Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:02 pm
Time: 12:02 pm
Results for drug trafficking (mexico)
28 results foundAuthor: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia Summary: This policy paper addresses the issue of how to reduce violence in Mexico. It first describes the illegal drug economy in Mexico, contrasts the situation in Mexico with Colombia and the Plan Colombia, and then argues that although public policy analyses center comparisons on and draw lessons from Plan Colombia, the better analogy for Mexico is Colombia before Plan Colombia, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The paper ends with a brief decription of the Mexican reponse and the Merida Initiative and offers recommendations for a new strategy in Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009. 29p. Source: Policy Paper, No. 12; Foreign Policy at Brookings Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 113769 Keywords: Drug Control (Mexico)Drug Trafficking (Mexico)DrugsViolent Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Astorga, Luis Title: Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context Summary: This paper looks at the increase in violence in Mexico among trafficking organizations and the efforts and prospective strategies available to counter the drug trafficking networks. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, 2010. 29p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 13, 2010 at http://http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Drug%20Trafficking%20Organizations.%20Astorga%20and%20Shirk.pdf; Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Drug%20Trafficking%20Organizations.%20Astorga%20and%20Shirk.pdf; Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Shelf Number: 119596 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlOrganized Crime |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security Summary: La Familia Michoacana burst onto the national stage on September 6, 2006, when ruffians crashed into the seedy Sol y Sombra nightclub in Uruapan, Michoacán, and fired shots into the air. They screamed at the revelers to lie down, ripped open a plastic bag, and lobbed five human heads onto the beer-stained black and white dance floor. The day before these macabre pyrotechnics, the killers seized their prey from a mechanic’s shop and hacked off their heads with bowie knives while the men writhed in pain. “You don’t do something like that unless you want to send a big message,” said a U.S. law-enforcement official, speaking on condition of anonymity about an act of human depravity that would “cast a pall over the darkest nooks of hell.” The desperados left behind a note hailing their act as “divine justice,” adding that: "The Family doesn't kill for money; it doesn't kill women; it doesn't kill innocent people; only those who deserve to die, die. Everyone should know . . . this is divine justice.” While claiming to do the “Lord’s work,” the ruthless leaders of this syndicate have emerged as the dominant exporter of methamphetamines to the United States, even as they control scores of municipalities in Michoacán and neighboring states. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2010 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1033 Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1033 Shelf Number: 120529 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Violence |
Author: Barria Issa, Cecar A. Title: The Use of Terrorism by Drug Trafficking Organizations' Paramilitary Groups in Mexico Summary: "In the early 1990s, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) created their own military arms that later evolved into sophisticated paramilitary groups, now engaged in an all-out war against the state and/or anyone who represents an obstacle for their criminal activities. Furthermore, they are not hesitating to use tactics of extreme violence as terrorism to psychologically impact their enemies and those civilians not supporting them. Historically, terrorism related to drugs is new in Mexico but not in Latin America. The illegal drug trade has funded terrorist groups in Peru and Colombia, empowered criminal organizations and caused them to challenge the state's authority. An objective comparison of these cases can teach important lessons and show new paths to follow in the solution of Mexico's costly conflict. This thesis will define: How, where and why are DTO's paramilitary groups opting for terrorism in Mexico. It will outline the proper mechanisms to counter that terrorism. There is a long way to go to win the war on drugs in Mexico, but in order to apply new long term, less direct, and more social-based strategies, it is urgent for the state to set the proper security conditions in the short term." Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Theses: Accessed February 17, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136969&coll=limited Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136969&coll=limited Shelf Number: 120810 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Illegal TradeParamilitary GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Shirk, David A. Title: The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat Summary: The drug war in Mexico has caused some U.S. analysts to view Mexico as a failed or failing state. While these fears are exaggerated, the problems of widespread crime and violence, government corruption, and inadequate access to justice pose grave challenges for the Mexican state. The Obama administration has therefore affirmed its commitment to assist Mexico through continued bilateral collaboration, funding for judicial and security sector reform, and building “resilient communities.” This paper analyzes the drug war in Mexico, explores Mexico’s capacities and limitations, examines the factors that have undermined effective state performance, assesses the prospects for U.S. support to strengthen critical state institutions, and offers recommendations for reducing the potential of state failure. He argues that the United States should help Mexico address its pressing crime and corruption problems by going beyond traditional programs to strengthen the country’s judicial and security sector capacity and help it build stronger political institutions, a more robust economy, and a thriving civil society. Details: Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Council Special Report No. 60: Accessed March 17, 2011 at: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262?co=C009602 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262?co=C009602 Shelf Number: 121051 Keywords: Drug EnforcementDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlViolence |
Author: U.S. Senate. Caucus on International Narcotics Control Title: U.S. and Mexican Responses to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Violence in Mexico continues unhindered without any signs of slowing. This report outlines a series of concrete steps the United States can take to support the Mexican government in its fight against drug trafficking organizations and drug-related violence. While our security partnership with Mexico has deepened in recent years, more can be done to help. The attached report synthesizes information gathered by Caucus staff through a country visit, briefings, interviews, and a review of documents from both government and non-government subject matter experts. The report describes the current strategy and provides important recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: The Caucus, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/Mexico-Report-Final-5-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/Mexico-Report-Final-5-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 121837 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Control PolicyDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized Crime |
Author: Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas Title: Journalism in Times of Threats, Censorship and Violence Summary: Journalism in Times of Threats, Censorship and Violence, a report from the workshop “Cross-border Coverage of U.S.–Mexico Drug Trafficking” held March 2000 in Austin, Texas. This report presents a summary of the experiences shared by the participating journalists and the presentations made by experts. The working conditions for journalists covering the drug trade on the border have become increasingly difficult, and Mexico has become one of the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists, according to studies by journalism organizations and human rights groups since the mid-2000s. More than 20 journalists have been killed in Mexico since President Felipe Calderón launched his anti-drug campaign in December 2006. The text deals with violence and other challenges faced by journalists covering the drug trade. It explains how journalists face different levels of risk, depending on whether they are members of the foreign press corps, Mexican reporters who work and live in Mexico City, local journalists who live and work in the cities directly affected by drug trafficking violence, or reporters who run specific risks by crossing the border every day to cover the drug trafficking beat. The report also addresses the evolution of the history of the drug trade in Mexico. It explains that journalists on both sides of the border have reported for decades on links between state and local authorities and drug groups. But the outbreak of drug-related violence that began in the last decade is a new phenomenon that has rapidly intensified, turned more brutal, and spread to parts of Mexico that were once peaceful. The report concludes that questions about how to perform quality journalism while keeping reporters safe in the violent, rapidly changing environment of drug trafficking on the U.S.–Mexico border can not be answered in a single workshop. Networking and collaboration among Mexican and U.S. colleagues is fundamental to informing the public on both sides of the border. Details: Austin, TX: Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas, 2010. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://knightcenter.utexas.edu/ebook/journalism-times-threats-censorship-and-violence Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://knightcenter.utexas.edu/ebook/journalism-times-threats-censorship-and-violence Shelf Number: 121942 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)MediaViolence |
Author: Bjerke, Maxwell E. Title: Explaining Variation in the Apprehension of Mexican Drug Trafficking Cartel Leaders Summary: Successive Mexican administrations have turned to the deployment of military and federal law enforcement agencies to respond to crises, recently focusing in particular on targeting the leaders of major drug cartels in their counternarcotics efforts. However, since 2000 Mexico’s government’s efforts to control criminal activities in these cities have met with varying success. During that period, the Mexican federal government has apprehended ten leading members of the Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), one of the most prolific drug trafficking organizations. In contrast, only three major cartel leaders have been apprehended from the Carrillo Fuentes Organization, (CFO), another enduring drug trafficking organization. This thesis draws upon theories of organization and path dependence to explain variation in the Mexican government’s success in arresting major cartel leaders. It argues that variation between the AFO and CFO in their internal structures — in particular, the AFO’s low level of professionalism relative to that of the CFO — has facilitated the apprehension of the AFO leadership. In terms of path dependence, the thesis finds that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s focus on the AFO is due to the legacy of a random event, the AFO predecessor’s role in the 1985 kidnapping and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. The DEA has clung to this case across twenty-five years and therefore has remained focused on the AFO, in order to justify U.S. counterdrug efforts in Mexico. Changing U.S.-Mexico relations have facilitated the DEA’s focus on the AFO, particularly since 2000. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 21, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada524554.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada524554.pdf Shelf Number: 122141 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking Control |
Author: Campbell, David R. Title: Evaluating the Impact of Drug Trafficking Organizations on the Stability of the Mexican State Summary: Since 2007, when President Felipe Calderon declared his government’s war on the drug trafficking organizations operating in his country, the level of narcotics related violence has increased dramatically. The violence, which had been largely confined to factions of the cartels, now threatens every citizen and is devastating the economy of the border region. This thesis evaluates the impact of Mexican drug cartels on the stability of the Mexican State and on the security of the U.S. The primary conclusion drawn is that the Mexican state is unlikely to fail as state failure is defined, but the Mexican government is likely to return to a one party system under which drug trafficking and corruption are tolerated but the violence does not directly affect the average Mexican. While current U.S. efforts toward increased border security and assistance to Mexico in the form of the Merida Initiative have made positive impacts, it is only by decreasing U.S. demand for illegal narcotics and encouraging Mexican economic growth that both nations can make real progress in the drug war. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 22, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada524420.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada524420.pdf Shelf Number: 122143 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlDrugsMerida Initiative |
Author: Schaefer, Agnes Gereben Title: Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Policy Options Summary: The security structure in Mexico is characterized by shifting responsibilities, duplication of services, and general instability, along with a lack of coordination among federal, state, and local security forces. The backdrop of a deteriorating security situation in Mexico and change in administration in the United States demands a closer examination of potential priorities and policy options to guide future U.S.-Mexico relations. U.S. aid to Mexico has typically focused on a narrow set of outputs — improved technology, training, and equipment to prevent drug trafficking. Despite these efforts, Mexico's security situation continues to deteriorate. To help inform debate, this study examined a set of policy options for the United States (strategic partnership, status quo, and retrenchment), along with promising potential policy priorities (help Mexico streamline delivery of security services, bridge the gap between federal and local security, support Mexico's efforts to address domestic security concerns, and build trust in security institutions). Problems related to drug and human trafficking, corruption, weapon smuggling, and gang violence have spilled into the United States, reaching far beyond the border. For this and other reasons, the United States has a significant stake in the success or failure of Mexico's security reform measures. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG876.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG876.pdf Shelf Number: 122145 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)DrugsGang ViolenceGangs |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond Summary: Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security and governance in Mexico. According to Mexican government data, organized crime-related violence claimed more than 34,500 lives in Mexico between January 2007 and December 2010. That toll may now exceed 40,000. Escalating violence has increased U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States. Mexican drug trafficking organizations dominate the U.S. illicit drug market and are now considered the greatest organized crime threat facing the United States. In recent years, U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly, largely as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and Central America that was first proposed in October 2007. Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico, with an early emphasis on training and equipping Mexican security forces engaged in counterdrug efforts. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to intensify its efforts against transnational criminal organizations and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. With funding for the original Mérida Initiative technically ending in FY2010 and new initiatives underway for Central America and the Caribbean, the Obama Administration worked with the Mexican government to develop a new four-pillar strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. That strategy, adopted in March 2010, focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. The first two pillars largely build upon existing efforts, whereas pillars three and four broaden the scope of Mérida programs to include efforts to facilitate “secure flows” through the U.S.-Mexico border and to improve conditions in violence-prone border cities. Congress appropriated $143.0 million in Mérida assistance for Mexico for FY2011 in P.L. 112-10. The Administration requested $282 million in Mérida assistance for FY2012. As of August 1, 2011, a total of $473.8 million worth of assistance had been provided to Mexico. The 112th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative, as well as examining the degree to which the U.S. and Mexican governments are fulfilling their pledges to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region. Congress may also examine the degree to which the Administration’s new strategy for the Mérida Initiative complements other counterdrug and border security efforts as outlined in the 2011 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. Given current budget constraints, Congress may also debate how best to measure the impact of current and future Mérida Initiative programs. Another congressional interest is likely to focus on whether human rights conditions placed on Mérida Initiative funding are appropriate or sufficient. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: R41349: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Shelf Number: 122670 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug ControlDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Merida InitiativeOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: Threat Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico Summary: Until the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they usually abided by informal rules of conduct hammered out between several capos and representatives of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country until the 1990s. Relying on bribes, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities. In return for the legal authorities turning a blind eye, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned high-tech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their children’s weddings. Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico’s barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could clinch the desired arrangement. Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed the “live and let live” ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often hid cocaine and other drugs among the merchandise that moved northward through Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits for cocaine traffickers--a phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge of electoral victories. Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are vigilante activities. With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of justice that enjoys a groundswell of support. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Shelf Number: 122800 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceVigilantismViolent Crime |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform Summary: Violent drug-trafficking organizations (VDTOs) in Mexico produce, transship, and deliver into the United States tens of billions of dollars worth of narcotics annually, but their activities are not limited to drug trafficking. VDTOs have also engaged in human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, racketeering, and assassinations. In an effort to clarify the scope and details of the challenges posed by VDTOs, a RAND team conducted a Delphi expert elicitation exercise, the results of which offer an assessment of the contemporary security situation in Mexico through the lens of existing RAND research on related issues. The exercise centered around three strands of prior RAND research on urban instability and unrest, historical insurgencies, and defense-sector reform. Although this prior research was not designed specifically for the study of Mexico, all three areas offer applicable insights. Assessment scorecards from these projects were used to obtain input from the expert panel and to guide the resulting discussion. The goal was not to break significant new ground in understanding the dynamics of drug violence in Mexico or to offer a qualitative assessment of these dynamics, but rather to provide an empirically based platform for identifying key areas that merit further investigation. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 108p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html Shelf Number: 123414 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug CartelsDrug EnforcementDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Illegal DrugsViolence |
Author: Bricker, Kristin Title: Military Justice and Impunity in Mexico’s Drug War Summary: Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s military deployment to combat the country’s war on drugs has been strongly criticized by international human rights groups. During Calderón’s administration, over 47,337 people have been killed and thousands of human rights complaints have been filed against the military. The Inter- American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has issued several binding rulings that obligate Mexico to strip the military of its jurisdiction to investigate and try soldiers accused of violating civilians’ human rights. On July 12, 2011, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled that Congress must reform the Code of Military Justice so that human rights abuse cases always fall under civilian jurisdiction. The Arce Initiative, brought forward by Senator René Arce from Mexico’s opposition party, is the only proposed reform that complies with the IACtHR rulings and international human rights law. The Merida Initiative, a US aid package designed to assist in the fight against the war on drugs, places too much emphasis on the military and law enforcement, and needs to be revised. Civilian rule of law in Mexico can be strengthened by donor governments who are willing to help implement measures to increase transparency, combat corruption and rampant human rights abuses, and ease the transition to an accusatorial oral justice system. Details: Waterloo, ONT: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2011. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: SSR Issue Papers: No. 3: Accessed January 19, 2012 at: http://mafiaandco.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/military-justice-and-impunity-in-mexico_s-drug-war.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://mafiaandco.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/military-justice-and-impunity-in-mexico_s-drug-war.pdf Shelf Number: 123665 Keywords: CorruptionDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Human RightsWar on Drugs |
Author: Dell, Melissa Title: Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War Summary: Drug trade-related violence has escalated dramatically in Mexico during the past fi ve years, claiming 40,000 lives and raising concerns about the capacity of the Mexican state to monopolize violence. This study examines how drug traffickers' economic objectives influence the direct and spillover effects of Mexican policy towards the drug trade. By exploiting variation from close mayoral elections and a network model of drug trafficking, the study develops three sets of results. First, regression discontinuity estimates show that drug trade-related violence in a municipality increases substantially after the close election of a mayor from the conservative National Action Party (PAN), which has spearheaded the war on drug trafficking. This violence consists primarily of individuals involved in the drug trade killing each other. The empirical evidence suggests that the violence reflects rival traffickers' attempts to wrest control of territories after crackdowns initiated by PAN mayors have challenged the incumbent criminals. Second, the study accurately predicts diversion of drug traffic following close PAN victories. It does this by estimating a model of equilibrium routes for trafficking drugs across the Mexican road network to the U.S. When drug traffic is diverted to other municipalities, drug trade-related violence in these municipalities increases. Moreover, female labor force participation and informal sector wages fall, corroborating qualitative evidence that traffickers extort informal sector producers. Finally, the study uses the trafficking model and estimated spillover effects to examine the allocation of law enforcement resources. Overall, the results demonstrate how traffickers' economic objectives and constraints imposed by the routes network affect the policy outcomes of the Mexican Drug War. Details: Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Seminar in series: Job Market Talks : Accessed January 26, 2012 at: http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/7398 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/7398 Shelf Number: 123761 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)NetworksViolent Crime |
Author: Hale, Gary J. Title: A "Failed State" in Mexico: Tamaulipas Declares Itself Ungovernable Summary: Mexico finds itself in a precarious position, given the level of victimization that the drug cartel wars are imposing on its citizens and the resultant loss of civil authority that is increasingly being eroded by pressures placed on local and state governments by drug trafficking organizations. The larger part of the violence is occurring in two regions in Mexico - namely, the Pacific states, where drugs and chemicals are introduced into the country; and the northern border, where those same illegal commodities are ultimately exported into the United States. Criminality is visibly gaining ground over local governments, gradually subverting the abilities of mayors and governors to function effectively. Drug cartels are controlling police assets from behind the barrel of a gun or with more money than public coffers can afford, thereby negating the ability of elected officials to direct security resources from the chambers of city halls and state government houses. The cartels make and enforce their own rules, often with little to no interference from legitimate municipal authorities. Mexican officials continue being threatened, kidnapped, tortured, and killed, most often with impunity, and common folk are in fear, unable to freely carry on the tasks of daily living because of the war that endlessly rages around them. The implications of an admitted loss of governmental control in the Mexico border area stretching from Nueva Ciudad Guerrero in the northwest to Matamoros in the southeast, and beyond to Monterrey and Ciudad Juarez is troubling not only because the cartels are victimizing anyone who crosses their path, or that drug smuggling is occurring despite warring among the cartels and between the cartels and the government, but because the adjacent states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, and Chihuahua could readily suffer the same loss of control if the strength and influence of the cartels are not reversed and subsequently eliminated. Details: Houston, TX: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/DRUG-pub-HaleTamaulipasFailedState-072611.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/DRUG-pub-HaleTamaulipasFailedState-072611.pdf Shelf Number: 123911 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Eberle, Miriam Title: The Logic of Drug-Related Violence: A Case Study of Mexico from 2006 to 2011 Summary: Mexico has experienced a dramatic escalation of drug-related violence under Mexican President Calderón which has reached a level of intensity and atrocity transcending previous periods of drug-related violence. How to explain the dramatic rise of drug-related violence since 2006? Why are some states plagued with extremely high levels of drug-related violence, whereas others remain largely unaffected? The thesis seeks to explain the variation of drug related violence across time and space by using Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence. The central propositions and hypotheses of Kalyvas’ theory will be tested by using data on the Mexican case in general and Michoacán in 2009 in particular. The aim is to show whether or not the theory correctly predicts drug-related violence in Mexico. However, there have been some major impediments that complicated the use of Kalyvas theoretical model on the Mexican case: (1) data is often lacking and incomplete; (2) the Mexican “conflict” is a mixture of irregular and conventional warfare; (3) there is more than one conflict, namely one between the Mexican government and the DTOs, and various other conflicts among the different DTOs themselves; and (4) the relationship between DTOs and state officials cannot be compared with the one that exists between incumbents and insurgents in a classical sense. Although only a plausibility probe, the case of Mexico between 2006 and 2011 and of Michoacán in 2009 in particular, provides strong evidence that Kalyvas’ theoretical model can even be applied on this case: (1) civilian support matters for the outcome of the conflict and the actors involved are eager to obtain it; (2) violence plays a key role in obtaining control and collaboration; (3) Mexican DTOs use both types of violence, though selective violence seems to be the predominant type of violence. A shift from indiscriminate violence to more selective violence within the process of the conflict does not seem to conform to the empirical reality. The measurement of territorial control on the case of Michoacán turned out to be difficult; in some cases impossible. Furthermore, there was only little empirical evidence. It was therefore not possible to make rigorous hypotheses testing. Despite these limitations there was evidence that: (1) zone 1 and zone 5 are affected by low levels of violence; (2) zone 2 and 4 are affected by high levels of violence; and (3) Kalyvas’ last hypothesis for zones of parity could neither be confirmed nor denied because of the lack of empirical evidence. However, I assume that the internal logic of DTOs must contradict this hypothesis. Instead I argue that they are equally affected by violence like zone 2 and 4. The following recommendations can be made: (1) the Mexican government has to put more efforts to obtain civilian support which implies combating corruption, regaining trust of the civilian population and winning the “war of perceptions” by preventing DTOs from spreading their propaganda; (2) active or passive collaboration with a DTO does not necessarily mean sympathy, it might also be the result of lacking alternatives and a will to survive; (3) the mere reliance on the Mexican armed forces is counterproductive and has contributed to the escalating levels in violence; as a result (4) Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence should be integrated into the policy process. This bears practical contributions, namely to better interpret the varying patterns of drug-related violence which could help to produce more subtle approaches how to cope with DTOs. Details: The Netherlands: Radboud University Nijmegan, 2011. 129p. Source: Thesis: Internet Resource: Accessed March 23, 2012 at http://geography2.ruhosting.nl/masterthesis/scripties/EberleMiriam.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://geography2.ruhosting.nl/masterthesis/scripties/EberleMiriam.pdf Shelf Number: 124669 Keywords: Corruption (Mexico)Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug Markets (Mexico)Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Violence (Mexico)Police Behavior (Mexico) |
Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic in Mexico Summary: : By analyzing and gathering quantitative data, this paper presents the first formal economic analysis of the impacts of the drug trafficking industry in Mexico. The analysis measures the number of drug-traffic employees, the amount of cash and investments generated by the drug-trafficking industry, the monetary costs of violence and corruption, the estimated losses in foreign investment, and the costs generated by local drug abuse. While the authors acknowledge that in some small and less diversified rural communities, drug-traffic cash flows may be helping to alleviate a grinding stage of poverty and underdevelopment, they conclude that the illegal-drug industry generates economic losses of about 4.3 billion dollars annually. Such a high figure is certainly impeding Mexican economic growth and development. Several policy options are considered. Details: Boston, MA: Department of Government, Harvard University, 2008. 21p. Source: Working Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed March 23, 2012 at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww-old.gov.harvard.edu%2Fstudent%2Frios%2FMexicanDrugMarket_Riosv2.doc&ei=J_RsT-72NYXJ0QGY3P3kBg&usg=AFQjCNFbq-goC75ieInetM5AAsDsyQtOzQ&sig2=cnk6mi7f5s0-X7iUz3jD9A Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww-old.gov.harvard.edu%2Fstudent%2Frios%2FMexicanDrugMarket_Riosv2.doc&ei=J_RsT-72NYXJ0QGY3P3kBg&usg=AFQjCNFbq-goC75ieInetM5 Shelf Number: 124670 Keywords: Corruption (Mexico)Costs of Crime (Mexico)Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Violence (Mexico) |
Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Dangerous Work: Violence Against Mexico’s Journalists and Lessons from Colombia Summary: The job of Mexican journalists covering drug trafficking and organized crime along the Mexico-U.S. border has been called the most dangerous job in the world. And the danger has spread from journalists for traditional media to bloggers and citizens who post reports on drug cartel violence through social media such as Twitter and Facebook. In many ways the experience of Mexico today mirrors the experience of journalists in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, when much of that country was a war zone and reporters and editors were being killed or driven into exile by drug traffickers, paramilitary squads, and Marxist guerrillas. Yet the response of the governments and media organizations in the two countries could hardly be more different, nor could the results. Many of the successful steps taken in Colombia could be implemented in Mexico in a relatively short time. This report looks at some of the lessons Mexico could learn from Colombia’s experience, as well as some reasons these lessons have not yet been taken to heart. In addition to conducting a literature review, the author interviewed more than a dozen Colombian and Mexican journalists, in person and by e-mail, to learn more directly about the experiences of those who have lived or are now living on the front lines, in situations of significant risk. Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance, National Endowment for Democracy, 2010. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2012 at: http://cima.ned.org/sites/default/files/CIMA-Mexico-Colombia%20-%2004-09-12.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://cima.ned.org/sites/default/files/CIMA-Mexico-Colombia%20-%2004-09-12.pdf Shelf Number: 124945 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)JournalistsMediaOrganized Crime |
Author: Murray, Chad Title: Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization Summary: Mexico's drug war has claimed more than 30,000 lives since 2006. The intensity and duration of this violence has produced an environment in which “few Mexican citizens feel safer today than they did ten years ago, and most believe that their government is losing the fight.” However, the problem of drug violence in Mexico is not domestic, but transnational in nature. President Barack Obama recently noted that “we are very mindful that the battle President Calderón is fighting inside of Mexico is not just his battle; it's also ours. We have to take responsibility just as he is taking responsibility.” It is U.S. demand for illicit drugs that provides the primary incentive for Mexican narcotics trafficking. Therefore, there is a possibility that a change in U.S. drug policy could negatively affect the revenues of Mexican DTOs, and even their ability to wage violence. This paper will examine the validity of that argument, as well as several of the issues that would accompany such a fundamental policy shift. The purpose of this report is to evaluate current U.S. policy on marijuana, extract lessons learned from policy changes in other countries, analyze the effects that legalization of marijuana in the United States might have on Mexican DTOs, and provide recommendations for future U.S. policies. Current U.S. laws will serve as a starting point to determine if existing decriminalization or medicinal marijuana reforms have had any impact on Mexican DTOs. After examining what effects, if any, these policies have had, reforms in other countries will be examined. From the case studies of Portugal, the Netherlands, and Mexico, lessons will be drawn to give context to any possible ramifications or benefits of U.S. marijuana legalization. Finally, concrete recommendations will be made on whether recent marijuana policy reforms should be maintained, improved, or repealed. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, The Elliott School of International Affairs, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Elliott School of International Affairs/Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report: Accessed April 30, 2012 at: http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf Shelf Number: 125103 Keywords: DecriminalizationDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug PolicyDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Violence |
Author: Michaelsen, Maren M. Title: Mental Health and Labour Supply: Evidence from Mexico's Ongoing Violent Conflicts Summary: In Mexico, conflicts between drug-trafficking organisations result in a high number of deaths and immense suffering among both victims and non-victims every year. Little scientific research exists which identifies and quantifies the monetary and nonmonetary consequences of ongoing violent conflicts on individuals. Using the Mexican Family Life Survey for 2002 and 2005, the causal effect of mental health (symptoms of depression / anxiety) on the extensive and intensive margin of labour supply for work-ingaged men and women is estimated. Measures of the ongoing drug-related violent conflicts both at the macro level using intentional homicide rates by region, and at the micro level indicated by the presence of armed groups in the neighbourhood, serve as instruments for mental health. The results show a significant adverse impact of the conflicts on anxiety for men and women. Based on IV-Tobit model results, a worse mental health state decreases individual labour supply strongly and significantly for men. The findings demonstrate that Mexico's population not only suffers from the violent conflicts between drug-trafficking organisations by anxiety or even depression but also indirectly from less household income through less work which in turn has consequences for Mexico's social development and economic growth. Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, The Institute of Development Studies - at the University of Sussex, 2012. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-117.zip Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-117.zip Shelf Number: 126046 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceEconomic DevelopmentHomicidesLabor SupplyPoverty |
Author: Coscia, Michele Title: How and Where Do Criminals Operate? Using Google to track Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: We develop a tool that uses Web content to obtain quantitative information about the mobility and modus operandi of criminal groups, information that would otherwise require the operation of large scale, expensive intelligence exercises to be obtained. Exploiting indexed reliable sources such as online newspapers and blogs, we use unambiguous query terms and Google's search engine to identify the areas of operation of criminal organizations, and to extract information about the particularities of their mobility patters. We apply our tool to Mexican criminal organizations to identify their market strategies, their preferred areas of operation, and the way in which these have evolved over the last two decades. By extracting this knowledge, we provide crucial information for academics and policy makers increasingly interested in organized crime. Our findings provide evidence that criminal organizations are more strategic and operate in more differentiated ways than current academic literature had suggested. Details: Cambridge, MA: Department of Government, Harvard University, 2012. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/CosciaRios_GoogleForCriminals.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/CosciaRios_GoogleForCriminals.pdf Shelf Number: 126637 Keywords: ComputersCrime AnalysisDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Information TechnologyOrganized Crime |
Author: Southern Pulse Title: Monterrey Street Gangs - March 2012 Summary: The greater Monterrey metropolitan area (MMA) presents a compelling story of how transnational organized crime can from one moment to the next bring a city to a halt, snap from the picture of serenity to a “narco terror” attack, or evolve from an island of security to a significant cause for concern. As Mexico’s industrial powerhouse in the north, Monterrey is a case of resiliency within a strong business community to protect its city. It is also a case of how street gangs evolve, adapt, and ultimately present a public security challenge that neither the Mexican government nor many international businesses are prepared to confront. To contribute to the conversation about the direction of public security in Mexico, Southern Pulse published in January 2012 its first ebook, Beyond 2012, which presented a chapter on public security in Mexico. This chapter concluded with a consideration of a future when “super-empowered” street gangs will eclipse groups such as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation: As we theorized in 2005, the devolution of Los Zetas, of the Gulf Cartel, and the predictable dissolution of the Sinaloa Federation points to the formation of several criminal organizations, not a Mega Cartel. Whereas Mexico under the guise of six large, national-level criminal enterprises in 2006 could have been considered a sea of tranquility punctuated by islands of violence (less than 100 municipalities out of 2,000-plus with violence) the opposite may be proven true by early 2014, as the number of well-armed criminal groups jumps from the six significant groups we counted in 2006 - Sinaloa Federation, La Familia, Gulf Cartel, Beltra-Leyva Organization, Arellano-Felix Organization, Carrillo-Fuentes Organization - to over 10 in 2012 with a steady growth of new groups to bring the total number to possibly over 20 by the end of 2014. By the end of 2014, the men organized by El Chapo and his principal rival Heriberto Lazcano will no longer be the principal drivers of violence across Mexico. At the hyper-local level, super-powered street gangs, armed with Twitter, You Tube, the weapon of fear, and an enviable armory will man-handle local politicians and municipal police. We believe that while the above process continues forward beyond March 2012, there are certain cities in Mexico today that present an advanced case of how the criminal system in Mexico will evolve as street gangs become more powerful. Monterrey lists among the top five. Within this brief report, Monterrey Street Gangs, we would like to present our assessment of street gang activity in Monterrey from both a strategic and tactical viewpoint to support an understanding of how the evolving criminal system in Monterrey could impact the daily lives of those who live there, as well as the business operations of the dozens of companies that rely on the MMA as a crucial element of a global enterprise. We would like to add that in the best interest of time and space, this primer on street gangs in the MMA makes some general assumptions: The top-tier transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are the primary drivers behind violence in Mexico in 2012; The Mexican government will not significantly alter its current strategy in 2012 or beyond, into the next administration; TCOs in Mexico are in constant communication with leadership elements of street gangs; TCOs do not solely rely on drug trafficking as a source of illicit revenue; and, The line between TCOs and street gangs is so blurred that many in Mexico still consider the two to be one single unit of criminality. Though outside the scope of this report, the above issues hold value and are certainly open to conversation and argument. We would welcome any opportunity to discuss with you the above topics, and how they play into the overall criminal system in Mexico. Details: Annapolis, MD: Southern Pulse, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2012 at http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/monterrey-street-gangs-march-2012?A=SearchResult&SearchID=5324185&ObjectID=4182275&ObjectType=35 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/monterrey-street-gangs-march-2012?A=SearchResult&SearchID=5324185&ObjectID=4182275&ObjectType=35 Shelf Number: 126695 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Organized Crime (Mexico)Street Gangs (Mexico)Transnational Crime |
Author: Rogan, Michael G. Title: Is the Narco-violence in Mexico an Insurgency? Summary: Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared war on the drug cartels in December 2006, more than 35,000 Mexicans have died due to narco-violence. This monograph examines whether the various Mexican drug trafficking organizations are insurgents or organized criminal elements. Mexican narco-violence and its affiliated gang violence have spread across Mexico’s southern border into Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Additionally, the narco-violence is already responsible for the deaths of American citizens on both sides of the United States – Mexico border, and the potential for increased spillover violence is a major concern. This monograph argues that the Mexican drug cartels are transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that pose a national security threat to the regional state actors; however, they are not an insurgency for four reasons. First, none of the cartels have the political aim or capability to overthrow the Mexican government. Second, the various TCOs are competing criminal organizations with approximately 90 percent of the violence being cartel on cartel. For example, the violence in the city of Juárez is largely the result of the fighting between the local Juárez cartel and the Sinaloa cartel for control of one of the primary smuggling routes into the United States. Third, the cartels’ use of violence and coercion has turned popular support against them thus denying them legitimacy. Fourth, although the cartels do control zones of impunity within their areas of influence, the Mexican government has captured, killed, and extradited kingpins from every major TCO. The monograph also examines the violence that has taken place in Colombia as a case study comparison for the current narco-violence in Mexico. The Colombian government battled and defeated both the Medellín and Cali drug cartels in the 1990s. It also has made significant progress against two leftist insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The Colombian government also reached agreement with the right-wing United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) who officially disbanded in April 2006. The primary implication of this monograph is that it is the responsibility of the leadership of the Mexican government, its law enforcement institutions, its judicial system, and the military to defeat the TCOs. The case study of Colombia provides strong evidence of the importance of competent political, judicial, law enforcement, and military leadership. It is also clear that the United States provided valuable assistance, but it was the Colombians’ efforts that reduced violence, secured the population, and marginalized the insurgents. The conclusion of this monograph is that the TCOs have a weak case for being an insurgency due to their lack of legitimacy because violence has been excessively cruel and lacking in purpose in the eyes of the Mexican people. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2011. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=721559 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=721559 Shelf Number: 127032 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Gang ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Martin, William Title: Cartels, Corruption, and Carnage in the Calderon Era Summary: While Mexico and the United States have ramped up their efforts to control and perhaps defeat Mexico’s increasingly violent drug cartels, the outcome of these efforts remains in doubt and no panaceas are in sight, but prohibition has once again proved to be a failure, according to a paper from Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. WILLIAM MARTIN The paper by Rice sociologist William Martin, “Cartels, Corruption and Carnage in the Calderón Era,” traces the origins and growth of Mexican drug cartels and the corruption, failed government policies and gruesome violence that accompanied their rise. Martin is the Baker Institute’s Harry and Hazel Chavanne Senior Fellow in Religion and Public Policy. Details: Houston, TX: James A. Baker II Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Baker Institute Policy Report: Accessed February 11, 2013 at: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/DRUG-pub-PolicyReport55.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/DRUG-pub-PolicyReport55.pdf Shelf Number: 127563 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Law EnforcementDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Organized Crime |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations Summary: Drug-related violence has become a very serious problem in Mexico. Of particular concern to U.S. policymakers, violent drug-trafficking organizations produce, transship, and deliver tens of billions of dollars' worth of narcotics into the United States annually. The activities of these organizations are not confined to drug trafficking; they extend to such criminal enterprises as human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, and racketeering. Then, there is the violence: Recent incidents have included assassinations of politicians and judges; attacks against rival organizations, associated civilians, and the police and other security forces; and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders. Despite the scope of the threat to Mexico's security, these groups are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. Comparison between Mexico and Colombia is a tempting and frequently made analogy and source for policy recommendations. A review of these approaches, combined with a series of historical case studies, offers a more thorough comparative assessment. Regions around the world have faced similar challenges and may hold lessons for Mexico. One point is clear, however: Mexico is not Colombia. In fact, Mexico is not particularly like any other historical case characterized by "warlordism," resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with the greatest improvements in countries facing similar challenges. A companion volume presents in-depth profiles of each of these conflicts. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z1/RAND_RR548z1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z1/RAND_RR548z1.pdf Shelf Number: 132898 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations. Supporting Case Studies Summary: Drug-related violence has become a very serious problem in Mexico. Of particular concern to U.S. policymakers, violent drug-trafficking organizations produce, transship, and deliver tens of billions of dollars' worth of narcotics into the United States annually. The activities of these organizations are not confined to drug trafficking; they extend to such criminal enterprises as human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, and racketeering. Then, there is the violence: Recent incidents have included assassinations of politicians and judges; attacks against rival organizations, associated civilians, and the police and other security forces; and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders. Despite the scope of the threat to Mexico's security, these groups are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. Comparison between Mexico and Colombia is a tempting and frequently made analogy and source for policy recommendations. A series of historical case studies offers a foundation for a more thorough comparative assessment. Regions around the world have faced similar challenges and may hold lessons for Mexico. One point is clear, however: Mexico is not Colombia. As the historical record shows, Mexico is not particularly like any other case characterized by "warlordism," resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with the greatest improvements in countries facing similar challenges. A companion volume describes the study's approach to assessing each historical case and presents findings from the overall analyses. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 285p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z2/RAND_RR548z2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z2/RAND_RR548z2.pdf Shelf Number: 132899 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico) Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime |
Author: Damnjanovic, Jelena Title: Organised Crime and State Sovereignty: The conflict between the Mexican state and drug cartels 2006-2011 Summary: Since December 2006, the government of Mexico has been embroiled in a battle against numerous criminal organisations seeking to control territory and assure continued flow of revenue through the production and trafficking of drugs. Although this struggle has been well documented in Mexican and international media, it has not received as much scholarly attention due to the difficulties involved with assessing current phenomena. This thesis seeks to play a small part in filling that gap by exploring how and why the drug cartels in Mexico have proved a challenge to Mexico's domestic sovereignty and the state's capacity to have monopoly over the use of force, maintain effective and legitimate law enforcement, and to exercise control over its territory. The thesis will explain how the violence, corruption and subversion of the state's authority have resulted in a shift of the dynamics of power from state agents to criminal organizations in Mexico. It also suggests implications for domestic sovereignty in regions experiencing similar problems with organized crime, perhaps pointing to a wider trend in international politics in the era of globalization. Details: Sydney: University of Sydney, Department of Government and International Relations, 2011. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/8273 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/8273 Shelf Number: 132974 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |