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Date: April 16, 2024 Tue
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Results for extortion
24 results foundAuthor: TRANSCRIME Title: Study on Extortion Racketeering - The Need for an Instrument to Combat Activities of Organised Crime Summary: This final report covers all the activities concerning the Study on “Extortion Racketeering – The need for an instrument to combat activities of Organised Crime” awarded to Transcrime by the European Commission. In continuity with the conclusions of the “Seminar on Counteraction of Extortion Racketeering” held in Frascati (Italy) on 8-10 March 2007 organised by the Italian Ministries of Justice and the Interior, within the framework of the AGIS programme, this study intends to assess the magnitude of the problem of extortion racketeering in the EU MS and if and how it should be tackled. There are two different types of extortion racketeering (systemic and casual) linked to three main variables: the organisational structure of the criminal crime group that engages in extortion racketeering; its strong presence at local territorial level; and the victim-offender relationship. These three variables are reciprocally related: the more the organised crime group focuses its activity on the local territory, being facilitated by its monopolistic position and hierarchical structure, the more it conducts criminal transactions with politicians and administrators, the more it infiltrates legitimate business, the more extortion becomes systemic (spreads and continues), and in becoming systemic provides more resources and closer control over the territory, the more criminals establish symbiotic relationship with the victims and the more the legitimate economy is infiltrated. Generally speaking, the more OC groups act at transnational level, and the more they develop network organisational structures the less they will be able to control systematically a territory, the less extortion they use and, when they do so, it is casual. This explains why EU MS have substantive differences in the presence of extortion. After pointing out similarities and differences in extortion racketeering among the EU MS (in the phenomenon and in the legislation and other practices), this study identifies the common elements that may help to increase the effectiveness of existing instruments, and it suggests recommendations that could be adopted at EU level and addressed to MS. To this end, this study: 1) frames the problem of extortion racketeering in the EU Agenda (Chapter 1); 2) outlines how extortion racketeering has developed in EU MS, the main forms of regulation of the phenomenon and the countermeasures (Chapter 2 and 3); 3) analyses the differing magnitude of the phenomenon across EU MS in light of the similarities and differences previously outlined, pointing out where the gaps are and where further action is needed (Chapter 4 and 5); 4) develops the index of relevance in the media in order to explain the social construction of the phenomeno in the EU Ms (Chapter 6); 5) summarizes the main findings (Chapter 7); and 6) identifies reccommendations (legislative and practices) which may be adopted at European and national level (Chapter 8). Details: Trento, Italy: TRANSCRIME, 2010. 297p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/documentos/420_Study_on_extortion_racketeering_Final_Report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/documentos/420_Study_on_extortion_racketeering_Final_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 120162 Keywords: ExtortionOrganized CrimeRacketeering |
Author: Detica Title: The Cost of Cyber Crime. A Detica Report in Partnership with the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office Summary: "Few areas of our lives remain untouched by the digital revolution. Across the world, there are now nearly two billion internet users and over five billion mobile phone connections; every day, we send 294 billion emails and five billion SMS messages. Over 91 per cent of UK businesses and 73 per cent of UK households have internet access and £47.2 billion was spent online in the UK alone in 2009. Our society is now almost entirely dependent on the continued availability, accuracy and confidentiality of its Information and Communications Technology (ICT). We need it for our economic health, for the domestic machinery of government, for national defence and for our day-to-day social and cultural existence. As well as significant benefits, the technology has also enabled old crimes to be committed in new and more subtle ways. In its National Security Strategy, cyber threats are recognised by the Government as one of four ‘Tier One’ risks to the UK’s security. But estimates of the cost of cyber crime have until now not been able to provide a justifiable estimate of economic impact and have failed to address the breadth of the problem. Therefore, the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) worked with Detica to look more closely at the cost of cyber crime in the UK and, in particular, to gain a better appreciation of the costs to the UK economy of Intellectual Property (IP) theft and industrial espionage. Further developments of cyber crime policy, strategies and detailed plans will thus benefit from this insight." Details: London: U.K. Cabinet Office, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2011 at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/the-cost-of-cyber-crime-full-report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/the-cost-of-cyber-crime-full-report.pdf Shelf Number: 120839 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCybercrimeExtortionIdentity TheftInternet CrimesInternet Safety |
Author: IKV Pax Christi Title: Kidnapping is Booming Business: A Lucrative Political Instrument for Armed Goups Operating in Conflict Zones Summary: In 2001, Pax Christi Netherlands published a report about the kidnapping industry in Colombia. The report had two objectives. The first was to demonstrate that, in countries such as Colombia, the kidnapping practices of the illegal armed groups provided the financial fuel for the conflict. Secondly, the report was intended as an indictment. Kidnapping was presented as a violation of human rights and, within the context of a war or internal armed conflict, in many cases as a violation of international humanitarian law. Seven years on, and the number of kidnappings worldwide has risen even more. The crime has lost nothing of its potency as a cause of human tragedy. Kidnapping is a serious violation of the most elementary right of mankind: the right to a dignified existence. We set out in this report to provide a brief summary of the kidnapping issue on a global level, in particular of kidnapping in conflict regions and fragile states. The questions to be answered are concerned with the financial and political requirements that the kidnappers set, and with the impacts of these practices on the conflict and its perpetuation, and on the performance of the state. Following on from the previous report, the emphasis of this investigation is on kidnapping and extortion in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Firstly, we wished to ascertain how the kidnapping issue has developed in these countries in the past ten years. This raised the question of whether there was any relationship between the kidnapping practices in Colombia, and trends in this crime in the neighbouring countries. Another primary question regarding Colombia was concerned with the role of the kidnapping theme in peace talks and other dialogue between illegal armed groups and the Colombian government, and with the possible role of the theme in any future peace talks. The final chapter investigates the kidnapping-related policies of the EU member states, and as far as possible we compare their policies with their actions in practice in recent years. The main question is whether there is any European consensus on how to deal with kidnapping, and how to suppress the phenomenon. What obstacles are there to a joint approach to the kidnapping issue? Details: Utrecht, The Netherlands: IKV Pax Christi, 2008. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 9, 2011 at: http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/LA%20Colombia/English%20Colombia/Eng%20brochure_Opmaak%201.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/LA%20Colombia/English%20Colombia/Eng%20brochure_Opmaak%201.pdf Shelf Number: 122328 Keywords: ExtortionHostage TakingKidnapping |
Author: Doyle, Charles Title: Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law Summary: It is a federal crime to devise a scheme to defraud another of property, when either mail or wire communications are used in furtherance of the scheme, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343. Mail or wire fraud includes schemes to defraud another of honest services, when the scheme involves bribery or a kick back, 18 U.S.C. 1346; Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010). In order to convict, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) used either mail or wire communications in the foreseeable furtherance, (2) of a scheme to defraud, (3) involving a material deception, (4) with the intent to deprive another of, (5) either property or honest services. Offenders face the prospect of imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), an order to pay victim restitution, and the confiscation of any property realized from the offense. Misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may also constitute a violation of one or more other federal crimes. Principal among these are predicate offense crimes, frauds based on jurisdictional factors other than use of mail or wire communications, and other honest services frauds in the form of bribery or kickbacks. The other federal bribery and kickback offenses include bribery of public officials, federal program bribery, extortion under color of official right, and Medicare/Medicaid kickbacks. Mail and wire fraud are money laundering and racketeering predicate offenses. Numbered among the fraud offenses based on other jurisdiction grounds are the false claims and false statement offenses, bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: R41930: Accessed August 9, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41930.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41930.pdf Shelf Number: 122333 Keywords: BriberyExtortionFraudMail FraudMoney LaunderingWire Fraud |
Author: D'Amato, Alessio Title: Bureaucrats vs the Mafia: Corruption, Extortion and Illegal Waste Disposal Summary: We develop a simple model where an economic agent chooses the level of legal and illegal disposal. Illegal disposal implies corruption of a bureaucrat in charge of waste management. In the absence of a criminal organization, illegal disposal is performed by the agent, who is subject to enforcement and bribes the bureaucrat. At the opposite, in the presence of a criminal organization, illegal disposal is performed by the mafia, which requires an extortion rate from the agent and bribes the public official; in this latter case no enforcement on the agent is possible. The environmental authority sets the enforcement e¤ort as well as the waste tax rate. In our setting the waste tax rate can be either budget balancing or optimally de ned. Results suggest that the presence of the ma fia leads to a larger illegal disposal and a larger economic activity. Enforcement is always smaller in the presence of the mafi a under the optimal tax rate, while the results are ambiguous under a budget balancing tax rate. Interestingly, the optimal tax rate implies smaller incentives for the criminal organization to enter the market, and welfare might be higher when the mafia is present. Details: Unpublished paper: 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/EAERE/2011/434/Corruption_Mafia_Waste_EAERE2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/EAERE/2011/434/Corruption_Mafia_Waste_EAERE2011.pdf Shelf Number: 123602 Keywords: BriberyCorruptionExtortionOrganized CrimeWaste Management |
Author: Kego, Walter Title: Russian Organized Crime: Recent Trends in the Baltic Sea Region Summary: A new criminal landscape is emerging in Europe. A key factor behind the dramatically increasing crime levels is Russian organized crime. While these groups are often comprised of Russians, they are not based solely on eth-nicity, often members are also from former Soviet repub-lics. According to Europol, these groups are among the most dangerous criminal groups operating in Europe to-day. They are involved in every type of illegal activity and excel in exploiting new opportunities in the economic and financial sectors. They make exorbitant amounts of money from illegal activities such as money laundering, human and drug trafficking, smuggling and extortion. Their activities have grown and spread to other countries to such an extent that they pose a serious problem affect-ing all EU member states. This report documents recent trends. Details: Nacha, Sweden: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2012. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2012 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2012_kego-molcean_russian-organized-crime-recent-trends.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2012_kego-molcean_russian-organized-crime-recent-trends.pdf Shelf Number: 124923 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtortionMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (Europe)Russian Organized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Oregon. Department of Corrections, Research & Evaluation Title: Survey of Inmate Victimization and Extortion In the Oregon Prison System Summary: There is some evidence that certain inmates use their seniority, status, knowledge, or other sources of power to victimize and extort less powerful inmates (Toch, 1992) and that physical, psychological, and sexual violence occurs within many correctional institutions throughout the United States. Inmate extortion and/or victimization could exist within Oregon’s prison system as well. As part of ODOC’s larger effort to examine rates of extortion the Research and Evaluation unit conducted a study in six Oregon prisons. The purpose of the study is fourfold: Estimate the incidence of extortion and victimization among inmates in the five largest male institutions and the only female institution in Oregon; Compare rates of extortion and victimization between male and female inmates; Compare rates of extortion and victimization between inmates with developmental disabilities (DD) and the general population; and, Determine patterns of extortion and victimization among different inmate groups (i.e., males, females, DD). Details: Salem, OR: Oregon Department of Corrections, Research & Evaluation, 2009. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2012 at http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/RESRCH/docs/inmate_extortion_2011.pdf?ga=t Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/RESRCH/docs/inmate_extortion_2011.pdf?ga=t Shelf Number: 125323 Keywords: ExtortionInmates (Oregon)Victims of Crime (Oregon) |
Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: To Be or Not To Be a Drug Trafficker: Modeling Criminal Occupational Choices Summary: Violent deaths, kidnapping and extortion have spiked in Mexico’s border towns since 2004. Using a formal model and case studies from Mexico, I argue that such phenomena are partially explained by (a) a change in the politics of organized crime, (b) changes in the composition of illegal labor markets, and (c) the incentives generated at legal labor markets. With democratization, Mexico’s government became unable to keep performing its role as central enforcer of territorial boundaries between drug cartels. As cartels became guardians of their own territories, a need to recruitment new cartel members to form private armies emerged. As a result, an illegal labor market –so far closed to non-blood-related individuals– opened and modified the incentives to join/remain in the legal labor markets. The outcome was the emergence of a new generation of drug employees that (a) disdain old mafia laws, (b) are more violent and (c) are also more prone to take part of other forms of “entrepreneurial” illegal occupations such as kidnapping and extortion. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2012 at: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_MPSA2010_TobeOrNotToBe.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_MPSA2010_TobeOrNotToBe.pdf Shelf Number: 125872 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug Violence (Mexico)ExtortionKidnappingsOrganized Crime |
Author: Ardizzi, Guerino Title: Money Laundering as a Financial Sector Crime - A New Approach to Measurement, with an Application to Italy Summary: Anti–money laundering regulations have been centred on the “Know-Your-Customer” rule so far, overlooking the fact that criminal proceedings that need to be laundered are usually represented by cash. This is the first study which tries to provide an answer to the question of how much of cash deposited via an official financial institution can be traced back to criminal activities. The paper develops a new approach to measure money laundering and then proposes an application to Italy, a country where cash is still widely used in transactions and criminal activities generate significant proceeds. In particular, we define a model of cash in-flows on current accounts and proxy money laundering with two indicators for the diffusion of criminal activities related to both illegal trafficking and extortion, controlling also for structural (legal) motivations to deposit cash, as well as the need to conceal proceeds from tax evasion. Using a panel of 91 Italian provinces observed over the period 2005-2008, we find that the average total size of money laundering is sizable, around 7% of GDP, 3/4 of which is due to illegal trafficking, while 1/4 is attributable to extortions. Furthermore, the incidence of “dirty money” coming from illegal trafficking is higher in the Centre-North than in the South, while the inverse is true for money laundering coming from extortions. Details: Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies (CES), the Ifo Institute and the CESifo GmbH (Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research), 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 4127: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19076139 Year: 2013 Country: Italy URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19076139 Shelf Number: 127738 Keywords: ExtortionFinancial CrimesIllegal TraffickingMoney Laundering (Italy)Shadow EconomyWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Pax Christi Netherlands Title: The Kidnap Industry in Colombia: Our Business? Summary: Today, almost one country in four around the world is affected by the crime of kidnapping. Colombia has been at the head of this sad list for a number of years. Even mass kidnappings and the kidnapping of small children have become part of this cynical form of financing a war. Taking hostage of unarmed, defenceless individuals not only paralyzes the individual victim, but also affects the psychological and economic integrity of an entire family. Moreover it creates an impossible moral dilemma for the individuals, companies and governments involved when ransom is demanded. On the one hand, paying ransom seems the only way to save the life of the victim. On the other hand, it contributes directly to the war. Pax Christi Netherlands has developed contacts over a large number of years with a wide variety of civil sectors in Colombia, especially the churches. We had to witness at close quarters many personal tragedies of the kidnapping of a loved one. The initiative to finally force an open discussion on the role of European companies and governments was suggested by various of our Colombian partners. One third of the abducted foreigners in Colombia are European, and together they account for a huge amount of ransom. While Europe is talking about the support of the European Union in dialogue and peace initiatives in Colombia, it fosters the war through ransom and extortion money at the same time. The subject is surrounded by a wall of silence. In Colombia this can be explained by sheer fear. All parties involved - Colombians and foreigners alike - have their own reasons to keep silent or to hide the reality behind smoke screens and blatant lies. This, combined with a general climate of corruption and lawlessness, is the main reason that no effective action has yet been taken in Colombia. The traditional code of silence did little to help the production of this report. Less easy to understand is why the crime of hostage taking is not denounced more explicitly in international human rights circles. This report - far from pretending to be complete - is addressed to both Colombians and Europeans when dealing with the dilemmas mentioned above. Far from condemning the decisions taken by anyone who is confronted with the crime of kidnapping, the document seeks to stimulate discussion about this growing form of terrorism. It is high time for the development of a common strategy. But above all, this initiative should be an incentive for the international community to devote more attention to kidnapping as a gross violation of human rights. Details: Utrecht: Pax Christi Netherlands, 2001. 121p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: www.paxvoorvrede.nl Year: 2001 Country: Colombia URL: www.paxvoorvrede.nl Shelf Number: 133254 Keywords: ExtortionHostage TakingKidnapping (Colombia)Ransom |
Author: European Network of Advisory Teams (EuNAT) Title: Prevention and Coping Strategies: Kidnapping, Hostage Taking, Extortion Summary: Due to your personal and/or professional circumstances, you and your family may be at a higher risk of being affected by a serious offence like kidnapping, hostage taking or extortion. Experience shows that these crimes are often well prepared by the perpetrators. The offender might take advantage of the victims routines or habits in order to identify opportunities for an attack. Understanding this will help you identify any weak spots in your routines and take steps to reduce the risk of becoming a victim. This also applies to spontaneous crimes such as robberies. This brochure aims to help you minimise potential and foreseeable risks and suggests how you can do this, in order to be as safe as possible. It should be used in accordance with national and company laws, policies and procedures. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 1, 2014 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/prevention-and-coping-strategies-kidnapping-hostage-taking-extortion Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/prevention-and-coping-strategies-kidnapping-hostage-taking-extortion Shelf Number: 133522 Keywords: ExtortionHostage Taking Kidnapping (Europe) |
Author: Sterrett, David Title: Green Grass and Graft: Corruption in the Suburbs Summary: The City of Chicago attracts local, national, and even international attention for its long and salient culture of corruption. But the media and the general public tend to overlook the abundant political and public corruption that also exists in many of the regions suburbs. Patronage, nepotism, cronyism, abuse of power and criminal activity flourish, sometimes for decades, in numerous city halls, police stations and special purpose government agencies in suburbs surrounding Chicago and in the collar counties. Public corruption has afflicted the north, south, and west suburbs. It impacts upper income and lower income villages, towns and cities. More than 130 individuals have been convicted of corruption related schemes in the suburbs since the 1970s, including more than 100 public officials in the last two decades. Far from being an escape from the corrupt practices of the big, bad city, many of the suburbs seem determined to imitate them. There are six categories of corruption-related convictions in suburban Chicago: 1) Public officials with ties to organized crime 2) Nepotism 3) Police officers aiding or extorting criminals 4) Kickbacks and bribes to officials and administrators 5) Large Development Projects 6) Stealing of funds by leaders of school districts and special purpose districts This report shows how suburban corruption takes different forms ranging from officials hiring family members to police chiefs protecting criminals. Cumulatively the many examples in this report contradict the common perception that while Chicago is corrupt, the suburbs have clean, open, and effective governments. In fact, corruption impacts a large number of local governments throughout the Chicago metropolitan area and it has persisted for decades. Understanding these facts is an essential first step to implementing new policies and ethical practices to curb corruption in the suburbs. Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science, 2012. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report No. 6: Accessed August 27, 2015 at: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/suburbancorruption.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/suburbancorruption.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 136600 Keywords: Bribes Corruption ExtortionOrganized Crime Police Misconduct Suburban Crime |
Author: Simpson, Dick Title: Chicago and Illinois, Leading the Pack in Corruption Summary: For a century and a half, public corruption has been a shameful aspect of both Illinois and Chicago politics. The Governor's mansion and Chicago City Council Chambers have long been the epicenters of public corruption. The extent and pervasiveness of bribery, fraud, stealing from the taxpayers, and illegal patronage have made the city and state national leaders of corruption. Our notorious reputations have provided fodder for scores of comedians and late night talk show hosts. But corruption is a serious problem that hurts all citizens who put their trust - and tax dollars - in the hands of politicians who abuse the power they are given. New public corruption conviction data from the U.S. Department of Justice shows the Chicago metropolitan region has been the most corrupt area in the country since 1976. In addition, the data reveal that Illinois is the third most corrupt state in the nation. The latest information, just released by the Justice Department, provides new evidence of the need for reforms to reduce rampant corruption in Chicago and Illinois. Since 1970, four Illinois governors have been convicted of corruption. Yet only seven men have held this office in this time, meaning more than half of the state's governors have been convicted in the past forty-two years. Otto Kerner, who served from 1961 until his resignation in 1968 to accept a federal judgeship, was convicted in 1973 of mail fraud, bribery, perjury, and income tax evasion while governor. Dan Walker, who served from 1973 - 1977, was convicted in 1987 of obtaining fraudulent loans for the business he operated after he left office. George Ryan, who served from 1999 - 2003, was found guilty in 2006 of racketeering, conspiracy and numerous other charges. Many of the charges were part of a huge scandal, later called "Licenses for Bribes," which resulted in the conviction of more than 40 state workers and private citizens. The scandal involved unqualified truck drivers receiving licenses in exchange for bribes that would ultimately end up in Ryan's campaign fund. The scandal came to light when a recipient of one of these licenses crashed in to a van and killed six children. But perhaps the most famous of all Illinois corrupt officials is Rod Blagojevich, who served from 2003 until his impeachment in 2009. Blagojevich was ultimately convicted in 2011 of trying to sell the U.S. Senate seat vacated by Barack Obama. Other charges included his attempting to shake down Children's Memorial Hospital for a campaign contribution in return for funding and his trying to extort a racetrack owner. Not to be outdone, the City of Chicago has seen its share of convicted officials. The first conviction of Chicago aldermen and Cook County Commissioners for accepting bribes to rig a crooked contract occurred in1869. Since 1973, 31 more aldermen have been convicted of corruption. Approximately 100 aldermen have served since then, which is a conviction rate of about one-third. In 1973 and 1974, four aldermen were convicted of bribery, income tax evasion and mail fraud in a scandal involving zoning changes. In the 1980s, three aldermen pleaded guilty or were found guilty in Operation Incubator, a major FBI investigation into Chicago corruption. The convictions included bribery, racketeering, extortion, mail fraud and tax evasion. Less than 10 years later, seven more aldermen were convicted as part of Operation Silver Shovel, another major FBI investigation into corruption in Chicago in the 1990s. Between 1996 and 1999 these seven were convicted of bribery, money laundering, fraud and tax evasion. Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science and the Illinois Integrity Initiative of the University of Illinois Institute for Government and Public Affairs, 2012. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Anti-Corruption Report No. 5: Accessed August 27, 2015 at: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/leadingthepack.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corruption_reports/leadingthepack.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 136601 Keywords: BribesCorruptionExtortionRacketeeringTax Evasion |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: New humanitarian frontiers: Addressing criminal violence in Mexico and Central America Summary: Parts of Central America and Mexico are suffering a humanitarian crisis which stems directly from expanding criminal violence. In vulnerable communities in the region there are mass casualties on a par with conflicts elsewhere in the world - rape, kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion, forced displacement (both internally and across borders), migration of unaccompanied minors from crime-ravaged communities and exploitation and murder. The report pinpoints three structural challenges to a stronger humanitarian agenda in response to criminal violence in the region: the features and characteristics of criminal violence, the presence of self-sustaining regional mixed migration and the flow of narcotics and the extremely fragile nature of Central American states. The case for a reinvigorated humanitarian approach to criminal violence is stronger than ever. There are notable opportunities. This report argues that the existing strengths of humanitarian organisations in addressing criminal violence could be responsibly enhanced. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2015 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/201510-am-central-americas-violence-en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/201510-am-central-americas-violence-en.pdf Shelf Number: 137158 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceExtortionHomicidesHuman TraffickingKidnappingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Kyle, Chris Title: Violence and Insecurity in Guerrero Summary: This paper is a continuation of the series Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence, a multiyear effort by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego to analyze the obstacles to and opportunities for improving citizen security in Mexico. Insecurity and violence associated with organized criminal activity are pervasive in Mexico's southern state of Guerrero. The state's homicide rate is the highest in the country and extortion and kidnapping are commonplace. For perpetrators, there is near complete impunity. The state is divided into territories within which either drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) or community policing networks exercise control over local policing functions. Local, state, or federal authorities occasionally join this competition, but for the most part policing powers are held by others. In rural areas competition between groups of traffickers over the state's prodigious narcotics output has created violent no-man's-lands in buffer zones between territories controlled by rival groups. In cities violence is mostly a byproduct of efforts to establish and preserve monopolies in extortion, kidnapping, and retail contraband markets. Despite claims to the contrary by state and federal authorities, there has been no discernible improvement in public security in recent months or years. Restraining the violence in Guerrero will require that state authorities make a systematic effort to address two existing realities that sustain the criminal activities producing violence. Thus, this paper examines the security situation in the state of Guerrero, including the operation of drug trafficking organizations, and proposes possible solutions to the security crisis. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence Briefing Paper Series: accessed February 17, 2016 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf Shelf Number: 137864 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtortionHomicidesKidnappingsOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Zhilla, Fabian Title: Organised Crime Threat Assessment in Albania Summary: This study focuses on the organized crime activities in Albania, as well as those conducted by Albanian criminal networks in the region and beyond. The study analyses organized crime activities such as trafficking in persons, illicit drugs and arms, smuggling of migrants, extortion, contract killings, organized cybercrime and money laundering. In some cases, so as to be able to clearly identify them, comparisons were made between various criminal activities and groups, despite the difficulties encountered with resources and the method applied. Various sources are used (both primary and secondary), including national official reports, and European and inter- national agencies fighting organized crime. In addition, 44 interviews were conducted with experts that have a direct or indirect relation with the fight against organized crime, for instance, serious crime judges, prosecutors, lawyers, investigative journalists, civil society representatives and experts of organized cyber-crime. Details: Tirana, Albania: Open Society Foundation for Albania, 2015. 122p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2016 at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280741426_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_in_Albania Year: 2015 Country: Albania URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280741426_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_in_Albania Shelf Number: 138190 Keywords: Cybercrime Drug Trafficking ExtortionHuman Trafficking Money Launders Organized Crime |
Author: Jones, Nathan P. Title: The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience Summary: This dissertation elucidates the relationship between a profit-seeking illicit network's (PSIN's) business strategy and resilience. The dissertation finds that territorial PSIN business strategies challenge "the territorially sovereign state" through activities like kidnapping and extortion. The intensity of the state reaction to the illicit network was the single most important factor in its ability to survive disruptive events. The state, in this case Mexico, reacted more intensely to territorial PSIN's in collaboration with civil society, other states and rival "transactional" PSIN's. In this case the state (Mexico) dissolved a territorial PSIN, suggesting that the state is capable of effectively confronting this illicit network type. On the other hand, the case finds that the state was corrupted by transactional PSINs whose business strategies made them resilient. This finding suggests that through corruption, transactional PSINs will pose a long-term threat to democratic institutionalization in Mexico and internationally anywhere that states must address these illicit networks. The dissertation is an in-depth historical case study of the Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO). Through archival research and interviews with experts on the illicit network a case study was constructed. Experts interviewed for the dissertation during nine months of fieldwork in Mexico City and Tijuana, included: journalists, law enforcement, scholars, extortion victims and businessmen. Given the similar structures of illicit networks, the findings of this dissertation have important implications for understanding other drug trafficking organizations, prison gangs, terrorists, insurgencies, arms traffickers, among a host of other potential "dark network" actors. Details: Irvine, CA: University of California, Irvine, 2011. 299p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 18, 2016 at: http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/awards/jones.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/awards/jones.pdf Shelf Number: 139085 Keywords: Dark NetworksExtortionKidnappingOrganized Crime |
Author: Agger, Kasper Title: Warlord Business: CAR's Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power Summary: The two main armed groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) - the ex-Seleka and the Anti-Balaka, along with their multiple factions - make millions of dollars in profits from illicit activities, which support their operations and create wealth for ruthless warlords and business owners. Killings, extortion, and other forms of violence are used to control areas with gold and diamonds throughout CAR, and the groups are deeply involved in this high-value trade in several ways. The two groups also generate income through illicit taxes and "protection money" from civilians, road travelers, businesses, local organizations, and state institutions. Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka groups profit from a large illicit minerals trade. They do this directly by the mining and theft of diamonds and gold that they then sell to middlemen. They also profit indirectly by looting, extortion, and predatory taxation of miners and traders. Research presented in this report estimates the total current value of the illicit diamond trade and taxation by armed groups in CAR to be between $3.87 and $5.8 million dollars annually, a sufficient amount in CAR to fund widespread military operations. The majority of the diamonds and the gold are smuggled out of CAR to neighboring countries - mainly Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan - and then on to international markets; a lesser amount is sold on the local market within CAR. Some of the diamonds sold locally are purchased by three Central African diamond buying houses that currently have a total stock of diamonds worth close to $8 million. This domestic diamond trade is not prohibited by the Kimberley Process (KP) suspension of CAR's membership and the decision by KP members to refrain from sending or receiving diamond shipments from CAR that has been in effect since May 2013 and only restricts exports of rough Central African diamonds. Deliberations are, however, underway concerning the possibility of a partial lifting of the KP restrictions. There are concerns that the combination of an inadequate diamond tracing system in CAR and control by armed groups of diamond mines could result in conflict diamonds, which have provided financing for armed groups, entering the KP-approved diamond trade. To counter this danger, any lifting of CAR's KP diamond restrictions should be conditioned on the removal of all armed groups from mining sites, full control of diamond trading markets by U.N. peacekeepers or local gendarmes, and a credible tracing and due diligence system for diamonds bought and sold by Central African diamond companies, including those for export. In addition to natural resource exploitation, ex-Seleka factions in particular have set up efficient tax collection practices. Conservative assessments estimate that different factions within the group collect $1.5 to $2 million annually from illicit road taxation throughout the areas they control in central and eastern CAR. They gain an additional estimated $210,000 to $420,000 in taxation of cattle traders and $200,000 to $240,000 from taxation of coffee traders. Meanwhile, Anti-Balaka groups that roam western CAR collect illicit road taxes, extort money from rural villages, and demand sums that range from $600 to $1,000 as a one-time payment for "protection." Additional research is needed to estimate the total annual profits collected by Anti-Balaka groups through road taxation, looting, and other abusive activities. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: The Political Economy of African Wars: No. 2: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Warlord%20Business%20061615.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Warlord%20Business%20061615.pdf Shelf Number: 139294 Keywords: DiamondsExploitation of Natural ResourcesExtortionIllicit TradeLootingNatural ResourcesViolence |
Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: Extortion Racketeering in the EU: Vulnerability Factors Summary: Extortion racketeering has been long pointed out as the defining activity of organised crime. Although in recent years this crime has not been among the top listed organised crime threats in the strategic EU policy documents, it still remains ever present in European countries. The seriousness of the phenomenon has been recognised at the EU level and the crime has been listed in a number of EU legal acts in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The report Extortion Racketeering in the EU: A six country study of vulnerability factors analyses extortion racketeering forms and practices in six EU member states. The analysis disentangles the risk and the vulnerability factors for enterprises in two business sectors - agriculture and hospitality - as well as in the Chinese communities. Drawing on the results of the analysis, the report suggests new policies for tackling extortion racketeering in the EU. This report has been produced with the joint efforts of the Center for the Study of Democracy, Instituto de Ciencias Forenses y de la Seguridad - Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Transcrime - Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano and Vitosha Research and with the support of Guardia Civil in Spain. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 351p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17701 Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17701 Shelf Number: 139413 Keywords: ExtortionOrganized CrimeRacketeering |
Author: Zhilla, Fabian Title: Organised crime risk assessment in Albania: Executive summary Summary: This study focuses on the organised crime activities in Albania, as well as those conducted by Albanian criminal networks in the region and beyond. The study analyses organised crime activities such as trafficking in persons, illicit drugs and arms, smuggling of migrants, extortion, contract killings, organised cybercrime and money laundering. In some cases, so as to be able to clearly identify them, comparisons were made between various criminal activities and groups, despite the difficulties encountered with resources and the method applied. Various sources are used (both primary and secondary), including national official reports, and European and international agencies fighting organised crime. In addition, 44 interviews were conducted with experts that have a direct or indirect relation with the fight against organised crime, for instance, serious crime judges, prosecutors, lawyers, investigative journalists, civil society representatives and experts of organised cyber-crime. The total duration of recorded interviews is 24 hours and 12 minutes. Our findings and the opinions of the interviewees suggest that the elements that have stimulated organised crime in the country are of a social, economic and political nature: - Transition from a totalitarian regime with a stringent policy on crime, to a fragile democracy with weak and unconsolidated institutions, and staff without sufficient education and/or experience; - Chaotic situation post-1997 with the collapse of the pyramid schemes; - Institutions that are subject to reform, with staff turnover due to changes in government; - Lack of institutional independence, and endemic corruption in the police and law-enforcement agencies; - Albania's favourable geographical position - with drug-producing and supplier countries such as Afghanistan and Turkey in the East, and high-consumption countries in the West; - International nature of organised crime and the impact of globalisation; - Lack of political stability in the country for more than two decades; - Weak economy with high levels of unemployment and insufficient earnings per capita (one of the lowest in the continent); - Dismantling of social structures, adversely affecting the family as the nucleus; - Continuous immigration waves, importing experiences and criminal connections obtained abroad; - Support from members of the Albanian diaspora; - Conflicts in the region, with 'golden opportunities' to obtain money from the trafficking of arms, smuggling activities, etc; - Use of technology and advanced communication tools Details: Tirana, Albania: Open Society Foundation for Albania, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2016 at: https://www.osfa.al/sites/default/files/press_permbledhje_english_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Albania URL: https://www.osfa.al/sites/default/files/press_permbledhje_english_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140410 Keywords: Cybercrime Drug Trafficking ExtortionHuman Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime |
Author: Mesa de Sociedad Civil contra el Desplazamiento Forzado por Violencia y Crimen Organizado en El Salvacor Title: Desplazamiento Interno Por Violencia: Y Crimen Organizado en El Salvador. Informe 2016 (International Displacement Due to Violence and Organized Gang Violence in El Salvador) Summary: The government of El Salvador has been unable to deter organized gang violence plaguing many of its municipalities and communities. Violence against children, extortion of businesses and land owners, femicide, physical assaults, and threats from local and rival gangs has contributed to forced displacement among El Salvador's citizens. Several international non-government organizations are working with the El Salvadoran government in search of solutions. The impact of gang violence has many citizens seeking asylum in the United States and other areas. Details: La mesa de Sociedad Civil contra el Desplazamiento Forzado por Violencia y Crimen Organizado de El, 2016. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: (In Spanish): Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5784803ebe6594ad5e34ea63/t/5880c66b2994ca6b1b94bb77/1484834488111/Desplazamiento+interno+por+violencia+-+Informe+2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: El Salvador URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5784803ebe6594ad5e34ea63/t/5880c66b2994ca6b1b94bb77/1484834488111/Desplazamiento+interno+por+violencia+-+Informe+2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147327 Keywords: ExtortionFemicideGang ViolenceGang-Relations ViolenceGangsViolent Crime |
Author: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto Title: Caught in the Crossfire: The Geography of Extortion and Police Corruption in Mexico Summary: When Mexican president Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 he declared a war on the nation’s drug traffic organizations (Ríos and Shirk, 2011). Violence escalated as criminal organizations became increasingly fragmented and disputed their territories (Killebrew and Bernal, 2010; Beittel, 2011). The main strategy followed by the federal government involved capturing leaders and lieutenants of criminal organizations (Calderón et al. forthcoming). This seemed to provoke even more violence, by making the competition over-territorial control fiercer and providing incentives for many gangs to make extortion and protection fees (derecho de piso) an additional source of revenue (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2010). Given the absence of legal(and peaceful) rules and enforcement mechanisms for competitors in the illegal drug market, disagreements were usually solved violently. Under the pressure of the crackdown by the federal police, the navy and the army, contracts among criminal gangs were often disrupted, leading to even more violence. Competition over the strategic routes towards the market in the United States was settled by literally eliminating rivals (Dell, 2012). The wide availability of illegal guns crossing from the US border (Dube et al., 2013) turned firearm deaths into the main cause of death among young men in Mexico.Meanwhile, citizens became caught in the crossfire of rival drug cartels and extortion at the hands of criminal gangs. A highly visible example of this was the case of two students in the prestigious private university Tecnológico de Monterrey who were kidnapped by drug traffickers in 2010, but then killed by the military in a botched attempt to rescue them. The case became particularly controversial due to the excessive use of force by the army and their effort to cover up the case with planted evidence. During the late 1990s and early 2000s Mexico gradually changed from being a transit territory for drugs heading to the United States market to a place of increasing consumption (Castañeda and Aguilar, 2010). This transformation was partially driven by a change in the way that wholesale drug importers were paying for services; they switched from payments only in cash to payments with part of the same drug they were distributing (Grillo, 2011:80). The change from a transportation to a retail distribution business implied that drug cartels had to increase the number of personnel. Having a larger full-time workforce, the cartels could now count on small armies of salaried criminals at their disposal. The perfect complement to this new industrial organization was an easily corruptible police and judicial system at all levels of government. Increasingly fragmented criminal organizations began to diversify their illegal activities–to extortion of small businesses, kidnappings of middle-class individuals, racketeering and control of retail trade in their territories, and extortion of migrant workers– perhaps in associations with police departments. Although it is difficult to provide evidence on how much real progress has been made, there is no question that efforts at reforming the police forces in Mexico face a momentous challenge in such environment. Although a new federal police force was created after 2006 and, in principle, all police had to comply with background checks and other administrative procedures, in fact, state and municipal police forces remain not just corrupt but also keep on using excessive force and violating human rights. This became patently clear in the case of the 43 Ayotzinapa missing students that in October of 2014 were detained by the municipal police of the city of Iguala, to be handed in to the killers of a drug traffic organization. The police forces of Iguala are not the only ones that are penetrated by organized crime and have failed to protect citizens. This chapter explores the connection between police distrust, corruption and extortion. Despite the difficulty in measuring these phenomena through conventional public opinion polls and citizen or firm level surveys,much can be learned from the variation across geographic units in reported victimization and corruption. We use a list experiment collected through the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico (SPSGM), to study the practices of extortion by both police forces and criminal organizations. Using a Bayesian spatial estimation method, we provide a mapping of the geographic distribution of police extortion. Our findings suggest that weak state institutions in vast regions within Mexico have become captured, through corruption, by competing drug traffic organizations. Extortion prevails either because police forces have become agents of criminal organizations or because criminals can engage in racketeering without any police intervention. We conclude with a discussion of the emergence of self-defense groups as a strategy for coping with extortion; a strategy that while effective at protecting citizens,may further undermine state capacity. Details: Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper; Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/caught_in_the_crossfire_final_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/caught_in_the_crossfire_final_final.pdf Shelf Number: 141225 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingExtortionGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimePolice Corruption |
Author: Cruz, Jose Miguel Title: The New Face of Street Gangs: The Gang Phenomenon in El Salvador Summary: Can a member of a Salvadoran youth gang, locally known as 'maras,' leave the gang and start a new life away from crime and violence? To answer this question, the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center and the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University, with the support of the Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE), conducted a study with Salvadoran gang members and former gang members across the country. The study, which is based on a survey with a combination of a convenience and purposive sample of 1,196 respondents with record of gang membership and 32 in-depth interviews, reveals that desistance from the gang is possible in El Salvador but, in the short-term, it depends on two factors. First, it depends on the individual and active commitment of gang members to abandon gang life and stop partaking in violent activities. Second, it depends on the tacit or explicit consent of the leaders of the gang organization. Hence, in El Salvador, gang desistance—which, according to some authors, is the declining probability of gang membership—involves the acquiescence of the group. The study builds on previous academic scholarship on gangs in El Salvador and Central America as well as on the general criminological literature on youth gangs. The results indicate that youth gangs remain a predominantly male phenomenon and that the average age of joining the gang does not seem to have changed significantly in comparison with data from 10 years ago. Nearly 40% of the subjects interviewed for this study are active members of the gang, while the rest are in different stages of calming down and leaving the gang. Approximately 50% of the subjects interviewed in the survey belong—or have belonged—to Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13); 23% expressed their loyalty to the 18th Street Gang Sureños; while only 11% mentioned they were part of the 18th Street Revolucionarios. The rest of the interviewees indicated past or present membership in peripheral gang groups: Mirada Locos, Mara Máquina, Mao-Mao, etc. Across the survey and in-depth interviews, MS-13 emerged not only as the largest gang organization but also as the most structured and regulated national group. MS-13 members interviewed in this research report the highest levels of participation in criminal activities and also have the lowest levels of intentions to leave the gang. Contrary to the widespread view that Salvadoran gangs are comprised of a large number of deportees and returned migrants from the United States, the study found little evidence of a direct influence of migration in the composition and the dynamics of local gangs. Almost all of the surveyed gang members and subjects of this study were born and raised in El Salvador, and very few maintain regular contact with their peers in the United States. The vast majority of people with a record of gang membership interviewed for this study come from the most underprivileged sectors of Salvadoran society. Most respondents dropped out of school before turning 16 and did not even complete middle school. Seven out of ten are from households with a monthly income below $250 and more than 80% have not had a regular job, either in the formal or informal sector. In addition, most respondents come from dysfunctional and disintegrated families. Nearly half of gang members and former gang members reported having run away from their family’s home before turning 15 years old, primarily due to domestic violence and family problems. Furthermore, more than half of gang members have children of their own, with a higher prevalence of parenthood (nearly 90%) among females affiliated with gangs. Violence and criminal activities remain essential components of gang life. Murder and extortions are the most common crimes gang members are accused of, with nearly 67% of the respondents being accused of committing these types of crimes in addition to assaults, armed robberies, kidnappings, and rapes. In some gangs, most notably MS-13, numerous assassinations and the capability to control new territories through the use of extortions, threats, and strategic murders are critical strategies for ascending within the gang structure. In the past, gang members only had to complete a "mission" to join the gang. In contrast, and according to the information collected by the study, today gang members would have had to commit more than one murder even to be considered as a potential candidate for gang membership. More than two-thirds of the respondents have been arrested more than once and have spent time incarcerated in the Salvadoran detention centers. A significant share of the gang member sample (45.5%) also reported being attacked and injured by police officers and security forces in the last years, in addition to rival gangs (28.2%), friendly gangs (13%), and other actors. Gang structures are significantly more developed now than they were 10 or 20 years ago when the gang phenomenon started to expand in El Salvador. They also seem to be more structured and tend to regulate the life of the average gang member more strictly than in most of the cases reported in the literature elsewhere, especially in the United States. Gangs operating at the local level preserve some levels of autonomy that allows them high levels of adaptation and transformation in the face of challenges and threats. Again, MS-13 stands out among the gang groups due to its high level of organization and territorial control. MS-13's structure includes different levels of management, which typically start with the clique as its lowest operational level (i.e. at the neighborhood level). Some cliques have managed to expand beyond their original neighborhood structure, to what they call "sectores," which function as a franchise of the initial clique. The next organizational level is the "programas," which operate at the regional level. Finally, the top level in the organization is the national "ranfla." The “ranfla” includes a group of leaders who manage the entire gang structure and serve as a decision-making board. According to some informants, the "ranfla" is divided into two sub-structures: one that is formed by leaders serving time in the national prisons, and the other which is comprised of principals operating on the street. In contrast, the 18th Street groups are less well-structured regarding their organization. In many cases, it was difficult to establish a unique organizational pattern based on the statements of the experts interviewed. However, and according to some informants, the 18th Street groups divide their organization in "canchas," which operate at the neighborhood level and the city level, and "tribus," which extend to the regional scale. Most of the people interviewed in the survey (76.2%) held what can be considered a regular (homeboy or soldier) position within the structure of the gang. However, nearly 9% of the respondents had some position of leadership, and 15% were aspiring members of the gang. Although the latter are not formally considered members of the gang organizations yet, their activities for the benefit of the gang and their loyalty to the gang clique and group highlight the significant role they play in the dynamics of gang survival and effort for territorial control. The size of the clique varies significantly depending on the gang organization, the neighborhood, and other factors. According to the results of the survey, the average number of members in a Salvatrucha clique is 85, while the 18th Street groups tend to have fewer members per clique. The average number in the Sureños is 66 compared to 31 in the Revolucionarios cliques. The largest reported cliques seem to be comprised of the peripheral gang groups: members of the Mirada Locos and other organizations tend to have bigger cliques with an average size of 160 members per clique. The results of the study suggest that Salvadoran youths keep joining the gangs as a result of problematic families, lack of opportunities, and a heightened perception of deprivation of social respect and affection in their communities. Gang organizations tap into such shortages to recruit and maintain an army that becomes instrumental in the control of new territories and the waging of war with enemies, including the police and security forces. However, from the standpoint of the gang members and former gang members, the main reasons why people continue joining the gang still revolve around the excitement from hanging out with peers and the development of social respect and public recognition. Young kids continue joining gang organizations because they provide assets that were not provided by their families and community, namely: friendship, protection, resources, and self-confidence. Thus, the gang becomes the center of the lives of the youngsters who joined at early ages. This view of the gangs remains unchallenged during the adolescent years, but starts to fade as the person matures, forms a family of his/her own, and faces the hardships brought by gang violence and law enforcement persecution. Details: Miami: Florida International University, 2017. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 28, 2017 at: https://lacc.fiu.edu/research/the-new-face-of-street-gangs_final-report_eng.pdf Year: 2017 Country: El Salvador URL: https://lacc.fiu.edu/research/the-new-face-of-street-gangs_final-report_eng.pdf Shelf Number: 144609 Keywords: ExtortionGang Desistance Gang Violence Gang-Related Violence Gangs Homicides Mara Salvatrucha MS-13 Street Gangs Youth Gangs |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime and the Impact on the Private Sector: The Hidden Battalions Summary: his paper is based on a detailed review of the scale and nature of organised crime's infiltration of the private sector. These findings are a 'call to arms' for the international private and public sectors to transform their co-operation and teamwork. We have adopted a practical definition of organized crime as that which is carried out by a group of people, suspected of serious criminal offences, over a prolonged period, motivated by profit or power. In our analysis of six major private sector industries, six specific forms of organised crime stood out as either having material impact on the private sector, or using the private sector as facilitators. Money laundering is the process of making dirty money look clean. One estimate puts it at 2% of global GDP - c.$1.5 trillion. Money-laundering is an 'enabling crime', facilitating organized crime (as well as terrorism) with social and economic costs. Asset misappropriation refers to stealing from businesses. For example, cargo thefts cost as much as $30 billion in losses each year worldwide. Counterfeiting and contraband, whilst thought of as being a consumer goods crime, is rife in a broad range of sectors, in particular technology products and pharmaceuticals, to devastating effect. It is estimated by OECD at $461billion, or 2.5% of world trade. Fraud and extortion remain strongly present in the financial, construction and real estate industries. In construction extortion could account for of 20-30 per cent of lost project value. Human trafficking. High volume, low skilled labour enterprises such as construction and building, have the highest penetration of trafficking incidence in the private sector. Cyber Crime. Hacking attacks cost the average American firm $15.4 million per year over. In 2015 68,000 URLs containing child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) images were hosted online on 1,991 domains. The reputational impact means major tech companies apply significant collaborative resources to weeding out criminal, terrorist and CSEA activity. Finding#1: The Scale and Impact of Crime in the Private Sector is Truly Staggering. A conservative estimate of the value of organized crime was $3.6-$4.8 trillion, in 2015/2016, 7% of global GDP. The broader impact of organized crime is difficult to assess as it is multi-dimensional, and shared across the private, public sector, and society itself. The impact on the private sector only - in terms of revenue loss - is estimated at c$130 billion. The Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) calculated the financial cost of terrorism at over $52 billion in 2014. A conservative estimate of total transnational organized crime is $870 billion a year. This is more than six times the amount of official development assistance and close to 7% of the world's exports of merchandise Finding #2 Private sectors are either facilitators or targets. Crimes are either done 'to' private sector organisations, or 'through' them. Sectors are either the targets of fraud or asset theft themselves, particularly in construction, consumer goods ($460 billion counterfeit goods), and financial card fraud, or they facilitate crime unwittingly, through use of technology networks by fraudsters to target victims, e.g. the real estate sector laundering dirty funds or the transport industry moving illicit goods. Regulation varies between the 'victim' and 'enabling' industries. Laws are in place to criminalise the use of the private sector for technology or money laundering crime. The victim industries, however, often are reliant on existing laws around theft, or copyright infringement, which are not tailored to the activities of TOC groups and tend to have lower penalties for infringement. Finding #3 Organized crime's impact on the private sector is growing not shrinking. Counterfeit goods have risen from $250 billion to $461 billion in the last 8 years. Asset theft in the transport and logistics theft rose by over 90% 2015 to 2016. There is a sense that regulation is not working: money laundering seizures equated to 0.2% of all laundered funds in one study; and after the dark web's Silk Road was taken down, many sites sprung up to take on and indeed grow the trade. Finding #4 Direct impact of Crime Disproportionately felt in the global south. Sweatshops flourish in South Asia; trafficking of labour and sex workers originates predominantly in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe; corruption in natural resources damages production in Africa and the Caucasus; technology fraud is driven from eastern and southern Europe, West Africa and the Middle East. Whereas in developed economies counterfeit drugs may comprise less than 0.2 percent of the market developing markets are often beset by 30% fakes, as a UNODC report showed for anti-malarial drugs in Africa. Globalization is increasing the 'attack surface' for TOC groups. The abuse of the often weaker regulatory regimes in the Global South by TOC groups further increases the risk for the private sector operating in these areas. Finding #5 Responses re confrontational rather than collaborative. There are very few examples of successful public and private sector co-operation against TOC groups. Private sector organisations complain that communication with the law enforcement sector is one-way and that the regulatory reporting burden, designed to combat crime, can act as a deterrent to co-operation. Tangible results have been seen when industries take the lead on disrupting the work of TOC groups, such as TAPA the Transported Asset Protection Association Details: Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed December 7, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Shelf Number: 148755 Keywords: Cargo TheftContrabandCounterfeit GoodsCybercrimeExtortionHuman TraffickingIllicit TradeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePrivate SectorStolen PropertyTheft of Goods |