselves. The project is loosely divided into two broad sections. The first five chapters address ways internal police policies can be improved to strengthen the ability of UPPs to carry out their community policing mission. Topics include strengthening respect for community policing objectives within the police force, improving working conditions for officers, enhancing community control and involvement with local UPP units, coordinating with other governmental institutions to break the cycle of violence for convicted criminals, and including NGOs and community members in devising training curriculum for officers. The second half involves improving the means by which community upgrading projects and the provision of public services takes place after the UPPs are installed in communities. Topics include instituting a new system for coordinating public service works with ground-level community interests, improving access to healthcare within favelas by involving UPP officers in first-response systems, easing the process of land title formalization, and instituting programs to dissipate tensions between police and youth. Details: Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2013. 270p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/22749/TF%20I%202013%20text.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/22749/TF%20I%202013%20text.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 129789 Keywords: Community Policing Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Crime Favelas Gang-Related Violence Gangs Violence Violent Crime

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Mexico's Disappeared: The Enduring Cost of a Crisis Ignored Summary: When Enrique Pena Nieto took office in December 2012, he inherited a country reeling from an epidemic of drug violence. The "war on drugs" launched by his predecessor, Felipe Calderon, had not only failed to reduce violence, but also led to a dramatic increase in human rights violations. Throughout most of his presidency, Calderon denied abuses had occurred and failed to take adequate steps to ensure they were prosecuted. That responsibility now falls to President Enrique Pena Nieto. And nowhere is it more urgent than in the crime of disappearances: where people have been unlawfully taken against their will and their fate is still unknown. Mexico's Disappeared documents nearly 250 "disappearances." In 149 of these cases, evidence suggests that these were enforced disappearances, carried out with the participation of state agents. In virtually all of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, authorities failed to promptly and thoroughly search for the disappeared person, instead blaming the victim and passing the responsibility to investigate onto families. The limited investigative steps prosecutors took were undermined by delays, errors, and omissions. These lapses only exacerbate the suffering of victims' families, for whom not knowing what happened to their loved ones is a source of perpetual anguish. Another path is possible. In the state of Nuevo Leon, responding to pressure from victims' families and human rights defenders, prosecutors have broken with a pattern of inaction and begun to seriously investigate a select group of disappearances. While progress thus far has been limited, it is an encouraging first step. Ultimately, enforced disappearances are a national problem, and the success of state-level efforts will depend in large measure on whether the federal government is willing and able to do its part. If, like its predecessor, the Pena Nieto administration fails to implement a comprehensive strategy to find the missing and bring perpetrators to justice, it will only worsen the most severe crisis of enforced disappearance in Latin America in decades. Details: New York: HRW, 2013. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Shelf Number: 127733 Keywords: Disappearances Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Missing Persons Murders War on Drugs

Author: Simmons, Krista Title: The State and Youth Violence:A Socio-Political Approach to Understanding Youth Violence in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas Summary: Drug trafficking has drastically increased levels of violence in Rio de Janeiro since the arrival of the cocaine trade in the early 1980's. The rate of homicides in Rio de Janeiro in the late 1990's and early 2000's marked the city as one of the most violent urban centers in the world. Even today, there is an average of 20 homicides each day in Rio de Janeiro, a city of just under 12,000,000 people. The rate of death as a result of violence and other demographic factors such as an overabundance of male recorded deaths between the ages of 15-24, a deficit of young men, an imbalanced sex ratio, and a rise in youth mortality since the 1980's more closely mirror warzone demographics than those of a city in a modern, stable state such as Brazil. For example, between 1998 and 2000 there were between 2,000 and 5,000 violent deaths, in Yugoslavia, and roughly 11,000 in Angola. In the same period, Rio de Janeiro saw 7,465 citizens die as a result of violence. Of grave concern to children's rights activists has been the accompanying spike in violence against and among children and youth. Deaths by external causes among individuals under 18 years of age in Rio de Janeiro have increased from 8.1% in 1979 to 26.4% in 2002, with violent causes predominating external causes of death increasingly with time. The increased involvement of children in violent drug gangs is reflected in the testimony of local favela dwellers (or favelados), as well as Rio de Janeiro crime statistics. In 1980, there were 110 registered convictions of minors for drug related crime. By 2001, there were 1,584 convictions of minors for drug related crimes: a number shocking, although decreased from a high of 3,211 in 1998. This translates to a 1340% increase in drug related convictions among minors in Rio de Janeiro between 1980 and 2001. It is estimated that 5,000-6,000 children are currently working for drug factions within Rio de Janeiro's favelas (poor shanty towns). The realities faced by youth involved in organized drug violence in Rio de Janeiro are similar to those of child soldiers elsewhere in the world, with whom they share the dynamics of "voluntary" recruitment, a hierarchical structure of orders and punishment, access to and use of firearms and other weapons, kill-or-be-killed surroundings, and involvement in large-scale armed confrontations. Despite the similarities, however, the children of Rio's drug gangs cannot be classified as child soldiers because the drug factions for which they work have no political objectives or desire to replace the state. Furthermore, labeling them child soldiers runs the risk of legitimizing lethal state force against them. However, these children are clearly more than "delinquents." A call for a category all their own has grown in recent years, with Brazilian NGO, Viva Rio, developing a working definition for these children which can be applied in similar circumstances around the world: "Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV) - Children and Youth employed or otherwise participating in Organized Armed Violence where there are elements of command structure and power over territory, local population, or resources." Details: Washington, DC: American University, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://auislandora-dev.wrlc.org/islandora/object/0910capstones%3A108 Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://auislandora-dev.wrlc.org/islandora/object/0910capstones%3A108 Shelf Number: 129786 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Favelas Homicides Urban Areas Violence Violent Crime Youth Gangs Youth Violence

Author: Carvalho, Ilona Szabo de Title: Citizen security rising: new approaches to addressing drugs, guns and violence in Latin America Summary: Many Latin American states are facing epidemic levels of organised and interpersonal violence. This violence is attributed to a number of risk factors, even if the illegal drugs trade and punitive responses to trafficking are widely credited with being the principle drivers. Yet while trafficking in narcotics is commonly associated with insecurity, weakening governance and underdevelopment, drugs as such are not the central problem. Rather, it is competition between criminal factions for control over the trade and a protracted "war" declared against drugs that have ratcheted up insecurity from Mexico to Brazil. The outcomes of this four-decade-long war are at best uneven, with gains in one country overshadowed by severe declines in others. More optimistically, a regional debate is under way that is challenging the status quo with a more concerted focus on prevention and demand reduction. Latin American societies are beginning to explore alternative approaches to drug control tailored to regional and national needs and priorities. There is a visible shift toward a discourse that emphasises prevention and treats consumption as a public health issue, focuses repression on the most violent criminal organisations and redirects law enforcement toward harm reduction. The hope is that this may presage a turn toward investment in policies that are animated more by evidence than ideology. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF): 2013. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/061bc30adffa795e6a5e43bf664c8666.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/061bc30adffa795e6a5e43bf664c8666.pdf Shelf Number: 129717 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Drugs and Crime Gun Violence War on Drugs

Author: Eguizabal, Cristina Title: Crime and Violence in Central America's Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, Hurting, and Can Be Improved Summary: Throughout the spring and summer of 2014, a wave of unaccompanied minors and families from Central America began arriving at the U.S.-Mexican border in record numbers. During June and July over 10,000 a month were arriving. The unexpected influx triggered a national debate about immigration and border policy, as well as an examination of the factors compelling thousands of children to undertake such a treacherous journey. Approximately two-thirds of these children are from Central America's Northern Triangle-El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. According to interviews with the children their motives for migrating ranged from fleeing some of the world's highest homicide rates, rampant extortion, communities controlled by youth gangs, domestic violence, impunity for most crimes, as well as economic despair and lack of opportunity. Many hoped to reunite with family members, especially parents, who are already in the United States. The wave of migrants has underscored chronic problems in the region that stem back decades. It is often assumed that international drug trafficking explains the surge in violence since 2009, but other important factors are also at play. Drug trafficking is certainly a factor, especially in areas where criminal control of territory and trafficking routes is contested, but drugs do not explain the entirety of the complex phenomenon. Other factors have also contributed. While there are important differences among the three countries, there are also common factors behind the violence. Strong gang presence in communities often results in competition for territorial and economic control through extortion, kidnapping and the retail sale of illegal drugs. Threats of violence and sexual assault are often tools of neighborhood control, and gang rivalries and revenge killings are commonplace. Elevated rates of domestic abuse, sexual violence, and weak family and household structures also contribute as children are forced to fend for themselves and often chose (or are coerced into) the relative "safety" of the gang or criminal group. Likewise, important external factors such a weak capacity among law enforcement institutions, elevated levels of corruption, and penetration of the state by criminal groups means impunity for crime is extraordinarily high (95 percent or more), and disincentives to criminal activity are almost non-existent. Public confidence in law enforcement is low and crime often goes unreported. U.S. policy and practice are also a major contributing factor to the violence. U.S. consumption of illegal drug remains among the highest in the world, and U.S. and Mexican efforts to interdict drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Mexico has contributed to the trade's relocation to Central America. Furthermore, the policy of deporting large numbers of young Central Americans in the 1990s and 2000s, many of them already gang members in the United States, helped transfer the problem of violent street gangs from the United States to Central America's northern triangle. El Salvador now has the largest number of gang members in Central America followed close behind by Honduras and Guatemala. Finally, the trafficking of firearms, especially from the United States, has also contributed to the lethality and morbidity of crime. Efforts to slow firearms trafficking from the United States have encountered many domestic and political barriers and continue largely unchecked. Over the past year, the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program has undertaken an extensive review of the principal United States security assistance program for the region-the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This review has focused on the major security challenges in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and how CARSI seeks to address these. This publication includes country reports on each country including a review of the current in-country security context, as well as assessing CARSI's effectiveness for addressing these challenges. The report also includes a chapter providing an in-depth analysis of the geographic distribution of homicides and an examination of how such an analysis can help policy makers design more effective targeted strategies to lower violence. A final chapter outlining policy options for the future completes the report. Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015. 155p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Shelf Number: 135789 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gangs Homicides Illegal Immigration Immigration Kidnapping Organized Crime Trafficking in Firearms

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment Summary: Key Findings: - Transnational organized crime in Eastern Africa is a product of both illicit markets that span continents and an underlying weakness in the rule of law. - Due to conflict and poverty, Eastern Africa produces a large and vulnerable stream of smuggled migrants, who are abused and exploited at multiple stages of their journey. - More than 100,000 people paid smugglers to transport them across the Gulf of Aden or Red Sea to Yemen in 2012, generating an income for the boatmen of over US$15 million. - Around 80,000 of these migrants attempted to cross Yemen to Saudi Arabia, but many of these were waylaid by smugglers and subjected to a range of abuses, including confinement, beatings, extortion and rape. - Despite the large numbers, the flow of migrants is concentrated, with most embarking from two port areas (Obock, Djibouti and Boosaaso, Somalia) where interventions could be addressed. - Heroin has been trafficked to and through Eastern Africa since at least the 1980s, but a series of recent large seizures suggests that this flow has increased. - Some air couriering has been noted, but it appears the great bulk of the heroin is being transported by dhow from the Makran Coast, an area that spans Iran and Pakistan. - The local market is estimated to consume at least 2.5 tons of pure heroin per year, worth some US$160 million in local markets. The volumes trafficked to the region appear to be much larger, as much as 22 tons, suggesting substantial tran-shipment. Eastern Africa is a known transit area for heroin destined for South Africa and West Africa. - Given the prevalence of blood borne disease and known injection drug use, the spread of heroin throughout the region must be carefully monitored and addressed. - Recent research indicates that the rate of poaching in Eastern Africa has increased, rising to levels that could threaten the local elephant population. - The bulk of the large ivory shipments from Africa to Asia appears to pass through the container ports of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, where interventions could be addressed. - It is estimated that between 5,600 and 15,400 elephants are poached in Eastern Africa annually, producing between 56 and 154 metric tons of illicit ivory, of which two-thirds (37 tons) is destined for Asia, worth around US$30 million in 2011. - Somali pirates brought in an estimated US$150 million in 2011, which is equivalent to almost 15% of Somalia's GDP. - Effective intervention has forced pirates to range ever further from the coast to attain their targets: in 2005, the average successful pirate attack was 109 km from the Somali coast; in 2012, it was 746 km. Ships have also become more effective at defending themselves. - The increase in risk associated with protracted expeditions and international countermeasures have contributed to a decline in piracy: in April of 2009 alone, pirates hijacked 16 ships, but after April 2011, they averaged less than one per month. There were no successful hijackings for ransom in the Somali area of operations in the first half of 2013. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 28, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Africa_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Africa_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129829 Keywords: Animal Poaching Drug Trafficking Elephants Heroin Human Smuggling Ivory Migrants Organized Crime Pirates/Piracy Wildlife Crime

Author: Charles, Christopher A.D. Title: The Entrepreneurial Experiences of a Jamaican Posse in the South Bronx Summary: This chapter extends the prior research on gang members as entrepreneurs and in particular seeks to understand the members of the Peyton Place Posse as entrepreneurs in the illegal narcotics market, as they pursued their quest to achieve the American Dream. Specifically, we explore the reasons for Posse members entering the illicit drug market and review their successes and failures in pursuit of capital accumulation. We begin with a synopsis of strain theory, and how gangs operate in the illegal drug market. The foregoing is followed by a brief discussion of the characteristics of the Bronx, NY. Next, we present a synopsis of the Peyton Place Posse. Finally, we use strain theory to explain the Posse's entrepreneurial experiences and outcomes in the illegal narcotics market. Details: Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies; Bronx, NY: Monroe College, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2372179 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2372179 Shelf Number: 135807 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Gangs Jamaican Posses

Author: Santamaria, Gema Title: Drugs, gangs and vigilantes: how to tackle the new breeds of Mexican armed violence Summary: Since 2007 Mexico has experienced a steady increase in lethal and non-lethal forms of violence, including kidnappings, extortion, extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances. This spiral of violence has been driven by the consolidation and expansion of non-conventional armed actors operating in an institutional and political climate characterised by pervasive levels of corruption, impunity and criminal collusion. Public indignation over this state of affairs reached a high after the disappearance of 43 trainee teachers in the town of Iguala in September 2014. This report analyses the objectives, structures and impact of non-conventional armed actors in Mexico, focusing on drug-trafficking organisations, street gangs and so-called self-defence forces. It examines the pitfalls and lessons learned from the country's past and present security strategies, and lays out the basis for an alternative approach to understanding and tackling non-conventional armed violence. Based on a careful analysis of the dynamic and hybrid character of these groups, the report argues for an approach that prioritises the fight against corruption and the protection of embattled communities through localised prevention, geographic sequencing and knowledge-based policing. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2014. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Santamar%C3%ADa_NOREF_Drugs%2C_gangs_and_vigilantes_December%202014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Santamar%C3%ADa_NOREF_Drugs%2C_gangs_and_vigilantes_December%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 135843 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Kidnapping Organized Crime Political Corruption Violence Violent Crime

Author: Unal, Mehmet Title: Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Cross-Border Heroin Trafficking in Turkey Summary: Drug use and trafficking is one of the most significant problems of today's society. According to the United Nations Office of Drug Control Program, 16 million people are described as problem drug users meaning they are dependent to illegal drugs in their daily life. Problems associated with illegal drugs are not only associated with people's health but also related to economy, politics and social life. Illegal drug trafficking is a multi-billion dollar industry. When it spreads across society, illegal drug business is highly associated with judicial, political, and socio-economical instability in local communities. Arguably one of the leading crime prevention theories is Situational Crime Prevention theory. Situational Crime Prevention seeks to reduce opportunities of specific crimes by increasing risk and reducing the awards. Positive effects of situational prevention strategies on street level crimes are well documented in rigorous academic studies. Although the situational approach has been successfully applied to street level crimes, there are few examples of application to macro level cross-border crimes. This study will test whether international drug trafficking is suitable for application of situational crime prevention. Specifically, this study seeks to locate possible opportunity reduction points in the drug trafficking process. The study has three steps. First the nature and dimension of the drug trafficking in Turkey will be analyzed with specific data provided from Turkish National Police's archives. Second, this data will be analyzed to identify the situational factors that facilitate drug trafficking. Finally, possible means of blocking opportunities for drug trafficking will be explored. Details: Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati, 2009. 163p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 8, 2015 at: http://cech.uc.edu/content/dam/cech/programs/criminaljustice/docs/phd_dissertations/Unal,%20Mehmet.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Turkey URL: http://cech.uc.edu/content/dam/cech/programs/criminaljustice/docs/phd_dissertations/Unal,%20Mehmet.pdf Shelf Number: 135919 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Heroin Situational Crime Prevention

Author: Urgent Action Fund of Latin America Title: Drug trafficking: Shadow powers and their hidden impact on the women's life in Latin America Summary: The Urgent Action Fund of Latin America, concerned about the situation of women and the consequences for their lives and communities of the dynamics of drug trafficking, initiated the Collaborative Initiative, Women, Resistance and "Shadow Powers", in 2013. The goal was to promote collective action among activists, members of women's organizations, and academics, who influence public policy in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador and the United States. The objective of this initiative is to identify existing information related to the specific dynamics of this issue in the region and to bring out distinct points of view regarding the problem, the final goal being to identify ways to develop shared advocacy initiatives in the defense of women's rights. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Urgent Action Fund of Latin America, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 8, 2015 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/fondoaccionurgente-drug-trafficking-shadow-powers-and-their-hidden-impact-on-the-women%27s-life-in-latin-america.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Latin America URL: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/fondoaccionurgente-drug-trafficking-shadow-powers-and-their-hidden-impact-on-the-women%27s-life-in-latin-america.pdf Shelf Number: 135929 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Femicide War on Drugs

Author: de Oliveira Carlos, Juliana Title: Drug policy and incarceration in Sao Paulo, Brazil Summary: This briefing paper analyses the impact of drug policy on incarceration in Sao Paulo (Brazil), based on information collected among 1,040 people caught for having committed a drug-related offence (i.e. arrested in "flagrante delicto") between 1st April and 30st June 2011. The objective of the research was to use empirical data on those caught in the criminal justice system for drug traffic to demonstrate the fragile distinctions between drug users and traffickers, provide information on how police officers deal with drug-related offences, and analyse how the judiciary effectively responds to these crimes (at least in the initial phases of the criminal justice process). Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2015. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed July 8, 2015 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-briefing-paper_Drug-policy-in-Brazil-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Brazil URL: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-briefing-paper_Drug-policy-in-Brazil-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 135960 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Prisoners

Author: Gandilhon, Michel Title: Chemical precursors, the unknown dimension of the world's illegal drug market Summary: Precursor trafficking draws little attention as efforts are focused on seizures of finished products listed as narcotics. Yet, this trafficking is a reality that now touches all continents and makes use of all major global trade routes. For the services responsible for controlling chemical precursors and preventing their trafficking, the task is extremely complex because, in contrast with finished products, the production and commerce of substances involved in the production of the majority of illegal drugs is in fact perfectly legal. Furthermore, to circumvent the controls established by international conventions and regulations, dealers constantly adapt by using unclassified substances. After presenting an overview in the first section of the global situation, and in particular, the main trafficking routes, this issue will discuss the latest trends, and especially the challenges facing Europe with the appearance on the market of new precursors and pre-precursors. The third section will be dedicated to the resources employed by the international community to fight against this phenomenon. Details: Saint Denis La Plaine Cedex: French Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2014. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Drugs, International Challenges, no. 7: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://en.ofdt.fr/BDD/publications/docs/efdamgub.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://en.ofdt.fr/BDD/publications/docs/efdamgub.pdf Shelf Number: 135998 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs

Author: Livingston, Andrew Title: A Reputation for Violence: Fractionalization's Impact on Criminal Reputation and the Mexican State Summary: Friday night, July 8th 2011 - gunmen aligned with Los Zetas smash their way into a bar in the Northern Mexican city of Monterrey. They open fire and kill 20 people while wounding even more. The next morning, in an unrelated incident, police find 10 people shot and left to rot in an abandoned SUV. In just 24 short hours, 30 people are added to the ever-expanding casualty count. Horrific days of violence like these have become more frequent over the past few years. The Government of Mexico responds to violent organized criminal groups (OCGs) by increasing enforcement and the OCGs retaliate with brazen acts of aggressive defiance. The 15,000 that died in 2010 alone, elevates the death toll from the Mexican Drug War to around 35,000 since 2007. These huge numbers have a way of desensitizing us to the reality of death. That cannot be allowed to happen. On average, 14 sons, daughters, husbands, wives, friends and neighbors are murdered every day in the violent border city of Juarez. Fourteen died yesterday and more will perish today, tomorrow, and the day after. In an effort to reduce violence and the power of criminal organizations, US and Mexican strategy has focused primarily on removing high valued targets within an OCG's top leadership in order to fracture the organization's power structure. Mexican President Felipe Calderon believes breaking up the gangs will turn a criminal problem that threatens Mexican national security into a regional safety issue. But in the short run fragmentation causes spikes in violence because conflicts arise within and between criminal organizations. After the pre-existing power relationship disintegrates, leaders of criminal groups attempt to increase their market share by muscling out the competition. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration views this escalation in violence as "a sign of success in the fight against drugs" an instance of "caged animals, attacking one another." But this view may be oversimplified. Organized crime groups are horizontally structured for-profit criminal businesses that operate to maximize revenues gained from illegal activities. They typically engage in violence only when it serves a specific business purpose. The strategy of continually breaking apart criminal organizations has kept the balance of power from reaching a stable equilibrium. These uncertain conditions incentivize OCGs to forcefully take advantage of their rivals' unstable control over market share. But physical violence is only one way to increase market share and control competitors. Establishing a threatening reputation from past displays of violence and corrupting government officials are integral components of a combined strategy that allow an OCG to attain a dominant status within the market hierarchy without having to resort to expensive warfare. The following analysis considers criminal violence in Mexico from an economic perspective of illegal firms' incentives to build violent reputation capital. Studying the costs and benefits of utilizing violent intimidation and institutional corruption to gain an economic advantage provides an objective point from which the success or failure of the US-Mexican strategy of fragmentation can be analyzed. Reputation building by criminal organizations will be discussed in the context of their effect on the local population, the government and rival OCGs. This analysis will attempt to answer the central question of whether President Calderon's war against the organized crime groups increases violence and destabilizes the Mexican state. In the end, the continuous periods of intense violence that occur when government enforcement keeps the market destabilized perpetuates an environment where reputation must be constantly rebuilt and reaffirmed with actual displays of violence. This violent environment selects for the most aggressive and brutal leaders all while overburdening criminal justice system and eroding public confidence in the rule of law. Going after the dangerous criminals that control Mexico's illicit underworld sounds like a reasonable and responsible plan to weaken their power over the state but in the end, constantly breaking apart criminal organizations exacerbates many of the problems the government is trying to solve. Details: Hamilton, NY: Colgate University, 2011. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.colgate.edu/portaldata/imagegallerywww/096e1793-d3a4-43b3-b7fa-bd595c56c799/ImageGallery/LivingstonA(1)FinalCopy.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.colgate.edu/portaldata/imagegallerywww/096e1793-d3a4-43b3-b7fa-bd595c56c799/ImageGallery/LivingstonA(1)FinalCopy.pdf Shelf Number: 135999 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Violent Crime War on drugs

Author: European Commission Title: Mid-term review of the Cocaine Route Programme financed by the EU Instrument for Stability Summary: The present evaluation is a review of the Cocaine Route Programme (CRP) 2009-2013 funded by the European Union (EU) Instrument for Stability (IfS), Long-term component, Global and trans-regional threats, conducted from November 2012 until June 2013. The CRP has a mandate to support law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in third countries along the so called 'cocaine route', i.e. from the production countries in Latin America to Europe, via Central America, the Caribbean and West Africa. The overall objective is to enhance their capacity for international cooperation in the fight against international criminal networks, while fully respecting human rights. The budget of the CRP totals L34,916,9731 and has been allocated to eight self-standing projects in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC): 1) AIRCOP I, II and III (Airport Communication Programme): to build drug-interdiction capacities via Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITFs) at selected international airports in West Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and promote communication and intelligence sharing through real-time connection to Interpol's I 24/7 and the WCO CENComm. 2) AML-WA (Anti-money laundering activities in West Africa): to develop AML activities in the non-banking financial businesses and professions; to enhance Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde and promote liaison with the international community. 3) SEACOP I, II and III (Seaport Cooperation Programme): to set-up Joint Maritime Control Units (JMCU) in seaports in West Africa and develop regional intelligence and maritime cooperation. 4) WAPIS I and II (West African Police Information System): to support collection and analysis of police information in ECOWAS countries and Mauritania, increase police information exchange regionally and with the rest of the world through Interpol tools and services. 5) AMERIPOL I and II (Law Enforcement & Judicial Cooperation in Latin America): to strengthen exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement and judicial authorities at regional level in Latin America and with West Africa and the EU. 6) GAFISUD I, II and III (Support to the fight against money laundering in Latin America): to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of money laundering in the non-banking financial sector of GAFISUD member countries (Latin America) and foster international cooperation. 7) PRELAC I and II (Prevention of the diversion of drugs precursors in the LAC region): to strengthen the capacities of national administrative control authorities to prevent the diversion of chemical precursors in 17 countries in Latin and Central America and the Caribbean. 8) CORMS I and II (Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support): to strengthen the trans-regional coordination, coherence and complementarity effect among the various CRP projects and any other relevant initiative, conducted by the EU, MS or other international organisations. The objectives of the evaluation are: (i) to provide an overall independent assessment of the CRP activities according to the five evaluation criteria endorsed by the OECD-DAC (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact), and to the European Commission (EC) specific evaluation criteria (EC added value and coherence); (ii) to verify, analyse and assess the integration and impact of cross cutting issues in the Programme, with a particular emphasis on human rights and governance aspects; (iii) to assess the overall relevance of the Programme in relation to the objectives of the IfS and the related IfS Strategy and subsequent Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs). In addition, (iv) the review assesses the performance of contractors, (v) the institutional set up of the Programme and (vi) complementarity with other programmes, particularly COPOLAD ("Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Anti-drugs policies") funded by the EU under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The review identifies key lessons and proposes practical recommendations for follow-up actions. Details: Hemel Hempstead, Herts, UK: HTSPE Limited, 2013. 181p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/drugs/global/EU%20-%20Mid%20Term%20Review%20of%20the%20Cocaine%20Route%20Programme%202013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/drugs/global/EU%20-%20Mid%20Term%20Review%20of%20the%20Cocaine%20Route%20Programme%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 136003 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Law Enforcement Drug Trafficking

Author: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Office of Foreign Asets Control Title: Impact Report on Economic Sanctions Against Colombia Drug Cartels Summary: Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") integrates regulatory, national security, investigative, enforcement, and intelligence elements towards a single goal: effective implementation of economic sanctions programs against foreign threats and adversaries. OFAC currently administers and enforces more than 30 economic sanctions programs pursuant to Presidential and Congressional mandates, targeting select foreign countries and regimes, terrorist organizations, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics traffickers. OFAC acts under general Presidential wartime and national emergency powers, as well as specific legislation, to prohibit transactions and freeze (or "block") assets within the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons, including their foreign branches. These programs are administered in conjunction with diplomatic, law enforcement and occasionally military action. Since 1995, the Executive Branch has developed an array of "targeted" sanctions programs that focus on drug cartels and traffickers, international terrorist groups, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, members of hostile regimes, and other individuals and groups whose activities threaten U.S. interests. Narcotics traffickers operating on a global scale require an extensive support network, including procurement, logistics, transportation, communications, security, money laundering, and other facilitation. Disguising the sometimes vast profits derived from major drug operations requires the purchase of ostensibly legitimate enterprises capable of handling business on an international scale. These illicitly funded "corporate empires" can be extensive, complex, and undermine the integrity of financial systems. They are also one of the drug cartels' greatest vulnerabilities. To combat the threats of violence, corruption, and harm posed by narcotics traffickers and their networks, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12978 in October 1995, declaring a national emergency with respect to significant foreign narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia. The impact of these sanctions has been significant and, at times, dramatic. When OFAC designates an individual or entity, any assets within the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person anywhere in the world, must be frozen. Trade with or through the United States is cut off. Moreover, many non-U.S. businesses and banks have voluntarily severed all ties with individuals and entities that OFAC has listed. As a result, designated persons may lose access to their bank accounts outside the United States, disrupting their operations and freedom of access. Finally, in many cases, Colombian authorities have taken law enforcement actions against designated companies or properties after OFAC listed them. Collectively, these actions have disrupted more than $1 billion worth of assets - in blockings, seizures, forfeitures, and the failure of enterprises - and economically isolated the individuals who own and manage the enterprises. The Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), in fact, stated that OFAC's efforts have resulted in "the forfeiture of billions of dollars worth of drug-related assets." This report reviews the SDNT program's achievements over the past 11 years, as it has targeted the leaders of Colombia's Cali, North Valle, and North Coast drug cartels. It is our hope that the report will provide a useful window into the history and achievements of this program, as well as lessons for refining sanctions targeting and implementation in the future in this and other programs. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2007. 180p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf Shelf Number: 136005 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Economic Sanctions

Author: Ross, Cameron Title: It's All About Money: Crime in the Caribbean and Its Impact on Canada Summary: For most Canadians, the Caribbean is a place to take an idyllic break from winter. Sandy beaches and warm temperatures lure Canadians to the islands. Interaction with the local population is mostly limited to those who work in hotels and bars. What actually happens in the local communities is generally lost on the average Canadian. Appreciating the large Caribbean diaspora in Toronto and Montreal, the connections are dynamic between those sun-baked Caribbean communities and Canadian society. While those linkages are generally positive, there are disturbing trends in crime in the Caribbean. Herculean efforts are being made by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the regional Caribbean Development Bank to build regional capacity in governance and criminal justice systems. There is, however, a lack of political will by some Caribbean leaders to implement recommendations that would greatly improve citizen security and national institutions. Scholarly and professional studies have made recommendations for the security sector that are achievable, but the political will in many countries has been lagging. The Caribbean drug trade has long held the spotlight, but money laundering is increasingly a concern, especially with evidence of linkages between terrorist groups resident in Central America and Venezuela, which have close proximity to the Caribbean Windward Islands. Post-9/11 financial tools, utilized under the U.S. Patriot Act, have been effective in dealing with rogue governments, corrupt officials, and transnational criminal gangs. However, the use of the Internet for financial transactions and the emergence of digital currencies have made regulatory control challenging. This is significant considering the Canadian tourism, banking, and resource development in the region that have caused steady flows of Canadians, money and expertise to the Caribbean. This paper reviews Caribbean crime and its trends and impacts on Canada, money-laundering trends, and highlights policies that could be reinforced to better curb these trends. Crime is a societal problem for which solutions are found within communities. This applies equally to the Caribbean and to Canada. It is in Canada's best interest to accelerate efforts to aid the region, especially in the area of citizen security and reforms of the criminal justice system. Multi-lateral programs aimed at building regional capacities in governance and criminal justice systems are the areas in which Canada can play an important role. The creation of a Canada-Caribbean institute would go a long way in conducting scholarly graduate-level research in fields of security-sector reform. Details: Calgary: University of Calgary, School of Public Policy, 2014. 23p. Source: SPP Research Papers, Vol. 7, issue 19: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/ross-caribbeancrime.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Caribbean URL: http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/ross-caribbeancrime.pdf Shelf Number: 136072 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Terrorism

Author: Miraglia, Paula Title: Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies Summary: Key Findings - Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world with a national homicide rate of 27.1 per 100,000 inhabitants. A large part of this violence and criminality can be linked to arms and drug trafficking operations by organized crime groups. - Brazil's increased domestic drug consumption in recent years has affected the domestic drug market and changed the structure, profile, and modes of operation of organized crime groups. - In 2006, Brazil adopted a new drug law intended to make a clear and definitive distinction between drug users and dealers. However, a discriminatory culture in the justice system, combined with great discretion given to the authorities to classify offenses as trafficking, resulted in increased imprisonment of addicts. - Today, Brazil has the world's fourth largest imprisoned population, which points to the need for alternatives in dealing with violence and crime, particularly when related to drug consumption. - Brazil boasts innovative programs, such as the Sao Paulo de Bracos Abertos program and the Unidades de Pol�cia Pacificadora in Rio de Janeiro, but each of these faces complex challenges to their success. Policy Recommendations - Brazil needs criminal justice system reform, together with improved drug legislation that classifies offenses more precisely, to minimize the discretionary imprisonment of addicts. - Brazil should develop improved mechanisms to prevent police brutality and lethality, and should also adopt reforms to improve police efficiency and effectiveness. - Brazil should mainstream the concept of prevention in its domestic drug policy programs. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Miraglia--Brazil-final.pdf?la=en Year: 2015 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Miraglia--Brazil-final.pdf?la=en Shelf Number: 136103 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime

Author: Lumpe, Lora Title: US Law Enforcement Involvement in Counternarcotics Operations in Latin America Summary: US government assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies to curb drug trafficking into the United States began in 1949. At that time, two agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics were sent to Turkey and France to try and interdict the flow of heroin. By the 1960s and 70s, federal drug law enforcement agents were conducting major international operations aimed at cutting marijuana importation across the Mexican border and curbing heroin trafficking into the US by the French mafia (the "French connection"). In 1973 the DEA was created, in what was billed as an effort to consolidate drug control functions of several offices and agencies. However, US Customs overseas enforcement operations and investigations, which date back several decades, continued. Meanwhile, the US Coast Guard became involved in overseas counterdrug enforcement and investigation, State Department-backed counternarcotics assistance to foreign police agencies began in 1978 and FBI involvement in international counternarcotics programs began in earnest the 1980s and escalated in the mid-1990s. (The September 11th attacks and the resultant shift toward a focus on countering terrorist threats to the United States have affected the role and scope of most agencies with foreign counternarcotics responsibilities.) This memo covers each of these agencies' involvement in general terms, including their mission, methods of international operation, budgetary and bureaucratic history, and oversight mechanisms. An appendix relates specific details available about these agencies' activities in WOLA's priority countries. The information is drawn largely from government documentation (wherein the various agencies self describe their operations and motivation), congressional hearings, oversight reports and investigative journalistic accounts. The intent of the document is threefold: - to provide leads or questions that in-country researchers can follow up on to discover as much as possible about the reality and local impact of these agencies' overseas operations; - to identify places where Congress' help is needed in order to force basic information on these agencies' operations into the public domain and where work by WOLA will result in greater oversight of US counternarcotics policy; and - to lay the groundwork for an overview chapter on the non-military (ie, law enforcement) aspects of the US-backed war on drugs in Latin America. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2002. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/past/ddhr_law_enforcement_overview.pdf Year: 2002 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/past/ddhr_law_enforcement_overview.pdf Shelf Number: 136104 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Law Enforcement Drug Trafficking War on Drugs

Author: Calderon, Gabriela Title: The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico Summary: In 2006 the Mexican government launched an aggressive campaign to weaken drug- trafficking organizations (DTOs). The security policies differed significantly from those of previous administrations in the use of a leadership strategy (the targeting for arrest of the highest levels or core leadership of criminal networks). While these strategies can play an important role in disrupting the targeted criminal organization, they can also have unintended consequences, increasing inter-cartel and intra-cartel fighting and fragmenting criminal organizations. What impact do captures of senior drug cartel members have on the dynamics of drug-related violence? Does it matter if governments target drug kingpins vs. lower ranked lieutenants? We analyze whether the captures or killings of kingpins and lieutenants have increased drug-related violence and whether the violence spills over spatially. To estimate effects that are credibly causal, we use different empirical strategies that combine difference-in-differences and synthetic control group methods. We find evidence that captures or killings of drug cartel leaders have exacerbating effects not only on DTO-related violence, but also on homicides that affect the general population. Captures or killings of lieutenants, for their part, only seem to exacerbate violence in "strategic places" or municipalities located in the transportation network. While most of the effects on DTO-related violence are found in the first six months after a leader's removal, effects on homicides affecting the rest of the population are more enduring, suggesting different mechanisms through which leadership neutralizations breed violence. Details: Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, 2015. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper: Accessed July 20, 2015 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/beheading-criminal-organizations-and-dynamics-violence-mexico%E2%80%99s-drug-war Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/beheading-criminal-organizations-and-dynamics-violence-mexico%E2%80%99s-drug-war Shelf Number: 136109 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Combating Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the guardian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its supplementary Protocols, and of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), in its twentieth session in 2011 considered the problem of combating transnational organized crime committed at sea. Resolution 20/5 mandates UNODC to convene an expert meeting to "facilitate the investigation and prosecution of such cases by Member States, including by identifying gaps or possible areas for harmonization, and measures to strengthen national capacity, in particular in developing countries, to more effectively combat transnational organized crime". This Issue Paper is the product of discussions held in Vienna on 12-13 November 2012 at the expert group meeting convened pursuant to resolution 20/5 of the CCPCJ. It is also based on a desk review of research carried out on the issue, with particular emphasis on existing UNODC materials concerning transnational organized crime at sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its goal is to serve as a background document to the recommendations of the expert meeting, which will be presented to the CCPCJ at its twenty-second session to be held 22-26 April 2013. The Issue Paper underscores the common and interlinked emerging crimes at sea, including piracy and armed robbery at sea, migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, organized crime within the fishing industry and oil bunkering; it identifies the applicable maritime laws and regulations and their potential gaps as well as the relevant good practices and challenges in international cooperation at the legal and operational level with respect to crimes at sea; it discusses the problems concerning the investigation and prosecution of crimes at sea, including questions such as where capacity-building is needed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Paper: Accessed July 22, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_at_Sea.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_at_Sea.pdf Shelf Number: 136126 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Fishing Industry Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Maritime Crime Organized Crime Piracy

Author: Marczak, Jason Title: Security in Central America's Northern Triangle: Violence Reduction and the Role of the Private Sector in El Salvador Summary: In the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the increase in violence and organized crime highlights the need for new approaches to improve citizen security. In the case of El Salvador, a March 2012 gang truce has halved the daily homicide rate, opening an opportunity to build on existing efforts or to launch new approaches aimed at violence prevention. While public safety is the responsibility of the state, this Americas Society policy brief highlights the role of the private sector in violence prevention. It highlights innovative corporate efforts in violence prevention so that policymakers, businesses leaders, and others concerned about improvements in security can learn from these initiatives and obtain a more nuanced grasp of the possible space that can be filled by the private sector. Security in Central America's Northern Triangle: Violence Reduction and the Role of the Private Sector in El Salvador focuses on the role that multinational corporations can play in forging an integrated approach to crime reduction. This is a little known field in Central America. While the policy brief analyzes reinsertion efforts for former gang members and at-risk youth programs in the Salvadoran context, it also serves as a reference point for Honduras and Guatemala. Drawing examples from a larger sample of violence prevention efforts, the Americas Society policy brief highlights five corporate efforts that are creating safer communities and contributing to business bottom line. The local focus and the direct or indirect cooperation with the public sector are critical to program success. One of the companies, Grupo Calvo, employs 90 rehabilitated former gang members in its El Salvador plant-about 5 percent of its staff-and facilitates employment opportunities with suppliers for an additional 100 former gang members. These workers are some of the strongest and most productive employees at Grupo Calvo as well as at League Collegiate Wear, where 15 percent (40 employees) of its Salvadoran workforce joined the company through its reinsertion program. Additional companies featured in the policy brief include the AES Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, and Rio Grande Foods. Five recommendations are issued: 1.The private and public sectors each bring unique ideas, resources, and skills to violence prevention efforts and must find ways to coordinate these efforts, especially at the local level. 2.Corporate practices to improve security must be continuously catalogued and updated with a central repository and coordinating institution. 3.Private-sector violence prevention programs must be recognized both for their value in improving local communities as well the potential benefits they can bring to corporate bottom lines. 4.Reinsertion efforts and at-risk youth programs analyzed in the Salvadoran context should serve as examples-both the lessons learned and the overall strategies-for other Northern Triangle countries. 5.Regular dialogue between the public and private sectors is critical for identifying medium- to long-term violence prevention programs that will outlast the period in office of one particular official or political party. Details: New York: Americas Society, 2011. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Americas Society Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/Central%20American%20Security%202012.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/Central%20American%20Security%202012.pdf Shelf Number: 136141 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Drug Trafficking Gangs Public Safety Violence Violence Prevention Violent Crime

Author: Heinle, Kimberly Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2014 Summary: - Violence is lower in Mexico than elsewhere in the Americas, but average for the region. Levels of violence are relatively lower in Mexico than in several other countries in the Americas, but are about average for the Western Hemisphere. Mexico's 2012 homicide rate of 21.5 was just above the region's average of approximately 21.4 homicides per 100,000 people. However, this was up nearly threefold from Mexico's rate of 8.1 per 100,000 in 2007. No other country in the hemisphere has seen such a large increase in the number or rate of homicides over the last decade. - Homicides had been declining through the mid-2000s, reaching a record low in 2007. Continuing a long-term trend, the number of intentional homicides documented by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI) declined significantly under both presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox (2000-2006). Under Zedillo, the number of intentional homicides declined fairly steadily from 15,839 in 1994 to 10,737 in 2000, totaling 80,311 homicides. The annual number of homicides fluctuated somewhat under Fox, but continued to decline generally, with a total of 60,162 homicides. Moreover, the number of homicides actually reached a record low of 8,867 intentional homicides in 2007, the first full year in office for Felipe Calderon (2006-2012). - Violence grew dramatically after 2008, with the number of homicides peaking in 2011. After Calderon's first year, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI climbed sharply, with year-over-year increases of more than 58% in 2008, 41% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 5% in 2011. As predicted by last year's Justice in Mexico drug violence report, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI declined somewhat in 2012, Calderon's final year in office. Specifically, our March 2013 report predicted that INEGI would register a modest decline for 2012 (no greater than 8.5%). According to figures released in late-2013, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI for 2012 declined about 4% to 26,037. All told, throughout the Calderon administration, INEGI reported 121,669 homicides, an average of over 20,000 people per year, more than 55 people per day, or just over two people every hour. - The total number of homicides appears to have declined by nearly 15% again in 2014. While INEGI's figures are not available for 2014, preliminary data from Mexico's National Security System (SNSP) suggests that the total number of intentional homicides in 2013 declined again this year by about the same proportion as in 2013. However, some analysts are skeptical about SNSP's data because of concerns about possible political manipulation by the Peea Nieto administration, so these findings should be viewed with caution. Keeping such concerns in mind, at the time of this report, SNSP's tally of all intentional homicides in 2014 was 15,649, down 13.8% from the 18,146 reported for 2013 the same time last year. The authors estimate a more modest rate of decline (about 9%) for INEGI's figures, to be released later in 2015. - Mexico's recent violence is largely attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime. A large part of the sudden increase in violence in Mexico is attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime groups. Tallies compiled independently by media organizations in Mexico suggest that at least a third and as many as half of all intentional homicides in 2014 bore characteristics typical of organized-crime related killings, including the use of high-caliber automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages involving organized-crime groups. The Mexican newspaper Reforma put the figure at 6,400 organized-crime-style homicides in 2014 (though its coverage appeared to be less complete and less consistent with other sources than previous years), while Milenio reported 7,993 for the year. - Amid declining violence, serious security crises continued in central & Pacific states. Even amid the overall reduction in violence, there were serious security crises in central and Pacific states, notably the states of Guerrero, Mexico, and Michoacan. In early 2014, clashes broke out between the Knights Templar Organization (Caballeros Templarios, or KTO) and local "self-defense" (autodefensa) groups in Michoacan, causing the federal government to intervene and deputize some self-defense groups, creating official Rural Defense Forces. In late 2014, there were a series of violent crackdowns by authorities that resulted in the deaths of scores of people - including both alleged criminals and innocent civilians - in the states of Mexico and Guerrero, provoking national and international condemnations. In particular, when municipal authorities in the town of Iguala, Guerrero allegedly turned over dozens of student protestors to a local organized crime group known as the Guerreros Unidos, the perceived corruption and ineptitude of government officials led to massive protests and even acts of violence throughout the country. - The Mexican government arrested major drug traffickers, including "El Chapo" Guzman. Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018) has continued the previous administration's efforts to arrest major organized crime figures. In early 2014, the Pena Nieto administration succeeded in arresting Mexico's most notorious drug trafficker Joaqu�n "El Chapo" Guzman (head of the Sinaloa Cartel). In 2014, federal authorities also eliminated key leaders of the Knights Templar Organization, killing Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, a.k.a. "El Chayo" (who had been previously presumed dead) and Enrique "El Kike" Plancarte Solis. In early 2015, authorities continued to make important arrests targeting the Knights Templar Organization, the Gulf Cartel, the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, and the Zetas. - Recent organized crime arrests have not appeared to produce large spikes in violence. Some experts say that destroying leadership structures leads to greater violence because it contributes to infighting, splintering, and/or encroachment by rival criminal organizations. However, compared to previous years, the Mexican government's arrests of high-level members of organized crime groups have not resulted in such dramatic surges in violence due to infighting, splintering, or encroachment by rival criminal organizations. This may be attributable to a number of factors, including the dwindling size and capacity of criminal organizations in Mexico, the reduction in competition over drug production and trafficking routes, and/or the possible collusion of government officials to broker a peace. - Mexican security efforts appear more focused on prevention and criminal justice reform. While President Pena Nieto continued the same strategies of the previous administration during his first year in office, he also began to emphasize crime prevention and judicial system reform more strongly than in the past. Indeed, both the federal and state governments have moved into high gear in the effort to transition Mexico to a new oral, adversarial criminal procedure - popularly referred to as "oral trials" (juicios orales) - that proponents believe will provide greater transparency, efficiency, and fairness in the Mexican criminal justice system. In 2014, the Pena Nieto administration moved these efforts forward considerably by approving a Unified Code of Criminal Procedure that will be implemented at the federal and state levels throughout the country by June 2016. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego, 2015. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Drug-Violence-in-Mexico-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Drug-Violence-in-Mexico-final.pdf Shelf Number: 136142 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence (Mexico) Drugs and Crime Homicides Organized Crime Violent Crime

Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Reversing a fairly robust record of capturing and imprisoning leaders of Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), the escape of notorious cartel leader Joaquin El Chapo Guzman on July 11, 2015, was a huge setback for the Mexican government already beleaguered by charges of corruption and low approval ratings. Mexico's efforts to combat drug traffickers have touched all of the major organizations that once dominated the illicit drug trade: for example, the February 2014 capture of Guzman who leads Sinaloa, Mexico's largest drug franchise; top leaders of Los Zetas in 2013 and March 2015; the October 2014 arrests of Hector Beltran Leyva of the Beltran Leyva Organization and, later, of Vicente Carrillo Fuentes of the once-dominant Juarez cartel. The DTOs have been in constant flux in recent years. By some accounts, in December 2006 there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured into many more groups. In recent years, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these might be viewed as the traditional DTOs. However, many analysts suggest that those 7 seem to have now fragmented to 9 or as many as 20 major organizations. Several analysts estimate there have been at least 80,000 homicides linked to organized crime since 2006. Few dispute that the annual tally of organized crime-related homicides in Mexico has declined since 2011, although there is disagreement about the rate of decline. It appears that the steep increase in organized crime-related homicides during the six-year administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) is likely to trend down far more slowly than it rose. The Mexican government no longer publishes data on organized crime-related homicides. However, the government reported the rate of all homicides in Mexico has declined by 30% since 2012 (roughly 15% in 2013, and another 15% in 2014). Although murder rates have diminished, the incidence of other violent crimes targeting Mexican citizens, such as kidnapping and extortion, has increased through 2013 and stayed elevated. Notably, questions about the accuracy of the government's crime statistics persist. Former President Calderon made his aggressive campaign against the DTOs a defining policy of his government, which the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change that led to significantly greater instability among the groups and continued violence. Since his inauguration in December 2012, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs have fragmented, and new crime groups have emerged. Meanwhile, the DTOs and other criminal gangs furthered their expansion into other illegal activities, such as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft, and the organizations now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to governance in Mexico no less threatening to the rule of law than the challenge that faced Pena Nieto's predecessor. According to the Pena Nieto Administration, 93 of the 122 top criminal targets that their government has identified have been arrested or otherwise "neutralized" (killed in arrest efforts) as of May 2015, although Guzman's escape confounds that achievement. Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution through alliances with U.S. gangs. This report provides background on drug trafficking and organized crime inside Mexico: it identifies the major DTOs, and it examines how the organized crime "landscape" has been significantly altered by fragmentation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed July 28, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 136160 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime

Author: Otis, John Title: The FARC and Colombia's Illegal Drug Trade Summary: In 2014, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Latin America's oldest and largest guerrilla army known as the FARC, marked the 50th anniversary of the start of its war against the Colombian government. More than 220,000 people have been killed and more than five million people uprooted from their homes in the conflict, which is the last remaining guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere. However, this grim, half-century milestone coincides with peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC that began in Havana, Cuba, in November 2012. The Havana talks have advanced much farther than the three previous efforts to negotiate with the FARC and there is a growing sense that a final peace treaty is now likely. So far, the two sides have reached agreements on three of the five points on the negotiating agenda, including an accord to resolve an issue that helps explain why the conflict has lasted so long: The FARC's deep involvement in the taxation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs. On May 16, 2014, the government and the FARC signed an agreement stating that under the terms of a final peace treaty, the two sides would work in tandem to eradicate coca, the plant used to make cocaine, and to combat cocaine trafficking in areas under guerrilla control. A decade ago, Colombia supplied about 90 percent of the world's cocaine. But due to anti-drug efforts in Colombia as well as Peru's reemergence as a major producer, Colombia since 2011 is believed to provide less than half of the world's cocaine, according to U.S. officials. Yet drug profits continue to be a vital source of cash for the FARC, a smaller Marxist rebel group known as the National Liberation Army, or ELN, and other criminal organizations in Colombia. Massive drug profits help the FARC to buy weapons, uniforms, and supplies and to recruit fresh troops. The fight between the FARC and illegal right-wing paramilitary groups over coca fields and drug smuggling corridors has been a key factor in the conflict's extreme levels of violence, forced displacement and land grabs. When the two sides first met to discuss the drug issue in November 2013, Colombia's chief peace negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, called the illegal drug trade "the fuel that feeds the conflict." During the last round of peace talks with the government that lasted from 1999 to 2002, the FARC was at the peak of its military power thanks, in part, to a surge in drug income and made almost no effort to seriously negotiate a peace treaty. Since then, the U.S. government has provided Colombia with $9.3 billion in aid, much of which has been spent on counterinsurgency and counterdrug programs targeting the FARC. The Colombian military's successful efforts to weaken the FARC and reduce its drug income through targeting coca fields, drug laboratories, and smugglers have helped convince FARC leaders to return to the bargaining table for negotiations that hold much promise for a final peace accord. This paper will examine the FARC's long history of involvement in Colombia's illegal narcotics industry and the impact of rebel drug profits on the course of the armed conflict. It will also explore the likely impact of the drug accord reached at the peace negotiations in Cuba on efforts to extricate the FARC from the drug-trafficking equation, possible changes in Colombia's counterdrug policies, as well as the strong possibility that some FARC members will continue producing and smuggling drugs in a post-conflict scenario. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf Shelf Number: 136289 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia Smuggling

Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Assessment of the Implementation of the United States Government's Support for Plan Colombia's Illicit Crop Reduction Components Summary: This study provides an assessment of the success to date of Counter-Narcotics (CN) efforts under Plan Colombia along with a set of recommendations for the United States Government (USG) to strengthen future CN efforts directed at increasing security, decreasing coca cultivation and cocaine, and opium poppy and heroin production in Colombia. Plan Colombia commenced in 1999 as a multi-year effort to stem a decades' long spiral towards domestic violence, fueled by narcotics funding resulting from an increasingly robust drug industry. Plan Colombia provided funding to support increased security and counternarcotics efforts, and to address issues of rural development, rule of law, human rights, and support for displaced persons. The assessment was carried out by a team of specialists in economic policy, alternative development, law and security and comparative drug control. The team reviewed documents and secondary literature, conducted interviews with relevant US and Government of Colombia (GOC), local officials, development workers, representatives of national agencies, farmers, farm association officials and other stakeholders. It undertook three site visits, in South of Bolivar (Sur de Bolivar), in Macarena (Meta) and in Narino. In all three sites, team members conducted focus groups made up of local officials, representatives of national ministries, members of farmer associations and farmers. The team also used economic regressions and simulations to assist its analyses. The team examined the history of Plan Colombia, reviewed performance in areas such as implementation of alternative development, impact of eradication, cost effectiveness, improvements in security, and socio-economic aspects of state presence. The report looks at approaches to adjusting performance measures for CN programs. With a view toward formulating recommendations for the future, the report presents analyses of lessons that could be drawn from the significant reduction in poppy cultivation, the role of alternative development and the involvement of citizens and local governments in coca reduction. The report examines the internal balloon effect as that influences the geographic dispersion of coca cultivation. Finally, the report reviews various elements of rural development and agricultural policy as well as providing an estimation of the extent that families in rural areas are vulnerable to participating in coca cultivation. (Vulnerable families are defined as families in coca growing areas that share the socioeconomic characteristics of existing coca farmers.) Details: Washington, DC: Management Systems International, 2009. 177p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2015 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN233.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Colombia URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN233.pdf Shelf Number: 136307 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Enforcement Drug Police Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Heroin Plan Colombia

Author: Negroponte, Diana Villiers Title: Pillar IV of Beyond Merida: Addressing the Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Related Crime and Violence in Mexico Summary: The 'Merida Initiative' and its successor 'Beyond Merida' form an integral part of the Mexican National Crime Strategy that seeks to contain, if not defeat narcotics trafficking, organized crime and the consequential violence. Elaborated in October 2009, both governments announced the second phase in early 2010. Broader than the 'Merida Initiative,' 'Beyond Merida' proposes four categories, known as 'Pillars,' some of which directly involve the U.S. government agencies and others which imply collaboration. - Pillar I. Disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations . - Pillar II. Strengthen state institutions, i.e. law enforcement, the judiciary and correctional institutions to reduce public insecurity and provide better serve Mexican citizens. - Pillar III. Develop a "smart border" with the U.S. so as to facilitate trade and overcome the bottlenecks currently choking the U.S./Mexico border. - Pillar IV. Address the social and economic factors contributing to the violence and seek to build strong and resilient communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence. This article examines U.S. and Mexican government efforts to develop Pillar IV. It also recognizes programs that Mexico commenced in 2010 to focus seriously on the socio-economic causes of violence in the northern cities, Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey. This article addresses the effectiveness of current bilateral programs and asks what changes might be made to increase the impact in the short and long term. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Accessed August 4, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Merida%20-%20Pillar%20IV%20Working%20Paper%20Format1_1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Merida%20-%20Pillar%20IV%20Working%20Paper%20Format1_1.pdf Shelf Number: 136310 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Drugs and Crime Merida Initiative Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime

Author: Renard, Thomas Title: Partners in crime? The EU, its strategic partners and international organised crime Summary: Organised crime is a major security challenge. Recognising the importance of this challenge, the European Union (EU) has acquired more competences in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA) over the last years and has become more active in the fight against organised crime, not only internally but also externally. Although the EU remains a modest player at the global level, it has become an interlocutor, and sometimes even a partner, in terms of combating various dimensions of organised crime, including drug-trafficking. This paper focuses specifically on the EU's cooperation with its strategic partners on international crime-related issues. First, it describes organised crime as a security challenge, particularly to Europe. It then reviews the EU's strategic approach to cope with this challenge, and how it is implemented. Subsequently, the paper looks at the EU's cooperation with its strategic partners against organised crime, with a view to assessing the general effectiveness of these partnerships. This paper concludes that many strategic partnerships are still under-delivering, but most of them hold large potential for further cooperation. Details: Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 5: Accessed August 5, 2015 at: http://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/Partners%20in%20crime%20The%20EU%2C%20its%20strategic%20partners%20and%20international%20organised%20crime.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/Partners%20in%20crime%20The%20EU%2C%20its%20strategic%20partners%20and%20international%20organised%20crime.pdf Shelf Number: 136332 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Law Enforcement Capacity Building in the Fight against Illicit Drug Trafficking in Selected Countries in West Africa Summary: This Report provides an independent evaluation of UNODC project XAW/U53, entitled "Law Enforcement Capacity Building in the Fight against Drug Trafficking in Selected Countries in West Africa". This project is a direct response to one of the main thematic priorities of the ECOWAS Political Declaration end resulting "Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa, 2008-2011". The project was implemented by UNODC in 2009-2011, with the support of the Government of Italy. The project objective was to build enhanced capacity of law enforcement agencies to combat illicit drug trafficking to and from beneficiary states, i.e. Guinea Bissau, Mali, Sierra Leone and Senegal. On the basis of preliminary assessment missions conducted in July 2009 beneficiary countries clearly expressed the need for the project to focus on the financial crimes component of drug trafficking and TOC, i.e. money laundering. This would enable the project to usefully complement other assistance initiatives that very much focus on law enforcement capacity building, by providing added value when investigating drug trafficking and organized crime cases. The implementing activities consisted essentially of specialized training and were complemented with the delivery of IT and office equipment to the beneficiaries. An independent evaluation was initiated upon completion of project activities. It consisted of a desk review of relevant documents, followed by a field mission that took place from 10 October to 4 November 2011. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the impact of project activities, as well as to draw lessons from project implementation and make recommendations. Those could be the basis for instituting improvements when planning, designing and managing UNODC technical assistance in the interrelated fields of law enforcement capacity building, countering drug trafficking and anti money laundering. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/XAW_U53_Final_Report_rev3.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/XAW_U53_Final_Report_rev3.pdf Shelf Number: 136345 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Police Training

Author: Gaspar, Roger Title: Establishment of Interagency Law Enforcement Mobile Groups in Kyrgyzstan: Counter-narcotics enforcement Summary: This project was a three year plan to create small interagency mobile law enforcement groups called MOBITs based in south Kyrgyzstan to increase resources in the difficult border region with Tajikistan to interdict drug trafficking into the country. The concept included certain key ideas: interagency composition to enhance the cooperation between agencies and as a counter corruption component, special vetting and bonus payments to ensure a high level of integrity within the teams and training in special investigation techniques to expand their capacity for operations. The teams were also intended to participate in enhanced intelligence collection and analysis, improve the qualitative and quantitative information and knowledge within Kyrgyzstan on the extent of various types of crime and to engage in collaboration with law enforcement agencies of neighbouring and other countries. How they were to do this was poorly addressed. The teams were provided with vehicles, a separate base and advanced strongholds in the difficult border areas and the project implied a flexible rapid deployment when required and the ability to initiate operations from their own information sources. It appears to have been assumed that the provision of a correctly trained and resourced team was sufficient to achieve a new level of impact against drug trafficking and organised crime but a lack of development of information sources undermined the concept. The formal objectives were: Objective 1: Improve national interdiction results and investigative capacity Output 1 - establishment of joint mobile interdiction teams Output 2 - Enhancement of intelligence analysis/investigative capacity of the joint mobile interdiction teams Objective 2: Ensure integrity and sustainability of joint mobile interdiction teams Output 1 - system in place for the constant monitoring of integrity of mobile teams Output 2 - Mechanism for self-sustainability of joint mobile interdiction teams under development The project commenced in late 2007 after some procedural delays and concluded at the end of 2010. The initial host agency for the MOBIT teams was the Drug Control Agency and under their aegis and that of this project, four teams were constructed, based in Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan with advanced strongholds in Alay, Aidarken and Batken. Equipment and training was funded or provided the donor or CENTCOM on a bi-lateral basis. Initial results of interdiction were slow and at the mid term review in 2009, concern was expressed over performance levels. No issues were, however, raised over integrity. In late 2009, the then President, President Bakiyev abolished the DCA (the host agency) and transferred the MOBIT resources into the Ministry of Interior. As the independence of the Units had been an important aspect of the project and was thus compromised, the project was suspended at the request of the donor. In March, 2010, MOBITs were formally moved into the newly created Chief Department on Counter Drug Trafficking of the Ministry of the Interior and a request for the reinstatement of the project was accepted. Subsequently in August, 2010, President Otunbaeva established the new State Service on Drug Control and the MOBIT resources were to be moved from the MoI to the SSDC. This process of movement was slow and indeed some resources are not yet recovered. Following a further project revision, support was continued until the closure of the project at the end of December, 2010. The impact of the changes in host agency means that at the end of the project, there were no active MOBIT teams. The SSDC is, however, in the process of reconstructing the teams and approximately one third of the personnel have now been inducted. It is no fault of the project that the host agencies were changed. The implication for the evaluation is that most key interlocutors were no longer available and that the evaluation had to proceed by taking stock of what had been achieved under the DCA and MoI and what is planned under the SSDC. The evaluation found justification for the concept of interagency mobile teams that had been specially vetted and secured against corruption and the need for arrangements for a counter narcotics team to operate in the restricted border area. However, the value of confining such a special team to interdictions within the border area is not supported. Such a team is unique within Kyrgyzstan and can have a broader value. In this context it is interesting to note that while under DCA control, they were deployed, inter alia, on controlled deliveries indicating that they were at least from time to time operating in a broader role. The concerns over performance identified at the mid year review in 2009 are valid. MOBIT teams recovered only 6.6% of the total annual national heroin seizures in 2008, 7.7% in 2009 and 19.4% in the first seven months of 2010. Overall, seizures for the whole country fell between 2008 and 2010. This is a disappointing performance in the context of the project objectives for improving national interdiction results and in relation to the MOBITS is considered to be linked to the disappointing outcome of the aspirations of this project to enhance the intelligence and analysis ability of the teams. The objective to enhance the intelligence and analysis ability is entirely in the right direction. Drug trafficking is a highly skilled clandestine activity with few visible opportunities for law enforcement. Investments in the development of new sources of information, dedicated analysts and active management are essential to provide the opportunities for skilled teams such as MOBITs. However, the MOBIT teams are small units, their training has concentrated on special investigative techniques and it is doubtful if they had the capacity for developing the kind of enhanced intelligence collection and analysis envisaged in the project document. This was something better intended for development with the host agency - in which the MOBIT teams should obviously participate. Without better sources of information, it is difficult to see how the MOBIT teams could deliver the higher level of interdiction expected and whilst this was not articulated, it is assumed the principle behind the project concept was that there was either ample information waiting to be acted upon or once the threat of corruption was removed, there would be no shortage of information from which the MOBITs could benefit. Whether this is a correct deduction of the thinking at the time of the project concept, the reality has been that insufficient information appears to be available to lift the MOBIT teams to a new level of performance. Since the SSDC is currently rebuilding the MOBITs as envisaged in the project document, this will be an issue to be addressed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/kgz_i75_establishment_of_interagency_law_enforcement_mobile_groups_in_kyrgyzstan_rev.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/ProEvals-2010/ProEvals-2011/kgz_i75_establishment_of_interagency_law_enforcement_mobile_groups_in_kyrgyzstan_rev.pdf Shelf Number: 136346 Keywords: Corruption Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Schunemann, Julia Title: Reform Without Ownership? Dilemmas in Supporting Security and Justice Sector Reform in Honduras Summary: Honduras simultaneously faces the recovery from a severe political crisis due to a coup d'etat in June 2009 as well as a sustained crisis of security and legitimacy. Since then, society has been ever more marked by polarisation and the political equilibrium is very fragile. Levels of violence are at an all-time high and organized crime, especially drug trafficking, is threatening the bases of state institutions and people's physical security. The country's socio-economic situation is dire and the global economic crisis has fuelled increasing levels of poverty and unemployment. Honduras' security and justice sector suffers from severe deficiencies. It remains largely inefficient and unable to safeguard security and the rule of law for its citizens. Criminal investigative units are plagued with serious problems of incompetence, corruption and progressive penetration by organised crime. The judiciary lacks independence and is subject to systematic political interference. Inter-institutional coordination is poor and flawed by a climate of mutual mistrust and rivalry over competencies. This report describes and analyses the EU's contribution to strengthening security and the rule of law in Honduras through a major security sector reform (SSR) programme earmarked with a budget of L44 million. The report underlines the crucial need for increased local ownership as a sine qua non condition if the EU's endeavours are to trigger sustainable institutional change and thus further human security in Honduras. The report also examines prospects for the creation of an international commission against impunity, following the example of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). The EU's Support Programme to the Security Sector (PASS) in Honduras meets local needs, is comprehensive in its approach and targeted at the relevant institutions. However, the current political climate of polarization and a government that is weak and lacking in legitimacy seriously compromises the programme's prospects for successful implementation. A solid political, legal and budgetary framework for reform is missing, as is local ownership. The EU and other donors eager to support security and justice sector reform in Honduras should use their joint weight to ensure basic conditions are met with regards to the political, legal and budgetary framework, thus preparing the ground for reasonable prospects for successful implementation and the sustainability of their activities. Details: Madrid: Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: IFP Security Cluster: Country Case Study: Honduras: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/020711honduras.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/020711honduras.pdf Shelf Number: 136367 Keywords: Criminal Justice Reform Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Violent Crime

Author: Janecek, Michael J. Title: Policing Iranian Sanctions: Trade, Identity, and Smuggling Networks in the Arabian Gulf Summary: There are continual debates regarding the effectiveness of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803 and 1929 as tools for limiting the Islamic Republic of Iran's goals for a nuclear program. This thesis examines the enforceability of the maritime sections of both resolutions at the police level in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Arab nations along the Arabian Gulf have had long-standing maritime trade relations with Iran and the greater Indian Ocean that extend generations into history. This relationship led to the extensive merging of Arab and Persian cultures in the GCC, as well as the growth of an immigrant workforce from South Asia. With this influx of identities and nationalities, challenges were developed in enforcing both resolutions, specifically as it relates to the inspection of Iranian maritime cargo. Alongside this merging of cultures, is the growth of successful maritime drug-smuggling networks that weapons proliferators could exploit to intentionally violate UNSCR 1803 and 1929. Based on the challenges of maritime trade, cultural and national identity, as well as criminal activity, it is argued that both resolutions are an unnatural fit in the Arabian Gulf, and are therefore questionable as policy choices in the GCC countries. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2013. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Iran URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 136483 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Maritime Crime Maritime Security Smuggling

Author: Centre for Security Studies - BH Title: Study of Organised Crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina Summary: The Study of Organised Crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the need to make it easier for decision-makers in government institutions to identify the priority strategic areas in the fight against organised crime. It was initiated by the wish to fill the possible gaps that may appear in the public policies developed solely on the information and data in the possession of government institutions. The analysis of the citizens' views and perceptions of the issues falling within the scope of responsibility of the relevant agencies should be one of the sources of information to which officials will give adequate attention, in particular bearing in mind that it is related to the rule of law and threats to human security. The results presented in this study are the product of the analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data, within a complex approach to the phenomenon of organised crime which had to be examined from various aspects. Hence, the approach to the implementation of the research had to be multi-dimensional, giving the same amount of weight to institutions in the area of justice and security but also to the sources which are not part of government albeit deeply engaged in efforts to fight organised crime through their own activities. This study does not go deep into or draw attention to either completed or still pending investigations of individual criminal activities conducted by relevant institutions. Rather, its goal is to identify, from the civil society perspective, the areas of real threats which should be taken into consideration when developing national strategies, with recommendations for concrete actions plans to fight organised crime. - A diverse array of criminality covered under organised crime, the various forms of its manifestation and a multitude of other characteristics organised crime contains resulted in the absence of the general consensus in either theory or legislation over what the term organised crime encompasses. - Most of domestic and international authors believe that organised crime encompasses the component of the necessary existence of the link between a criminal organisation and the state and its authorities, as an important element of organised crime. - International literature contains the vast array of definitions of organised crime. Prominent among them is the UN definition under which organised crime is: "a large scale and complex criminal activity carried on by groups of persons, however loosely or tightly organised, for the illegal enrichment of those participating at the expense of the community and its members". - The European Union did not accept the model of developing a single definition of organised crime. Rather, it adopted a list of 11 characteristics of organised crime, of which six must be present for any crime to be classified as organised crime. - Under the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an organised crime group is defined as an organised group of at least three persons, which has existed over a certain period of time, operating for the purpose of committing one or more criminal acts which are punishable by imprisonment for a term not less than three years or a heavier punishment. - The authors from our country and the region share the opinion that the main motivating power of organised crime, as a heterogeneous and complex phenomenon, is financial gain, or more precisely, generation of massive profits quickly, and no risk of exposure in such criminal activities. - Analysing the significant number of international documents treating organised crime-related issues, we can say that there is a huge number of organised crime activities, although among the most dominant are certainly trafficking in drugs, money laundering, trafficking in human beings, and vehicle theft. - Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional capacities for fighting organised crime exist. They are numerous, ranging across a broad spectrum, from legislative, operational, advisory to controlling capacities. At the level of BiH, there are 142 institutions which have a role to play in fighting organised crime. Details: Sarajevo: Centre for Security Studies, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/delegacijaEU_2014080112003740eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina URL: http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/delegacijaEU_2014080112003740eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136503 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Vehicle Theft

Author: Santana, Geraldo Title: Can cocaine production in Colombia be linked to environmental crime?: A case study into the effect of EU legislation on the trade Summary: This case study highlights the interrelationship between cocaine production, a drug-related criminal activity and environmental pollution and degradation, activities that are considered to be environmental crimes in many parts of the world today. To a lesser extent, this case study also explores the links between cocaine trafficking and organised crime groups, such as the militias in Colombia. There, cocaine production is not just an ordinary illicit activity, it is also a means used by the militias to secure territory, power, finances and weaponry. The European Union represents the second largest market in the world for cocaine. It also exports 20% of the world's chemical precursors, with Germany as the largest European producer with 5.7% share of the global sales. Chemical precursors such as potassium permanganate, an essential ingredient in cocaine production, are highly monitored yet Colombia seized 80% of the global seizure of illicit potassium permanganate for the period of 2007-2012. Criminals have adopted various diversion methods to make up for their losses from tighter controls on chemical precursors trafficking. There is legislation in place that monitor the trade of chemical precursors within and outside the borders of the EU. The case study seeks to examine if the said legislation has been effective in preventing the illicit use of chemical precursors in cocaine production in Colombia and as a consequence help to prevent further environmental pollution and degradation. Details: The Hague: Institute for Environmental Security, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: A study compiled as part of the EFFACE project. Accessed August 21, 2015 at: http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/EFFACE%20Can%20cocaine%20production%20in%20Colombia%20be%20linked%20to%20environmental%20crime_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Colombia URL: http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/EFFACE%20Can%20cocaine%20production%20in%20Colombia%20be%20linked%20to%20environmental%20crime_0.pdf Shelf Number: 136517 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Environmental Crime Environmental Pollution Organized Crime

Author: Galabov, Antoniy Title: Legislation Meets Practice: National and European Perspectives in Confiscation and Forfeiture of Assets: Comparative Report. Summary: In order to disrupt organised crime activities it is essential to deprive criminals of the proceeds of crime. Organised crime groups are building largescale international networks and amass substantial profits from various criminal activities. The proceeds of crime are laundered and re-injected into the economy to be legalised. The confiscation/forfeiture and recovery of criminal or illegal assets is considered as a very effective way to fight organised crime, which is essentially profit-driven. Seizing back as much of these profits as possible aims at hampering activities of criminal organisations, deterring criminality and providing additional funds to invest back into law enforcement activities or other crime prevention initiatives. The relevance of this problematic is in removing the economic gain from serious crime (including, but not limited to drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, organised crime) in order to discourage the criminal conduct. Its importance is evidenced by the number of multilateral treaties that have been concluded and provide obligations for states to cooperate with one another on confiscation, asset sharing, legal assistance, and compensation of victims. Several United Nations conventions and multilateral treaties contain provisions with regard to confiscation and forfeiture. The issue is also a matter of interest at European Union (EU) level with the new legislation adopted. However challenges still remain and should be addressed, so that cooperation can be more effective, since anti-fraud policy should be targeted in a trans-border perspective. The Stockholm programme called upon the Member States and the Commission to make the confiscation of criminal assets more efficient and to strengthen the cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices (AROs)3; EC report on cooperation between AROs (2011) has identified common capacity problems (insufficient personnel and resources, lack of common legislative framework), inadequate access to databases and judicial statistics. In this context, three national chapters of Transparency International, being also EU Member States, (TI-Bulgaria, TI-Italy and TI-Romania) are conducting a 24-month research and independent civil monitoring over the legal, institutional, and operational modes of the Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) and policies to outline their main strong and weak aspects in terms of competencies, capacity, performance and integrity. The aim of the project "Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches", funded by the "Prevention of and Fight against Crime" programme carried out by DG Home Affairs of the European Commission, is to support the effectiveness, accountability and transparency of asset confiscation/ forfeiture policies and practices in Europe, allowing for improved cooperation between authorities in Member states (MSs). The research provided for objective understanding of main strong and weak points in asset confiscation/ forfeiture legal, institutional and policy practices in Bulgaria, Romania and Italy. It became the basis for the independent civil monitoring and the exchange of know-how and good practices. The addressed shortcomings and recommendations will trigger improvement of the institutional and procedural capacities of national confiscation/forfeiture authorities at local and EU level, especially regarding transparency, accountability, integrity, modes of operation, human resource management, coherence with other relevant authorities, access to databases, use of expertise in asset assessments, cost effectiveness. The project findings from the monitoring (lessons learnt) will also be disseminated via the Transparency International network on regional, EU and international level. Ultimately, this means strengthened capacities of AROs, better chances for cooperation between MSs and civil society representatives. The publication is based on the work of the three national chapters of Transparency International that analyse and monitor the national models of confiscation/forfeiture of assets in Bulgaria, Italy and Romania. The aim is to provide information on the national approach on confiscation/forfeiture as regulated by the national law as well as to provide information on its implementation, based on civil monitoring on real cases tackled by the national confiscation authorities. The publication includes summaries of the three national models of confiscation/forfeiture of illegal/criminal assets (Bulgaria, Italy and Romania). In this part a critical analysis of the legislation is made to be used as a basis for identification of strong and weak features of each model. This is the basis for concrete recommendation for improvement of each model. The second part of the publication includes summaries of the reports for monitoring of the activities of the national confiscation/forfeiture authorities in the three countries. The actual reports are presented as attachments at the end of the book. Each monitoring report includes specific recommendations for improvement. The analysis of the indicators for transparency, integrity, accountability and efficiency in the work of confiscation authorities, based on the active monitoring, is provided as well. In addition the paper provides for a model for civil monitoring of the activities of national confiscation/ forfeiture authorities, which is irrelevant of the specific national model and could be used by civil society organizations in any country to monitor the activities of institutions in this respect. The presentation gives a special focus on the elaboration of an "ideal model" for confiscation/forfeiture at national level. This model is perceived as a set of common standards which should be applied in all EU MSs, in order to achieve transparency, accountability, integrity, efficiency and human rights protection, when confiscation/forfeiture procedures are at stake. Last but not least, the book provides for recommendations for adoption of more advanced common European standards at EU level in the field of confiscation/forfeiture of assets. Further improvement of the existing EU regulations shall contribute to the more successful work of national authorities. Details: Sofia: Transparency International Bulgaria, 2015. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.bg/media/publications/Final_Report_EN_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transparency.bg/media/publications/Final_Report_EN_web.pdf Shelf Number: 136565 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime

Author: Schujer, Maria Title: The impact of drug policy on human rights: The experience in the Americas Summary: This report highlights the different strategies used in countries across the Americas to tackle the drugs problem in the region. It discusses the prohibitionist approach which has led to militarisation, violence, criminalisation of drug use and users, mass incarceration and forced crop eradication campaigns. The so-called "War on Drugs" deployed in the last 50 years has had an enormous impact on the functioning of security, justice and prison systems in Latin America. Despite the high levels of violence that this battle has caused in some areas and its grave consequences, for many years it was not analyzed from a human rights perspective in local or international arenas. This scenario has begun to change. In March 2014, at the request of 17 organizations from 11 countries in the Americas, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) held a regional thematic hearing on this topic, the first in the history of its 150 sessions. This publication expands on the assessment presented by those organizations. The prohibitionist paradigm has increased exponentially the militarization and violence associated with drug trafficking. By creating an enormous illegal market controlled by complex and increasingly powerful criminal groups, violent conflicts have intensified throughout the region, especially in impoverished areas where there has been a further deterioration of inhabitants' living conditions and increased stigmatization. These repressive policies tend to violate the human rights of thousands of people, above all those who face judicial proceedings and are sent to prison, where overcrowding and inhumane detention conditions are often the norm. Numerous studies have shown that these policies tend to disproportionately affect particularly vulnerable groups, and in that way, they reinforce and replicate discrimination and social exclusion Details: Buenos Aires, Argentina: Center for Legal and Social studies (CELS), 2015. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/the-impact-of-drug-policy-on-human-rights-CELS.pdf Year: 2015 Country: South America URL: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/the-impact-of-drug-policy-on-human-rights-CELS.pdf Shelf Number: 136526 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Human Rights War on Drugs

Author: Melara, Christian N. Title: Fighting narcotraffic in Latin America: Mexico and El Salvador - a comparative approach Summary: Mexico and El Salvador have been fighting organized crime for decades. While Mexico has fought drug cartels with the support of the U.S. government, El Salvador has struggled to lower high crime rates mostly with its own resources. Mexico, which has a different government structure from El Salvador's, has not been able to control drug trafficking despite the use of armed forces. Although Mexico's approach to fighting drug cartels differs from El Salvador's approach, neither country has been able to control organized crime in its own territory. While both countries have used armed forces, the outcomes vary. Mexico achieved partial success by incarcerating drug cartel leaders and seizing drugs; however, drug trafficking continued. El Salvador'suse of armed forces has been limited, and the strategy did not lower high crime rates. Human rights issues have aroused negative attention to both countries. The magnitude of the criminal activity in both countries requires a more comprehensive approach, rather than the use of armed forces to counter criminal organized crime. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 9, 2015 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45226/15Mar_Melara_Christian.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: Latin America URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45226/15Mar_Melara_Christian.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 136710 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Turner, Duilia Mora Title: Violent crime in post-civil war Guatemala: causes and policy implications Summary: Guatemala is one of the most violent countries in Latin America, and thus the world. The primary purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question: what factors explain the rise of violent crime in post-civil war Guatemala? The secondary focus of this thesis is to identify the transnational implications of Guatemala's violence for U.S. policy. Guatemala's critical security environment requires the identification of causal relationships and potential corrective actions. This thesis hypothesizes that the causes of violent crime in post-conflict Guatemala are the combination of weak institutional performance and social factors. Determining that Guatemala is not a consolidated democracy, this thesis concludes that a flawed judicial system, inadequate police reform, and weak civil control over the armed forces have a direct causal effect on violent crime in Guatemala. Furthermore, an analysis of social factors demonstrates that these are not causal in nature but rather influential elements in the occurrence of violence. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 131p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 9, 2015 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45266/15Mar_Turner_Duilia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: Guatemala URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45266/15Mar_Turner_Duilia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 136711 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Gang-Related Violence Violence Violent Crime

Author: Pew Charitable Trusts Title: Federal Drug Sentencing Laws Bring High Cost, Low Return. Penalty increases enacted in 1980s and 1990s have not reduced drug use or recidivism Summary: More than 95,000 federal prisoners are serving time for drug-related offenses - up from fewer than 5,000 in 1980. Changes in drug crime patterns and law enforcement practices played a role in this growth, but federal sentencing laws enacted during the 1980s and 1990s also have required more drug offenders to go to prison- and stay there much longer - than three decades ago. These policies have contributed to ballooning costs: The federal prison system now consumes more than $6.7 billion a year, or roughly 1 in 4 dollars spent by the U.S. Justice Department. Despite substantial expenditures on longer prison terms for drug offenders, taxpayers have not realized a strong public safety return. The self-reported use of illegal drugs has increased over the long term as drug prices have fallen and purity has risen. Federal sentencing laws that were designed with serious traffickers in mind have resulted in lengthy imprisonment of offenders who played relatively minor roles. These laws also have failed to reduce recidivism. Nearly a third of the drug offenders who leave federal prison and are placed on community supervision commit new crimes or violate the conditions of their release - a rate that has not changed substantially in decades. Details: Philadelphia: Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief: Accessed September 14, 2015 at: http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2015/08/PSPP_FedDrug_brief.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2015/08/PSPP_FedDrug_brief.pdf Shelf Number: 136745 Keywords: Costs of Corrections Costs of Criminal Justice Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Recidivism Sentencing

Author: Ledebur, Kathryn Title: Bolivian Drug Control Efforts: Genuine Progress, Daunting Challenges Summary: Following a landslide victory at the polls, Evo Morales became president of Bolivia in January 2006. Head of the coca-growers' federation, Morales was a long-standing foe of U.S. drug policy, and many observers anticipated a complete break in U.S.-Bolivian relations and hence an end to drug policy cooperation. Instead, both Morales and the George W. Bush administration initially kept the rhetoric at bay and developed an amicable enough bilateral relationship - though one that at times has been fraught with tension. Following Bolivia's expulsion in 2008 of the U.S. Ambassador, Philip Goldberg, for allegedly meddling in the country's internal affairs and encouraging civil unrest, and the subsequent expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the White House upped its criticism of the Bolivian government and for the past five years has issued a "determination" that Bolivia has "failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to [its] obligations under international narcotics agreements." U.S. economic assistance for Bolivian drug control programs has slowed to a trickle. Nonetheless, in 2011 the two countries signed a new framework agreement to guide bilateral relations and are pending an exchange of ambassadors. Moreover, cooperation continues between the primary Bolivian drug control agency - the Ministry of Government's Vice Ministry of Social Defense and Controlled Substances - and the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the U.S. embassy. At the international level, Bolivia is seeking to reconcile its new constitution, which recognizes the right to use the coca leaf for traditional and legal purposes and recognizes coca as part of the country's national heritage, with its commitments to international conventions. In June 2011, the country denounced the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol and announced its intention to re-accede with a reservation allowing for the traditional use of the coca leaf. (The 1961 Convention mistakenly classifies coca as a dangerous narcotic, along with cocaine.) Unless more than one-third of UN member states object by the January 10, 2013 deadline, the Bolivian reservation will be accepted and the country will once again be a full Party to the Single Convention. The approaching date for Bolivia's potential return to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs provides an opportune moment to evaluate the Bolivian government's progress achieving its drug policy objectives. Moreover, the Morales administration has been in office for nearly six years, providing a clear track record to evaluate. Adopting a "coca yes, cocaine no" approach, Bolivia has sought to decrease the cultivation of coca - the raw material used in manufacturing cocaine - while increasing actions against cocaine production and drug trafficking organizations. In 2011, the land area devoted to coca cultivation in Bolivia dropped by 13 percent, according to U.S. government figures, in contrast to net increases in Peru and Colombia. Seizures of coca paste and cocaine and destruction of drug laboratories have steadily increased since President Morales took office. Yet despite the positive results achieved to date, the government faces increasing challenges as the amount of coca paste and cocaine flowing across its borders from Peru has increased, the production of cocaine in Bolivia itself has risen, and drug traffickers have diversified and expanded areas of production and transportation within the country. The Bolivian government has made significant progress facing the ongoing challenges of drug production and trafficking, in part due to the assistance provided by the European Union (EU), the United States, and others. The U.S. government should now recognize this progress in its annual determinations. The string of negative determinations are increasingly disconnected from reality in Bolivia and retain little credibility with the Bolivian government or with other governments in the region, which continue to see the annual U.S. rating as offensive and politically motivated. The signing of the framework agreement marked significant progress in U.S.-Bolivian bilateral relations. Both governments should build on that success by using the accord as a venue to discuss areas of concern, friction, and consensus. While differences will undoubtedly arise, it is in the best interests of both countries to maintain an open dialogue. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/AIN-WOLA%20Final%20Bolivia%20Coca%20Memo.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Bolivia URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/AIN-WOLA%20Final%20Bolivia%20Coca%20Memo.pdf Shelf Number: 136789 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking

Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Consolidating "Consolidation": Columbia's "security and development" zones await a civilian handoff, while Washington backs away from the concept Summary: Colombia's government is negotiating peace with the country's largest and oldest guerrilla group, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). If the talks succeed- a strong possibility - Colombia faces a big question: what will be different in the vast territories where the guerrillas have been in control, or operated freely, for decades? In these areas, violence, drug trafficking, and warlordism have long been the norm, and the government's presence has been virtually nonexistent. If the government does not establish itself in these jungles, mountains, plains, coasts, and borderlands, the FARC's negotiated end will make little difference; illegality and violence will continue to fill the vacuum. Colombia must follow a successful negotiation with getting the government into the country's ungoverned zones. And not just military occupiers: a real, civilian state whose members provide basic services, operate without impunity, and thus enjoy the population's support. Will Colombia be able to fill the vacuum and end the cycle of violence? As WOLA's new report Consolidating "Consolidation" describes, the record of the National Territorial Consolidation Plan - a five-year-old program with that very goal - should worry us that it might not. Backed by at least half a billion dollars in U.S. assistance, this ambitious program seeks to bring the government into several areas of the country with histories of illegal armed groups, violence, drug trafficking, and statelessness. (It is often called the "La Macarena" program, after the southern Colombian zone where the most advanced pilot project has taken place.) Today, while "Consolidation" has brought security improvements and more soldiers and police to a few territories, the governance vacuum remains far from filled. In the Consolidation zones, armed groups remain very active, especially outside of town centers. Soldiers are by far the most commonly seen government representatives, and the civilian parts of the government - such as health services, education, agriculture, road-builders, land-titlers, judges, and prosecutors - are lagging very far behind. In Consolidating "Consolidation," WOLA sought to identify the reasons why the Consolidation program's military-to-civilian transfer has stalled. Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy Adam Isacson found that while the U.S. and Colombian governments underestimated the difficulty of achieving security and the cost of "state-building," much of the blame lies with civilian government agencies themselves, most of which have been very reluctant to set up a presence in Consolidation zones. But we found something even more serious: the entire Consolidation model is losing momentum quickly and may have begun to deteriorate. Based on dozens of interviews and a very close read of available evidence, Consolidating "Consolidation" portrays a program lacking interest and backing at high levels of government. What was once a showcase program stagnated during a year and a half-long "rethinking," followed by several months of infighting that culminated in the sudden exit of the program's director. Meanwhile, in places like Afghanistan, the United States is edging away from similar missions, which it calls "Stability Operations," that sought to provide basic services to citizens in ungoverned areas. Instead, U.S. forces are relying more on Special Forces operations and drone strikes. Programs continue in Consolidation zones in Colombia, thanks in great part to US$227 million in USAID contracts awarded since 2010. But Consolidation, which once promised to bring a functioning government to areas that never had one, may be on its way to becoming a politically driven handout program attached to an open-ended military occupation. If Consolidation fades away, the report warns, it is not clear what will replace it in Colombia's neglected territories. As Colombia faces the possibility of peace in zones of historic guerrilla control, it is crucial that a plan be in place to prevent a re-emergence of violence. If the peace talks succeed, for a brief period Colombia will have a window of opportunity to bring the government to areas that have long generated violence, bringing their citizens into national civic and economic life for the first time. The National Territorial Consolidation Plan could offer a way to do this, but only if it returns to its initial vision of a phased, coordinated entry of civilian government. If this scheme, or something like it, is to succeed, it will require political will from the highest levels to ensure that the civilians take over as quickly as security conditions allow. And it will require a renewed - but far more civilian-centered - commitment from the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Shelf Number: 136802 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Violence Warlords

Author: Taxy, Samuel Title: Drug Offenders in Federal Prison: Estimates of Characteristics Based on Linked Data Summary: Presents a description of drug offenders in federal prison, including criminal history, demographics, gun involvement in the offense, and sentence imposed. The report examines each characteristics by type of drug involved in the offense. It also examines demographic information for the entire federally sentenced population and discusses alternative methods for defining drug offenders. Data are from a linked file created with data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons and United States Sentencing Commission. Highlights: This study is based on 94,678 offenders in federal prison at fiscal yearend 2012 who were sentenced on a new U.S. district court commitment and whose most serious offense (as classified by the Federal Bureau of Prisons) was a drug offense. Almost all (99.5%) drug offenders in federal prison were serving sentences for drug trafficking. Cocaine (powder or crack) was the primary drug type for more than half (54%) of drug offenders in federal prison. Race of drug offenders varied greatly by drug type. Blacks were 88% of crack cocaine offenders, Hispanics or Latinos were 54% of powder cocaine offenders, and whites were 48% of methamphetamine offenders. More than a third (35%) of drug offenders in federal prison at sentencing, had either no or minimal criminal history. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 28, 2015 at: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf Shelf Number: 137166 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Federal Prisons Prisoner Statistics Prisoners

Author: Paredes, Dusan Title: Is crime in Mexico a disamenity? Evidence from hedonic valuation approach Summary: Since Roback (1982)'s seminal work, the literature has evaluated the role of the amenities to equilibrate the regional differentials of nominal wages and prices. While these studies generally find evidence for traditional amenities and disamenities in developed countries, it still exists a scarce exploration on how those characteristics assessed, like violence, affect the equilibrium in less developed countries. In this paper, we explore violence as amenity or disamenity for the case of Mexico as a particular and unique natural experiment. We use the hedonic wage and rent theory proposed by Roback using data from the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure Survey, along with other information at municipal and state level. For our particular hypothesis, we find evidence to support that inhabitants in traditional drug trafficking states could consider drug-related crime as an amenity. Details: Antofagasta, Chile: Departamento de Economia, Universidad Catolica del Norte, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: No 67, Documentos de Trabajo en Economia y Ciencia Regional : Accessed October 30, 2015 at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/cat/dtecon/dt201512.html Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/cat/dtecon/dt201512.html Shelf Number: 137178 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Economics and Crime Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime

Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali Summary: Mali's descent into a war of secession at the start of 2012 was a conflict foretold. Yet what followed proved radically distinct from the country's three previous episodes of insurgency in its vast, impoverished and arid north. Radical Islamists seized control of the main urban centres of northern Mali, displacing the Tuareg rebels with whom they had struck a working relationship. In the capital, Bamako, a military coup led by an unknown and low-ranking army captain overthrew a president who had been in power for a decade. An uneasy stand-off came into being: Mali's debilitated military guarded the frontiers to the south, while Islamist hardliners and criminals meted out their own version of sharia justice across the north. As is well known, the decomposition of Malian state authority was finally halted early in 2013. Faced with an Islamist advance to the south, French military forces embarked on a lightning intervention that scattered the extremists and reasserted control over the north. Since then, the pace of Mali's post-conflict recovery and stabilization has been astonishing: a UN peacekeeping mission and a host of bilateral and EU programmes have been put into place; a new president and a new National Assembly have been elected; peace talks with the more moderate armed groups, though stuttering, are under way. But as the national government and the international community leave behind the heat of the crisis, it is now incumbent on them to understand what caused such a perilous tailspin to start in Mali, so as to prevent it from reoccurring. As in other countries of West Africa and the Sahel, transnational organized crime has played a prominent role in the affairs of Mali over the past two decades, above all in the north. Drug trafficking, including large consignments of high-value cocaine from Latin America, as well as kidnapping rackets led by Islamist terror groups operating freely across the borders of the Sahel, are both widely regarded as playing key roles in fomenting the instability, unrest and violence that climaxed in 2012. However, the depiction of a crime-terror nexus in Mali, whereby criminal profits feed insurgent arms and recruitment, does not do justice to the multi-faceted role played by illicit activity across the country. This paper is an attempt to marshal all the available evidence, along with the insights provided by experts in Mali, so as to understand the relations that were forged prior to 2012 between criminal enterprises, communities, political and social elites, armed groups, the Malian state and neighbouring countries. On the basis of recent developments, the paper seeks to outline the likely adaptations that the main illicit networks will now make, and to draw out some recommendations as to how best to temper the criminality and violence that menace Mali's post-conflict transition. At the heart of this analysis is an account of how Mali was both the victim of the displacement of drug-trafficking routes and armed jihadist activity from other countries, and a deeply complicit partner in profiting from the incoming wave of illicit trade and Islamist terror. Behind this willing complicity lay the particular vulnerabilities of Malian state and society. Government in Bamako, the country's capital, had by 2006 replaced direct authority over the north with sporadic, ham-fisted interference. Chronic competition between the north's many ethnic, caste and clan groups offered numerous possibilities for the political elite in Bamako to find useful allies to do its bidding. However, these social fissures were also fodder for the designs of other, newer parties: nearby states such as Algeria and Libya, criminal organizations seeking to traffic drugs, and radical armed groups. The resulting transactions between supranational forces and local ethnic or tribal factions were to set Mali on the way to the fourth, and arguably the most threatening, insurgency of its post-colonial history. But Mali's war was not merely the product of radicalized and internationalized disaffection in the north. The conflict also threw a harsh light on the degradation of the state itself. A model for democratic virtue in Africa, half of whose budget was financed by foreign donors, Mali re-emerged after its coup as a state that had been afflicted by multiple vices. Illicit practices had become rampant across the public sector, corroding popular faith in politicians; Mali's celebrated elections had in fact received some of the lowest turnouts in the democratic world. Moreover, the day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism formed a permissive soil on which an all-powerful presidency could nurture the construction of a shadow state. The greatest drug trafficking scandal of Malian history, the Air Cocaine case of 2009, suggests that official complicity in the criminal business had penetrated the highest echelons of power. Mali has now set the course for a recovery of legitimate and accountable state authority. Its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has backed a clean sweep of the judicial system and a Truth Commission on violence in the north. Captain Sanogo, the coup leader, is in jail, along with his accomplices. Key Islamist leaders and narco-traffickers have been scattered or neutered, as have the masterminds of the shadow state. From the information available, it would seem that major illicit trafficking across the north has also diminished in scale. However, it is far too soon to proclaim an end to the crisis. Occasional terrorist attacks and ethnic skirmishes remain a constant headache for local people and UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the pre-war illicit networks are never far away: clearing corruption from the public sector is set to be a long and arduous haul, while illicit networks in political life are destined to regroup and reconfigure, as they have in many other criminalized environments, notably in Latin America. Nearby countries such as Niger and Libya have quickly emerged as staging posts in the Saharan and Sahelian criminal economy. As Mali negotiates its post-conflict recovery, the focus must be directed at ways to reduce the systemic threat from criminal business while avoiding the sorts of blind repressive policies that have engineered insurgencies in Afghanistan, or terrible bloodshed in Mexico. This paper outlines a number of approaches that should lie at the heart of such a balanced, conflict-sensitive strategy towards crime. A robust and inclusive political settlement for the north is critical, though for this to work attention must now focus on how decentralized or autonomous regional authorities can be supervised without the risk of meddling from Bamako. Provision of security and security reform must be imbued with realism as to what can be achieved with the institutions available, and should be shaped by an emphasis on intelligence-led policing that seeks to sever the most dangerous criminal linkages to power-brokers. Counter-terrorism must also be wise to the intermediation of criminal figures, and to the armed networks that illicit businessmen have cultivated. And lastly, it remains imperative that renascent Mali attacks the roots of the shadow state, and is backed by an international community willing to abandon its hunger for fixers in the state and short-term solutions. Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, the Clingendael Institute, 2014. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed October 30, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mali URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Shelf Number: 137180 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Illicit Networks Kidnapping Organized Crime Terrorism Violence

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain Summary: Violent crimes committed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico often involve firearms, and a 2009 GAO report found that many of these firearms originated in the United States. ATF and ICE have sought to stem firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. GAO was asked to undertake a follow-up review to its 2009 report (GAO-09-709) addressing these issues. This report examines, among other things, (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced by ATF, (2) the extent to which collaboration among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved, and (3) the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed program information and firearms tracing data from 2009 to 2014, and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States take steps to formally monitor implementation of the 2009 MOU between ATF and ICE. GAO also recommends that ONDCP establish comprehensive indicators that more accurately reflect progress made in efforts to stem arms trafficking to Mexico. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-223: Accessed January 12, 2016 at: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 137468 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Firearms Trafficking Homeland Security Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Ajzenman, Nicolas Title: On the Distributed Costs of Drug-Related Homicides Summary: Reliable estimates of the effects of violence on economic outcomes are scarce. We exploit the many-fold increase in homicides in 2008-2011 in Mexico resulting from its war on organized drug traffickers to estimate the effect of drug-related homicides on house prices. We use an unusually rich dataset that provides national coverage on house prices and homicides and exploit within-municipality variations. We find that the impact of violence on housing prices is borne entirely by the poor sectors of the population. An increase in homicides equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 3% decrease in the price of low-income housing. In spite of this large burden on the poor, the willingness to pay in order to reverse the increase in drug-related crime is not high. We estimate it to be approximately 0.1% of Mexico's GDP. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 364: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/distributive-costs-drug-related-homicides_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/distributive-costs-drug-related-homicides_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132248 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug-Related Violence Drugs and Crime Economics of Crime Homicides Organized Crime

Author: Malone, Mary Fran T. Title: Why Do the Children Flee? Public Security and Policing Practices in Central America Summary: In this brief, author Mary Fran Malone discusses the security crisis in Central America and successful policing strategies for confronting this crisis. She reports that Central Americans' experiences and perceptions of crime are linked to an increased likelihood of migration. In 2014, approximately 57,000 unaccompanied minors traveled from Central America to Mexico, continuing north to cross the U.S. border illegally. The large numbers of people fleeing Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras testify not only to the violence of illicit markets but also to the failure of these countries' governments to fulfill their most important task - protecting the lives of their citizens. Not all Central American countries have failed at this task, however. Nicaragua and Panama have successfully created civilian police forces that have contained the crime crisis while also respecting the rights of citizens. Trust in police is significantly higher in Nicaragua and Panama than other countries in Central America, and people have more trust that the justice system will convict perpetrators of crime. If the United States aims to reduce the number of people fleeing north, it must invest more seriously in policing and public security practices that have a track record of success. After almost two decades, it is clear that the militarized and repressive policing strategies of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras do not work. As the cases of Nicaragua and Panama demonstrate, community-oriented policing strategies are effective in building citizens' trust in their police and fostering a culture of respect for human rights. Details: Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire, Carsey School of Public Policy, 2015. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: National Issue Brief #95: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1259&context=carsey Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1259&context=carsey Shelf Number: 137791 Keywords: Community-Oriented Policing Drug Trafficking Illegal Immigration Illicit Markets Police Legitimacy Unaccompanied Children

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Anti-organized crime and counter-narcotics enforcement in Cape Verde Project (ANTRAF) Summary: Cape Verde is an archipelago consisting of 10 islands (being one uninhabited) located at 500 kilometres off the coast of Senegal. According to 2010 Census, the country is home to almost 492 thousand people, out of which 39% is less than 18 years old. Most of the population (62%) now lives in the urban centres. In the early 2000s, Cape Verde was identified as a transit route for drug trafficking between Latin America and Europe. In the same period, internally, drug trafficking and abuse as well as all sorts of criminal behaviour were on the rise. In 2002, Cape Verde requested UNODC assistance to tackle drug trafficking and organized crime, which had turned into a real concern in the archipelago. The CAVE INTECRIN Programme (Cape Verde Integrated Crime and Narcotic Programme) was signed in 2005, as the result of a constructive dialogue developed with the relevant national authorities in 2003 and 2004. The objectives have been set out with a view to meeting both the request for technical assistance of the Government of Cape Verde and the overall mandates of UNODC, particularly in relation to its three main areas of operations, viz. anti-trafficking, reduction of uncivil behaviours, and rule of law. The ANTRAF project (CPV/S28) - subject of this evaluation - was part of the CAVE INTECRIN programme. The Government of Cape Verde and UNODC signed the CPV/S28 in September 2005, with an approved duration of 30 months (from January 2006 to March 2008) and a total budget of USD 5.8 million. As of 31 December 2011, the project had undergone to four revisions (one in 2009, two in 2010 and one in 2011), and it has been extended up to December 2014. The overall purpose for this evaluation is to assess whether the implementation of the CAVE ANTRAF CPV/S28 project has been contributing to meet the project's objectives, outcomes and outputs, so that lessons can be drawn and recommendations made, which in turn will constitute the basis for making decisions regarding instituting improvements to project planning, implementation, design and management. The evaluation used a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches in order to analyse data, assess the status of outputs and outcomes, and triangulate evidence. The methods utilized in the evaluation were: desk review of relevant documents, interviews with key stakeholders, field visits, data analysis and focus group discussion. The main constraints of the evaluation were related to the availability of data; the time available for conducting the evaluation; the geographical coverage for the field visits that were limited to the capital of the country; the lack of inputs to perform an outcome and impact evaluation; and the political constraints related to the project's thematic areas. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2012. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2012/CPVS28_Eval_Report_Final_edited.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Cape Verde URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2012/CPVS28_Eval_Report_Final_edited.pdf Shelf Number: 137855 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Kyle, Chris Title: Violence and Insecurity in Guerrero Summary: This paper is a continuation of the series Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence, a multiyear effort by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego to analyze the obstacles to and opportunities for improving citizen security in Mexico. Insecurity and violence associated with organized criminal activity are pervasive in Mexico's southern state of Guerrero. The state's homicide rate is the highest in the country and extortion and kidnapping are commonplace. For perpetrators, there is near complete impunity. The state is divided into territories within which either drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) or community policing networks exercise control over local policing functions. Local, state, or federal authorities occasionally join this competition, but for the most part policing powers are held by others. In rural areas competition between groups of traffickers over the state's prodigious narcotics output has created violent no-man's-lands in buffer zones between territories controlled by rival groups. In cities violence is mostly a byproduct of efforts to establish and preserve monopolies in extortion, kidnapping, and retail contraband markets. Despite claims to the contrary by state and federal authorities, there has been no discernible improvement in public security in recent months or years. Restraining the violence in Guerrero will require that state authorities make a systematic effort to address two existing realities that sustain the criminal activities producing violence. Thus, this paper examines the security situation in the state of Guerrero, including the operation of drug trafficking organizations, and proposes possible solutions to the security crisis. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence Briefing Paper Series: accessed February 17, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf Shelf Number: 137864 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extortion Homicides Kidnappings Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: Leoncini, Riccardo Title: Counteracting Cocaine Production - An Analysis Based on a Novel Dataset Summary: The debate about the effectiveness of the counteracting policies against the supply of drugs, in particular of cocaine, is very lively and intense. Indeed, since many opinions are based on certain measures rather than others, the construction of reliable indicators is one of the preconditions for a correct and concerted assessment of drug supply. The lack of reliable data on drug provision derives, on the one side, from the objective difficulties encountered in assessing the quantitative elements of drug production and drug trafficking due to its illegal nature, and, on the other side, from the lack of a standard methodological approach to the issue. This paper tries to contribute to the topic by proposing a new dataset, based on a completely new approach to the problem of measuring drug supply. We put forward a unique dataset covering cocaine related seizures in Colombia for the whole of year 2008. Data have been collected on a daily basis from the websites of the main organizations fighting against drug traffickers (Army, Air Force, National Police, Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, Armada Nacional, Fiscalia), detailing each single seizure of laboratories for the production of both basic paste and cocaine hydrochloride. By means of this dataset, we offer some accounts of the main numbers on drug supply and on drug seizures, suggesting some policy options, and arriving to an estimate of cocaine production Details: Unpublished paper, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 26, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546925 Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546925 Shelf Number: 137983 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking War on Drugs

Author: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Title: Illicit Trade: Converging Criminal Networks Summary: Illicit trade is a worldwide phenomenon. Globalisation has provided opportunities for criminal networks to expand the scope and scale of their operations, with serious negative consequences for the economy, the environment and society. Illicit trade also undermines good governance, the rule of law and citizens' trust in government, and can ultimately threaten political stability. This report provides analysis of some of the main areas of illicit trade, including trafficking in persons, wildlife, counterfeit medicines, narcotics, tobacco, alcohol and sports betting. It looks at what drives and facilitates such activity, estimates the volume of trade and amount of revenue it generates, maps the pathways of illicit goods from production to consumer, describes the shortcomings of current policies for reducing or deterring illicit trade, and suggests avenues for improvement. Understanding illicit trade It is important to clearly define and measure illicit trade, and understand the context that allows it to flourish. However, countries - and sometimes regions within countries - do not always agree on what goods can be legally traded, and there is even greater variance in the application of quality standards and the protection of intellectual property rights. These differences can make cross-country measurement of illicit trade as a whole very difficult, which is why this report takes a sectoral approach. Our increasingly interconnected economies and societies have allowed organized crime to expand alongside the exponential growth in legitimate international trade. Criminal networks exploit differences in regulatory and tax regimes to move goods and services across borders. While exact measurements can be difficult given the clandestine nature of illicit transactions, one estimate puts the profits of international organised crime as high as USD 870 billion, or 1.5% of global GDP. Calculating and tracking the money made from these activities is important as it can provide crucial information to law enforcement. More data and information sharing is needed to develop a clearer understanding of illicit trade and how to combat it. A more holistic view of the cost of illicit trade also takes into account its harmful impacts on consumers, the environment, tax revenues and jobs. Traffic in humans and narcotics, for example, also exact a very heavy social toll. Illicit trade can also be closely linked to criminal violence and terrorism. Costs in terms of law enforcement, incarceration and rehabilitation should also be taken into account. Finally, illicit trade can cause longer-term damage to the rule of law, public trust, human capital and public health, as well as deter foreign investment. Trafficking in persons According to estimates by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 20.9 million people are forced into slavery worldwide causing immense, long-term damage to individuals, communities, and nations. Trafficked persons tend to flow from poorer regions to richer regions and from conflict regions to more stable regions. Governments need to give priority to implementing laws for preventing trafficking, protecting victims and prosecuting both traffickers and the corrupt public officials who assist them. Illicit trade in wildlife Demand for elephant ivory and rhino horn has driven dramatic growth in illegal wildlife markets in recent years due primarily to a growing consumer base in East Asia. Taken together, all forms of wildlife trafficking constitutes one of the most lucrative forms of illicit trade, and the sector has more than doubled since 2007. Monitoring and enforcement in source countries can be effective means to reduce poaching, but training and information systems are needed to build adequate capacity. Counterfeit medicines The trade in counterfeit medicine is a huge industry, generating as much as USD 200 billion a year in tangible goods alone according to OECD's study of 2005 data, which is soon to be updated. It has a direct negative impact on health, depriving users of appropriate treatment and contributing to global microbial resistance. Pharmaceutical companies also suffer a loss in revenue and reputation, and increased costs for security. Successfully combatting counterfeiting will require more extensive information sharing across agencies and nations. Finally, the development and adoption of an international public health treaty would be a significant step toward protecting patients and public health globally. Tobacco products The illicit trade in tobacco is perhaps the most widespread and most documented sector in the shadow economy. It has been estimated that 570 billion illicit cigarettes were consumed worldwide in 2011. Illicit tobacco is an important source of revenue for criminal networks, and deprives government services of excise tax revenues at the same time. To counter the illicit trade in tobacco products, governments developing a multifaceted approach, including: building partnerships, increasing data validity and reliability, launching educational and public awareness campaigns, increasing capacity-building efforts, and prioritising countering illicit tobacco products and its associated crimes. Narcotics The global narcotics trade is thought to be the single largest black market in the world, and is a source of revenue for international criminal organization. In addition to the negative impact on human health and well-being caused by the narcotics themselves, the criminal violence that accompanies all aspects of drug trafficking erodes state institutions and is often difficult to reverse. Tackling the narcotics trade effectively will require not only punitive approaches and sanctions but also state building, economic development and good governance practices. Alcohol It is estimated that billions of dollars from trafficking and illegal trade in alcoholic beverages flow through the global economy each year, distorting local economies, diminishing government and legitimate business revenues, and in some cases posing a serious health risk to consumers. It is estimated that illicit sources account for 25% of total worldwide adult alcoholic consumption. Contributing factors include the higher cost of legal products from taxes, weak laws, lack of enforcement and social acceptance of contraband in some countries. Sports manipulation The globalisation of sports has led to an increase in unregulated sports betting, which is increasingly used for money laundering and has been connected to corruption in sports (match-rigging). An internationally co-ordinated, pro-active response is needed, including initiatives targeting bettors and offenders, police action and co-operation with financial institutions. It is also important to communicate on the subject of sports integrity to all stakeholders, including the public and the media. Details: Paris: OECD, 2015. 259p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2016 at: http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/illicit-trade-converging-criminal-networks.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/illicit-trade-converging-criminal-networks.pdf Shelf Number: 138115 Keywords: Counterfeit Medicines Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Tobacco Illicit Trade Organized Crime Sports Betting Wildlife Crime

Author: Souza Pinheiro, Alvaro de Title: Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas Summary: This monograph by Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro contributes to the discussion of urban guerrillas, their impact on society, and the role of the armed forces in countering criminal elements. The rise of urban guerrillas is a result of an evolution in command and control capabilities, weapons, and doctrine that has given them strong influence over the daily lives of citizens living in neighborhoods where government support and control is limited or absent. The favelas (ghettos, slums) of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are ready examples that provide the setting for General Alvaro's monograph. The urban guerrilla, however, is emblematic of a wider-felt problem, not limited to Brazil. What makes General Alvaro's monograph compelling is that this Brazilian story has universal application in many locales that are under-governed and under-supported by constituted authorities. Urban guerrillas flow from a witch's brew of ersatz political doctrine, readily available and powerful weapons, and criminal gangs that typically are financed by the drug trade. Criminal groups like the Red Command (Comando Vermelho-CV) and Third Command have been able to thrive in the favelas because of ineffective policing and lack of government interest. These Brazilian gangs have filled the void with their own form of governance. As General Alvaro indicates herein, criminal urban guerrillas have latched on to revolutionary doctrine, such as the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla and the First Capital Command Statute, so as to give political legitimacy to their lawlessness. In fact, these are gangs that terrorize the residents of the favelas, holding them hostage to criminal exploits, while keeping government legitimacy and security in check. As in the United States, when the general welfare of civil society is at risk, the President may call upon the armed forces to aid the police or take control. Under the Brazilian Constitution the President can "intervene -- to put an end to serious jeopardy to public order --" through his power to "decree and enforce federal intervention." This is akin to the U.S. President's authorities for civil disturbances and other emergencies, but a notable difference is the expansive role that Brazilian armed forces can take. Under the Brazilian Constitution the armed forces "are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers [legislative, executive, judicial], and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order." Thus during the crisis to restore public order in Rio de Janeiro in November 1994 through January 1995, the military was put in charge as the lead agency, with operational control over federal and state police. With Presidential authorization, the Brazilian Minister of the Army designated the Eastern Military Commander as the General Commander of Operations. Operation Rio commenced with the goals of reducing urban violence and reestablishing government authority. Operations consisted of isolating lawless areas, conducting squad patrols and large sweeps, and on several occasions, attacking the urban guerrilla directly. The operation suppressed urban guerrilla activity-for a time. There was a decrease in bank robberies, car thefts, gang shootouts, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling, plus some 300 automatic rifles and 500 hand guns were confiscated. Yet as General Alvaro illustrates in this monograph, the problem persists today with similar public order crises in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and other cities. It is for good reason that General Alvaro includes in this monograph a translation of Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, since the man and his manual continue to inspire miscreants and would-be revolutionary groups. Much as psychiatrist-philosopher Frantz Fanon provided a rationale for African anticolonialists to kill the white interlopers, Marighella is a symbol for ideological activists who would resist authority, as well as for criminals who profit when government presence and legitimacy are wanting. The military planner and strategist should be familiar with the Minimanual and similar writings since they contribute to the development of the strategic environment as we find it, and it is against this backdrop that we plan for countering insurgencies and terrorism. The military will continue to play an important part in countering the urban guerrilla, whose goal is to separate the population from the government (typically by making government forces overreact) then supplanting it. This suggests that the military will need to conduct a range of irregular warfare activities in coordination with civilian agencies. Whatever the combination of direct and indirect actions that are applied to counter the urban guerrilla, the military planner will be well served to consider General Alvaro's insights about Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas. Details: Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2009. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 09-8: Accessed March 12, 2016 at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/0909_jsou-report-09-8.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/0909_jsou-report-09-8.pdf Shelf Number: 138195 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Favelas Gangs Organized Crime Urban Guerrillas Urban Violence Violent Crime Weapons Smuggling

Author: Kushlick, Danny Title: The War on Drugs: Undermining Peace and Security Summary: The global war on drugs has been fought for 50 years, without preventing the long-term trend of increasing drug production, supply and use. But beyond this failure to achieve its own stated aims, the drug war has also produced a range of serious, negative costs. Many of these costs have been identified by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) - the very UN agency that oversees the system responsible for them - and are described as the 'unintended consequences' of the war on drugs. They may have been unintended, but after more than 50 years, they can no longer be seen as unanticipated. These costs are also distinct from those relating to drug use, stemming as they do from the choice of a punitive enforcement-led approach. This briefing explores how the UN seeks to promote the security of its member states through implementing a drug control system that treats the use of certain drugs as an 'existential threat' to society. The briefing will demonstrate, however, that this approach is fatally undermining international peace and security. There is naturally overlap with other areas of the Count the Costs project, including: development, human rights, health, crime and economics. Details: London: Count the Costs, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Security-briefing.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Security-briefing.pdf Shelf Number: 138249 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Policy Drug Trafficking War on Drugs

Author: Mackey, Kelly Title: Analysis of Sentencing for Possession or Importation of Drugs for Sale or Supply Summary: This analysis examines the sentencing practice of the courts in relation to certain drug trafficking offences, specifically the offences of possession or importation of controlled drugs for the purpose of sale or supply. There are four such offences which are detailed herein:  Possession of controlled drugs for unlawful sale or supply (s. 15 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended).  Possession of controlled drugs (valued at L13,000 or more) for unlawful sale or supply (s. 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended).  Importation of controlled drugs for unlawful sale or supply (several provisions found in the Customs Acts, Misuse of Drugs Acts 1979-1984, as amended, and the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1988).  Importation of controlled drugs (valued at L13,000 or more) for unlawful sale or supply (s. 15B of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended). It is important to note that there is a different sentencing regime for the ordinary possession and importation for sale or supply offences and possession or importation for sale and supply offences where the value of the drug or drugs exceeds L3,000. Convictions under s. 15A or s. 15B automatically attract a "basic presumptive sentence" of 10 years or more. This applies regardless of whether mitigating factors may exist meriting a lower sentence. A sentencing court may however impose a lower sentence where there are mitigating factors that amount to "exceptional and specific circumstances", which would render the imposition of a sentence of 10 years or more "unjust in all the circumstances". "Exceptional and specific circumstances" can be said to set a higher threshold than mitigating factors generally in sentencing law: all "exceptional and specific circumstances" are mitigating factors, but not all mitigating factors constitute "exceptional and specific circumstances". In Part I, the legislative basis for these drug trafficking offences and the reserved judgments of the superior courts are analysed in order to articulate a sentencing framework. Part II examines the application of such sentencing principles to the hybrid sentencing regime for offences of possession or importation for sale or supply where the controlled drugs are above a certain monetary value, i.e. whether the "basic presumptive sentence" should be imposed or whether to do so would be unjust in all the circumstances. Part III contains a pr�cis of all judgments on sentencing - total of 79 reserved and ex tempore decisions involving 81 offenders - the Court of Criminal Appeal from 2009 to 2012. 20 judgments were analysed pertaining to the ordinary offence and 59 relating to the offences carrying the presumptive sentence. Details: Dublin: Irish Sentencing Information System, 2013. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2016 at: http://www.irishsentencing.ie/en/ISIS/Analysis%20of%20Sentencing%20for%20Drug%20Offences,%20Mar%202014.pdf/Files/Analysis%20of%20Sentencing%20for%20Drug%20Offences,%20Mar%202014.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Ireland URL: http://www.irishsentencing.ie/en/ISIS/Analysis%20of%20Sentencing%20for%20Drug%20Offences,%20Mar%202014.pdf/Files/Analysis%20of%20Sentencing%20for%20Drug%20Offences,%20Mar%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 138347 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Possession Drug Trafficking Sentencing

Author: Novis, Roberta Title: Hard Times: Exploring the Complex Structures and Activities of Brazilian Prison Gangs Summary: This research examines the presence of organised criminal groups in prison and its influence on inmate's interaction and on the prison system of Rio de Janeiro. Information collected from a series of in-depth interviews with prisoners and ex-prisoners, members and non-members of the criminal groups and authorities of the criminal justice system, suggests that the current social organisation of prisons is working favourably towards the further development of organised crime and deviant behaviour. Prisoners are subordinated not only to the prison administration but also to the gang leaders. If a convict had no links with drug trafficking prior to incarceration, they definitely create one behind bars. Ninety-eight percent (98%) of interviewees from the sensitive sample engaged in drug trafficking while in prison. Off-brand inmates, those who are the less conspicuous convicts, end up engaging in illegal activities to avoid retaliation, perpetuating then a cycle of violence in a fragmented geopolitical gang space behind bars. Political pressure towards the validity of the classification system stratified by gang affiliation has impacted on the prison administration to create multiple categories of prisoners, which are mutually exclusive. This has had pervasive impacts on penal affairs such as allocation of sentences, lack of vacancies and disruption of prisoner's routine. The research shows that the State goes beyond classification of inmates by gang affiliation; it has incorporated elements of gang's violent tradition to assess and influence justice and prisoner's progression. This study offers an interesting scope for a comparative analysis through the study of anti-prison gang strategies. Experiences around the globe have been driven to target gangs with racial and ethnical rivalries. Prison gangs in this study are devoted to a more capitalist goal: the monopoly of illegal drug markets in the streets. Such understandings and contextualizing make a significant contribution to re-examining the role of inmate culture as well as the value of contemporary penal reforms designed to making the penal institutions more responsive and interventionist in addressing inmate needs. Details: London: London School of Economics, 2013. 279p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/958/1/Novis_hard_times.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/958/1/Novis_hard_times.pdf Shelf Number: 138455 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Prison Administration Prison Gangs Prison Violence Prisoners

Author: Pinheiro, Alvaro de Souza Title: Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces Summary: If combined special operations are to be conducted effectively in the complex strategic environment of a post 9/11 world, then it is necessary to have a sound understanding of each nation's interests, defense policies, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and practices. This monograph contributes to that goal by exploring avenues for U.S.-Brazilian SOF interaction and cooperation. It provides on an overview of Brazil, its national security and defense policy, and current relations with the United States. This monograph describes the history and present organization of Brazilian SOF and considers its future. To this end, the purpose of this monograph is to offer the U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) community a portrait of Brazilian SOF in areas such as the Tri-Border Area of the Southern Cone, and other operational environments. Details: MacDill AFB F: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-7: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Shelf Number: 138476 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups National Security Violence

Author: Queensland Organised Crime Commission of Inquiry Title: Report Summary: The Commission commenced on 1 May 2015, by Commissions of Inquiry Order (No. 1) 2015, to make inquiry into the extent and nature of organised crime in Queensland and its economic and societal impacts. The otherwise very broad nature of such an inquiry was somewhat narrowed by the Terms of Reference within the Order in Council, which focused the Commission on four key areas: - the major illicit drug and/or precursor markets - online child sex offending, including the child exploitation material market - financial crimes, primarily investment/financial market fraud and financial data theft - the relationship between organised crime and corruption in Queensland. The Commission was also required to investigate the extent to which organised crime groups use various enabling mechanisms or services: in particular, money laundering, cyber and technology-enabled crime, identity crime, professional facilitators, violence and extortion. In carrying out the Inquiry, the Commission was to examine the adequacy and appropriateness of current responses to organised crime by law enforcement, intelligence, and prosecution agencies, as well as the adequacy of legislation and of the resources available to such agencies. The six-month timeframe given for the Inquiry was limited, given the areas required to be examined. Details: Sydney: The Commission, 2015. 578p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://www.organisedcrimeinquiry.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/935/QOCCI15287-ORGANISED-CRIME-INQUIRY_Final_Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.organisedcrimeinquiry.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/935/QOCCI15287-ORGANISED-CRIME-INQUIRY_Final_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 138491 Keywords: Child Sexual Exploitation Corruption Cybercrime Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Identity Theft Money Laundering Motorcycle Gangs Organized Crime

Author: Carrera, Sergio Title: The Cost of Non-Europe in the Area of Organised Crime and Corruption: Annex I - Organised Crime Summary: This Research Paper examines the costs of non-Europe in the field of organised crime. It provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the main legal/ethical, socio-political and economic costs and benefits of the EU in policies on organised crime. It offers an in-depth examination of the transformative contribution that the EU has made, in terms of investigation, prosecution and efficiency, to trans-border operational activities and the protection of its citizens' rights. Finally, it seeks to answer the questions of what are the costs and benefits of European cooperation and what forms of cooperation would bring more European added value. Details: Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 177p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579318/EPRS_STU(2016)579318_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579318/EPRS_STU(2016)579318_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138492 Keywords: Costs of Crime Counterfeiting Cybercrime Drug Trafficking Economic Crimes Environmental Crime Human trafficking Organized Crime Weapons Trafficking

Author: Bybee, Ashley Neese Title: Narco State or Failed State? Narcotics and Politics in Guinea-Bissau Summary: Drug-funded insurgencies in Latin America and more recently in Afghanistan have prompted the use of the term "Narco-State" to describe those countries that have fallen victim to drug cultivation, narco-corruption, trafficking and related activities. In around 2005, West Africa emerged as a major transit hub for Latin American Drug Trafficking Organizations transporting cocaine to Western Europe, prompting many observers to label several countries in the region as the world's newest "Narco-States." The absence of a standard definition for a "Narco-State," however, has compelled many to question the purpose of this designation, asking not only "what is a Narco-State" but "so what?" Moreover, the vulnerability of Transit States - i.e. states through which drugs are transported - to these pressures adds another interesting dimension, begging the question "can Transit States also succumb to the pressures of an illicit drug trade without cultivating drugs within their borders?" and "to what extent?" Lastly, the latest trend of drug traffickers to exploit weak and failed states, such as Guinea-Bissau and its neighbors in West Africa, adds yet another layer of unanswered questions such as "how do the impacts of drug trafficking differ in states with various degrees of institutional strength and capacity?" Using Guinea-Bissau as the primary case study and comparing it with the experiences of four other geographically, economically, and institutionally diverse Transit States, this research seeks to clarify the impacts that the drug trade has on weak and failing states, and how - if at all - those states can become destabilized by this phenomenon. Details: Washington, DC: George Mason University, 2011. 450p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April, 2, 2016 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/6618/BYBEE%20Signed%20Dissertation%20Failed%20State%20or%20Narco%20State%20Politics%20and%20Narcotics%20in%20Guinea%20Bissau.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2011 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/6618/BYBEE%20Signed%20Dissertation%20Failed%20State%20or%20Narco%20State%20Politics%20and%20Narcotics%20in%20Guinea%20Bissau.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138529 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Illicit Trade

Author: Fleetwood, Jennifer Title: Women in the international cocaine trade: Gender, choice and agency in context Summary: This thesis is about women in the international cocaine trade and in particular about their experiences as drug mules. This is the first comprehensive qualitative investigation based on the accounts of women and men who worked as drug mules and those who organise and manage trafficking cocaine by mule across international borders. Two explanations for women's involvement in drug trafficking compete. The 'feminisation of poverty' thesis contends that women's participation in the drug trade results from (and is a response to) their economic and social subordination. The 'emancipation thesis' contends that women's participation in the drugs trade is an effect of women's liberation. This thesis explores if and how women's involvement in the drug trafficking (recruitment and 'work') is shaped by their gender. I interviewed 37 men and women drug traffickers imprisoned in Quito, Ecuador. This location was chosen due to the high numbers of women and men imprisoned for drug trafficking crimes. Respondents came from all levels of the drug trade and from different parts of the world. Data was collected and analysed using narrative analysis to understand the way in which discourses of victimhood were created in prison. This allowed for a sensitive interpretation of the meaning of victimhood and agency in respondents' responses. The substantive section of the thesis examines two aspects of women's involvement in drug trafficking in depth. The first section examines aspects of women's recruitment into the drug trade as mules; the second section examines the work that mules do. This research finds that women's participation in the international cocaine trade cannot be adequately understood through the lens of either victimisation or volition. The contexts in which men and women chose to work as a mule were diverse reflecting their varied backgrounds (nationality, age, experience, employment status, as well as gender). Furthermore, mules' motivations reflected not only volition but also coercion and sometimes threat of violence. Although gender was a part of the context in which respondents became involved in mule-work, it was not the only, or the most important aspect. Secondly, this research examined the nature of mule-work. Most mules (men and women) willingly entered a verbal contract to work as a drugs mule; nonetheless the context of 'mule-work' is inherently restrictive. Mules were subject to surveillance and management by their 'contacts' had few opportunities to have control or choice over their work. Collaboration, resistance and threat were often played out according to gendered roles and relationships but gender was not a determining factor. Nonetheless, respondents could and did find ways to negotiate resist and take action in diverse and creative ways. Prior research on the cocaine trade has ignored the importance of women's participation or has considered it only in limited ways driven by gender stereotypes. Thus, this research addresses a significant gap in available evidence on women in the drug trade. This research also contributes to contemporary debates in theories of women's offending which have centred on the role of victimisation and agency in relation to women's offending. Details: Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2009. 272p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/9895/Fleetwood2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2009 Country: Ecuador URL: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/9895/Fleetwood2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138564 Keywords: Drug Mules Drug Offenders Drug Trade Drug Trafficking Female Offenders

Author: Jakobsson, A. Title: From Gold Coast to Coke Coast: Politicians, Militaries and Large-Scale Trafficking of Cocaine in Guinea-Bissau Summary: The tiny West African nation of Guinea-Bissau made the news as the first narco-state in Africa during the mid-2000s. Guinea-Bissau had out-of-the-blue become a key transit point for cocaine out of South America on route to Europe. What's more, high-ranking government and military officials were supposedly deeply complicit in the illicit drug trafficking. This master's thesis applies the state crime theory of Penny Green and Tony Ward in order to explain the emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. No previous criminological studies have ever revealed the reasons for these dynamics. In this thesis, I illustrate how weak institutions, corruption, unsustainable economy, porous borders, and a lack of military legitimacy have conspired to facilitate the development of the predatory state in this country. State power has become fundamental to individual gain, as state elements fused with crime. Consequently, I demonstrate that the large-scale trade of cocaine has greatly contributed to the rise of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. Details: Stockholm: Stockholm University, Kriminologiska institutionen, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: http://www.criminology.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.257044.1448011357!/menu/standard/file/2015m_15_Jakobsson_Angelina.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://www.criminology.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.257044.1448011357!/menu/standard/file/2015m_15_Jakobsson_Angelina.pdf Shelf Number: 138594 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Narcotics Political Corruption

Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border Security Counter-Terrorism Cybercrime Data Protection Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups Information Sharing Money Laundering Partnerships Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Fusion Center, Intelligence & Counterterrorism Division Title: Texas Gang Threat Assessment Summary: The key analytic judgments of this assessment are: - Gangs continue to represent a significant public safety threat to Texas due to their propensity for violence and heightened level of criminal activity. Of the incarcerated gang members within Texas Department of Criminal Justice prisons, over 60 percent are serving a sentence for violent crimes, including robbery (24 percent), homicide (16 percent), and assault/terroristic threat (15 percent). We assess there are likely more than 100,000 gang members in Texas. - The Tier 1 gangs in Texas for 2015 are Tango Blast and Tango cliques (estimated 15,000 members), Texas Syndicate (estimated 3,400 members), Texas Mexican Mafia (estimated 4,700 members), Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) (estimated 800 members), and Latin Kings (estimated 2,100 members). These groups pose the greatest gang threat to Texas due to their relationships with Mexican cartels, high levels of transnational criminal activity, level of violence, and overall statewide presence. - Gangs in Texas remain active in both human smuggling and human trafficking operations. Gang members associated with human smuggling have direct relationships with alien smuggling organizations (ASOs) and Mexican cartels. These organizations were involved in and profited from the recent influx of illegal aliens crossing the border in the Rio Grande Valley in 2014. Gang members involved in human trafficking, including commercial sex trafficking and compelling prostitution of adults and minors, exploit their victims through force, fraud or coercion, including recruiting and grooming them with false promises of affection, employment, or a better life. Gangs identified as being involved in human trafficking in Texas in 2014 include Tango Blast, Texas Syndicate, Bloods, Crips, Gangster Disciples, and MS-13. - Mexican cartels regularly use Texas gangs for the purposes of illicit cross-border smuggling. Members of Tier 1, Tier 2, and other gangs are sometimes recruited and tasked by cartels to carry out acts of violence in both Texas and Mexico. The relationships between certain gangs and cartels fluctuate based on cartel structures and cell alignments, gang alignment with specific cartels, threats or coercion, and familial ties. - Traditional rivalries between gangs continue to diminish as members take advantage of opportunities to collaborate and achieve common criminal objectives, typically for financial gain. Members of gangs such as the Bloods, Texas Syndicate, and Texas Mexican Mafia are working together to smuggle and sell drugs and weapons, among other crimes. In addition, law enforcement continues to observe gang members with hybrid memberships, where gang members claim multiple affiliations, which presents challenges in identifying and investigating gang activity. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Department of Public Safety, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2016 at: https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/2015/txGangThreatAssessment.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/2015/txGangThreatAssessment.pdf Shelf Number: 138647 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gang Violence Gangs Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Prostitution Sex Trafficking

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: The Afghan Opiate Trade and Africa - A Baseline Assessment Summary: This report presents a "Baseline Assessment" of the illicit Afghan opiate trafficking situation in Africa, with a focus on heroin trafficking along the southern route out of Afghanistan into, through and from Africa. The main objective of this report is to provide an initial evidence base to support policymakers and law enforcement officials in evaluating the trafficking of Afghan opiates into and across the continent, and to allow the development of effective responses to the issue. While Africa has traditionally been perceived as a transit region for heroin and other drugs moving to destination markets in Europe, North America and Asia, drug trafficking and organized crime is increasingly posing a multifaceted challenge to health, the rule of law and development within the continent itself. Eastern Africa faces many challenges. Natural disasters and civil war, recurrent food shortages and droughts have left many of the region's 180 million people struggling under extreme poverty, and this has been exacerbated by corruption and poor governance. Eastern Africa is increasingly becoming a major landing point for heroin shipped from Afghanistan to Africa via the Indian Ocean. However, despite this increase in maritime smuggling, seizure rates of opiate within Eastern Africa remain low. In Western Africa, drug trafficking, notably via air couriers, has been going on for decades with trafficking networks making extensive use of established courier networks to move drugs, both heroin and cocaine, towards destination markets. This is one of the poorest regions in the world, and in many of the countries in this region governance and law enforcement continues to face challenges as a result of a lack of resources, making the region vulnerable to organised crime. These factors, combined with West Africa's geographic location along major and well established trafficking routes between, for example, South America and Europe, make it attractive to organized crime. Northern Africa appears to be somewhat of an outlier in this analysis of the opiate trade in the African continent, possibly due to being separate from wider drug trafficking trends seen in sub-Saharan Africa, and as a result of being mainly supplied by a sub-section of the Balkan route rather than the southern route. Heroin seizures in Northern Africa are limited and drug addiction rates are generally low. Knowledge of the current drug trafficking picture in Southern Africa is limited. A lack of heroin seizure, purity and consumption data is notable across the region, largely due to a lack of law enforcement capacity and poor data collection processes. While Mozambique and South Africa are known to be major transshipment countries for Afghan opiates, the broader picture of how this affects Southern Africa remains largely unknown. There remains a risk that traffickers will exploit limited law enforcement capacity in Southern Africa, leading to increasing drug trafficking and use, which in turn will further inhibit economic and social development within the region. Comprehensive data on the prices of opiates throughout Africa is currently unavailable. Although heroin commands a reasonably high price in parts of Africa, greater profits can generally be made in other destination markets and it is likely that prices of heroin in Africa remain significantly lower than in other international markets. There is limited data on the purity of heroin trafficked into, through and out of Africa, and there is no evidence to suggest that heroin is produced in Africa itself. Globally, Africa is estimated to be home to 11 per cent of global opiate users and of this 11 per cent of users living in Africa, more than 50 per cent live in Western and Central Africa. While cannabis remains the number one illicit drug used both on the continent and globally, and the only drug produced in Africa for export in large quantities, heroin appears to be becoming more popular in some areas, particularly in Eastern Africa. Synthetic opiates such as Tramadol are also used in Africa and use of such opiates may lead to the use of Afghan opiates, should market conditions for heroin change. Use of Afghan-sourced heroin has wider public health impacts in Africa, including on transmission rates of HIV and Hepatitis C, although data on this area remains limited. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2016. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opiate_trade_Africa_2016_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opiate_trade_Africa_2016_web.pdf Shelf Number: 138840 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking Heroin Maritime Crime Opium Organized Crime

Author: O'Neil, Shannon K. Title: Mexico on the Brink Summary: The headlines don't mislead. Mexican society is reeling from the collateral damage of the permanent war on drugs in the Americas, as crime cartels duke it out for control of illicit exports to the US. Indeed, high levels of violence largely explain why Mexico ranked 104th out of 142 countries in the Safety and Security category in the 2013 Legatum Prosperity Index - and why, in spite of a very high ranking (27th) in the Economy category, the country is only 59th in the overall prosperity ranking. But that's just one element of the story of contemporary Mexico. Here, Shannon O'Neil, a senior fellow for Latin American Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (and author of the new book, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead), focuses on Mexico's progress in escaping what development economists call the "middle-income trap". In the early 1980s, Mexico began to shake off the political and economic torpor created by one-party, Tammany Hallstyle rule and self-imposed isolation from the competitive pressures of a rapidly integrating global economy. Reform was initially forced on the country as a condition for relief from the consequences of default on its foreign loans. But it triggered a series of secondary tremors that shook the domestic economic and political landscape, leading first to the free trade agreement with the US and Canada, and then to the opening of the political system to interests that had no stake in preserving a bloated, bureaucratic government and corrupt, state-owned enterprises. O'Neil picks up the story from there. Arguably the least understood aspect of Mexico's coming of age, she suggests, is the role played by global supply chains in manufacturing. Mexico's combination of competitively priced labour, proximity to the US and Canada, and market-friendly regulation has led to an unprecedented degree of integration between the three economies, powering the growth of Mexico's middle-class. O'Neil makes it clear that the path forward is not strewn with roses, however. Organised crime still makes life terrifying for millions on a daily basis. Public services - in particular, public education - remain inadequate to meet the challenge of creating a workforce the equal of, say, the US or Northern Europe. The national oil monopoly is still corrupt, poorly managed and woefully lacking in modern technology. But by O'Neil's reading, Mexico really does have a shot at joining the elite club of rich, democratic nations. Details: London: Legatum Institute, 2013. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Prosperity in Depth: Mexico: Accessed May 13, 2016 at: https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/country-growth-reports/pid-mexico-2013---mexico-on-the-brink.pdf?sfvrsn=0 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/country-growth-reports/pid-mexico-2013---mexico-on-the-brink.pdf?sfvrsn=0 Shelf Number: 139017 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Drugs and Crime Homicides Organized Crime Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: McCarthy-Jones, Anthea Title: Mexical Drug Cartels and Dark-Networks: An Emerging Threat to Australia's National Security Summary: Over the past decade Mexican drug cartels' power and the violent struggles between them have increased exponentially. Previously Mexico, and in particular the border regions with the US, were the key battle grounds for control of distribution routes. However, today Mexican drug cartels are now looking abroad in an attempt to extend their operations. This expansion has seen several cartels moving into lucrative international markets in Europe and the Asia Pacific. It is in this context that Australia has now become a target of several Mexican cartels. They have already established linkages in the Asia Pacific and are further attempting to strengthen and expand these - with a particular focus on penetrating the Australian market. These developments show how Mexican drug cartels operate as 'dark-networks', successfully creating a global system that seeks to capture new markets, and further extend their control and dominance of the flow of illicit drugs around the world. For Australia, the emergence of Mexican drug cartels in local markets presents not only criminal but strategic challenges. The size of these operations, their resources and 'dark-network' structure makes them a difficult opponent. Their presence threatens to not only increase the supply of illicit drugs in Australia, but encourage turf wars, increase the amount of guns in the country, tax border security resources and threaten the stability and good governance of South Pacific transit spots. This represents the end of Australia's 'tyranny of distance', which previously acted as a buffer and protected Australia from the interests of remote criminal groups such as the Mexican cartels. Details: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Centre of Gravity Series: Accessed May 18, 2016 at: http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2325%20Web%20v3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2325%20Web%20v3.pdf Shelf Number: 139078 Keywords: Border Security Dark Networks Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Organized Crime

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would Benefit from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates Summary: Why GAO Did This Study Incidents of aviation workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons and drugs into security-restricted areas and onto planes has heightened awareness about security at commercial airports. TSA, along with airport operators, has responsibility for securing the nation's approximately 440 commercial airports. GAO was asked to review TSA's oversight of airport perimeter and access control security since GAO last reported on the topic in 2009. This report examines, for airport security, (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed the components of risk and (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions to oversee and facilitate security, among other objectives. GAO examined TSA documents related to risk assessment and security activities; analyzed relevant TSA security event data from fiscal years 2009 through 2015; obtained information from TSA and industry association officials as well as from a non-generalizable sample of 11 airports, selected based on factors such as size. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that TSA update its Risk Assessment of Airport Security, develop and implement a method for conducting a system-wide assessment of airport vulnerability, and update its National Strategy for Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-632: Accessed May 31, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Shelf Number: 139249 Keywords: Airport Security Aviation Security Drug Trafficking Risk Assessment Smuggling Transportation Security

Author: Andreas, Peter Title: The International Politics of Drugs and Illicit Trade in the Americas Summary: Illicit trade has long been a central feature of Latin America's engagement in the world. In this chapter we first briefly sketch the scope and dimensions of illicit trade in the region, and stress the importance of various types of power asymmetries. Drawing on illustrations primarily from drug trafficking (by far the most studied and documented case), we then outline in a preliminary fashion some of the key issues in understanding transnational illicit flows and their impact on Latin America foreign and domestic policy and governance. We concentrate on four themes: 1) the relationship between illicit trade and diplomatic relations with the United States; 2) the relationship between illicit trade and democratic governance; 3) the relationship between illicit trade and organized violence; and 4) the relationship between illicit trade and neo-liberalism. Details: Providence, RI: Brown University - Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, 2013. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Watson Institute for International Studies Research Paper No. 2013-05 : Accessed June 8, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326720 Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326720 Shelf Number: 139315 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Trade Violence

Author: Magaloni, Beatriz Title: Killing in the Slums: An Impact Evaluation of Police Reform in Rio de Janeiro Summary: This paper evaluates the causal impact of Rio de Janeiro's Pacifying Police Units (UPPs), probably the largest-scale police reform initiative taking place in the developing world. The main goals of the UPPs were: 1) to regain control of territories previously dominated by armed criminal groups; and 2) to improve security for these communities through reduction of lethal violence. In the course of six years, more than 9,000 police officers were permanently assigned to the UPPs, servicing close to half million residents in the city slums (favelas). We are interested in understanding the process through which governments supply a basic public service - the police - in poor urban neighborhoods that have long been abandoned to the arbitrary rule of non-state armed actors. Moreover, our paper documents Rio de Janeiro's painful trajectory of police violence, illuminating some of it major institutional facilitators. Painstakingly geo-coding homicides and police killings from 2005 to 2013, we provide answers to some of the most critical questions about police use of lethal force, including the determinants of variations in who is targeted by police repression and how different strategies for policing the slums have impacted police killings. To evaluate the UPP impact on lethal violence, we use a variety of causal identification strategies that leverage spatial and temporal variation in the introduction of the UPP as well as geo-referenced data of more than 22,000 incidents of lethal violence. Our empirical models reveal that the UPP had mixed results. The introduction of the UPPs did not play a significant role in reducing murders in the favelas that were pacified. The UPP's failure to reduce homicides imply that the poor in the slums continue to be subject to two or three times higher murder rates than the white middle class. Nonetheless, the UPP is breaking long-held practices of extreme use of police lethal violence. Our empirical results convincingly demonstrate that police killings would have been 60 percent larger without the UPP intervention. Details: Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), 2015. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper: Accessed June 8, 2016 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/cddrl_working_paper_dec15_rio.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Brazil URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/cddrl_working_paper_dec15_rio.pdf Shelf Number: 139326 Keywords: Deadly Force Drug Trafficking Favelas Gang Violence Homicides Pacifying Police Units Police Reform Police Use of Force Slums

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: World Drug Report 2016 Summary: The World Drug Report 2016 comes at a decisive moment, just months after Member States, at a special session of the General Assembly, adopted a comprehensive set of operational recommendations on the world drug problem. The session was only the third in the history of the General Assembly to focus on drugs, and the resulting outcome document, entitled "Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem", provides a concrete way forward to take action on shared challenges. In the outcome document, Member States reaffirmed their commitment to addressing persistent, new and evolving challenges in line with the three international drug control conventions, which were recognized as allowing States parties sufficient flexibility to design and implement national drug policies consistent with the principle of common and shared responsibility. The operational recommendations contained in the outcome document encompass measures to address demand and supply reduction, as well as to improve access to controlled medicines while preventing their diversion; they cover human rights, youth, children, women and communities and highlight emerging challenges and the need to promote long-term, comprehensive, sustainable, development-oriented and balanced drug control policies and programmes that include alternative development. The text highlights the importance of drug abuse prevention and treatment; encourages the development, adoption and implementation of alternative or additional measures with regard to conviction or punishment; and promotes proportionate national sentencing policies, practices and guidelines for drug-related offences. Now the international community must come together to make good on its commitments. The World Drug Report 2016, which provides a comprehensive overview of major developments in drug markets, trafficking routes and the health impact of drug use, supports comprehensive, balanced and integrated rights-based approaches. This year's report offers insight into the wide-ranging impact of drugs not only on the health and well-being of individuals, but also on the people around them - families and communities. This can include such harms as HIV, as well as the threat of violence, faced in particular by women and children. Details: New York: UNODC, 2016. 174p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf Shelf Number: 139529 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Abuse Prevention Drug Reform Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Drugs and Crime

Author: Musilli, Pietro Title: The Lawless Roads: An Overview of Turbulence Across the Sahel Summary: The political, economic and social crises that stretch across Africa's Sahel region are connected via trade routes that were established centuries ago. The Sahel is now the main area of conflict and desperate poverty on the continent, but with implications for countries thousands of miles away. For example, the conflict in Mali is undermining stability in oil- and gas-rich Nigeria and Algeria, respectively. The lack of jobs, education and health services is drawing more young people into a criminal-political economy. The links between drug lords and kidnappers, on the one hand, and opportunistic politicians and jihadists, on the other, mean that the proceeds of crime have become an important political resource. Civic leaders and independent activists in Mali say political dialogue and widely agreed reforms are necessary if this worsening social breakdown is to be stopped. They warn that attempts by the political class in Bamako, encouraged by Western governments, to organise a quick-fix election could reverse some of the tentative progress in recent months and prolong the conflict. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e2cc78a2ce149944b9a35b4ce42759b9.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mali URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e2cc78a2ce149944b9a35b4ce42759b9.pdf Shelf Number: 139819 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Jihad Kidnappings Political Corruption Poverty

Author: Nunez, Hector Title: Is Crime in Mexico a Disamenity? Evidence from hedonic valuation approach Summary: Since Roback (1982)'s seminal work, the literature has evaluated the role of the amenities to equilibrate the regional differentials of nominal wages and prices. While these studies generally find evidence for traditional amenities and disamenities in developed countries, it still exists a scarce exploration on how those characteristics assessed, like violence, affect the equilibrium in less developed countries. In this paper, we explore violence as amenity or disamenity for the case of Mexico as a particular and unique natural experiment. We use the hedonic wage and rent theory proposed by Roback using data from the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure Survey, along with other information at municipal and state level. For our particular hypothesis, we find evidence to support that inhabitants in traditional drug trafficking states could consider drug-related crime as an amenity. Details: Documentos de Trabajo en Economia y Ciencia Regional from Universidad Catolica del Norte, Chile, Department of Economics , 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=dWNuLmNsfHdwZWNvbm9taWF8Z3g6NDVlZTdlZWE3N2NlZDUzMQ Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=dWNuLmNsfHdwZWNvbm9taWF8Z3g6NDVlZTdlZWE3N2NlZDUzMQ Shelf Number: 139822 Keywords: Criminal Violence Drug Trafficking Economics and Crime Violent Crime

Author: Turhal, Tugrul Title: Organizational Structure of PKK and Non-PKK-Linked Turkish Drug Trafficking Organizations: The Influence of Social bonds Summary: Drugs and drug related crime problems pose major threats to societies around the world in terms of their negative consequences at both individual and societal levels. Turkish drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) have ethnic, social, geographic, and economic ties with Turkey's eastern neighbors, the Balkan Region, and Europe, and are considered to play major roles in the drug trade. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has also had a longstanding presence in the drug trade in this region. The goals of this research are (1) to identify the social and demographic characteristics of people in drug-trafficking organizations in Turkey; (2) to elucidate the differences, if any, of the social and structural characteristics in PKK-related and non-PKK-related drug organizations; and (3) to analyze the impact of social bonds on the Turkish drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), their networks and relationships. The data used in this study are official Turkish Police records of drug trafficking cases between 1984 and 2010. Several statistical techniques were used to analyze the data; relationship analysis, analysis of difference, and social network analysis to address the research questions. An analysis of these relationships at both the individual and network level was conducted using original data on 773 members from 100 drug-trafficking organizations (50 of them PKK linked and 50 of them non-PKK linked). The results indicate that while there are some similarities with PKK and non-PKK linked organizations there are also distinct differences in their individual and organizational characteristics, structure, role distribution, nationality, and social ties and bonds. In addition, the study found important evidence connecting the terrorist organization (PKK) with several non-PKK organizations. These connections are quite strong for a portion of the networks. This study significantly contributes to the related literature; it provides a general overview of drug and drug related crime problems and their connection to terrorist organizations throughout the world particularly for those located in Turkey and the Middle Eastern regions. Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2015. 258p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/10137/Turhal_gmu_0883E_11045.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: Turkey URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/10137/Turhal_gmu_0883E_11045.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 139834 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Social Bonds Terrorism

Author: Siegel-Rozenblit, Dina Title: Asian organized crime in the European Union Summary: The note shows that Asian organized crime, which is a relatively new phenomenon, has entered the criminal area in a number of EU countries. It analyses how the activities of Asian criminal groups are linked to migrant communities and which fields are concerned. They include extortion, human smuggling/trafficking and money laundering. In collaboration with other non-Asian criminal groups, Asian organized crime is also active in the production and trade of illegal drugs, match-fixing and counterfeiting of consumer goods. This note proposes appropriate solutions on how to fight this particular form of organized crime. Details: Brussels: European Parliament, 2011. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 30, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-LIBE_NT(2011)453191 Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-LIBE_NT(2011)453191 Shelf Number: 139902 Keywords: Counterfeiting Drug Trafficking Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force of Latin America Title: Analysis of Regional Threats on Money Laundering Summary: The XXX GAFILAT Plenary approved the implementation of a regional study of threats on money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) of the member countries of the Financial Action Task Force on Latin America with the financial support of the European Union. The pursued objective is for countries to achieve greater effectiveness in mitigating risks and that the resources allocated for this purpose are used more efficiently. Details: s.l.: Cocaine Route Program, European Union, 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: The European Union's Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace: The Cocaine Route Programme: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Analysis-of-Regional-Threats-on-Money-Laundering-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Analysis-of-Regional-Threats-on-Money-Laundering-.pdf Shelf Number: 139951 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Guarin, Arlen Title: The Effects of Punishment of Crime in Colombia on Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Human Capital Formation Summary: Based on individual data on the population of those arrested in Medellin, we assess whether the change in punishment at age 18, mandated by law, has a deterrent effect on arrests. No deterrent effect was found on index, violent or property crimes, but a deterrence effect was found on non-index crimes, specifically those related to drug consumption and trafficking. This implies an elasticity of arrests with respect to punishment that varies between -1.0 and -6.7 percent. The number of days that arrested individuals take to recidivate is 300, higher for index crimes if they are arrested right after, rather than before, reaching 18 years of age, in which case they are less likely to recidivate in any type of crime. The change in criminal penalties at 18 years of age does not explain future differences in human capital formation among the population that had been arrested immediately after versus immediately before reaching 18 years of age. There is no evidence that the longer length of time to recidivate on the part of individuals arrested for the first time immediately after reaching 18 implies future differences in human capital formation. This suggest that our estimated incapacitation effect would not be explained by the impossibility of the arrested population to recidivate due to their having been imprisoned, but rather by a specific deterrence effect resulting from the harsher experience while in prison of those arrested right after, rather than before, reaching 18. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Banco de la Rep�blica, 2013. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: : Accessed August 5, 2016 at: http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/borrador-774 Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/borrador-774 Shelf Number: 130037 Keywords: Deterrence Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Punishment

Author: Proctor, Nathan Title: Anonymity Overdose: Ten cases that connect opioid trafficking and related money laundering to anonymous shell companies Summary: Opioid deaths now exceed those from motor vehicle accidents. It's clear we need to do more. Fair Share Education Fund's latest report, "Anonymity Overdose," connects opioid trafficking and the subsequent crisis with the activities of anonymous shell companies - companies formed with no way of knowing who is actually in charge. Because they shield the owners from accountability, anonymous shell companies are a common tool for disguising criminal activity and laundering money, and are also at heart of the Panama Papers. "Anonymity Overdose" found 10 case studies that show the connection between the use of anonymous shell companies and opioid trafficking and related money laundering. In one such example, Kingsley Iyare Osemwengie and his associates were found to use call girls and couriers to transport oxycodone, and then move profits through an anonymous shell company aptly named High Profit Investments LLC. Meanwhile, the crisis is taking an increasing toll on the nation. According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) , in 2014 there were approximately one and a half times more drug overdose deaths in the United States than deaths from motor vehicle crashes. Since 2000, the rate of deaths from opioid related overdoses has increased 200%. The CDC refers to the opioid crisis as an epidemic. The report uses perspectives provided by law enforcement officials as well as federal court cases to highlight the role that ending anonymous shell companies could play in addressing the crisis. Details: Washington, DC: Fair Share, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2016 at: http://www.fairshareonline.org/sites/default/files/AnonymityOverdose_Aug1_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.fairshareonline.org/sites/default/files/AnonymityOverdose_Aug1_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 139975 Keywords: Drug Addition Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Money Laundering

Author: Nguyen, Amanda Title: Developing Performance Metrics for Drug Enforcement: Evaluating the Efficacy of the MJTF Teams Using a Tiered and Priority Scoring System Summary: The Michigan State Police (MSP) strategic plan recognizes the role that illegal drug production, abuse, and trafficking plays in violent and property crime, accidental deaths, a nd drugged driving. Consequently, MSP has placed an emphasis on developing a statewide drug enforcement strategy that include s new metrics used to measure enforcement activities and to track progress toward reducing the level of illegal drug production, abuse, and trafficking and the associated public safety and health problems associated with illegal drugs. A key element of MSP's drug enforcement strategy is a series of multijurisdictional task forces (MJTF). Michigan's MJTFs are comprised of 22 teams that focus on drug - related crimes within specific regions of the state. Each team investigates drug crimes within their jurisdiction which comprises one or more surrounding counties. The MJTFs are based on the principles of bringing additional resources from multiple agencies, improving the coordination and communication across agencies, and being able to follow illegal drug activities across jurisdictional boundaries. As noted above, MSP's strategic plan has prioritized developing meaningful performance metrics for the MJTFs. A key element of the performance measures is to prioritize "harm" associated with illegal substances. Prior to the implementation of a new arrest scoring system based on "tiers," the previous scale of measurement for drug arrests was based on a level system that categorized offenders and drug quantities ranging from Level 1 (least harm) to Level III (most harm). In 2014, a new tier system with redefined categories was employed along with a scoring guide to transform raw arrest numbers into a point system. (Refer to Appendix A for Drug Trafficking Tier Definitions). The scoring guide used to accompany the new tier definitions was created based on a drug's amount of harm caused. Each drug category is assigned a priority value along with each trafficker tier also being assigned a point value. This new system allows for high priority drugs and higher tier arrests to be given more value than low priority drugs and lower tier arrests. The scoring guide is used to measure MJTF performance based on these arrest scores. Details: East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, Michigan Justice Statistics Center, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2016 at: http://cj.msu.edu/assets/MJSC_Developing-Performance-Metrics-for-Drug-Enforcement_May2016_FINAL-REPORT.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://cj.msu.edu/assets/MJSC_Developing-Performance-Metrics-for-Drug-Enforcement_May2016_FINAL-REPORT.pdf Shelf Number: 140043 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking

Author: Hughes, Caitlin Title: Trafficking in Multiple Commodities: Exposing Australia's poly-drug and poly-criminal networks Summary: International law enforcement agencies have increasingly pointed to an apparent rise in poly-drug traffickers: high level drug traffickers who choose to trade in multiple illicit drugs. This project provided the first detailed examination of poly-drug and poly-crime trafficking in Australia. It used three different types of Australian Federal Police data (border seizures, cases and linked-cases) and court sentencing data to estimate the scale of and trends in poly-drug commercial importation at the Australian border from 1999-2012; generate and compare criminal profiles of 20 poly-drug and 20 mono-drug traffickers; and conduct social network analysis of three Australian poly-drug networks. The analysis showed that over the 14 year period, from 1999 to 2012, between 5% and 35% of commercial importations at the Australian border involved poly-drug trafficking. Poly-drug trafficking occurred in almost every year of analysis: and increased only slightly over time. Finally, poly-drug traffickers were associated with more serious and potentially harmful behaviour. For example, compared to mono-drug traffickers, poly-drug traffickers were associated with larger quantities of drug seized, larger networks, longer periods of operation, and greater involvement in other types of serious crime. The project concluded that some fears about poly-drug traffickers may have been overstated particularly about the inherent escalation of this form of trafficking, but that poly-drug traffickers are likely to pose added risks to governments and law enforcement than mono-drug traffickers. Two key implications are that first, poly-drug traffickers warrant increased attention in Australia; and second, regulatory or law enforcement responses aimed at one drug may increase the problems associated with another drug. This demands a new way of thinking about Australian illicit drug markets that can better respond to drug traffickers operating in an inter-connected marketplace. Details: Canberra: National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund, 2016. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series No. 62: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph-62.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph-62.pdf Shelf Number: 140130 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Organized Crime

Author: New York City Department of Investigation Title: NYPD and NYCHA's Roles in Controlling Violent and Narcotics Crime By Removing Criminal Offenders from Public Housing Summary: Since 1996, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) have operated under a joint public safety agreement requiring NYPD to inform NYCHA of arrests of NYCHA residents, or on NYCHA property, so that NYCHA can then take steps to keep dangerous criminals out of public housing. NYPD has failed to comply with this agreement in that it does not routinely inform NYCHA of arrests, eve n where they involve sexual assault, gun possession, or n arcotics trafficking. In turn , even when informed of such arrests, NYCHA often fails to take steps to remove such criminals from public housing and thus protect the overwhelming majority of law abid ing residents. These systemic failures documented by a Department of Investigation review of thousands of files have contributed to disproportionately high violent crime rates at NYCHA, including a shooting incidence rate that is four times higher tha n in the City as a whole. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 1996, N YPD and NYCHA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) , through which NYPD agreed to provide NYCHA with all arrest and complaint reports concerning criminal activity taking place at NYCHA dev elopments, or committed by NYCHA residents. The purpose of the MOU is to enable NYCHA, the largest landlord in New York City, to undertake its critical obligation to maintain safety and security at public housing developments by monitoring criminal activ ity at public housing developments , evict ing criminal offenders where needed to protect public safety, and address ing physical security vulnerabilities highlighted in these reports. After several incidents in which crimes were committed on NYCHA property by known felons, the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI) conducted a proactive investigation to determine NYPD's compliance with the 1996 MOU. This led to a further investigation of NYCHA's efforts to evict or exclude individuals and families whose criminal activities pose a threat to their neighbors. DOI's investigation revealed several key failures by both NYPD and NYCHA: 1) NYPD is out of compliance with the MOU because it does not provide NYCHA with NYPD complaint reports concerning NYCHA properties. 2) NYPD is also violating the MOU by failing to share with NYCHA reports of arrests of non - residents on NYCHA property. 3) Pursuant to Patrol Guide procedure known as "Cases For Legal Action" (CFLA) , NYPD is required to report to NYCHA all arrests of NYCHA residents on NYCHA property for certain enumerated serious violent and drug crimes . However, NYPD's actual compliance with this internal procedure in a sample one - month period was only 67% . As a res ult, NYCHA loses opportunities to address dangerous conditions by evicting or excluding residents who have committed violent crimes. 4) NYCHA , in turn, fails to take sufficient action to ensure that criminal offenders who pose a danger to their neighbors are removed from public housing. Specifically, NYCHA has a weak enforcement record of terminating tenancies based on criminal activity by public housing leaseholders or unauthorized occupants (dubbed "non - desirability" cases). 5) Longstanding NYCHA procedure known as "Permanent Exclusion" allows NYCHA to exercise discretion concerning NYPD Cases For Legal Action referrals. Specifically, although NYCHA has legal authority to evict the entire household of a criminal offender who presents a danger to neighbors' safety or peac eful tenancy, instead NYCHA may and frequently does opt for the less severe sanction of Permanent Exclusion of only the individual offender from the apartment, thus allowing possibly innocent household members to remain in public housing. DOI's investigation revealed that NYCHA's enforcement of Permanent Exclusion is essentially toothless, such that criminal offenders are allowed to return to NYCHA housing without consequences . 6) DOI further identified numerous critical flaws in NYCHA's systems and resources for enforcing Permanent Exclusion, including severe understaffing, inadequate safety equipment and protocols, an ineffective bureau cratic case management approach, and lack of coordination with law enforcement entities that could assist with meaningful enforcement of Permanent Exclusion, including by arresting excluded occupants subject to open warrants or Trespass Notices that prohibit their presence on NYCHA premises. Details: New York: NYC Department of Investigation, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/doi/downloads/pdf/2015/Dec15/pr41nycha_nypd_mou_120815.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.nyc.gov/html/doi/downloads/pdf/2015/Dec15/pr41nycha_nypd_mou_120815.pdf Shelf Number: 140148 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Eviction Housing and Crime Public Housing Violent Offenders

Author: United States Sentencing Commission Title: Report to the Congress: Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Summary: The United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commission") submits this report to Congress in response to a congressional directive contained in section 10 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 ("FSA"), and pursuant to the Commission's general authority under 28 U.S.C. 994-995. For more than twenty years, the Commission has consistently worked with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and other interested parties to ensure that cocaine sentencing policy promotes the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act,1 including avoiding unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar criminal records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct and promoting proportionate sentencing. Prior to the FSA, the Commission submitted four reports to Congress regarding cocaine sentencing, in 1995, 1997, 2002, and 2007, based on legislative history, scientific and medical literature, extensive analysis of the Commission's own data, public comment, and expert testimony.2 Since 1995, the Commission consistently took the position that the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio of crack to powder cocaine significantly undermined the congressional objectives set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act. The Commission reached this conclusion based on its core findings regarding crack cocaine penalties as they existed before the FSA: - they overstated the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine compared to powder cocaine; - they swept too broadly and applied most often to lower level offenders; - they overstated the seriousness of most crack cocaine offenses and failed to provide adequate proportionality; and - their severity mostly impacted minorities.3 As a result of these findings, the Commission recommended that Congress reduce crack cocaine penalties so that the crack-to-powder drug quantity ratio was no more than 20-to-1, and that Congress repeal the mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession of crack cocaine.4 In 2007, the Commission reduced the crack cocaine guideline by two levels as an interim measure to alleviate some of the problems its reports identified.5 Consistent with the Commission's recommendations, the FSA reduced the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses to produce an 18-to-1 crack-to-powder drug quantity ratio and eliminated the mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine.6 The FSA also increased statutory fines and directed the Commission to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to account for specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances in drug trafficking offenses involving any drug type, not only crack cocaine.7 The FSA also directed the Commission to "study and submit to Congress a report regarding the impact of the changes in Federal sentencing law under this Act and the amendments made by this Act." 8 The report generally follows the structure of the FSA, first analyzing the FSA's changes to crack cocaine penalties, then turning to its changes to penalties for federal drug trafficking offenses more broadly. The Commission's study finds that the FSA reduced the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences, reduced the federal prison population, and appears to have resulted in fewer federal prosecutions for crack cocaine. All this occurred while crack cocaine use continued to decline. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Commission, 2015. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/201507_RtC_Fair-Sentencing-Act.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/201507_RtC_Fair-Sentencing-Act.pdf Shelf Number: 140267 Keywords: Cocaine Offenders Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Fair Sentencing Act Federal Offenders Recidivism Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Policy

Author: Reichert, Jessica Title: Drug trends and distribution in Illinois: A survey of drug task forces Summary: Drug trafficking is the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and sale of drugs (UNODC, 2016). Drug distribution networks exist to oversee operations to obtain, transport, deliver, and finally sell to individuals in communities all over the United States (Johnson, 2003). Globally, money exchanged through the illicit drug trade is around $500 billion per year (UNDCP, 1998). Despite great risk, individuals in the in illegal drug trade are drawn to the potentially lucrative enterprise. However, the economic cost to U.S. society for drug distribution including criminal activity, as well as users' medical costs and lost productivity, was estimated at $76 billion per year (Parsons & Kamenca, 1992; UNDCP, 1998). In Illinois, the distribution of controlled substances is a significant problem. In 1995, the Office of the National Drug Control Policy established the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program in Chicago (Chicago HIDTA, n.d.). Chicago HIDTA's mission is to enhance and coordinate drug control efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in order to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking in critical regions in Illinois. In addition to establishing programs like HIDTA, drug task forces also were created to combat the distribution of controlled substances at the local level. Drug task forces arrest and prosecute drug offenders, identify and respond to emerging drug problems, and enhance interagency cooperation (Applied Research Services, Inc., 2014; Hollist et al., 2014). The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority has supported drug task forces with federal funding for more than 20 years. Enlisting the participation of the 19 drug task force directors, this study sought to understand the extent of the drug problem in the jurisdictions covered by each drug task force. To do so, Authority researchers analyzed data from a survey administered to the 19 Authority-funded drug task forces on types of drugs frequency, trends, use, and distribution. Details: Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2016 at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/articles/Drug%20distribution_Drug%20task%20forces%2008-17-16.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/articles/Drug%20distribution_Drug%20task%20forces%2008-17-16.pdf Shelf Number: 147879 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking

Author: InSight Crime Title: Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime Summary: Guatemala is Central America's most populous country and its largest economy. But an intransigent elite, an ambitious military and a weak state has opened the way for organized crime to flourish, especially since the return of democracy. During three decades of democratic rule since 1985, the longest such period in Guatemala's history, economic elites have sought to gain hegemonic control. In doing so they have tried to exercise power that is not sustained by military force, but rather by legitimacy and consensus, at least among the diverse group of elites who share power. Historically, there were two prominent power actors: ideologically conservative businessmen and high-ranking military officials from the middle classes who derived their influence by maintaining the army as an institution of social and political control. The political parties distinguished themselves between those that mobilized the social base to gain power and those who opposed them while at a disadvantage and under persecution. In contrast, almost all popular movements were opposed to the power groups, or openly challenged the established political system. Some of these popular movements eventually formed the core of insurgent groups which fought with the state between 1960 and 1996 in a brutal civil war that left more than 200,000 dead and 70,000 disappeared. Throughout, elites have remained central actors in Guatemalan politics, as their economic power is based on their influence within political circles. They employ diverse mechanisms -- formal and informal -- to influence public policy. They can differ in their interests, values and functions, and operate on an unequal plane of power relations, being simultaneously in conflict with and dependent on society. These actors exercise autonomy and can formulate as well as carry out projects at the local and national level. Details: InsightCrime.org, 2016. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Guatemala_Elites_Organized_Crime Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Guatemala_Elites_Organized_Crime Shelf Number: 140351 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Huistas Organized Crime Political Corruption

Author: Zhilla, Fabian Title: Organised crime risk assessment in Albania: Executive summary Summary: This study focuses on the organised crime activities in Albania, as well as those conducted by Albanian criminal networks in the region and beyond. The study analyses organised crime activities such as trafficking in persons, illicit drugs and arms, smuggling of migrants, extortion, contract killings, organised cybercrime and money laundering. In some cases, so as to be able to clearly identify them, comparisons were made between various criminal activities and groups, despite the difficulties encountered with resources and the method applied. Various sources are used (both primary and secondary), including national official reports, and European and international agencies fighting organised crime. In addition, 44 interviews were conducted with experts that have a direct or indirect relation with the fight against organised crime, for instance, serious crime judges, prosecutors, lawyers, investigative journalists, civil society representatives and experts of organised cyber-crime. The total duration of recorded interviews is 24 hours and 12 minutes. Our findings and the opinions of the interviewees suggest that the elements that have stimulated organised crime in the country are of a social, economic and political nature: �- Transition from a totalitarian regime with a stringent policy on crime, to a fragile democracy with weak and unconsolidated institutions, and staff without sufficient education and/or experience; �- Chaotic situation post-1997 with the collapse of the pyramid schemes; �- Institutions that are subject to reform, with staff turnover due to changes in government; �- Lack of institutional independence, and endemic corruption in the police and law-enforcement agencies; �- Albania's favourable geographical position - with drug-producing and supplier countries such as Afghanistan and Turkey in the East, and high-consumption countries in the West; �- International nature of organised crime and the impact of globalisation; �- Lack of political stability in the country for more than two decades; �- Weak economy with high levels of unemployment and insufficient earnings per capita (one of the lowest in the continent); �- Dismantling of social structures, adversely affecting the family as the nucleus; �- Continuous immigration waves, importing experiences and criminal connections obtained abroad; �- Support from members of the Albanian diaspora; �- Conflicts in the region, with 'golden opportunities' to obtain money from the trafficking of arms, smuggling activities, etc; �- Use of technology and advanced communication tools Details: Tirana, Albania: Open Society Foundation for Albania, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: https://www.osfa.al/sites/default/files/press_permbledhje_english_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Albania URL: https://www.osfa.al/sites/default/files/press_permbledhje_english_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140410 Keywords: Cybercrime Drug Trafficking Extortion Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Korthuis, Aaron Title: The Central America Regional Security Initiative in Honduras Summary: In November 2013, Hondurans headed to the election polls for a second time since the 2009 coup d'etat that destabilized the country and left unchecked a problem that the country has long failed to address: violence and organized crime. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) latest homicide report, Honduras continues to struggle with the highest homicide rate in the world. The seriousness of the security situation has provoked travel warnings from the U.S. Department of State and infamy in the international press tied to the violence experienced in Honduran cities and the abuses perpetuated by state security forces. Over the past decade, drug trafficking through the country has surged, making it the "favoured northbound route for cocaine from South America" for many years. Given the country's historically weak law enforcement institutions, persistent problems with corruption, and poverty, as well as a continued U.S. appetite for cocaine, these problems are hardly a novelty - and present grave problems for the country's leaders. Unsurprisingly then, this problem was consistently featured in the leading presidential candidates' discourse and public debate, and was undoubtedly a major factor in the final outcome. National Party candidate and eventual victor, Juan Orlando Hernandez, called for a heavy-handed approach to security that relied on a newly created military police, while LIBRE candidate Xiomara Castr's voice resounded on public airwaves calling for Honduran soldiers to return to their barracks and their traditional role. These starkly divergent views stem from a Honduran population tired of years of violence, organized criminal activity, declining security, and increasingly accustomed to the military's involvement in traditional policing. Alarmingly, only 27 percent of Hondurans expressed any confidence in the civilian police in August 2013, while 73 percent disagreed with the idea that the military should remain in the barracks (and by extension, presumably refrain from involvement in policing efforts). Efforts to address burgeoning organized crime and violence and instigate reform of Honduras' security and justice institutions have consumed the country over the past few years and feature prominently in President Hern�ndez�s plans. Yet, at best, these efforts have produced mixed results, and at worst have resulted in a depressingly stagnant landscape. The United States, through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), seeks to strengthen and improve Honduran initiatives through law enforcement cooperation, capacity building, and prevention programs. These programs persist amidst Honduras' difficult political environment and staggering problems, and success remains isolated, although hope remains that reform may finally gain momentum. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2014. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Honduras.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Honduras.pdf Shelf Number: 144861 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Organized Crime Security Violence Violent Crime

Author: Phillips, Nicholas Title: CARSI In Guatemala: Progress, Failure, and Uncertainty Summary: To the extent that the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) is a coherent policy, Guatemala is its centerpiece. This land of sultry jungles, volcanic highlands and buzzing cities boasts a population of nearly 16 million-the largest on the isthmus, with roughly 39 percent self-identifying as indigenous. During the first five years of CARSI, no country in Central America received more of the initiative's funds, or was allocated more non-CARSI security aid. Thus it would appear that the U.S. Congress is aware of Guatemala's problems: its weak institutions, drug smuggling, violence, gangs, poverty, inequality, impunity, corruption, and malnutrition. We may now add to this list the recent swell of Guatemalan youth who abandoned their homeland and were caught crossing illegally and unaccompanied onto American soil. But is CARSI a catalyst for adequate solutions? In some ways, yes. In others, no. And in some areas, it is hard to say for lack of performance evaluations. CARSI funds have bolstered the criminal courts and the police's anti-gang unit, for example, but have failed to produce an exemplary police precinct or eradicate poppy farms. Furthermore, some crime prevention efforts bankrolled by CARSI have never been audited, so their effectiveness is not clear. This chapter will shed some light on CARSI's successes, challenges, and unknowns in Guatemala. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2014. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala_1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala_1.pdf Shelf Number: 144860 Keywords: Criminal Courts Drug Trafficking Gangs Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin America Summary: Organized criminal networks are global phenomena that distort local and global economic markets, bring violence and blur the role of the state in providing basic services, all in the interest of increasing their wealth. The main weapon used by such networks is corruption - of politicians and of many of the state apparatuses in the countries in which they operate. This undermines the basic principles of democracy and puts the state at the mercy of illicit economic interests. This is a global challenge. Latin America has particularly suffered from these issues for a number of reasons. The strong presence of illicit networks dedicated to illegal mining, the trafficking of exotic species, arms trafficking and, in particular, the production and sale of illegal drugs such as cocaine has created a massive inflow of illicit money. Together with the high cost of political activity in the region and difficulties in controlling political contributions, this has allowed organized crime to penetrate the political landscape. However, efforts made in different Latin American countries to confront these networks have seen significant achievements. There is a wealth of positive and negative experience on how these problems can be confronted that will be useful for countries in the same region and on other continents. This book focuses on experiences in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru. The authors draw on research that illustrates how relationships are forged between criminals and politicians. They identify numerous mechanisms for tackling these relations, and discuss both the achievements and the challenges concerning their practical application. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), 2014. 305p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm Shelf Number: 140463 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Illegal Mining Illicit Networks Money Laundering Organized Crime Political Corruption Wildlife Trafficking

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Transnational Organized Crime in the Pacific: A Threat Assessment Summary: This report presents major threats posed by transnational organized crime in the Pacific region, mainly focusing on the Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs). Based on consultations with the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and information obtained from desk reviews conducted by UNODC, this report focuses on four major types of transnational organized crime affecting the Pacific region: - Drug and precursor trafficking; - Trafficking in persons & smuggling of migrants; - Environmental crimes (fishery crime and other wildlife trafficking & illegal logging and timber trafficking); and - Small arms trafficking. In addition to the major four types of transnational crime, the report also includes some information on the trafficking of counterfeit goods, including fraudulent medicines, and cybercrime to shed light on emerging threats in the region. The four major illicit flows discussed in the report are different sorts of illicit activities, yet they all pose immense challenges to the region. There are strong indications that the PICTs are increasingly targeted by transnational organized crime groups due to their susceptibility to illicit flows driven by several factors. These include (a) the geographical location of the PICTs situated between major sources and destinations of illicit commodities; (b) extensive and porous jurisdictional boundaries; and (c) differences in governance and heterogeneity in general law enforcement capacity across numerous PICTs and the region in general. These complexities also underscore the inherent difficulties in detecting, monitoring, preventing and responding to transnational organized crimes in the region. In this context, transnational criminal activities continue to increase throughout the Pacific and have detrimental impacts on communities, sustainable economic development and regional security. At a regional level and across all transnational organized crime types discussed in this report, a fundamental problem is the significant gaps in data and information related to transnational crime among the PICTs. This is a major hindrance in developing effective and evidence-based responses to transnational organized crime. Details: Bangkok: UNODC, 2016. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/2016.09.16_TOCTA_Pacific_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/2016.09.16_TOCTA_Pacific_web.pdf Shelf Number: 140518 Keywords: Counterfeit Goods Drug Trafficking Environmental Crimes Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Illegal Fishing Illegal Logging Organized Crime Wildlife Crime Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Mani, Kristina Title: Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America Summary: The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times co-opted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: - Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet "lost" to criminal groups. - Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. - In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. - Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. - Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: - Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. - A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. - More effective securing of military arsenals. - Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices. Details: Miami: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International University, 2011. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/4690459.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central African Republic URL: https://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/4690459.pdf Shelf Number: 140538 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs Homicides Military Personnel Organized Crime Violence

Author: Corrales Compagnucci, Hugo Title: Armed Groups and Violence in Paraguay Summary: Armed violence in Paraguay is not a recent phenomenon. During the second half of the XX Century, Paraguay saw the rise of a larger number of underground, revolutionary movements that sought the overthrow of the Alfredo Stroessner's (1954-1989) government. From among those movements emerged the Partido Patria Libre (or, Free Fatherland, also known for its acronym PPL), made up of a two branches: one legal and the other one, operational. The latter was based on people's power, as represented by "Ejercito del Pueblo Paraguayo" (or, the Paraguayan People's Army, with acronym EPP). After EPP broke with PPL in March 2008, this Marxist-oriented revolutionary project, which was apparently oriented to put an end to the social, political and economic inequalities in Paraguay, began to carry out markedly criminal activities, which included bank robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorist attacks and armed confrontations. Its strategies and modus operandi utilized by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). Paraguay features a farm sector in a state of crisis, in which cattle-ranchers, peasants and agro-exporting companies live in a constant strife. The Paraguayan Departments that are the most affected by this situation are Concepcion, San Pedro, Canindeyu y Caazapa, which also suffer from a weak government presence. This deficiency has made these departments ripe for drug-trafficking activity by Brazilian groups such as Primer Comando Capital (i.e., First Capital command), also PCC and Comando Vermelho, (i.e., The Red Command). That is why many peasants, now recruited by EPP, have joined the drug-trafficking business and that, not only as marihuana growers but as "campanas" (i.e., early warning sentinels) for the organization. This helps shape their attitudes for their future involvement in all areas of drug-trafficking. Paraguayan society is the result of social inequity and inequality, such as those resulting from a lack of opportunity. Although Paraguay has successfully recovered from the last world economic crisis, economic growth, by itself, does not ensure an improvement in the quality of life. As long as such economic and social gaps persist and the government fails to enact the policies that would result in a more just society and toward EPP neutralization or containment, the latter is bound to grow stronger. In this context, the situation in Paraguay calls for more research into the EPP phenomenon. It would also seem necessary for Paraguay to promote an open national debate that includes all sectors of society in order to raise consciousness and to induce society to take actual steps to eliminate the EPP, as well as any other group that might arise in the immediate future. EPP has strong connections with the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez in Chile and other armed groups and peasant movements in other countries of this region. Although most governments in the region are aware that the armed struggle is not a solution to current problems, it might be worth it to hold a regional debate about armed or insurgent groups in Latin American to seek common strategies and cooperation on dealing with them since the expansion of these armed groups is a problem for all. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 31. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Paraguay URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140539 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Inequality Kidnappings Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorism Violence

Author: de Leon-Escribano, Carmen Rosa Title: Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua Summary: A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attaches in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 10. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140540 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illicit Arms Military Organized Crime Policing Public Security Violence

Author: Palmer, David Scott Title: Peru's Shining Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects Summary: Although soundly defeated in the early to mid-1990s, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) did not disappear. Over the past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially different form, with both a military and a political component. The organization, once again coordinated by jailed leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso, has eschewed shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term strategy of slowly rebuilding popular support and establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In so doing, it has also moved from extreme Maoist ideological rigidity to a more pragmatic, though perhaps only tactical, approach. Financial support is derived once again from cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Although there may be some individual exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization. At the same time, Sendero is still very small, in no way a threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based political organization and the military wing in the UHV continue to follow Guzman's leadership, while the Apur�mac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to the armed struggle. The Government of Peru (GOP) response to date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate. VRAE military operations are hampered by poor leadership, ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE development resources have been cut, and the long-promised paved road remains in the planning stage. Without significant GOP adjustments, Shining Path is likely to continue to grow. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 2. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Peru URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140541 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Military Shining Path Violence

Author: Sutton, Mitchell Title: Transnational crime in Sri Lanka: Future considerations for international cooperation Summary: This report examines transnational, serious and organised crime in Sri Lanka, its impact on neighbouring states, law enforcement cooperation, and the influence of Sri Lanka's changing geopolitical and economic orientation on criminal activity. Geopolitical change was a major influence on the patterns of transnational crime in Sri Lanka, especially the end of the civil war in 2009 and the destruction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE's demise ended some activity while changing the patterns of transnational crimes such as arms smuggling, people smuggling and human trafficking. Still, the threat of transnational crime hasn't disappeared from Sri Lanka since the end of the civil war. Local law enforcement agencies and the military are struggling to develop strategies to combat a multifaceted threat exacerbated by the country's porous border with India, international drug rings and cartels, government corruption, and proximity to swathes of under- or ungoverned territory in Myanmar, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Historical and new international relationships-especially with Russia, China and the Middle East - have also influenced crime patterns in Sri Lanka. Regional states have felt strong impacts from criminal activities involving Sri Lanka. Those impacts have differed markedly, as each affected state has been incorporated into a different place along the contraband supply chain. People smuggling and associated crimes are likely to remain the main concerns for Australia. Drug, arms and human trafficking are likely to pose problems for India and Southeast Asia. Because this criminal activity is diffuse, solutions must necessarily come from both domestic and regional sources, and involve neighbouring states working with the Sri Lankan Government to develop strategies to jointly reduce the threat. Already, a proliferation of different multilateral and bilateral law enforcement cooperation agreements has emerged in response to these challenges. Future engagement should focus on enhancing the intelligence capabilities of Sri Lanka's military and law enforcement agencies, encouraging reforms to eliminate corruption and inefficiency and realigning government agencies to fit the new threat. Details: Barton,. ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/transnational-crime-in-sri-lanka-future-considerations-for-international-cooperation/SR94_Sri-Lanka.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Sri Lanka URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/transnational-crime-in-sri-lanka-future-considerations-for-international-cooperation/SR94_Sri-Lanka.pdf Shelf Number: 145538 Keywords: Arms Smuggling Drug Trafficking Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Organized Crime Trafficking in Firearms

Author: Cutrona, Sebastian Antonino Title: Challenging the U.S.-Led War on Drugs: Argentina in Comparative Perspective Summary: This dissertation analyzes the cases that have resisted the U.S. pressure to adopt the standard security model (SSM) to fight against drug-trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since more can be learned by examining phenomenon that deviate from the modal pattern, this dissertation focuses on Argentina. Existing research, by contrast, has revolved around Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, and the Caribbean; countries where the U.S. securitized drug-trafficking by presenting it as an existential threat, justifying the militarization of counter-narcotics policies. In seeking to fill this theoretical and empirical vacuum, this dissertation answers three main research questions: Why have some countries succumbed to the U.S. pressure for a SSM while others resisted? What specific factors explain the different trajectories followed by these countries? And, finally, what alternative policies, if any, have these countries chosen to replace the SSM. Details: Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 2016. 237p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2675&context=oa_dissertations Year: 2016 Country: Argentina URL: http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2675&context=oa_dissertations Shelf Number: 140774 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking War on Drugs

Author: Van Riper, Stephen K. Title: Tackling Africa's First Narco-State: Guinea-Bissau in West Africa Summary: The U.S., Europe and regional African players must tackle drug smuggling in West Africa to prevent that region from falling into chaos. Today, West Africa is a significant nexus for the illegal trafficking of oil, weapons, cigarettes, drugs and other commodities. The United States has labeled Guinea-Bissau Africa's first narco-state and it has become the epicenter of a region where Transnational Criminal Organizations are corrupting governments and societies at an alarming rate. Their nefarious efforts, and Guinea-Bissau's state failure, conflict with U.S. stated interests. Tackling corruption, neutralizing spoilers, and increasing the societies' culture of lawfulness are necessary steps to save West Africa. This will be challenging in Guinea-Bissau due to geography, culture, government structure, and a corrupted military. But with the right adjustments to resources, authorities and priorities, it can be done. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2014. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2016 at: http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/VanRiper_monograph_Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/VanRiper_monograph_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 146013 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Oil Industry Organized Crime Smuggling Trafficking of Goods

Author: Garat, Guillermo Title: Paraguay: The cannabis breadbasket of the Southern Cone: A focus on the largest cannabis producer in South America Summary: Key Points - Paraguay is the principal producer of cannabis in South America. Despite its importance as a supplier of cannabis in South America, there has been a surprising absence of serious studies of its impact on its own society, and on the play of offer and demand in neighbouring countries. - After 40 years of an intense "war on drugs", there are now eight departments involved in the business, with spiralling homicide rates, an absence of state policy intervention, drug traffickers infiltrated into local political structures, and millions of dollars which are shared out by terrorist organizations, a new chain of services connected to the illicit trade, and - to a much lesser extent - small farmers suffocated by repeated crises. - Contradictions in productive structures, the lack of agrarian policies, poverty and the absence of perspectives for the rural population led to a gradual, and progressively more blatant, adoption of cannabis cultivation by young. Over time, growing cannabis became one of the few viable economic prospects for large sectors of the population. - Intermediaries who manage contacts with the buyers on the border with Brazil, employ young people to grow, protect, harvest, dry, press, package and even transport the cannabis - not just within Paraguay, but even into nearby countries, using the limited means at their disposal, such as their shoulders, bicycles and motorbikes. - The use of cannabis is looked down on by the general population, particularly in rural areas, and even in the communities where it is grown, it is commonly referred to as the "demon weed" (hierba maldita). Lifetime use of cannabis in Paraguay is the second lowest in all Latin America, only 0.4% admitting to having tried it. - Some politicians, government officials, civil society organisations and farmers' organisations see the benefit of the regulation of the cannabis market in Paraguay, but the debate is still incipient. Details: Bonn, Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Drug Policy Briefing, no. 46: Accessed November 2, 2016 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/drug_policy_briefing_46.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Paraguay URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/drug_policy_briefing_46.pdf Shelf Number: 145004 Keywords: Cannabis Drug Markets Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Illicit Trade Marijuana War on Drugs

Author: Crabtree, Ben Title: The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking: Syria and the wider region Summary: Evidence of drug seizures shows that captagon has become the major drug in the Middle East, enriching criminal and terrorist networks and fueling conflict across the region, sidelining other drug routes such as the billion-dollar business of Afghan heroin via the Balkan route. With seizures of 69.5 million pills in Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon in 2015 alone, the captagon market has exploded. One captagon pill, sold on the streets in the Gulf countries, would fetch US 10-20$. Thus, the market can be estimated at a worth as much as 1.39$ billion. This means that millions of dollars are being raised from drug trafficking and directly benefit different groups involved in the Syrian conflict. This Global Initiative investigation shows that captagon has become the conflict drug of choice -- not only in directly financing the ever deteriorating war in Syria but also slowly fueling the appetite for conflict: Evidence suggests that ISIS is also not only involved in captagon trafficking but also in prescription drug trafficking and abuse (tramadol). Both captagon and tramadol are used by ISIS fighters to suppress feelings of pain, induce feelings of euphoria and thereby increase levels of violence. In addition, migration and displacement feed into another vicious cycle. As drug trafficking sprawls, so does the potential for increased abuse and addiction by Syrian nationals both within the country and among the refugee populations. Further evidence suggests the increasing vulnerabilities and mental health issues of the displaced population, leading to spiking levels of drug abuse. This new Global Initiative report, launched on 1st of November, is a timely piece of analysis based on field research in six countries. It examines the dimensions of regional drug trafficking and highlights the troubling consequences for the possible resolution of the Syria conflict and the region's long-term stability. This report finds that despite limited reliable information: Drug trafficking and its impact on the rule of law is extensive and chronic, and its impact goes beyond the borders of Syria. This must be factored into development implementations in a post-conflict Syria. Development policies should have a mid- to long term focus understanding the local needs and conflicts and development of the rule of law as a cornerstone for success. Captagon production within Syria has been occurring for at least a decade. However, the current conflict has merely exploited the breakdown of the rule of law to intensify production and trafficking and added a regional facet to the issue, because The current level of conflict within Syria has forced some traffickers to move production of captagon to Lebanon and Turkey and potentially other countries within the region including Sudan. If the conflict worsens for either the regime, FSA, or ISIS and extremist groups, captagon drug trafficking could be moved on a larger scale to neighboring countries. It is unclear if ISIS is a net exporter of captagon due to other more reliable sources of funding (oil, extortion). However, there are clear links between tramadol trafficking and ISIS. Destination markets for captagon are predominantly in the Arab Peninsula and East Africa with consumption in Turkey and Syria also rising precipitously. Overall, drug trafficking and serious organized crime are a significant challenge to some countries in the region, due to newer priorities and limited capacity of law enforcement. Details: Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/global-initiative-the-nexus-of-conflict-and-illicit-drug-trafficking--syria-and-the-wider-region-november-2016_low.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Syria URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/global-initiative-the-nexus-of-conflict-and-illicit-drug-trafficking--syria-and-the-wider-region-november-2016_low.pdf Shelf Number: 144991 Keywords: Drug Trafficking ISIS Organized Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: Way, Julian Title: Charting Out the Digital Ecosystem of Gangs in the U.S. and Mexico Summary: People, drugs and weapons are routinely smuggled across the U.S.-Mexican border. Drug trafficking cartels and organized criminal gangs are suppliers, brokers, retailers and regulators of the trade. Conventional assessments of the political economy of the illicit trafficking along known corridors such as San Diego-Tijuana or El Paso-Ciudad Juarez rely on painstaking qualitative assessments, including key informant interviews with those in and outside the business. In some cases, quantitative approaches are deployed, including modeling flows on the basis of extant data on sex trafficking or drugs and arms seizures. Due in part to the rapid digital penetration of the Internet and social media over the past decade, there are novel ways of tracking cartel and gang activity. Many of these approaches are still experimental and in early stages of development. This article considers the digital ecosystem linking gangs in San Diego, Tijuana and more widely across Mexico and other parts of Latin America. The focus is not restricted to mapping the online presence of gangs in social media and related public digital platforms, but also the dynamic interaction between members, affiliates and the wider public. The article draws on research conducted in partnership with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and University of San Diego in 2015. The article considers the digital activities of gangs – especially Latin American groups – at two levels. At the micro-level, the focus was on mapping online gang involvement in sex trafficking in San Diego in the U.S. and Tijuana in Mexico. At the macro-level, we considered the activities and dynamics of online gang networks in southern California, Mexico and wider Latin America. We then applied a combination of social media analytics, social network analysis, and digital forensics to understand the distribution and dynamics of cartels and gangs in cyberspace. While experimental in nature, the assessment generated descriptive and methodological findings. Details: Small Wars Journal, April 11, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2016 at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/charting-out-the-digital-ecosystem-of-gangs-in-the-us-and-mexico Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/charting-out-the-digital-ecosystem-of-gangs-in-the-us-and-mexico Shelf Number: 146974 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gang-Related Violence Gangs Gun Trafficking Sex Trafficking Social Media

Author: Tamayo, Adrian Title: Determining Statistical Pattern on the Drug-Related Killing in Philippines Using ARIMA and Poisson Techniques Summary: A univariate time series technique was conducted to determine statistical pattern on killings of drug suspects in Philippines from May 19 to July 7, 2016. The technique reveal a moving average of order 2, MA(2) with a positive coefficient suggestive that value of outcome variable x tend to increase, on the average, than the recent value of x . This means that drug-related killings will tend to be higher than the most current rate; and killings is seen to increase as weekend comes. Poisson regression indicated an average of 13 deaths on a Sunday; only 2 on Monday average; odds of survival increases as well as weekend comes. Finally, the forecast model and the simulation are limited by the data used. Structure of the univariate series may change as additional data are added; this is also true for the forecasted average occurrence. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 71528: Accessed November 21, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72518/1/MPRA_paper_72518.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Philippines URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72518/1/MPRA_paper_72518.pdf Shelf Number: 147848 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homicides Violent Crime

Author: Munoz-Herrera, Manual Title: Drug Dealing In Bucaramanga: Case Study In A Drug Producing Country Summary: We present a case study of the market of drug dealing in the context of a drug producing country. A main characteristic of a drug producing country is that illegal drugs are more accessible and have dramatically lower prices in the street market compared to countries that do not produce drugs. We locate our study to the city of Bucaramanga, Colombia; the country with the largest production of cocaine in the world. We make use of two sources of primary information (i) direct interviews to drug dealers, and (ii) media analysis of the local newspaper. Our main finding is that individual dealers exchange drugs, without any incentives to integrate and take control of the distribution in the city. That is, the low prices of drugs reduce profit and deter dealers to fight for monopoly, leading to a decentralized market of multiple uni-personal firms who use no violence. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2014. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 58523: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58523/1/MPRA_paper_58523.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58523/1/MPRA_paper_58523.pdf Shelf Number: 147951 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Dealers Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence

Author: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Program Title: Marijuana's Impact on California. California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Report Summary: A growing number of California residents are interested in removing barriers to recreational marijuana use, and this paper will outline the current state of marijuana policy in California and the potential impacts of further legalizing marijuana use. Section One, The Science on Marijuana Marijuana is the most abused illicit drug in the world, but the gap between the science on marijuana and the common perception of marijuana has never been greater. Section Two, California Youth Marijuana Use In 2013, California was ranked 20th in current use among youth, and by 2014 California was ranked 11th in the country. The state's largest average increase in youth past 30-day use of marijuana coincided with the proliferation of marijuana dispensaries in the state; at that time, California’s youth use rate was already 29% higher than the national average. Section Three, California Schools Due to a new program, school expulsion rates in California have greatly decreased, even though the number of students who are caught with drugs has not declined. Section Four, California Marijuana Use Ages 18-25 In 2012 and 2013, adult marijuana use for California adults aged 18-25 years was 22% compared to the national average of 19%. Section Five, Marijuana-Related Emergency Department Visits and Hospital Admissions From 2010 to 2014, after marijuana dispensaries began to proliferate, there was a 116% increase in Emergency Department visits and admissions for any related marijuana use. Marijuana-related exposures for young children (0-5 years old) also increased 513% between 2005 and 2015. During the same time there was a 139% increase among children 6-19 years old. Section Six, Treatment From 2005 to 2015, the rate of admissions to drug treatment programs for marijuana abuse remained steady – so did the fact that teens and young adults make up the largest proportion of people admitted for treatment. Section Seven, California Impaired Driving From 2005 to 2014, total statewide traffic fatalities decreased 29% in California, but fatalities involving drivers testing positive for marijuana increased 17%. Section Eight, Diversion More interdiction events, including those by the United States Postal Service (USPS) Inspection Service, resulted in seized marijuana originating from California than from any other state. Details: s.l.: California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Program, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: https://learnaboutsam.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CA-MJ-IMPACT-REPORT-FINAL1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://learnaboutsam.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CA-MJ-IMPACT-REPORT-FINAL1.pdf Shelf Number: 147299 Keywords: Driving Under the Influence Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Drug Treatment Drugged Driving Marijuana

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Development Responses to Organized Crime: new agendas, new opportunities Summary: There are a number of signifcant policy processes advancing that are changing the way that development actors will engage with organized crime programming. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (ASD2030) by the General Assembly on the 25 September 2015 places the issue of organized crime firmly within the realm and mandate of development actors. The shifts in the rules for recording development assistance contributions under the revised Financing for Development framework and the clarification of the ODA rules will make it easier for development actors to engage in programming directly related to tackling organized crime, mitigating its impact and building the resilience of communities to criminal flows. In addition, as preparation for the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) intensifies, this will shine a spotlight on the debates around what are the appropriate responses to transnational organized crime, and how we achieve balanced, integrated approach that can include both criminal justice, security and development responses. The Development Dialogue is a process that the Global Initiative has facilitated since early 2013, and it is clear that a lot of ground has been covered since those initial discussions, in which development actors were only beginning to come to terms with organized crime, and the evidence base was still largely yet to be determined. A number of the most pressing challenges which the international community and individual states are grappling with have highlighted the importance: illicit migration, but also debates around reducing the harm from drug trafficking, or protecting key species from extinction for example. This conference is the fourth meeting of the Development Dialogue: the first was held in the Hague in April 2013, the second in Berlin in November 2014, and the third in Oslo in March 2015.1 In each meeting, the hosting country partnered with the Global Initiative to use the discussion to learn from thematic and regional specialist, and to raise awareness and catalyze the debate internally. In a small way, this has contributed to the growing momentum around the debate, and has provided policymakers an opportunity to benchmark and compare approaches. This meeting brought together some 50 policymakers, experts and development practitioners at the HMS President facility in London, offered by the UK Ministry of Defense, and co-hosted between the Global Initiative and the UK’s Department for International Development. Representatives from twelve separate UK Government departments participated in the meeting, highlighting how wide the debate has become, and the ever-increasing need to build bridges between different departments, build a common language and create whole of government approaches. The meeting was held under the Chatham House rule. The debate has unquestionably progressed. The ASD2030 outcome shows us is that there is no longer a question that development actors have a role to play in countering organized crime – this was less clear when the Development Dialogue process began – but the challenge remains complex, without simple solutions. Debating the complexity, discarding simple solutions, innovating new response and seeking ways to measure progress are the key things on the agenda now, and there is a hope that the Development Dialogue can continue to add value to that process. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: A Conference Report: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-Crime.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 144927 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia Summary: Colombia has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Most of those killings involve firearms. What is the relationship between violence, crime and arms trafficking in Colombia? This report aims to find out. The biggest problem is that in parts of Colombia, the State does not have a monopoly on the use of force. Highly organized criminal structures such as drug trafficking mafias and paramilitary groups are well-armed and dangerous. There are many private security companies, some of which use illegal weapons. Most Colombians who die from bullets do not die through indiscriminate violence. Rather, firearms are being used in the “professional” exercise of violence. The Government therefore has a major challenge to disarm such groups and reduce violence. It also needs to strengthen gun control by increasing penalties for arms trafficking and the illegal carrying of arms. Furthermore it needs to cut the supply of weapons by stopping the illicit trafficking in firearms. As demonstrated in this report, this is a trans-border issue. Weapons and ammunition are being smuggled into Colombia, very often in return for drugs. Regional cooperation and improved border control are essential to cut the links between drug trafficking, organized crime and insurgency. Colombia deserves praise for its regional and international efforts to regulate and control small arms and light weapons. It understands from its bitter experience the need to reduce arms trafficking and that international cooperation, particularly with neighbouring States, is vital. More countriesshould learn from Colombia’s experience. Since 2005 the world has had a powerful instrument against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, namely a Protocol which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Ratification of this protocol is shamefully slow considering the seriousness of the threat posed by illegal weapons. Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearmsis not an impossible dream. Whereas in the past people have talked about the importance of beating swords into ploughshares, some inspired Colombians are showing the world that you can turn guns into guitars. Colombian musician and peace activist Cesar Lopez has builtseveral "escopetarra" – part rifle (escopeta) and part guitar (guitarra). With more activistslike Mr. Lopez, greater domestic gun control and greater regional and global cooperation, Colombia and the rest of the world will have less guns and more guitars. Details: Bogota: UNODC, 2006. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf Shelf Number: 144925 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gun-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Trafficking in Weapons Violent Crime

Author: Ellis, Clare Title: On Tap Europe: Organised Crime and Illicit Trade in Spain: Country Report Summary: The criminal networks behind Spain's illicit trade are sophisticated, agile and often active in other areas of criminality. In contrast to other countries studied, there does not appear to be a decisive shift away from the established high-risk activities of organised crime (such as trafficking narcotics) towards illicit trade, which is considered comparatively low-risk both in terms of detection and potential sanctions. Instead, the flexibility of organised crime groups in Spain includes both forms of activity, with groups moving between different illicit commodities and between crime types as opportunities arise. While Spain has long acted as a transit hub, a substantial domestic market for illicit goods has also developed. There appears to be limited infiltration of legal supply chains, with stringent regulatory systems largely preventing illicit goods from being sold through registered retailers. However, such goods remain readily available from a variety of sources, suggesting that measures have displaced rather than suppressed the sale of illicit products. Production of illicit goods within Spain is also an emerging trend, with illegal tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceutical factories uncovered in recent years. This paper identifies four specific drivers that underpin this complex and evolving role: the significant price differentials with nearby countries and territories; the impact of the global financial crisis on the Spanish economy; a social acceptance of illicit goods and the perception among the public that illicit trade is not a serious criminal issue; and the application of relatively lenient sanctions against those convicted of crimes related to illicit trade. It is the combination of these factors that has simultaneously created demand for illicit products, fuelled their supply, and offered limited deterrence for participation in this form of criminality. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper; On Tap Europe Series No. 2: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_on_tap_europe_spain_final.2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Spain URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_on_tap_europe_spain_final.2.pdf Shelf Number: 145542 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Tobacco Illicit Goods Illicit Trade Organized Crime

Author: Lamb, Robert Dale Title: Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens Summary: Individuals and groups who use violence in ways that threaten the United States, its allies, or its partners habitually find or create ways to operate with impunity or without detection. Whether for private financial gain (e.g., by narcotics and arms traffickers) or for harmful political aims (e.g., by insurgents, terrorists, and other violent extremists), these illicit operations are most successful "and most dangerous" when their perpetrators have a place or situation that can provide refuge from efforts to combat or counter them. Such places and situations are often called safe havens, and potential safe havens are sometimes called ungoverned areas. A key component of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stabilization, peacekeeping, and other such efforts is to reduce the size and effectiveness of the safe havens that protect illicit actors. Agencies in defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and other areas all have capabilities that can be applied to countering such threats and building the capacity and legitimacy of U.S. partners to prevent ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas from becoming safe havens. To do this effectively requires careful consideration of all the geographical, political, civil, and resource factors that make safe havens possible; a sober appreciation of the complex ways those factors interact; and deeper collaboration among U.S. government offices and units that address such problems - whether operating openly, discreetly, or covertly - to ensure unity of effort. This report offers a framework that can be used to systematically account for these considerations in relevant strategies, capabilities, and doctrines/best practices. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2008. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Shelf Number: 146248 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Drug Trafficking Firearms Trafficking Public Safety Safe Havens Violence Violent Extremists

Author: Wolff, Michael Jerome Title: Criminal authorities and the state: gangs, organized crime, and police in Brazil Summary: Drug gangs and organized criminal groups rarely evolve into structured authorities governing their resident communities. Where this occurs, however, they may effectively replace the state in its most basic functions, and consequently exclude subject populations from the rights and protections supposedly guaranteed by the state. Employing qualitative research methods, this study compares criminal development and state public security policies in Rio de Janeiro and Recife, Brazil. The research is primarily concerned with the development of criminal authority structures, and asks when, where, why, and how they develop. Arguing that the extant literature on organized crime fails to adequately explain this phenomenon—particularly in the case of drug trafficking gangs—I draw from the civil wars literature to theoretically explain the rise of non-state authority structures. The parallels are compelling. In Rio de Janeiro, concentrated illicit wealth created by the cocaine boom in the 1980s attracted an international arms market that helped drug gangs dominate larger territories (i.e. opportunities), while indiscriminate and lethally violent state repression pushed non-criminal publics into a de facto alliance with drug traffickers (i.e. grievance). In this context gangs—and later, militias—developed clear and structured governing functions. Other factors, such as inhibiting geography, also contributed to this authoritative duality. In Recife, by contrast, drug gangs have remained small, disorganized, and unengaged in local political structures. A smaller drug market, flat and vehicle-accessible slums, and a comparatively much less violent police force help to explain the failure of gangs and other criminal groups to develop broader authoritative functions. Details: Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico, 2014. 228p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 1, 2017 at: http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/24606/Wolff_Dissertation_Final_2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2014 Country: Brazil URL: http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/24606/Wolff_Dissertation_Final_2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 140769 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gang Violence Gang-Related Violence Organized Crime Policing

Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Title: Drug supply reduction: an overview of EU policies and measures Summary: The operation of illicit drug markets is dependent on a chain of events with a global span. At each stage of the process, from the production to the trafficking through to the consumption and the derived profits, the health and security of different countries is compromised by organised crime groups. This paper looks at EU policies and responses to the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, set within the global context. It considers the different strategic areas where these challenges are addressed, the EU structures involved, and some of the key measures currently being implemented by the EU and its international partners. Drug supply reduction issues arise in many policy areas, including illicit drug policy, security, organised crime, and maritime and regional cooperation policy. Issues related to drug production and trafficking arise in the work of several institutions, bodies and EU agencies. The operation of smuggling routes challenges the security of the EU in different ways and measures have been adopted to counteract these problems. These include developing intelligence-led policing and improved border management and surveillance as well as legislative tools to target criminal profits. The EU is involved in a range of projects and initiatives around the world designed to reduce the supply of illicit drugs, including capacity-building initiatives targeting smuggling routes and measures to support economic, legislative and monitoring infrastructural development. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: EMCDDA Papers: Accessed February 1, 2017: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/3633/TDAU16002ENN_web_file.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/3633/TDAU16002ENN_web_file.pdf Shelf Number: 145072 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Supply Reduction Drug Trafficking Illicit Drug Markets Illicit Drugs Organized Crime

Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Title: Drug trafficking penalties across the European Union: a survey of expert opinion. Technical report Summary: The results of a study on national drug trafficking laws and their application in the Member States of the European Union are presented in this report. It is based on an analysis of the national laws and on the opinions of legal practitioners — judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers — from 26 countries. The penalties set out in national laws for trafficking cannabis, amphetamine, cocaine and heroin are compared with the sentencing outcomes expected by the legal practitioners, including penalties imposed and the estimated time likely to be spent in prison. Details: Lisbon, Portugal: Praca Europa, 2017. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2017 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/3573/Trafficking-penalties.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/3573/Trafficking-penalties.pdf Shelf Number: 140778 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Traffickers Drug Trafficking Punishment Sentencing

Author: Adetula, Victor A.O. Title: Nigeria's Response to Transnational Organised Crime and Jihadist Activities in West Africa Summary: Nigeria's status and role as a regional power continues to impact the entire West African sub-region. However the country is facing serious security challenges that are complicated by transnational threats which are associated with organised crime and the activities of jihadist movements. Threats to security linked to the activities of illegal migrants, smugglers, drug traffickers and human traffickers in West Africa have attracted considerable attention from scholars, policy makers and practitioners alike. As the activities of the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) also known as Boko Haram are spreading fast through the northern part of the country into a number of countries in West and Central Africa—notably Chad, Niger, and Cameroon—fears and anxiety have become more noticeable among stakeholders. Also, the challenge of piracy and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea threatens Nigeria's national security as well as regional stability. This study presents the role of Nigeria as a regional hegemon, and also discusses its response to transnational organised criminality and jihadist activities in the sub-region, highlighting Nigeria's official response as well as other interventions undertaken through bilateral and multilateral platforms. The study concludes that there is no controversy about the desirability of the Nigerian government to curb transnational organised crime and jihadist activities in the country. However, the complexities of strategies and modalities for effective curbing of transnational threats still requires in-depth and concerted efforts than have been given by stakeholders. One may argue that the prospects for effective control of cross-border crime in West Africa are positive. Both at bilateral and multilateral levels, Nigeria has shown commitment to working with other countries within the West African sub-region to address the menace of transnational criminality including smuggling, human trafficking and cross-border banditry. On the other hand, the over-subscription of Nigeria and some of its immediate neighbours to pseudo-nationalist policies hinder the implementation of broad-based regional strategies to address transnational threats. Thus the general apathy and lack of courage in official circles and among civil society organizations and other non-state actors in West Africa to organise across national frontiers and engage in security and development discourse, all have the tendency to limit the prospects of effective control of transnational criminality. The efforts of the Nigerian government at combating transnational organised crime and the spread of jihadist activities are yielding some gains. However, lack of political will, bad governance, and poorly equipped and motivated defence and security agencies coupled with other problems such as the porosity of the borders and noninvolvement of the people have continued to inhibit progress. Details: Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich Evert Stiftung, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper: No. X: Accessed February 7, 2017 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/11578.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/11578.pdf Shelf Number: 140850 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human trafficking Illegal Migrants Jihadist Terrorism Organized Crime Smugglers Terrorism

Author: Chioda, Laura Title: Stop the Violence in Latin America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood. Overview booklet. Summary: For a long time, the logic seemed unassailable: Crime and violence were historically thought of as symptoms of a country’s early stages of development that could be "cured" with economic growth and reductions in poverty, unemployment, and inequality. More recently, however, our understanding has changed. Studies now show that economic progress does not necessarily bring better security to the streets. Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean exemplify this point. Between 2003 and 2011, average annual regional growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, excluding the global crisis of 2009, reached nearly 5 percent. What’s more, the growth rate among the bottom 40 percent of the population eclipsed that of the same group in every other region of the world. During that same decade, the region experienced unprecedented economic and social progress: extreme poverty was cut by more than half, to 11.5 percent; income inequality dropped more than 7 percent in the Gini index; and, for the first time in history, the region had more people in the middle class than in poverty. Despite all this progress, the region retained its undesirable distinction as the world’s most violent region, with 23.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. The rate of homicide actually accelerated during the latter half of the decade. The problem remains staggering and stubbornly persistent. Every 15 minutes, at least four people are victims of homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2013, of the top 50 most violent cities in the world, 42 were in the region. And between 2005 and 2012, the annual growth rate of homicides was more than three times higher than population growth. Not surprisingly, the number of Latin Americans who mention crime as their top concern tripled during those years. Violence makes people withdraw, hide behind closed doors, and avoid public spaces, weakening interpersonal and social ties that bind us as a community. Insecurity is the result of a combination of many factors, from drug trafficking and organized crime, to weak judicial and law enforcement systems that promote impunity, to a lack of opportunities and support for young people who live in deprived communities. Youth bear a disproportionate share of the risk of committing and falling victim to violence, with important repercussions for their life trajectories and society as a whole. The complexity of the issue (and multiplicity of its causes) is one of its defining characteristics and the main reason why there is no magic formula or a single policy that will fix the violence in our region. We will not solve the problem by relying only on greater police action or greater incarceration, or through more education or employment. We must do all this and do it in a deliberate way, based on reliable data and proven approaches, while continuously striving to fill existing knowledge and data gaps to improve policy design. To that end, Stop the Violence in Latin America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood is a significant contribution. This report takes a new and comprehensive look at much of the evidence that now exists in preventing crime and violence. It identifies novel approaches —both in Latin America and elsewhere—that have been shown to reduce antisocial behavior at different stages in life. Effective prevention starts even before birth, the report argues, and, contrary to common perceptions, well-designed policies can also be successful later in life, even with at-risk individuals and offenders. The report emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive approach to tackle violence, and it highlights the benefits and cost-effectiveness of redesigning existing policies through the lens of crime prevention. This will require substantial coordination across ministries, as well as accountable and efficient institutions. While economic and social development do not necessarily lead to a reduction in crime and violence, high levels of crime and violence do take a toll on development. And in that regard, we at the World Bank are fully aware that in order to succeed in our goals to eradicate extreme poverty and boost prosperity, the unrivaled levels of crime and violence in the region need to come to an end. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25920/210664ov.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Latin America URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25920/210664ov.pdf Shelf Number: 144833 Keywords: Crime Prevention Drug Trafficking Homicides Organized Crime Political Corruption Violence Violence Prevention Violent Crime

Author: Osorio, Javier Title: Hobbes on Drugs: Understanding Drug Violence in Mexico Summary: This dissertation analyzes the unprecedented eruption of organized criminal violence in Mexico. To understand the dynamics of drug violence, this dissertation addresses three questions. What explains the onset of the war on drugs in Mexico? Once the conflict starts, why does drug violence escalate so rapidly? And lastly, why is there subnational variation in the concentration of violence? Based on a game theoretic model, the central argument indicates that democratization erodes the peaceful configurations between the state and criminal organizations and motivates authorities to fight crime, thus triggering a wave of violence between the state and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups fighting to control strategic territories. In this account, state action is not neutral: law enforcement against a criminal group generates the opportunity for a rival criminal organization to invade its territory, thus leading to violent interactions among rival criminal groups. These dynamics of violence tend to concentrate in territories favorable for the reception, production and distribution of drugs. In this way, the disrupting effect of law enforcement unleashes a massive wave of violence of all-against-all resembling a Hobbesian state of war. To test the observable implications of the theory, the empirical assessment relies on a novel database of geo-referenced daily event data at municipal level providing detailed information on who did what to whom, when and where in the Mexican war on drugs. This database covers all municipalities of the country between 2000 and 2010, thus comprising about 9.8 million observations. The creation of this fine-grained database required the development of Eventus ID, a novel software for automated coding of event data from text in Spanish. The statistical assessment relies on quasi-experimental identification strategies and time-series analysis to overcome problems of causal inference associated with analyzing the distinct - yet overlapping - processes of violence between government authorities and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups. In addition, the statistical analysis is complemented with insights from fieldwork and historical process tracing. Results provide strong support for the empirical implications derived from the theoretical model. Details: Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2013. 485p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Shelf Number: 150551 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Violence

Author: Germa-Bel Title: A two-sided coin: Disentangling the economic effects of the 'War on drugs' in Mexico Summary: Mexican President Felipe Calderon was sworn into office in December 2006. From the outset, his administration was to deploy an aggressive security policy in its fight against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), in what became known as the Mexican 'War on Drugs'. The policy was strongly condemned because of the 68,000 unintentional deaths directly attributable to it. Here, we evaluate the economic effects of this 'War on Drugs'. To disentangle the economic effects of the policy, we study the effects of homicides and the rise in the homicide rate together with the impact of federal public security grants and state-level military expenditure on economic growth. Using spatial econometrics, we find that at the state-level the number of homicides reduced the Mexican states' GDP per capita growth by 0.20 percentage points, while the growth in the homicide rate increased the states' per capita GDP by 0.81 percentage points. The government's efforts to fight DTOs had a positive and highly significant impact on economic growth. Details: Barcelona: Research Institute of Applied Economics, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 2016/11 : Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2016/201611.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2016/201611.pdf Shelf Number: 146289 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug Wars Drug-Related Violence Economics of Crime Homicides

Author: Gberie, Lansana Title: Crime, Violence, and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea Summary: Key Findings • There has been a general increase in drug trafficking in West Africa. Regional institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States have made some effort to counter the impact of drug transit and consumption in the region, but this has had a limited effect in Guinea and Mali. • Guinea and Mali, along with the rest of the region, are reportedly experiencing increased local consumption of illicit drugs, which poses challenges related to treatment, harm reduction, security, and human rights. • In both Guinea and Mali, drug traffickers have exploited widespread poverty and corruption to co-opt government officials, military and law enforcement officers, and political and traditional leaders into an opportunistic network that underpins a very profitable criminal enterprise. • Both countries have experienced serious political turmoil that has brought to light the role drug trafficking has played in provoking internal unrest and coups d'état. • Mali, which experienced a major international intervention following a 2012 coup as well as Tuareg and Islamist uprisings in its northern regions, has passed numerous counter-narcotics measures into law. Generally punitive in approach, their implementation and enforcement have been lacking. • Guinea has proven to be highly resistant to changing its domestic counter-narcotics policies, most likely due to the penetration of drug traffickers in state institutions. Policy Recommendations • Both countries should adopt the recommendations made by a 2014 report by the West Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD), Not Just for Transit: Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa, which emphasized decriminalizing some degree of drug use and possession for personal use. • Mali is likely to support the approach proposed by the WACD at the 2016 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016), while Guinea has thus far taken no position on the UNGASS 2016 treaty review process. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Gberie-Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mali URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Gberie-Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf Shelf Number: 146977 Keywords: Counternarcotics Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs

Author: Mazzitelli, Antonio L. Title: The New Transatlantic Bonanza: Cocaine on Highway 10 Summary: The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel's growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine "Highway 10" among law enforcement. Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 146980 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Terrorist Financing

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: UNODC Regional Programme in support of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy: Preventing and Countering Illicit Trafficking and Organized Crime for Improved Governance, Justice and Security Summary: The Caribbean is situated in the midst of some of the world's major drug trafficking routes, between the worlds main drug producing countries to the South and the major consumer markets of the North. The geographic location of the region, the general lack of adequate law enforcement capacities to effectively monitor vast coastlines, as well as its susceptibility to exogenous shocks, are some of the factors explaining the Caribbean's extreme vulnerability to the threat of transnational organized crime and its various manifestations. The nature of these challenges makes regional cooperation and a coordinated response key factors in addressing the increasing plague of transnational crime, which threatens not only regional security, but also sustainable development and growth. 2. The UNODC Regional Programme (2014-2016) in support of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy serves as an overarching policy framework for UNODC’s technical assistance to the Caribbean region. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 'Crime and Security Strategy 2013' (CCSS) clearly illustrates the areas of greatest concern regarding regional security and outlines a set of Strategic Goals aimed at strengthening the region's capacity to combat transnational organized crime and its manifestations. In an effort to support the region in achieving these Goals, UNODC has worked closely with the CARICOM Secretariat and its Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) to align technical assistance in such a way that these main areas of priority are adequately addressed, while avoiding any duplication of initiatives. 3. The Regional Programme consists of the following five sub-programmes, which not only reflect the range of thematic areas covered by the UNODC mandate, but also directly target the priority goals of the CARICOM Strategy: (i) Countering transnational organized crime, Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism; (ii) Countering Corruption and Money Laundering; (iii) Preventing Crime and Reforming Criminal Justice; (iv) Drug Use, Prevention and Treatment and HIV/AIDS and (v) Research, Trend Analysis and Forensics. These sub-programmes will guide the development of concrete UNODC projects and initiatives to be implemented in the region. The indicative budget of the Regional Programme, for its 3-year timeframe, stands at US$ 11,690,257. 4. The direct responsibility for the implementation of the initiatives included in this Regional Programme will lie with the UNODC Regional Office for Central America and the Caribbean in Panama (ROPAN). Standard UNODC rules and procedures will be observed, so as to ensure the appropriate level of internal oversight and evaluation. Furthermore, in line with the regional consensus on programme management, UNODC will adhere closely to agreed coordination and oversight mechanisms, through the submission of annual reports to the CARICOM Council of Ministers for Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE), which will provide strategic guidance to and oversight of the Regional Programme’s implementation, so as to ensure adequate coordination in the implementation of activities at the regional level. . 1CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013, Chapter 1 (Strategic Security Environment), paragraph 1.6. 2 The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013 was adopted at the Twenty-Fourth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, 18-19 February 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The Strategy, which is based on a 3-year timeframe, is the authoritative reference and guiding document for security issues within CARICOM. 5. This Regional Programme (2014-2016) is an over-arching policy framework defining the joint priorities for UNODC’s technical assistance to Caribbean Member States, in alignment with and in support of the implementation of the CCSS. In their "Political Declaration on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorism and other Serious Crimes in the Caribbean", which was approved by the Caribbean Member States during a Ministerial Conference on 'Illicit Drug Trafficking, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism as Challenges for Security and Development in the Caribbean' (Santo Domingo, 17-20 February 2009), the participating Member States requested “UNODC to prepare, in coordination with regional and sub-regional partners, thematic programmes identified by the region, covering the priority concerns”. UNODC's Regional Programme constitutes the key element of UNODC's response to this request as well as to the more recent calls by Member States in the region for a revitalized engagement of the Office in the Caribbean. These requests are a consequence of the perception, by Governments in the region, of the increased threats that are posed to Caribbean societies and institutions by transnational organized crime. There is a strong recognition that, in order to prevent and counter the problem of illicit drugs and organized crime affecting the Caribbean, there is a need for enhanced technical cooperation and assistance by UNODC. 6. The Programme has been developed in close collaboration with the CARICOM Secretariat, the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), the Regional Security System (RSS), the Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CASSOS), as well as Member States in the region (through programming missions as well as discussions with Permanent Missions), and reflects the key priorities of regional and national stakeholders. Substantively, the Regional Programme is underpinned by and alligned with the Strategic Goals outlined in the CCSS. 7. The Regional Programme also draws significant elements from the Caribbean Community Action Plan for Social and Development Crime Prevention 2009-2013, as it fully incorporates its main pillars and updates its priorities for the period 2014-2016. 8. In the context of the CCSS, this Regional Programme will therefore cover Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. Strategic and programmatic synergies will also be sought with Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the framework of CARIFORUM. 9. The Regional Programme is designed as a strategic tool that reflects the region's main priorities for action, and ensures complementarity with the various on-going and future initiatives of UNODC and its main partners in the region in the area of justice and security. It provides a roadmap towards providing required expertise, technical tools and services to enhance national and regional capabilities to prevent and counter organized crime, including drug trafficking and terrorism, by building stronger societies based on the rule of law and human rights. It promotes regional cooperation and integration, and supports regional and country-level capacity building, as determined by existing national needs, priorities and specificities. 10. The overall vision is that, by the year 2016, countries of the region will be in a position to count on strengthened institutions and cooperate in an effective and sustainable manner to counter the destabilizing impact of organized crime. While the ultimate attainment of this vision depends on the commitment of countries in the region and their international partners, UNODC, through the development of this Regional Programme, reiterates its commitment to support the realization of this vision through its engagement at the regional, sub-regional, national and local levels, in close collaboration with the CARICOM Secretariat, CARICOM IMPACS and other relevant regional security insitutions, such as the RSS and CASSOS. Details: New York: UNODC, 2013. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/ropan/UNODC_Regional_Programme_Caribbean/UNODC_Regional_Programme_for_the_Caribbean_2014-2016_in_support_of_the_CARICOM_Crime_and_Security_Strategy_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Caribbean URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/ropan/UNODC_Regional_Programme_Caribbean/UNODC_Regional_Programme_for_the_Caribbean_2014-2016_in_support_of_the_CARICOM_Crime_and_Security_Strategy_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 146652 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Crime Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: United States Sentencing Commission Title: Recidivism Among Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders Summary: The Commission's Ongoing Recidivism Research The United States Sentencing Commission began studying recidivism shortly after the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"). The Commission’s recent publication Recidivism Among Federal Offenders: A Comprehensive Overview ("Recidivism Overview Report") discussed the history of this study in greater detail. Recidivism information is central to three of the primary purposes of punishment described in the SRA—specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—all of which focus on prevention of future crimes through correctional intervention. Information about recidivism is also relevant to the Commission’s obligation to formulate sentencing policy that "reflect[s], to the extent practicable, advancements in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the sentencing process." Considerations of recidivism by federal offenders were also central to the Commission’s initial work in developing the Guidelines Manual's criminal history provisions.4 They remain important to subsequent work, including the retroactive application of sentencing reductions in cases involving crack cocaine, and continue to be a key consideration in the Commission’s work today. Recent developments, particularly public attention to the size of the federal prison population and the costs of incarceration, have highlighted the importance of studying recidivism among federal offenders. The Commission's current recidivism research substantially expands on the scope of previous Commission recidivism projects. In addition to a different set of offenders— U.S. citizen federal offenders released in 2005—the project's study group is much larger than those in previous Commission studies. A larger study group provides the opportunity to develop statistically useful conclusions about many subgroups of federal offenders. This Report: Recidivism Among Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders This report examines a group of 10,888 federal drug trafficking offenders who were released in calendar year 2005. They were originally sentenced between fiscal year 1991 and the first quarter of fiscal year 2006. Offenders were placed in this group based on the primary sentencing guideline that the court applied when sentencing the offender. One-half (50.0%) of these drug trafficking offenders were rearrested for a new crime or for an alleged violation of their supervision over the follow-up period of eight years. This compares to a 49.3 percent rearrest rate for all offenders reported in the Recidivism Overview Report. These 10,888 offenders, who were all U.S. citizens, represent 42.8 percent of the 25,431 federal offenders who were released in calendar year 200510 and analyzed in the Recidivism Overview Report. Among those offenders in this group for whom drug type information was available,11 crack cocaine was the most common primary drug type, with 2,953 crack cocaine offenders (27.3% of the 10,814 offenders with a known primary drug type). The remaining primary drug types, in order of prevalence, were marijuana (n=2,570, 23.8%), powder cocaine (n=2,350, 21.7%), methamphetamine (n=1,826, 16.9%), and heroin (n=590, 5.5%). An additional 525 (4.9%) offenders had some other type of drug as the primary type of drug in their offense, and were not studied separately for purposes of this report. Details: Washington, DC: USSC, 2017. 149p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20170221_Recidivism-Drugs.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20170221_Recidivism-Drugs.pdf Shelf Number: 141174 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Traffickers Drug Trafficking Federal Offenders Recidivism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Global SMART Programme Title: Afghanistan Synthetic Drugs Situation Assessment Summary: Afghanistan's opiate market has annually accounted for the largest share of illicit opium produced worldwide. Alongside the continued dominant presence of an illicit opiate market, recent reports indicate an increasing availability of synthetic drugs in Afghanistan and the South-Western and Central Asian region as a whole. Overall, there continue to be some significant analytical gaps in the information and data relating to synthetic drugs in Afghanistan. The main objective of this report is to offer some initial insights into the extent of synthetic drug production, use, and trafficking in Afghanistan and to highlight important areas for further research. The phenomenon of synthetic drugs cannot be understood by focussing on Afghanistan alone. Rather, this report situates the dynamics of synthetic drugs in the country within the wider context of South-Western and Central Asia in order to understand the recent emergence and origins of synthetic drugs in Afghanistan. Based on this approach, presenting the regional perspective helps to provide a full picture of the synthetic drug situation in Afghanistan. The research process of this report incorporated various resources and strands of information. Much of the data and information presented in this report are derived from field research material that was gathered over an eight-month period. The field research included missions to 5 provinces in Afghanistan, where interviews were conducted with over 100 key informants, drug users and law enforcement officials at government offices, health service centres and drug treatment providers (see Annex). These various sources of information have also been supplemented by official reports involving national aggregate information and data. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/Reports/2017_Afghanistan_Synthetic_Drugs_Assessment_report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/Reports/2017_Afghanistan_Synthetic_Drugs_Assessment_report.pdf Shelf Number: 144842 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Illicit Drugs Opium Synthetic Drugs

Author: Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo Title: Structure of a Transnational Criminal Network: "Los Zetas" and the Smuggling of Hydrocarbons Summary: Mexico is currently one of the most important hotspots of criminal activity with effects in the Western Hemisphere. In this criminal dynamic, the Sinaloa Cartel, The Gulf Cartel, "La Familia Michoacana", "The Knights Templar" and "Los Zetas" are some of the most relevant criminal networks that originated in Mexico, but currently reach and operate in different countries across Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. While the operations of criminal networks inside of Mexico are severely violent, outside of Mexico their operations mainly consist of smuggling, transportation and distribution of illegal drugs, and other such activities. "Los Zetas", initially created out of former elite army soldiers, was the armed wing of the criminal network known as the “Gulf Cartel” [Cartel del Golfo] at the beginning of the present century. However, very quickly "Los Zetas" began operating as an independent criminal network, currently challenging the Gulf Cartel for control of trafficking routes and "plazas", meaning gaining local power in municipalities. Bearing this in mind, in this paper we present and discuss a model of a transnational criminal structure of "Los Zetas". Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 12: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_b8156d42310843a1b9dbcce4095c51b8.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_b8156d42310843a1b9dbcce4095c51b8.pdf Shelf Number: 141197 Keywords: Criminal Network Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Smuggling

Author: Jeffray, Calum Title: On Tap Europe: Organised Crime and Illicit Trade in Greece: Country Report Summary: Organised crime in Greece has historically been presented as an external threat, and the country’s vast coastline is indeed vulnerable to small-scale smuggling of various illicit goods from overseas, while its two major ports are frequently targeted by smugglers. As a result, Greece is widely cited as a key entry point for illicit goods into Europe, with the majority of illicit trade occurring in the regions where the two biggest cities and ports – Athens and Thessaloniki – are located. Illicit trade is not seen as an isolated problem in Greece, but as part of a broader category of economic crimes. It is closely linked to tax evasion, corruption and fraud. However, specific information on the scale and the scope of illicit trade in Greece is limited and tends to be largely anecdotal, reflecting a lack of publicly available information on organised crime more broadly. Authorities suggest that the way in which criminals in Greece organise themselves has evolved from strict, hierarchical structures to a more flexible ‘enterprise model’ in which a network of smaller OCGs is established for a particular operation. Groups that smuggle goods tend to deal across multiple commodities, moving between products based on the profit that can be made at any one time, regardless of the risk. Some illicit markets seem to be growing: data show that legitimate tobacco and alcohol sales are both decreasing, but there has not been a similar reduction in consumer demand. This paper makes various key findings. First, the debt crisis that has affected Greece since 2008 has undeniably had an impact on local illicit markets, making the black market more attractive to some consumers and affecting the resources available to law enforcement authorities. Second, during this period of economic uncertainty, authorities have focused on tackling crimes that they believe have the biggest impact on state revenues, such as tax evasion, excise evasion, fraud, and bribery and corruption. Third, Greece has become an attractive hub for smuggling activity for various reasons, including its combination of remote and porous land borders and its long coastline, the scale of operations at the port of Piraeus, which makes monitoring the content of incoming containers a challenge, and because the country is in the Schengen Area, which means that the circulation of goods into the rest of Europe is relatively straightforward. Fourth, there is only limited information available on the scale and scope of organised crime activity, and of illicit trade in particular. Finally, identifying 'little and often' smuggling operations, whether by sea or by land, requires an excellent intelligence picture, which Greece has struggled to achieve. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper; On Tap Europe Series No. 3: Accessed February 24, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201702_op_on_tap_europe3_greece.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Greece URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201702_op_on_tap_europe3_greece.pdf Shelf Number: 141207 Keywords: Corruption and Fraud Drug Trafficking Illegal Tobacco Illicit Goods Illicit Trade Organized Crime Smuggling Tax Evasion

Author: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto Title: Caught in the Crossfire: The Geography of Extortion and Police Corruption in Mexico Summary: When Mexican president Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 he declared a war on the nation’s drug traffic organizations (Ríos and Shirk, 2011). Violence escalated as criminal organizations became increasingly fragmented and disputed their territories (Killebrew and Bernal, 2010; Beittel, 2011). The main strategy followed by the federal government involved capturing leaders and lieutenants of criminal organizations (Calderón et al. forthcoming). This seemed to provoke even more violence, by making the competition over-territorial control fiercer and providing incentives for many gangs to make extortion and protection fees (derecho de piso) an additional source of revenue (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2010). Given the absence of legal(and peaceful) rules and enforcement mechanisms for competitors in the illegal drug market, disagreements were usually solved violently. Under the pressure of the crackdown by the federal police, the navy and the army, contracts among criminal gangs were often disrupted, leading to even more violence. Competition over the strategic routes towards the market in the United States was settled by literally eliminating rivals (Dell, 2012). The wide availability of illegal guns crossing from the US border (Dube et al., 2013) turned firearm deaths into the main cause of death among young men in Mexico.Meanwhile, citizens became caught in the crossfire of rival drug cartels and extortion at the hands of criminal gangs. A highly visible example of this was the case of two students in the prestigious private university Tecnológico de Monterrey who were kidnapped by drug traffickers in 2010, but then killed by the military in a botched attempt to rescue them. The case became particularly controversial due to the excessive use of force by the army and their effort to cover up the case with planted evidence. During the late 1990s and early 2000s Mexico gradually changed from being a transit territory for drugs heading to the United States market to a place of increasing consumption (Castañeda and Aguilar, 2010). This transformation was partially driven by a change in the way that wholesale drug importers were paying for services; they switched from payments only in cash to payments with part of the same drug they were distributing (Grillo, 2011:80). The change from a transportation to a retail distribution business implied that drug cartels had to increase the number of personnel. Having a larger full-time workforce, the cartels could now count on small armies of salaried criminals at their disposal. The perfect complement to this new industrial organization was an easily corruptible police and judicial system at all levels of government. Increasingly fragmented criminal organizations began to diversify their illegal activities–to extortion of small businesses, kidnappings of middle-class individuals, racketeering and control of retail trade in their territories, and extortion of migrant workers– perhaps in associations with police departments. Although it is difficult to provide evidence on how much real progress has been made, there is no question that efforts at reforming the police forces in Mexico face a momentous challenge in such environment. Although a new federal police force was created after 2006 and, in principle, all police had to comply with background checks and other administrative procedures, in fact, state and municipal police forces remain not just corrupt but also keep on using excessive force and violating human rights. This became patently clear in the case of the 43 Ayotzinapa missing students that in October of 2014 were detained by the municipal police of the city of Iguala, to be handed in to the killers of a drug traffic organization. The police forces of Iguala are not the only ones that are penetrated by organized crime and have failed to protect citizens. This chapter explores the connection between police distrust, corruption and extortion. Despite the difficulty in measuring these phenomena through conventional public opinion polls and citizen or firm level surveys,much can be learned from the variation across geographic units in reported victimization and corruption. We use a list experiment collected through the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico (SPSGM), to study the practices of extortion by both police forces and criminal organizations. Using a Bayesian spatial estimation method, we provide a mapping of the geographic distribution of police extortion. Our findings suggest that weak state institutions in vast regions within Mexico have become captured, through corruption, by competing drug traffic organizations. Extortion prevails either because police forces have become agents of criminal organizations or because criminals can engage in racketeering without any police intervention. We conclude with a discussion of the emergence of self-defense groups as a strategy for coping with extortion; a strategy that while effective at protecting citizens,may further undermine state capacity. Details: Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper; Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/caught_in_the_crossfire_final_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/caught_in_the_crossfire_final_final.pdf Shelf Number: 141225 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Extortion Gun-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Police Corruption

Author: Magaloni, Beatriz Title: The Mexican War on Drugs: Crime and the Limits of Government Persuasion Summary: In order to successfully battle organized crime, governments require a certain degree of citizens' support. Governments are sometimes able to influence citizens' opinions, but sometimes they are not. Under what circumstances do pro-government frames influence citizens' opinions? Will individuals who are victims of crime be equally sensitive to frames than those who are not? We argue that crime victimization desensitizes citizens to pro-government frames. This further complicates governments' fights against criminals, creating a vicious circle of insecurity, distrust, and frustrated policy interventions. To test our argument, we conducted a frame experiment embedded in a nationwide survey in Mexico. The empirical evidence supports our argument in most circumstances; yet desensitization is moderated by love media-exposure and identification with the president's party. Details: Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper no. 144: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/144.Romero_Magaloni_Diazcayeros_frameeffects_v6.0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/144.Romero_Magaloni_Diazcayeros_frameeffects_v6.0.pdf Shelf Number: 141226 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: Denyer-Willis, Graham Title: Smarter Policing: Tracking the Influence of New Information Technology in Rio de Janeiro Summary: Technological advancements are changing the architecture of police-society relations around the world. New modes of oversight, whether applied by public security entities or citizens, are dramatically transforming the way policing is conducted. This is especially the case in digitally connected cities in the North and South. Surprisingly little is known, however, about how technology can be used to drive reform in police institutions including in Rio de Janeiro, where the relationships between police and residents are characterized by mistrust. A key objective of the Smart Policing project, a partnership of the Igarapé Institute and the Policia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ), is to explore ways to enhance police accountability through technology. The following Strategic Note considers how the recently installed pacification police units (Unidades de Policia Pacificadora or UPP) are using technology to recapture urban territory from drug trafficking groups while simultaneously expanding trust and reciprocity with citizens. It examines how technological innovations at the street level, including mobile phone applications, can potentially strengthen the integrity of police work and the social contract. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, 2013. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Note 10: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Smarter_Policing_ing.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Smarter_Policing_ing.pdf Shelf Number: 141323 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Information Technology Mobile Phones Police Accountability Police Effectiveness Police Technology

Author: Muggah, Robert Title: Securing the Border: Brazil's Summary: Brazil is at a crossroads in the fight against transnational organized crime. For one, Brazil is claiming a wider involvement in the international peace and security agenda and pursuing priorities overseas. At the same time, the country is adopting what might be described as a "South American first" approach to dealing with narco-trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering and cybercrime. It consists of investing in subregional institutions and discrete bilateral agreements in its near abroad. This more localized approach is contributing to the consolidation of Brazilian state institutions in its hinterland. But what direction will Brazil take in the coming decade? This Strategic Paper offers an overview of the scope and scale of organized crime in Latin America and Brazil more specifically. It critically reviews Brazil's normative and institutional responses – both regional and national – and considers likely future security postures. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, 2013. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Paper 5: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/AE-05_EN_Securing-the-border.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/AE-05_EN_Securing-the-border.pdf Shelf Number: 146410 Keywords: Arms Smuggling Border Security Cybercrime Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Macleod, Morna Title: Violencias graves en Morelos Una mirada sociocultural. (Severe violence in Morelos. A sociocultural view) Summary: In the last decade there has been an unprecedented escalation of violence in the state of Morelos, which has led him to appear as one of the most violent and insecure in Mexico. The Mexico Peace Index (IEP, 2015) places Morelos as the fifth state in terms of crimes committed by organized crime (kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking), while the Center for Research in Development (CIDAC) ) Places it in second place (CIDAC, 2015). Under this emergency, a group of researchers and students of the UAEM, has been focused on analyzing from a sociocultural angle the problem of violence in Morelos. Their contributions are an invaluable material not only to understand this frightening reality that is destroying the human, civil and small-town life of that state. (English Summary; full document in Spanish) Details: México : Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, Facultad de Estudios Superiores de Cuautla, 2016. 254p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 15, 2017 at: http://www.casede.org/BibliotecaCasede/Novedades-PDF/Violencias_Morelos_UAEM.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.casede.org/BibliotecaCasede/Novedades-PDF/Violencias_Morelos_UAEM.pdf Shelf Number: 144472 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extortion Kidnapping Organized Crime Violence Violence Crime

Author: Kronick, Dorothy Title: Prosperity and Violence in Illegal Markets Summary: Does prosperity generate violence in markets with ill-defined property rights? I consider the consequences of prosperity in drug trafficking markets in Venezuela. Using an original data set constructed from Ministry of Health records, I compare violent death trends in Venezuelan municipalities near trafficking routes to trends elsewhere, both before 1989 - when trafficking volumes were negligible - and after 1989, when heightened counter-narcotics operations in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. I find that, for thirty years prior to 1989, violent death trends and levels were nearly identical in treatment and control municipalities. After 1989, outcomes diverged: violence increased more in municipalities along trafficking routes than elsewhere. I estimate the difference-in-differences as approximately 10 violent deaths per 100,000, a magnitude similar to the overall pre-1989 violent death rate. Together with qualitative accounts, I interpret these findings as evidence in favor of the longstanding notion that, without Leviathan, prosperity creates violence. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/ProsperityViolence_2016July2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Venezuela URL: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/ProsperityViolence_2016July2.pdf Shelf Number: 144742 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Illegal Markets Murders Violence Violent Crimes

Author: Castillo, Juan Camilo Title: The Resilience of Illegal Markets Summary: Why are illegal markets so resilient? Literature on the political economy of enforcement points to weak state capacity, ineffective enforcement technology, or electoral incentives for forbearance-none of which characterize prohibition efforts such as the U.S. war on drugs. We propose instead that governments face a tradeoff between prohibition and low violence. Using a model in which policy affects dynamic interaction among traffickers, we show that reducing the supply of an illegal good can increase profits through higher prices-and higher profits drive violence among traffickers, who invest more in fighting over an increasingly valuable prize. Jailing or killing traffickers makes them short-sighted and splinters their criminal organizations-both of which increase violence. While previous models of illegal markets focus either on supply reduction or on violence, we consider both together, revealing why prohibition is self-limiting: the government achieves one enforcement goal only at the cost of another. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/DrugWarfare.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/DrugWarfare.pdf Shelf Number: 144743 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Markets Illicit Drugs Violence

Author: Raffo Lopez, Leonardo Title: Law enforcement and drug trafficking networks: a simple model Summary: This article presents a theoretical model to explain the performance of illicit drug markets. The analytical framework is based on the oligopoly model of Poret and Tejedo (2006), but the latter is extended in a crucial respect: the influence of drug trafficking networks in the illicit drug markets is considered. The proposed model indicates that Poret and Tejedo were correct: the aggregate quantity of drugs sold is negatively affected by the intensity of the law enforcement policies applied and positively affected by the number of traffickers in the market. We also determined that the individual and aggregate sales in the market are positively affected by the network's average density. Our model is useful for explaining the failure of the war against drugs to halt the reproduction and expansion of illegal activities at a global level during the three past decades. Details: Cali, Colombia: Universidad del Valle, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Economicas, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 162: Accessed April 8, 2017 at: http://lacer.lacea.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/53019/lacea2015_drug_trafficking_networks.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://lacer.lacea.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/53019/lacea2015_drug_trafficking_networks.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 144749 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Illegal Markets

Author: Espach, Ralph Title: The Dilemma of Lawlessness: Organized Crime, Violence, Prosperity, and Security along Guatemala's Borders Summary: For centuries, the Central American region has been among the world's most important transit zones. The Spanish shuttled the gold, silver, and other valuables from Southeast Asia and from South America across the Panamanian isthmus. Later, the French and the Americans competed to control and improve that route with a water canal, either in Panama or Nicaragua. Since the emergence of the United States as a major economy and consumer market, the region has been a key zone for the northward flow of all kinds of products - legal and illegal. Economically, the countries of Central America, particularly northern Central America (including Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador), have traditionally been among the most unequal in the Americas. Throughout most of these countries' histories, political power and state resources were controlled by the same families and networks that owned most of the land and industries. Relatively few resources and little state attention were dedicated to improving the lives of the poor, especially in isolated rural areas. Except during infrequent instances of insurgency, civil war, or interstate conflict, border control or even preserving a state presence in rural areas in these regions was not an important concern. In practical terms, national territorial borders were unmarked and did not exist. What is today considered smuggling was a normal, everyday practice. Many border communities had closer economic ties to cities, agricultural zones, or economic infrastructure such as railroads or ports in countries across the border than they did to those within their own country. Moreover, most of the residents of these rural areas were indigenous and largely disconnected from the country in which they lived and the government that notionally had authority over them. In this way, most border zones in these countries have traditionally been "ungoverned," or "undergoverned," in terms of their relations with the national and provincial or departmental governments. Over the decades, numerous groups have taken advantage of the porousness of these borders, and the general lawlessness of these remote areas (many of which are heavily forested and/or mountainous), to elude governments or armed forces. In addition to the ever-present smugglers, armed insurgent groups from both the left and the right, as well as paramilitaries of all stripes, crossed borders to conduct their operations during the Cold War. The most recent, and by some accounts the most dangerous, type of actors to exploit these weakly governed, porous borders in northern Central America have been narcotics trafficking networks. Illegal drugs have been smuggled from the world's foremost coca production zone - the northern Andean foothills - to the world's richest and largest drug consumption market - the United States - since at least the 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, however, an international crackdown on drug smuggling through the Caribbean region led Colombian cartels to favor overland routes through Central America and Mexico. The Colombians moved product through the region largely by buying the services of local trafficking networks. These networks were particularly well developed in Guatemala as a result of the intelligence and transport networks the military created during that country's civil war from the 1960s to the 1990s. Over time, Mexican trafficking networks grew into competitive cartels themselves and began to fight each other for control over valuable transport and smuggling routes. Mexico's largest cartels-including the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, and the Zeta-grew their operations from merely trafficking the product of others to buying the product upstream and controlling its transit in Central America. Traditionally, Colombian- or Mexican-run trafficking cartels operated in Guatemala by buying the services of local trafficking networks, but around 2008 they began to seek to control routes themselves. Many of these routes lie along the Guatemalan coast, where drugs are brought in by boat and then transferred onto land for transit into Mexico. Other routes enter from Honduras, with the drugs being flown in from Venezuela or brought in via boat. Recently, there has been evidence not only of a broad presence of Mexican drug-trafficking networks across Guatemala but also of the expansion of their operations there, particularly into drug processing. They also sell more of their product in local markets, rather than shipping it onward, fueling local gang activity and urban violence. Details: Arlington, CA: CNA; Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Shelf Number: 144948 Keywords: Border Security Criminal Cartels Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Gang-Related Violence Organized Crime Smuggling Violence Violent Crime

Author: Cengiz, Mahmut Title: Amped in Ankara: Drug trade and drug policy in Turkey from the 1950s through today Summary: KEY FINDINGS Drug trafficking in Turkey is extensive and has persisted for decades. A variety of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, synthetic cannabis (bonsai), methamphetamine, and captagon (a type of amphetamine), are seized in considerable amounts there each year. Turkey is mostly a trans-shipment and destination country. Domestic drug production is limited to cannabis, which is produced mainly for domestic consumption, and small amounts of captagon. An effective poppy cultivation licensing scheme in the 1970s ended illegal poppy cultivation and the diversion of opiates into the illegal trade. Since the 1970s, Turkish drug trafficking groups have grown in terms of their power, global reach, and market control. They are also among Europe's most powerful organized crime groups when it comes to heroin trafficking. Moreover, other international drug trafficking groups also operate in Turkey. The civil wars in Iraq and Syria have reshaped drug smuggling routes in the Middle East. Syrian drug traffickers now play a significant role in Turkey's illegal drug trade. The illegal drug trade in Turkey is a complex and multidimensional issue that poses public safety, national security, and public health threats and risks. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is strongly involved in drug trafficking and closely connected to terrorism in the region. Meanwhile, Turkish drug trafficking groups have also become involved in human smuggling, cigarette smuggling, and antiquities trafficking. Turkey's drug policy under-emphasizes treatment, prevention, and harm reduction approaches, while overemphasizing drug seizures. Tens of thousands of people have been charged with drug trafficking for possession and sale of cannabis. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS To improve its drug policies, Turkey should take a more balanced, evidence-based, comprehensive, and integrated approach. It should focus on and expand resources for reducing both demand and harm. Turkey should strengthen the capacity and independence of law enforcement and the judiciary through better laws, investigative procedures, and bolstered capacities. The government should improve anti-money laundering and anti-corruption capacities, regional counter-narcotics cooperation, border security, and the vetting of migrants and refugees in Turkey for connections to terrorism and organized crime. Details: Washington, DC: Drug Policy at Brookings, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/fp_201704_turkey_drug_policy.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Turkey URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/fp_201704_turkey_drug_policy.pdf Shelf Number: 144986 Keywords: Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Illegal Drug Trade Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Heinle, Kimberly Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2016 Summary: This report examines trends in violence and organized crime in Mexico through 2016. Over the years, this series of Justice in Mexico special reports has compiled and attempted to reconcile often imperfect, confusing, and even conflicting information from both official and non-governmental sources regarding trends in violence and organized crime, and particularly "drug-related" violence. As the eighth annual report on Drug Violence in Mexico, this study compiles the latest available data and analysis of trends to help separate the signals from the noise to help better understand the facets, implications, and possible remedies to the ongoing crisis of violence, corruption, and human rights violations associated with the war on drugs. - Mexico has experienced dramatic increases in crime and violence in recent years. The number of intentional homicides documented by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI) declined significantly under both presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox (2000-2006), but rose dramatically a year after President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) took office. All told, throughout the Calderon administration, INEGI reported 121,669 homicides, an average of over 20,000 people per year, more than 55 people per day, or just over two people every hour. No other country in the Western Hemisphere saw such a large increase either in its homicide rate or in the absolute number of homicides over the last two decades. - After a decline in 2012-2014, homicides began to rise again in 2015 and jumped 20% in 2016. Official homicide statistics from Mexico's National Security System (SNSP) registered significant decreases in 2012 (about 5%), in 2013 (about 16%), and in 2014 (about 15%), before climbing upwards again in 2015 (+7%) and 2016 (+22%). SNSP reported the number of intentional homicides at 18,650 in 2015 to 22,932 in 2016. The worsening of security conditions over the past two years has been a major setback for President Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018), who pledged to reduce violence dramatically during his administration. - In 2016, increases in cases of intentional homicide were registered in 24 states. Fueling the national increase in homicides were increases in 24 states. Notably, the largest increases were registered in Colima with a 600% increase from 2015 to 2016, Nayarit (500% increase), and Zacatecas (405% increase), all of which have an important role in drug production or trafficking and are contested by rival organized crime groups. Meanwhile, several states registered noticeable decreases, including Queretaro with a 69% decrease in intentional homicides and Campeche with a 24% decrease. - Local officials and journalists remained prime targets of violence in 2016. According to Justice in Mexico's Memoria dataset, seven current or former mayors were killed in 2016 (in comparison five mayoral candidates, two sitting mayors, and one former mayor were killed in 2015). Justice in Mexico also documented 11 journalists and media-support workers killed in 2016 in Mexico, continuing a slight downward trend from the 14 killed in 2015 and 15 killed in 2014. - Mexico's recent violence is largely attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime. What is particularly concerning about Mexico's sudden increases in homicides in recent years is that much or most of this elevated violence appears to be attributable to "organized crime" groups, particularly those involved in drug trafficking. While there are important methodological problems with compiling data on organized crime-related killings, tallies produced over the past decade by government, media, academic, NGO, and consulting organizations suggest that roughly a third to half of all homicides in Mexico bear signs of organized crime-style violence, including the use of high-caliber automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages involving organized crime groups. In 2016, there was greater disparity in the estimated number of organized crime-style killings documented by some sources (6,325 according to Reforma newspaper and 10,967 according to Milenio), but the proportion of total homicides was at least 25% and perhaps greater than 40%. - "El Chapo" Guzman's arrest and extradition appear to be partly fueling violence. The notorious kingpin leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaqu�n "El Chapo" Guzman, was arrested in early 2016. Guzman had been arrested previously in 2001, after which he escaped prison. He was then arrested in 2014, only to escape again in 2015. After the most recent arrest, demands for Guzman's extradition to the United States where he would face a 17- count indictment came to fruition. In early 2017, Guzman arrived in New York to face charges of organized crime, murder, and drug trafficking, among others. The analysis in this report suggests that a significant portion of Mexico's increases in violence in 2015 and 2016 were related to inter- and intra-organizational conflicts among rival drug traffickers in the wake of Guzman's re-arrest in 2016. - Constitutional deadline for New Criminal Justice System implementation passes. The New Criminal Justice System (NJSP) is in full effect nationwide, with the constitutional deadline for all 32 states to launch the system having passed on June 18, 2016. The justice system's overhaul from the traditional 'mixed inquisitorial' model of criminal procedure to an 'adversarial' model is significant step toward strengthening Mexico's democracy. However, many recognize that substantial further efforts will be needed to bolster the rule of law. - President Pena Nieto's approval rating hits new low amid concerns about corruption. Despite some important achievements, in 2016 President Peea Nieto (2012-2018) received the public's lowest approval rating not just for his first four years in office, but the lowest of all time for any president since Mexico began documenting approval ratings. In addition to accusations of corruption in his government and among fellow PRI politicians, Pena Nieto's unpopularity also reflects dissatisfaction with the country's recent economic and security problems, including the federal government's poor handling of the disappearance and murder of dozens of students from Ayotzinapa, Guerrero in 2014. - President Donald Trump prioritizes counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico. Drug trafficking from Mexico has become a more urgent concern in light of the mounting heroin epidemic in the United States, with the U.S. Center for Disease Control reporting that heroin-related deaths quadrupled to more than 8,200 people from 2002-2013. Initial diplomatic signals suggest that newly inaugurated U.S. President Donald Trump wants to push the Mexican government to reinvigorate its counter- narcotics efforts and also work to increase U.S. security measures along the 2,000 mile Southwest border. However, tensions between the two countries could undermine the close law enforcement and security cooperation achieved under the administrations of presidents George W. Bush (2000-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017_DrugViolenceinMexico.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017_DrugViolenceinMexico.pdf Shelf Number: 145064 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence (Mexico) Drugs and Crime Homicides Organized Crime Violent Crime

Author: Associacion Civil Paz Activa Title: 2 - Informe del Observatorio de delito organizado en Venezuela (The increase in Organized Crime is a threat to democracy Summary: Venezuelans perceive that the state security forces, instead of fighting, favor the existence and operation of Organized Crime. Sixty-six percent of the interviewees considered that it was the police and the military who sold arms to Organized Crime. The three most common activities at the national level are: drug trafficking, product smuggling and theft and sale of vehicles and spare parts. On average, about one in 3 respondents who said that drug trafficking is "very present" in the country, one interviewee said that they are "not present". The Organized Crime Observatory and the Social Sciences Laboratory (LACSO) are pleased to present the II report of the Organized Crime Observatory, based on the "Results of the 2nd Organized Crime Survey in Venezuela", a study carried out in 7 regions Of the national territory in the period of July and August of this year 2015. Beyond the mere disclosure of the results of our research, we consider it extremely important to inform the citizen in some way about the nature of these crimes and how not to be part of them or victims of these in particular. As reflected in the pages of this publication, more than half of Venezuelans believe that the increase in Organized Crime is a threat to democracy, and even more so in this time where we perceive their presence in much of our daily lives. Here are some relevant results of this study: The three most common activities at the national level are: drug trafficking, product smuggling, theft and sale of vehicles and spare parts. Gangs, mafias and bands, along with pranes and armed groups, are the groups that are considered to be the cause of Organized Crime. For every 3 people who reported that the activity of gangs, mafias and gangs are responsible for Organized Crime, 1 person said otherwise. Sixty-six percent of the interviewees considered that it was the police and the military who sold arms to Organized Crime. More than half of the interviewees expressed fear of the complaint and cooperated with the police and the judicial system. Half of those surveyed nationwide in the past 12 months have been the victims of robbery or theft. Sixty-four percent of respondents felt that it was easy or very easy to get drugs in their community. This perception has increased little between 2013 and 2015 by 3 percentage points. The interviewees consider that personal insecurity has worsened in the country in the last twelve months. This is perceived by 76% of the respondents. The actors identified as responsible for Organized Crime were gangs, mafias and gangs, prisons in the prisons and groups. There was little attribution to the paramilitaries and guerrillas. An important majority of the population considered that the military had been corrupted by drug trafficking. The population considers that organized crime should be combated with the application of the law and not negotiate with criminals or zones of peace. The vast majority of the population, throughout the country and all social or political sectors, believes that the increase in Organized Crime is a threat to democracy. English Summary Details: Caracas: Asociacion Civil Paz Activa, Observatorio de delito organizado. 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2017 at: http://observatoriodot.org.ve/cms/images/documentos/ODO_2do_informe_web_v11_carta.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Venezuela URL: http://observatoriodot.org.ve/cms/images/documentos/ODO_2do_informe_web_v11_carta.pdf Shelf Number: 145156 Keywords: Automobile Theft Citizen Security Drug Trafficking Gangs Organized Crime Smuggling

Author: Loi, Valerio Title: Tendencies in World Imprisonment for Drug Related Crime Summary: The latest estimates on the world prison population indicate that 10.35 million people are incarcerated worldwide, according to calculations presented in February 2016. The assertion this figure can be correlated to the effects and outcomes of the global drug prohibition regime is the starting point of this chapter, which will try to give an overview of to what extent the use of criminal law has contributed to this figure on a global scale. Drug control policies with a strong emphasis on criminal law became a global reality particularly after the adoption of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychoactive Substances, which requires countries to suppress the illicit production, supply and consumption of drugs through criminal law. As an indirect result, it can be one of the main causes of imprisonments worldwide, as many countries have adopted legislation with prison sentences for all drugs related offences after signing this treaty. This emphasis on criminal law to deal with the drugs market has provoked thirty three countries to prescribe the death penalty for drug offences. And last but certainly not least, hundreds of thousands of people are locked up without any trial for lengthy periods of time in the name of drug treatment. The 2014 UNODC "World crime trends and emerging issues and responses in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice", of April 2014, shows the global trend on drug offences remains on the increase: drug trafficking grew by 11%, while offences related to drug possession increased over 18%, in the period 2003-2012. It is of high relevance to stress that most legislations do not distinguish between possessions of and traffic in drugs, possibly altering these figures even more towards the latter. Although exact figures lack, the 2014 World Drug Report indicates that, "worldwide, the large majority of drug use offences are associated with cannabis"; an indication that a large share of penal prosecutions globally is geared towards the cannabis market. Meanwhile, policy debates in different parts of the world reflect certain recognition of both the ineffectiveness of the current penal focus, especially for non-violent offences, such as possession for personal use and use, but sometimes including small scale traffic; and the degree of injustice being done to certain vulnerable population groups, such as single mothers, and people imprisoned abroad. This has lead in some countries to legislative reform and changing practice in the criminal justice system. Questioning the exclusive penal model is no longer taboo, and the need to restore the balance between punishment and care is long overdue. The following chapter will basically focus on the impact of the present drug laws enforcement in the world's prison systems. It won't be a mere recount of the share of detainees for drug crimes within the overall inmates' population, as far as data for that is available, according to geographical macro-regions. While assessing the main trends, we want to highlight the challenges and possible reform proposals of the present prison systems. Details: El Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2017 at: http://www.drogasyderecho.org/pses/restoi.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.drogasyderecho.org/pses/restoi.pdf Shelf Number: 145234 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Imprisonment Prison Population Prisoners

Author: Fuentes, Johanan Rivera Title: Crime Hype in Mexico: A fierce battle for attention Summary: The way media covers drug-related violence in Mexico generates more violence because it responds to the publicity-seeking behavior of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). My analysis shows that excessive media coverage in violent states translates into more narcomantas and that high numbers of narcomantas are positively and strongly correlated with high levels of violence. The incentive for DTOs to 'publish' a narcomanta in response to media coverage in violent states is three times larger than in states with average violence. My projections show that in extremely violent states a shock in coverage generates an average increase of 1.6 narcomantas during the following week. DTOs use media attention to build reputation and increase the perception of insecurity. The way media covers violence in Mexico is generating feelings of fear and danger in the population. The 2011 Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico shows that common offenses such as house robberies and street assaults have not changed much since the early 2000s. However, insecurity perception has increased to the point that, today, over 80 percent of the population is afraid of being victims of these crimes. Fear and insecurity perception can make the population an easy target for extortion, local authorities an easy target for corruption and hinder reporting. The situation is now at a point where action is needed. The best method for promoting a more responsible behavior while protecting media freedom is self-regulation since it originates from a multi-stakeholder open discussion on editorial guidelines and accountability mechanisms. I recommend the following next steps should be taken in the next six months to build a strong self-regulatory media environment: - Create a code of editorial guidelines to reporting on publicity-seeking crimes. Each code of ethics responds to the peculiarities of the media and its context, hence it can be tailored to the sensitivities of the Mexican society and democracy. - Institute a self-regulatory body that oversees completion of the code and has a complaint system open to the public. These bodies can have different forms such as ombudsmen, press councils, editorial committees, etc. - Introduce training programs for journalists. Good reporting on publicity-seeking crimes requires a lengthier and more thoughtful narrative. Additionally, journalists reporting on violence and conflict should know how to assess risks in threatening environments and be trained in digital as well as physical security. - Design a campaign to raise awareness among the population. Raising awareness is about creating civic engagement. Without civil engagement self-regulation compliance becomes almost impossible. Setting up a self-regulatory system will prevent the media from furthering DTOs objectives. This will help raise professional standards, strengthen the social standing of journalism in the country while increasing the quality of information people receive and reducing publicity-seeking violence. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2013. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2017 at: http://ksghauser.harvard.edu/index.php/content/download/66767/1239878/version/1/file/SYPA_JohananRivera_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://ksghauser.harvard.edu/index.php/content/download/66767/1239878/version/1/file/SYPA_JohananRivera_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 145247 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Fear of Crime Homicides Kidnappings Media and Crime Publicity Violent Crime

Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: Toward Effective Violence Mitigation: Transforming Political Settlements Summary: Recognising the centrality of violence in the development process (though not subscribing to the notion that conflict and violence are development in reverse), in 2012-14 a group of researchers at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) engaged in depth with the complex and thorny questions of how 'new' forms of violence in the developing world - as opposed to 'traditional' civil or intra-state war - should be understood; and through which policies they could best be prevented and/or mitigated. The result of this endeavour is a series of evidence-based reports that were produced in collaboration with Southern partners in a sample of four violence-affected countries in Africa: Nigeria (Niger Delta), Sierra Leone, Egypt and Kenya (Marsabit County). The evidence from the four case studies suggests that - contrary to the early post-Cold War accounts of 'barbarism' and 'senseless bloodshed' - the violence we observe in many countries and locales today is about something. Yet, the analyses also show that the triggers, manifestations and effects of this violence - characterised as diffuse, recursive and globalised - cannot be captured by using the analytical tools developed to explain armed conflict within states. Strictly speaking, it would be misguided to label the violence in the Niger Delta, Marsabit County, Egypt and Sierra Leone as 'civil war', 'internal armed conflict' or 'new war'. Instead, it is more accurate to speak of highly heterogeneous situations of violence or 'fields of social violence'. At the same time, it is crucial not to dissociate these situations of violence from political processes by, for instance, reducing them to manifestations of criminality, such as homicide and illicit drug trafficking, or reflections of social problems like rampant youth unemployment, the use of prohibited psychoactive substances, and gang culture. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute Of Development Studies, 2014, 35p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Evidence Report 101: Accessed May 6, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5367/ER101TowardEffectiveViolenceMitigationTransformingPoliticalSettlements.pdf;jsessionid=BE35B3DE96D5A63C6C020B53BA376257?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5367/ER101TowardEffectiveViolenceMitigationTransformingPoliticalSettlements.pdf;jsessionid=BE35B3DE96D5A63C6C020B53BA376257?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145345 Keywords: Conflict-Related Violence Drug Trafficking Gang-Related Violence Homicides Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime

Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Colombia's Changing Approach to Drug Policy Summary: Colombia is one of the largest producers of cocaine globally, and it also produces heroin bound for the United States. Counter-narcotics policy has long been a key component of the U.S.- Colombian relationship, which some analysts have described as "driven by drugs." Now, Colombia is changing its approach to counter-narcotics policy, which may have implications for the U.S.-Colombian relationship. U.S. concerns about illicit drug production and trafficking in Colombia arose in the 1970s but grew significantly when Colombia became the dominant producer of cocaine in the Andean region in the mid-to-late 1990s. The United States has worked closely with Colombia to eradicate drug crops and combat trafficking. Simultaneously, over the past 17 years, the United States has forged a partnership with Colombia - perhaps its closest bilateral relationship in Latin America - centered on helping Colombia recover its stability following a decades-long internal conflict with insurgencies of left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries, whose longevity has been attributed, in part, to their role in the country's illicit drug trade. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion of bilateral foreign assistance to support a Colombian-written strategy known as Plan Colombia and its successor programs. In addition to counter-narcotics, the United States helped support security and development programs designed to stabilize Colombia's security situation and strengthen its democracy. A peace accord between the government of Colombia and the country's main leftist insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was signed in late November 2016 after four years of formal peace talks. The Colombian Congress unanimously ratified the peace accord, which had been revised following the narrow rejection of an earlier accord in a national referendum in October 2016. The final peace agreement addresses important issues, such as illicit crop cultivation - a major source of FARC income-and rural development. According to President Juan Manuel Santos, the peace accord will draw former FARC members into efforts to counter illicit drug production and trafficking. In 2017, as Colombia begins to implement the final peace accord and demobilize the FARC, the country is facing a large increase in cocaine production. During the protracted peace negotiations with the FARC, the Colombian government altered its approach to drug policy. A major change was the decision to end aerial spraying to eradicate coca crops, which had been a central - albeit controversial - feature of U.S.-Colombian counter-drug cooperation for more than two decades. In addition, Colombia's counter-narcotics policies shifted in 2015 to a public health approach under President Santos. The shift was influenced by broader hemispheric trends to reform traditional anti-drug practices in ways that proponents claim can reduce human rights violations. On the supply side, Colombia's new drug policy gives significant attention to expanding alternative development and licit crop substitution while intensifying interdiction efforts. The revised drug policy approach promotes drug-use prevention and treatment for drug users. According to Colombian officials, the public health and prevention dimensions of the revised strategy will be led by Colombia's Health Ministry, in coordination with other agencies. This report examines how Colombia's drug policies have evolved in light of Colombia's peace agreement with the FARC and its changing counter-narcotics policy. It explores both policy and oversight concerns, such as - prospects for reducing coca and poppy cultivation under Colombia's new drug policy and the peace accord with the FARC; - the role of Colombian drug trafficking organizations, including powerful criminal groups containing former paramilitaries, in a post-peace accord environment; - U.S.-Colombian cooperation on counter-narcotics and Colombia's future role in regional anti-drug efforts; and - shifts in U.S. government assistance to support Colombia's revised drug policy and how Colombia's new policy converges with traditional U.S. priorities. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: R44779: Accessed May 8, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44779.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Colombia URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44779.pdf Shelf Number: 145353 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Control Policy Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs

Author: European Commission. Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs Title: Mid-term assessment of the EU drugs strategy 2013-2020 and final evaluation of the action plan on drugs 2013-2016 Summary: This evaluation assesses the degree of implementation of the EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 and the Action Plan 2013-2016 in terms of outputs and, to the extent possible, impacts. It looks at the extent to which the objectives of the EU Drugs Strategy have been achieved, highlighting the areas where progress has been made and those where progress is lagging. In addition, the evaluation aims to provide evidence to support the Commission's decision about whether to propose a new Action Plan for the period 2017-2020, and if so, what changes would be needed compared to the current plan. In accordance with the Better Regulation guidelines, the evaluation addresses 13 research questions that relate to the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and coherence of the EU Drugs Strategy and the Action Plan as well as their EU added value. The evaluation addresses all parts of the Strategy; the two policy areas (or 'pillars') of drug demand and drug supply reduction, and the three cross-cutting themes of coordination, international cooperation, and information, research, monitoring and evaluation. This summary describes how the data were collected for the evaluation (and the limitations to those data), sets out the main findings in relation to each of the 13 research questions and presents some cross-cutting conclusions which highlight key messages from across the evaluation criteria. Lastly, it lists the 20 recommendations made by the evaluation Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016. 280p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 11, 2017 at: https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/search/Filter?SearchParameter=%26%40QueryTerm%3D*%26Author%3DEmilie%2BBalbirnie Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/search/Filter?SearchParameter=%26%40QueryTerm%3D*%26Author%3DEmilie%2BBalbirnie Shelf Number: 145413 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Trafficking

Author: Aziani, Alberto Title: Shrinking businesses and expanding graveyards: how fluctuations in the value of cocaine markets influence the recourse to lethal violence Summary: Many scholars have investigated the escalation of violence associated with drug trafficking. Despite the plethora of literature, limited attention has been paid to the consequences of fluctuations in the value of markets. This study addresses this lacuna in extant research by proposing an original estimate of the gross value added of cocaine markets in 151 countries between the period 1998-2013, taking into consideration both national and international dimensions of cocaine trafficking through recourse to a flow/network approach. In conjunction with this, the fluctuation of the gross value added of the cocaine market is examined in terms of an etiological factor in the upsurge of interpersonal lethal violence. The analysis demonstrates how expansions and contractions of the gross value added in cocaine markets are significant determinants of the level of violence within the respective countries that constitute the global cocaine network. Finally, through mobilising innovative methods for estimating drug law enforcement actions, the study problematizes extant methods for disrupting drug trafficking on the basis that they may, paradoxically, engender cycles of violence. Details: Milan: UNIVERSITA CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE, 2016. 287p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: https://tesionline.unicatt.it/bitstream/10280/17473/1/Alberto%20Aziani%20_%20PhD%20Thesis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://tesionline.unicatt.it/bitstream/10280/17473/1/Alberto%20Aziani%20_%20PhD%20Thesis.pdf Shelf Number: 145472 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Economics of Crime

Author: Luong, Hai Thanh Title: Transnational Narcotics Trafficking and Law Enforcement: A Vietnam Perspective Summary: Close proximity to the major production zones, porous borderlands, mountainous frontiers and long coastlines offer advantageous conditions for trafficking narcotics. The illicit drug situation has become much more complex in Vietnam with the growth in amphetaminetype stimulants production and trade. Even so, empirical research and analysis of the organization and operation of transnational narcotics trafficking (TransNT) remains limited. The purpose of this thesis is to present the first detailed inquiry into the nature of TransNT across the border between Lao PDR and Vietnam using an exploratory approach which draws upon qualitative and quantitative methods. In particular, the thesis presents findings from case studies of cross-border trafficking between Vietnam and Lao PDR in the period of 2003-2013 combined with interview and survey data from criminal investigation police and drug-related crimes officers (CIPDRC) from six border provinces who are directly and indirectly involved in investigating these cases. The findings of this study indicate that drug markets in Vietnam are not controlled by monopolistic, hierarchical organizations or 'cartels'. The structures of TransNT entities operating across the Lao-Vietnam border are small, based on family ties and fellow-countrymen relations, are fluid and loosely organized. They are very adaptable and sophisticated with diverse modus operandi and multiple divisions of labour. This presents particular challenges to law enforcement agencies (LAEs). This thesis questions to capacity of Vietnam's police to enforce the government's zero-tolerance anti-narcotics policy. The study highlights practical problems and specific barriers in combating TransNT. LEAs in Vietnam and Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) operate without effective mechanisms to cooperate and share information. It is also the case that traffickers often have more sophisticated equipment at their disposal to help them avoid arrest. Police forces work within national structures and yet are faced with the task of combatting transnational crime. This reality affects law enforcement capacity at a national as well as regional level, but Association of the Southeast Asian Nations member states have yet to establish effective structures for dealing with this non-traditional security challenge. Based on these findings, therefore, the thesis proposes recommendations to enhancing the effectiveness of LEAs in dealing with TransNT across Vietnam's border with Lao PDR. Details: Melbourne, AUS: School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, College of Design and Social Context, RMIT University, 2017. 417p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 16, 2017 at: https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:162002/Luong.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Vietnam URL: https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:162002/Luong.pdf Shelf Number: 145478 Keywords: Border Security Drug Enforcement Drug markets Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs

Author: Ameripol Title: Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking: Police Point of View: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru Summary: A new study from the Americas regional police association Ameripol explores the shifting dynamics of the global drug trade, as new trafficking routes and criminal networks emerge to meet the demands of evolving consumer markets. The report (pdf), entitled "Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking - A Police Perspective," is a collaboration between the American Police Community (Ameripol), an association of police from around the region, and the European Union (EU), focusing on the drug trade in the three main coca production countries -- Peru, Colombia and Bolivia -- as well as key transit countries. One of the most notable aspects of the report is its plotting of the rise of new trafficking routes to meet the needs of ever changing drug consumer markets around the globe. Most of these rely on maritime transport, which the report classifies as "the biggest drug trafficking threat." Many of these routes now run through Brazil, which is now the world's second largest consumer of cocaine and a key transit point for shipments destined for Europe. The report examines both the traditional and developing trafficking routes that take cocaine from production countries to the cities of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and the northeast of the country, where it is processed, then either sold locally or exported. At the heart of many of the routes sits Manaus, the capital of Amazonas state and a critical thoroughfare for drugs arriving from Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. The report highlights the cross-pollination of illegal activities in the Amazon region, noting that pilots involved in drug flights are also often involved in the illegal mining that blights the region. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Ameripol, 2013. Source: Internet Resource: Available at the Rutgers Criminal Justice Library. Year: 2013 Country: South America URL: Shelf Number: 131271 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Illegal Mining

Author: Couch, Neil Title: 'Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse'. Reality or Exaggeration? Summary: More than 55,000 people have been killed in Mexico's vicious drug wars between 2006 and 2011. The Pentagon's Joint Operating Environment Paper 2008 speculated that the country was one of two major states at risk of rapid and sudden collapse. This paper investigates the potential causes of state failure and the extent to which these are present in Mexico today as a result of corruption and violent, lucrative organised crime. It explains the mutual dependency between the two and shows how deeply entrenched and extensive their power and influence have become at all levels of government and in key state institutions. It examines progress in the National Security Strategy and the impact of crime and corruption on key strategic measures of success. It concludes that the Pentagon's failure to understand the nature of the conflict led to a gross overstatement of the risk to the country. It also demonstrates, however, that crime and corruption threaten the transitional democracy that has emerged in Mexico since the turn of the century. Finally, it raises questions regarding the reliability and general applicability of some theories of state failure, state legitimacy and civil-military relations. Details: London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2012. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Seaford House Paper: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/mexico-in-danger-of-rapid-collapse-reality-or-exaggeration-14620 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/mexico-in-danger-of-rapid-collapse-reality-or-exaggeration-14620 Shelf Number: 131268 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Wars Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Political Corruption

Author: Levi, Michael Title: Drug Law Enforcement and Financial Investigation Strategies Summary: Since the 1980s, there has been a major push in rhetoric and institution-building, emphasizing the centrality of attacking the financial lifeblood of drug trafficking networks and organised economic crimes. Much progress has been made in legislation and the creation of financial intelligence units. However, there are volumes of commentary and legal analysis, but almost nowhere in the world is there any systematic analysis of law enforcement or criminal justice inputs or outputs, let alone of outcomes in terms of reduced crimes of any kind or reduced harms arising from the 'organised' nature of crime. Much depends on how plausible it is that the sources of funds can be represented as being licit when saving or investing: but a global, well-advertised set of financial intermediaries exist upon whom to experiment, and expectations of being reported following failed attempts may be quite low. Judging from the continued involvement of major banks in negligently or actively facilitating a variety of suspected illicit activities, and the relative impunity of institutions that are 'too big to be prosecuted', normal risk perceptions of relevant parts of financial institutions are not nearly high enough to deter all serious noncompliance to AML regulation, though without increasing perceived and/or actual detection risks and reducing elapsed time to action, raising sanctions alone may not work. This report makes no claim to be offering a certain route to success, but is offering an overview of some better and some false steps that have been undertaken in the field of drug law enforcement and financial investigation strategies. Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Modernising Drug Law Enforcement Report 5: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://www.tni.org/files/MDLE-5-drug-law-enforcement-financial-investigation-strategies_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.tni.org/files/MDLE-5-drug-law-enforcement-financial-investigation-strategies_0.pdf Shelf Number: 131377 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Drug Reform Drug Trafficking Financial Investigations Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Collodi, Jason Title: External stresses in West Africa: Cross-border Violence and Cocaine Trafficking Summary: The 2011 World Development Report on conflict, security and development highlights the centrality of 'external stresses' for generating insecurity and increasing the risk of violence in fragile areas. West African states are particularly vulnerable, with serious concerns around cross-border violence and illicit drug-trafficking. Policy responses need to: tackle the region's recent legacy of conflict and violent upheaval; address weak governance and entrenched corruption; improve regional cooperation; and support border and outlying communities that have been marginalised by insecurity, poverty and unemployment. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Policy Briefing 60: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3858/External%20Stresses%20in%20West%20Africa%20cross-border%20violence%20and%20cocaine%20trafficking.pdf;jsessionid=706100FE21470352417E0571F8249D73?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3858/External%20Stresses%20in%20West%20Africa%20cross-border%20violence%20and%20cocaine%20trafficking.pdf;jsessionid=706100FE21470352417E0571F8249D73?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145950 Keywords: Cocaine Conflict-Related Violence Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Violence

Author: Aning, Kwesi Title: Getting Smart and Scaling Up: The Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries. A Case Study of Ghana Summary: his case study presents findings of field research on the impact of organized crime on governance and development in Ghana. The objective is not to paint a negative picture of Ghana, but rather to highlight core structural weaknesses that enable organized crime to flourish largely uncontested, placing significant, albeit not immediately obvious, pressure on the democratic and development gains made over the past two decades. The case study is divided into five sections. Section I begins with an overview of the political context in Ghana, with specific reference to the emergence of democratic politics and the nature of the political economy in the post-independence era. It reviews trends in Ghana's economic development and governance since 1992, and examines the nature of formal and informal institutions and prevalent norms of behaviour. Section II examines the nature and scope of organized crime in Ghana, namely drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal mining, electronic waste dumping, cybercrime, human trafficking, and small arms trafficking and manufacturing. Section III focuses on the impact of organized crime on governance and development, while Section IV suggests some initial recommendations. Details: New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/getting-smart-and-scaling-up-the-impact-of-organized-crime-on-governance-in-developing-countries-a-case-study-of-ghana Year: 2013 Country: Ghana URL: https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/getting-smart-and-scaling-up-the-impact-of-organized-crime-on-governance-in-developing-countries-a-case-study-of-ghana Shelf Number: 146138 Keywords: Cybercrime Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Illegal Mining Organized Crime

Author: Reitano, Tuesday Title: Libya: The Politics of Power, Protection, Identity and illicit Trade Summary: Post-Revolution Libya has fractured into a volatile plethora of political ecosystems and protection economies, in which access to resources has become critical to survival. The struggle for control over illicit flows has shaped Libya's civil conflict and remains a decisive centrifugal force, actively preventing central state consolidation. Illicit flows exposed the deep fissures within Libyan society, divisions that the Gaddafi regime had controlled through a combination of force and the manipulation of economic interests in both the legitimate and illicit economy. The impact of illicit flows, however, has been different in different parts of the country: in a perverse resource triangle, coastal groups, while linked to the illicit economy (particularly through the control of ports and airports), have been paid by the state, while also relying on external financial support in a proxy war between competing interests centered in the Gulf. In the southern borderlands of the country, by contrast, control of trafficking, and the capture of the country's oil resources, have been key drivers in strengthening conflict protagonists. For some of the minority players in Libya's patchwork state, control over illicit resources became a way to bargain for attention in the transition. The gradual erosion of the legitimate economy following six years of protracted conflict and political stalemate has resulted in a status quo where the size and dynamism of illicit markets for fuel, human smuggling and subsidised goods far outweighs legitimate alternatives for several groups, thereby building the legitimacy of criminal actors over formal institutions. While the focus of much of the coverage of the external reporting of the Libyan conflict is on the divide between east and west, putting a spotlight on illicit trafficking also highlights the disparities between the coast and the interior. Unless the illicit economy, and the priorities of those who control it, are addressed holistically as part of the political transition, the possibilities for a peaceful settlement remain remote and the viability of the central state questionable. There are now no easy policy options. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime-Conflict Nexus Series: No 3: Accessed June 16, 2017 at: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2523/Libya-The-Politics-of-Power-Protection-Identity-and-Illicit-Trade-02.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Libya URL: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2523/Libya-The-Politics-of-Power-Protection-Identity-and-Illicit-Trade-02.pdf Shelf Number: 146193 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Markets Illicit Trade Organized Crime

Author: Arbid, Jeremy Title: Captured by Captagon? Lebanon's evolving illicit drug economy Summary: Lebanon has a long history of drug cultivation and trafficking, which predated the civil war, and has long been attributed with resourcing conflict protagonists thereby prolonging it. By the end of the war in 1990, Lebanon was home to a multi-billion drug economy which was firmly entrenched both into local and central politics and power. The Bekaa valley, which assumed prominence as a drug producing hotspot during the conflict, has retained its reputation as a source of opium and hashish production. Estimating the exact size of the country's current drug trade is difficult given the paucity of reliable figures, although its assumed to have reduced since the war. There is however a worrying new trend: the growth of the illicit economy around the drug Captagon - a global illicit industry worth an estimated US $ 1 billion a year. Captagon is an amphetamine and popular party pill widely used throughout the Gulf countries. Profit margins of Captagon are astonishingly high: a single pill can be produced for a few cents with easy to access precursor chemicals, but currently retails at up to US$20 in the Gulf. Evidence presented in an earlier Global Initiative report, "The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Conflict in Syria and the Wider Region" suggests that the trade in Captagon is burgeoning, with much of the production in Syria and its neighbouring countries. and profits from the drug trade once again fuelling conflict actors. This paper explores the evolution of Lebanon's drug trade, and in particular the production and trafficking of Captagon. Major seizures were made in Lebanon in 2014 in particular, but the subsequent steady decline in seizures suggests, that smuggling groups have adapted to law enforcement interventions rather than increased efficacy of enforcement. Given the litany of other challenges faced by the Lebanese government, curbing the illegal trade in drugs is not a priority. Lebanon's military is focussed on more significant cross-border threats and terrorist violence, and the police force is understaffed, underfunded and under equipped. A central directorate for drug control within the Ministry of Interior exists only on paper. Lebanon's own Finance Minister has suggested that weeding out corrupt personnel at Beirut's airport is a more urgent need to combat smuggling than to reinforce capacity or introduce new technologies aimed at curbing these illicit practices. Legal and institutional frameworks are inadequate and international support in the area of organised crime and drug trafficking is small. Tracking the money flow is next to impossible, but various patterns for laundering money in Lebanon are clearly apparent: from Halawa cash transfer networks, to smuggled telephones, to a real estate sector where cash-based transactions are still common. Drug use, addiction prevalence and rehabilitation statistics in Lebanon are nearly non-existent, as is the amount the state dedicates to the war on drugs that officials involved insist they are waging. Lacking reliable data, drawing detailed recommendations is difficult, but what is clear is that Lebanon needs more of everything (funding, manpower, strategy, rehabilitation facilities) if it ever wants to genuinely address its growing drug problem. A lack of resources continues to bedevil attempts at border control and law enforcement. The international community and the Lebanese themselves may rue this lack of attention in future. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 16, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/lebanon-drug-report_24.05.17_low.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Lebanon URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/lebanon-drug-report_24.05.17_low.pdf Shelf Number: 147632 Keywords: Amphetamines Drug Cultivation Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Illicit Drugs Organized Crime

Author: Silva Avalos, Hector Title: Corruption in El Salvador: Politians, Police, and Transportistas Summary: Corruption and the infiltration of public institutions in Central America by organized crime groups is an unaddressed issue that lies at the core of the increasing violence and democratic instability that has afflicted the region in the last decade. In El Salvador, infiltration has mutated into a system capable of determining important political and strategic decisions, such as the election of high-level judicial officials and the shaping of the state approach to fighting crime. This paper addresses corruption in El Salvador's National Civil Police (PNC), the law enforcement agency created under the auspices of the 1992 Peace Accord that ended the country's 12-year civil war. Archival and field research presented here demonstrates that the PNC has been plagued by its own "original sin": the inclusion of former soldiers that worked with criminal groups and preserved a closed power structure that prevented any authority from investigating them for over two decades. This original sin has allowed criminal bands formed in the 1980s as weapon or drug smugglers to forge connections with the PNC and to develop into sophisticated drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). These new DTOs are now involved in money laundering, have secured pacts with major criminal players in the region - such as Mexican and Colombian cartels - and have learned how to use the formal economy and financial system. These "entrepreneurs" of crime, long tolerated and nurtured by law enforcement officials and politicians in El Salvador, are now major regional players themselves. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, American University, 2014. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: CLALS Working Paper Series, No. 4: Accessed June 26, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2419174 Year: 2014 Country: El Salvador URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2419174 Shelf Number: 146382 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Police Corruption Political Corruption

Author: Galemba, Rebecca B. Title: Cultures of Contraband: Contesting Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala Border Summary: Driving from Frontera Comalapa, Chiapas, Mexico to the communities on the Mexico-Guatemala border where I planned to live and conduct fieldwork from September 2006- September 2007, I drove through several rural farms, towns, and winding roads. Upon reaching the Pan-American Highway is a makeshift police station, a small concrete building labeled, PFP (Policia Federal Preventiva, or Federal Preventative Police). Outside a police car was stationed as traffic whizzed by. Shortly before entering the border communities, there is also a military base. The Mexican government installed this base in the late 1990s during the Zapatista conflict to monitor resistance, despite the fact that the Zapatistas had little presence in the Comalapa region. The military currently uses the base to erect road blockades to inspect for contraband, illegal migrants, illicit drugs, and illegal firearms. There were almost always blockades on Fridays so that soldiers could inspect vehicles returning from market day at the official border crossing at La Mesilla, Guatemala and Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, Mexico. I had originally intended to conduct research at the Mexico-Guatemala border to study the contrasts between policies that simultaneously advocated an "open" border for free trade and a militarized border to comply with Washington's security demands to stem the northward flow of illicit drugs, crime, and undocumented migrants (Benitez Manaut 2003; Pickard, CIEPAC 2007). Despite the increased presence of the Mexican military and police forces2 in the region, border residents agreed that since the late 1990s they experienced less official border surveillance. Instead, residents allude to a booming industry of cross-border contraband in everyday goods, as well as undocumented migrants, arms, and drugs. I realized that my original interest in undocumented migration formed part of a larger picture of historical and cross-border flows of people, goods, and information. Studying border flows from the ground-up revealed a border region that was not just simultaneously "open" to goods and "closed" to people as I had anticipated, but full of various contingent and conflicting openings and enclosures. When I interviewed a Mexican customs inspector at Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, he lamented, "In this region illegality governs. It is what distinguishes this region [from other customs inspections posts]." This inspector had worked in multiple customs ports throughout Mexico, but seemed to resign and adapt himself to this aspect of "illegality," referring to it as part of the "regional culture." Despite stricter laws and Mexico's modernization of the official border crossing and customs inspections in the late 1990s, he told me that most commerce in the region occurred in clandestine crossings. This dissertation examines the multiple meanings of illegality and how notions of illegality permeate, and at times govern, social, political, and economic life at the Mexico-Guatemala border. A 2006 article in El Financiero, labeled the Mexico-Guatemala border "a paradise for contraband...[stating that] the problem, which is little spoken about, is that illegality dominates everything at the border." By focusing on the residents of a clandestine border pathway on the Mexico-Guatemala border, I problematize the concept of "illegality," arguing that the social and economic relations engendered by illegal practices often generate new forms of law, economy, and moral norms. While legal and illegal practices may blur in everyday interactions (Nordstrom 2007), I examine how residents distinguish and organize the heterogeneity of these practices in order to situate illegality within the larger political and moral economy. By examining the daily relations between border residents, state and federal agents, farmers, formal-sector companies, and smugglers, I illustrate how illegality produces and reconstitutes gendered, ethnic, and class inflected subjectivities. Details: Providence, RI: Brown University, 2009. 364p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Shelf Number: 130138 Keywords: Border Security Contraband Drug Trafficking Illegal Firearms Illegal Migrants Illicit Drugs Trafficking in Firearms

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Anti-Money Laundering: U.S. Efforts to Combat Narcotics-Related Money Laundering in the Western Hemisphere Summary: Proceeds from narcotics-related illicit activities are one of the most common sources of money laundering in the United States. Though difficult to accurately determine, in 2015, Treasury estimated that drug trafficking generated about $64 billion annually from U.S. sales. Moreover, the Western Hemisphere accounts for about a third of the jurisdictions designated by State as of primary concern for money laundering. GAO was asked to provide information on U.S. efforts to impede illicit proceeds from drug trafficking from entering the financial systems of the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries. This report describes (1) U.S. agency oversight and monitoring of compliance with the BSA, including collaboration with counterparts in other Western Hemisphere countries, and (2) State's and Treasury's efforts to build capacity in other Western Hemisphere countries to combat narcotics-related money laundering. GAO reviewed laws and regulations; interviewed experts and U.S. officials; reviewed documents and examined State's and Treasury's budget data for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the most recent at the time of the review, for anti-money laundering activities. GAO selected Colombia, Mexico, and Panama - three principal recipients of AML support - for site visits, in part, because each country was designated a major drug transit or illicit drug-producing country from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-684: Accessed September 11, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686727.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686727.pdf Shelf Number: 147217 Keywords: Anti-Money Laundering Drug Trafficking Financial Crime Money Laundering Proceeds of Crime

Author: Gastelum Felix, Siria Title: Resilience in Sinaloa: Community Responses to Organized Crime Summary: The term resilience has started to sound like a cliche. The concept has become a popular buzzword in development discourses over the last decade, but in the international global policy fora, resilience remains a loosely defined conceptual approach. The empirical ambiguity of the concept, its incipient implementation as well as its rising popularity can make resilience susceptible to becoming another empty rhetorical promise in development brochures. However, the resilience approach to development has the potential to show us new modes of learning about the ways we organize ourselves into more effective networks to achieve common goals and overcome disruptions. This report is the first of a series of evidence-based research in Sinaloa, Mexico on community resilience and organized crime supported by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI) as part of the #GIresilience Project. The Resilience Series, as it is formally known seek to provide substantial knowledge and data on building community resilience in the context of organized crime to the ongoing multi-stakeholder dialogue in the international global development policy fora. Drug wars, illicit economies, and weak governance have marred Sinaloa for decades, along with countless failed security policies. In the last thirty years, the state became the base of one of the largest transnational drug-trafficking networks in the world: the Sinaloa Cartel. As the power of the Sinaloa DTO increased, the influence of organized crime became prominent in citizen's daily lives. The Sinaloa Federation became a separate power structure effectively challenging and overpowering legitimate state institutions. Against this tumultuous background, extraordinary civic responses to the effects of organized crime have been taking place at the community level. These responses are effectively non-violent and demonstrate great capacities of resilience at the grassroots where violence and violations are intensified. Our intention is to bring these perspectives and resilient actors into the global policy dialogue on organized crime and development, to discuss alternatives to the traditional security-driven responses. The ultimate aim of the #GIresilience Project is to create a global network of resilient communities to counter and mitigate the effects of criminal networks. This involves a) highlighting the courageous and inspiring work done under the most arduous circumstances, and b) incubating and developing resilience-based initiatives that can protect, enable and empower citizens who have taken and continue to take a stand against organized crime. By tapping into these communities' own sources of resilience, we can build sustainable responses to organized crime and develop their capacity to thrive. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2017 at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Resilience-in-Sinaloa-community-responses-to-OC.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://globalinitiative.net/resilience-in-sinaloa/ Shelf Number: 147222 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Zaluar, Alba Title: Youth, drug traffic and hyper-masculinity in Rio de Janeiro Summary: I began my ethnographic studies of violence in the city of Rio de Janeiro almost by chance when I went to Cidade de Deus, a low-income housing estate project built in the 1960s for those forcibly evicted from the shantytowns. My intention in 1980 was to study voluntary associations, which were typical of the long existing shantytowns, to see what had changed for the dwellers reinstalled in the new housing project. One major change I found was a new kind of organization of which there had been no record in the literature on poverty prior to 1980: drug dealing gangs engaged in incipient turf wars. Since then, I have not been able to stop studying the subject and willy-nilly became an "expert" on it. I undertook two major ethnographic research projects in Cidade de Deus; one by myself and the second with four research assistants, three of them male and one female. All were university students who had grown up and continued to live in Cidade de Deus. The first study focused on the meanings of poverty, neighbourhood associations and local politics; the second focused on youth involved with the gangs or were about to join them. Later in the 1990s, with a different team, we investigated styles of drug dealing and consumption in three other districts of the city. Three years ago, a series of interviews and focus groups with former dealers allowed us to deepen our knowledge of the dynamics of the unlawful trade as well as the ideas and mixed feelings of the main actors. All these studies were based on participant observation and interviewing techniques. Details: Vibrant (Florianopolis), v. 7: 7-27, 2010. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2017 at: http://www.vibrant.org.br/downloads/v7n2_zaluar.p Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.vibrant.org.br/downloads/v7n2_zaluar.p Shelf Number: 147599 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Masculinity Poverty Slums Youth Gangs

Author: Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Title: Operation Tone: Special report concerning drug use and associated corrupt conduct involving Ambulance Victoria paramedics Summary: The Victorian community places great trust in paramedics. Paramedics are often among the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency and are responsible for treating and stabilising patients. They have access to an array of powerful, prescription medications that they can administer (in accordance with clinical guidelines) depending on a patient's needs and circumstances. Victorians rightfully expect that paramedics will demonstrate professionalism and expertise in carrying out their duty of care to patients. This report concerns an investigation by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) into allegations that Ambulance Victoria (AV) paramedics engaged in serious corrupt conduct, namely the theft, trafficking and use of drugs of dependence, and misappropriation of AV equipment. Many paramedics are exemplars of their profession. However, Operation Tone has identified a culture of illicit drug use and misappropriation of AV equipment by individuals and among certain groups, particularly in the Barwon South West region. Based on evidence obtained during the investigation, IBAC believes it is probable that this conduct occurs beyond that identified in this investigation. Illicit drug use by paramedics is concerning on several fronts: - Illicit drug use, possession and trafficking are criminal offences and contravene the Code of Conduct for Victorian Public Sector Employees and the AV Workplace Conduct Policy. A paramedic who procures and uses illicit drugs is, by definition, engaging in criminal conduct. - The use of drugs of dependence undermines the safety of the Victorian community. It is imperative that a paramedic's judgement and performance not be impaired by illicit drugs, particularly when they are dealing with patients. The use of drugs of dependence also poses a safety risk for individual users and their AV colleagues. Since 2012, fentanyl or morphine have been involved in three paramedic deaths in Victoria. - The use of drugs of dependence erodes public confidence in AV. AV has proactively responded to the vulnerabilities identified in Operation Tone. When IBAC commenced its investigation in November 2015, AV's capacity to identify and expose at-risk paramedics was initially limited. During IBAC's investigation, AV introduced new policies and practices to minimise opportunities for the possession, use and misappropriation of drugs of dependence. New AV policies and practices also limit the opportunity for misappropriation of AV equipment. AV has advised it accepts the content of this report and the recommendations made. AV also advised it has continued to implement initiatives to address illicit drug use and misuse of drugs of dependence since the completion of IBAC's investigation. During Operation Tone, one paramedic was terminated and eight paramedics resigned while under investigation. Six paramedics retained their employment with a formal warning; of these, five were relocated to different regions for varying periods, were enrolled in an ethics counselling course, and precluded from development opportunities for 12 months. Following the IBAC investigation, one witness pleaded guilty in the Geelong Magistrates. Court to breaching a confidentiality nottice and misleading IBAC, and was fined $5000. Details: Melbourne: The Commission, 2017. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2017 at: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/operation-tone-special-report-september-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/operation-tone-special-report-september-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 148138 Keywords: Corruption Drug Abuse Drug Trafficking Employee Misconduct Illicit Drug Use Prescription Drug Abuse

Author: Martinez, Cesar Title: Security Policy in Mexico: Recommendations for the 2018 Presidential Election Summary: For over ten years, Mexico's security situation has been a consistent public concern and policy priority. Since the 2000 democratic transition, the country's criminal landscape has changed dramatically. The dissolution of implicit organized-crime political agreements, a move toward more confrontational security strategies, and intra- and inter-group fighting have shattered criminal groups, pushed criminal activity into new industries and exploitative practices, and forced the Mexican government to rethink and continuously adjust its security strategy. The result of these changes is that today's organized criminal groups look different from their historic predecessors, which dedicated their time and energy primarily to transporting and cultivating drugs and keeping a low profile. Today's groups experiment with a range of illicit revenue-generating activities and have adopted shockingly brutal and violent tactics. These profits are then funneled into corrupting political institutions at every level, weakening the government's ability to fulfill its mandate and decimating public trust. The overall insecurity also hurts the country's economy, with estimates that it slashes 1.25 percent off the country's GDP every year. In July 2018, Mexico will elect its next president for the following six years. In the backdrop, the country's homicide level is once again on the rise after a two-year drop. Further, almost 60 percent of the population reported in 2016 that insecurity or delinquency was Mexico's principal problem. These ongoing challenges and concerns will ensure that public security features prominently in the upcoming presidential campaigns and will be a central issue for the incoming administration. To address some of these issues, this Policy Research Project on Mexico's security policy- sponsored by the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law-will address Mexico's major security challenges and offer a series of policy recommendations. The report is divided into four chapters, focusing on the overall security strategy, important domestic and international security issues, illicit economic markets, and civil society efforts. Within each chapter, the authors identify the current policies, evaluate their effectiveness, and provide steps for a path forward to a safer and more secure Mexico. Details: Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 2017. 166p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research Project Report Number 193 ; Accessed December 6, 2017 at: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/61475/prp_193-security_policy_in_mexico-2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/61475/prp_193-security_policy_in_mexico-2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 148728 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Illegal Markets Illicit Markets Murders Organized Crime Public Security Violence Violent Crime

Author: Murphy, Tommy E. Title: Following the Poppy Trail: Causes and Consequences of Mexican Drug Cartels Summary: We study the historical origins and consequences of Mexican cartels. We first trace the location of current cartels to the location of Chinese migration at the beginning of the XX century, and document that both events are strongly connected. We then use Chinese presence in 1930 as an instrument for cartel presence today. We find a positive link between cartel presence and good socioeconomic outcomes, such as lower marginalization rates, lower illiteracy rates, higher salaries, and better public services. We also report that municipalities with cartel presence have higher tax revenues and more political competition. Given that Chinese immigration at the end of the century was driven by elements largely exogenous to the drug trade, the link between cartel presence and good socioeconomic outcomes can be interpreted in a causal way. Previous research has shown that the presence of organized crime is associated with bad outcomes at the macro level (Pinotti, 2015) and has deep effects at individual level, making children more likely to be criminals in adulthood (Sviatschi, 2017a; 2017b). Our paper reconciles this previous literature with the fact that drug lords, the leaders of this particular form of organized crime, have great support in the local communities in which they operate. Details: Buenos Aires, Argentina: Universidad de San Andres, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2018 at: ftp://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc130.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: ftp://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc130.pdf Shelf Number: 148851 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Economics of Crime Opium Poppy Cultivation Organized Crime Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime

Author: Porter, Alex Title: Finding a foothold. Assessing forecastability in transnational organised crime Summary: To what extent can the scale and scope of transnational organised crime be forecast? This paper offers insights for modelling various crime types. States and intergovernmental bodies increasingly recognise the threats transnational organised crime (TOC) poses to human wellbeing, state legitimacy and the global economy, but we do not have a clear understanding of its scale or scope. This paper outlines a conceptual background for understanding and quantifying the future in broad terms and in the context of TOC. It provides an overview of data estimation and modelling, and offers a framework for beginning to think about forecasting types of TOC. The paper offers an assessment of 'forecastability' in five TOC categories, reviewing research and data estimation in each category. Key points - Modelling and/or forecasting transnational organised crime (TOC) could provide a useful tool for governments and policy-makers to better understand and combat TOC. - However, the illicit and hidden nature of TOC makes it difficult to define and accurately measure. - Barriers to measurement and understanding of TOC mean that it is not possible to model and forecast at this juncture. - It may, however, be possible to find a foothold in forecasting TOC by modelling illicit drug demand. - Modelling illicit drug demand could provide insight into long-term trends within the international illicit drug trade. Details: ENACT Africa, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Research paper: Issue 02: Accessed February 1, 2018 at: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-30-11_Denver_ResearchReport_Findingafoothold.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-30-11_Denver_ResearchReport_Findingafoothold.pdf Shelf Number: 148964 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illicit Drug Trade Organized Crime

Author: Bellezza-Smull, Isabella Title: Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century? Summary: Cuba has an unprecedented opportunity to avoid such outcomes by proactively upgrading its drug policy as it updates its economy - by building on strengths while adjusting for new vulnerabilities. Among other things, Cuba's National Drug Commission, National Anti-Drug Directorate, and other bodies tasked with formulating and implementing national drug policy should continue to fortify border controls, to develop anti-money laundering measures, and to strengthen bilateral counter-narcotics cooperation. More importantly, they could also emphasize prevention and treatment by decriminalizing the possession of all drugs for personal use, by adopting proven harm-reduction strategies, and by elaborating alternative sentencing procedures for non-violent drug offenders, including low-level traffickers and producers. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Igarape Institute, 2017. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Note 29: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Cuba URL: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf Shelf Number: 148935 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Money Laundering

Author: Hsu, Ko-Hsin Title: How are Street Drug Dealing Locations Selected? A Situational Analysis Summary: In Newark, NJ, drug dealing is common, but it is not evenly distributed in every part of the city. Between 2007 and 2009, most drug arrests were made on less than 20% of the streets. The dissertation seeks to explain how the locations for drug dealing are related to their surrounding situational features. It is hypothesized that these features produce criminal opportunities for drug dealing activities: lack of guardianship, accessibility, and crime generators. This dissertation focuses on drug arrests at the micro-level - street segments and intersections. Police arrest records from 2007 to 2009 provided by the Newark City Police Department are analyzed. A matched case-control design is used. Applying a threshold criterion of 5 or more arrests, 104 street segments and 31 intersections having frequent dealing activity per year in 2007 to 2009 are sampled to be the cases. Controls are individually matched with the cases, taking account of their distance from the cases, street length, and the intersecting thoroughfares. The sample size is 135 pairs. Situational data of local drug dealing settings are observed using Google Street View. Inter-rater reliability is assessed to affirm the quality of the data. McNemar's test is employed to examine the correlations between variables and the drug market. The dissertation also sets forth a conditional logistic regression model to analyze the causal relationships between variables and the drug market. Results show that drug dealing activity tends to occur on specific street segments characterized by abandoned buildings, bus stops, parking lots, vacant land, mailboxes, retail stores (near vacant lands), or the absence of a church. Drug dealing activity tends to occur on specific intersections characterized by parking lots, retail stores, and churches. The presence of a church as a crime generator to the occurrence of drug markets on intersections is one notable finding of this dissertation. The results signal that there are distinguishable situational factors affecting drug activity on streets and intersections, respectively. This dissertation demonstrates the feasibility of using Google Street View for future crime research. Policy implications are provided for making local drug markets more predictable and controllable to the police. Details: Newark, NJ: Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 2014. 193p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/43986/ Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/43986/ Shelf Number: 149109 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking

Author: InSight Crime Title: MS13 in the Americas: How the World's Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction Summary: The Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) is one of the world's largest and arguably most violent street gangs. After relatively humble beginnings in Los Angeles in the 1980s, it has spread to more than a half-dozen countries and become a central focus of law enforcement in two hemispheres. In spite of these efforts, the MS13 remains a persistent threat and shows signs of expanding its criminal portfolio. This report attempts to explain what makes the MS13 such a difficult problem for authorities to tackle. It focuses on assisting law enforcement's understanding of the gang's criminal activities, but it includes deep discussion on the social and political issues around the MS13. Below are our major findings. The MS13 is a largely urban phenomenon that has cells operating in two continents. The MS13 has between 50,000 and 70,000 members who are concentrated in mostly urban areas in Central America or locations outside the region where there is a large Central American diaspora. In Honduras and Guatemala, the gang is still largely urban. In El Salvador, however, the gang has steadily spread into more rural areas. Expansion beyond urban areas has also happened in places in the United States, most notably in Long Island and North Carolina, and increasingly California. The gang has appeared as well in Europe, specifically in urban areas of Spain and Italy. The size of the gang in these settings varies greatly and fluctuates, mostly in accordance with law enforcement efforts and migration patterns unrelated to the gang. The MS13 is a social organization first, and a criminal organization second. The MS13 is a complex phenomenon. The gang is not about generating revenue as much as it is about creating a collective identity that is constructed and reinforced by shared, often criminal experiences, especially acts of violence and expressions of social control. The MS13 draws on a mythic notion of community, a team concept, and an ideology based on its bloody fight with its chief rival, the Barrio 18 (18th Street) gang, to sustain a huge, loosely organized social and criminal organization. The MS13 is a diffuse organization of sub-parts, with no single leader or leadership structure that directs the entire gang. The MS13 has two poles of power: in Los Angeles, where it was founded, and in El Salvador, its spiritual birthplace where many of its historic leaders reside. But the gang has no single leader or leadership council. Instead it is a federation with layers of leaders who interact, obey and react to each other at different moments depending on circumstances. In general terms, most decisions are made by the individual cell, or what is known as the "clica," the Spanish term for clique. The highest-ranking members in some geographic areas make up a leadership council, but not all areas have a leadership council. In Los Angeles, the MS13 is subservient to the prison gang known as the Mexican Mafia. In El Salvador, the gang is also run from prison by its own leadership council. Along the East Coast of the United States, the gang has no council, although it is takes much of its directives from Salvadoran-based gang leaders. Because these leaders are mostly in jail, it is exceedingly difficult for them to impose total control over the rank-and-file. The MS13 has guidelines more than rules, which are subject to varying interpretations. The diffuse nature of the organization has widespread implications for how it operates. The gang has guidelines more than rules. These guidelines are subject to haphazard interpretations and application. In other words, this internal justice is not necessarily a strict system and often depends more on who the leader is and who is being judged, rather the actual transgression or the circumstances surrounding it. This inconsistent application of the rules leads to constant internal and external conflicts and is the cause of widespread violence wherever the gang operates. MS13 violence is brutal and purposeful. Violence is at the heart of the MS13 and is what has made it a target of law enforcement in the United States, Central America and beyond. It is central to the MS13's ethos, its modus operandi, and its evaluation and discipline of its own members. Violence also builds cohesion and comradery within the gang's cliques. This use of violence has enhanced the MS13's brand name, allowing it to expand in size and geographic reach, but it has undermined its ability to enter more sophisticated, money-making criminal economies. Potential partners see the gang as an unreliable, highly visible target, and the gang's violent spasms only reinforce this notion. The MS13's diffuse nature makes it hard for it to control its own expressions of violence. The MS13's diffuse nature has made it difficult to curtail its violence. The gang itself has attempted to implement rules to control the use of force. Most murders must be sanctioned from the highest levels, but as one of our case studies illustrates, this is often a perfunctory task, reflecting what seems to be a disregard for human life. In addition, the very system that is designed to control the violence often leads to more violence, since failure to carry out a sanctioned hit becomes cause for internal disciplinary action. The MS13 is a hand-to-mouth criminal organization that depends on control of territory to secure revenue. The gang's lack of a centralized leadership has kept it relatively impoverished. While it has established revenue streams, the MS13 has a hand-to-mouth criminal portfolio. Extortion is the single most important revenue stream for the gang in Central America, although a significant and rising portion of the MS13's criminal portfolio comes from local drug peddling, especially in US cities such as Los Angeles. The gang is also involved in prostitution, human smuggling, car theft and resale and other criminal activities, but the gang's revenue nearly always depends on its ability to control territory. The MS13 is a transnational gang, not a transnational criminal organization (TCO). While the gang has a presence in two continents and at least a half-dozen nations, the gang is a small, part-time role player in international criminal schemes. In cases of international drug trafficking, for instance, the MS13 is dependent on other criminal actors such as the Mexican Mafia. The gang plays a similar, part-time role in other international criminal activities such human smuggling as well. Its diffuse organizational structure and public displays of violence are two of the main reasons why the gang has not succeeded in transforming itself into a TCO. And while some criminal activity - most notably the MS13's involvement in petty drug dealing on a local level - is driving the gang's maturation process and leading it to new opportunities, this is a slow process that is causing significant conflict within the gang. El Salvador's MS13 leaders are trying to assert more control over the US East Coast. Some MS13 leaders, especially those operating from jails in El Salvador, are trying to create more top-down control, and expand its social and political influence. In El Salvador, the gang has negotiated delivering votes to some of the country's most powerful politicians. They have also instituted more formal and complex command structures inside and outside of jail, and they have emissaries in places as far away as Boston who are trying to corral the rudimentary and undisciplined gang cliques operating along the US East Coast. The MS13 is taking advantage of traditional migration patterns, not sending members to set up new cells. The MS13's efforts in El Salvador have alarmed law enforcement officials who say the gang's high-ranking leaders are also moving their rank-and-file around the region, including to the United States. But while the gang is repopulating cells and establishing new ones, the MS13 appears to be taking advantage of circumstances, rather than actively creating those circumstances. MS13 members migrate for the same reasons that other migrants do, and they go to the same places. They also face many of the same risks such as indigence, isolation, victimization, detention and deportation. This report is divided into five sections. We begin by chronicling the multi-national history of the MS13. The group is the byproduct of war, migration and policy, and it has a footprint in a half dozen nations. We then turn to the gang's philosophy, its guiding principles and ideology. The gang centers itself around the idea of community, which is reinforced mostly via violent rituals and expressions of rage towards outsiders and rivals. From there, we move to organizational structure. This includes explaining the largely misunderstood loose hierarchy of the gang and its clique system. Then we cover modus operandi, tackling the all-important questions of recruitment, criminal economy, use of violence, and political and social capital. Finally, we elaborate five case studies, which address the MS13's: 1) organizational structure; 2) use of violence; 3) criminal migration; 4) involvement in international drug trafficking; and 5) political and social capital. Details: s.l.: Insight Crime; Washington, DC: Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, 2018. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2018 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MS13-in-the-Americas-InSight-Crime-English.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Central America URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MS13-in-the-Americas-InSight-Crime-English.pdf Shelf Number: 149182 Keywords: Criminal Organization Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gang Violence Gang-Related Violence Gangs Mara Salvatrucha MS13 Prison Gangs

Author: Management Systems International Title: The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming Guide Summary: Drug trafficking poses a growing problem in Africa. Increasing flows of illicit drugs threaten good governance, peace and security, economic growth and public health. Failure to address this threat risks undermining the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)'s investments and thwarting U.S. Government objectives on the continent. In recognition of the issue, USAID's Africa Bureau initiated research in 2011 on the development causes and consequences of drug trafficking and potential programmatic responses. The resulting programming guide aims to help USAID, other development actors, and other U.S. Government personnel understand the relationship between drug trafficking and development assistance and seek ways to mitigate any negative impacts. At a minimum, development actors should undertake crimesensitive programming that ensures their efforts do no harm. Where possible, development actors should consider programming targeted to counter the flow of drugs (e.g., anticorruption efforts or judicial reform) or programming to ameliorate the impacts of drug trafficking, such as demand reduction programs including prevention and treatment. This guide helps Missions examine opportunities for incorporating such considerations into current or future USAID programming. This guide first focuses on identifying the development challenge in Africa. The second section addresses the political economy analysis that will inform what type of programming is appropriate and which actors are appropriate partners for development efforts. The third section presents programming options to: (1) counter drug trafficking, (2) ameliorate its impacts, and (3) incorporate crime sensitivity. The fourth section presents key findings and lessons learned. These include: - Drug trafficking in Africa threatens development. Drug trafficking has exacerbated instability in Guinea-Bissau and Mali and is corroding governance throughout Africa. If left unattended, drug trafficking threatens to further undermine stability and governance and impair economic growth and public health. - Development practitioners must "get smart" on the issue. Given the significant threats across development sectors, USAID personnel should increase awareness of this issue by engaging with U.S. Government counterparts and incorporating issues of drug trafficking and criminality into planned assessments and analyses. - Interdiction alone will not solve the problem. Interdiction must be accompanied by demand reduction efforts to help counteract the potential increased profitability from decreasing the supply of drugs. Moreover, interdiction must lead to prosecution of traffickers beyond the lowest level to effectively disrupt drug trafficking networks. - Early identification of the problem and prevention efforts are critical. Although it is difficult to garner support for these issues before they erupt, early investments to contain the influence of drug money in politics and local conflicts and to prevent the spread of a retail drug market could significantly contribute to Africa's future stability and prosperity. - Political will must drive the counternarcotics approach. Whereas Missions can undertake crime-sensitive programming and support efforts to ameliorate harm and increase demand for counternarcotics measures without accompanying political will, they should only pursue supply-side efforts to improve counternarcotics efforts where there is corresponding political will. - Resources influence programming options. To the extent that a Mission has democracy and governance funds and a serious drug trafficking issue, the Mission could direct resources to building accountable governance that simultaneously addresses core democracy and governance challenges in the country and promotes counternarcotics efforts. Absent such resources, Missions may still ensure that existing programming across development sectors incorporates crime sensitivity and works to ameliorate the impacts of drug trafficking (e.g., consider using health resources to raise awareness and support demand and harm reduction). - Change presents windows of opportunity and vulnerability. The environment for drug trafficking is fluid and Missions should identify windows of opportunity, or moments that present a chance for positive change, and vulnerability, or moments that risk fostering drug trafficking. - Coordination increases impacts. Given the many actors involved in providing assistance, USAID should work closely with its local, interagency and international counterparts as coordinated efforts are more likely to result in system-wide reform than those undertaken by any single entity. In addition, USAID should seek ways to align efforts across a region to prevent successful efforts in one country from simply pushing the problem elsewhere. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2013. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 14, 2018 at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Development_Response_to_Drug_Trafficking_in_Africa_Programming_Guide.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Development_Response_to_Drug_Trafficking_in_Africa_Programming_Guide.pdf Shelf Number: 149469 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs

Author: Queensland Sentencing Advisory Council Title: Sentencing Spotlight on trafficking in dangerous drugs Summary: This Sentencing Spotlight examines sentencing outcomes for trafficking in dangerous drugs offences finalised in Queensland courts between 1 July 2005 and 30 June 2016. The Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) (DMA) refers to 'a person who carries on the business of unlawfully trafficking' as being guilty of a crime. The term 'trafficking' is not defined in legislation under the DMA, but rather by case law. If dealing with dangerous drugs does not meet the case law definition of trafficking, it will usually constitute the separate offence of supplying dangerous drugs. While trafficking typically involves selling, it has a wider meaning of 'knowingly engaging in the movement of drugs from source to ultimate user'. A single sale made as part of carrying on a business could be trafficking, if it was the first sale of expected continuing activity. Occasional sales across limited isolated transactions are not sufficient. The prosecution is required to demonstrate several transactions were conducted for gain over more than a brief interval. However, the trade does not have to last indefinitely, generate profit, service more than one customer, or include payment in money (for instance, someone addicted to drugs could traffic to obtain drugs for personal consumption). Carrying on the business of unlawfully trafficking goes beyond sales and usually involves other activities including product advertising or promotion, negotiating prices and terms, taking orders and arranging delivery. Different drug traffickers receive different sentences because factors vary across individual cases. These include the application of general sentencing principles in section of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) and other considerations such as the type, quantity and value of drugs supplied, the nature of the trafficking, and whether the offender's motivation was financial profit or to feed their drug habit. Analysis or comments about the type and quantity of dangerous drugs associated with these offenders' cases are excluded as these are not reported in the administrative data. Details: Melbourne: The Commission, 2018. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2018 at: http://www.sentencingcouncil.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/555320/sentencing-spotllight-on-trafficking-in-dangerous-drugs-february-2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: http://www.sentencingcouncil.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/555320/sentencing-spotllight-on-trafficking-in-dangerous-drugs-february-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 149532 Keywords: Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Sentencing

Author: Coyne, John Title: 'Santa Muerte', are the Mexican cartels really coming? Summary: Whether in Mexico, the US or Australia, the image of the transnational serious and organised crime (OC) threat from 'Mexican cartels' used to construct policy doesn't appear to engage with the reality that there's no homogeneous Mexican cartel, cartels or OC group. In popular culture, the labels 'Mexican cartel' and 'street gang' conjure an image of a highly organised, hierarchically commanded and ultraviolent crime group. Even Mexico's infamous Sinaloa cartel, rumoured to have an increasingly ominous presence in Australia, is more an alliance of criminal figures than a hierarchical organisation. There should be little doubt that these groups, as a collective phenomenon, have consistently demonstrated a propensity to regularly use breathtakingly barbaric violence for revenge and intimidation. Unfortunately, popular characterisations of the structure and organisation of these groups does little justice to the complexity of the threat that they pose. These generalisations lack the necessary granularity to be useful in the development of disruption- and mitigation-focused strategies. For policymakers, it's convenient to conflate well-known US-based Mexican street gangs, transnational street gangs such as the 'Mexican Mafia' and transnational OC groups such as the 'Mexican cartels' into a singular homogeneous threat grouping or strategy: 'the cartels'. It's equally convenient to link all Mexican OC activity together with the cartel thread. With this kind of conflation, the seriousness of the threat at hand can clearly and concisely be communicated to government decision-makers in terms that will ensure funding and strategy responses. Frustration with the inability of law enforcement arrest and seizure strategies to undermine the drug trade and its associated OC has further complicated the policy decision-making in this space. In the US and Mexican governments' cases, it's likely that this frustration has underpinned government policy, thereby expanding the role of the military and intelligence agencies in the 'war on drugs'. Unfortunately, conflating these groups doesn't produce the kinds of policies and strategies that will result in operational activity that has long-term disruption impacts on the groups involved. Moreover, the current understanding arguably does not allow for the involvement and integration of enforcement operations with other whole-of-government social, economic and development strategies. This report argues that, for Australia and Asia, the menace of Mexican OC is no longer looming on the horizon; it has already arrived. However, the nature of the Mexican OC problem in Australia and Asia is not likely to be the same as that found in either the US or Mexico. To fully understand the implications of this development for Australia and the region, this threat needs to be viewed in context. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed April 2, 2018 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Shelf Number: 149648 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Gang Violence Mexican Cartels Organized Crime Street Gangs

Author: Perotti, Victoria Title: Imagining the Future of Crime and Politics Summary: Organized crime networks dedicated to illicit trafficking of drugs, people and wildlife-as well as money laundering and cybercrime, among other activities-are engines of instability. From Latin America to West Africa, from West Asia to Eastern Europe, and from Central Africa to Southern Europe, these networks engage in corruption to advance their interests, depriving the state of precious resources needed to build resilient institutions (OECD 2014). Corruption is channeled through multiple avenues, including by pouring illicit money into political institutions and actors (Villaveces-Izquierdo and Uribe Burcher 2013; Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014; Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016). The world is experiencing several parallel trends-including increased violent conflict, democratic backsliding and technological advancements-that affect these corrupt dynamics. Given that conflict and weak governance typically create a fertile environment for organized crime to engage in public sector corruption (Lupsha 1996; Cockayne and Pfister 2008: 18; Kupferschmidt 2009), and since technology may facilitate or hinder criminal behaviour (Baker 2014), these trends will presumably have a pivotal impact on the fight against organized crime and political corruption. On 4 May 2017, International IDEA hosted the workshop 'Political corruption and organized crime: Drivers, effects and responses' at the 2017 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, organized by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2017). The workshop aimed to discuss potential future trends regarding corruption linked to organized crime and strategic policy responses. It gathered scholars and practitioners in anticorruption, international crime prevention and peacebuilding in a common dialogue. This Discussion Paper was initially drafted as a scenario-building exercise to inform the workshop and was further developed with the input of its participants. Scenario building is an analytical method that encourages prospective thinking within a thematic field to identify new strategic policy alternatives (Conway 2006). Specifically, the scenarios consist of an illustration of possible futures. As such, they are not intended to predict the future (European Commission 2007). The methodology tends to be qualitative and engages a group of people in a simulation process. By developing a future narrative that takes existing interconnected trends to the extreme, participants can challenge assumptions and expand their perceptions of options available, ultimately engaging in strategic conversations. This Discussion Paper and the adapted scenario-building exercise on which it is based were therefore developed from the perspective of a fictitious criminal network. Its hypothetical activity focus is diverse and, depending on the opportunities, it could hypothetically venture to any existing and new illicit activities. Its structure is flexible as well; as such, it can potentially adapt to new markets. Section 1 illustrates some of the key geopolitical trends and drivers in governance, peace and technology that may affect corruption dynamics in relation to organized crime in the coming 10 years. Written from the perspective of a fictitious criminal network, it depicts a scenario where conflict, democratic decline and new technologies exacerbate the negative impact of organized crime on the state. By describing an imaginary future, it includes the most relevant concerns for practitioners within the field. Section 2 briefly presents current policy options for tackling organized crime and political corruption, and outlines recommendations for future policy adjustments that may contribute to the improvement of crime and corruption prevention and mitigation. The main argument of this Discussion Paper is that the policies that seek to address corruption and organized crime should be brought closer together in the promotion of global peace and stability. Details: Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: International IDEA Discussion Paper 2/2018: Accessed April 3, 2018 at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/imagining-the-future-of-crime-and-politics.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/imagining-the-future-of-crime-and-politics.pdf Shelf Number: 149660 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Political Corruption Wildlife Crime

Author: Ramirez, Socorro Title: Drug Policy in the Andes: Seeking Humane and Effective Alternatives Summary: The Andean-United States Dialogue Forum, which is supported by the Carter Center and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), met in 2010 and 2011 with the participation of 35 prominent citizens who are involved in diverse social processes and the shaping of public opinion and dialogue with governments. Participants came from a variety of sectors in six countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, the United States and Venezuela). The working group on drug policy and organized crime was established at the first meeting of the Forum and implemented a plan for national consultations through meetings, events and interviews in the five Andean countries, to analyze drug policy successes, failures and alternatives. Two members of the working group, Socorro Ramirez and Coletta Youngers, were asked to develop a report as a contribution to the current discussion of the issue and efforts to develop effective, humane policies. Fifty years after signing the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and 40 years after the U.S. government declared a "war on drugs," many obstacles remain despite the partial successes of efforts to counter the problem. Organized crime tied to drug trafficking continues to rise, aggravating violence that involves gangs and hired assassins, murders and arms trafficking. These criminal organizations take advantage of all forms of illicit interaction with the state: corruption, impunity and infiltration. They also try to block action by police and the courts by co-opting or assassinating public officials, legislators and prosecutors. A growing symbiosis between the state and organized crime spreads insecurity and weakens democratic institutions. The election of Barack Obama raised expectations that Washington would acknowledge the urgent need for a change in drug policy. It is fair to highlight a shift in language and tone under the Obama administration, which has stopped using the term "war on drugs" and has acknowledged the need to treat drug use as a public health problem. It is also noteworthy that the White House is taking a less interventionist stance in response to alternatives emerging in the region. Specific policy reforms have yet to be defined, however. The regional dynamic has changed with the "left turn" that has occurred in the majority of South American countries, as well as the diversification in these countries' international relations. Countries are seeking their own platform, such as the Andean Community (CAN) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to discuss policies and respond to priority issues on the international agenda. The limitations of the current drug policy is causing increasing frustration within and between countries and is leading policy makers, experts and activists in the region to seek new strategies to contain the escalation of illicit markets and minimize the harm done to people, communities and states by drug production and use. The work of the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy and of the Global Commission on Drug Policy has begun to break the taboo that has blocked progress in discussions of policy assessment and alternatives. In the present report, the authors describe a series of alternatives being considered and, in some cases, implemented in Latin America. These alternative policies are reflected in the following recommendations. The authors recommend that governments, shapers of public opinion and civil society in the Andean countries: Take the proposals of the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy and the Global Commission on Drug Policy as points of departure when formulating drug policy and launch an educational and media campaign to help remove ideological biases from the debate while promoting a more evidence-based and regional approach to drug policy. Include additional state institutions (not just those related to police or military activities) in this shared task, along with the widest possible range of eminent individuals, communications media, health experts, non-governmental organizations, civil society and community organizations, churches and academics. Support the Global Commission on Drug Policy's call for a deeper debate on new approaches that focus on reducing the harm caused to the most vulnerable sectors of society affected by the production, trafficking and consumption of drugs, which would benefit the Andean countries in their efforts to develop humane and effective policies. Take into consideration efforts to implement new policies based on specific national situations and local cultural or social circumstances. Support the August 10, 2009 declaration by the governments of the UNASUR countries, in which they "recognize that the chewing of coca leaves is an ancestral cultural manifestation of the Bolivian people which must be respected by the international community." Strengthen dialogue and agreements among the Andean countries and within the frameworks of CAN and UNASUR and ensure the participation of civil society in these regional entities; implement UNASUR's South American Council on the World Drug Problem; and hold a regional meeting to discuss the development of a common agenda on drug policy. Implement solid drug use prevention, treatment and harm-reduction policies that respect human rights and offer adequate care to those who need it, treat drug use as a public health problem rather than a crime, and allocate the necessary resources to achieve this goal. Support the recommendation of the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy to evaluate "the convenience of decriminalizing the possession of cannabis for personal use." Decriminalize personal consumption, use alternatives to incarceration for perpetrators of minor, non-violent crimes, and apply humanitarian considerations to confront the devastating impact the increase of women incarcerated for drug trafficking is having on their lives, their families and their communities. Advance towards an agreement among the Andean countries to end the forced eradication of small farmers' crops and redirect resources toward rural development. Adopt an "alternative livelihoods" approach that involves an appropriate sequence of actions: once other sources of income are established, crops for illegal markets can be reduced. This strategy implies decriminalizing relations with small farmers, instead making them partners in the effort to foster integrated rural development. Redirect law-enforcement efforts toward dismantling criminal organizations and networks linked to drug trafficking; improve and target intelligence activities; transform the exercise of politics; strengthen institutions; confront corruption and empower communities-especially those located in border areas. Strengthen mechanisms to protect democratic institutions from the corrosive influence of illicit political financing from drug trafficking by leveling the electoral playing field through measures such as public financing for parties and candidates, financial transparency during campaigns and sanctions against parties that include confirmed "narco-candidates" on their tickets. Details: Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - International; Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, 2011. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 24, 2018 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/book-drug-policy-in-the-andes.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/book-drug-policy-in-the-andes.pdf Shelf Number: 149881 Keywords: Drug Control Policy Drug Enforcement Drug Policy Reform Drug Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: McDermott, Jeremy Title: The Changing Face of Colombian Organized Crime Summary: - Colombian organized crime, that once ran, unchallenged, the world's cocaine trade, today appears to be little more than a supplier to the Mexican cartels. Yet in the last ten years Colombian organized crime has undergone a profound metamorphosis. There are profound differences between the Medellin and Cali cartels and today's BACRIM. - The diminishing returns in moving cocaine to the US and the Mexican domination of this market have led to a rapid adaptation by Colombian groups that have diversified their criminal portfolios to make up the shortfall in cocaine earnings, and are exploiting new markets and diversifying routes to non-US destinations. The development of domestic consumption of cocaine and its derivatives in some Latin American countries has prompted Colombian organized crime to establish permanent presence and structures abroad. - This changes in the dynamics of organized crime in Colombia also changed the structure of the groups involved in it. Today the fundamental unit of the criminal networks that form the BACRIM is the "oficina de cobro", usually a financially self-sufficient node, part of a network that functions like a franchise. In this new scenario, cooperation and negotiation are preferred to violence, which is bad for business. - Colombian organized crime has proven itself not only resilient but extremely quick to adapt to changing conditions. The likelihood is that Colombian organized crime will continue the diversification of its criminal portfolio, but assuming an ever lower, more discrete profile and operating increasingly abroad. Details: Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Sstiftung, 2014. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspectivas 9/2014: Accessed April 26, 2018 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/la-seguridad/11153.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/la-seguridad/11153.pdf Shelf Number: 149898 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime

Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Lessons from San Diego's Border Wall: The limits to using walls for migration, drug trafficking challenges Summary: The prototypes for President Trump's proposed border wall are currently sitting just outside San Diego, California, an area that serves as a perfect example of how limited walls, fences, and barriers can be when dealing with migration and drug trafficking challenges. As designated by Customs and Border Protection, the San Diego sector covers 60 miles of the westernmost U.S.-Mexico border, and 46 of them are already fenced off. Here, fence-building has revealed a new set of border challenges that a wall can't fix. The San Diego sector shows that: - Fences or walls can reduce migration in urban areas, but make no difference in rural areas. In densely populated border areas, border-crossers can quickly mix in to the population. But nearly all densely populated sections of the U.S.-Mexico border have long since been walled off. In rural areas, where crossers must travel miles of terrain, having to climb a wall first is not much of a deterrent. A wall would be a waste of scarce budget resources. - People who seek protected status aren't deterred by walls. Some asylum-seekers even climbed existing fence at the prototype site while construction was occurring. In San Diego, they include growing numbers of Central American children and families. Last year in the sector, arrivals included thousands of Haitians who journeyed from Brazil, many of whom now live in Tijuana. The presence or absence of a fence made no difference in their decision to seek out U.S. authorities to petition for protection. - Fences are irrelevant to drug flows. Of all nine border sectors, San Diego leads in seizures of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and probably fentanyl. Authorities find the vast majority of these drugs at legal border crossings-not in the spaces between where walls would be built. Interdicting more drugs at the border would require generous investment in modern, well-staffed ports of entry-but instead, the Trump administration is asking Congress to pay for a wall. - The border doesn't need a wall. It needs better-equipped ports of entry, investigative capacity, technology, and far more ability to deal with humanitarian flows. In its current form, the 2018 Homeland Security Appropriations bill is pursuing a wrong and wasteful approach. The experience of San Diego makes that clear. Details: Washington, DC: WOLA, 2017. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2018 at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-lessons-san-diegos-border-wall/ Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-lessons-san-diegos-border-wall/ Shelf Number: 149951 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Homeland Security Illegal Immigrants Immigration Enforcement

Author: Nicoletti, Michael Title: Opium production and distribution: Poppies, profits and power in Afghanistan Summary: Opium cultivation has occurred in Asia for centuries, but why has Afghanistan seen such an explosion in opium production during the last two decades? Furthermore, the increase in opium production disrupted the stability of rural livelihood strategies in the countryside. Some research tries to explain this trend by citing the Taliban's financial gains from opium production, or the international market for heroin. While these issues are significant, they alone do not critically examine the multi-faceted role that the opium trade has in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the onset of nearly three decades of permanent turmoil, followed by the Afghan Civil War, the Taliban's reign, and the U.S. invasion in 2001. Before 1979, Afghanistan had a decentralized state and large swaths of the mostly rural country had a subsistence economy based primarily on agriculture, whereas the commercial and industrial sectors were small. A decade after the 2001 U.S. invasion, military occupation, and nation building efforts by the U.S. and its N.A.T.O. allies, the central government's capacities still remain limited, the Taliban insurgency still rages on, with the pervasive insecurity undermining any sustained effort at rebuilding a vestige of a functioning and sustainable national economy. As a result, the country now largely depends on foreign aid, and in many rural areas opium production has become a rural livelihood strategy. After the Soviet invasion in 1980, Afghanistan became the world's leading supplier of opium and has continued to do so in 2011. The prevailing explanations for the proliferation of the opium economy in Afghanistan point out several key factors: opium as a manageable and profitable cash crop brings a monetary income to farmers who are deprived of the ability to produce their food crops due to violence and the destruction of infrastructure, economic stability to farmers, drug trafficking thrives primarily when country has been in a state of permanent turmoil, and the Taliban fund their insurgency because of the drug trade. Some of these ideas are more insightful than others, but they all lack a careful analysis of the geographic, cultural, and social complexities of the context of Afghanistan's opium production. The country is geographically and demographically diverse. The geographical and political experiences for a landowning farmer in Balkh are substantially different than that of a seasonal wage laborer in Helmand. Yet both may earn income from opium production and the prevailing tendency is to view this as a farmer who earns income from illicit crops. These explanations fail to address differences in geography, income, land ownership, state penetration of society, and the internal and external political actions in Afghanistan. The research and literature on drug trafficking in Afghanistan is abundant and contested, especially because of the various external influences in the country. Historically, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. flooded Afghanistan with money and military equipment during the 1980s. The U.S. repeated this policy in its 2001 invasion, thus re-forging relationships with militia commanders that fought the Soviet Union. Part of this relationship, both in the 1980s and more recently, entailed the empowering of armed "resistance" groups to monopolize violence and control aspects of an illicit economy, one of which is opium production. Thus, the changing power relationships are vital in understanding the context of opium production in Afghanistan. The country's glaring lack of infrastructure and economic productivity are areas that were exacerbated by the Soviet Union, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Pakistan that also contribute to the context of opium production and resultant stability. However, using flawed analysis to understand the context of opium production only helps to reinforce the unequal power relationships that drive it and does not address dependency on opium as a livelihood. The question is not whether opium production is defined within the realm of what is legally permissible, or not. The questions that should be emphasized are ones that address the structural drivers of opium production and who actually benefit from it. It should also be concerned with the majority of the population who are involved with opium production, like the Afghan farmers, landowners, informal creditors, and wage and seasonal laborers that predominantly engage in this livelihood strategy. Clearly, a far more nuanced understanding of opium production should address these issues and determine the consequences for this group. A critical analysis of all of the factors involved with Afghanistan's opium production indicates that it may occur as a rural livelihood strategy for farmers, wage laborers, and landowners. It is not such a strategy for insurgents and drug traffickers who profit considerably more and engage in cultivation far less than these other groups. Opium production is neither uniform throughout the country, nor are the people that engage in it. The prevailing assumptions that farmers cultivate solely for profit, that the Taliban drive the insurgency, and that opium spreads corruption need a careful examination. Some farmers may profit whereas others are try to make ends meet. The Taliban have a monopoly on violence in certain areas of the country, but so does the Afghan state and militia commanders that have the support of the U.S. and its allies. This research addresses these issues and demonstrates that opium production as a rural livelihood strategy may or may not be locally generated, the geopolitical context of Afghanistan must be addressed, and those that engage in at as a strategy can become more vulnerable to physical and economic insecurity. Details: Chicago: DePaul University,College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences, 2011. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 4, 2018 at: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=etd Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=etd Shelf Number: 150064 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Narcotics Opium Production

Author: Blake, Damion Keith Title: Violent Actors and Embedded Power: Exploring the Evolving Roles of Dons in Jamaica Summary: The Jamaican don is a non-state actor who wields considerable power and control inside that nation's garrison communities. A don is a male figure, usually from the community in which he plays a leadership role. Garrisons in Jamaica have often emerged as neighborhoods that are don-ruled shadow versions of the official State. These are poor inner city communities characterized by homogeneous and, in some cases, over-voting patterns for one of Jamaica's two major political parties: the Peoples National Party (PNP) or the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP). This dissertation explores the major roles dons played in Jamaican garrisons. It focused on one community in the downtown metro area of one of the nation's cities. Additionally, it investigated the factors that account for the evolution of such roles performed by dons from the 1960s to the present. I used governance theories and the concept of embeddedness as an analytic framework to interpret the power and authority dons have in garrisons. Dons, as it turned out, perform four central roles in garrisons: security/protection, social welfare, partisan mobilization and law, order and conflict resolution via "jungle justice" measures. Different types of dons perform alternate mixes of these roles. The case study described here led me to develop a taxonomy of these informal community leaders by separating them into Mega, Area and Street Dons. I argue overall that dons are embedded governing authorities in Jamaican garrisons based on the socio-economic and political roles they carry out. By examining the responsibilities of dons in Jamaica, this analysis contributes to the literature on the activities of non-state criminal actors and their forms of influence on governance processes. The study suggests that it may now be appropriate to re-think the nature of governance and the actors we broadly assume are legitimate holders of power and authority in developing nation contexts. Details: Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2012. 213p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 14, 2018 at: https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/49569/Blake_DK_D_2012.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2012 Country: Jamaica URL: https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/49569/Blake_DK_D_2012.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 150186 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gun Trafficking Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: Guerrero Castro, Javier Enrique Title: Maritime Interdiction in the War on Drugs in Colombia: Practices, Technologies and Technological Innovation Summary: Since the early 1990s, maritime routes have been considered to be the main method used by Colombian smugglers to transport illicit drugs to consumer or transhipment countries. Smugglers purchase off the shelf solutions to transport illicit drugs, such as go-fast boats and communication equipment, but also invest in developing their own artefacts, such as makeshift submersible and semisubmersible artefacts, narcosubmarines. The Colombian Navy has adopted several strategies and adapted several technologies in their attempt to control the flows of illicit drugs. In this research I present an overview of the 'co-evolution' of drug trafficking technologies and the techniques and technologies used by the Colombian Navy to counter the activities of drug smugglers, emphasizing the process of self-building artefacts by smugglers and local responses by the Navy personnel. The diversity of smugglers artefacts are analysed as a result of local knowledge and dispersed peerinnovation. Novel uses of old technologies and practices of interdiction arise as the result of different forms of learning, among them a local form of knowledge 'malicia indigena' (local cunning). The procurement and use of interdiction boats and operational strategies by the Navy are shaped by interaction of two arenas: the arena of practice - the knowledge and experience of local commanders and their perceptions of interdiction events; and, the arena of command, which focuses on producing tangible results in order to reassert the Navy as a capable counterdrug agency. This thesis offers insights from Science and Technology Studies to the understanding of the 'War on Drugs, and in particular the Biography of Artifacts and Practices, perspective that combines historical and to ethnographic methods to engage different moments and locales. Special attention was given to the uneven access to information between different settings and the consequences of this asymmetry both for the research and also for the actors involved in the process. The empirical findings and theoretical insights contribute to understanding drug smuggling and military organisations and Enforcement Agencies in ways that can inform public policies regarding illicit drug control. Details: Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2017. 345p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/22950/Guerrero2017.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Year: 2017 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/22950/Guerrero2017.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 150324 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Enforcement Drug Interdiction Drug Trafficking Smuggling War on Drugs

Author: Troyano Sanchez, Dora Lucila Title: Coca Industrialization: A Path to Innovation, Development, and Peace in Colombia Summary: For decades, Colombia has faced the challenge of promoting economic development and peace in its coca growing regions while quelling the flow of coca for unlawful purposes. During this time, the country has rarely considered promoting economic development with coca, partly because the national and international conversation has written off coca growers as one of the main drivers of the drug trade. Coca Industrialization: A Path to Innovation, Development, and Peace in Colombia seeks to challenge this perspective, primarily by conceiving of coca as an agricultural product with ample industrialization opportunities that fit within the existing national and international legal arrangements. This report explores coca's diverse potential in applications as varied as nutrition, natural medicine, personal care, and agro-industry-as well as coca's historical cultural uses. The report addresses the following questions regarding this controversial plant and its use in economic ventures: What are the benefits of coca leaf for nutrition? What examples are there in Colombia of initiatives that advance coca industrialization? Is there a legal framework for developing enterprises in Colombia based on coca? What would need to be true to expand the horizons for coca industrialization? The report suggests seeing the coca plant (Erythroxylum spp) as an agricultural product. It proposes building a coca leaf industry that, firstly, guarantees a sound income for farmers; secondly, provides good quality, sustainable raw materials for manufacturers; and, thirdly, ensures traceability, and control across the supply chain, with adherence to international laws. The report is divided into four sections. The first chapter, "What Does the Coca Leaf Offer," considers the coca leaf 's value and uses. It describes the results of a recent bromatological study that explores coca's nutritional value, applying the national regulator's standards for food products. This chapter concludes that coca indeed appears to have significant nutritional potential and offers a research agenda to help fully confirm this hypothesis. The second chapter, "Coca Industrialization Experiences," describes Colombian entrepreneurship surrounding coca leaf. It maps the business initiatives that have sprung up in the gray area of the current normative framework. This chapter briefly reviews Bolivia and Peru's coca leaf markets, and examines how these countries facilitated the development of new products across coca's traditional and modern uses. The third chapter, "The Normative Framework for Colombia," outlines and analyzes the laws and regulations relating to coca. Despite Colombia's political changes, industrializing coca leaf for non-drug uses remains challenging. The current policy framework tolerates a gray area where small businesses can operate, but has failed to define norms that would promote industry growth from farmer to end user. We scan the laws passed since colonial times right up to the State Council ruling issued in the first half of 2015, which widened the narrow legal window that allows coca manufacturing and distribution. The final chapter, "Horizons for Coca Industrialization," offers approaches for building a coca leaf industry around non-narcotic uses. We describe the experience of the National Training Service (SENA) partnership with the southern Cauca village of Lerma. This state-community partnership (which we call the Lerma Model) offers a process to incrementally build the coca leaf industry and gradually reform Colombia's coca control framework. The Lerma Model focuses on advancing community well-being via technological innovations that benefit the entire supply chain. Drawing from experiences in Lerma and the Andean region, we conclude with a proposal that reinforces the Colombian state's rural development policy stemming from the 2016 Peace Agreement framework. This proposal scales the Lerma Model into a social and technology innovation program based on sectoral pilots that accelerate coca industrialization while building a system of local social control. This strategy contributes to a more legitimate and effective drug and rural development policy via a process based on science, innovation, and mutual benefit, which invites all social and political sectors of a polarized country. Details: New York: Open Society Foundations, 2018. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Lessons for Drug Policy Series: Accessed May 25, 2018 at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/path-to-innovation-evelopment-and-peace-in-colombia-en-20180521.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/path-to-innovation-evelopment-and-peace-in-colombia-en-20180521.pdf Shelf Number: 150368 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Markets Drug Policy Reform Drug Trafficking Economic Development Illicit Drugs

Author: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Title: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Report to Congress Summary: Pursuant to the requirements of Section 707 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Reauthorization Act of 1998, as amended by Section 301 of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, ONDCP is providing Congress with this report on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). In order to present a national overview and individual HIDTA focus, this report provides background information and addresses three Congressional reporting requirements in one cohesive and coordinated document. This document is divided into an Executive Summary, Strategic Objectives, and five primary sections: 1. HIDTA Program Background Information The HIDTA program provides assistance to Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking regions of the Nation. There are currently 28 regional HIDTAs which include approximately 16 percent of all counties in the United States and 60 percent of the population. HIDTA-designated counties are located in 45 states plus Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Through the HIDTA program, representatives of Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies in each HIDTA region coordinate and collaborate to address the specific drug threats of that region. 2. National HIDTA Program Evaluation This report provides Congress with an evaluation of HIDTA performance. ONDCP has established two goals for the HIDTA program which address program effectiveness, program efficiency, and program management. These goals also reflect the continued refinement of the process ONDCP has developed to manage and measure HIDTA performance. The first goal is to reduce drug availability by assisting Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in HIDTAs to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations. The second goal is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives. In order to report on their achievement of these goals, each HIDTA is required to provide the following four documents pertaining to its geographical area, on which its performance evaluation is based: 1) Threat Assessment; 2) Strategy; 3) Initiative Budget Proposals; and 4) Annual Report. 3. Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in the HIDTA Program This report outlines the formal processes of the HIDTA program to assess law enforcement intelligence and information sharing, and highlights the formal evaluation and review process of the HIDTA program, including policy and budget guidance; FY 2009 funding levels for intelligence; processes for sharing Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement information; and the measures needed to achieve effective sharing of information. The HIDTA program has 57 operational intelligence and information sharing initiatives. Each HIDTA capitalizes on the combined resources of the Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement communities. The HIDTAs prepare and review threat assessments and apply the appropriate law enforcement response to combat illegal drug activity in our Nation. 4. Assessment of Drug Enforcement Task Forces in HIDTAs Regardless of the method of funding task forces (e.g., HIDTA, Justice Action Grant (JAG)/Byrne-sponsored), the 28 HIDTAs provide a coordination umbrella for Federal, state, local, and tribal drug law enforcement efforts; foster a strategy-driven systemic approach to integrate and synchronize efforts; facilitate efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation among and between various agencies; and focus on outcomes and impacts. Using both formal and informal methods of coordination among drug enforcement task forces, the HIDTAs act as neutral centers to manage, deconflict, analyze, and report on drug enforcement activities in their respective regions. 5. Individual HIDTA Reports To address the specific reporting requirements, an analysis of each HIDTA is included in this report. These reports are succinct descriptions of the individual HIDTAs and their responses to the Congressional report requirements. For more comprehensive information on an individual HIDTA's performance in addressing specific drug threats, ONDCP can provide, upon request, that HIDTA's Annual Report, Strategy, or Threat Assessment. Details: Washington, DC: ONDCP, 2010. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2018 at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/hidta_2011.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/hidta_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 150507 Keywords: Collaboration Drug Control Policy Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Information Sharing

Author: La Rosa, Lucy Title: The New Generation: Mexico's Emerging Organized Crime Threat Summary: Over the past decade, more than 200,000 people have been murdered in Mexico, including the record 29,000 murders that occurred in 2017 alone. While there are complex underlying factors behind every individual homicide, a substantial portion of Mexico's recent violence is attributable to organized crime groups. In an effort to reduce the operational capabilities of these groups, the government of Mexico has responded to this crisis with a deliberate strategy to target top organized crime figures for arrest and even extradition. In January 2017, these efforts culminated in the downfall of famed drug trafficker, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, who was extradited to the United States and is currently preparing to stand trial for various related crimes in New York. One of the unintended consequences of Guzman's downfall has been an increase in homicides to unprecedented levels. Following Guzman's removal as the purported head of the Sinaloa Cartel, one of Mexico's most powerful criminal organizations, splinter groups and rival organizations have competed to take over the lucrative drug trafficking routes he formerly controlled. One group that has been behind much of this violence is a relatively new organized crime syndicate known as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion, CJNG), an offshoot of the Sinaloa Cartel that has managed to re-brand itself, consolidate splintered criminal networks, and emerge as one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, 2018. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180319-Policy_Brief-CJNG.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180319-Policy_Brief-CJNG.pdf Shelf Number: 150594 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Homicides Organized Crime Trafficking Drugs

Author: Arredondo Sanchez Lira, Jaime Title: The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana Summary: This policy brief provides an assessment of the recent resurgence of violent crime in the Mexican border city of Tijuana in the state of Baja California. With an estimated 1.8 million inhabitants in 2017, Tijuana is the largest Mexican city on the U.S.-Mexico border. The city is home to roughly 49% of Baja California's population, while comprising only around 2% of the state's territory. Today one of Mexico's fastest growing cities, Tijuana reportedly grows at an annual rate of 35,000 people per year, or nearly 96 new inhabitants per day, drawing large numbers of immigrants from elsewhere in Mexico to join the city's robust economy. A longtime destination for cross-border tourism, Tijuana has long prided itself as the "world's most visited city." Today, nearly 190,000 people cross the border between Tijuana and neighboring San Diego on a daily basis for work, commerce, schooling, fine dining, family gatherings, and other recreational pursuits. Moreover, an estimated 200,000 U.S. citizens reside in the state of Baja California (roughly one in five of all U.S. citizens estimated to reside in Mexico), with many of them living in Tijuana. The city's thriving manufacturing sector makes Tijuana a vital part of the vibrant cross-border economic area known as the "Cali-Baja" region, particularly in areas such as electronics and medical devices; one study estimates that this region is responsible for roughly 40% of all audio-visual manufacturing in North America. Yet, dating back to the Prohibition-era of the 1920s, Tijuana also has long suffered a reputation as a city of vice. Over the last decade, that reputation has been further damaged by dramatic surges of violent crime, often attributable to drug-trafficking and organized crime groups. The city also has high levels of drug use that are shaped by its proximity to the United States. While methamphetamine is the main illicit drug used in the State of Baja California, the city has a higher concentration of heroin drug users compared to the national average, resulting in a concentrated epidemic of HIV and Hepatitis C virus among this high-risk population. In 2017, Tijuana had more homicides than any other city in Mexico, in a record year for national homicide figures. According to information from the Baja California Ministry of Public Safety, from 2016 to 2017 Tijuana saw the number of investigations on homicide cases rise from 872 to 1,618, an increase of roughly 86% in just one year. Preliminary figures from the Baja California State Secretary of Public Security put the total number of homicides in these cases at 1,780 homicide victims in Tijuana. 8 Preliminary data from Mexico's National Public Security system puts the total number of victims of homicide in the country at 29,168, a number that could increase to over 30,000 when final tallies are completed in the coming months.9 Based on these figures, the authors calculate that in 2017 one out of twenty murders in Mexico took place in Tijuana. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, 2018. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180205_TJViolence.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/180205_TJViolence.pdf Shelf Number: 150597 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Illicit Drugs Organized Crime Trafficking in Drugs Violence Violent Crime

Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: The notorious drug trafficking kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman is now imprisoned in the United States awaiting trial, following the Mexican government's decision to extradite him to the United States on January 19, 2017, the day before President Trump took office. Guzman is charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise and conducting drug-related crimes as the purported leader of the Mexican criminal syndicate commonly known as the Sinaloa cartel. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) maintains that the Sinaloa cartel has the widest reach into U.S. cities of any transnational criminal organization. In November 2016, in its National Drug Threat Assessment, the DEA stated that Mexican drug trafficking groups are working to expand their presence, particularly in the heroin markets inside the United States. Over the years, Mexico"s criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and increasingly the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have been in constant flux. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured. In recent years, the DEA has identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations might be viewed as the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. New crime groups have emerged since the December 2012 inauguration of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and oil syphoning, posing a governance challenge to President Pena Nieto as daunting as that faced by his predecessors. Former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. Such violence appears to be rising again in Mexico. In January 2017, the country registered more homicides than in any January since the government began to release national crime data in the late 1980s. In a single weekend in April 2017, more than 35 died in what was assumed to be drug trafficking-related violence. Although the Mexican government no longer estimates organized crime-related homicides, some independent analysts have claimed that murders linked to organized crime may have exceeded 100,000 since 2006, when President Calderon began his campaign against the DTOs. Mexico's government reported that the annual number of all homicides in Mexico declined after Calderon left office in 2012 by about 16% in 2013 and 15% in 2014, only to rise in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, the Mexican government reported a 22% increase in all homicides to 22,932, almost reaching the high point of nearly 23,000 murders in 2011, Mexico's most violent year. The 115th Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape has been significantly altered by fragmentation and how the organizational shape-shifting continues Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 150740 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug-Related Violence Homicides Illegal Drugs Organized Crime Violence

Author: Haysom, Simone Title: The heroin coast: A political economy along the eastern African seaboard Summary: This report examines the characteristics of the heroin trade off the East African coast and highlights the criminal governance systems that facilitate drug trafficking along these routes. In recent years, the volume of heroin shipped from Afghanistan along a network of maritime routes in East and southern Africa appears to have increased considerably. Most of this heroin is destined for Western markets, but there is a spin-off trade for local consumption. An integrated regional criminal market has developed, both shaping and shaped by political developments in the region. Africa is now experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use worldwide and a spectrum of criminal networks and political elites in East and southern Africa are substantially enmeshed in the trade. This report focuses on the characteristics of the heroin trade in the region and how it has become embedded in the societies along this route. It also highlights the features of the criminal governance systems that facilitate drug trafficking along this coastal route. Details: s.l.: ENACT, 2018. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper, Issue 04 : Accessed July 5, 2018 at: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-02-research-paper-heroin-coast.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-02-research-paper-heroin-coast.pdf Shelf Number: 150768 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Heroin Illicit Drugs Organized Crime

Author: United States Sentencing Commission Title: Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Firearms Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice System Summary: This publication is the third in the Commission's series on mandatory minimum penalties. Using fiscal year 2016 data, this publication includes analyses of the two statutes carrying a firearms mandatory minimum penalty, 18 U.S.C. � 924(c) (relating to using or possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking or crimes of violence) and the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. � 924(e), as well as the impact of those provisions on the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) population. Where appropriate, the publication highlights changes and trends since the Commission's 2011 Mandatory Minimum Report. Details: Washington, DC: The Commission, 2018. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 10, 2018 at: https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/20180315_Firearms-Mand-Min.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/20180315_Firearms-Mand-Min.pdf Shelf Number: 150793 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Federal Sentencing Guidelines Firearms Offenses Mandatory Minimum Sentences Sentencing Guidelines Violent Crime

Author: McGovern, Tara Alexandra Title: New Armed Groups in Colombia: The Emergence of the Bacrim in the 21st Century Summary: The 2003-2006 paramilitary demobilization in Colombia created major public policy challenges for the government, including the emergence of new illegal groups (Bacrim or bandas criminales). To date, there is no agreement between the government, academicians, and non-governmental organizations about the nature of these bacrim. The lack of shared understanding inhibits the establishment of a comprehensive plan to combat the bacrim and does a disservice to prior demobilization efforts. If these groups are legitimate participants in the on-going conflict, members will reap economic and legal benefits; otherwise, they will face criminal consequences. In this dissertation, I used an embedded case study of five major bacrim (Las Aguilas Negras, ERPAC, Los Paisas, Los Rastrojos, and Los Urabenos) to examine their origins and leadership, members and structure, ideology and activities, and territory. I developed a comparative framework to identify key characteristics of paramilitary groups, drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and new types of organized crime. I also developed a supporting quantitative analysis of crime statistics and public opinion surveys. The case study revealed heterogeneity across all five groups, calling into question the utility of the umbrella term bacrim. The quantitative research showed a substantial postdemobilization decline in homicides and other violent crimes but steady and/or increasing extortion and corruption. Identifying and ameliorating long-standing social and economic problems, in addition to developing strategies for individual groups, will do more to support peace in Colombia than focusing on short-term homogeneous approaches to the bacrim, such as kingpin removal. Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2016. 357p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 17, 2018 at: http://ebot.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/10611/McGovern_gmu_0883E_11303.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: http://ebot.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/10611/McGovern_gmu_0883E_11303.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 151161 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Gangs Homicides Organized Crime Paramilitary Groups Violent Crime

Author: Rico, Daniel M. Title: The Dimension of International Organized Crime in Colombia: The Bacrim, Routes, and Shelters - La Dimension Internacional del Crimen Organizado en Colombia: Las Bacrim, sus Rutas y Refugios Summary: The dimensions and structures of organized crime in Colombia have been drastically transformed in the last ten years. The clearing part of the paramilitary structures and the advantages of a reintegration process that take several years and I do not include agreements on drug trafficking, it generated a criminal diaspora that incubated the new structures of criminal gangs - more known as Bacrim - initially dedicated to drug trafficking in several regions of Colombia. Since then, around the Bacrim have been generated multiple political, legal debates and to a lesser extent, scholars who argue their similarities and differences vis-a-vis paramilitarism, the challenges that represent the national security and the efficiency of policies public implemented for its containment. However, the understanding and analysis of international dimensions of this generation of criminal organizations have been modest and scarce. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2013. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2018 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Daniel%20Rico.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Daniel%20Rico.pdf Shelf Number: 151543 Keywords: Criminal Gangs Drug Trafficking National Security Organized Crime

Author: Comision Mexicana de Defensa y Promocion de los Derechos Humanos Title: Violaciones graves a derechos humanos en la guerra contra las drogas en Mexico (Human rights violations in the context of the war on drugs in Mexico) Summary: Prohibition policies regarding drugs have failed in their goal of achieving a "drug-free world" and have forced the drug market to remain illegal. This has triggered an illicit market, exclusively controlled by organized crime cartels, who have created links to other criminal markets and use violence as a primary form of regulation. In December 2006, former President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006-2012) launched an open confrontation strategy against organized crime locally known as guerra contra el narcotrafico and known internationally as the war on drugs. This policy set de facto military control over the country's public security through the deployment of thousands of troops throughout the national territory and the replacement of multiple civil government leaders of public security institutions at all levels by active and retired military elements. An example of this is the fact that elements of the military and federal, state and municipal police forces systematically transfer arrested civilians to military or exclusive control facilities, where without any monitoring of civil authorities, detainees suffer ill treatment, torture and even enforced disappearance. It has also been documented how in joint operations with civilian authorities, military elements dress in civilian clothing. The press and mass media have systematically spread the federal government's vision, where people who are killed as a result of the strategy against organized crime are not civilians but "fallen criminals", without any prior investigation and despite the fact that in many cases it was subsequently proven that they did not belong to any group or organized crime and posed no "threat" to society. Additionally, the violent confrontation of civil public security and armed forces against organized crime groups has increased. The cartels' territorial division was disbanded, the fight for drug distribution routes intensified and large cartels were fragmented into smaller groups that fought for territorial control, diversifying their criminal activity. Likewise, there has been indiscriminate use of lethal force and an unjustifiable extension of State powers, through the adoption of laws and figures, such as arraigo (pre-charge judicial detention) and protected witnesses, which operate to the detriment of judicial rights and guarantees. In 2012 the administration of President Enrique Pena Nieto began. The discourse of war promoted by the Calderon administration was replaced by one of institutional strengthening and building a full rule of law. However, the security strategy has not changed significantly. As a result of the inertia of these strategies, Mexico has accumulated alarming numbers of dead, enforced disappeared and displaced persons, and as a result of the widespread violence there has been an increase in corruption and impunity. Details: Del. Cuauhtemoc, Mexico: PDH, 2016?. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2018 at: https://www.pdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/pdh-violaciones-graves-a-ddhh-en-la-guerra-contra-las-drogas-en-mexico.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.pdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/pdh-violaciones-graves-a-ddhh-en-la-guerra-contra-las-drogas-en-mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 151591 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Human Rights Abuses Illicit Markets Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: Strategic Applications International Title: Below Ten: Combating Drugs, Guns, and Human Trafficking at the U.S. Southwest Border Summary: The Below Ten project focused on three cities located on or below Interstate 10 - (1) Nogales, Arizona; (2) Pharr, Texas; and (3) San Diego, California - and their efforts to respond to a wide range of problems related to guns, drugs, and human trafficking. A key component of the project was the series of summits held to develop stakeholder-led plans to respond to the wide range of humanitarian, commercial, and enforcement issues. This publication describes the outcomes of these summits, which brought community members together with local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement; public health providers; social services; and other groups to identify problems, challenges, and solutions. It also provides detailed information on the approach adopted by each community and the activities that have been sustained since the project ended. Details: Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2018. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2018 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p369-pub.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p369-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 151604 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Gun Trafficking Human Trafficking Trafficking in Weapons

Author: d'Este, Rocco Title: Breaking the Crystal Meth Economy: The Effects of Over the Counter Medicine Restrictions on Drug-Related Crime in the United States Summary: What is the impact of illegal drug use on crime? Research on this question has been hindered by the lack of a major exogenous 'lever' affecting drug consumption. I use the mid-2000's U.S. crackdown on the Over-the-Counter (OTC) sale of pseudoephedrine-based medications to investigate the effect of crystal methamphetamine on crime. The domestic and localized nature of crystal meth production, performed synthesizing pseudoephedrine, enabled OTC restrictions to disrupt the clandestine economy built around the drug. To guide the empirical exercise, I model the choices of a heavy meth consumer at the margins of crime. I combine a rational addiction framework a la Becker-Murphy (1988) with Becker's model of crime (1968). The positive price shock induced by the reform deters drug abuse, but discourages drug-motivated crime only for 'sufficiently' high prices. Several quasi-experimental designs, performed on a newly assembled DEA-FBI panel of U.S. counties, lend support to the model's predictions. Crime fell by approximately 10 percent in areas adopting the policy. OTC restrictions cut heavy drug abuse, reducing acquisitive crimes undertaken to sustain the habit (economic channel), and violent crimes committed under the influence of the drug (psychological channel). Crucially, the analysis allows to parse out violence associated with illegal drug trafficking (systemic channel), from violence committed 'under the influence'. A calculation based on the evidence of the paper, which consistently points to a 30-35 percent decline in meth usage, provides boundaries for the drug-crime elasticity in the range of 0.1 to 0.4. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2018 at: http://www.eief.it/files/2016/01/02-jmp_deste.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.eief.it/files/2016/01/02-jmp_deste.pdf Shelf Number: 152840 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Trafficking Drugs and Crime Illegal Drugs Methamphetamines

Author: United States Sentencing Commission Title: Recidivism Among Federal Offenders Receiving Retroactive Sentence Reductions: The 2011 Fair Sentencing Act Guideline Amendment Summary: The Fair Sentencing Act of 20101 ("FSA") reduced the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses in two ways. First, it increased the drug quantity thresholds required to trigger the statutory mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for manufacturing or trafficking crack cocaine. Second, it eliminated the statutory mandatory minimum penalty for possession of crack cocaine. In the FSA, Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") to amend the federal sentencing guidelines to incorporate the reduced statutory penalty structure for crack cocaine offenses effective November 1, 2010. Congress did not make the FSA statutory penalty reductions retroactive, but the Commission did give retroactive effect to the FSA guideline amendment (the "FSA Guideline Amendment") as of November 1, 2011.2 Following that action, 7,748 crack cocaine offenders have received an estimated average sentence reduction of 30 months, lowering their sentence from an average of 153 months to 123 months of imprisonment. In 2015, as required by the FSA, the Commission submitted a report to Congress assessing the impact of the FSA on the federal criminal justice system (the "2015 FSA Report"). The Commission noted in that report that its earlier research had found that a previous population of crack cocaine offenders released early as a result of retroactive application of a guideline amendment did not show a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of recidivating, but it was too soon to assess the recidivism of crack cocaine offenders released early through retroactive application of the FSA Guideline Amendment. In the 2015 FSA Report, the Commission further stated its intent to separately study the effect of retroactive application of the FSA Guideline Amendment on recidivism. This publication provides that analysis: Finding: The Commission finds no difference between the recidivism rates for offenders who were released early due to retroactive application of the FSA Guideline Amendment and offenders who had served their full sentences before the FSA Guideline Amendment reduction retroactively took effect. Details: Washington, DC: USSC, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2018 at: https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/20180328_Recidivism_FSA-Retroactivity.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/20180328_Recidivism_FSA-Retroactivity.pdf Shelf Number: 152918 Keywords: Cocaine Offenders Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Fair Sentencing Act Federal Offenders Recidivism Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Policy

Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) National Drug Threat Assessment published in October 2017. These organizations have for years been identified for their strong links to drug trafficking, money laundering, and other violent crimes. These criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, increasingly, the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. U.S. overdoses due to opioid consumption sharply increased to a record level in 2016, following the Mexican criminal syndicates expanded control of the heroin and synthetic opioids market. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft that costs the government's oil company more than a billion dollars a year. Mexico's DTOs have also been in constant flux. Early in his term, former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. In recent years, larger and more stable organizations have fractured, leaving the DEA and other analysts to identify seven organizations as predominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations include the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented further to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. A new transnational criminal organization, Cartel Jalisco-New Generation, which split from Sinaloa in 2010, has sought to become dominant with brutally violent techniques. During the term of President Enrique Peea Nieto that will end in 2018, the government has faced an increasingly complex crime situation that saw violence spike. In 2017, Mexico reached its highest number of total intentional homicides in a year, exceeding, by some counts, 29,000 murders. In the 2017-2018 election period that opened in September 2017 and ran through June 12, 2018, 114 candidates and politicians were killed allegedly by crime bosses and others in an effort to intimidate public office holders, according to a security consultancy that tracks these homicides. On July 1, 2018, Andres Manuel Lopez Obredor won the election for President by as much as 30 points over the next contender. He leads a new party, Morena, but has served as Mayor of Mexico City and comes from a leftist ideological viewpoint. Lopez Obredor campaigned on fighting corruption and finding new ways to combat crime and manage the illicit drug trade. U.S. foreign assistance for Mexico in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) totaled $152.6 million, with more than $100 million of that funding focused on rule of law and counternarcotics efforts. The 115th Congress pursued oversight of security conditions inside of Mexico and monitored the Mexican criminal organizations not only because they are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States but also to appraise their growing control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape in Mexico has been altered by fragmentation of criminal groups and how the organizational shape-shifting continues. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed )ctober 22, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 153043 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug-Related Violence Homicides Illegal Drugs Organized Crime Violence

Author: Ashby, Paul Title: NAFTA-land Security: The Merida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico Summary: This thesis explores recent U.S. bilateral aid to Mexico through the Merida Initiative (MI), a $2.3 billion assistance commitment on the part of the United States (U.S.) officially justified as helping Mexico build its capacity to take on violent drug cartels and thereby improve security in both countries. There has been a good amount of engaging work on the MI. However this extant literature has not undertaken detailed policy analysis of the aid programme, leading to conclusions that it is a fresh approach to the Mexican counternarcotics (CN) challenge, or that CN is a 'fig leaf' for the U.S. to pursue other 'real' goals. This is a core gap in the literature this project seeks to fill. Through policy analysis, I make an empirically supported argument that Merida is a component of a far more ambitious policy agenda to regionalise security with Mexico more generally. This involves stabilising Mexico itself, not least in response to serious drug-related violence. However the U.S. also aims to improve its own security by giving greater 'depth' to its borders, and seeks protect the political economy of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) from variegated security threats. In this way, recent U.S. policy in Mexico is both derivative of its wider grand strategic traditions in stabilising key political economies in line with its interests, and representative of some distinct developments stemming from the deeply integrated U.S.-Mexican economy as part of NAFTA. To assure U.S. interests accrued to it through the increasingly holistic North American economy, the U.S. has used the MI as the main vehicle in the construction of a nascent 'NAFTA-land Security' framework. Details: Canterbury, UK: University of Kent, 2015. 322p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 24, 2018 at: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/48367/ Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/48367/ Shelf Number: 153069 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Homeland Security Merida Initiative Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Drug Enforcement Administration Title: 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary: The 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA)1 is a comprehensive strategic assessment of the threat posed to the United States by domestic and international drug trafficking and the abuse of illicit drugs. The report combines federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement reporting; public health data; open source reporting; and intelligence from other government agencies to determine which substances and criminal organizations represent the greatest threat to the United States. Illicit drugs, as well as the transnational and domestic criminal organizations who traffic them, continue to represent significant threats to public health, law enforcement, and national security in the United States. Drug poisoning deaths are the leading cause of injury death in the United States; they are currently at their highest ever recorded level and, every year since 2011, have outnumbered deaths by firearms, motor vehicle crashes, suicide, and homicide. In 2016, approximately 174 people died every day from drug poisoning (see Figure 1). The opioid threat (controlled prescription drugs, synthetic opioids, and heroin) has reached epidemic levels and currently shows no signs of abating, affecting large portions of the United States. Meanwhile, as the ongoing opioid crisis justly receives national attention, the methamphetamine threat remains prevalent; the cocaine threat has rebounded; new psychoactive substances (NPS) are still challenging; and the domestic marijuana situation continues to evolve. Controlled Prescription Drugs (CPDs): CPDs are still responsible for the most drug-involved overdose deaths and are the second most commonly abused substance in the United States. As CPD abuse has increased significantly, traffickers are now disguising other opioids as CPDs in attempts to gain access to new users. Most individuals who report misuse of prescription pain relievers cite physical pain as the most common reason for abuse; these misused pain relievers are most frequently obtained from a friend or relative. Heroin: Heroin use and availability continue to increase in the United States. The occurrence of heroin mixed with fentanyl is also increasing. Mexico remains the primary source of heroin available in the United States according to all available sources of intelligence, including law enforcement investigations and scientific data. Further, significant increases in opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in Mexico allow Mexican TCOs to supply high-purity, low-cost heroin, even as U.S. demand has continued to increase. Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids: Illicit fentanyl and other synthetic opioids - primarily sourced from China and Mexico - are now the most lethal category of opioids used in the United States. Traffickers- wittingly or unwittingly- are increasingly selling fentanyl to users without mixing it with any other controlled substances and are also increasingly selling fentanyl in the form of counterfeit prescription pills. Fentanyl suppliers will continue to experiment with new fentanyl-related substances and adjust supplies in attempts to circumvent new regulations imposed by the United States, China, and Mexico. Cocaine: Cocaine availability and use in the United States have rebounded, in large part due to the significant increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia. As a result, past-year cocaine initiates and cocaine-involved overdose deaths are exceeding 2007 benchmark levels. Simultaneously, the increasing presence of fentanyl in the cocaine supply, likely related to the ongoing opioid crisis, is exacerbating the re-merging cocaine threat. Methamphetamine: Methamphetamine remains prevalent and widely available, with most of the methamphetamine available in the United States being produced in Mexico and smuggled across the Southwest Border (SWB). Domestic production occurs at much lower levels than in Mexico, and seizures of domestic methamphetamine laboratories have declined steadily for many years. Marijuana: Marijuana remains the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. The overall landscape continues to evolve; although still illegal under Federal law, more states have passed legislation regarding the possession, use, and cultivation of marijuana and its associated products. Although seizure amounts coming across the SWB have decreased in recent years, Mexico remains the most significant foreign source for marijuana available in the United States. Domestic marijuana production continues to increase, as does the availability and production of marijuana-related products. New Psychoactive Substances (NPS): The number of new NPS continues to increase worldwide, but remains a limited threat in the United States compared to other widely available illicit drugs. China remains the primary source for the synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones that are trafficked into the United States. The availability and popularity of specific NPS in the United States continues to change every year, as traffickers experiment with new and unregulated substances. Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs): Mexican TCOs remain the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States; no other group is currently positioned to challenge them. The Sinaloa Cartel maintains the most expansive footprint in the United States, while Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion's (CJNG) domestic presence has significantly expanded in the past few years. Although 2017 drug-related murders in Mexico surpassed previous levels of violence, U.S.-based Mexican TCO members generally refrain from extending inter-cartel conflicts domestically. Colombian TCOs: Colombian TCOs' majority control over the production and supply of cocaine to Mexican TCOs allows Colombian TCOs to maintain an indirect influence on U.S. drug markets. Smaller Colombian TCOs still directly supply wholesale quantities of cocaine and heroin to Northeast and East Coast drug markets. Dominican TCOs: Dominican TCOs dominate the mid-level distribution of cocaine and white powder heroin in major drug markets throughout the Northeast, and predominate at the highest levels of the heroin and fentanyl trade in certain areas of the region. They also engage in some street-level sales. Dominican TCOs work in collaboration with foreign suppliers to have cocaine and heroin shipped directly to the continental United States and its territories from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Family members and friends of Dominican nationality or American citizens of Dominican descent comprise the majority of Dominican TCOs, insulating them from outside threats. Asian TCOs: Asian TCOs specialize in international money laundering by transferring funds to and from China and Hong Kong through the use of front companies and other money laundering methods. Asian TCOs continue to operate indoor marijuana grow houses in states with legal personal-use marijuana laws and also remain the 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, commonly known as Ecstasy) source of supply in U.S. markets by trafficking MDMA from clandestine laboratories in Canada into the United States. Gangs: National and neighborhood-based street gangs and prison gangs continue to dominate the market for the street-sales and distribution of illicit drugs in their respective territories throughout the country. Struggle for control of these lucrative drug trafficking territories continues to be the largest factor fueling the street-gang violence facing local communities. Meanwhile, some street gangs are working in conjunction with rival gangs in order to increase their drug revenues, while individual members of assorted street gangs have profited by forming relationships with friends and family associated with Mexican cartels. Illicit Finance: TCOs' primary methods for laundering illicit proceeds have largely remained the same over the past several years. However, the amount of bulk cash seized has been steadily decreasing. This is a possible indication of TCOs' increasing reliance on innovative money laundering methods. Virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, are becoming increasingly mainstream and offer traffickers a relatively secure method for moving illicit proceeds around the world with much less risk compared to traditional methods. Details: Washington, DC: DEA, 2018. 164p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2018 at: https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/DIR-032-18%202018%20NDTA%20final%20low%20resolution.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/DIR-032-18%202018%20NDTA%20final%20low%20resolution.pdf Shelf Number: 153464 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Cartels Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Gangs Illicit Drugs Opioid Crisis Organized Crime

Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation and Production Summary: Key Findings Area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 63 percent since 2016, reaching a new record high. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 hectares in 2017, a 63 percent increase or 127,000 hectares more compared to the previous year. This level of opium poppy cultivation is a new record high and exceeds the formerly highest value recorded in 2014 (224,000 hectares) by 104,000 hectares or 46 percent. Strong increases were observed in almost all major poppy cultivating provinces. In Hilmand province alone, cultivation increased by 63,700 hectares (+79 percent) which accounted for about half of the total national increase. Strong increases were observed also in Balkh (+10,000 hectares or almost five times more than in 2016), Kandahar (+7,500 hectares or +37%), Nimroz (+6,200 hectares or +116%), and Uruzgan (+6,000 hectares or +39%). The majority (60%) of cultivation took place in the South of the country. The Western region accounted for 17% of total cultivation, the Northern region for 13% and the Eastern region for 7%. The remaining regions (North-eastern and Central) together accounted for 3%. Hilmand remained the country's major opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Badghis, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, Farah, Balkh, Nimroz and Badakhshan. Opium poppy cultivation expanded to new regions and intensified where there was cultivation before. In 2017, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan decreased from 13 to 10. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation increased from 21 to 24. Ghazni, Samangan and Nuristan provinces lost their poppy-free status. Ghazni had been poppy-free for more than two decades (since 1995), Samangan and Nuristan for almost 10 years (since 2007). Starting in 2014, the Northern region experienced a rapid expansion of opium poppy cultivation. In 2014, a total of 574 hectares was cultivated in three out of seven provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari-Pul); in 2017, only one province remained poppy-free (Bamyan) and some 43,000 hectares were cultivated in the other six provinces. Cultivation in Balkh, which was poppy-free until 2014, expanded from 204 hectares in 2015 to 12,100 hectares in 2017. In Jawzjan, which was poppy-free between 2008 and 2015, cultivation increased from 409 hectares in 2016 to 3,200 hectares in 2017. In Sari-Pul (last time poppy-free in 2013), cultivation expanded from 195 hectares in 2014 to 3,600 hectares in 2017. Opium poppy cultivation intensified in the main opium-poppy cultivating provinces by holding a more significant share of the available agricultural land. In Hilmand, a third of the arable land was dedicated to opium poppy in 2017, whereas only 20% was under cultivation in 2016. Less drastically, but still significant increases in density could be observed in Uruzgan and Nangarhar where a fourth of the arable land was under opium poppy cultivation in 2017 compared to 19% in Uruzgan and 16% in Nangarhar in 2016. Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 395 hectares but remained very low. In 2017, 750 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 14 provinces (355 hectares in 7 provinces in 2016). During the 2017 eradication campaign, six lives were lost and eight persons were injured. In 2016, eight lives were lost and seven persons were injured. Potential opium yield and production increased in 2017. Potential opium production was estimated at 9,000 tons in 2017, an increase of 87% from its 2016 level (4,800 tons). The increase in production is mainly a result of an increase in area under opium poppy cultivation, while an increase in opium yield per hectare also contributed. In 2017, the average opium yield amounted to 27.3 kilograms per hectare, which was 15% higher than in 2016. Yields increased in the Southern region by 19% (from 22.0 kilograms per hectare in 2016 to 26.2 kilograms per hectare in 2017), in the North-eastern region by 14% (from 31.2 to 35.4 kilograms per hectare) and in the Eastern region by 8% (from 32.4 to 34.9 kilograms per hectare). In the Central and Northern regions, yields decreased by 5% and 6% respectively and remained stable in the Western region. Accounting for 57% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan. With 16% of national production, the Northern region was the second most important opium-producing region in 2017, followed by the Western region (13%) and Eastern region (9%). In response to the increased supply of opium, 2017 prices at harvest time decreased in all regions (between -7% in the Western region and - 50% in the North-eastern region) of Afghanistan except in the Southern region where prices only dropped in the months after the harvest. At almost US$ 1.4 billion (1.2 - 1.5 billion), equivalent to roughly 7% of Afghanistan's estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production increased by 55% in 2017 as compared to past year. Reasons for the increase. There is no single reason for the massive 2017 increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The multiple drivers are complex and geographically diverse, as many elements continue to influence farmers' decisions regarding opium poppy cultivation. Rule of law-related challenges, such as political instability, lack of government control and security, as well as corruption, have been found to be main drivers of illicit cultivation. Also impact farmers' decisions, for example scarce employment opportunities, lack of quality education and limited access to markets and financial services continue to contribute to the vulnerability of farmers towards opium poppy cultivation. A combination of events may have exacerbated some of these elements and may have led to the large increase in 2017. The shift in strategy by the Afghan government - focusing its efforts against anti-government elements (AGE) in densely populated areas - may have made the rural population more vulnerable to the influence of AGE. This may have subsequently contributed to the strong increase in the area under opium poppy cultivation. Political instability and increased insecurity particularly affected the Northern region, where opium poppy cultivation expanded drastically in the last couple of years. Generally, the weaker engagement of the international aid community may also have reduced the socio-economic development opportunities in rural areas. In Hilmand province, additional factors may have played a role. In 2017, reports from the field indicate that more cheap labour for harvesting might have become available. In combination with increasing yields in 2016, this could have motivated many farmers to take up or expand opium poppy cultivation. The opium harvest requires a large number of skilled labourers, who often come from other provinces of Afghanistan and even from neighbouring countries. In past years, there have been reports of a lack of workers, caused by the on-going fights within Hilmand, which may have led farmers to restrict their investments in opium poppy cultivation to avoid the risk of unharvested fields. The continuing advances in agriculture, including the use of solar panels for powering irrigation pumps and fertilizers and pesticides, may have made opium poppy cultivation increasingly profitable even under unfavourable natural conditions. Solar panels for irrigation seem to have replaced diesel pumps in many areas. These panels require a sizable initial investment, but have lower running costs than diesel-powered pumps and thus can turn desert areas into highly productive arable land at a relatively low cost. The nation-wide high opium farm-gate prices of 2016 might have facilitated some of these investments. Future challenges The 2017 record levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan create multiple challenges for the country, its neighbours and the many other countries that are transit for or destination of Afghan opiates. The significant levels of opium poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates will probably further fuel instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. More high quality, low cost heroin will reach consumer markets across the world, with increased consumption and related harms as a likely consequence. Addressing the opiate problem in Afghanistan remains a shared responsibility. Only a small share of the revenues generated by the cultivation and trafficking of Afghan opiates reaches Afghan drug trafficking groups. Many more billions of dollars are made from trafficking opiates into major consumer markets, mainly in Europe and Asia. Moreover, the transformation of opium into heroin is likely to bring increased trafficking of precursor substances. Tons of precursor chemicals will potentially be diverted from licit international markets and smuggled into Afghanistan to supply manufacturers of heroin. In Afghanistan, one of the least-developed countries worldwide, the impact of the illicit drug cultivation and production on economic, environmental and social development, continues to be multifaceted. The large increase in opium production will reinforce the negative consequences of the already existing large-scale production of opiates. The expanding illicit economy, which in many provinces has permeated rural societies and made many communities dependent on the income from opium poppy, will further constrain the development of the licit economy and potentially further fuel corruption. The increased levels of opium poppy cultivation also have the potential to exacerbate existing environmental damage caused by over-exploitation of the land for opium. The increased availability of opium and heroin in the country might further raise the social and economic costs associated with the consumption of opiates for drug users, their families, and for society in general. To support the Afghan Government in its efforts to counter illicit crop cultivation, continuing analysis and monitoring of the links between the rule of law, illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking is required. The forthcoming MCN/UNODC socio-economic survey report will discuss these factors in detail, presenting an in-depth analysis of the risk factors related to illicit cultivation of opium, as well as the possible consequences and policy considerations for Afghanistan and the international community following this year's record cultivation. Details: Vienna, Austria: 2017. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: http://mcn.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Opium%20Survey%202017%20(Cultivation%20and%20Production).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/access-to-information/14115/14116 Shelf Number: 154100 Keywords: Development Assistance Drug Cultivation Drug Trafficking Farm-Gate Value Illicit Crop Cultivation Illicit Economy Illicit Trafficking Opium Poppy Cultivation Opium Production Opium Yield Rule of Law

Author: Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa Title: Typologies Report on Laundering the Proceeds of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in West Africa Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I Drug trafficking is the largest source of illicit funds globally. This is largely due to the wide gap between production cost and the final price the consumer pays, especially in Western Europe and North America. For the trafficker, profit is the motive and is largely determined by the risk they are willing to take to deliver the drugs to the highest paying consumer. Locally, massive cannabis cultivation and consumption has been a source of major concern in the not only because of the illegal money it generates but also due to the associated health hazards. In recent years, West Africa has been targeted by drug traffickers from Latin America with large consignment of cocaine which is warehoused in the region and mostly shipped in small quantities to Europe and other destinations using local couriers. The problem has attracted attention at the highest level in the region as well as globally. There are ongoing regional initiatives to address the problem. II As a contribution to that initiative, and in order to have a good understanding of the relationship between money laundering and drug trafficking in the region, this typologies exercise was conducted. The study analyses various facets of the legal and enforcement environment of AML and Drug trafficking in ECOWAS member States. It looked at the vulnerabilities of the region and why West Africa has become a target for drug traffickers. It also looked at the techniques, methods, mechanisms and instruments used by drug traffickers to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking by reviewing relevant case studies and identifying typologies. III Twelve out of fifteen ECOWAS countries were involved in the study. One expert was identified in each of the 12 countries who helped to administer the two questionnaires developed for the study and produced a country report. A typologies workshop was held where country reports were reviewed, including case studies. IV The findings of the study indicates that drug traffickers employ complex means to launder money generated from drug trafficking including the use of lawyers, bureau de change, trade, cash couriers,, front companies, purchase of real estate, etc. V With regard to legal framework, most of the AML laws are quite recent compared to the drug trafficking laws. In some countries, the penalty for drug offences is not proportionate and dissuasive. There is general lack of effectiveness with regard to the enforcement of AML laws across board. Capacity to carry out effective AML investigation is generally low and many ML predicate offences are not investigated for ML. The domination of the informal sector and cash transaction of the economy of the region are obstacles to effective enforcement/implementation of AML measures. The disparity in AML capacity among member States is a source of concern and need to be urgently addressed. VI A number of recommendations were made which, if implemented will help to improve the overall implementation of AML measures both at the member States and at the regional levels. Summary of Findings VII The following is the summary of the major findings of the exercise: A. All countries in West Africa are extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking and related money laundering. The vulnerability is related to geographical, political, legal, institutional, economic and social factors. The large sea coast is either partly or completely unmanned in most parts of the region. Generally, inland borders are porous and not effectively manned across the region. B. Most of the countries have AML laws that were enacted not more than 4 years earlier, and the necessary infrastructure and human capacity to support the execution of the law are still being put in place. In a number of the countries, this process has been stalled by lack of resources. C. The trafficking tends to concentrate in countries with unstable political, social and economical situation and weak controls (legal, enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial). D. The laundering of the money generated from drug trafficking tend to be carried out in stable countries with relatively fair economy in the region where cash dominates transactions and is difficult for authorities to monitor cash inflows and outflows, as well as some in countries outside the region (largely countries where the heads of the networks operate from and the countries of some of the drug couriers from outside of the region). E. Corruption appears to play an important part in the cross-border movement of proceeds of crime as cash or when converted into goods. F. The general lack of capacity to interdict illicit drugs especially cocaine and heroin, makes money laundering almost inevitable due to the prevailing opportunities for money laundering in the informal sector. G. There is general lack of capacity for money laundering investigation in most of the countries coupled with the fact that money laundering investigation has not been fully integrated in drug trafficking investigation in most of the countries. Investigating money laundering during drug investigation does not appear to be a top priority as indicated by the apparent absence of asset seizure and confiscation despite convictions obtained of drug traffickers in most of the countries and the significant drug seizures made. H. Coordination between the investigating agencies and FIUs during drug trafficking related money laundering investigation is very week. The trust factor remains an important element in this lack of coordination. I. Over emphasis of money laundering through the formal financial system undermines overall AML/CFT efforts especially in West Africa where the cash dominated informal sector is the preferred channel for laundering the proceeds of crime, including drug trafficking. J. Reporting entities do not appear to be providing STRs commensurate with the level of the drug trafficking problems in most of the countries. This may be as a result of lack of expertise in ML risk analysis or lack of interest in providing such information. K. Most of the FIUs do not have sufficient analytical expertise to detect drug trafficking related money laundering. Emphasis appears to be placed more on corruption related ML by the FIUs. L. Cross border information sharing both in the control of drug trafficking and related money laundering is virtually absent except where there is a public incidence that affect countries. Details: Dakar, Senegal: GIABA, 2010. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 14, 2019 at: https://www.giaba.org/media/f/118_final-drugs-typologies-report-dev071811---english.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: https://www.giaba.org/media/f/118_final-drugs-typologies-report-dev071811---english.pdf Shelf Number: 154138 Keywords: Anti-Money Laundering Cocaine Corruption Drug Traffickers Drug Trafficking Drug Typologies ECOWAS FIU Illicit Drugs Money Laundering West Africa

Author: Interpol Title: Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in North Africa Summary: Executive Summary Transnational organized crime in Northern Africa poses a substantial threat to the safety and security of all member countries in the region, and poses a significant challenge to law enforcement agencies. As a result, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, has sought to catalogue and assess organized crime in the region to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response. International criminal organizations target North Africa due to the significant illicit wealth that can be generated from criminal market opportunities throughout the region, notably but not limited to drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, the counterfeiting of a range of goods, and the illicit traffic of cultural heritage. Crime syndicates exploit various social issues and take advantage of state fragility and limited law enforcement policing capacities to conceal and develop their activities. In addition, there are a number of additional facilitating factors bolstering organized criminality throughout the region such as the length of the region's borders with sub-Saharan Africa, the strategic geographic position of the region between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, the inclusion of North African countries in global trade flows, fragile economies, war profiteering stemming from many of the recent conflicts in the region or its vicinity, as well as corruption to varying degrees. The threat from organized crime in Northern Africa is therefore substantial, yet often going undetected and underreported, despite various data sources indicating major activities and dynamics of groups and networks active in the region. This mostly stems from limited and unequal capacity amongst law enforcement in the region to manage complex organized crime issues. A greater awareness of the scope and functioning of organized crime in North Africa, nurturing stronger partnerships amongst law enforcement agencies in the region, will contribute to better tackle the threat posed by organised crime. Details: Lyon, France: Interpol, 2018. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2019 at: https://enactafrica.org/research/analytical-reports/interpol-overview-of-serious-and-organised-crime-in-north-africa-2018 Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-12-12-interpol-north-africa-report.pdf Shelf Number: 154820 Keywords: Arms Trafficking Crime Syndicates Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Human Smuggling North Africa Organized Crime Transnational Organized Crime

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Fire and Ice: Conflict and Drugs in Myanmar's Shan State Summary: Myanmar's Shan State has emerged as one of the largest global centres for the production of crystal methamphetamine ("ice"). Large quantities of the drug, with a street value of tens of billions of dollars, are seized each year in Myanmar, neighbouring countries and across the Asia-Pacific. Production takes place in safe havens in Shan State held by militias and other paramilitary units allied with the Myanmar military, as well as in enclaves controlled by non-state armed groups. The trade in ice, along with amphetamine tablets and heroin, has become so large and profitable that it dwarfs the formal economy of Shan State, lies at the heart of its political economy, fuels criminality and corruption and hinders efforts to end the state's long-running ethnic conflicts. Myanmar's government should stop prosecuting users and small-scale sellers and work with its neighbours to disrupt the major networks and groups profiting from the trade. The military should better constrain pro-government militias and paramilitaries involved in the drugs trade, with an eye to their eventual demobilisation. The growing drugs trade in Shan State is in part a legacy of the area's ethnic conflicts. For decades, the Myanmar military has struck ceasefire deals with armed groups and established pro-government militias. Such groups act semi-autonomously and enjoy considerable leeway to pursue criminal activities. Indeed, conditions in parts of Shan State are ideal for large-scale drug production, which requires a kind of predictable insecurity: production facilities can be hidden from law enforcement and other prying eyes but insulated from disruptive violence. Tackling the drug trade presents a complex policy challenge involving security, law enforcement, political and public health aspects. But if the drugs trade is partly a symptom of Shan State's conflicts, it is also an obstacle to sustainably ending them. The trade, which now dwarfs legitimate business activities, creates a political economy inimical to peace and security. It generates revenue for armed groups of all stripes. Militias and other armed actors that control areas of production and trafficking routes have a disincentive to demobilise, given that weapons, territorial control and the absence of state institutions are essential to those revenues. The trade attracts transnational criminal groups and requires bribing officials for protection, support or to turn a blind eye, which allows a culture of payoffs and graft to flourish and adds to the grievances of ethnic minority communities that underpin the seventy-year old civil war. Myanmar's military, which has ultimate authority over militias and paramilitaries and profits from their activities, can only justify the existence of such groups in the context of the broader ethnic conflict in the state - so the military also has less incentive to end that conflict. Tackling the drug trade presents a complex policy challenge involving security, law enforcement, political and public health aspects. An integrated approach that addresses all of these areas will be needed to effectively address it: - Myanmar's government should redouble its drug control efforts, ending prosecutions of small-time dealers and users and refocusing on organised crime and corruption associated with the trade. The president should instruct and empower the Anti-Corruption Commission to prioritise this. - At the community level, the government should focus more on education and harm reduction, in line with its February 2018 National Drug Control Policy. It should work with relevant donors and international agencies to invest in education and harm reduction initiatives geared specifically toward the particular dangers of crystal meth use. Although crystal meth is currently not widely used in Myanmar, that is likely to change given the huge scale of production. - Myanmar's military should rethink the conflict management approaches it has employed for decades. In particular, it should exert greater control over - and ultimately disarm and disband - allied militias and paramilitary forces that are among the key players in the drug business. The impunity that these groups enjoy, and the requirement that they mostly fund themselves, has pushed them to engage in lucrative illicit activities. - The military should also investigate and take concerted action to end drug-related corruption within its ranks, focusing on senior officers who facilitate or turn a blind eye to the trade. - ​​​​​​​Myanmar's neighbours should stop illicit flows of precursors, the chemicals used to manufacture drugs, into Shan State. As the main source of such chemicals, China has a particular responsibility to end this trade taking place illegally across its south-western border. It should also use its influence over the Wa and Mongla armed groups controlling enclaves on the Chinese border to end their involvement in the drug trade and other criminal activities. Targeting the major players in the drug trade will not be easy and comes with risks of pushback, perhaps violent, from those involved. But the alternative - allowing parts of Shan State to continue to be a safe haven for this large-scale criminal enterprise - will see closer links between local armed actors, corrupt officials in Myanmar and the region, and transnational criminal organisations. The more such a system becomes entrenched, and the greater the profits it generates, the harder it will be to dislodge and the longer conflicts in that area are likely to persist. The people of Shan State, and Myanmar as a whole, will pay the highest price. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2019. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2019 at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/299-fire-and-ice-conflict-and-drugs-myanmars-shan-state Year: 2019 Country: Asia URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/299-fire-and-ice.pdf Shelf Number: 154750 Keywords: Corruption Crystal Meth Drug Dealing Drug Trade Drug Trafficking Ice Methamphetamine Myanmar Shan State

Author: InSight Crime Title: Criminal Game Changers 2018 Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Criminal GameChangers 2018, where we highlight the most important trends in organized crime in the Americas over the course of the year. From a rise in illicit drug availability and resurgence of monolithic criminal groups to the weakening of anti-corruption efforts and a swell in militarized responses to crime, 2018 was a year in which political issues were still often framed as left or right, but the only ideology that mattered was organized crime. Some of the worst news came from Colombia, where coca and cocaine production reached record highs amidst another year of bad news regarding the historic peace agreement with the region's oldest political insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC). The demobilization of ex-FARC members has been plagued by government ineptitude, corruption, human rights violations, and accusations of top guerrilla leaders' involvement in the drug trade. And it may have contributed directly and indirectly to the surge in coca and cocaine production. It was during this tumult that Colombia elected right wing politician Ivan Duque in May. Duque is the protege of former president and current Senator Alvaro Uribe. Their alliance could impact not just what's left of the peace agreement but the entire structure of the underworld where, during 2018, ex-FARC dissidents reestablished criminal fiefdoms or allied themselves with other criminal factions; and the last remaining rebel group, the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional - ELN), filled power vacuums in Colombia and neighboring Venezuela, making it one of our three criminal winners this year. Meanwhile, a new generation of traffickers emerged, one that prefers anonymity to the large, highly visible armies of yesteryear. Also of note in 2018 was a surge in synthetic drugs, most notably fentanyl. The synthetic opioid powered a scourge that led to more overdose deaths in the United States than any other drug. Fentanyl is no longer consumed as a replacement for heroin. It is now hidden in counterfeit prescription pills and mixed into cocaine and other legacy drugs. It is produced in Communist-ruled China and while much of it moves through the US postal system, some of it travels through Mexico on its way to the United States. During 2018, the criminal groups in Mexico seemed to be shifting their operations increasingly around it, especially given its increasing popularity, availability, and profitability. The result is some new possibly game changing alliances, most notably between Mexican and Dominican criminal organizations. Among these Mexican criminal groups is the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion - CJNG), another of our three criminal winners for 2018. The CJNG has avoided efforts to weaken it with a mix of sophisticated public relations, military tactics and the luck of circumstance - the government has simply been distracted. That is not the say it is invulnerable. The group took some big hits in its epicenter in 2018, and the US authorities put it on its radar, unleashing a series of sealed indictments against the group. Mexico's cartels battled each other even as they took advantage of booming criminal economies. The result was manifest in the record high in homicides this year. The deterioration in security opened the door to the July election of leftist candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. AMLO, as he is affectionately known, did not necessary run on security issues, but he may have won on them, and in the process, inherited a poisoned security chalice from his predecessor. While Pena Nieto can claim to have arrested or killed 110 of 122 criminal heads, AMLO faces closer to a thousand would-be leaders and hundreds of criminal groups.... Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2019. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2019 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CRIMINAL-GAMECHANGERS-2018-InSight-Crime.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CRIMINAL-GAMECHANGERS-2018-InSight-Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 155157 Keywords: Cocaine Criminal Networks Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Fentanyl Illicit Drugs Opioids Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: AMLO's Security Policy: Creative Ideas, Tough Reality Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- - Improving public safety, especially reducing Mexico's soaring murder rate, is the toughest challenge of Mexico's new president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (known as AMLO). - In November 2018, AMLO unveiled his National Peace and Security Plan 2018-2024, describing it as predominantly focused on the roots of insecurity, as opposed to confronting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The plan combines anti-corruption measures; economic policies; enhanced human rights protections; ethics reforms; public health, including treatment for drug use and exploration of drug legalization; transitional justice and amnesty for some criminals; and broader peace-building, to include traditional anti-crime measures such as prison reform and security sector reform, plus a new law enforcement force, the National Guard. - Various elements of his announced new security strategy-such as the formation of the National Guard - remain questionable and unclear and are unlikely to reduce violence quickly. - AMLO's proffered security strategy will likely create friction with the United States. Jointly countering fentanyl smuggling, however, could provide one venue of U.S.- Mexico cooperation. Corruption and Mexico's justice system - Combatting corruption is a foundational element of AMLO's security policy, and his administration has adopted a wide set of anti-corruption measures, including highly controversial and questionable ones. - However, AMLO has yet to appoint a dedicated anti-corruption prosecutor, make appointments to the National Anti-Corruption System, and support the 2016 National Anti-Corruption System reform. - AMLO has not broken with politically powerful and immensely corrupt unions, proposing instead to reverse reforms and lay off 70 percent of non-unionized federal workers. - It remains unclear whether AMLO will empower Mexico's civil society-crucial for reducing corruption-or continually define it as his antagonist. - AMLO's administration has not yet focused sufficiently on implementing the judicial reform by properly implementing the new prosecutorial system. - The administration has emphasized minimizing salary differences between public ministries, federal judges, prosecutors, and police officials. The weakness of prosecutors and their lack of cooperation with law enforcement and judges have been key stumbling blocks, keeping prosecution rates abysmally low. However, minimizing salary differences is inadequate. - Deleteriously, AMLO has refused to allow the independent selection of an autonomous attorney general. Focus on brutal crimes instead of drug trafficking groups and rejection of high-value targeting - The AMLO administration suspended focus on DTOs, drug trafficking, and high-value targeting of DTO leaders. Instead, it prioritizes "brutal crimes." But that strategy ignores the fact that key perpetrators of homicides, extortion, and robberies are DTOs. - Large law enforcement deployments to Tijuana and efforts to combat fuel theft have been interpreted by DTOs as direct confrontation. Instead, AMLO should prioritize targeting the most violent criminal groups, while deterring new outbreaks of violence. - The target should be the middle operational layer of a criminal group, seeking to disable the vast majority of the middle layer in one sweep, in order to reduce the group's regeneration capacity. - The Mexican government remains challenged in implementing such a policy by the continual lack of strategic and tactical intelligence in an ever more fragmented, mult-ipolar, and opaque criminal market, and by the continual corruption of Mexico's law enforcement apparatus. The National Guard -- - AMLO has not stopped using the Mexican military for domestic law enforcement. However, he has created a new structure combining military forces with Federal Police forces-The National Guard. - To be completed in three years, the National Guard is to be 150,000-strong. Sent initially to 17 areas with high homicide rates, the first contingent of 50,000 is to start functioning by April 2019. The head of the National Guard is a civilian, but much of the leadership is military.... Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute, 2019. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190325_mexico_anti-crime.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190325_mexico_anti-crime.pdf Shelf Number: 155191 Keywords: Criminal Justice Policy Criminal Justice System Drug Trafficking Homicides National Security Political Corruption Public Safety Security Forces Violent Crimes

Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Mexico's Out-of-Control Criminal Market Summary: This paper explores the trends, characteristics, and changes in the Mexican criminal market, in response to internal changes, government policies, and external factors. It explores the nature of violence and criminality, the behavior of criminal groups, and the effects of government responses. Over the past two decades, criminal violence in Mexico has become highly intense, diversified, and popularized, while the deterrence capacity of Mexican law enforcement remains critically low. The outcome is an ever more complex, multi-polar, and out-of-control criminal market that generates deleterious effects on Mexican society and makes it highly challenging for the Mexican state to respond effectively. Successive Mexican administrations have failed to sustainably reduce homicides and other violent crimes. Critically, the Mexican government has failed to rebalance power in the triangular relationship between the state, criminal groups, and society, while the Mexican population has soured on the anti-cartel project. Since 2000, Mexico has experienced extraordinarily high drug- and crime-related violence, with the murder rate in 2017 and again in 2018 breaking previous records. The fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups is both a purposeful and inadvertent effect of high-value targeting, which is a problematic strategy because criminal groups can replace fallen leaders more easily than insurgent or terrorist groups. The policy also disrupts leadership succession, giving rise to intense internal competition and increasingly younger leaders who lack leadership skills and feel the need to prove themselves through violence. Focusing on the middle layer of criminal groups prevents such an easy and violent regeneration of the leadership. But the Mexican government remains deeply challenged in middle-layer targeting due to a lack of tactical and strategic intelligence arising from corruption among Mexican law enforcement and political pressures that makes it difficult to invest the necessary time to conduct thorough investigations. In the absence of more effective state presence and rule of law, the fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups turned a multi-polar criminal market of 2006 into an ever more complex multi-polar criminal market. Criminal groups lack clarity about the balance of power among them, tempting them to take over one another's territory and engage in internecine warfare. The Mexican crime market's proclivity toward violence is exacerbated by the government's inability to weed out the most violent criminal groups and send a strong message that they will be prioritized in targeting. The message has not yet sunk in that violence and aggressiveness do not pay. For example, the destruction of the Zetas has been followed by the empowerment of the equally aggressive Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Like the Zetas, the Jalisco group centers its rule on brutality, brazenness, and aggressiveness. Like the Zetas and unlike the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG does not invest in and provide socio- economic goods and governance in order to build up political capital. Equally, the internal re-balancing among criminal groups has failed to weed out the most violent groups and the policy measures of the Mexican governments have failed to reduce the criminal groups' proclivity toward aggression and violence. The emergence of the CJNG has engulfed Mexico and other supply-chain countries, such as Colombia,in its war with the Sinaloa Cartel. The war between the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG provides space for local criminal upstarts, compounds instability by shifting local alliances, and sets off new splintering within the two large cartels and among their local proxies. To the extent that violence has abated in particular locales, the de-escalation has primarily reflected a "narco-peace," with one criminal group able to establish control over a particular territory and its corruption networks. It is thus vulnerable to criminal groups' actions as well as to high-value targeting of top drug traffickers. In places such as Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and Monterrey, local law enforcement and anti-crime socio-economic policies helped in various degrees to reduce violence. When the narco-peace was undermined, the policies proved insufficient. At other times, the reduction of violence that accompanied a local narco-peace gave rise to policy complacency and diminished resources. Socio-economic policies to combat crime have spread resources too thinly across Mexico to be effective. Violence in Mexico has become diversified over the past decade, with drug trafficking groups becoming involved in widespread extortion of legal businesses, kidnapping, illegal logging, illegal fishing, and smuggling of migrants. That is partially a consequence of the fragmentation, as smaller groups are compelled to branch out into a variety of criminal enterprises. But for larger groups, extortion of large segments of society is not merely a source of money, but also of authority. Violence and criminality have also become "popularized," both in terms of the sheer number of actors and also the types of actors involved, such as "anti-crime" militias. Widespread criminality increases the coercive credibility of individual criminals and small groups, while hiding their identities. Low effective prosecution rates and widespread impunity tempt many individuals who would otherwise be law-abiding citizens to participate in crime. Anti-crime militias that have emerged in Mexico have rarely reduced violence in a sustained way. Often, they engage in various forms of criminality, including homicides, extortion, and human rights abuses against local residents, and they undermine the authority of the state. Government responses to the militias-including acquiescence, arrests, and efforts to roll them into state paramilitary forces-have not had a significant impact. In fact, the strength and emergence of militia groups in places such as Michoacan and Guerrero reflect a long-standing absence of the government, underdevelopment, militarization, and abuse of political power. In places such as Guerrero, criminality and militia formation has become intertwined with the U.S. opioid epidemic that has stimulated the expansion of poppy cultivation in Mexico. The over-prescription of opioids in the United States created a major addiction epidemic, with users turning to illegal alternatives when they were eventually cut off from prescription drugs. Predictably, poppy cultivation shot up in Mexico, reaching some 30,000 hectares in 2017. Areas of poppy cultivation are hotly contested among Mexican drug trafficking groups, with their infighting intensely exacerbating the insecurity of poor and marginalized poppy farmers. Efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation have often failed to sustainably reduce illicit crop cultivation and complicated policies to pacify these areas, often thrusting poppy farmers deeper into the hands of criminal groups that sponsor and protect the cultivation. Eradication is easier than providing poppy farmers with alternative livelihoods. Combined with the Trump administration's demands for eradication, the Enrique Peea Nieto administration, and Mexico historically, showed little interest in seriously pursuing a different path. Poppy eradication in Mexico does not shrink the supply of illegal opioids destined for the U.S. market, since farmers replant poppies after eradication and can always shift areas of production. The rise of fentanyl abuse in the United States, however, has suppressed opium prices in Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations and dealers prefer to traffic and sell fentanyl, mostly supplied to the United States from China, because of its bulk-potency-profit ratio. The CJNG became a pioneer in fentanyl smuggling through Mexico into the United States, but the Sinaloa Cartel rapidly developed its own fentanyl supply chain. Although the drug is deadly, the Sinaloa Cartel's means of distribution remain non- violent in the United States. Fentanyl enters the United States from Mexico through legal ports of entry. In the short term, fentanyl has not altered the dynamics of Mexico's criminal market, but in the long term, fentanyl can significantly upend global drug markets and the prioritization of drug control in U.S. agendas with other countries. If many users switch to synthetic drugs, the United States may lose interest in promoting eradication of drug crops. Such a switch would also weaken the power of criminal and insurgent groups who sponsor illicit crop cultivation. Even if they switch to the production of synthetic drugs, they will only have the capacity to sponsor the livelihoods of many fewer people, thus diminishing their political capital with local populations and making it less costly for the government to conduct counter-narcotics operations. Mexico's violence can decline in two ways. First, a criminal group can temporarily win enough turf and establish enough deterrence capacity to create a narco-peace, as has been the case so far. Alternatively, violence can decline when the state at last systematically builds up enough deterrence capacity against the criminals and realigns local populations with the state, from which they are now often alienated. Mexico must strive to achieve this objective. Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute, 2019. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155192 Keywords: Criminal Cartels Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Fentanyl Homicides Narcotics Opioids Organized Crime Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Violence

Author: Calderon, Laura Title: Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Analysis Through 2018 Summary: Justice in Mexico, a research-based program at the University of San Diego, released its 2019 report on Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, co-authored by Laura Calderon, Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk. This report analyzes the latest available data to broadly assess the current state of violence, organized crime, and human rights in Mexico. The tenth edition in a series is published under a new title to reflect the gradual shift that has occurred to the restructuring illicit drug trade and the rise of new organized crime groups. In 2018, Mexico saw record violence with 28,816 homicide cases and 33,341 victims reported by the Mexican National Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Publica, SNSP). This reflects the continued augmentation in violent crime in Mexico for more than a decade with a notable increase in the last few years. The homicide rate has dramatically escalated from 16.9 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 as reported to UNODC to 27.3 per 100,000 in 2018 based on SNSP figures. In this and past reports, the authors attribute much of the violence, between a third to a half, to the presence of organized crime groups, particularly drug trafficking organizations. According to the report, violence has become more pervasive throughout the country but remains highly concentrated in a few specific areas, especially in the major drug trafficking zones located in the northwest and the Pacific Coast. The top ten most violent municipalities in Mexico accounted for 33.6% of all homicides in Mexico in 2018, with 24.7% concentrated in the top five: Tijuana (2,246), Ciudad Juarez (1,004), Acapulco (839), Cancun-Benito Juarez (537), Culiacan (500). Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2019. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Organized-Crime-and-Violence-in-Mexico-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Organized-Crime-and-Violence-in-Mexico-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155611 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Human Rights Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime

Author: Campos, Juan C. Title: State Incoordination and Political Assassinations in Mexico: Why does the Mexican Government Fail to Protect Mayors from Drug-Trafficking Organizations? Summary: Does state incoordination increase the number of political assassinations in new democracies? In this paper, I answer this question by observing the relationship between political assassinations by drug-trafficking organizations and the lack of party coordination across the state and federal levels of government in Mexico. Despite large bodies of research on political violence, few studies to date have examined this link (Rios, 2015; Duran-Martinez 2015). Specifically, using data compiled by Justice in Mexico, I expect to find that if the two levels of government are not ruled by the same political party between 2005 and 2017, this signals that Mexico's security institutions lack coordination, so the state's ability to protect mayors from assassinations will decline. This is because rule by a single party facilitates cooperation across all levels of government. Such cooperation is necessary to allocate resources properly while combating cartels and stifling their operations, including political assassinations. However, states whose political parties differ from the federal government's party affiliation are - for political reasons - less likely to witness coordination and therefore incapable of protecting mayors from being assassinated. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2018. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: JUSTICE IN MEXICO, WORKING PAPER SERIES, Volume 15, Number 2: Accessed May 9, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/181010_Working-Paper_CAMPOS_JUAN.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/181010_Working-Paper_CAMPOS_JUAN.pdf Shelf Number: 155728 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Political Assassinations Political Violence

Author: Torres Quintero, Astrid Title: Colombia - Ninos y ninas con madres y padres encarcelados por delitos de drogas menores no violentos ( 103/5000 Colombia - Children with mothers and fathers imprisoned for minor non-violent drug offenses) Summary: In Colombia, there are currently 115,862 people deprived of their liberty, despite the fact that The capacity of the institutions of confinement is for 79,211 (INPEC, 2018). This situation of overcrowding generates multiple violations of human rights, recognized by the Court Constitutional, that declared an "unconstitutional state of affairs" in prison matters, is say, a serious and massive situation of violation of rights for the private population of the freedom, derived from multiple factors and that, for its improvement, requires actions of all the competent institutions (Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2013 and 2015). However, the recognition of the serious situation suffered by people who are in seclusion does not imply the visibility of other subjects who suffer the impacts of imprisonment, as are families and, especially, children and adolescents (NNA, from now on) whose parents are deprived of freedom, for which reason they are out of focus of attention for making decisions both in terms of prison policy, and in the field of policies aimed at protecting the rights of children and adolescents. In the case of non-violent drug-related crimes, despite the fact that there has been debate over the impact of criminal treatment mainly on the people who carry out the traffic and sale of psychoactive substances, because of the vulnerability that characterizes them, little has been said about their family contexts and the effects they may suffer as a consequence of imprisonment. This invisibility is serious in the Colombian context, where the drug trafficking has especially impacted on family and community relations, not only as a consequence of this activity in itself, but also because of the effect that the hardening of sentences and the premise that they should focus on the use of prison. Therefore, although the vulnerability of persons deprived of their liberty is recognized and, in As a consequence, penal and penitentiary policies are questioned (for example, in terms of use of preventive detention and toughening of sentences in some crimes), these questions do not include analyzes related to the affectations suffered by children and adolescents as a result of the imprisonment of their parents. Several studies allow us to conclude that the populations that suffer the most the consequences of this criminal hardening are those that are in conditions of vulnerability, as women, who usually participate in the stages of transport and sale. However, these investigations do not delve into the effects that deprivation of liberty has on children and adolescents, with the exception of some mentions that are reached as a consequence of the observation of the situation of women who are mothers and are imprisoned. Details: Church World Service, 2018. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2019 at: http://www.cwslac.org/nnapes-pdd/docs/PDD-Colombia.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.cwslac.org/nnapes-pdd/docs/PDD-Colombia.pdf Shelf Number: 155873 Keywords: Children of Inmates Drug Offenders Drug Trafficking Families of Prisoners Human Rights Abuses Prison Policy Rights of Children

Author: Economist Intelligence Unit Title: The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index: Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro Summary: Geography, history and political culture (characterised by high levels of corruption) combine in the economies of the former Yugoslavia (and the Balkans in general) to create a range of issues when it comes to combatting illicit trade. Serbia, for one, lies on a major trade corridor known as the Balkan route, which is used by criminal groups for various activities, including human trafficking and the trafficking of drugs coming from Asia and South America. Montenegro's ports are similarly used as transit points for the unloading and reloading of illicit cargo destined for Central and Western Europe. Bosnia's porous borders with the former two economies, as well as with neighbouring Croatia, enable easy transit from Eastern Europe and the Balkans region to economies in Western Europe. This could be made worse by the adoption of a Visa Liberalisation Agreement between the European Union's (EU) Schengen zone and Kosovo (which lies in an area considered by Serbia to be vulnerable to trafficking), expected by the end of the year. Compounding the problem, the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the accompanying conflicts, is thought to have led to an increased risk of terrorism in the region - with an increase in Islamic radicalisation and in nationals of countries and territories in the region joining the so-called Islamic State (IS) as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Ethnic separatist and religious extremist groups are active in some southern regions of Serbia and Kosovo, whose declaration of independence in 2008 was not recognised by Belgrade. These factors lead to increased terrorist financing and thus money laundering. Bosnia's complex and decentralised government structure has also been an obstacle to reforms, and corruption is prevalent in all three economies. This briefing paper will look at the illicit trade environment in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro across the four categories of the index: government policy, supply and demand, transparency and trade, and the customs environment. It will consider how these economies compare at global and regional levels, as well as looking at some of the details particular to each. Details: New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2018. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Shelf Number: 156582 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups Financing of Terrorism Human Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Trade Organized Crime Political Corruption Terrorism

Author: Economist Intelligence Unit Title: The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index: Asia Summary: Economies around the world are facing the blight of illicit trade, but perhaps nowhere more so than in Asia-Pacifc. The region, long a source of supply for illicit goods - be it counterfeits, drugs, or traffcking in humans or illicit wildlife - is now emerging as a major source of demand, compounding the problem signifcantly. And although not much hard data are available, it is quite clear that "due to rising affuence in Asia and other major consuming economies, illicit trade volumes have gone up," says Steven Galster, founder and executive director of the Freeland Foundation, an Asia based non-governmental organisation (NGO) focused on environmental conservation and human rights, who cited the trade in endangered species, specifically. As a result, wildlife species are disappearing at alarming rates; pirated and mislabelled products are traded freely across borders and sold openly within them, with varied rates of concern and control on the part of governments; narcotics-related incidents frequently make headlines of regional newspapers; human trafficking is becoming even more common, abated and masked at the same time by various refugee crises in South-east Asia; illegal logging remains a threat to deforestation throughout the region, spurring corruption and lining the pockets of criminals with piles of cash; and illegal arms sales are rampant. The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index is a tool not to measure the size of the problem, but to better understand underlying vulnerabilities in economies that give rise to illicit trade or fail to inhibit it. Although the size of the problem in monetary terms is hard to measure, it is clear the sums of illegal money involved are huge, and there is a consensus on the need to curb illicit trade. Through this study, we hope to provide insight on how economies can use the tools at their disposal to create the right environment to do so. Given Asia's geographic, economic and political diversity, it should come as no surprise that its economies have had varying degrees of success in - and varying attitudes towards - combating illicit trade. As the region continues to grow, and as it moves towards deeper economic and trade integration via various trade agreements and related initiatives, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community (AEC), there will be an attendant need for it to implement stricter policies on illicit trade. Its record so far is not encouraging. There have, however, been some positive developments in recent years, says Jeremy Douglas, regional representative of the UN Offce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for South-east Asia and the Pacifc. Mr Douglas notes that there has been "increasing political interest" in addressing illicit trade and [we are seeing] a couple of key ASEAN member states prioritising action on border management and scanning illicit flows of all kinds. Nevertheless, he does caution that political interest "hasn't translated into practical change yet". To measure how nations are addressing the issue of illicit trade, the Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT) has commissioned the Economist Intelligence Unit to produce the Global Illicit Trade Environment Index. The global index expands upon an Asia-specifc version, originally created by The Economist Intelligence Unit in 2016 to score 17 economies in Asia on the extent to which they enabled or prevented illicit trade. The Asian index generated much-needed attention on the issue of illicit trade within the region. Building upon the success of the Asia index, the global index now includes 84 economies, providing a global perspective and new insights on the social and economic impacts of illicit trade. This briefng paper focuses on the 21 economies in the Asia-Pacific covered by the index. For an explanation of how the global illicit index differs from the 2016 index, please consult the methodology in the appendix. Details: New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2018. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_asia_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Asia URL: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_asia_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Shelf Number: 156583 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Endangered Species Human Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Trade Wildlife Crime Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Kennert, Matthias Title: A Militarized Political Weapon: The Philippines' War on Drugs Summary: Since July 2016, communities in the Philippines have been subjected to a violent nationwide police crackdown on illegal drugs, which has courted international condemnation and prompted a possible investigation to be opened by the International Criminal Court. The Philippine leader, Rodrigo Duterte, who took office as president in June 2016, rose to political power on the back of promises to end the country's 'drug crisis'. The illicit drug economy of the Philippines exists - and thrives - owing to the complicity of law-enforcement agents, politicians and the military with the drug-trade networks. Ironically, the very people who are tasked with tackling the country's illicit drug trades are instead colluding and cooperating with drug traders for their own financial gain. Police officers, soldiers and politicians of all ranks have assembled a protective net around the country's drug markets for their own economic benefit, in what has become a highly enmeshed narco-political web. The chief of the Philippines National Police (PNP) has claimed that more than 300 of his officers are conspirators in the drug business, while the president of the Philippines, Duterte, in 2016 named five police generals as playing a central role in sustaining the drug trade. The sheer scale of this collusion led some members of the security sector to comment: 'When the [drug war] campaign started, we realized that the problem was bigger than expected, with many branches of the political system deeply entrenched in the drug trade.' Details: Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 24, 2019 at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/TGIATOC-Drug-related-violence-in-the-Philippines-report-1938-web-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Philippines URL: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/TGIATOC-Drug-related-violence-in-the-Philippines-report-1938-web-2.pdf Shelf Number: 156608 Keywords: Drug Enforcement Drug Offenders Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Illegal Drugs Illicit Drugs Organized Crime War on Drugs

Author: Magliocca, Nicholas R. Title: Modeling Cocaine Traffickers and Counterdrug Interdiction Forces as a Complex Adaptive System Summary: Abstract: Counterdrug interdiction efforts designed to seize or disrupt cocaine shipments between South American source zones and US markets remain a core US "supply side" drug policy and national security strategy. However, despite a long history of US-led interdiction efforts in the Western Hemisphere, cocaine movements to the United States through Central America, or "narco-trafficking," continue to rise. Here, we developed a spatially explicit agent-based model (ABM), called "NarcoLogic," of narco-trafficker operational decision making in response to interdiction forces to investigate the root causes of interdiction ineffectiveness across space and time. The central premise tested was that spatial proliferation and resiliency of narco-trafficking are not a consequence of ineffective interdiction, but rather part and natural consequence of interdiction itself. Model development relied on multiple theoretical perspectives, empirical studies, media reports, and the authors' own years of field research in the region. Parameterization and validation used the best available, authoritative data source for illicit cocaine flows. Despite inherently biased, unreliable, and/or incomplete data of a clandestine phenomenon, the model compellingly reproduced the "cat-and-mouse" dynamic between narco-traffickers and interdiction forces others have qualitatively described. The model produced qualitatively accurate and quantitatively realistic spatial and temporal patterns of cocaine trafficking in response to interdiction events. The NarcoLogic model offers a much-needed, evidence-based tool for the robust assessment of different drug policy scenarios, and their likely impact on trafficker behavior and the many collateral damages associated with the militarized war on drugs. Details: S.L.: Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences of the United States of America, 2018. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 27, 2019 at: https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/16/7784.full.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.pnas.org/content/116/16/7784 Shelf Number: 157047 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trade Drug Traffickers Drug Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Trade Narcotics War on Drugs