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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:01 pm
Time: 12:01 pm
Results for employee misconduct
3 results foundAuthor: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct. There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border. CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity. CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations). However, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents. Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process. CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a strategy, but CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy. Moreover, he stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority for overseeing all integrity-related activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-59: Accessed February 21, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf Shelf Number: 127690 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Customs OfficialsDrug SmugglingEmployee CorruptionEmployee MisconductHuman Smuggling |
Author: Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Title: Operation Tone: Special report concerning drug use and associated corrupt conduct involving Ambulance Victoria paramedics Summary: The Victorian community places great trust in paramedics. Paramedics are often among the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency and are responsible for treating and stabilising patients. They have access to an array of powerful, prescription medications that they can administer (in accordance with clinical guidelines) depending on a patient's needs and circumstances. Victorians rightfully expect that paramedics will demonstrate professionalism and expertise in carrying out their duty of care to patients. This report concerns an investigation by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) into allegations that Ambulance Victoria (AV) paramedics engaged in serious corrupt conduct, namely the theft, trafficking and use of drugs of dependence, and misappropriation of AV equipment. Many paramedics are exemplars of their profession. However, Operation Tone has identified a culture of illicit drug use and misappropriation of AV equipment by individuals and among certain groups, particularly in the Barwon South West region. Based on evidence obtained during the investigation, IBAC believes it is probable that this conduct occurs beyond that identified in this investigation. Illicit drug use by paramedics is concerning on several fronts: - Illicit drug use, possession and trafficking are criminal offences and contravene the Code of Conduct for Victorian Public Sector Employees and the AV Workplace Conduct Policy. A paramedic who procures and uses illicit drugs is, by definition, engaging in criminal conduct. - The use of drugs of dependence undermines the safety of the Victorian community. It is imperative that a paramedic's judgement and performance not be impaired by illicit drugs, particularly when they are dealing with patients. The use of drugs of dependence also poses a safety risk for individual users and their AV colleagues. Since 2012, fentanyl or morphine have been involved in three paramedic deaths in Victoria. - The use of drugs of dependence erodes public confidence in AV. AV has proactively responded to the vulnerabilities identified in Operation Tone. When IBAC commenced its investigation in November 2015, AV's capacity to identify and expose at-risk paramedics was initially limited. During IBAC's investigation, AV introduced new policies and practices to minimise opportunities for the possession, use and misappropriation of drugs of dependence. New AV policies and practices also limit the opportunity for misappropriation of AV equipment. AV has advised it accepts the content of this report and the recommendations made. AV also advised it has continued to implement initiatives to address illicit drug use and misuse of drugs of dependence since the completion of IBAC's investigation. During Operation Tone, one paramedic was terminated and eight paramedics resigned while under investigation. Six paramedics retained their employment with a formal warning; of these, five were relocated to different regions for varying periods, were enrolled in an ethics counselling course, and precluded from development opportunities for 12 months. Following the IBAC investigation, one witness pleaded guilty in the Geelong Magistrates. Court to breaching a confidentiality nottice and misleading IBAC, and was fined $5000. Details: Melbourne: The Commission, 2017. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2017 at: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/operation-tone-special-report-september-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/operation-tone-special-report-september-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 148138 Keywords: CorruptionDrug AbuseDrug TraffickingEmployee MisconductIllicit Drug UsePrescription Drug Abuse |
Author: Dussuyer, Inez Title: Preventing Victimisation of Whistle-blowers Summary: Aims of the Study The central focus of the study was on understanding the experiences of whistle-blowers after they had reported wrongdoing. In particular, the aims were to investigate the nature of victimisation, retaliation or other negative treatment against whistle-blowers and what the impact of such actions was on the whistle-blowers. A further aim was to identify what factors might prevent such actions and protect whistle-blowers when they speak out against misconduct. As part of this approach, information was also obtained about the type of misconduct involved, about the organisations where the whistleblowers were working; and about what processes they had in place for reporting misconduct and for protecting the whistle-blowers. Study Participants Qualitative semi-structured interviews (a majority of these were by telephone) were conducted with 36 whistle-blowers who were self-selected after being invited to participate through an independent hotline2 (n=12 out of 19 who had originally contacted the researchers) and through a volunteer support line Whistle-blowers Australia3 (n=24 out of 36 who had made initial contact) corresponding to a rate for interview of 65 percent (63 percent for the hotline and 66 percent for the support line). Of those interviewed 44 percent were female and 56 percent were male (there were more males from the support line, while more females came via the hotline). The age categories ranged from 30's to 70's at the time of interview. Participants resided principally in Victoria, NSW and Queensland with a few from the other states. A further set of interviews were conducted with persons who, in a professional capacity, had dealt with whistle-blowers, to enable alternative perspectives on the whistle blowing experience to be obtained. After being invited to participate principally through the hotline, which sent an email to client organisations, 19 qualitative semi structured interviews were conducted (of whom 6 were female and 13 male). Interviewees came from independent hotlines, integrity bodies with roles in whistle blowing processes including investigations, public sector disclosure coordinators as well as persons from the private sector with a role for handling whistle-blowers reports. Types of Misconduct Reported Responses from both the whistle-blowers and persons who deal with whistle-blowers indicated that while misconduct could involve dishonesty, fraud and deception, a greater proportion related to what can be broadly termed as 'workplace grievances', covering bullying, harassment and intimidation. For some whistle-blowers, in particular from the support line, the misconduct had occurred many years ago; for the hotline it had been in the last six years. In many instances the misconduct had gone on for some time before the whistle-blowers made the reports. Whistleblowing Reporting Processes Whistle-blowers would in the first instance, usually report the misconduct internally, often to their immediate manager or higher, or else to a designated disclosure coordinator (in the public sector) or, in the private sector the use of an independent hotline was available. In general, when whistle-blowers used the hotline there was anonymity for the whistle-blowers and the hotline acted as a go between the whistle-blower and the client organisation. Anonymity appeared to be less assured in public sector organisations, although investigative bodies went to considerable lengths to protect the identity of the whistle-blowers. There was frustration expressed by whistle-blowers when they tried to report misconduct about a number of issues - that they were not clear how they would be protected, who the right persons were to go to, and that they were not kept informed about what was happening to their reports of misconduct and what the outcomes were. Other complaints emerged along the way about the whistleblower reports not having been taken seriously or simply ignored. Some whistle-blowers reported not knowing what to do and who to go to when they wanted to report. Some also went to considerable lengths to have their concerns addressed by other avenues when there was an initial lack of responsiveness to their concern. These avenues included the unions, Ministers/MPs, the media, anticorruption bodies and employment commissions, as well as going to the courts and using lawyers. There appeared to be a variety of avenues available to whistle-blowers to go to report wrongdoing but it was not obvious for many, which was most appropriate and what the best steps were; that also depended on what sector they were working in and on the organisation itself. When dealing with whistle-blowers in their professional capacity, many interviewees from the agencies dealing with whistle-blowers said that it was important to clarify with whistle-blowers about their expectations and what could be achieved in a practical sense. Some said that the 'unrealistic' expectations of many whistle-blowers when they reported misconduct could have negative consequences on the interactions with the agencies they were dealing with, as well as increasing the frustration and indeed the anger of whistle-blowers. Consequences for Whistle-blowers after Reporting Misconduct - Retaliation and Reprisals Both groups - the whistle-blowers (once their identity had become known), and some of those who dealt with them, generally acknowledged the overall negative experience of 'speaking out', including lack of support, criticism and retaliation by management and being in a workplace culture characterised by denial/defensiveness, blaming, fear and bullying and harassment of the whistleblower. A number of the interviewees who dealt with whistle-blowers stated that they often did not know about or what had happened to whistle-blowers and, thus they had no or little knowledge about any negative treatment the whistle-blowers were subjected to. Whistle-blowers themselves were able to provide many examples of the victimisation they had suffered. Most common were bullying and harassment in the workplace associated with ostracism, isolation, being excluded from meetings and derogatory remarks on social media as well as being subject to disciplinary actions and counter allegations. Examples were given where whistle-blowers were also physically assaulted, their families threatened. As part of this array was the often mentioned issue of a lack of welfare support for the whistle-blowers. This was particularly emphasised by those who deal with whistle-blowers as being either absent or inadequate; there were some exceptions; an anonymous counselling/welfare service was available for employees (not only for whistle-blowers) in some organisations. About the protection offered by the whistle-blowers legislation there was no one who indicated it was effective in doing so, nor was it effective even as a deterrent. However many suggestions were provided as to how whistle-blowers and the whistle blowing processes could be improved and how negative experiences could be minimised both by whistle-blowers and in particular by those who dealt with them. Impact on Whistle-blowers For many whistle-blowers the outcomes of reporting misconduct were significant emotional and psychological impact, including stress, exhaustion, mental health and health related issues as well as the financial costs (using lawyers, going to court, losing their jobs) and a negative impact on their careers (not being promoted, moved sides ways, not having their contract renewed or in a number of cases dismissal). All of the whistle-blowers interviewed were no longer working for the organisation in where they had observed the misconduct; indeed many were no longer working (were unemployed or retired). Above all, whistle-blowers had a pervading sense of injustice and perceived a lack of fairness at the treatment that they had been subjected to after reporting misconduct, and that influenced their sense of trust and confidence in people and organisations. In many instances these experiences of being badly treated when they reported misconduct, led to a radical change in the lives of a number of whistle-blowers; with some changing career direction, some going back to further study (employment/workplace law in particular) and others writing about their experiences and publishing books. Again for other whistle-blowers they had gone on to help other (and potential) whistle-blowers by working for whistle-blower volunteer support lines and establishing websites to inform whistle-blowers about practical strategies and ways of handling the reporting process and the aftermath. When in the light of their experiences, whistle-blowers were asked whether they would do it over again, that is, to report the misconduct, about half said emphatically, yes of course while the other half said no, never. Improving Protection for Whistle-blowers Some thoughtful suggestions were proposed by whistle-blowers themselves and included: - Establish an annual citation or award for corporate governance where whistle-blowers are recognised and thanked. - Provide compensation to the whistle-blowers (as in the US). - Prosecute those who retaliate against whistle-blowers (has anyone been charged in Australia? asked one whistle-blower). - Changing the workplace culture was emphasised; the workplace brings together all sorts of people, with different values and ethical standards, increasing the risk of conflict and cultural clashes; ethical competency was identified as needing to be cultivated. - Investigations need to be done independently, not by Human Resources departments and that the whistle-blower should be given feedback and a copy of the report. - In some sectors such as some sports, there appears to be no grievance process and there is a lack of transparency and independence, especially if there are complains about conduct. - While colleagues and peer groups are supportive, they often do not have the information or knowledge to advise effectively or strategically; more appropriate sources are available. - Support should be provided to whistle-blowers, particularly those who may be vulnerable to reprisals and victimisation; for example having an independent counsellor or psychologist to guide the whistle-blower through the reporting process. None of the persons interviewed, whether they were whistle-blowers or those dealt with them, perceived legislation as effective in preventing victimisation. More often it was improvements in management and workplace culture that were identified as being more useful. Also the need for workplace policies that are actually implemented and complied with was stressed, as well as and more practical welfare support for the whistle-blower and more education in the workplace about whistleblowing procedures and processes. Details: Melbourne: Victoria University, 2016. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/IBACC/Submissions/Submission_20_-_Victoria_University_27.7.2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/IBACC/Submissions/Submission_20_-_Victoria_University_27.7.2016.pdf Shelf Number: 150343 Keywords: Employee Misconduct Retaliation Whistleblowers Workplace Misconduct |