Date: November 22, 2024 Fri

Time: 11:53 am

Results for financial crimes

247 results found

Author: Kego, Walter Title: Counteracting Transnational Organized Crime: Challenges and Countermeasures Summary: According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, transnational organized crime is one of the major threats to human security, impeding the social, economic, political and cultural development of societies worldwide, and involved in trafficking in human beings, drugs and firearms, money laundering, etc. This report outlines the origins of transnational organized crime, describes how it manifests itself and identifies possible threats against societies. Money laundering is dealt with in some detail since it facilitates transnational crime activities and their expansion into the legal economy. The challenges posed by financial crime are identified and guidelines for its prevention are outlined. The EU strategy against transnational organized crimes is an example of how the common European model of crime prevention can be implemented elsewhere. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource; Stockholm Paper Series Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118591 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Transnational Crime

Author: World Bank Title: Stolen Asset Recovery (STAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan Summary: The theft of public assets from developing countries is a huge and serious problem. While the traditional focus of the international development community has been on addressing corruption and weak governance within developing countries themselves, this approach ignores the other side of the equation: stolen assets are often hidden in the financial center of developed countries; bribes to public officials from developing countries often originate from multinational corporations; and the intermediary services provided by lawyers, accountants, and company formation agents, which could be used to launder or hide the proceeds of asset theft by developing country rulers, are often located in developed country financial centers. The STAR Initiative is an integral part of the World Bank Group's strategy which recognizes the need to help developing countries recover stolen assets. This action plan presented in this report responds to feedback received from consultations with developed and developing countries, as well as lessons from the experience of Nigeria, Peru, and the Philippines. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank; Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007. 48p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119268 Keywords: Bribery Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Stolen Asset Recovery

Author: Unger, Brigitte Title: Detecting Criminal Investments in the Dutch Real Estate Sector Summary: The real estate sector is a prominent candidate for money laundering and criminal abuse. Real estate objects can be used in two ways for criminal purpose. They can be traded in order to hide the origin of illicit funds on a non transparent and speculative market, or they can be used as a final investment, where criminals park their money in business or houses permanently. Given the importance of this sector in the Netherlands, both with regard to its economic size and its relevance for criminals, several studies on criminal behavior in the real estate sector have been made. Most prominently the study of the WODC by Ferwerda et al (2007), which gives a good overview over maleficent behavior in the Dutch real estate sector, and the Financial Expertise Center (FEC) report of 2008 on money laundering techniques. However, so far, no systematic study on the importance and frequency of diverse maleficent behavior constructions for money laundering in this sector has been conducted. This study tries to use all information available, to operationalize it into measurable indicators, and to systematically analyze criminal investment in the Dutch real estate sector. Details: The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Finance, Justice and Interior Affairs, 2010. 252 p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2010 at: http://www.minfin.nl/dsresource?objectid=80301&type=org Year: 2010 Country: Netherlands URL: http://www.minfin.nl/dsresource?objectid=80301&type=org Shelf Number: 119823 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Real Estate

Author: Ellison, Anna Title: Interim Evaluation of the National Illegal Money Lending Projects Summary: This report presents the findings and evidence from a review of the effectiveness of the illegal money lending national project that started in 2007. The project set out to address the illegal money lending which is common in deprived estates and which entrenches poverty and disadvantage. The review assesses the effectiveness of teams and delivery models in meeting both enforcement and financial inclusion objectives, and the aggregate impact of the national project. It identifies replicable best practice, assesses the wider economic and social benefits, to inform the development of future policy approaches in this area. Details: London: UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2010. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2010 at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/i/10-1186-interim-evaluation-illegal-money-lending Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/i/10-1186-interim-evaluation-illegal-money-lending Shelf Number: 120065 Keywords: Business Crime Consumer Protection Financial Crimes

Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: The Illegal Movement of Cash and Bearer Negotiable Instruments: Typologies and Regulatory Responses Summary: As part of global regulatory measures designed to minimise risks of money laundering and financing of terrorism, financial institutions and other designated businesses in most countries are required to report certain financial transactions to government regulators. This has increased the probability that transactions involving the proceeds of crime will be detected and reported officially. In order to avoid such detection, serious criminals may simply retain the proceeds of their crimes in cash or use bearer negotiable instruments in connection with their money laundering activities. Although not a new concern, the illegal movement of cash and bearer negotiable instruments across borders is likely to continue and although such movements are now regulated, criminals will continue to devise new strategies to circumvent regulatory controls. This paper explores the ways in which covert movements of currency and bearer negotiable instruments currently take place and reviews the regulatory measures that exist to address such activities in Australia. Increased detection and enforcement action, coupled with intensive data collection and analysis, are likely to be the most effective ways in which to address this way of laundering the proceeds of crime. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 402: Accessed October 26, 2010 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/2/3/%7B8239E8CD-681A-401B-B094-414C872418BE%7Dtandi402.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/2/3/%7B8239E8CD-681A-401B-B094-414C872418BE%7Dtandi402.pdf Shelf Number: 120096 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Guardianships: Cases of Financial Exploitation, Neglect, and Abuse of Seniors Summary: As individuals age, some become incapable of managing their personal and financial affairs. To protect these individuals, state laws provide for court appointment of guardians, who may be professionals or family members, to protect the incapacitated person's personal and/or financial welfare. State and local courts are responsible for overseeing guardians. In addition, federal agencies may appoint a representative payee, in some cases, the guardian, to manage federal benefits on behalf of incapacitated adults. Previous GAO reports have found that poor communication between state courts and federal agencies may allow guardians to continue abusing their victims. GAO was asked to (1) verify whether allegations of abuse by guardians are widespread; (2) examine the facts in selected closed cases; and (3) proactively test state guardian certification processes. To verify whether allegations are widespread, GAO interviewed advocates for seniors and reviewed court documents. To examine closed criminal, civil or administrative cases with a finding of guilt or liability in the past 15 years, GAO reviewed court records, interviewed court officials, attorneys and victims, and reviewed records from federal agencies. To test state guardian certification, GAO used fictitious identities to apply for certification in four states. GAO's results cannot be projected to the overall population of guardians or state certification programs. GAO could not determine whether allegations of abuse by guardians are widespread; however, GAO identified hundreds of allegations of physical abuse, neglect and financial exploitation by guardians in 45 states and the District of Columbia between 1990 and 2010. In 20 selected closed cases, GAO found that guardians stole or otherwise improperly obtained $5.4 million in assets from 158 incapacitated victims, many of whom were seniors. In some instances, guardians also physically neglected and abused their victims. The guardians in these cases came from diverse professional backgrounds and were overseen by local courts in 15 states and the District of Columbia. GAO found several common themes. In 6 of 20 cases, the courts failed to adequately screen potential guardians, appointing individuals with criminal convictions or significant financial problems to manage high-dollar estates. In 12 of 20 cases, the courts failed to oversee guardians once they were appointed, allowing the abuse of vulnerable seniors and their assets to continue. Lastly, in 11 of 20 cases, courts and federal agencies did not communicate effectively or at all with each other about abusive guardians, allowing the guardian to continue the abuse of the victim and/or others. Using two fictitious identities--one with bad credit and one with the Social Security number of a deceased person -- GAO obtained guardianship certification or met certification requirements in the four states where we applied: Illinois, Nevada, New York, and North Carolina. Though certification is intended to provide assurance that guardians are qualified to fulfill their role, none of the courts or certification organizations utilized by these states checked the credit history or validated the Social Security number of the fictitious applicants. An individual who is financially overextended is at a higher risk of engaging in illegal acts to generate funds. In addition, people with criminal convictions could easily conceal their pasts by stealing a deceased person's identity. The tests raise questions about the effectiveness of these four state certification programs. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-1046: Accessed October 29, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101046.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101046.pdf Shelf Number: 120124 Keywords: Elder Abuse Elderly Victims Embezzlement Financial Crimes Fraud Restitution

Author: Kego, Walter Title: The Fight Against Money Laundering in Latvia and Sweden Summary: The common denominator in all transnational criminal activities is money laundering, the process by which the proceeds of illegal activities are converted into means for legal investments. The fight against money laundering means combating large scale crime. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that shadow transactions amounted to between US$6.5 trillion and US$9 trillion, equaling 20-25% of total global GDP. On the other hand, the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) assesses the annual turnover from the entire criminal market to be around US$1500 billion. This Policy Brief summarizes the proceedings of the Workshop on Money Laundering organized by the Institute for Security and Development Policy, and the Riga Stradins University, Latvia, held May 28, 2010. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2010. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2010 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_kego_the-fight-against-money-laundering.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_kego_the-fight-against-money-laundering.pdf Shelf Number: 120149 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Raczkowski, Konrad Title: Transnational Organized Crime: An Economic Security Threat in the Baltic Sea Region Summary: At the beginning of the 21st century the world encountered a new type of threat, extraordinary both in scale and effect. Terrorist actions were unprecedented in their scale and have altered perceptions of global terrorism. An expansion of organized crime further fuelled by the worldwide economic crisis in 2007–08, triggered by the high risk U.S. mortgage loan market, were all factors in raising awareness of an uncertain and unpredictable future. The addition of catastrophic natural disasters in India, Thailand, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Pakistan , China1 as well as natural disasters on a more localized scale such as fires, flooding, technical breakdowns or effects of the ash cloud from the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull which in 2010 disrupted European and transcontinental air travel, may lead us to the assumption that our world is no longer a safe place. Meanwhile, pressure is mounting from related discussions for a redefinition of organized crime and penalizing actions on the fringes of legality which have a destructive impact on individuals or society as a whole. At this time of crisis it is particularly worthwhile to reflect over whether pushing many companies to the verge of bankruptcy while tightening criteria for loans affords new opportunities for embezzlement, money laundering and consequently legalizing capital coming from undisclosed sources of income. As set forth by the Italian President Giorgio Napolitano, there is a risk that mafia organizations will avail themselves of opportunities afforded by the current crisis, resulting in their taking control of companies under threat of bankruptcy, which will lead to their presence in all regions of the country. It seems necessary now, more than ever before, to reconstruct the financial system in the public sphere and also within individual households while supervising all the incoming assets, at both domestic and international levels. In most cases the impersonal nature of the financial market appear to have brought about irretrievable changes that significantly influenced the daily life and operations of many people, companies, institutions and states. If we add the fact that in Greece, among other countries, the data concerning the budget deficit presented to Brussels and potential purchasers of Greek debt were incorrect, the whole sequence of events following the disclosure of the scale of financial irregularities seen under the government ofKostas Karamanlis are hardly surprising. It is therefore key to address the threats to economic safety where moral and ethical standards fell apart and an undefined speculative capital from supranational capital groups ravaged investors on a large scale. For this reason it is relevant to consider the understanding of traditional criminal groups as well as attempting to answer whether consent to organized operations of financial groups in an incompletely specified system of international law may have features of organized crime and therefore may be seen as criminal. This report is an attempt to outline certain economic conditions which may determine speculative or criminal activity in this field. This factor seems to be crucial as most citizens of developed countries even do not entirely comprehend this mechanism and the reasons behind its efficiency. In this respect a significant part of this report is devoted to elucidate the foundation for contemporary economic conditions in the global system. The analysis is intended to make the reader aware of how far these conditions may determine organized criminal activity or contribute to forming organized activity of a culpable nature, constituting social harm of a scope permitted by law but nevertheless not negligible. Details: Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2010. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_raczkowski_transnational-organized-crime.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_raczkowski_transnational-organized-crime.pdf Shelf Number: 120154 Keywords: Economics and Crime Financial Crimes Organized Crime

Author: Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond Title: Challenges in Dealing with Politically Exposed Persons Summary: Politically exposed persons (PEPs) are individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions. PEPs are potential targets for bribes due to their prominent position in public life. They have a higher risk of corruption due to their access to state accounts and funds. A review of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-style regional bodies' mutual evaluation reports reveals that a significant number of jurisdictions are found to be either non-compliant or partially-compliant with the FATF recommendation on PEPs. Corrupt PEPs may exploit the regulatory difference between jurisdictions to facilitate the laundering of corruption proceeds and/or illegally diverted government, supranational or aid funds. To combat money laundering risks posed by PEPs, there is a need for ongoing monitoring of risks by regulated entities. This paper also outlines three policy implications, namely: deciding whether to include domestic public office holders in existing PEP definitions; deciding when to terminate PEP status; and deciding whether to extend PEP monitoring to individuals holding important positions in the private sector, that is, financially exposed persons. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 386: Accessed November 3, 2010 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/D/3/6/%7BD36F2729-AFC4-48CC-8A3C-2C81FCDCE5A3%7Dtandi386.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/D/3/6/%7BD36F2729-AFC4-48CC-8A3C-2C81FCDCE5A3%7Dtandi386.pdf Shelf Number: 120173 Keywords: Bribery Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in Federal Government's Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead federal agency responsible for inspecting travelers who seek to smuggle large volumes of cash--called bulk cash--when leaving the country through land ports of entry. It is estimated that criminals smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion a year in bulk cash across the southwest border. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is responsible for reducing the risk of cross-border smuggling of funds through the use of devices called stored value, such as prepaid cards. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent of actions taken by CBP to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country and any challenges that remain, (2) the regulatory gaps, if any, of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements of stored value, and (3) if gaps exist, the extent to which FinCEN has addressed them. To conduct its work, GAO observed outbound operations at five land ports of entry. GAO also reviewed statutes, rules, and other information for stored value. This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2010. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. In March 2009, CBP created an Outbound Enforcement Program aimed at stemming the flow of bulk cash leaving the country, but further actions could be taken to address program challenges. Under the program, CBP inspects travelers leaving the country at all 25 land ports of entry along the southwest border. On the Northern border, inspections are conducted at the discretion of the Port Director. From March 2009 through June 2010, CBP seized about $41 million in illicit bulk cash leaving the country at land ports of entry. Stemming the flow of bulk cash, however, is a difficult and challenging task. For example, CBP is unable to inspect every traveler leaving the country at land ports of entry and smugglers of illicit goods have opportunities to circumvent the inspection process. Other challenges involve limited technology, infrastructure, and procedures to support outbound operations. CBP is in the early phases of this program and has not yet taken some actions to gain a better understanding of how well the program is working, such as gathering data for measuring program costs and benefits. By gathering data for measuring expected program costs and benefits, CBP could be in a better position to weigh the costs of any proposed expansion of the outbound inspection program against likely outcomes. Regulatory gaps of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements exist with the use of stored value. For example, travelers must report transporting more than $10,000 in monetary instruments or currency at one time when leaving the country, but FinCEN does not have a similar requirement for travelers transporting stored value. Similarly, certain anti-money laundering regulations, such as reports on suspicious activities, do not apply to the entire stored value industry. The nature and extent of the use of stored value for cross-border currency smuggling and other illegal activities remains unknown, but federal law enforcement agencies are concerned about its use. FinCEN is developing regulations, as required by the Credit CARD Act of 2009, to address gaps in regulations related to the use of stored value for criminal purposes, but much work remains. FinCEN has not developed a management plan that includes, among other things, target dates for completing the regulations. Developing such a plan could help FinCEN better manage its rulemaking effort. When it issues the regulations, law enforcement agencies and FinCEN may be challenged in ensuring compliance by travelers and industry. For example, FinCEN will be responsible for numerous tasks including issuing guidance for compliance examiners, revising the way in which it tracks suspicious activities related to stored value, and addressing gaps in anti-money laundering regulations for off-shore entities that issue and sell stored value. GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, gather data on program costs and benefits and that FinCEN develop a plan, including target dates, to better manage its rulemaking process. CBP and FinCEN concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-73: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Shelf Number: 120339 Keywords: Border Security Financial Crimes Illegal Money Laundering Smuggling

Author: Kar, Dev Title: The Drivers and Dynamics of Illicit Financial Flows from India: 1948-2008 Summary: India's underground economy is closely tied to illicit financial outflows. The total present value of India's illicit assets held abroad ($462 billion) accounts for approximately 72 percent of India's underground economy. This means that almost three-quarters of the illicit assets comprising India's underground economy—which has been estimated to account for 50 percent of India's GDP (approximately $640 billion at the end of 2008)—ends up outside of the country. The finding that only 27.8 percent of India's illicit assets are held domestically support arguments that the desire to amass wealth illegally without attracting government attention is one of the primary motivations behind the cross-border transfer of illicit capital. In the post-reform period of 1991-2008, deregulation and trade liberalization accelerated the outflow of illicit money from the Indian economy. Opportunities for trade mispricing grew and expansion of the global shadow financial system—particularly island tax havens—accommodated the increased outflow of India's illicit capital flight. There is a statistical correlation between larger volumes of illicit flows and deteriorating income distribution. Tax evasion is a major component of the underground economy, which in turn is a primary driver of India's illicit outflows. Expanding India's tax base and improving tax collection has high potential to curtail illicit flows. Illicit financial flows cannot be curtailed without the collaborative effort of both developing and developed countries. Economic reforms key to stemming the outflow of illicit money from India and the developing world in general include: •curtail trade mispricing (a widely utilized tax avoidance technique of international businesses); •require country-by-country reporting of sales, profits and taxes paid by multinational corporations; •require confirmation of beneficial ownership in all banking and securities accounts; •require automatic cross-border exchange of tax information on personal and business accounts; and •harmonize predicate offenses under anti-money laundering laws across all countries that cooperate on the Financial Action Task Force. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2010. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2010 at: http://india.gfip.org/ Year: 2010 Country: India URL: http://india.gfip.org/ Shelf Number: 120391 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering (India) Tax Evasion Underground Economy

Author: U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of Economics Title: Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009: Report on Emergency Technology for Use With ATMs Summary: Every year millions of transactions are conducted using the nation’s estimated 400,000 automated teller machines (“ATMs”). Before, during, or after withdrawing cash from an ATM, a customer may be the target of a robbery or other violent offense. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (the “Act”) mandates that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) provide an analysis of any technology, either currently available or under development, which would allow a distressed ATM user to send an electronic alert to a law enforcement agency. In particular, the FTC was directed to evaluate the efficacy of so-called “emergency-PIN” and “alarm button” technologies by: (1) providing an estimate of the number and severity of any crimes that could be prevented by the availability of these devices; (2) estimating the costs of implementing such devices; and (3) comparing the costs and benefits of at least three types of such devices. Although FTC staff determined that the requisite data to evaluate the efficacy of these technologies are not available, staff nevertheless conducted a review based on other materials to provide a sense of the value of the technology. FTC staff reviewed various ATM trade press reports and academic studies and contacted a range of entities – several government agencies, a number of major, private financial institutions, other firms, trade associations involved with ATMs and ATM security, and suppliers of the technologies – that staff believed to be most likely to have relevant data on ATM crimes and security technologies. None of these sources, however, provided data that would permit the analyses specified by the Act. Most fundamental, FTC staff learned that emergency-PIN technologies have never been deployed at any ATMs, and alarm buttons have been deployed only at very few ATMs. None of the information collected indicated that any similar technology is currently in use for a distressed customer to electronically alert local law enforcement. FTC staff found that data on ATM-related crimes and the costs of these emergency technologies – whether from government or private sources – are very limited and are inadequate for a rigorous analysis. The information staff received and staff’s review of the state-level legislative history relating to these issues, however, raise questions about whether the benefits of emergency-PIN or alarm button technologies would exceed the associated costs of implementation for most ATM-related crimes. The available information suggests that emergency-PIN and alarm button devices: (1) may not halt or deter crimes to any significant extent; (2) may in some instances increase the danger to customers who are targeted by offenders and also lead to some false alarms (although the exact magnitude of these potential effects cannot be determined); and (3) may impose substantial implementation costs, although no formally derived cost estimates of implementing these technologies are currently available. The anecdotal evidence that the staff relied upon, however, does not allow for any definitive conclusions regarding the efficacy of the reviewed emergency-PIN or alarm button systems to affect ATM crimes. Details: Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 2010. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2010 at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/05/100504creditcardreport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/05/100504creditcardreport.pdf Shelf Number: 120592 Keywords: ATM Crimes Automated Teller Machines Crime Prevention Financial Crimes Robberies

Author: Hubschle, Annette, compiler Title: Organised Crime in Southern Africa: First Annual Review Summary: In 2005 representatives of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Secretariat of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) discussed the lack of reliable information and research on organised crime and how it impacted on law enforcement in southern Africa. The lack of credible homegrown research data ultimately led to the conceptualisation of a joint research project between the Cape Town-based ISS Organised Crime and Money Laundering Programme and SARPCCO. The Enhancing Regional Responses Against Organised Crime (EROC) Project commenced in January 2008 and concludes in December 2010. The objectives of the research are to: Provide in-depth information on contemporary organised criminal activities in the sub-region to policy and decision makers; Analyse the transnational dynamics of organised criminal groups and networks; Determine whether, and to what extent, links exist between organised crime and terrorism; Consider and document the role that corruption plays in organised crime; and Evaluate the capacity and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in the sub-region to overcome organised crime. This report comprises the research findings of the first year of data collection (2008) for the EROC project. It is the first of three such reports that will be published by the ISS in collaboration with SARPCCO. It looks at selected organised criminal activities and observed levels of prevalence in 12 southern African countries. Research questions, methodologies, limitations and ethical considerations are discussed in detail. Due to the lack of statistical and quantitative data, the report relies mostly on qualitative methodologies. Representatives of law enforcement agencies, government departments and para-statals, civil society, business and professional associations, academics, prisoners, former gang members and members of the broader communities whose lives have been affected by organised crime, were consulted in one-on-one interviews, focus groups, observations and workshops. A team of field researchers led by a research coordinator collected the data presented and analysed in this report. The research was informed by a working definition of organised crime which was jointly developed by the heads of criminal investigation departments in southern Africa and the research team. The report shows that the more serious forms of crime in terms of the monetary value involved or the potential harm they cause have a transnational dimension, both in terms of being committed by people of varying nationalities and in terms of affecting more than one country. It has been established that organised crime in most countries is underpinned by corruption, which is either a facilitating activity or an organised criminal activity in its own right. The geo-political and economic environments of individual countries amplifies the significance of specific criminal activities, the commonest forms of which have been identified as stock theft, theft/hijacking of motor vehicles, cultivation of marijuana and a broad spectrum of economic crimes. Further, the research has shown that although economic crimes may not be as prevalent as other forms of crime, statistically their impact on the society and the economy are far reaching. Furthermore, the effectiveness of law enforcement against organised crime has been put in the spotlight. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2010. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf Shelf Number: 120675 Keywords: Corruption Counterfeit Goods Drug Markets Financial Crimes Human Trafficking Money Laundering Offenses Against the Environment Organized Crime (South Africa) Poaching Smuggling Stolen Motor Vehicles Wildlife Crime

Author: Haken, Jeremy Title: Transnational Crime In The Developing World Summary: This report analyzes the scale, flow, profit distribution, and impact of 12 different types of illicit trade: drugs, humans, wildlife, counterfeit goods and currency, human organs, small arms, diamonds and colored gemstones, oil, timber, fish, art and cultural property, and gold. Though the specific characteristics of each market vary, in general it can be said that these profitable and complex criminal operations originate primarily in developing countries, thrive in the space created by poverty, inequality, and state weakness, and contribute to forestalling economic prosperity for billions of people in countries across the world. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_high-res.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_high-res.pdf Shelf Number: 120716 Keywords: Art Crime Counterfeiting Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Human Trafficking Illicit Trade Offenses Against the Environment Transnational Crime Wildlife Crime

Author: Blickman, Tom Title: Countering Illicit and Unregulated Money Flows: Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Financial Regulation Summary: In July 1989, the leaders of the economic powers assembled at the G7 Paris summit decided to establish a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to counter money laundering as an effective strategy against drug trafficking by criminal ‘cartels’. Here began an international anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Since then it has expanded its scope to fight transnational organized crime and counter the financing of terrorism. During that time other illicit or unregulated money flows have appeared on the international agenda as well. Today, tax evasion and avoidance, flight capital, transfer pricing and mispricing, and the proceeds of grand corruption are seen as perhaps more detrimental obstacles to good governance and the stability and integrity of the financial system. Other international bodies were tasked to tackle these ‘public bads’. Tackling tax evasion is still in its infancy, and there is a growing awareness that the AML regime is not working as well as intended. Experts still ponder how to implement one that works. Tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) were identified as facilitating these unregulated and illicit money flows. The 2007-2008 credit crisis made only too clear the major systemic risk for all global finance posed by the secrecy provided by tax havens and OFCs. They were used to circumvent prudential regulatory requirements for banks and other financial institutions and hide substantial risks from onshore regulators. After twenty years of failed efforts, the G20 (having supplanted the G7) has again pledged to bring illicit and harmful unregulated money flows under control. This briefing looks at previous attempts to do so and the difficulties encountered along the way. Can the G20 succeed or is it merely following the same path that led to inadequate measures? What are the lessons to be learned and are bolder initiatives required? In brief, the paper concludes that current initiatives have reached their sale-by date and that a bolder initiative is required at the UN level, moving from recommendations to obligations, and fully engaging developing nations, at present left out in the current ‘club’-oriented process. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime and Globalisation Debate Papers: Accessed February 10, 2011 at: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Countering%20illicit%20and%20unregulated%20money%20flows.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Countering%20illicit%20and%20unregulated%20money%20flows.pdf Shelf Number: 118152 Keywords: Cartels Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Tax Evasion

Author: Kar, Dev Title: The Absorption of Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006 Summary: A recent study by Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) found that over the period 2002 to 2006, illicit financial flows from developing countries increased from US$372 to US$859 billion. The purpose of this paper is to link these outflows with major points of absorption consisting of offshore financial centers and developed country banks. While offshore centers have recently attracted media attention regarding their lack of transparency, the paper finds that large data gaps exist for banks as well. These gaps make it difficult to analyze the absorption of illicit funds, defined as the change in private sector deposits of developing countries in banks and offshore centers. The paper argues that both need to greatly improve the transparency of their operations. Regular reporting of detailed deposit data by sector, maturity, and country of residence of deposit holder would close many of the data gaps identified in this paper and allow for a more robust analysis of the absorption of illicit flows from developing countries. Given data limitations, certain assumptions had to be made regarding the behavior of illicit flows and investments. These assumptions were formulated as control variables for a simple model of absorption. Several simulations of illicit outflows against absorption (defined as the non-bank private sector deposits of developing countries) were carried out using different settings of the control variables. The paper finds that while offshore centers have been absorbing an increasing share of illicit flows from developing countries over the five-year period of this study, international banks have played a pivotal role in facilitating that absorption. Depending upon whether one uses the narrower Bank for International Settlements or broader International Monetary Fund definition (a control variable), offshore centers hold an estimated 24 or 44 percent of total absorption respectively, while banks hold the balance. As total absorption consists of both licit and illicit funds, the paper presents a simple algebraic analysis to estimate the portion of such deposits in banks and offshore centers. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the polar extreme (all illicit or all licit) in such holdings by either group is not tenable given the overall volume of illicit flows and absorption. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2010. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/absorption_of_illicit_flows_web.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/absorption_of_illicit_flows_web.pdf Shelf Number: 120745 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006 Summary: This report shows that the developing world is losing an increasing amount of money through illicit capital flight each year. Moreover, the value of the illicit flows surpasses the amount of Official Development Assistance entering those countries by an order of magnitude. "Illicit financial flows siphon revenue out of poor countries, robbing them of much-needed assets and forestalling economic development,” said GFI director Raymond Baker. “These new figures reveal that illicit financial flows outpace Official Development Assistance by a ratio of nearly 10 to 1. This is critical to understanding global poverty and developing effective poverty alleviation and economic development strategies,” Baker said. Primary findings of the report include: Total capital flight exiting the developing world may be as much as $1 trillion dollars per year; Measured against the flow of Official Development Assistance in 2006 poor countries, in aggregate, are losing close to $10 dollars for every $1 dollar they receive in aid; The volume of capital flight from developing countries is increasing at an average of 18.5% a year. Over the five-year period of this study, illicit financial flows grew at the fastest pace in the Middle East and North Africa region (49.4 percent) followed by Europe (25.4 percent), Asia (15.7 percent), and the Western Hemisphere (2.8 percent). Illicit financial flows from Africa actually declined (-2.9 percent) but this decline is more the result of incomplete data than supportive economic or political factors. Illicit financial flows refer to money that is illegal in its origin, transfer or use and reflect the proceeds of corruption, crime and tax evasion. Corporate avoidance of customs duties, VAT and income taxes constitute an estimated 60% of the total outflow. The study utilized multiple economic models which were combined and “tested” to determine the most reliable estimates. The findings were based on macroeconomic trade and external debt data maintained by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2008. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/executive%20-%20final%20version%201-5-09.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/executive%20-%20final%20version%201-5-09.pdf Shelf Number: 120746 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Tax Evasion

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2009, Update with a Focus on Asia Summary: The report, “Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2009,” finds that approximately $6.5 trillion was removed from the developing world from 2000 through 2008. The report also examines illicit flows from Asia, which produced the largest portion of total outflows and makes projections for 2009. The report ranks countries according to magnitude of outflows with China ranking 1 ($2.18 trillion), Russia 2 ($427 billion), Mexico 3 ($416 billion), Saudi Arabia 4 ($302 billion), and Malaysia 5 ($291 billion). The report also shows the annual outflows for each country and breaks outflows down into two categories of drivers: trade mispricing and “other,” which includes kickbacks, bribes, embezzlement, and other forms of official corruption. The report also looks at the impact of the global economic recession—on both magnitudes and trends in illicit outflows, it makes policy recommendations, and it projects outflows for 2009 (for which complete data is not yet available). Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/IFF2010/gfi_iff_update_report-web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/IFF2010/gfi_iff_update_report-web.pdf Shelf Number: 120748 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Richardson, Amy Title: Understanding Forfeitures: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Case Details and Forfeiture Among TEOAF High-Forfeiture and Major Cases Summary: The Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF), which is the receipt account for the deposits of nontax forfeitures that result from law-enforcement actions against criminal enterprises, such as drug cartels, terrorist organizations, and individual embezzlers, by agencies that are currently, or were historically, part of the U.S. Treasury — the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Secret Service. High levels of forfeiture from the prosecution of these crimes serve to punish the individuals involved, help to dismantle the operations associated with the crime, may deter others from engaging in similar crimes, and provide funds to support future investigations among participating agencies. TEOAF commissioned the RAND Corporation to examine the relationship between targeted funding support of significant financial investigations and the forfeiture outcomes of such investigations. This report presents the findings of that analysis. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR631.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR631.pdf Shelf Number: 120842 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Financial Crimes

Author: Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond Title: Cyber Threat Landscape Faced by Financial and Insurance Industry Summary: Opportunities for criminals to engage in transnational activities have expanded with globalisation and advancements in information and communications technologies. Cyber criminal activities will increasingly affect the financial security of online business. It is widely accepted that the financial and insurance industry is the ‘target of choice’ for financially motivated cyber criminals. Yet there is a lack of understanding about the true magnitude of cyber crime and its impact on businesses. Drawing on data from a 2008 Australia-wide survey conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the threat landscape faced by the financial and insurance industry by assessing the top four risk areas reported by the survey respondents. The paper also examines whether the results from the financial and insurance industries differ from other industries and identifies ways in which industries (particularly the financial and insurance industry), can neutralise or reduce cyber crime opportunities. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 408: Accessed February 22, 2011 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/F/B/%7B8FB75BEB-DA4B-458B-A444-1EED76001EEE%7Dtandi408.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/F/B/%7B8FB75BEB-DA4B-458B-A444-1EED76001EEE%7Dtandi408.pdf Shelf Number: 120849 Keywords: Cybercrime Financial Crimes Internet Crimes

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods Summary: NPMs (prepaid cards, mobile payments and Internet payment services) have become more widely used and accepted as alternative methods to initiate payment transactions. Some have even begun to emerge as a viable alternative to the traditional financial system in a number of countries. The rise in the number of transactions and the volume of funds moved through NPMs since 2006 has been accompanied by an increase in the number of detected cases where such payment systems were misused for ML/TF purposes. The NPM report in 2006 identified potential legitimate and illegitimate uses for the various NPMs but there was little evidence to support this. The current report will compare and contrast the “potential risks” described in the 2006 report to the “actual risks” based on new case studies and typologies. Not all potential risks identified in 2006 were backed up by case studies. This does not mean that those risks are no longer of concern, and jurisdictions should continue to be alert to the market´s development to prevent misuse and detect cases that went unnoticed before. The report will also develop red flag indicators which might help a) NPM service providers to detect ML/TF activities in their own businesses and b) other financial institutions to detect ML/TF activities in their business with NPM service providers, in order to increase the number and quality of suspicious transaction reports (STRs). Although more case studies are now available, issues surrounding appropriate legislation and regulations for NPMs are still a challenge for many jurisdictions. Consequently, the report also identifies the unique legal and regulatory challenges associated with NPMs and describes the different approaches national legislators and regulators have taken to address these. A comparison of regulatory approaches can help inform other jurisdictions’ decisions regarding the regulation of NPM. Finally, this report considers the extent to which the FATF 40+9 Recommendations continue to adequately address the ML/TF issues associated with NPMs. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 24, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/56/46705859.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/56/46705859.pdf Shelf Number: 120873 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering Using Trust and Company Service Providers Summary: Trust and Company Service Providers (TCSPs) provide an important link between financial institutions and many of their customers. TCSPs have often been used, wittingly or unwittingly, in the conduct of money laundering activities. This comprehensive typologies report evaluates the effectiveness of the practical applications of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations as they relate to TCSPs. It also considers the role of TCSPs in the detection, prevention and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing. Finally, it evaluates the potential need for additional international requirements or sector-specific international standards for TCSPs. This typologies exercise has drawn from the research and conclusions that were made in previous work, such as the 2006 FATF Typologies study "The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles, including Trust and Company Service Providers" ; from analysis of jurisdictions' responses to a questionnaire developed for this project; as well as case studies obtained from various sources. This report presents issues for consideration that should help to reduce the use of TCSPs for money laundering purposes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 24, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/38/46706131.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/38/46706131.pdf Shelf Number: 120874 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Elder Justice: Stronger Federal Leadership Could Enhance National Response to Elder Abuse Summary: Each day, news reports cite instances of older adults across the United States being abused, denied needed care, or financially exploited, often by those they depend on. This report contains information on (1) existing estimates of the extent of elder abuse and their quality, (2) factors associated with elder abuse and its impact on victims, (3) characteristics and challenges of state Adult Protective Services (APS) responsible for addressing elder abuse, and (4) federal support and leadership in this area. To obtain this information, GAO reviewed relevant research; visited six states and surveyed state APS programs; analyzed budgetary and other federal documents; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and interviewed federal officials, researchers, and elder abuse experts. The most recent study of the extent of elder abuse estimated that 14.1 percent of noninstitutionalized older adults had experienced physical, psychological, or sexual abuse; neglect; or financial exploitation in the past year. This study and three other key studies GAO identified likely underestimate the full extent of elder abuse, however. Most did not ask about all types of abuse or include all types of older adults living in the community, such as those with cognitive impairments. In addition, studies in this area cannot be used to track changes in extent over time because they have not measured elder abuse consistently. Based on existing research, various factors appear to place older adults at greater risk of abuse. Physical and cognitive impairments, mental problems, and low social support among victims have been associated with an increased likelihood of elder abuse. Elder abuse has also been associated with negative effects on victims' health and longevity. Although state APS programs vary in their organization and eligibility criteria, they face many of the same challenges. According to program officials, elder abuse caseloads are growing nationwide and cases are increasingly complex and difficult to resolve. However, according to GAO's survey, APS program resources are not keeping pace with these changes. As a result, program officials noted that it is difficult to maintain adequate staffing levels and training. In addition, states indicated they have limited access to information on interventions and practices on how to resolve elder abuse cases, and may struggle to respond to abuse cases appropriately. Many APS programs also face challenges in collecting, maintaining, and reporting statewide case-level administrative data, thereby hampering their ability to track outcomes and assess the effectiveness of services provided. Federal elder justice activities have addressed some APS challenges, but leadership in this area is lacking. Seven agencies within the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Justice devoted a total of $11.9 million in grants for elder justice activities in fiscal year 2009. These activities have promoted collaboration among APS and its partners, such as law enforcement, but have not offered APS the support it says it needs for resolving elder abuse cases and standardizing the information it reports. Although the Older Americans Act of 1965 has called attention to the importance of federal leadership in the elder justice area, no national policy priorities currently exist. The Administration on Aging in HHS is charged with providing such leadership, but its efforts to do so have been limited. The Elder Justice Act of 2009 authorizes grants to states for their APS programs and provides a vehicle for establishing and implementing national priorities in this area, but does not address national elder abuse incidence studies. The Secretary of HHS should determine the feasibility of providing APS-dedicated guidance, and, in coordination with the Attorney General, facilitate the development and implementation of a nationwide APS data system. Also, Congress should consider requiring HHS to conduct a periodic study to estimate elder abuse's extent. HHS indicated that it will review options for implementing GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-208: Accessed March 8, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11208.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11208.pdf Shelf Number: 120903 Keywords: Crimes Against the Elderly Elder Abuse Elderly Victims Financial Crimes Financial Exploitation

Author: Budd, Carolyn Title: Consumer Fraud in Australasia: Results of the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce Online Australia Surveys 2008 and 2009. Summary: Those who perpetrate consumer scams use a wide range of deceptive practices and methods of communication. However, all aim to trick unsuspecting consumers into parting with money or information, often to criminals located overseas. Phishing attacks, lottery and prize scams, financial investment scams and advanced fee fraud are just a few of the more common scam varieties that are used in an attempt to gain either money or personal details that will eventually be used for financial gain by offenders. The increased use of electronic forms of communication and the ease of sending mass scam invitations via the Internet has also resulted in an increase in the number of scam requests disseminated globally. Scam invitations may appear benign to those who receive them and choose not to respond. This form of spam may be seen as an unfortunate consequence of using the Internet, however, scams can cause serious financial and other harms to those who are victimised, as well as to the wider community. Consumer fraud has been estimated to cost Australia almost $1b annually, although the full extent of the losses is unknown as many choose not to report their experiences officially. Although victims of scams can lose as little as $1, some send substantial amounts to criminals, occasionally exceeding many hundreds of thousands of dollars. Those who send such large amounts frequently feel ashamed of what they have done, or apprehensive that they might have acted illegally. Victims may also receive little sympathy for having being victimised and may be blamed for being gullible. These factors act to deter victims from formally reporting the scam to police. When the full circumstances of cases are known, however, the sophistication of the deception makes it clear that victims have been enticed by a serious and concerted campaign of trickery which preys on their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce (ACFT) includes 20 government regulatory agencies and departments in Australia and New Zealand that work alongside private sector, community and non-government partners to prevent fraud. In order to understand the dynamics of consumer fraud victimisation, the ACFT has conducted a range of fraud prevention and awareness-raising activities since 2006. One key activity of the ACFT is to hold an annual consumer fraud survey to obtain a snapshot of the public’s exposure to consumer scams, to assess their impact, to determine how victims respond and to identify any emerging typologies and issues. This report presents the results of surveys conducted in conjunction with the 2008 campaign that focused on Seduction and Deception Scams and the 2009 campaign that focused on sending the message— Scams Target You: Protect Yourself, Don’t Be a Victim of Scammers and Fight the Scammers. Don’t Respond. Overall, both surveys found that despite most respondents indicating that they had received a scam invitation over the specified 12 month period, the majority did not respond. Invitations sent by email remained the most common method of receiving an invitation, with lottery scams attracting the highest number of victims in 2008 whereas in 2009, work from home scams were the most common way respondents were scammed. Although the survey relies on self-reported data, it still provides a useful means of identifying the nature of victimisation and for identifying areas for further research into consumer fraud. The links identified between scam victimisation and factors such as age, income, reporting and jurisdiction could be used to develop more strategic consumer fraud awareness campaigns that focus on the groups more vulnerable to scam victimisation. The relationships between these variables and victimisation could then be explored more fully using representative samples of the population, or in-depth data collection techniques such as interviewing of those who have been defrauded. With a more extensive understanding of who is victimised and why, more effective scam prevention measures can be enacted. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Technical and Background Paper No. 43: Accessed March 10, 2011 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tbp/41-60/tbp043.aspx Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tbp/41-60/tbp043.aspx Shelf Number: 120967 Keywords: Consumer Fraud Consumer Protection Financial Crimes Internet Crimes Scams

Author: Jackson, Shelly L. Title: Financial Abuse of Elderly People vs. Other Forms of Elder Abuse: Assessing Their Dynamics, Risk Factors, and Society’s Response Summary: Financial exploitation of elderly people is expected to proliferate over the next decade as the elderly population continues to grow rapidly. This study examined financial exploitation of elderly people compared to other forms of elder maltreatment (physical abuse, neglect, and hybrid, i.e., financial exploitation and physical abuse and/or neglect) that occurred in a domestic setting. Using semi-structured interviews, 71 adult protective services (APS) caseworkers in Virginia and their elder client were interviewed separately about incidents of maltreatment that came to the attention of APS. Elderly participants were on average 76 years of age, 83% Caucasian, 76% female, and 84% were living in their own home. Interviews lasting between one and three hours covered a number of domains such as case characteristics, consequences, risk factors associated with the elderly victims and their perpetrators, the nature of the interactions between them, the APS investigation, the criminal justice response, and outcomes. In addition, data derived from the Adult Services Adult Protective Services (ASAPS) database managed by the Virginia Department of Social Services were used to in logistic regressions. Financial exploitation differed from other forms of elder maltreatment, specifically, physical abuse, neglect by other, and hybrid financial exploitation, across a number of important domains. Furthermore, financial exploitation is underreported, underinvestigated and underprosecuted. However, important differences existed among all four forms of elder abuse. An exploration of the dynamics of elder abuse facilitated a greater understanding of the different forms of elder abuse under investigation. Results further revealed discrepancies between APS caseworkers’ and elderly persons’ perceptions of the causes of the elder’s abuse. Furthermore, when differences did persist to the close of the case, the abuse was significantly less likely to cease. These findings indicate the critical need to separate theoretically and practically different types of elder maltreatment. Additionally, critical to increasing our understanding of elder maltreatment is the need to take into consideration perpetrators when examining, predicting, and explaining elder maltreatment and related interventions. An exclusive focus on elderly people will continue to undermine effective interventions. Implications for theory, research, policy, and intervention are discussed. Details: Final Report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2010. 608p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/233613.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/233613.pdf Shelf Number: 121410 Keywords: Domestic Violence Elder Abuse Elderly Victims Financial Crimes

Author: Initernational Monetary Fund Title: Kingdom of the Netherlands - Netherlands: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Summary: This assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime of the Netherlands is based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and was prepared using the AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004, as last updated in February 2009. The assessment team considered all the materials supplied by the authorities, the information obtained on site during their mission from June 28 to July 13, 2010, and other verifiable information subsequently provided by the authorities. During the mission, the assessment team met with officials and representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector. A list of the bodies met is set out in Annex 1 to the detailed assessment report. This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in the Netherlands at the time of the mission or shortly thereafter. It describes and analyzes those measures, sets out the Netherlands's levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (see Table 1), and provides recommendations on how certain aspects of the system could be strengthened (see Table 2). The report was produced by the IMF as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of the Netherlands. It was also presented to the FATF and adopted by this organization at its plenary meeting of February 2011. Details: Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2011. 334p. Source: Internet Resource: IMF Country Report No. 11/92: Accessed April 25 at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1192.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Netherlands URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1192.pdf Shelf Number: 121482 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering (Netherlands) Terrorist Financing

Author: European Banking Federation Title: EBF Anti Money Laundering Report: 2009 Summary: This report has been drafted by the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Fraud Committee of the European Banking Federation (EBF) based on contributions submitted by national banking associations. This extensive document offers an inventory of national regulations on money laundering in more than 25 countries in Europe with a focus on the implementation of Directive 2005/60/EC1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the Prevention of the use of the Financial System (the” Third EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive”). National legislation are detailed and listed with identical headings (type of legislation, business covered, reporting procedures, identification requirements, etc.) which introduce some valuable elements of comparison among countries. Please note that the Report is based on information collected from August 2008 to March 2009. Details: Brussels: European Banking Federation, 2009. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://www.sff.is/media/ebf/EBF_Anti_Money_Laundering_Report_2009.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://www.sff.is/media/ebf/EBF_Anti_Money_Laundering_Report_2009.pdf Shelf Number: 121609 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Amin, Mohammad Title: Crime, Security, and Firms in Latin America Summary: Existing studies show that crime is more rampant in the larger cities and that wealthier individuals are more often targeted. Using Enterprise Surveys data for 14 Latin American countries, we find that one- third of the firms surveyed suffer from one or more incident of crime annually, which is roughly similar to the percentage of households affected. Crime-related losses average 2.7 percent of annual sales for all firms in the sample, which is more than the reported amount of bribery, losses due to power outages, and firms’ expenditure on research and development. We also find that the relatively well-off large firms are more likely to be victims of crime than the small firms, but losses due to crime as a percentage of annual sales are bigger for small firms. In short, crime in the region is regressive. Last, larger cities are more prone to crime than the smaller cities. However, we find that what matters for crime is the relative size of a city within a country; its absolute size is irrelevant. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank Group, International Finance Corporation, 2009. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Enterprise Note No. 2: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Documents/EnterpriseNotes/Note2.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Documents/EnterpriseNotes/Note2.pdf Shelf Number: 121714 Keywords: Bribery Crimes Against Businesses (Latin America) Financial Crimes Victimization

Author: Bjelajac, Zeljko Dj. Title: Contemporary Tendencies in Money Laundering Methods: Review of the Methods and Measures for its Suppression Summary: Money laundering is not an isolated case, present in a single state or a series of states, but a worldwide phenomenon. Banking represents a useful field for different types of offenses related to money laundering. The utilization of corresponding accounts for the purposes of money laundering has also been perceived as a serious problem. The exploitation of the electronic money transfer for money laundering appears to be the most convenient and frequent method of concealing illegally acquired assets, and this method is today one of the most common and suitable methods of the capital transfer worldwide. Money laundering represents important organized crime activity, that is, its’ typical and characteristic behavior. Traditional financial instruments are increasingly repressed by the use of the new technological systems and replaced by new electronic payment systems. However, the utilization of the new electronic payment systems introduces a variety of risks associated to numerous opportunities of abuse due to money laundering. In order to prevent money laundering and the wrongful consequences it causes in different spheres of society, competent authorities engage in a number of preventive processes and actions, applying specific methods and measures developed for combating this phenomenon. Details: Athens, Greece: Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), 2011. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: RIEAS: Research Paper, No. 151: Accessed May 29, 2011 at: http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas151.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas151.pdf Shelf Number: 121763 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows from the Least Developed Countries: 1990–2008 Summary: This paper explores the scale and composition of illicit financial flows from the 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Illicit financial flows involve the cross-border transfer of the proceeds of corruption, trade in contraband goods, criminal activities and tax evasion. In recent years, considerable interest has arisen over the extent to which such flows may have a detrimental impact on development and governance in both developed and developing countries alike. This issue has been recognised by the UN as important for development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Illicit capital flight, where it occurs, is a major hindrance to the mobilisation of domestic resources for development. In many cases, it significantly reduces the volume of resources available for investment in the MDGs and productive capacities. Through the United Nations, the international community has committed to strengthen national and multilateral efforts to address it. As the deadline for achievement of the MDGs draws closer, it is vital understand more about the nature of this problem and to explore possible policy solutions, especially for those countries furthest off-track towards the MDGs. The study’s indicative results find that illicit financial flows from the LDCs have increased from US$9.7 billion in 1990 to US$26.3 billion in 2008 implying an inflation-adjusted rate of increase of 6.2 percent per annum. Conservative (lower-bound) estimates indicate that illicit flows have increased from US$7.9 billion in 1990 to US$20.2 billion in 2008. The top ten exporters of illicit capital account for 63 percent of total outflows from the LDCs while the top 20 account for nearly 83 percent. Trade mispricing accounts for the bulk (65-70 percent) of illicit outflows from the LDCs, and the propensity for mispricing has increased along with increasing external trade. Empirical research on illicit flows indicates that there are three types of factors driving illicit flows—macroeconomic, structural, and governance-related. The ratio of illicit outflows to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averages about 4.8 percent but there is wide variation among LDCs. Of the top 10 countries with the highest illicit flows to GDP ratio, four are small island countries, two are landlocked, and four are neither. In some LDCs, losses through illicit capital flows outpace monies received in official development assistance (ODA). Estimating illicit flows from some LDCs is problematic because the underlying macroeconomic or partner-country trade data are either non-existent or spotty due to widespread on-going or recent conflict and/or weak statistical capacity. Complete macroeconomic and partner-country trade data were available for 34 LDCs, while 11 report partial data to the IMF and 3 are nonreporters. The report thus presents an estimate of illicit flows from some of the non-reporting and partially reporting countries based on the assumption that illicit flows from these countries are in the same proportion to GDP as are outflows from other reporting LDCs with complete data. The results of this study are indicative but demonstrate a clear need for further research in this area given the scale of the development challenges which currently face the Least Developed Countries and the need to ‘think outside the box’ and find innovative development solutions. The paper presents a number of useful measures LDCs may wish to consider to curtail the generation and transmission of illicit financial flows. The international community must also play its part. However, even where policy measures are well designed and targeted, lasting improvements in this area can only be achieved when there is the sufficient political will and leadership to tackle corruption and some of the root causes of illicit financial flows. For the Least Developed Countries, policy recommendations include measures to address trade mispricing through for instance systematic customs reform and the adoption of transfer pricing regulations with commensurate increase in enforcement capacity. The implementation of specialised software which helps governments to identify possible incidences of transfer pricing may also be useful to some governments. Measures to reform the tax base through the progressive strengthening and widening of the tax base in order to reduce dependence on indirect taxes which are more difficult to manage and have built-in incentives for tax evasion may also be beneficial. Ultimately tax is the most sustainable source of finance for development and the long-term goal of poor countries must be to replace foreign aid dependency with tax self-sufficiency. However taxation reform must be seen as equitable and fair and must not unduly burden the poorest. The international community must also support LDCs’ efforts to curtail the illicit outflow of capital. This includes specific measures to support LDCs to improve the systematic exchange of tax information between governments on non-resident individuals and corporations while the adoption of globally consistent regulations for transfer pricing could encourage multinational companies to modify their behaviour towards more transparency and accountability. The UN’s Model Income Tax Treaty refers to the importance of automatic exchange of information between national tax authorities in different jurisdictions. In order to stem tax avoidance by multinational corporations, the international community could support the development of an international accounting standard requiring that all multi-national corporations report sales, profits, and taxes paid in all jurisdictions in their audited annual reports and tax returns. Details: New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.gfip.org/ Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.gfip.org/ Shelf Number: 121767 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Illicit Trade Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Belli, Roberta Title: Where Political Extremists and Greedy Criminals Meet: A Comparative Study of Financial Crimes and Criminal Networks in the United States Summary: Financial crime poses a serious threat to the integrity and security of legitimate businesses and institutions, and to the safety and prosperity of private citizens and communities. Experts argue that the profile of financial offenders is extremely diversified and includes individuals who may be motivated by greed or ideology. Islamic extremists increasingly resort to typical white-­‐collar crimes, like credit card and financial fraud, to raise funds for their missions. In the United States, the far-­‐right movement professes its anti-­‐government ideology by promoting and using a variety of anti-­‐tax strategies. There is evidence that ideologically motivated individuals who engage in financial crimes benefit from interactions with profit-­‐driven offenders and legitimate actors that provide resources for crime in the form of knowledge, skills, and suitable co-­‐offenders. This dissertation sheds light on the nexus between political extremism and profit-­‐driven crime by conducting a systematic study of financial crime cases involving Islamic extremists, domestic far-­‐rightists, and their non-­‐extremist accomplices prosecuted by federal courts in 2004. Attribute and relational data were extracted from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which is the first open-­‐source relational database that provides information on all extremist crimes, violent and non-­‐violent, ideological and routine crimes, since 1990. A descriptive analysis was conducted comparing schemes, crimes, and techniques used by far-­‐rightists, Islamic extremists, and non-­‐extremists, before moving into an in-­‐depth social network analysis of their relational ties in co-­‐offending, business, and family networks. The descriptive findings revealed considerable differences in the modus operandi followed by far-­‐rightists and Islamic extremists as well as the prosecutorial strategies used against them. The subsequent exploratory and statistical network analyses, however, revealed interesting similarities, suggesting that financial schemes by political extremists occurred within similarly decentralized, self-­‐organizing structures that facilitated exchanges between individuals acting within close-­‐knit subsets regardless of their ideological affiliation. Meaningful interactions emerged between far-­‐rightists and non-­‐extremists involved in business ventures and within a tax avoidance scheme, indicating that the crime-­‐extremism nexus was more prevalent within far-­‐right settings compared to Islamic extremist ones. The findings were discussed in light of their implications for criminological theories, criminal justice and crime prevention policies, and methodological advances. Details: Dissertation, City University of New York, 2011. 464p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Shelf Number: 121874 Keywords: Extremist Groups Financial Crimes Fraud Organized Crime Tax-Evasion Terrorism Terrorists White Collar Crime White Collar Offenses

Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Fraud in the 'Outback': Capable Guardianship in Preventing Financial Crime in Regional and Remote Communities Summary: The Australian Institute of Criminology previously estimated the cost of fraud in Australia in 2005 to be approximately $8.5b (Rollings 2008). Fraud risks affect all sectors of society extending from those who provide government services, to those who receive benefits, as well as private sector businesses such as primary producers, and those who buy and sell goods and services online. In this paper, the specific risks of financial crime that arise in and subsequently affect those in remote and regional communities in Australia are explored. The risk of fraud is increased because of the difficulties that arise in ensuring adequate levels of ‘capable guardianship’ in non-urban locations which are often disadvantaged in terms of money and knowledge of fraud risks, as well as the ability to avoid them. Examples of recent fraud cases from regional and remote Australia are used to highlight the risks associated with fraud in these places and to indicate where the absence of guardianship may have increased risks. It is concluded that capable guardianship, as a whole, needs to be enhanced outside major cities in order to reduce the level of fraud experienced by government, businesses and individuals each year. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 413: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/1/6/7/%7B167998BB-D3E8-4F2E-9E3A-F6CE673CE0D6%7Dtandi413.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/1/6/7/%7B167998BB-D3E8-4F2E-9E3A-F6CE673CE0D6%7Dtandi413.pdf Shelf Number: 121876 Keywords: Capable Guardianship Financial Crimes Fraud (Australia)

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption Summary: This typology originates from a practitioners‘ understanding that the fight against corruption is inextricably intertwined with that against money laundering; that the stolen assets of a corrupt public official are useless unless they are placed, layered, and integrated into the global financial network in a manner that does not raise suspicion. In some ways, a public official (known as a politically exposed person, or ―PEP) who gathers vast sums of money through corrupt means is far more vulnerable than some other criminals. A narcotics trafficker may reliably depend on being able to remain anonymous with his vast amount of money; a public official begins to draw unwanted attention as soon as he is associated with significant sums from unknown sources. Thus, the corrupt PEP‘s vulnerability presents an opportunity for those authorities engaged in both anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and anti-corruption (AC) enforcement. This typology differs from other such typologies previously produced by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) because it draws from publicly available work undertaken by experts. The body of work the project team analyzed represents deep AML expertise possessed by individuals and organisations around the globe. Indeed, the objective was to understand these works to draw conclusions from them. Broadly stated, the goal was to stand on the shoulders of others in order to better understand corruption, its mechanisms and vulnerabilities, through an AML/CFT lens. Part of the mandate of the Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) is to identify new threats and vulnerabilities and conduct research on money laundering and terrorist financing methods and techniques. FATF typology reports typically reveal, describe, and explain the nature of ML/TF methods and threats, thus increasing global awareness and opportunities for earlier detection. In light of its mandate, the project team focused only on the methods used to launder the proceeds of corruption. It does not attempt to describe the methods by which bribery and other corruption are effectuated, concealed, or discovered; such a discussion would be outside of the scope of this paper. While there may be no internationally recognised legal definition of corruption, it is most commonly functionally defined as the use of public office for private gain. The United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and the Council of Europe Conventions establish the offences for a range of corrupt behaviour. The conventions define international standards on the criminalisation of corruption by prescribing specific offences rather than through a generic definition or offense of corruption. The offenses can range from petty or systemic corruption, in which public officials or employees receive money to perform (or refrain from performing) official acts, to ―grand corruption, in which those at the political, decision-making levels of government use their office to enrich themselves, their families, and their associates. Because of time and resource limitations involved in this project, the project team restricted itself to an analysis of grand corruption. While there is no precise threshold -- by official rank or otherwise -- to distinguish grand from systemic corruption, the positions of the PEPs involved in the cases in our report ranged from senior legislators to governors to prime ministers and presidents. All of the cases examined involved behaviour that would constitute offenses falling under any of the relevant international AC conventions, as well as the generic definition described above. Where possible, the case studies identified the type of corrupt act from which the proceeds had been derived. The types of corruption involved bribe taking and kickbacks, of both foreign and domestic officials, but also embezzlement (in which money rightly belonging to the State was siphoned for personal use through a variety of means), extortion (in which the public official uses the threat of official power to receive money) and self dealing (in which the corrupt PEP has a personal financial interest in acts and decisions he makes in his official capacity). Details: Paris: FATF, 2011. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 5, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf Shelf Number: 122313 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Political Offenses Terrorism

Author: Savona, Ernesto U. Title: Cost Benefit Analysis of Transparency Requirements in the Company/Corporate Field and Banking Sector Relevant for the Fight Against Money Laundering and Other Financial Crime Summary: The aims of the study were: 1. To analyse the cost-benefits from the introduction at the EU level of an up-front and ongoing disclosure system in the company/corporate field (from now on, MODEL 1) made up of the following five transparency requirements relevant for the fight against money laundering and other financial crime: •a statutory duty on the registered owner of a shareholding of 10% or more of the issued capital of a private or public unlisted company to confirm to the company their beneficial ownership of such shares or, if not, details of whom they believe the beneficial owner (BO) to be; •a statutory duty on beneficial but not registered owners of a shareholding of 10% or more to notify the company of such beneficial ownership and, for registered and beneficial owners of 10% or more, any changes in details as and when they occur; •a statutory duty on the company to file such data with a central registry within a short period; •the making such information available on-line to LEAs along with actual and historic data on company shareholders and their managers/directors; •making such data available to the public. 2. To highlight: •what EU measures may be appropriate to address those who aid and abet/facilitate corporate money laundering/terrorist financing arrangements, especially professional service providers, to contribute to more effective deterrence or (if not) suitable punishment, and •any issues and approaches revealed in the study likely to help improve the regulation of charities, trusts, associations and foundations with regard to AML and CFT. Details: Milano, Italy: Transcrime - Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime, 2007. 691p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 23, 2011 at: http://transcrime.cs.unitn.it/tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/CBA-Study_Final_Report_revised_version.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Europe URL: http://transcrime.cs.unitn.it/tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/CBA-Study_Final_Report_revised_version.pdf Shelf Number: 122427 Keywords: Banking Cost-Benefit Analysis Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Villasenor, John Title: Shadowy Figures: Tracking Illicit Financial Transactions in the Murky World of Digital Currencies, Peer-to-Peer Networks, and Mobile Device Payments Summary: The history of the movement of money is as complex and varied as the history of money itself, and includes ships laden with gold bullion, desert caravans carrying salt or cowry shells, armored trucks filled with banknotes, paper checks, and today, a large and quickly growing list of digital transfer methods. Secrecy and anonymity have always played roles in the movement of money, most commonly because they offer a strong measure of privacy and protection against being targeted by thieves, but also because the parties in financial transactions can have other reasons — some legitimate, some not — for keeping a low profile. The combination of the enormous growth in social networks, the complexity of peer-to-peer systems and software, and the number of Internet and wirelessly connected devices is altering the landscape of financial transactions at a rate and to a degree that is unprecedented. Today, such transactions can be conducted not only using traditional, state-backed currencies, but also through purely digital currencies, virtual currencies, and virtual goods. In addition, mobile phone-based money transfer systems enabling traditional currencies to be moved in novel ways are experiencing rapid adoption, particularly in developing nations. Almost no one would argue that governments do not have a right to track and trace digital financial transactions associated with activities such as terrorism and human trafficking. It is less clear, however, how governments can surmount the formidable technical and organizational challenges associated with detecting and monitoring these transactions. The solution will require a combination of self-regulation, government-industry collaboration, and change in both technology and culture within government agencies. Details: Houston, TX: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2011 at: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/ITP-pub-FinancialTransactions-082911.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/ITP-pub-FinancialTransactions-082911.pdf Shelf Number: 122619 Keywords: Financial Crimes Financial Fraud Money Laundering

Author: Albin-Lackey, Chris Title: Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Summary: This report analyzes the successes and failures of Nigeria’s most promising effort to fight high-level corruption: the country’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). At its best, the EFCC has given Nigerians rare hope that the powerful might be held to account for their crimes. But the institution has ultimately fallen short of its promise and needs a change of course. Corruption on Trial? describes how a variety of factors have damaged the EFCC’s reputation and undermined its ability to fight high-level corruption in Nigeria’s political system. Some of these factors are largely of the EFCC’s own making. Others — like crippling patterns of political interference in the institution’s work and a lack of support from other key anti-corruption institutions — are systemic and larger than the EFCC itself. Based on interviews with current and former EFCC officials, civil society activists, lawyers, judges, key government officials and others, this report shows how the EFCC has fallen short on many fronts, but also lays out an agenda for Nigeria’s government and the EFCC to quickly start to fix these problems. Nigeria’s international partners also have a role to play. Western governments, in particular, should apply both pressure and support to ensure that the EFCC is truly independent and strengthened. They must also stop their own jurisdictions from serving as havens for stolen funds and should help ensure that corrupt officials in Nigeria and beyond are held to account. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2011 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0811WebPostR.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0811WebPostR.pdf Shelf Number: 122686 Keywords: Financial Crimes Political Corruption (Nigeria)

Author: Bricknell, Samantha Title: Misuse of the Non-Profit Sector for Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Summary: The manner in which terrorist organisations finance their activities became a policy focal point after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Non-profit organisations, and charities in particular, were identified as potentially significant contributors to terrorism financing. This premise was based on known links between charitable giving and prominent terrorist groups, and the vulnerabilities of the non-profit sector to misuse. Money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risks to the Australian non-profit sector are thought to be low. However, the impact of such misuse is inevitably high. One of the underlying premises in combating non-profit misuse has been the application of a response proportionate to risk. Australia has based its response on education, sector outreach and peak body codes of conduct, alongside more conventional forms of regulatory control. This paper examines vulnerabilities to ML/TF misuse and the publicly available evidence for actual misuse. It is suggested that the Australian response could incorporate a more uniform commitment from the sector to adopting risk-based strategies, with government providing education for the sector that is based on the identification of specific points of vulnerability. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice no.424: Accessed September 20, 2011 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/421-440/tandi424.aspx Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/421-440/tandi424.aspx Shelf Number: 122788 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering (Australia) Terrorist Financing

Author: KPMG Title: Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2011 Summary: This latest Anti-Money Laundering (AML) survey explores where AML fits into the changing risk and regulatory landscape facing the financial sector. It reports the views of the survey participants on their areas of focus and challenge, and also contains commentary from KPMG on what our client work in this space tells us. The highlights of the survey include the following: AML is still on the radar of many banks’ leadership, but is being squeezed by other priorities. AML continues to be a significant and rising expense for banks, but many under-estimate how much it costs. PEPs and sanctions are a major focus for banks and governments alike, however both are far from straightforward to get to grips with. Transaction monitoring policies and systems are generally seen as satisfactory, but with plenty of room for improvement. KYC data is generally collected and updated both robustly and regularly, but there is great variation in the approach used. Details: London: KPMG, 2011. 76 p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 4, 2011 at: http://www.kpmg.com/RU/ru/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/AML%20Survey%202011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.kpmg.com/RU/ru/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/AML%20Survey%202011.pdf Shelf Number: 122982 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Rush, Howard Title: Crime Online: Cybercrime and Illegal Innovation Summary: With the growing sophistication and use of information technology, the past decade has seen a major growth in cybercrime. Broadly described, cybercrime refers to all types of crime that exploit modern telecommunications networks, in which computers or computer networks are used for criminal activity. This report focuses exclusively on financial cybercrime, specifically credit card fraud and identity theft. Financial cybercrime has increased dramatically in recent years and looks set to increase further as the proliferation of communications technology proceeds apace and reaches regions of the world with many underemployed poor people with information technology skills who can take advantage of cybercrime opportunities. The current global recession will likely increase this trend still further. Details: Brighton, UK: CENTRIM, University of Brighton, 2009. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 22, 2011 at: http://eprints.brighton.ac.uk/5800/ Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://eprints.brighton.ac.uk/5800/ Shelf Number: 123116 Keywords: Computer Crimes Credit Card Fraud Cybercrimes Financial Crimes Identity Theft Online Victimization

Author: Beaton-Wells Title: The Cartel Project: Report on a Survey of the Australian Public Regarding Anti-Cartel Law and Enforcement Summary: Amongst the Australian public, there is substantial majority support for the view that cartel conduct is unacceptable in the sense that it should be against the law. This view is associated with a positive attitude towards competition as healthy. It is also associated with pre-existing awareness of cartel-related topics, such as the ACCC and price fixing. However, less than a majority support the view that cartel conduct should be a criminal offence and less than a quarter support the view that individuals should be jailed for it. There are few associations between views on whether cartel conduct should be a criminal offence or conduct for which individuals are jailed and demographic attributes such as age, education, work status and political affiliation. However, men are less lenient in their views than women in that they are more likely to consider that cartel conduct should be a crime and that individuals should go to jail for it. Insofar as there is support for treating cartel conduct as a criminal offence, that support is based on a wide range of reasons that encompass its economic effects, its moral character and the instrumental characteristics of the criminal law as a mechanism for deterrence and punishment. There is almost no support for the view that cartel conduct is behaviour for which either companies or individuals alone should be sanctioned; rather, there is almost universal support for the view that sanctions should attach to both. There is substantial majority support for the view that companies and individuals involved in cartel conduct should be publicly named and shamed and that they should be fined. There is clear majority support for the view that the fine imposed on a company for cartel conduct should at least disgorge the company of the illegal profits and strong (one third) support for basing the fine on treble the profits derived from the conduct. There is a significant gap between public opinion about the appropriate level of corporate fines for cartel conduct and the actual level of fines that have been imposed over the last decade in Australia. Opinion is divided on the level of the fine that should be imposed on an individual for cartel conduct as reflected in the fact that maxima of AU$10,000 and AU$500,000 attract similar levels of support.  There is relatively less but still majority support for other legal consequences for corporate and individual offenders, such as the requirement that compensation be paid or compliance programs be implemented or, that in the case of individuals, disqualification orders be made. There is low support for the view that immunity from sanctions for cartel conduct should be available in return for being the first to report the conduct to the authorities even if, without such a report, the authorities are unlikely to have detected the conduct. There is thus a clear misalignment between enforcement policy with respect to immunity and public opinion. Cartel conduct is clearly regarded as serious insofar as it is seen as behaviour that:  should be treated as illegal, if not criminal;  should attract fines that, for companies at least, are considerable and public naming and shaming of those involved; and  should not be readily excused on grounds relating to the nature of the companies involved, the reasons for the conduct, or its effects. For those members of the public who consider that it should be a criminal offence, cartel conduct is seen as just as serious as a range of long-standing or well-established criminal offences such as theft, fraud, tax evasion, breach of directors’ duties and insider trading. Consistent with findings generally in crime seriousness research, offences involving physical harm or the risk of such harm to other persons (including consumer protection offences involving misrepresentations over product safety) are seen as more serious than cartel conduct. The seriousness of cartel conduct is viewed generally by the public more in moral terms than in terms of its economic effects, as reflected in:  the fact that the reasons for treating such conduct as a criminal offence that attract greatest support are reasons relating to moral characterisations of the conduct as dishonest and deceptive (as distinct from characterizations based on economic effects);  the high level of support for publicly naming those involved in the conduct, suggesting this is conduct seen as warranting the stigma of community disapproval;  the low level of support for allowing an offender to escape penalties in return for reporting the conduct, a response that sits more comfortably with a moral rather than an instrumental approach;  majority support for the view that cartel conduct should be seen as just as serious regardless of its effects or circumstances, that is, even if prices do not increase as a result of the conduct, the conduct would prevent factories from closing and would save jobs, or the companies involved are small businesses;  substantial majority support for the view that the conduct should be regarded as more serious when it has elements that make it less acceptable from a moral perspective, namely when it involves coercion of another company to join the cartel or where elaborate steps are taken to conceal the conduct from authorities. There are no significant differences in views on the legal treatment and seriousness of different types of cartel conduct, except to the extent that the public appears to take a more lenient view of market allocation than of price fixing or output restriction. Business people who have roles that make the anti-cartel laws relevant to them have quite a low degree of knowledge of the fact that cartel conduct is a criminal offence. They also have low knowledge of the fact that jail is available for individuals for engaging in cartel conduct:  less than one quarter of the business respondents are aware that jail is available as a penalty for individuals for cartel conduct;  less than half are aware that cartel conduct is a criminal offence;  two thirds know that cartel conduct is a civil contravention but one third are either unsure or think it is not a civil contravention;  less than half are aware that a fine is available as a penalty for cartel conduct (whether they believe it is a civil contravention or criminal offence). This same group of business people also perceive the likelihood of enforcement action against cartel conduct as fairly low. They rate the likelihood of being caught for engaging in cartel conduct, being subject to legal action for cartel conduct, and being sentenced to jail (if found guilty of a criminal offence of cartel conduct) as all fairly low.  Business respondent perceptions of the likelihood of being caught or of being subject to legal action both increase modestly when they know that cartel conduct is a criminal offence. However: o being caught is still considered unlikely even when business people know cartel conduct is a criminal offence; o the likelihood of a person being subject to legal action once caught is perceived as a little higher than being caught in the first place, but it is still not seen as very likely, even when criminal sanctions apply. Even though perceptions of the likelihood of enforcement do increase when business respondents are told that cartel conduct is a criminal offence, overall the survey results suggest that many business people do not know (without being told) that cartel conduct is a criminal offence. Some do not even know it is a civil contravention. This low level of knowledge suggests that in real life many business people will tend to perceive the likelihood of enforcement against cartel conduct as low. Business respondents generally rate the likelihood of a hypothetical third person or themselves actually engaging in cartel conduct as fairly low, but there are still substantial numbers who report that engaging in cartel conduct would be likely in certain circumstances. In particular: o half of the business respondents report that a hypothetical person would be likely or very likely to engage in cartel conduct where only civil sanctions are available, and nearly one third still see cartel conduct by a hypothetical person as likely where criminal sanctions are available; o almost one in ten business respondents report that they themselves would be likely to engage in cartel conduct if the opportunity presented itself – even where criminal sanctions are available. Business people’s ratings of the likelihood of themselves or another person engaging in cartel conduct are lower when the respondent knows the conduct is criminal than when they know it is only a civil contravention. But, as mentioned above, the survey also shows that knowledge that cartel conduct is a criminal offence is in fact quite low. Therefore many business people might still have a tendency to engage in cartel conduct if the opportunity arises, not knowing that it is a criminal offence. Preliminary analysis of the survey results suggests that business people are more likely to engage in cartel conduct when they are under economic pressure to do so, even though they know that criminal sanctions are available for such conduct. That is, knowing about criminal sanctions and the availability of jail may not outweigh economic pressure to engage in cartel conduct. Further analysis is necessary to test the robustness of this result. Not surprisingly, business respondents are more likely to rate another person as likely to engage in cartel conduct, than they are to rate themselves as likely to engage in such conduct. It is likely, however, that to some extent at least respondents’ ratings of what another person is likely to do in fact reflect their own tendencies. Moreover business respondents see other business people as influenced by deterrence (that is the likelihood of enforcement) in making decisions about engaging in cartel conduct. They do not see themselves as influenced by likelihood of enforcement in deciding whether to engage in cartel conduct to the same extent as other people. It therefore seems likely that business people like to think of themselves as making decisions about engaging in cartel conduct on an ethical basis (in relation to the morality or harm of the conduct), rather than making a calculated decision about the costs and gains of non-compliance with anti-cartel law (on the basis of perceptions of the likelihood of deterrence). This is consistent with the survey findings that suggest that members of the public generally view cartel conduct through a moral rather than an economic lens. Details: Melbourne: University of Melbourne, School of Law, 2010. 374p. Source: Internet Resource: Legal Studies Research Paper No. 519; Accessed October 22, 2011 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1743268 Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1743268 Shelf Number: 123117 Keywords: Business Cartels Financial Crimes Punishment, White Collar Offenses White Collar Crimes

Author: de Willebois, Emile van der Does Title: The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It Summary: Corruption is estimated to be at least a $40 billion dollar a year business. Every day, funds destined for schools, healthcare, and infrastructure in the world’s most fragile economies are siphoned off and stashed away in the world’s financial centers and tax havens. Corruption, like a disease, is eating away at the foundation of people’s faith in government. It undermines the stability and security of nations. So it is a development challenge in more ways than one: it directly affects development assistance, but it also undermines the preconditions for growth and equity. This report, The Puppet Masters, deals with the corporate and financial structures that form the building blocks of hidden money trails. In particular, it focuses on the ease with which corrupt actors hide their interests behind a corporate veil and the difficulties investigators face in trying to lift that veil. It serves as a powerful reminder that recovering the proceeds of corruption is a collective responsibility that involves both the public and private sector. Law enforcement and prosecution cannot go after stolen assets, confiscate and then return them if they are hidden behind the corporate veil. All financial centers and developed countries have committed, through the UN Convention against Corruption and international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards, to improving the transparency of legal entities and other arrangements. This StAR report provides evidence of how far we still have to go to make these commitments a reality. Narrowing the gap between stated commitments and practice on the ground has a direct impact on actual recovery of assets. Details: Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2011. 284p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Puppet%20Masters%20Report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Puppet%20Masters%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 123150 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Political Corruption Stolen Assets

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes: Research Report Summary: “Always follow the money” has been sound advice in law enforcement and political circles for decades. Nevertheless, tracking the flows of illicit funds generated by drug trafficking and organized crime and analysing the magnitude and the extent to which these are laundered through the world’s financial systems remain daunting tasks. UNODC’s research report, Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes, attempts to shed light on the total amounts likely to be laundered across the globe, as well as the potential attractiveness of various locations to those who launder money. As with all such reports, however, the final monetary estimates are to be treated with caution. Further research and more systematic collection of data on this topic are clearly required. Prior to this report, perhaps the most widely quoted figure for the extent of money-laundering was the IMF’s ‘consensus range’ of between 2-5 per cent of global GDP, made public in 1998. A study-of-studies, or metaanalysis, conducted for this report, suggests that all criminal proceeds are likely to have amounted to some 3.6 per cent of GDP (2.3 - 5.5 per cent) or around US$2.1 trillion in 2009. The resulting best estimate of the amounts available for money-laundering would be within the IMF’s original ‘consensus range’, equivalent to some 2.7 per cent of global GDP (2.1 – 4 per cent) or US$1.6 trillion in 2009. From this figure, money flows related to transnational organized crime activities represent the equivalent of some 1.5 per cent of global GDP, 70 per cent of which would have been available for laundering through the financial system. The largest income for transnational organized crime seems to come from illicit drugs, accounting for a fifth of all crime proceeds. Research in the area of illicit financial flows generated by one key transnational organized crime sector, the global market for cocaine, was also conducted for this report. The gross profits out of cocaine sales (totaling US$85 billion) were estimated at US$84 billion for the year 2009, compared with about US$1 billion earned by the farmers in the Andean region. Most of the gross profits (retail and wholesale) were generated in North America (US$35 billion) and in West and Central Europe (US$26 billion). The report also reminds us that, contrary to the common misperception that money is neither good nor bad, investments of ‘dirty money’ into licit economies can create problems ranging from distortions of resource allocation to the “crowding out” of licit sectors. In some cases, the influx of tainted money undermines the reputations of local institutions. Significantly, these investments can hamper investment and economic growth. While the situation is less clear for financial centers receiving illicit funds, the long-term consequences may be negative if they fail to actively fight money-laundering. Research also indicates that the socio-economic costs related to drug abuse are twice as high as the illicit income generated by drug trafficking. Indeed, in some countries (for example, the United States and the United Kingdom) the ratio is 3:1. This report argues that the severest consequence of criminal funding is that they perpetuate and promote criminal activities, creating a cycle of organized criminal activity and drug trafficking that leeches off societies. Less than 1 per cent of global illicit financial flows are currently seized and frozen. UNODC’s challenge is to work within the UN system and with Member States to help build the capacity to track and prevent money laundering, strengthen the rule of law and prevent these funds from creating further suffering. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 29, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf Shelf Number: 123169 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Money laundering in Australia 2011 Summary: Money laundering in Australia 2011 presents a consolidated picture of current money laundering - the indicators and activities involved, the sectors and professions which are vulnerable, a range of new threats which are emerging, and the general framework of regulations and actions necessary to identify and prevent this crime. By contributing to greater public and industry knowledge about money laundering, this report better positions government, industry and the community to work together to develop and strengthen preventative strategies against money laundering and the critical risk which it poses to Australia. Details: Chatswood, NSW: AUSTRAC, 2011. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 22, 2011 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/money_laundering_in_australia_2011.html Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/money_laundering_in_australia_2011.html Shelf Number: 123421 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering (Australia)

Author: Budzilowicz, Lisa M. Title: Who's on First? Challenges Facing Prosecutors and Financial Institutions in Responding to Identity Theft Summary: Prosecutors and law enforcement struggle with how to approach victimized financial institutions and their consumers. Prosecutors rely on prompt reporting of crime and they need to access financial institutions' information, such as account data, video evidence, and witness statements, as evidence of the crimes. This report examines how prosecutors and financial institutions can work together to prevent, investigate, and prosecution identity theft. Details: Alexandria, VA: National District Attorneys Association, American Prosecutors Research Institute, 2007. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Topics Series: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/pub_whos_on_first_07.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/pub_whos_on_first_07.pdf Shelf Number: 123607 Keywords: Consumer Fraud Cybercrime Financial Crimes Identity Theft Prosecutors

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries Over the Decade Ending 2009 Summary: This report provides estimates of illicit financial flows (IFFs) from developing countries over the decade 2000-2009 based on balance of payments (BoP), bilateral trade, and external debt data reported by member countries to the IMF and the World Bank. It should be noted that estimates of IFFs at the developing world, regional, and country levels presented in this report could differ from those published in the 2010 report due to revisions to underlying data, reported by member countries. The most notable finding in this report is that in 2009 IFFs from developing countries, led by the top ten exporters of illicit capital, most of which are in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, have declined by 41 percent over the last year. Principal components analysis seems to indicate that this decline was the result of the global economic crisis which tended to reduce the source of funds (new external loans and net foreign direct investments), increase the use of funds and reduce trade mispricing due to lower trading volumes. We find no reason to subscribe the wide-ranging reduction in IFFs to far-reaching economic reform or improvements in overall governance in major emerging markets. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2011. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2012 at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/illicit_financial_flows_from_developing_countries_over_the_decade_ending_2009.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/illicit_financial_flows_from_developing_countries_over_the_decade_ending_2009.pdf Shelf Number: 123640 Keywords: Corrupt Practices Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: FATF-GAFI Title: Global Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment Summary: Since 1989, the FATF has led efforts to counter the abuse of the international financial system by criminals. Over the years, governments, intergovernmental and multi-lateral organisations, the private sector and academics have made great progress in understanding the threats of money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) and the measures to be taken to make the abuse of the financial system for ML/TF purposes more difficult. But the problem of ML/TF remains and requires ongoing efforts, in particular in the area of detecting and taking enforcement actions against individuals and organisations who conduct these serious illegal activities. The Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment (GTA) report provides an assessment of the global systemic ML/TF threats. The document is aimed at raising the level of understanding of these threats and their negative impact, and help governments to take decisive action to minimise the harms they can cause. The report is based on the in-depth typologies studies and the FATF's Strategic Surveillance Initiative. This initiative was established in 2008, with the following objectives: detect and share information on the types of criminal or terrorist activities that pose an emerging threat to the financial system; develop a more strategic and longer-term view of these threats. This initiative involves the use of a detailed questionnaire which both FATF and FSRB members respond to on a yearly basis. This report was prepared by a team of experts from across the globe. They provided important content, peer review and validation throughout the project with the aim of producing this assessment. The project team comprised members from law enforcement and other agencies responsible for identifying and combating ML/TF from 10 jurisdictions and 8 international organisations. Details: Paris, France: FATF-GAFI (Financial Action Task Force), 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 28, 2012 at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Shelf Number: 123847 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: DeBacker, Jason Title: Importing Corruption Culture from Overseas: Evidence from Corporate Tax Evasion in the United States Summary: This paper studies how cultural norms and enforcement policies influence illicit corporate activities. Using confidential IRS audit data, we show that corporations with owners from countries with higher corruption norms engage in higher amounts of tax evasion in the U.S. This effect is strong for small corporations and decreases as the size of the corporation increases. In the mid-2000s, the United States implemented several enforcement measures which significantly increased tax compliance. However, we find that these enforcement efforts were less effective in reducing tax evasion by corporations whose owners are from countries with higher corruption norms. This suggests that cultural norms can be a challenge to legal enforcement. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2012 at: http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2011/CCf11/DeBacker_Heim_Tran.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2011/CCf11/DeBacker_Heim_Tran.pdf Shelf Number: 123920 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Tax Evasion (U.S.) White Collar Crime

Author: Chandaria, Karishma Title: Short changed: Protecting people with dementia from financial abuse Summary: The ways in which we can manage our money is rapidly changing, and this can pose serious challenges for people living with dementia. People with dementia and their families may need support to manage their money and stay safe from financial abuse. Alzheimer's Society undertook the largest ever survey carried out on this subject, and analysed responses from 104 carers and 47 people with dementia - as well as focus groups and interviews with professionals - to find out more about this issue. The report reveals that 15% of people living with dementia - an estimated 112,500 people - have been victims of financial abuse such as cold calling, scam mail or mis-selling. 62% of carers reported that the person they care for had been approached by cold callers or doorstep sales people, and 70% reported that telephone callers routinely targeted the person they care for. Not only have people lost money, but they and their families have also been suffering stress, exhaustion and frustration as a result. The report also highlights the challenges people with dementia can face when managing their money. 76% of people reported having trouble managing their money, with a range of issues highlighted such as the challenges of bank's security procedures, and a lack of dementia awareness in banks and other financial services organisations. The report calls for improved community support services for people with dementia to help them manage their money. Details: London: Alzheimer's Society, 2011. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2012 at http://alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/download.php?fileID=1296 Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/download.php?fileID=1296 Shelf Number: 123955 Keywords: Elder Abuse (U.K.) Financial Crimes

Author: Yikona, Stuart Title: Ill-gotten Money and the Economy: Experiences from Malawi and Namibia Summary: Over the last 20 years, the international community has significantly stepped up its efforts to prevent, detect, and deter money flows related to criminal activities and terrorism financing. Since the early 2000s, this drive has extended to developing countries, with most of them introducing anti-money laundering (AML) policies. The primary driver behind this is law enforcement; these policies are aimed at detecting and tracing flows of ill-gotten money, which would enable authorities to fight and prevent crime and recover assets of crime, corruption, and tax evasion. Insufficient attention has been paid to the economic side of ill-gotten money and the efforts to combat such flows, particularly in developing countries. Why is it critical for them, and what is the case for combating the flows of ill-gotten money in countries severely constrained by a lack of resources and limited technical capacity to implement a full AML-framework? Moreover, why are ill-gotten proceeds relevant to the issue of economic development? What is the magnitude of the ill-gotten money flows from activities that generate such flows? Added to this are concerns that anti-money laundering policies may at times actually jeopardize certain development objectives, such as access to finance for poor people. The core objective of this study is to introduce economics into the international debate about anti-money laundering, and to introduce the idea of the usefulness and effectiveness of such policies. We also hope that we might be able to bridge the gap between the law enforcement and economist communities. Indeed, the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) on conflict, security, and development provides us with a critical framework to think through the link between organized crime and development from an economic perspective. The study focuses on two developing countries: Malawi, a low-income country, and Namibia, a middle-income country. The central questions asked are: Why are “proceeds of crime” relevant for economic development? Do “proceeds of crime” and related policy responses help or harm economic development? One critical step in such analysis is to obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of the domestic or cross-border sources of ill-gotten money in a country: how it is recycled through the economy and across its borders or spent and invested. Only then is it possible to discuss the economic effects of the circulation and allocation of ill-gotten money in developing countries and the economic impact of the underlying activities. While not intended to be exhaustive or definitive, this study is meant to contribute to a better understanding and quantification of the issues relevant to the proceeds of crime and economic development. For practical and operational purposes, and to be grounded in country specifics, this study only focuses on Malawi and Namibia. However, it is hoped that the approach developed in this study will be useful to other developing-country governments in identifying the main sources and magnitude of the flows of ill-gotten money, and the main recycling patterns and their effects on the economy. Such a framework will help governments in developing countries to systematically analyze the potential impact of AML and design and prioritize AML policies. The findings presented in this study are based on an extensive literature research; World Bank discussions with numerous public- and private-sector officials and representatives of the Governments of Malawi and Namibia during a Bank mission in November 2010; and workshops conducted in both countries in February 2011 to obtain feedback on the preliminary findings. In conducting this study, the team adopted an interactive approach. This was critical because mobilization of local expertise is essential not only in establishing a complete picture of current and future AML challenges, but also in designing policy considerations that subsequently are widely supported. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2012. 114p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2012 at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/10/31/000386194_20111031015900/Rendered/PDF/651760PUB0EPI100money09780821388877.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/10/31/000386194_20111031015900/Rendered/PDF/651760PUB0EPI100money09780821388877.pdf Shelf Number: 124132 Keywords: Corruption Economic Development Economics and Crime Financial Crimes Money Laundering (Malawi, Namibia) Organized Crime Proceeds of crime Tax Evasion

Author: LeBillon, Philippe Title: Extractive Sectors and Illicit Financial Flows: What Role for Revenue Governance Initiatives? Summary: Countries highly dependent on natural resources are among the most severely affected by the problem of illicit financial flows. Despite a lack of definite studies proving the correlation between higher dependency on natural resources and higher levels of illicit flows, there are grounds to believe extractive industries’ revenues provide a large contribution to these flows. Most existing initiatives to address governance issues in extractive sectors have not been designed with the problem of illicit financial flows in mind. They have generally contributed to increased levels of transparency in the sector but have not significantly influenced the likelihood that revenues from natural resources will be misappropriated and illicitly transferred. But extractive industries initiatives can be improved in this regard, and development aid, along with other stakeholders, can help. Among other priorities, transparency initiatives should demand higher disaggregation of information disclosed by extractive companies and host governments. Transparency requirements should extend beyond revenues to licensing, contracts, physical resource flows, and other production factors, as well as to public expenditure. Extractives transparency initiatives also need to integrate elements of the tax justice and tax evasion agendas in order to expand their relevance to the effort to reduce illicit financial flows. Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue 2011:13) 41 p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2012 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/extractive-sectors-and-illicit-financial-flows-what-role-for-revenue-governance-initiatives/ Year: 0 Country: International URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/extractive-sectors-and-illicit-financial-flows-what-role-for-revenue-governance-initiatives/ Shelf Number: 124321 Keywords: Financial Crimes Natural Resources Offenses Against the Environment Tax Evasion

Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Suspicious matter reporting - Market Participants in the securities and derivatives sectors Summary: All reporting entities under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF Act) have obligations to report suspicious matters to AUSTRAC through the submission of suspicious matter reports (SMRs). These reports are a critical source of intelligence in combating serious criminal activity, including organised crime, terrorism financing and tax evasion. In July 2010 AUSTRAC conducted a survey of reporting entities that are Market Participants1 in the securities and derivatives sectors. The survey gathered information about how Market Participants have understood and addressed their SMR and related obligations under the AML/CTF Act. The survey included questions about staff training, transaction monitoring and enhanced customer due diligence (ECDD). This report presents the results of the survey, including aggregated data and analysis. It is a snapshot of organisational capacity and readiness among Market Participants to identify matters that may be reportable to AUSTRAC as SMRs. There are 16 key findings and five areas of ‘outlier behaviour’ that warrant highlighting. Where the report states that a respondent exhibited ‘outlier behaviour’, this indicates that the respondent’s behaviour diverged from that exhibited by their peers, and that they were yet to develop fully effective AML/CTF programs, systems or processes. The report’s findings will be directly relevant to Market Participants. The findings will also be of interest to the broader regulated population, compliance professionals, industry peak bodies, professional associations and academics. Details: West Chastwood, Australia: Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), 2010. 35p. Source: AUSTRAC survey series no. 2: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/surveyseries_market_participants.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/surveyseries_market_participants.pdf Shelf Number: 125219 Keywords: Business Crimes Crime Reporting (Australia) Financial Crimes Organized Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: Ramiriz, Mary Kreiner Title: Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime Summary: Recent financial scandals and the relative paucity of criminal prosecutions against elite actors that benefited from the crisis in response suggest a new reality in the criminal law system: some wrongful actors appear to be above the law and immune from criminal prosecution. As such, the criminal prosecutorial system affirms much of the wrongdoing giving rise to the crisis. This leaves the same elites undisturbed at the apex of the financial sector, and creates perverse incentives for any successors. Their incumbency in power results in massive deadweight losses due to the distorted incentives they now face. Further, this undermines the legitimacy of the rule of law and encourages even more lawlessness among the entire population, as the declination of prosecution advertises the profitability of crime. These considerations transcend deterrence as well as retribution as a traditional basis for criminal punishment. Affirmance is far more costly and dangerous with respect to the crimes of powerful elites that control large organizations than can be accounted for under traditional notions of deterrence. Few limits are placed on a prosecutor’s discretionary decision about whom to prosecute, and many factors against prosecution take hold, especially in resource-intensive white collar crime prosecutions. This article asserts that prosecutors should not decline prosecution in these circumstances without considering its potential affirmance of crime. Otherwise, the profitability of crime promises massive future losses. Details: Topeka, KS: Washington University School of Law, 2012. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2039785 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2039785 Shelf Number: 125404 Keywords: Elite Crime Financial Crimes Prosecutorial Discretion Punishment White-Collar Crime

Author: Australian Institute of Criminology Title: Serious and Organised Investment Fraud in Australia Summary: In 2011, Task Force Galilee was established to broaden the understanding of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud and to develop a national response. As at April 2012, the Task Force estimated that Australians’ losses to this type of fraud since January 2007 were in excess of A$113 million, with this figure likely to be conservative. During this period more than 2,600 Australians were victims of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud. These figures have largely been established as a result of intelligence analysis, and do not reflect the actual level of reporting by victims, which remains low. This report has been prepared to provide an insight into the nature and extent of this type of fraud as it currently affects Australia. Since the Task Force’s establishment, knowledge and understanding of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud has grown exponentially, and continues to do so. The information in this report is a compilation of the key characteristics identified via available literature and relevant Task Force member findings. The research and assistance of the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) is also acknowledged. This report uses the definition of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud which has been adopted by Task Force Galilee. This Task Force defines it as: a) any unsolicited contact, by telephone or internet, of persons in Australia (potential investors) by persons (callers) usually located overseas, where such callers engage in conduct that is fraudulent, false, misleading or deceptive with the purpose of inducing potential investors to buy, sell, or retain securities or other investments and where such callers do not have the license or authority to engage in a securities business, or investment advice business in Australia; and b) may include superannuation and investment fraud. The report is divided into three sections: •• Section 1: Characteristics of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud •• Section 2: Who is targeted by Serious and Organised Investment Fraud? •• Section 3: Current responses to Serious and Organised Investment Fraud Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2012 at: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Galilee%202012/SOIFA_Report_040712.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Galilee%202012/SOIFA_Report_040712.pdf Shelf Number: 125518 Keywords: Business Crime Financial Crimes Fraud (Australia)

Author: Cheng, Nelson Yiu-mo Title: The Effectiveness of Money Laundering Investigations in Fighting Transnational Crime: A Comparison of the United States and Hong Kong Summary: This research seeks to: (a) Identify emerging trends in transnational crime and the resulting challenges to law enforcement; (b) Examine the effectiveness of money laundering investigation of the law enforcement agencies of the United States and Hong Kong in addressing these trends and challenges; (c) Compare the two regimes so as to identify strengths and weaknesses; and (d) Suggest a way forward in enhancing the effectiveness of money laundering investigation. Details: Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2012 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/money%20laundering%20cheng/03_money_laundering_cheng.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Hong Kong URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/money%20laundering%20cheng/03_money_laundering_cheng.pdf Shelf Number: 125678 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering (Hong Kong, United States) Transnational Crime

Author: Webb, Sarah Title: The Contribution of Financial Investigation to Tackling Organised Crime: A Qualitative Study Summary: Financial investigation is one of many specialist investigative approaches employed by law enforcement when tackling organised crime, and it is an increasingly well-established discipline. Financial investigators typically operate within the legal framework of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), which introduced a number of asset recovery powers, including the use of restraint orders1 and post-conviction confiscation orders and cash seizure and civil forfeiture/recovery. Related policies include the Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme, which allows frontline agencies to keep a proportion of assets recovered. Knowledge about, and understanding of, the role that financial investigation can play in tackling organised crime has been identified as a key evidence gap. The current research therefore explores the contribution of financial investigation as one of the specialist investigation approaches used by law enforcement agencies to tackle organised crime. The report sets out its use and benefits, as well as the barriers and implications, for policy and practice. The research explored 60 cases where financial investigation was used to tackle organised crime. Methods were qualitative; 149 semi-structured interviews were carried out with practitioners including financial investigators, investigating officers and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) representatives. An additional eight interviews were completed with practitioners working in a confiscation order enforcement role. Key Findings -- Financial investigation was used across all aspects of organised crime cases, from identifying criminality, developing intelligence and case building, through to prosecution and confiscation order enforcement. Financial investigations were rarely used to identify organised criminality in the first instance. Financial investigation techniques were applied in more than one-half of the cases studied during the pre- and post-arrest investigation and case-building phase. Where used, financial investigation contributed to the process of case building through: - identifying organised criminality in the first instance; - identifying the extent of an organised crime group; - locating assets owned or used by organised crime group members; - identifying ownership and use of properties; - uncovering evidence of the lifestyle led by those targeted; - tracking the movements of individuals; - placing people at particular places at particular times, thereby linking them to criminality or particular criminal groups; and - identifying additional offences and offenders. In one-half of the cases examined, evidence from the financial investigation was considered to have influenced the prosecution's case. - In 12 cases, a conviction would not have been possible without the financial investigation (these were mainly money laundering or fraud cases). - In 14 cases the financial investigation was able to demonstrate the greater involvement of the accused in the criminal activity. - In five cases the financial investigation revealed additional members of the organised crime group who could be brought into the prosecution. - In seven cases additional offences (particularly money laundering) were brought into the prosecution. Interviewees also suggested that greater collaboration between enforcement and prosecution teams, or even co-location, could improve enforcement understanding of the criminality of organised crime groups. Details: London: Home Office, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 65: Accessed September 5, 2012 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/horr65?view=Binary Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/horr65?view=Binary Shelf Number: 126256 Keywords: Financial Crimes Financial Investigations Money Laundering Organized Crime (U.K.)

Author: Bartels, Lorana Title: Sentencing Scammers: Law and Practice Summary: Consumer fraud costs Australians almost $1b a year and most of this fraud involves scams in which individuals are persuaded to part with an upfront, or advance, fee, with the promise of large financial or other gain in the future. In this paper, consideration is given to the sentencing issues that apply in cases of this nature. In particular, the author examines the application of the key sentencing purposes, such as deterrence and rehabilitation, and the sentencing principles applied by courts, such as the proportionality principle, and the challenges that may arise in this context. Key sentencing factors often cited in aggravation or mitigation are also reviewed, before an examination of some of the issues relating to specific sentencing options is undertaken. This paper goes some way in providing a brief analysis of sentencing practices. However, further research is required to better explore how sentencers respond to consumer fraud matters. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 443: Accessed September 10, 2012 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/441-460/tandi443.aspx Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/441-460/tandi443.aspx Shelf Number: 126283 Keywords: Consumer Fraud (Australia) Consumer Protection Deterrence Financial Crimes Sentencing

Author: Walters, Julie Title: The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime in Australia: Perceptions of Regulated Businesses in Australia Summary: In Australia, legislation was introduced in 2006 that requires specified businesses to forward reports of certain financial transactions to the Australian Government agency, AUSTRAC. As part of the Australian Institute of Criminology’s research in to Australia’s anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing regime, a survey was conducted in mid 2009 of all business with reporting obligations to AUSTRAC. This report examines the findings of the survey on the perceptions of Australian businesses to the reporting regime in Australia. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series 117: Accessed September 13, 2012 at: http://aic.gov.au/documents/B/B/A/%7BBBA061D1-79A8-4F55-9429-B7390A34E13C%7Drpp117.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/documents/B/B/A/%7BBBA061D1-79A8-4F55-9429-B7390A34E13C%7Drpp117.pdf Shelf Number: 126323 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Money Laundering (Australia) Terrorist Financing

Author: Findley, Michael Title: Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers' and Terrorist Financiers' Access to Shell Companies Summary: For criminals moving large sums of dirty money internationally, there is no better device than an untraceable shell company. This paper reports the results of an experiment soliciting offers for these prohibited anonymous shell corporations. Our research team impersonated a variety of low- and high-risk customers, including would-be money launderers, corrupt officials, and terrorist financiers when requesting the anonymous companies. Evidence is drawn from more than 7,400 email solicitations to more than 3,700 Corporate Service Providers that make and sell shell companies in 182 countries. The experiment allows us to test whether international rules are actually effective when they mandate that those selling shell companies must collect identity documents from their customers. Shell companies that cannot be traced back to their real owners are one of the most common means for laundering money, giving and receiving bribes, busting sanctions, evading taxes, and financing terrorism. The results provide the most complete and robust test of the effectiveness of international rules banning untraceable, anonymous shell companies. Furthermore, because the exercise took the form of a randomized experiment, it also provides unique insight into what causes those who sell shell companies to either comply with or violate international rules requiring them to collect identity documents from customers. Just as the random assignment to control (placebo) and treatment groups in drug trials isolates the effect of a new drug, so too the random assignment of low-risk “placebo” emails and different high-risk “treatment” emails isolated the effects of different kinds of risk on the likelihood of (a) being offered a shell company, and (b) being required to provide proof of identity. Key findings include:1 1. Overall, international rules that those forming shell companies must collect proof of customers’ identity are ineffective. Nearly half (48 percent) of all replies received did not ask for proper identification, and 22 percent did not ask for any identity documents at all to form a shell company. 5. Informing providers of the rules they should be following made them no more likely to do so, even when penalties for non-compliance were mentioned. In contrast, when customers offered to pay providers a premium to flout international rules, the rate of demand for certified identity documentation fell precipitously compared to the placebo. Details: Nathan, Qld: Griffith University, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2012 at: http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/454625/Global-Shell-Games_CGPPcover_Jersey.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/454625/Global-Shell-Games_CGPPcover_Jersey.pdf Shelf Number: 126495 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Illicit Tobacco Trade Summary: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Plenary met in Mexico City, during June 2011. It was at said Plenary where a proposal to conduct typology research work into money laundering and terror financing to be associated with the Illicit Trade in Tobacco (ITT) was accepted. March of 2011 also saw the OECD launch the “Oslo Dialogue” with the aim of promoting a whole of government approach to the tackling of financial crimes and illicit flows. This has been augmented by the G20 calling for strengthened inter-agency cooperation to fight illicit activities as well as the FATF adding tax crimes to the list of predicate offences. The proponents of the typology stated that the illicit tobacco trade was prone to money laundering. Trade was considered to be cash intensive and profitable whilst being accompanied by low levels of risk posed to the criminal groupings (in terms of detection, seizures, penalties, criminal procedure) contributing towards the manifestation of the related illicit activities. Key areas of concern included: a) Loss of revenue to the fiscal authorities. b) The use of the illicitly generated proceeds (i.e., to fund other crimes or the financing of terror). c) The ability to distinguish between illicit activities as undertaken by licit and illicit players in the tobacco sector. d) To identify the extent that governments enforcement agencies prioritise the addressing of illicit trade in tobacco when compared to other crimes. It was furthermore mentioned that the project was to augment work already conducted by the FATF, which included Trade Based Money Laundering (June 2006), Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud (February 2007), ML Vulnerabilities in Free Trade Zones (February 2010) as well as the then recently published Global ML/TF Threat Assessment (June 2010). The identified key objectives were: a) To determine the extent of the Money Laundering and Terror Financing (ML/TF) vulnerabilities associated with illicit trade in tobacco at a global, regional and domestic level. b) To identify relevant case studies and determine trends and patterns from a global, regional and domestic perspective. c) To identify possible indicators which may assist financial and non financial institutions in developing mechanisms to identify, report and counter smuggling activities and the misuse of trade practices. d) To assist jurisdictions and FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in knowledge building and the identification of harms, drivers and measures associated with the illicit trade in tobacco. e) To enhance the efforts aimed at curbing ML and TF associated with the illicit trade in tobacco. This document provides a synopsis of the nature and extent of the ML/TF risks currently associated with the illicit trade in tobacco. It contains an overview of the problem statement and the data provided, as well as an analysis of the predicate offences, extent of associated money laundering and terror financing activities coupled lastly to the various jurisdictional enforcement responses to the curbing of this specific phenomenon. Details: Paris: FATF, 2012. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed october 4, 2012 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Illicit%20Tobacco%20Trade.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Illicit%20Tobacco%20Trade.pdf Shelf Number: 126552 Keywords: Financial Crimes Illicit Trade Money Laundering Terrorist Financing Tobacco

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Elder Justice: National Strategy Needed to Effectively Combat Elder Financial Exploitation Summary: Elder financial exploitation is the illegal or improper use of an older adult’s funds or property. It has been described as an epidemic with society-wide repercussions. While combating elder financial exploitation is largely the responsibility of state and local social service, criminal justice, and consumer protection agencies, the federal government has a role to play in this area as well. GAO was asked to review issues related to elder financial exploitation. This report describes the challenges states face in (1) preventing and (2) responding to elder financial exploitation, as well as the actions some federal agencies have taken to help states address these challenges. To obtain this information, GAO interviewed state and local social service, criminal justice, and consumer protection officials in California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania—states with large elderly populations; officials in seven federal agencies; and various elder abuse experts. GAO also analyzed federal strategic plans and other documents and reviewed relevant research, federal laws and regulations, and state laws. What GAO Recommends Federal agencies should develop a written national strategy addressing challenges GAO identified, facilitate case investigation and prosecution, and improve data, among other things. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Department of Health and Human Services supported GAO’s recommendations. FTC did not believe it is necessary to examine the feasibility of requiring victim’s age in complaints. GAO maintains the importance of its recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-110: Accessed November 20, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650074.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650074.pdf Shelf Number: 126945 Keywords: Confidence Game Crimes Against the Elderly Elder Abuse Elderly Victims Financial Crimes Financial Fraud

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows from China and the Role of Trade Misinvoicing Summary: The Chinese economy hemorrhaged US$3.79 trillion in illicit financial outflows from 2000 through 2011, according to a new report [PDF] released today by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a Washington, DC-based research and advocacy organization. Amidst increased domestic concern over inequality and corruption, GFI’s study raises serious questions about the stability of the Chinese economy merely two weeks before the once-in-a-decade leadership transition. The research, conducted by GFI Lead Economist Dev Kar and GFI Economist Sarah Freitas, found that the illegal outflows—the proceeds of crime, corruption, and tax evasion—were largely due to a trade-based money laundering technique known as ‘trade misinvoicing ,’ which accounted for US$3.2 trillion, or 86.2%, of the total outflow of illegal capital over the 11 years studied. The trade misinvoicing figures were provided exclusively to The Economist, and appear in the latest edition of the magazine which hits newsstands tomorrow. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2012. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 17, 2012 at http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/ChinaOct2012/gfi-china-oct2012-report-web.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/ChinaOct2012/gfi-china-oct2012-report-web.pdf Shelf Number: 127237 Keywords: Corporate Crime Corrupt Practices Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2001-2010 Summary: The developing world lost US$859 billion in illicit outflows in 2010, an increase of 11% over 2009. The capital outflows stem from crime, corruption, tax evasion, and other illicit activity. The report finds that illicit financial flows. From 2001 to 2010, developing countries lost US$5.86 trillion to illicit outflows. Conservatively estimated, illicit financial flows have increased in every region of developing countries. Real growth of illicit flows by regions over study period is as follows: •Africa 23.8 percent, •Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 26.3 percent, •developing Europe 3.6 percent, •Asia 7.8 percent, and •Western Hemisphere 2.7 percent. Top 10 countries with the highest measured cumulative illicit financial outflows between 2001 and 2010 were: 1.China: US$2.74 trillion 2.Mexico: US$476 billion 3.Malaysia: US$285 billon 4.Saudi Arabia: US$210 billion 5.Russia: US$152 billion 6.Philippines: US$138 billion 7.Nigeria: US$129 billion 8.India: US$123 billion 9.Indonesia: US$109 billion 10.United Arab Emirates: US$107 billion. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: accessed February 7, 2013 at: http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html Shelf Number: 127521 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Tax Evasion

Author: Ardizzi, Guerino Title: Money Laundering as a Financial Sector Crime - A New Approach to Measurement, with an Application to Italy Summary: Anti–money laundering regulations have been centred on the “Know-Your-Customer” rule so far, overlooking the fact that criminal proceedings that need to be laundered are usually represented by cash. This is the first study which tries to provide an answer to the question of how much of cash deposited via an official financial institution can be traced back to criminal activities. The paper develops a new approach to measure money laundering and then proposes an application to Italy, a country where cash is still widely used in transactions and criminal activities generate significant proceeds. In particular, we define a model of cash in-flows on current accounts and proxy money laundering with two indicators for the diffusion of criminal activities related to both illegal trafficking and extortion, controlling also for structural (legal) motivations to deposit cash, as well as the need to conceal proceeds from tax evasion. Using a panel of 91 Italian provinces observed over the period 2005-2008, we find that the average total size of money laundering is sizable, around 7% of GDP, 3/4 of which is due to illegal trafficking, while 1/4 is attributable to extortions. Furthermore, the incidence of “dirty money” coming from illegal trafficking is higher in the Centre-North than in the South, while the inverse is true for money laundering coming from extortions. Details: Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies (CES), the Ifo Institute and the CESifo GmbH (Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research), 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 4127: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19076139 Year: 2013 Country: Italy URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19076139 Shelf Number: 127738 Keywords: Extortion Financial Crimes Illegal Trafficking Money Laundering (Italy) Shadow Economy White Collar Crime

Author: Picard, Pierre M. Title: Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers Summary: International and national institutions regularly put pressure on offshore financial centers and their clients to enforce compliance with anti-money laundering regulations and that in spite of the existence of bank secrecy. This paper discusses the winners and losers of such policies. Surprisingly, aggregate proffits and tax revenues can increase under those policies. In addition, we show that offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of the investor's identity and the origin of his/her funds when the pressure creates sufficiently high risk of reputational harm to this investor. Nevertheless, the effcient pressure policy is dichotomous in the sense that a social planner chooses zero pressure or the pressure that just entices offshore banks to comply. By contrast, the implementation of those pressure policies on an onshore institution may be inefficient. Finally, we show that deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center while it also gives better incentives for delegated organizations to effectively induce compliance. Details: Luxembourgh: CREA, University of Luxembourg, and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 2009. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-45 : Accessed March 20, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1411584 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1411584 Shelf Number: 128013 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Offshore Banking

Author: Borlini, Leonardo Title: EU Anti-Money Laundering Regime: An Assessment within International and National Scenarios Summary: The present work is divided into three main parts. Part I aims at providing the proper background against which assessing the recent evolution of the EU anti-money laundering legal framework, by first illustrating the economic menaces posed by the crime at issue and, secondly, by accounting for the rise of new international standards and assessing the performance of a sample domestic anti-money laundering (AML) pieces of legislation. It outlines the serious threats posed by transnational laundering operations in the context of economic globalization, showing, at the same time, the key reasons for international responses to such a crime. We focus on the phenomenological aspect of money laundering (ML) as the necessary means through which criminal activity can live on and proliferate. Details: Milan, Italy: Universita Bocconi, 2012, 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2012-125, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2144122: Accessed March 20, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144122 Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144122 Shelf Number: 128048 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering (Europe)

Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: Money Laundering and Financial Means of Organized Crime: Some Preliminary Empirical Findings Summary: After giving a short literature review, the paper tries a quantification of the volume of money laundering activities, with the help of a MIMIC estimation procedure for the years 1995 to 2006 for 20 highly developed OECD countries. The volume of laundered money was 273 billions USD in the year 1995 for these 20 OECD countries and increased to 603 billions USD in 2006. The overall turnover in organized crime had a value of 595 billion USD in 2001 and increased to 790 billion USD in 2006. These figures are very preliminary but give a clear indication how important money laundering and the turnover of organized crime is nowadays. Details: Berlin: Economics of Security, c/o Department of International Economics, German Institute for Economic Research, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Economics of Security Working Paper 26: Accessed March 27, 2013 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.354167.de/diw_econsec0026.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.354167.de/diw_econsec0026.pdf Shelf Number: 128146 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: U.S. Congress. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control Title: The Buck Stops Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices Summary: A bipartisan report entitled The Buck Stops Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices that provides recommendations for Congress and the Obama Administration to strengthen anti-money laundering laws and regulations in the United States. “Drug traffickers are motivated by one thing: money. The illicit proceeds from their crimes are blood money, and blood money has no place in our financial system.” said Senator Feinstein. “Money laundering—very often through U.S. businesses and financial institutions—must be stopped if we are to make real progress in curtailing the drug trade. Improving our anti-money laundering laws will help better combat transnational organized crime and return revenue to the U.S. Treasury.” “Our report has common-sense recommendations to curb key shortcomings in anti-money laundering statutes and enforcement practices.” said Senator Grassley. “By cutting off financing, we can get at the criminals who misuse legitimate institutions to fuel their illegal activities. Congress and the Obama Administration should take a close look at these recommendations.” The report recommends: •Stronger enforcement of anti-money laundering laws by the Justice Department, particularly in cases where banks are accused of improperly monitoring billions of dollars in illicit proceeds; •Making pre-paid cards (known as stored value) subject to cross-border reporting requirements; •Closing a loophole that makes armored cash carriers exempt from reporting requirements; •Passage of the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act to make it more difficult for criminal organizations to hide behind shell companies; •Passage of the Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act to close gaps in anti-money laundering laws; and •Enforcement of the 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy, including the requirement that all money service businesses register with the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Details: Washington, DC: Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 2013. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 1, 2013 at: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee Shelf Number: 128503 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Money Laundering (U.S.) Organized Crime

Author: MacPhee, J. Title: Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: Beating the Banks: Hawala’s Place in the Global Financial Environment and its Potential Links to Piracy Summary: Hawala is an informal system that allows its users to transfer money quickly, reliably, and inexpensively. It is prevalent in countries where infrastructure is lacking and political corruption is widespread. As such, it is able to fill a major gap in citizens’ access to financial services. In Somalia, for example, hawala is the only reliable way of moving money into the country. Hence, it is used by members of the Somali diaspora to send remittances to their families, as well as by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to get aid money to those in need. Its contribution to these societies is vital. However, all of this takes place under the radar of formal financial institutions and regulatory bodies. This makes it an attractive channel for criminal groups that wish to fund or launder proceeds of illegal activities. Money can be transferred anonymously, and transaction records are scant or nonexistent. It is important to note, however, that illicit users make up only a small percentage of total clients, overall. For example, even using the highest estimate, Somali piracy proceeds could have made up only 6% of total money transferred out of the country through hawala in 2010. Viable alternatives are needed to draw users away from hawala and new developments in mobile money transfer technology could represent a promising first step. This SMS-based service allows individuals to deposit money into an account that they can access through their cell phones, using it for personal transfers or purchases. This innovation addresses many of the gaps in formal banking services that keep hawala in demand; mobile transfers are cheap, instant, and accessible to all segments of society. Through the use of new technology and strategic partnerships, legitimate users of hawala may begin to move away from informal transfer channels, leaving the system a weaker tool for the criminals left behind. Details: Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, 2012. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Marine Affairs Program Technical Report #8: Accessed May 21, 2013 at: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%238-2012-12.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%238-2012-12.pdf Shelf Number: 128761 Keywords: Financial Crimes Maritime Crimes Piracy/Pirates

Author: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Title: National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Summary: This document is intended to provide guidance on the conduct of risk assessment at the country or national level, and it relates especially to key requirements set out in Recommendation 1 and paragraphs 3-6 of INR 1. In particular, it outlines general principles that may serve as a useful framework in assessing ML/TF risks at the national level. The guidance contained in this document takes into consideration previous FATF work, which is still valid reference material. The general principles contained in this paper are also relevant when conducting risk assessments of a more focussed scope, such as in assessments of a particular financial or DNFBP sector (for example, the securities sector) or of thematic issues (for example, the proceeds of corruption related ML). All of these types of assessments (comprehensive, sectoral or thematic) carried out at the national level may also form the basis for determining whether to apply enhanced or specific measures, simplified measures, or exemptions from AML/CFT requirements. Furthermore, while FATF Recommendation 1 does not create specific risk assessment obligations regarding the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the general principles laid out in this guidance could also be used in conducting a risk assessment for this area. The guidance in this document is not intended to explain how supervisors should assess risks in the context of risk-based supervision, although risk-based supervision will likely be informed by a national-level risk assessment. Also, this guidance does not provide further explanation of RBA obligations and decisions for financial institutions and DNFBPs. The FATF has issued separate guidance on implementing the RBA for specific sectors and professions, and that material will be reviewed and, as necessary, modified in light of the revised FATF Recommendations. This guidance document is not a standard and is therefore not intended to designate specific actions necessary to meet obligations under Recommendation 1 and INR 1 or any other Recommendations dealing with the RBA. Criteria for technical compliance and for assessing effectiveness relevant to this and all other FATF Recommendations may be found in the FATF assessment methodology. The practices described in this guidance are intended to serve as examples that may facilitate implementation of these obligations in a manner compatible with the FATF standards. This guidance is structured as follows:  This section (1) lays out the purpose, scope and status of this guidance, along with an outline of the core FATF obligations relevant to ML/TF risk assessments at any level.  Section 2 lays out general principles that should be taken into account when conducting ML/TF risk assessments at the country or national level.  Section 3 discusses how to organise a national-level ML/TF risk assessment, its frequency, and the data and information that could be used while undertaking such an assessment.  Section 4 presents a high-level view of the three main stages involved in the ML/TF risk assessment process (identification, analysis and evaluation).  Section 5 considers the outcome and dissemination of the risk assessment product.  Annexes to this document contain additional information relating to ML/TF risk assessment including summaries of selected national-level assessments. Details: Paris: FATF, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: FATF Guidance: Accessed May 28, 2013 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 128840 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Risk Assessment Terrorist Financing

Author: Hutchings, Alice Title: Cloud Computing for Small Business: Criminal and security threats and prevention measures Summary: Compared with large organisations, small businesses operate in a distinct and highly resource-constrained operating and technical environment. Their proprietors are often time poor, have minimal bargaining power and have limited financial, technical, legal and personnel resources. It is therefore unsurprising that cloud computing and its promise of smoothing cash flows and dramatically reducing ICT overheads is attractive to small business. Cloud computing shifts the delivery and maintenance of software, databases and storage to the internet, transforming them into Pay-As-You-Go services accessed through a web browser. While providing many benefits, cloud computing also brings many risks for small business, including potential computer security and criminal, regulatory and civil liability issues. This paper, undertaken as a collaborative partnership with the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security at Griffith University, identifies these risks and offers a perspective on how they might be contained so that the benefits of cloud computing do not outweigh the risks for small businesses in the 21st century. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2013. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in criminal and Criminal Justice No. 456: Accessed May 29, 2013 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/441-460/tandi456.html Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/441-460/tandi456.html Shelf Number: 128842 Keywords: Cloud Computing (Australia) Computer Crimes Computer Security Financial Crimes

Author: Button, Mark Title: Measuring Fraud in Overseas Aid: Options and Method Summary: This report seeks to identify and select an appropriate methodology to measure fraud losses in the different modalities of aid. It explores the experience of other countries, donors and multilateral bodies in measuring fraud in overseas aid and discovers little evidence that bilateral donors, multilateral agencies or UK NGOs use Fraud Loss Measurement Techniques (FLM) to assess fraud levels in their overseas aid budgets. Some governments and multilateral agencies find it useful to have large sampling exercises to collect measures of wider losses due to what they call ‘Improper Payments’ or some similar term. Reported figures vary widely from organisation to organisation and over time: e.g. the total estimated Improper Payments rate for USAID was reported as 0.85% in 2008 and 0.28% for 2009; but the estimated financial impact of irregularities on the budget of the European Anti Fraud Office OLAF rose from 1.13% in 2009 to 1.27% 2010. FLM-type exercises are used by government agencies such as the DWP, HMRC, the NHS and Medicare in the US. Again there is considerable variation between agencies and types of expenditure: the DWP estimated fraud rate varied from 0.0% for pensions to 4.1% for jobseekers allowance; the HMRC estimated a total ‘direct tax gap’ for 2009 at 5.8%; a recent NHS study highlighted a fraud loss rate of 4.7% for a medical locum agency’s invoicing: and the US Medicare reported 7.6% ‘Improper Payments’ in 2009. This report examines the potential for FLM exercises applied to the complex and challenging environment of overseas aid and aid modalities. It shows that FLM approaches, being rare in this context, would be difficult and expensive to apply to a bilateral donor complete budget. However, the report argues that there are elements of the a bilateral budget where FLM can be undertaken and with the development of fraud resilience checks and a fraud loss model much greater understanding of the risk of fraud in different contexts can be gauged. As a result the report concludes on the need to: • Recognise that FLM and the broader development of counter fraud capacity are a form of aid. • Reject attempts to measure total fraud in a ‘super measure’ on all the bilateral donor budget as this is too complex and expensive to achieve. • Seek to use FLM to measure fraud where this is practicable. Work should be focussed upon: the bilateral donor Administration, Direct Purchasing, Developing Countries’ government departments and NGOs receiving aid from the donor. • Carry out further work to: develop resilience checks for the overseas aid fraud context and to create models for predicting range of likely fraud losses. The report also notes the need for a political lead from the top of the bilateral aid donor that enhancing the resilience to fraud should be a condition of aid to governments and international agencies and that multilateral organisations should also move towards enhancing the resilience to fraud as a condition of their aid to countries and to NGOs. The report makes the following recommendations that Bilateral aid agencies: 1. Consider FLM and the broader development of counter fraud capacity as a form of aid. 2. Reject attempts to measure total fraud in its budget as this is too complex and expensive to achieve. 3. Seek to use FLM to measure fraud. These should be focussed upon: – Administration; – Direct Purchasing; – Countries’ government departments and NGOs receiving aid (number depending upon budget). 4. Carry out further work to: – Develop resilience check for overseas aid fraud context; – Create model for predicting range of likely fraud losses. Details: Portsmouth, UK: University of Portsmouth, Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, 2012. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/misc_gov/60908-DFID_FINAL_REPORT_March2012post_david.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/misc_gov/60908-DFID_FINAL_REPORT_March2012post_david.pdf Shelf Number: 128859 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Fraud

Author: Button, Mark Title: Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions. Main Report Summary: This research was commissioned by the Midlands Fraud Forum, Eversheds and PKF with the aim to ‘assess how sanctions are used against fraudsters and how this can be made easier so as to maximise deterrence.’ Fraud is becoming much more transparent in society as a problem that causes significant harm. The recent National Fraud Authority’s Annual Fraud Indicator estimate of a £73 billion1 problem establishes it as, in all probability, the most expensive crime to UK Plc. There is also evidence that some criminals are moving from traditional acquisitive crime to fraud. Clearly more needs to be done to reduce fraud, and sanctions form an important element of that strategy. There has been interest in sanctions for fraud and related areas in recent years in Government backed reviews and strategies2. However, academic research in this area has been sparse and tended to focus upon specific types of fraud3. This research addresses some of that gap by delving deeper into the sanctions used to counter fraud. The aim was to look for inspiration from a range of other sectors, with a view to making recommendations for the more effective use of sanctions against fraudsters, building upon some of the other work undertaken in this area. The report is based upon documentary research, 39 interviews drawn from organisations across the criminal and civil justice systems, public and private sectors. Additionally a survey was also conducted for this research which secured 397 responses. This is the summary report and full findings can be found in the main report (“the Report”) and survey report documents. Details: Portsmouth, UK: Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, University of Portsmouth, 2012. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/centreforcounterfraudstudies/documents/filetodownload,161060,en.tmp Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/centreforcounterfraudstudies/documents/filetodownload,161060,en.tmp Shelf Number: 128913 Keywords: Business Crimes Corporate Fraud (U.K.) Criminal Sanctions Financial Crimes White-Collar Crime

Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit Sector Summary: This joint CGCC and United Nations report summarizes the outcomes of a multiyear project led by the UN and aimed at developing a common understanding of sound practices to counter the risk of terrorism financing through the nonprofit sector, protecting the sector and preventing terrorist abuse of nonprofit organizations. The project included two global-level meetings and five regional-level expert meetings. More than 50 states and 80 nonprofit organizations participated in the meetings, in addition to representatives of relevant UN and multilateral agencies, officials from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-style regional bodies, and the financial sector. Details: Washington, DC: , 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Shelf Number: 129018 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Financial Crimes Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce: Results of the 2012 online consumer fraud survey Summary: The Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce (ACFT) comprises 22 government regulatory agencies and departments in Australia and New Zealand that work alongside private sector, community and non-government partners to prevent fraud. The ACFT has conducted a range of fraud prevention and awareness-raising activities since 2006. One key activity of the ACFT is to hold an annual consumer fraud survey to obtain a snapshot of the public’s exposure to consumer scams, to assess their impact, to determine how victims respond and to identify emerging typologies and issues. As the survey participants were not randomly sampled, the survey findings are not representative of the general population. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) is a member of the ACFT and chair of the research sub-group. This report presents the results of the 2012 survey, which ran for three months commencing from 1 January 2012. This period encompassed National Fraud Prevention Week, which coincides with global awareness-raising activities. The theme of the 2012 campaign was Slam Scams! This theme aimed to raise awareness about scam delivery methods so that scams could be identified at the point of contact. The survey explored scams where respondents were contacted by phone, short message service (SMS), email, letter, via the internet and/or in person by someone who they did not know in relation to: having won a lottery or some other prize (lottery scams); a request for assistance to transfer money out of another country (such as Nigeria) (advance fee frauds); a notification of an inheritance (inheritance scams); a request by a business to confirm personal details or passwords (phishing scams); a request to supply financial advice (financial advice scams); an opportunity to work from home (a front for money laundering) (work from home scams); pursuing a personal relationship that turned out to be false (dating scams); a person representing themselves as someone from a computer support centre (computer support scams); and other fraud types. The survey was made available for completion on the AIC’s website. Participants who did not reside in Australia or New Zealand were excluded from the survey, as were invalid responses. In 2012, 1,576 participants completed the survey. Outliers, typically very large loss figures from respondents who appeared to have misunderstood the question, were removed from the analysis. The 2012 survey suffered from a number of limitations that made it difficult to generalise its findings to the greater Australasian population, in particular the self-selection bias of the survey design. As the sample was not randomly selected, those who participated in the survey may be different from the general population. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2013. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Technical and background paper series no.56: Accessed June 25, 2013 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tbp/41-60/tbp056.html Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tbp/41-60/tbp056.html Shelf Number: 129155 Keywords: Consumer Fraud (Australia) Consumer Protection Financial Crimes

Author: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Title: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals Summary: Criminals seek out the involvement of legal professionals in their ML/TF activities, sometimes because a legal professional is required to complete certain transactions, and sometimes to access specialised legal and notarial skills and services which could assist the laundering of the proceeds of crime and the funding of terrorism. The report identifies a number of ML/TF methods that commonly employ or, in some countries, require the services of a legal professional. Inherently these activities pose ML/TF risk. When clients seek to misuse the legal professional’s services in these areas, even law abiding legal professionals may be vulnerable. The methods are: •misuse of client accounts •purchase of real property •creation of trusts and companies •management of trusts and companies •managing client affairs and making introductions •undertaking certain litigation •setting up and managing charities The report also describes red flag indicators of ML/TF which may be useful to legal professionals, self-regulatory bodies (SRBs), competent authorities and law enforcement agencies. In this report, over 100 case studies referring to these and other ML/TF methods were taken into account. Some of these case studies show that not all legal professionals are undertaking client due diligence (CDD) when required. Even where due diligence is obtained, if the legal professional lacks understanding of the ML/TF vulnerabilities and red flag indicators, they are less able to use that information to prevent the misuse of their services. The report also challenges the perception sometimes held by criminals, and at times supported by claims from legal professionals themselves, that legal professional privilege or professional secrecy would lawfully enable a legal professional to continue to act for a client who was engaging in criminal activity and/or prevent law enforcement from accessing information to enable the client to be prosecuted. Details: Paris: FATF, 2013. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2013 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/mltf-vulnerabilities-legal-professionals.html Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/mltf-vulnerabilities-legal-professionals.html Shelf Number: 0 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: International Best Practices: Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (Recommendation 6) Summary: FATF Recommendation 6 requires countries to implement the targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing, such as UNSCR 1267(1999) and its successor resolutions, and UNSCR 1373(2001). Efforts to combat terrorist financing are greatly undermined if countries do not freeze the funds or other assets of designated persons and entities quickly and effectively. This updated best practices paper reflects the latest relevant UNSCRs in response to challenges faced by countries in the implementation of Recommendation 6. The paper provides best practices that could help countries in their implementation of the targeted financial sanctions to prevent and suppress terrorist financing in accordance with the relevant UNSCRs. Details: Paris: FATF, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 8, 2013 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/bpp-finsanctions-tf-r6.html Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/bpp-finsanctions-tf-r6.html Shelf Number: 129272 Keywords: Financial Crimes Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Elder Justice: More Federal Coordination and Public Awareness Needed Summary: As the percentage of older adults in the population increases, the number of older adults at risk of abuse also is growing. At the same time, constraints on public funds may limit assistance to the growing population of older adults in need. GAO was asked to review elder justice program issues. This report addresses: (1) the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication across the federal grant programs that support elder justice; (2) the extent to which federal programs coordinate their efforts and monitor elder justice outcomes; and (3) how state aging agencies, area agencies on aging, and service providers deliver federal elder justice services and what challenges, if any, they face in doing so. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, identified federal elder justice programs, surveyed federal officials about program elements, reviewed program documentation, and visited agencies responsible for elder justice in Illinois, Virginia and Arizona. GAO selected states based on the percentage of the elderly in the state population, geographic dispersion, and percentage of the state's Older American Act funds devoted to elder care. GAO recommends that HHS take the lead in identifying common objectives and outcomes for the federal elder justice effort and that HHS and Justice develop a national elder justice public awareness campaign. HHS concurred and Justice did not comment. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-498: Accessed July 13, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-498 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-498 Shelf Number: 129394 Keywords: Crimes Against the Elderly Elder Abuse (U.S.) Elderly Victims Financial Crimes Financial Exploitation

Author: Tendulkar, Rohini Title: Cyber-crime, Securities Markets and Systemic Risk Summary:  The soundness, efficiency and stability of securities markets relies on the quality of information provided; the integrity of people and service provision; the effectiveness of regulation; and increasingly the robustness of supporting technological infrastructure. Yet, there is limited public, targeted and in-depth study into how one of the more prominent technology-based risks: cyber-crime could and is impacting securities markets.  Cyber-crime can be understood as an attack on the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of an entity’s online/computer presence or networks – and information contained within. The Evolving Nature of Cyber-Crime  In recent years, cyber-crime has become increasingly sophisticated, making it difficult to combat, detect and mitigate. The rise of a relatively new class of cyber-attack is especially troubling. This new class is referred to as an ‘Advanced Persistent Threat’ (APT).1  The costs of cyber-crime to society so far may already be substantial. Some studies cite figures as high as $388 billion2 or $ 1 trillion3. While these high numbers are contentious due to lack of reliability when it comes to reporting direct and indirect costs, a growing number of high-profile cyber-attacks, high financial losses incurred, and other real-world manifestations suggest a potential for widespread impact. A focus on the world’s exchanges  To gather unique insights into the cyber-crime threat from a securities market perspective, the IOSCO Research Department, jointly with the World Federation of Exchanges Office, conducted a cyber-crime survey (hereafter the WFE/IOSCO survey) to some of our core financial market infrastructures - the world’s exchanges.4  This survey is intended as part of a series of surveys exploring perspectives and experiences with cyber-crime across different groups of securities market actors, financial institutions and regulators.  In this first survey, a vast majority of respondents agree that cyber-crime in securities markets can be considered a potentially systemic risk (89%). The following factors shed light on why:  Size, complexity and incentive structure  Cyber-crime is already targeting a number of exchanges. Over half of exchanges surveyed report experiencing a cyber-attack in the last year (53%).  Attacks tend to be disruptive in nature (rather than aiming for immediate financial gain). The most common forms of attack reported in the survey are Denial of Service attacks and malicious code (viruses). These categories of attack were also reported as the most disruptive. Financial theft did not feature in any of the responses.  This suggests a shift in motive for cyber-crime in securities markets, away from financial gain and towards more destabilizing aims. It also distinguishes cyber-crime in securities markets from traditional crimes against the financial sector e.g. fraud, theft.  Potential effect on market integrity and efficiency; infiltration of non-substitutable and/or interconnected services  The instances of attacks against exchanges means that cyber-crime is already targeting securities markets’ core infrastructures and providers of essential (and non-substitutable services). At this stage, these cyber-attacks have not impacted core systems or market integrity and efficiency. However, some exchanges surveyed suggest that a large-scale, successful attack may have the potential to do so.  Level of transparency and awareness  Transparency in the form of information sharing is occurring widely. 70% of exchanges surveyed note that they share information with authorities, overseers or regulators. However, most of these arrangements are national in nature.  There is also a high level of awareness of the threat across exchanges surveyed. Around 93% of exchanges surveyed report that cyber-threats are discussed and understood by senior management and almost 90% report having in place internal plans and documentation addressing cyber-crime.  Level of cyber-security and cyber-resilience  All exchanges surveyed appear to have in place myriad proactive and reactive defence and preventative measures (see Annex B) and report that cyber-attacks are generally detected immediately. Annual cyber-crime training for general (non-IT) staff is also a staple amongst the majority of respondent exchanges.  However, a small but significant number of exchanges surveyed recognize that 100% security is illusionary, with around a quarter recognizing that current preventative and disaster recovery measures may not be able to stand up against a large-scale and coordinated attack.  Around half of exchanges surveyed report having two separate groups for handling physical and cyber threats. Separation of the two teams could lead to challenges in engaging with cyber-physical threats, however these challenges may be easily overcome (if not already) through efficient and on-going coordination between the two groups. Further information around the level of coordination between these two groups could shed light on this point.  Around 22% of exchanges surveyed report having cyber-crime insurance or something similar. This is mainly due to lack of availability or insufficient coverage of available insurance.  Effectiveness of regulation  A number of respondents expressed doubt over the effectiveness of current regulation in deterring cyber-criminals from damaging markets, since the global nature of the crime makes it difficult to identify and prosecute them. Only 59% of exchanges surveyed report sanctions regimes being in place for cyber-crime, in their jurisdiction. Of these, only half (55%) suggest that current sanction regimes are effective in deterring cyber-criminals. Engaging with the risk  In terms of the future role of securities market regulators in engaging with cyber-crime in securities markets, the following activities were highlighted most frequently by exchanges surveyed:  Updating/implementing regulation and standards (in collaboration with other authorities);  Identifying and providing guidance on best practice, principles and/or frameworks;  Building, partaking in and promoting information sharing networks;  Acting as a repository of knowledge for securities market participants to tap into (e.g. keep up to date with trends, house technical expertise to answer industry questions, collect and record cases, identify biggest risks).  Many of the exchanges surveyed underline a need for further policy but assert that any efforts in this space should:  avoid being prescriptive;  maintain flexibility to adapt to changing risks;  concentrate on information sharing; effective regulations/legislation; providing guidance and principles; and not interfere with an institution’s own tailored internal measures or policy. Details: Paris: International Organisation of Securities Commissions or the World Federation of Exchanges. 2013. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Staff Working Paper: [SWP1/2013]: Accessed July 18, 2013 at: http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/statistics/pdf/IOSCO_WFE_Cyber-crime%20report_Final_16July.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/statistics/pdf/IOSCO_WFE_Cyber-crime%20report_Final_16July.pdf Shelf Number: 129445 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime (International) Financial Crimes Internet Crime Securities Markets

Author: James, Lachlan Title: Final Report - Cloud Computing Threat Assessment for Small Business Summary: Small businesses are not simply scaled-down versions of big business. Compared with larger organisations, small businesses operate in a distinct and highly resource constrained operating and technical environment. They are time-poor, have minimal bargaining power, and limited or inconsistent financial, technical, legal and personnel resources. Above all, small businesses are typically focused on one thing: survival. It is therefore unsurprising that cloud computing—and its promise of smoothing cash flows and dramatically reducing IT overhead—is attractive to small business. Cloud computing shifts the delivery and maintenance of software, databases and storage to the internet, transforming them into Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) services accessed through a small business user’s web-browser. Cloud computing often comes with zero upfront costs, and scales (up and down) with the demands of the small business. Cloud computing services demand minimal technical skills: they are easy to setup and require little if any maintenance. Accessed via a secure login, for the small business, cloud computing typically represents increased standards of security. However, along with the benefits, cloud computing also embodies many risks for small business, including potential computer security, criminal, regulatory and civil liability issues. Cloud computing—like other new information technologies— challenges the application and understanding of many pre-existing areas of law. Examples of key criminal, regulatory and legal threats for small business adopting cloud computing include: • Cloud Providers are the Target, But Small Business is the Victim – While cloud service providers themselves hold much greater appeal to cybercriminals, it is the cloud service provider’s small business tenants— experiencing disrupted services and hence disruption to their already fragile revenues—that are the real victims. Lacking policies, procedures and training relating to cyber and network security, small businesses are particularly vulnerable to having account details stolen, and their cloud services hijacked. • Ever Changing Sea of International, National & Local Regulation – Where personal information—including financial and credit details—is stored in the cloud, a routine international commercial transaction may require a small business to comply with a myriad of ever changing international, national and state-level regulations and industry-specific standards. • Practical Benefits of Cloud Computing Potentially Non-Compliant – Even some simple, practical benefits of using the cloud—such as storing MYOB files on a cloud storage service (such as DropBox)—may render the small business non-compliant. • Inequality of Bargaining Power: “Take It or Leave It” Service Agreements – With almost no bargaining power and faced with industry-wide boilerplate terms and conditions, small business has little choice but to accept one-sided cloud agreements on a “take it or leave it” basis, leaving vendors absolved of substantially all liability. • Service Credits Inconsistent with Potential Damage to Small Business – Despite the potentially devastating impact of even relatively short service outages, small business is typically left with “service credits” (based on a proportion of monthly subscription fees) as their “sole and exclusive remedy.” • Overseas Legal Jurisdiction & Choice-of-Law – With cloud service agreements frequently setting the legal jurisdiction and choice-of-law to the vendor’s overseas headquarters, even the most simple legal action immediately becomes prohibitively expensive for all but the most successful small business. • Unilateral Termination of Accounts & Data Loss – Cloud service providers, particularly in relation to free accounts, often reserve the right to unilaterally terminate accounts with or without notice, potentially devastating the small business. Absolved of substantially all liability, the cloud service provider leaves the aggrieved small business with no cause of action and no right to recover. Findings – Responding to the Criminal, Regulatory & Legal Threats Technical & Commercial Practices to Reduce Risks – The research has found that there are technical and commercial practices that can be implemented today by small businesses to reduce at least some of the security and commercial risks: • Policies & Training – Small businesses can provide computer security training to personnel, and institute simple policies setting out (for example) how computer resources should be used, how often passwords should be changed, access rights for staff, and how and when employees may bring in and use their own devices. • Industry Education – Industry bodies can provide education and training to small businesses about appropriate practices and regulatory requirements. • Cyber & Cloud Insurance – Existing cyber liability insurance holds out some limited hope of compensating for losses as a result of cybercrime. However, the best hope for broader coverage rests with contingent business interruption insurance adapted to the unique circumstances of cloud computing (“cloud insurance”) being developed by new entrepreneurial ventures such as CloudInsure. Opportunities for Legislative Intervention – The research also identified the likely need for legislative intervention. The near-term future of cloud computing shows signs of bifurcation into budget solutions (much like existing offerings) and premium services with increased security and regulatory compliance, and greater acceptance of liability. But without a change in relative bargaining power between the cloud service provider and small business, it is unclear if competitive forces alone will be sufficient to bring about quality premium services at a price affordable to cost-conscious small business. To encourage cloud service providers to deliver more attractive, secure and cost effective solutions, inequality of bargaining power between cloud service providers and small business clients will need to be addressed. In this respect, there is significant opportunity for judiciously applied legislative intervention. Opportunities for such carefully considered intervention include: a refined doctrine of unconscionability; possible introduction of legal principles broadly akin to “contracts of adhesion” in the United States; and new regulatory powers—possibly adapted from the Communications Alliance (formerly the Australian Communications Industry Forum, Industry Code for Consumer Contracts, ACIF C620:2005)—to police the cloud computing industry. Acting in concert, a combination of technical and commercial solutions—including improved cybersecurity practices, industry education programs, and new species of “cloud insurance”—together with legislative programs may serve to place small business on substantially the same footing as larger businesses, enabling them to fully capture the true benefits of cloud computing while enduring a more equitable share of the risks. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2013 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/special/002/Cloud-Computing-DBCDE.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/special/002/Cloud-Computing-DBCDE.pdf Shelf Number: 129472 Keywords: Cloud Computing (Australia) Computer Crimes Computer Security Crimes Against Business Financial Crimes

Author: Alkaabi, Ali Title: A Comparative Analysis of the Extent of Money Laundering in Australia, UAE, UK and the USA Summary: The IMF has estimated that the extent of money laundering globally is between 2 to 5 percent of the world’s gross domestic product. This figure is larger than the GDP of all but a handful of countries and represents correspondingly huge risks to global financial stability and to the financial well-being and stability of many countries. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the extent of Money Laundering over the last decade across four countries which represent a spectrum of economic development and culture: Australia, the UAE, the UK and the USA. We do so with a view to understanding their anti-money laundering systems and their recent efforts to improve the effectiveness of those systems. In the case of the UAE, we examine also the cultural influences which differentiate it from the other three countries and which have necessarily been a factor in shaping those efforts and their current system. Money laundering and related statistics including the number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) received from 1999 to 2008 are analyzed. The paper consolidates and analyses information made available by the government websites of these countries and information made available through other sources, both academic and non-academic. It is clear that international efforts to combat money laundering have achieved considerable success over the decade. It is also clear that there is more to be done, by policy makers, by regulators, and by evaluators, and in particular that success in combating money laundering globally must more precisely address cultural and historical differences amongst the international community. Details: Unpublished paper, 2010. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Finance and Corporate Governance Conference 2010 Paper ; Accessed August 12, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539843 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539843 Shelf Number: 129624 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering (International)

Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: The Hidden Economy in Bulgaria: 2011 – 2012 Summary: The deep penetration of hidden economic activities in Greece and other peripheral Eurozone members – a development which is at the epicenter of the continuing Eurozone debt crisis, has demonstrated that accurate understanding of the dynamics of the hidden economy is essential for improving public and private sector management. In the case of Bulgaria, an assessment of the hidden economy is an issue of particular importance as the country is facing serious challenges in all of its aspects – gray, black and informal economy. It is even more pressing in the light of the country’s current low level of competitiveness and its aspirations for participation in the European stability and sustainable growth initiatives such as Europe 2020 and the Euro-Plus Pact. The hidden economy in Bulgaria has decreased in 2011 – 2012 among both businesses and the population. Yet, the registered gains are modest. Deep structural labor market problems and long-term business environment issues continue to constitute favorable conditions for the development of hidden economic activities in Bulgaria. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 37: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=16342 Year: 2013 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=16342 Shelf Number: 129661 Keywords: Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Hidden Economy (Bulgaria)

Author: Interpol. Environmental Crime Programme Title: Guide to Carbon Trading Crime Summary: Over recent decades there has been a growing scientific consensus that average global temperatures are rising as a result of increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere caused by human activities, particularly industrialization. In response to this scientific evidence, the global community agreed in 1992 to an international treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The treaty requires countries to cooperatively consider what they could do to limit average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change and to cope with whatever impacts were, by then, inevitable. As at June 2013, the treaty has been ratified by 195 parties.1 In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted as an international agreement under the UNFCCC and entered into force in February 2005.2 As at June 2013, there are 192 parties to the Protocol.3 The major feature of the Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries (the “Annex I” parties)4 and the European Community to reduce their emissions of six specified types of greenhouse gases – the three most important being carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). The others being hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). While countries are encouraged to reduce emissions of all these greenhouse gases, for the purposes of standardising the measurements, the emissions of these other gases are converted into the equivalent “global warming potential” of CO2. For example, methane (CH4) has 21 times the global warming potential of carbon dioxide (which is measured over a 100 year timescale).5 Therefore the emission of 1 tonne of methane is considered to be equivalent to the emission of 21 tonnes of carbon dioxide. While the Kyoto Protocol requires signatory countries to meet their targets primarily through domestic measures, it also provides for a number of flexible mechanisms that allows them to offset their emissions by purchasing reductions made in other countries. This is done by purchasing “units”, each unit being equivalent to one tonne of CO2 (emissions of other greenhouse gases being converted to the equivalent number of tonnes of CO2). Through the trading of these units to offset emissions of greenhouse gases, a new commodity has been created in the form of emission reductions or removals. Since carbon dioxide (CO2) is the principal greenhouse gas, this market is widely referred to as the “carbon market”,6 with each of the units traded commonly referred to as “carbon credits”.7 Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries are to keep precise records of the trades carried out. Transfers and acquisitions of carbon credits are tracked and recorded through the registry systems under the Protocol. The UN Climate Change Secretariat, based in Bonn, Germany, keeps an international transaction log to ensure secure transfer of carbon credits between countries and to verify that transactions are consistent with the rules of the Protocol. Emissions trading schemes may also be established as climate policy instruments at the national and regional levels. Under such schemes, governments set emissions obligations to be reached by the participating entities. The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is the largest in operation. INTERPOL, through its Environmental Crime Programme and the Economic and Financial Crimes sub-Directorate, recognize that emerging carbon markets, like any market, are at risk of exploitation through criminal means and therefore require proper monitoring and enforcement to ensure environmental and financial integrity. This guide is not intended to take a position on the value of carbon trading in either a general or specific form but is intended to assess the current vulnerabilities of the existing and emerging carbon markets and provide fundamental information necessary to establish adequate policing of these mechanisms. INTERPOL is the only international police organization with a trans-boundary mandate, with designated units addressing both environmental and financial crimes. Its mandate includes the exchange of criminal intelligence and sensitive information between law enforcement agencies amongst INTERPOL’s 190 member countries. INTERPOL recognizes carbon trading crime as a new and emerging type of environmental and financial crime. Before assessing the potential scope for criminal activity, this report offers a comprehensive overview of the carbon market and carbon trading in practice, for those unfamiliar with its operations and terminology. Details: Lyon, France: Interpol, 2013. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: www.interpol.int Year: 2013 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 129663 Keywords: Carbon Trading Crime (International) Environmental Pollution Financial Crimes Offenses Against the Environment

Author: Hicks, David Title: Economic Sectors Vulnerable to Organized Crime: Securities Summary: This report offers a detailed and accessible study of the vulnerabilities to organized crime affecting the securities sector in Canada. Much of the focus is directly or indirectly placed on Toronto (Ontario) and Montreal (Quebec) given that these jurisdictions host and regulate the main Canadian stock and derivatives exchanges, respectively. Since 2002 the Criminal Code has provided an expansive definition of organized crime/criminal organizations that includes three or more persons involved in a group that has as one of its main purposes or activities the commission of serious offences. At the time of writing, we were unable to locate any securities-related cases where a Canadian court has issued a conviction for criminal organization charges although we are aware of one pending case. There are clearly ongoing difficulties in applying the label organized crime to the stereotypical groups (Type I), let alone the diversity of individuals and groups (Type II) that may facilitate or collude in securities-related misconduct and crime. The information reviewed shows that individuals who violate the Criminal Code are typically charged with fraud. The securities sector plays a key role in Canada's financial services industry and economy. The total market capitalization in 2010 amounted to $2.3 trillion or 4 per cent of total trading among the world stock exchanges. While the 2011 Supreme Court of Canada decision rejected the federal government move towards a national securities regulator, the sector is a complex and de-centralized model of provincial regulation and cooperative national harmonization of key features. In addition, 'national' self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that receive their mandate through provincial legislation play a critical role to regulate the member firms and their employees. The securities sector is vulnerable to organized crime for several reasons, not least that this is a hybrid zone with a focus on regulatory approaches and difficulties in applying crime labels. Potential wrong-doing can be difficult to identify and the interpretation of motivations and behaviour is not as clear as in other fields, such as interpersonal crimes. The securities sector is an area of low visibility that requires proactive enforcement and prevention, in part because victims may tend not to complain due to embarrassment or lack of knowledge, and industry participants may not want to report rule violations that would undermine confidence in their business. Organized crime involvement in capital market offences is possible at several levels in terms of the depth of its infiltration of the securities market. The securities sector may be a site for the laundering of proceeds of crime generated outside of the industry, for instance, drug money, or a site for fraud and related laundering of proceeds generated to varying degrees within or alongside the sector. Criminal organizations can establish real or paper-based companies and sell real or fictitious stocks outside the regulated market, or attempt to secure the cooperation of industry insiders through the threat of violence or in repayment of gambling debts. It is also possible that criminal organizations or their members may establish partial or direct beneficial ownership of brokerage houses and engage a broader and deeper exploitation of victims. Some schemes that occur in Canada include fraudulent high-yield investments, pyramid or Ponzi schemes, and illicit 'tax-free' investments. The 20 (N=20) interviewees expressed particular concerns about Canadian investor involvement with boiler-room operations and the regulatory light-touch segments of international markets such as pink sheets and Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) in the United States, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) in Germany, and domestic markets, such as exempt securities. Fundamentally, vulnerability is represented in the asymmetry between investors and (potentially fraudulent) market actors within or outside of the securities sector. The imbalance of information, knowledge and control in favour of market actors can be reduced through the scope and intensity of regulatory oversight. However, this can also result in push and pull factors for fraudulent behaviour to capitalize on variable standards across jurisdictions and national boundaries. Vulnerability is also a product of the convergence in the securities sector of a wide range of complementary and competing government, regulatory, industry and business, and investor interests. The essential profit-driven logic underlying commercial crimes is an apparently voluntary trade in (typically) legal goods and services combined with illegal (fraudulent) methods to manipulate market values to the disadvantage of victims. Enforcement data presented by regulatory authorities and the SROs illustrate their attempts to address these vulnerabilities. The volume of criminal charges in the securities sector remains limited in number but substantial in terms of estimated losses. Reducing the vulnerability to crime and organized crime in the securities sector can be achieved through systematic attention to the limitations and possibilities of market forces and control systems. There is an ongoing need for basic and enhanced public education for investors to better protect themselves and to promote a culture of lawful and ethical behavior. Control agencies should function as interdependent (rather than strictly independent) agents within a clear set of defined goals and a coordinated strategy is necessary to detect and deter violations and to reduce impact and harm by issuing proportionate sanctions. Stakeholders could consider research and policy development in the design and implementation of a national data collection and securities intelligence model. This could improve the separate and cumulative detection and deterrence of serious repeat offending in Canadian capital markets, and its potential utility as a vehicle for criminals and organized crime. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2012. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 26: Accessed October 28, 2013 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-123-2012-eng.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-123-2012-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 131494 Keywords: Financial Crimes Organized Crime (Canada) Securities Market White Collar Crimes

Author: Javelin Strategy and Research Title: 2013 LexisNexis True Cost of Fraud Study. Merchants Struggle Against an Onslaught of High-Cost Identity Fraud and Online Fraud Summary: While the rebounding economy is softening the blow of merchant fraud losses, merchants are still paying $2.79 in costs for each dollar of fraud losses they incur, up $0.10 on the dollar from 2012 (see figure 1). A spike in online fraud is responsible for these higher costs, as fraud through the online channel burdens merchants with higher fees and replacement costs than fraud through in-person or other channels. The surge in online fraud is driven by the proliferation of malware and data breaches, which facilitate the theft and misuse of consumers' payment card, merchant account, and alternative payments account information. Merchants would be wise to focus on customer identity and transaction verification, particularly for online transactions, as online fraud and identity fraud take a greater percent of fraud losses in 2013. Large e-commerce merchants demonstrate exemplary fraud attitudes and behaviors which mitigate the effect of fraud losses on their bottom line. These merchants believe that fraud is inevitable, but understand that their prevention efforts will result in more positive customer relationships (see figure 5). They use a greater number of fraud technology solutions than all merchants (5 solutions vs. 2, on average), and lose a relatively low (and declining) percent of revenue to fraud each year (from .60% in 2012 to .53% in 2013) (see figure 3). International merchants adhere to the same beliefs and behaviors to a lesser degree, though still more than all merchants (see figures 5 and 13). Although they lose more revenue to fraud each year, they reduced this percent even as their domestic-only counterparts saw an increase this year (see figure 17). Mobile merchants saw an increase in fraud as a percent of revenue this year (from .64% in 2012 to .75% in 2013) (see figure 3). While displaying similar attitudes to large e-commerce merchants as to the positive effects of reducing fraud, they are most likely among all segments to view fraud mitigation costs as burdensome (see figure 4). Details: New York: LexisNexis, 2013. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2013 at: http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/assets/true-cost-fraud-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/assets/true-cost-fraud-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 131600 Keywords: Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Online Fraud Online Victimization

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime Summary: In 2011, at least 2.3 billion people, the equivalent of more than one third of the world's total population, had access to the internet. Over 60 per cent of all internet users are in developing countries, with 45 per cent of all internet users below the age of 25 years. By the year 2017, it is estimated that mobile broadband subscriptions will approach 70 per cent of the world's total population. By the year 2020, the number of networked devices (the 'internet of things') will outnumber people by six to one, transforming current conceptions of the internet. In the hyper-connected world of tomorrow, it will become hard to imagine a 'computer crime', and perhaps any crime, that does not involve electronic evidence linked with internet protocol (IP) connectivity. 'Definitions' of cybercrime mostly depend upon the purpose of using the term. A limited number of acts against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data or systems represent the core of cybercrime. Beyond this, however, computer-related acts for personal or financial gain or harm, including forms of identity-related crime, and computer content-related acts (all of which fall within a wider meaning of the term 'cybercrime') do not lend themselves easily to efforts to arrive at legal definitions of the aggregate term. Certain definitions are required for the core of cybercrime acts. However, a 'definition' of cybercrime is not as relevant for other purposes, such as defining the scope of specialized investigative and international cooperation powers, which are better focused on electronic evidence for any crime, rather than a broad, artificial 'cybercrime' construct. In many countries, the explosion in global connectivity has come at a time of economic and demographic transformations, with rising income disparities, tightened private sector spending, and reduced financial liquidity. At the global level, law enforcement respondents to the study perceive increasing levels of cybercrime, as both individuals and organized criminal groups exploit new criminal opportunities, driven by profit and personal gain. Upwards of 80 percent of cybercrime acts are estimated to originate in some form of organized activity, with cybercrime black markets established on a cycle of malware creation, computer infection, botnet management, harvesting of personal and financial data, data sale, and 'cashing out' of financial information. Cybercrime perpetrators no longer require complex skills or techniques. In the developing country context in particular, subcultures of young men engaged in computer-related many of whom begin involvement in cybercrime in late teenage years. Globally, cybercrime acts show a broad distribution across financial-driven acts, and computer-content related acts, as well as acts against the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of computer systems. Perceptions of relative risk and threat vary, however, between Governments and private sector enterprises. Currently, police-recorded crime statistics do not represent a sound basis for cross-national comparisons, although such statistics are often important for policy making at the national level. Two-thirds of countries view their systems of police statistics as insufficient for recording cybercrime. Police-recorded cybercrime rates are associated with levels of country development and specialized police capacity, rather than underlying crime rates. Victimization surveys represent a more sound basis for comparison. These demonstrate that individual cybercrime victimization is significantly higher than for 'conventional' crime forms. Victimization rates for online credit card fraud, identity theft, responding to a phishing attempt, and experiencing unauthorized access to an email account, vary between 1 and 17 per cent of the online population for 21 countries across the world, compared with typical burglary, robbery and car theft rates of under 5 per cent for these same countries. Cybercrime victimization rates are higher in countries with lower levels of development, highlighting a need to strengthen prevention efforts in these countries. Private sector enterprises in Europe report similar victimization rates - between 2 and 16 per cent - for acts such as data breach due to intrusion or phishing. Criminal tools of choice for these crimes, such as botnets, have global reach. More than one million unique IP addresses globally functioned as botnet command and control servers in 2011. Internet content also represented a significant concern for Governments. Material targeted for removal includes child pornography and hate speech, but also content related to defamation and government criticism, raising human rights law concerns in some cases. Almost 24 per cent of total global internet traffic is estimated to infringe copyright, with downloads of shared peer-to-peer (P2P) material particularly high in countries in Africa, South America, and Western and South Asia. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 320p. Source: Internet Resource: Draft: Accessed November 7, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf Shelf Number: 131602 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime (International) Financial Crimes Internet Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Business, Corruption and Crime in the Western Balkans: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise Summary: This study offers a comprehensive assessment of corruption as experienced by businesses in the western Balkans, based on interviews with more than 12,700 companies. If not countered by strong preventive and law enforcement action, corruption and crime can act as a barrier to private and foreign investment as well as trade, and hinder economic development. By identifying areas of vulnerability, the study aims to support governments in the region to implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption and work effectively with the private sector to develop and put into action anti-corruption strategies and measures. In order to provide guidance for public interventions and evidence-based policymaking that support the rule of law and fair markets, it is necessary to go beyond perception-based and general indicators of corruption and measure the actual experience of corruption and crime. This survey, which follows UNODC's 2011 survey of bribery and other forms of corruption as experienced by private households in the western Balkans, seeks to provide this tool. Furthermore, building long-term capacity and promoting the sustainability of corruption monitoring instruments was an explicit goal of this undertaking. Quantitative monitoring of corruption and integrity - of the related vulnerabilities but also the successes achieved in fighting corruption - needs to be carried out regularly and consistently so that policy makers have the necessary information to implement and evaluate anti-corruption measures. A broad range of stakeholders in the western Balkans, ranging from anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement and criminal justice institutions to business organizations and chambers of commerce, were consulted during the preparatory phase of the survey. UNODC partnered with National Statistical Offices and other data producers, and involved national anti-corruption agencies, business organizations and others in the design of the survey as well as in the dissemination of the results, thereby helping to strengthen national capacities to produce evidence-based assessments of corruption and crime. The study demonstrates that measuring corruption affecting the business sector is both possible and useful. It is also an excellent example of the work carried out by UNODC to support Member States in areas related to our mandate and expertise. UNODC's Regional Programme for South Eastern Europe (2012-2015) was recently launched at the request of, and in close partnership with, the countries of the region, to provide concrete assistance in addressing the challenges identified and analysed through studies like this one. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Western_balkans_business_corruption_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Western_balkans_business_corruption_web.pdf Shelf Number: 131605 Keywords: Bribery Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption (Balkans)

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Statistics and Surveys Section Title: Business, Corruption and Crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise Summary: This survey of private businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina reveals that corruption and other forms of crime are a great hindrance to private enterprise and have a negative effect on private investment. A significant percentage of businesses pay bribes to public officials repeatedly over the course of the year. Businesses in the Building and Construction sector are those most affected by bribery, followed by businesses in the Transportation and Storage sector. The public officials with the highest risk of bribery in interactions with businesses are health authorities, police officers, customs officers and judges/prosecutors. While indicators of corruption perceptions are undoubtedly useful for raising awareness, this survey measures the actual experience of corruption and crime through representative sample surveys of businesses in order to provide a more realistic, evidence-based assessment of corruption and crime affecting the business sector. In so doing it focuses on the extent and pattern of bribery by businesses from five different sectors (accounting for 66.8 per cent of all businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina) in their frequent interactions with the public administration. According to the survey, of all the businesses that had contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the survey 10.4 per cent paid a bribe to a public official. The average prevalence of business bribery in Bosnia and Herzegovina is lower than the share of ordinary citizens (20.7 per cent) who experienced the same in UNODC's 2011 general population survey. The examination of the experience of businesses that pay bribes to public officials underlines the fact that corruption plays a role in the daily business of many companies. Bribe-paying businesses pay an average of 6.6 bribes per year, or about one bribe every eight weeks. The prevalence of bribery is substantially higher among small (10 to 49 employees) businesses than among businesses of other sizes. A substantial share of all the bribes paid to public officials by businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina are paid in cash (46.6 per cent), followed by the provision of food and drink (29 per cent) and the exchange of one "favour" for another (11.4 per cent). When bribes are paid in cash, the mean amount paid per bribe is 318 BAM, or the equivalent of 327 EUR-PPP. As for which party actually broaches the subject of kickbacks, in about 15.8 per cent of all bribery cases the payment of a bribe is offered by a representative of the business without a prior request being made, whereas in around over two thirds (70.2 per cent) of cases payment is either explicitly (26.8 per cent) or implicitly (20.4 per cent) requested by the public official. In a further 23 per cent of cases, bribes are paid after a third-party request. The most common purposes for paying bribes cited by businesses is to "speed up business-related procedures" (29.1 per cent of all bribes), "making the finalization of a procedure possible" (17.4 per cent) and "receiving better treatment" (14.4 per cent). At the same time, 8.6 per cent of bribes paid serve for no specific immediate purpose for the businesses paying them, suggesting that these are "sweeteners" given to public officials to "groom" them for future interactions in the interest of the company. As little as 6.6 per cent of bribes paid by businesses are reported to official authorities, mostly to the police, which suggests that businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina often feel obliged to participate in bribery. This is also reflected in the main reasons cited for not reporting bribery: "pointless to report it as nobody would care" (44.1 per cent), "giving gifts to public officials is common practice" (17.3 per cent) and "lack of knowledge of where to report" (15.5 per cent). Bribery in the private sector not only comprises bribes paid by businesses to public officials, it also takes place between businesses themselves in order to secure business transactions. Though lower than the prevalence of bribery between the private and public sector, at 1.7 per cent the prevalence of business-to-business bribery indicates that the practice does exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This type of corruption is not to be confused with normal marketing or public relations activities, in that it specifically aims, through illegal means, to breach the integrity of the bribe-taker in exchange for a bribe. Some 5.5 per cent of business representatives decided not to make a major investment in the 12 months prior to the survey due to the fear of having to pay bribes to obtain requisite services or permits, thus the impact of bribery on business activity can be substantial. The consequences of other more conventional crimes on a business's property and economic activities can also be considerable, both in terms of direct costs stemming from physical damage and indirect costs in the form of insurance premiums, security expenditure and lost investment opportunities. For instance, around 7.1 per cent of businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina fell victim to fraud by outsiders and such businesses were victimized an average of 3 times in that time period. Annual prevalence rates for burglary (5.8 per cent) and vandalism (2.5 per cent) in the private sector are also significant, as are the average number of times businesses affected fall victim to those crimes (1.8 and 1.4, respectively). Moreover, over the past 12 months some 0.7 per cent of all businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina fell victim to extortion, a crime that can be linked to organized criminal groups. In marked contrast to corruption, a larger share of conventional In marked contrast to corruption, a larger share of conventional crimes (on average, 65.1 per cent for five crime types) is reported to the police by businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the majority of business representatives (64.7 per cent) consider that the crime risk for their company has remained stable in comparison to the previous 12 months, more than one in ten (11.5 per cent) think it is on the increase and 15.7 per cent on the decrease. The fear of crime plays a very important role in the decision-making process of business leaders when it comes to making major investments. Although there are some differences by economic sector, on average 8.5 per cent of entrepreneurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina state that they did not make a major investment in the previous 12 months due to the fear of crime. Yet while seven out of ten (70.1 per cent) businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina use at least one protective security system against crime, only slightly more than a quarter (28.2 per cent) have any kind of insurance against the economic cost of crime. Together corruption and other forms of crime place a considerable burden on economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Putting in place more and better targeted measures for protecting businesses against crimes, as well as for preventing corruption (such as effective internal compliance measures and other policies concerning corruption) could make that burden considerably lighter. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 5, 2013 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/UNODC_BiH_Business_corruption_report_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/UNODC_BiH_Business_corruption_report_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 131750 Keywords: Bribery Bribes Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Public Corruption

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Statistics and Surveys Section Title: Business, Corruption and Crime in Kosovo: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise Summary: This survey of private businesses in Kosovo reveals that corruption and other forms of crime are a great hindrance to private enterprise and have a negative effect on private investment. A significant percentage of businesses pay bribes to public officials repeatedly over the course of the year. Businesses in the Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas, and Water supply sector are those most affected by bribery, followed by businesses in the Wholesale trade and Retail trade sector. The public officials with the highest risk of bribery in interactions with businesses are customs officers, officials in the tax/revenue administration and municipal or provincial officers. While indicators of corruption perceptions are undoubtedly useful for raising awareness, this survey measures the actual experience of corruption and crime through representative sample surveys of businesses in order to provide a more realistic, evidence-based assessment of corruption and crime affecting the business sector. In so doing it focuses on the extent and pattern of bribery by businesses from five different sectors (accounting for over 79.7 per cent of all businesses in Kosovo) in their frequent interactions with the public administration. According to the survey, of all the businesses that had contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the survey 3.2 per cent paid a bribe to a public official. The average prevalence of business bribery in Kosovo is lower than the share of ordinary Kosovar citizens (11.1 per cent) who experienced the same in UNODC's 2011 general population survey. The examination of the experience of businesses that pay bribes to public officials underlines the fact that corruption plays a role in the daily business of many companies. Bribe-paying businesses pay an average of 7.7 bribes per year, or about one bribe almost every seven weeks. The prevalence of bribery is substantially higher among medium and large (over 50 employees) businesses than among businesses of other sizes. A substantial share of all the bribes paid to public officials by businesses in Kosovo are paid in cash (59.2 per cent), followed by the provision of food and drink in exchange for an illicit "favour" by the public official (58.4 per cent) and other goods or advantages (12.1 per cent). When bribes are paid in cash, the mean amount paid per bribe is 844 Euro, or the equivalent of 1,787 EUR-PPP. As for which party actually broaches the subject of kickbacks, in about 38 per cent of all bribery cases the payment of a bribe is offered by a representative of the business without a prior request being made, whereas in around half (50.1 per cent) of cases payment is either explicitly (13.3 per cent) or implicitly (30.3 per cent) requested by the public official. In a further 6.5 per cent of cases, bribes are paid after a third-party request. The most common purposes for paying bribes cited by businesses is to "speed up business-related procedures" (28.4 per cent of all bribes), "receiving better treatment or information" (14.7 per cent) and "making the finalization of a procedure possible" (13.1 per cent). At the same time, almost a quarter (23.9 per cent) of bribes paid serve for no specific immediate purpose for the businesses paying them, suggesting that these are "sweeteners" given to public officials to "groom" them for future interactions in the interest of the company. As little as 3.7 per cent of bribes paid by businesses are reported to official authorities, mostly to the police, which suggests that businesses in Kosovo often feel obliged to participate in bribery. This is also reflected in the main reasons cited for not reporting bribery: "pointless to report it as nobody would care" (28.2 per cent), "fear of reprisal" (19.2 per cent) and "the payment or gift was given as a sign of gratitude" (19.4 per cent). Bribery in the private sector not only comprises bribes paid by businesses to public officials, it also takes place between businesses themselves in order to secure business transactions. Though lower than the prevalence of bribery between the private and public sector, at 0.6 per cent the prevalence of business-to-business bribery indicates that the practice does exist in Kosovo. This type of corruption is not to be confused with normal marketing or public relations activities, in that it specifically aims, through illegal means, to breach the integrity of the bribe-taker in exchange for a bribe. None of the businesses in the survey reported such business-to business bribery incidents to relevant authorities. Some 3.3 per cent of business representatives decided not to make a major investment in the 12 months prior to the survey due to the fear of having to pay bribes to obtain requisite services or permits, thus the impact of bribery on business activity can be substantial. The consequences of other more conventional crimes on a business's property and economic activities can also be considerable, both in terms of direct costs stemming from physical damage and indirect costs in the form of insurance premiums, security expenditure and lost investment opportunities. For instance, around one in ten businesses (10.1 per cent) in Kosovo fall victim to burglary in various different guises in a year and such businesses are victimized an average of 1.9 times in that time period. Annual prevalence rates for fraud (8 per cent) and vandalism (3.2 per cent) in the private sector are also significant, as are the average number of times businesses affected fall victim to those crimes (5.3 and 1.3, respectively). Moreover, over the past 12 months some 0.4 per cent of all businesses in Kosovo fell victim to extortion, a crime that can be linked to organized criminal groups. In marked contrast to corruption, a larger share of conventional crimes (on average, 59.3 per cent for five crime types) is reported to the police by businesses in Kosovo. While the majority of business representatives (70.5 per cent) consider that the crime risk for their company has remained stable in comparison to the previous 12 months, almost one in ten (9.8 per cent) think it is on the increase and 16.2 per cent on the decrease. The fear of crime plays a very important role in the decision-making process of business leaders when it comes to making major investments. Although there are some differences by economic sector, on average 9.1 per cent of entrepreneurs in Kosovo state that they did not make a major investment in the previous 12 months due to the fear of crime. Yet while about four fifths (80.4 per cent) of businesses in Kosovo use at least one protective security system against crime, only one third (33.5 per cent) have any kind of insurance against the economic cost of crime. Together corruption and other forms of crime place a considerable burden on economic development in Kosovo. Putting in place more and better targeted measures for protecting businesses against crimes, as well as for preventing corruption (such as effective internal compliance measures and other policies concerning corruption) could make that burden considerably lighter. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 5, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Kosovo_Business_corruption_report_EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Republic of Kosovo URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Kosovo_Business_corruption_report_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 131751 Keywords: Bribery Bribes Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Public Corruption

Author: Chilton, Bart Title: Ponzimonium: How Scam Artists are Ripping Off America Summary: In December of 2008, the world learned that legendary investment guru Bernard Madoff made-off with an estimated $50 billion in what was called the Mother of all Ponzi Schemes. Ponzi schemes, named after Charles Ponzi, are scams in which early investors are given sup-posed returns paid through funds provided by later investors. Typically, an investment is made and then some profits are paid out, prompting the investor to assume that his or her money has increased in value. In actuality, the perpetrators of these schemesPonzi, Madoff, or the others described in this booktake the money for themselves. The legal term for this kind of taking is misappropriation. As new investors enter the fraud, supposed returns are offered continually to initial investors, and many times are accompanied by fake account statements. This continues until new money stops flowing in and the investors want their money back. During the 2008 economic downturn, people needed their money back at the same time that there were no new investors. Many house of cards scams have fallen and the perpetrators of the swindles have been caught. Charles Ponzi ran these types of scams in the U.S. until he was deported to Italy, his birth-place, in 1934 as an undesirable alien. Many think that one would have to be foolish to invest in such a scam, but Madoff and other such folks are good at their craft. They often put on a great false front, even fooling the master of illusion, movie director Steven Spielberg. But Spielberg wasn't alone. Even banks we assume would undertake due diligence before funds were invested got caught in Madoff's web. Investors included Austrian, British, Dutch, Swiss, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish banks. Larry King and the owner of the New York Mets, Fred Wilpon, were duped, as was former LA Dodgers pitcher, Sandy Koufax. Actors Kevin Bacon, Kyra Sedgwick, John Malkovich, and Zsa Zsa Gabor, as well as New York University and New York Law School, a union's health care fund, several trusts, endowments, and non-profits such as the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity made the widely publicized victims list. Even the International Olympic Committee wasn't immune from the Madoff scam. While this may have been the largest swindle ever, scores and scores of Ponzis of all sizes and values continue to be unearthed. There have never been more of these scams, and they are occurring all over the world. That's why this publication is called Ponzimonium. The cases described here are just as damaging to the victims as the Madoff scam, and many of them are every bit as complicated and seemingly authentic. Meanwhile, Madoff traded his Manhattan penthouse for a jail cell for the next 150 years, but the damage he did to those he took advantage of cannot be repaired. Their story and others provide an instructive window into how these schemes operate and how to avoid becoming a Ponzi scheme victim. Details: Washington, DC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2011. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2014 at: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/sites/default/files/files/Ebooks/Ponzimonium_PDF.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/sites/default/files/files/Ebooks/Ponzimonium_PDF.pdf Shelf Number: 131862 Keywords: Financial Crimes Fraud Ponzi Schemes Scams

Author: International Monetary Fund Title: Panama: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Summary: This assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime of Panama is based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and was prepared using the updated AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004. The assessment team considered all the materials supplied by the authorities, the information obtained on-site during their mission from October 15-29, 2012, and other verifiable information subsequently provided by the authorities. During the mission, the assessment team met with officials and representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector. A list of the agencies and entities met is set out in Annex 1 to the detailed assessment report. This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Panama at the time of the mission. It describes and analyzes those measures, sets out Panama's levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations and provides recommendations on how certain aspects of the system could be strengthened. Details: Washington, DC: IMF, 2014. 348p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1454.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Panama URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1454.pdf Shelf Number: 132120 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: Holtfreter, Kristy Title: Final Report: Financial Exploitation of the Elderly in a Consumer Context Summary: National studies document that financial exploitation (e.g., fraud victimization) of elderly consumers has become an increasingly prominent problem, one likely to assume greater urgency as larger proportions of Americans enter the ranks of the elderly. Indeed, all 50 states have enacted elder abuse statutes, many of which focus on addressing financial exploitation of the elderly. Yet, remarkably little is known about the (1) true prevalence of elderly fraud victimization, save that it appears to be greatly underreported, (2) the risk and protective factors, other than physical limitations, associated with such victimization, or (3) what is effective in reducing it. These significant gaps make it difficult to develop effective policies. Which types of frauds are most common, and what are risk factors should be targeted in reducing them? Compared to the national average, the population of citizens age 60 and older is significantly higher in the states of Arizona and Florida. These population characteristics, coupled with current crime prevention efforts by both states' Attorneys General, point to a unique opportunity to shed light on financial exploitation and, more pointedly, to provide guidance to these and other states on how they might best focus their efforts to reduce such victimization. To this end, we propose a timely and cost-effective, multi-method study to address these important research and policy gaps. The study's goals are to provide policymakers, practitioners, and researchers with a greater, empirically-based understanding of the distribution and causes of, as well as solutions to financial exploitation of the elderly in a consumer context. The objectives are: (1) To determine the nature, incidence, and prevalence of fraud victimization among elderly consumers in Arizona and Florida; (2) To identify risk and protective factors associated with fraud victimization in this population; and (3) To evaluate the effectiveness of service providers, including assessment of the elderly population's awareness of state based programs, barriers to and facilitators of program use, and impacts on victimization. This 2-year study includes a telephone survey of 1,000 Arizonians and 1,000 Floridians over the age of 60, as well as interviews with elder service providers. We will examine (1) indicators of the nature and prevalence of financial exploitation, including identification of the victim offender relationship and dollar amount lost; (2) risk and protective factors (e.g., financial risk-taking, trust propensity, lifestyle characteristics, routine consumer activities, and personal characteristics); and (3) respondents� awareness and use of state Attorney General services, including assessment of potential barriers to and facilitators of program use, as well as reporting behavior to law enforcement and perceptions of law enforcement responsiveness. The research team will conduct descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate analyses. Particular emphasis will be given to identifying theoretically-informed variables that predict fraud victimization and reporting behavior. Regression analyses will allow us to identify risk and protective factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of fraud victimization and reporting. Data obtained from semi-structured interviews with service provider staff will help identify barriers to and facilitators of program success. Details: Final Report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2014. 186p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2014 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/245388.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/245388.pdf Shelf Number: 132217 Keywords: Consumer Fraud Elderly Victims Financial Crimes Financial Exploitation

Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Identity Crime and Misuse in Australia: Results of the 2013 Online Survey Summary: Identity crime and misuse of personal information affect all sectors in Australia and cost individuals, business and government many millions of dollars annually. In the public sector, the misuse of personal information has been recognised in income tax evasion, customs duty and GST fraud, superannuation fraud, obtaining welfare and health care benefit fraud achieved through the use of false names, immigration fraud and taking English language tests (a key requirement for visas) for someone else. In the private sector, the problem areas have been identified as opening bank accounts in false names to obtain finance, ATM fraud, online and mobile banking and payment card fraud, funds transfer fraud, and securities and investment fraud. In addition to these and other financial crime risks, misuse of identity can also arise in connection with violent crime, such as where individuals have sought to avoid detection and prosecution for murder, robbery and acts of terrorism by pretending to be someone else. In May 2013, in order to explore the nature and scope of identity crime and misuse in Australia, the Australian Institute of Criminology was commissioned by the Attorney-General's Department to undertake a national survey. This project is one of a series of initiatives that are being implemented as part of the National Identity Security Strategy, Australia's national response to enhancing identity security, which seeks to prevent identity crime and misuse, contribute to national security and facilitate the benefits of the digital economy. Subsequently, the Australian Institute of Criminology used an online research panel to generate a sample of 5,000 Australians aged 15 years and over to measure personal experiences of identity crime. The survey covered the number of contacts, responses and victimisation incidents experienced, as well as financial loss and other impacts, reporting and response activities, and victims' perceptions of changing levels of risk. Detailed demographic information was also collected that enabled profiles of victims to be created. This report presents the results of the survey. The findings confirm prior research that has found that identity crime affects a relatively high proportion of Australians who report substantial financial and other impacts. Raising awareness of the risks that individuals face, and gathering sound statistical data on the problem, is an effective way to address the problem. In order to monitor changes from year to year in the nature and extent of identity crime, it is proposed that this survey will be replicated on a regular basis. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2014. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series 128: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/128/rpp128.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/128/rpp128.pdf Shelf Number: 132240 Keywords: Computer Crimes Digital Crimes Financial Crimes Fraud Identity Theft

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Business, Corruption and Crime in Albania: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise Summary: This survey of private businesses in Albania reveals that corruption and other forms of crime are a great hindrance to private enterprise and have a negative effect on private investment. A significant percentage of businesses pay bribes to public officials repeatedly over the course of the year. Businesses in the Accommodation and Transportation sectors are those most affected by bribery, followed by businesses in the Construction sector. The public officials with the highest risk of bribery in interactions with businesses are police officers, customs officers, tax/revenues officers, municipal or provincial officers and land registry officers. While indicators of corruption perceptions are undoubtedly useful for raising awareness, this survey measures the actual experience of corruption and crime through representative sample surveys of businesses in order to provide a more realistic, evidence-based assessment of corruption and crime affecting the business sector. In so doing it focuses on the extent and pattern of bribery by businesses from five different sectors (accounting for over 83.5 per cent of all businesses in Albania) in their frequent interactions with the public administration. According to the survey, of all the businesses that had contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the survey 15.7 per cent paid a bribe to a public official. The average prevalence of business bribery in Albania is slightly lower than the share of ordinary citizens (19.3 per cent) who experienced the same in UNODC's 2011 general population survey. The examination of the experience of businesses that pay bribes to public officials underlines the fact that corruption plays a role in the daily business of many companies. Bribe-paying businesses pay an average of 4.6 bribes per year, or about one bribe every eleven weeks. The prevalence of bribery is higher among small (10 to 49 employees) businesses than among businesses of other sizes. Half of all the bribes paid to public officials by businesses in Albania are paid in cash (50 per cent), followed by the giving of food and drink (24.4 per cent) in exchange for an illicit "favour" by the public official and the provision of other goods not produced by the company (22.8 per cent). When bribes are paid in cash, the mean amount paid per bribe is 53,000 Lek, or the equivalent of 904 EUR-PPP. As for which party actually broaches the subject of kickbacks, in 22.7 per cent of all bribery cases the payment of a bribe is offered by a representative of the business without a prior request being made, whereas in almost two thirds (63.6 per cent) of cases payment is either explicitly (17.1 per cent) or implicitly (38.2 per cent) requested by the public official or paid after a third-party request (8.3 per cent). The most common purposes for paying bribes cited by businesses is to "speed up business-related procedures" (39.1 per cent of all bribes), "making the finalization of a procedure possible" (16.8 per cent), "receiving better treatment" (7.2 per cent), "reducing the cost of a procedure" (6.6 per cent) and "receiving information" (2.8 per cent). At the same time, almost one out of seven (13.5 per cent) bribes paid serve no specific immediate purpose for the businesses paying them, suggesting that these are "sweeteners" given to public officials to "groom" them for future interactions in the interest of the company. Only 2.2 per cent of the businesses who paid bribes had reported bribery incidents in the 12 months prior to the survey to official authorities in Albania, which suggests that businesses often feel obliged to participate in bribery. This is also reflected in the main reasons cited for not reporting bribery: "giving gifts to public officials is common practice" (36.2 per cent) and "it is pointless to report it as nobody would care" (23.6 per cent). Bribery in the private sector not only comprises bribes paid by businesses to public officials, it also takes place between businesses themselves in order to secure business transactions. Though lower than the prevalence of bribery between the private and public sector, at 3.7 per cent the prevalence of business-to-business bribery indicates that the practice does exist in Albania. This type of corruption is not to be confused with normal marketing or public relations activities, in that it specifically aims, through illegal means, to breach the integrity of the bribe-taker in exchange for a bribe. Less than 0.1 per cent of bribe-paying bribes in the survey reported such business-to business bribery incidents to relevant authorities. Some 3.3 per cent of business representatives decided not to make a major investment in the 12 months prior to the survey due to the fear of having to pay bribes to obtain requisite services or permits, thus the impact of bribery on business activity can be substantial. The consequences of other more conventional crimes on a business's property and economic activities can also be considerable, both in terms of direct costs stemming from physical damage and indirect costs in the form of insurance premiums, security expenditure and lost investment opportunities. For instance, 5.8 per cent of businesses in Albania fall victim to burglary in a year and such businesses are victimized an average of 1.9 times in that period. The annual prevalence rate for fraud by outsiders (4.8 per cent) in the private sector is also significant, as is the average number of times businesses affected fall victim to this crime (2.8). The prevalence rate of vandalism is 1.6 per cent, with businesses being victimized an average of 1.6 times a year. In addition, the prevalence rate of motor vehicle theft (MVT) is 0.5 per cent of all car owning businesses, with victims suffering an average of 1.6 incidents. Moreover, over the past 12 months 0.5 per cent of all businesses in Albania fell victim to extortion, a crime that can be linked to organized criminal groups. In marked contrast to corruption, a larger share of conventional crimes (on average, 49.3 per cent for five crime types) is reported to the police by businesses in Albania. While the majority of business representatives (67.7 per cent) consider that the crime risk for their company has remained stable in comparison to the previous 12 months, around one in twelve (8.6 per cent) think it is on the increase and 19.5 per cent on the decrease. The fear of crime plays an important role in the decision-making process of business leaders when it comes to making major investments. Although there are some differences by economic sector, on average 4.4 per cent of the entrepreneurs in Albania state that they did not make a major investment in the previous 12 months due to the fear of crime. Yet while about 88.8 per cent of businesses in Albania use at least one protective security system against crime, only 18.5 per cent have any kind of insurance against the economic cost of crime. Together corruption and other forms of crime place a considerable burden on economic development in Albania. Putting in place more and better targeted measures for protecting businesses against crimes, as well as for preventing corruption (such as effective internal compliance measures and other policies concerning corruption) could make that burden considerably lighter. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2014. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2014 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Albania_Business_Corruption_2013_EN.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Albania URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Albania_Business_Corruption_2013_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 132258 Keywords: Bribes Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Fraud Motor Vehicle Theft Public Corruption

Author: Schell-Busey, Natalie Marie Title: The Deterrent Effects of Ethics Codes for Corporate Crime: A Meta-Analysis Summary: The current financial crisis, brought on in part by the risky and unethical behaviors of investment banks, has drawn attention to corporate crime, particularly on the issue of how to prevent it. Over the last thirty years, codes of conduct have been a cornerstone of corporate crime prevention policies, and consequently are now widespread, especially among large companies. However, the empirical literature is mixed on the effectiveness of codes, leaving them open to critics who charge that codes can be costly to implement, ineffective, and even criminogenic. In this dissertation I use meta-analysis to examine the evidence regarding the preventative effects of ethics codes for corporate crime. The results show that codes and elements of their support system, like enforcement and top management support, have a positive, significant effect on ethical-decision making and behavior. Based on these results, I propose an integrated approach toward self-regulation founded on Braithwaite's (2002) enforcement pyramid, which specifies that regulation should primarily be built around persuasion with sanctions reserved for situations where a stronger deterrent is needed. Details: College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2009. 164p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 15, 2014 at: http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/9289/1/SchellBusey_umd_0117E_10313.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/9289/1/SchellBusey_umd_0117E_10313.pdf Shelf Number: 132364 Keywords: Corporate Crime Ethics Financial Crimes White Collar Crime White Collar Offenses

Author: Minnesota. Department of Public Safety, Office of Justice Programs Title: Financial Crime and Identity Theft: Law Enforcement Response, Challenges and Resource Needs. Report of Minnesota Law Enforcement Identity Theft Survey Summary: In August and September of 2013 the Minnesota Department of Public Safety Office of Justice Programs sent an on-line survey to all 87 county sheriffs and to 317 municipal police departments. Respondents were asked to complete an online survey about their departmental characteristics, experiences with financial crimes and identity theft, victim assistance, and training needs. A total of 35 sheriffs completed surveys, as did 156 municipal police departments. A total of 384 emails were delivered for a 50 percent response rate. Data were imported into a statistical analysis program and analyzed. Overall results from the survey are presented graphically. Analysis was also completed to see if there were any significant differences based on geography (urban vs. Greater Minnesota) or law enforcement type (municipal police departments vs. sheriffs' offices). Any statistically significant differences are discussed in text boxes throughout the report. Details: St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Department of Public Safety, 2013. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2014 at: https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/forms-documents/Documents/Financial%20Crime%20and%20Identity%20Theft%20Report%20Final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/forms-documents/Documents/Financial%20Crime%20and%20Identity%20Theft%20Report%20Final.pdf Shelf Number: 132388 Keywords: Crime Statistics Financial Crimes Identity Theft

Author: Baker, Raymond Title: Hiding in Plain Sight: Trade Misinvoicing and the Impact of Revenue Loss in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda: 2002-2011 Summary: Illicit flows of capital through developing countries due to trade misinvoicing is one of the most pressing challenges facing policymakers in these countries. The global figure for illicit financial outflows from developing countries is approximately $542 billion per year on average (over a 10-year time series), and trade misinvoicing makes up close to 80 percent of this or $424 billion. Capital flight, facilitated by a global network of secrecy jurisdictions and complex, opaque corporate and account structures, robs governments and societies of needed revenue for domestic investment in the private sector, infrastructure development, and the provision of vital social services. This translates into lost opportunities, lost jobs, and lost potential. This study explores the economic and the policy side of the issue of trade misinvoicing using case studies of Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. Data on illicit flows for these five countries demonstrate the varying magnitudes, sources, and consequences of trade misinvoicing at the country level and provide hope and warning to other developing countries. We find that trade misinvoicing is a significant source of illicit outflows and inflows of capital in each country, resulting in billions of dollars of lost investment and hundreds of millions of dollars in unrealized domestic resource mobilization. The sources of trade misinvoicing varied across the cases, as did the policy environment in which this misinvoicing occurs. However, we also find significant facets of this issue that apply to all the countries, particularly with regards to customs invoice review procedures and access to on-the-spot information. These challenges represent opportunities for the five countries to improve their economic systems and accountability mechanisms through greater transparency. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2014. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Hiding_In_Plain_Sight_Report-Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Hiding_In_Plain_Sight_Report-Final.pdf Shelf Number: 132540 Keywords: Corporate Crime Corrupt Practices Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Title: Targeting Scams: Report of the ACCC on Scams Activity 2013 Summary: This report explains key trends in scam activity and highlights the impact of scams on the community. It highlights the cooperative work of the ACCC, other regulators and law enforcement agencies to disrupt scams and educate consumers. Overall contacts levels and financial losses - In 2013 the ACCC continued to observe a high level of scams activity in Australia, with 91 927 scam-related contacts received from consumers and small businesses, an increase of nearly 10 per cent over 2012. - Estimated scam losses reported to the ACCC totalled $89 136 975, representing an almost 5 per cent decrease from 2012 ($93 423 030) - a reversal in trend from 2011 and 2012 where large increases were observed. However, actual losses are likely to be higher as many scams go unreported and the ACCC is only one of several agencies that receive scam reports. Most reported scams - In 2013 dating and romance scams moved to number one position in terms of financial losses, with $25 247 418 reported lost. For the third consecutive year the ACCC has observed a decrease in the conversion rate of people who responded to an approach by a scam admirer and subsequently lost money - from 48 per cent in 2011 to 46 per cent in 2012 to 43 per cent in 2013. However, financial losses continue to remain substantially disproportionate to contacts, with dating and romance scams making up only 3 per cent of all scam-related contacts in 2013. - Similar to previous years, the majority of people contacting the ACCC about scam-related activities in 2013 (slightly over 86 per cent) reported no financial loss. Nearly one third of people who lost money reported losing between $100 and $499, which indicates scammers continuing to prefer 'high volume scams' - that is, scams that are delivered to large numbers of recipients but cause smaller amounts of loss per victim. - At the same time, the ACCC continued to receive reports of individuals suffering significant losses. Over 10 per cent of scam contacts reported losing above $10 000. However, there were only two reports of losses above $1 million in 2013 compared to six reports in 2012. - In 2013 the top 10 scams reported to the ACCC in terms of contact levels remained the same with some minor movements in ranking. The three most commonly reported scams were advance-fee fraud, phishing and identity theft, and computer hacking scams. - The ACCC observed a significant increase in phishing and identity theft scams, with reports increasing by over 73 per cent from 2012 to 15 264 contacts. Actual financial losses remained low, suggesting that scammers are instead seeking personal information for later gain. - Computer prediction software scams saw a significant increase in both contacts and financial losses from the previous year, with an increase of 41 per cent in contact levels and associated losses more than doubling to a total of $9 144 288. This increase is likely attributable to a collapsed gambling system in Victoria, which received widespread media coverage. Age range and location demographics - In 2013, of all individuals who contacted the ACCC and provided their age, scams were most commonly reported by persons in the 45 to 54 age category. The percentage of reports from people who identified as 65 years and over nearly doubled to 18 per cent. - The greatest amount of scam reports came from New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Contact levels and associated losses were largely consistent with the percentage of the Australian population by state and territory. - At the end of 2013 the ACCC updated its data collection process and in 2014 will be able to analyse scam categories against new fields such as a victim's gender, whether they are a small business, or may be disadvantaged or vulnerable. Scam delivery method - In line with a shift in recent years, in 2013 over half (52 per cent) of scams were delivered via phone and text message, with combined total financial losses of $29 391 887. Telephone calls remained the most popular delivery method, with reports and losses rising in parallel by nearly 13 and 14 per cent respectively, and losses totalling $3 335 763. Scams delivered by text message decreased by around 35 per cent, while reported losses more than doubled to $1 848 805. - Despite representing a lower percentage of contacts (40 per cent), scams delivered online caused the greatest financial harm with associated losses totalling $41 781 071. While contacts of reports delivered via email increased by nearly 14 per cent, financial losses almost halved (49 per cent), which could indicate scammers using email to 'fish' for personal information but turning to other online communication platforms such as social networking sites for monetary gain. The ACCC's education and awareness raising activities - The ACCC continued to educate the public about how to identify and avoid scams, and raise community awareness about current scams targeting Australians. SCAMwatch, the Australian Government's website for information about scams that is run by the ACCC, received 1 228 599 unique visitors in 2013, an increase of over 26 per cent from the previous year. - The ACCC also continued to issue SCAMwatch radar alerts to its free subscription base, which in 2013 increased by 30 per cent to reach 29 150 subscribers. A total of 18 SCAMwatch alerts were issued warning about current scams, including joint radars issued with other government agencies and companies about scammers misusing consumer trust in these well-known entities. - The ACCC's SCAMwatch_gov Twitter profile also continued to communicate with its 4374 followers in real time as scams emerged, with 583 tweets posted during the year. - The 2013 National Consumer Fraud Week campaign, 'Outsmart the scammers!' (17-23 June), received significant media coverage as the ACCC and the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce urged people to stay one click ahead of scammers when shopping online. - The Little Black Book of Scams is the ACCC's most popular publication and 91 203 copies were distributed in 2013. A new small business scams factsheet was also produced. The ACCC's collaboration, disruption and enforcement activities - In 2013 the ACCC worked with a range of private and public sector representatives to disrupt scams including online shopping scams and the 'Yellow Pages' small business scam. - The ACCC continued to chair the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce, and hosted a conference and workshop as part of National Consumer Fraud Week where representatives across government, industry and academia explored how to minimise scams activity in the digital economy. - The ACCC successfully prosecuted the perpetrators behind schemes targeting small businesses including the operators of a pyramid selling scheme, an online business directory scam with a philanthropic slant, and an office supply scheme. - The ACCC also commenced planning for a national disruption project aimed at relationship scams, which is a 2014 compliance and enforcement priority. The ACCC will work closely with other agencies on this project, building upon previous work undertaken to disrupt relationship scams. Details: Canberra: ACCC, 2014. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Targeting%20Scams%202013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 132658 Keywords: Consumer Protection and Fraud Crimes Against Business Financial Crimes Fraud Scams

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Financial flows linked to the production and trafficking of Afghan opiates Summary: 1. Drug trafficking is a business, but our understanding of this enterprise and response to it remain limited - less than 0.5% of the total laundered funds are seized. 2. In 2011, the annual volume of the global opiate market was estimated at USD 68 billion (with around USD 60 billion from Afghan opiates). However, no widely agreed method or framework currently exists to map "the business model". Although a number of business modelling methodologies appear to have been created by academics, multilateral bodies and private organisations, the survey responses suggest that it remains unclear if these methodologies have been practically incorporated into law enforcement and FIU's intelligence collection plans and disruption strategies. 3. Terrorists profit from and are engaged in opiate trafficking - over half the Afghan Taliban Senior Leadership listed under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1988 are involved in drug trafficking. 4. The UN Al Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team assesses that opiate-financing will imminently be the leading source of income for the Afghan Taliban and thus enable a major threat to the national security of Afghanistan and wider regional stability. 5. International opiate traffickers rely on the services of financial professionals, either unwitting or complicit, to manage their assets but no global system exists to alert countries or the private sector of these individuals and entities, or to freeze the assets of opiate traffickers. 6. At most stages in the enterprise, opiates and associated financial flows do not follow the same routes. 7. The Afghan opiate business is believed to be a mixture of both cartels and multiple markets. There appears to be no single or small group of cartels that control the global opiate trade; but some groups control significant portions of the trade along various routes. However, detailed and reliable information regarding this issue remains limited and this can be considered a key information gap. 8. Between 50-90% of all financial transactions in Afghanistan are conducted via money or value transfer services (MVTS). Illicit use of MVTS appears to be a critical capability for opiate trafficking networks, not only in Afghanistan but also internationally. 9. The majority of illicit funds are likely moved through, and possibly stored in, financial centres. As the region's leading financial centre, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) financial system appears to be particularly vulnerable to abuse by opiate traffickers, regionally and internationally. 10. Cash, commodity-transfer and MVTS appear to be the leading value transfer instruments at the cultivation and manufacture stages of the enterprise; the formal financial system, MVTS and high-value commodities appear to facilitate international distribution of opiates. 11. Apart from cash, new payment methods (including virtual currencies) are used at consumer and international distribution stages of the Afghan opiate enterprise, albeit less than the above methods but may pose significant challenges to regulators, financial intelligence units (FIUs) and law enforcement agencies. 12. Many similarities exist between financing methodologies of different illicit drugs. Opiate-specific and more generic red flag indicators have been identified and collated. 13. This project was conducted in parallel with the Paris Pact (UNODC) Illicit Financial Flows analysis. The ML/TF threats from illicit groups, vulnerabilities in AML/CFT systems and opportunities identified herein are being used for immediate technical assistance delivery within the framework of the UNODC's current activities. Details: Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2014. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2014 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financial-flows-linked-to-production-and-trafficking-of-afghan-opiates.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financial-flows-linked-to-production-and-trafficking-of-afghan-opiates.pdf Shelf Number: 132781 Keywords: Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Heroin Illicit Drugs Money Laundering

Author: Riccardi, Michele Title: The Identification of Beneficial Owners in the Fight Against Money Laundering Summary: While a proposal for a Fourth EU Anti Money Laundering Directive is being adopted by the EU Commission, lack of data on the ownership structure of EU companies still represents a serious obstacle for the fight against the misuse of corporate entities for financial crime purposes. In order to address this problem, the research project BOWNET (www.bownet.eu), funded by EU Commission, DG Home Affairs, and carried out by an International consortium coordinated by Universit� Cattolica del Sacro Cuore � Transcrime (www.transcrime.it) has:  Understood what information is used by EU competent authorities and intermediaries in investigations as regards the ownership structure of suspicious companies;  Identified their main problems and needs ;  Identified the level of availability of data on the ownership structure of EU companies;  Explored where are these data stored, how they can be accessed, at which cost and in which data format;  Suggested a range of EU policy and regulatory initiatives that could be taken to improve the access to company ownership information;  Suggested a range of IT tools that could ease the identification of beneficial owners of suspicious corporate entities; For doing so, the project has performed surveys on EU Law enforcement agencies, Financial Intelligence Units, financial and non-financial intermediaries; a review of software used in the anti-money laundering (AML) field; a comprehensive analysis of the public business registers of the 27 EU member states; a comprehensive analysis of other 150 public and commercial providers of data on the ownership structure of EU companies. Details: Milan, IT: Transcrime, 2013. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2014 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/BOWNET3.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/BOWNET3.pdf Shelf Number: 132815 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Grant Thornton Title: Illicit Trade in Ireland: Uncovering the cost to the Irish economy Summary: Although frequently thought of as a victimless crime, illicit trade has a significant impact on the Irish economy. The objective of this report is to provide a detailed assessment of illicit trade in Ireland across a select number of sectors, namely fuel, tobacco, digital media and pharmaceuticals. With regard to each of these sectors, the report seeks to understand the impacts, identify key drivers behind these illicit trades, and where possible, quantifies the losses to the economy. Ultimately this report proposes an integrated approach to tackling the problem of illicit trade in Ireland. What is illicit trade? The most common definition of illicit trade is that used by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which covers many different areas that go beyond the scope of this report. These include money laundering, cash transaction, human trafficking and the trade in illegal drugs. Within the context of this report, the term "illicit trade" is more narrowly defined as: - Intellectual Property Crime (IPC); - Contraband; and - Illegal manufacturing. Importance of intellectual property It is widely accepted that the recognition of Intellectual Property ("IP") plays a vital role in promoting innovation and stimulating the economy in order to foster growth. Therefore, it is vital that appropriate legal recognition, public policies and enforcement is in place to ensure that IP and brands are protected. Illicit Trade in Ireland Despite the importance of IP rights and an increased emphasis on IP protection, significant levels of illicit trade remain in operation throughout the Irish economy. Illicit Trade in Ireland is not confined to a single industry but is present in a broad spectrum of activity across the Irish economy. The scale and scope of illicit trade in Ireland has resulted in significant losses to the Irish economy. The losses suffered include a number of important stakeholders such as right holders, retailers, consumers, the Government and the wider economy. Whilst almost every area of the general economy is subject to losses as a result of illicit trade, this report has narrowed its focus to a number of core areas which are having the most detrimental effect on the Irish economy. To address any problem, the first step should be to understand the problem and in this report we have attempted to do just this. The estimates that we have provided in this report show that illicit trade could be costing right holders as much as L547m per annum and the Irish Exchequer as much as L937m per annum. Details: Dublin: Retail Ireland, 2013. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2014 at: http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/jobsenterpriseandinnovation/Illicit-Trade-in-Ireland-report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Ireland URL: http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/jobsenterpriseandinnovation/Illicit-Trade-in-Ireland-report.pdf Shelf Number: 133069 Keywords: Contraband Costs of Crime Crime Against Businesses Financial Crimes Illegal Manufacturing Illicit Trade Intellectual Property Theft Money Laundering Organized Crime (Ireland) Retail Crime

Author: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Title: Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2014 Global Fraud Study Summary: Summary of Findings -Survey participants estimated that the typical organization loses 5% of revenues each year to fraud. If applied to the 2013 estimated Gross World Product, this translates to a potential projected global fraud loss of nearly $3.7 trillion. -The median loss caused by the frauds in our study was $145,000. Additionally, 22% of the cases involved losses of at least $1 million. -The median duration - the amount of time from when the fraud commenced until it was detected - for the fraud cases reported to us was 18 months. -Occupational frauds can be classified into three primary categories: asset misappropriations, corruption and financial statement fraud. Of these, asset misappropriations are the most common, occurring in 85% of the cases in our study, as well as the least costly, causing a median loss of $130,000. In contrast, only 9% of cases involved financial statement fraud, but those cases had the greatest financial impact, with a median loss of $1 million. Corruption schemes fell in the middle in terms of both frequency (37% of cases) and median loss ($200,000). -Many cases involve more than one category of occupational fraud. Approximately 30% of the schemes in our study included two or more of the three primary forms of occupational fraud. -Tips are consistently and by far the most common detection method. Over 40% of all cases were detected by a tip - more than twice the rate of any other detection method. Employees accounted for nearly half of all tips that led to the discovery of fraud. -Organizations with hotlines were much more likely to catch fraud by a tip, which our data shows is the most effective way to detect fraud. These organizations also experienced frauds that were 41% less costly, and they detected frauds 50% more quickly. -The smallest organizations tend to suffer disproportionately large losses due to occupational fraud. Additionally, the specific fraud risks faced by small businesses differ from those faced by larger organizations, with certain categories of fraud being much more prominent at small entities than at their larger counterparts. -The banking and financial services, government and public administration, and manufacturing industries continue to have the greatest number of cases reported in our research, while the mining, real estate, and oil and gas industries had the largest reported median losses. -The presence of anti-fraud controls is associated with reduced fraud losses and shorter fraud duration. Fraud schemes that occurred at victim organizations that had implemented any of several common anti-fraud controls were significantly less costly and were detected much more quickly than frauds at organizations lacking these controls. -The higher the perpetrator's level of authority, the greater fraud losses tend to be. Owners/executives only accounted for 19% of all cases, but they caused a median loss of $500,000. Employees, conversely, committed 42% of occupational frauds but only caused a median loss of $75,000. Managers ranked in the middle, committing 36% of frauds with a median loss of $130,000. -Collusion helps employees evade independent checks and other anti-fraud controls, enabling them to steal larger amounts. The median loss in a fraud committed by a single person was $80,000, but as the number of perpetrators increased, losses rose dramatically. In cases with two perpetrators the median loss was $200,000, for three perpetrators it was $355,000 and when four or more perpetrators were involved the median loss exceeded $500,000. -Approximately 77% of the frauds in our study were committed by individuals working in one of seven departments: accounting, operations, sales, executive/upper management, customer service, purchasing and finance. -It takes time and effort to recover the money stolen by perpetrators, and many organizations are never able to fully do so. At the time of our survey, 58% of the victim organizations had not recovered any of their losses due to fraud, and only 14% had made a full recovery. Details: Austin, TX: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2014 at: http://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf Shelf Number: 133182 Keywords: Costs of Crime Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Occupational Fraud White Collar Crimes

Author: Gray, Larissa Title: Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery Summary: Corruption has a devastating impact on developing and transition countries, with estimates of $20 billion to $40 billion per year stolen by public officials, a figure equivalent to 20 to 40 percent of official development assistance flows. The return of the proceeds of corruption - asset recovery - can have a significant development impact. Returns can be used directly for development purposes, such as improvements in the health and education sectors and reintegration of displaced persons, with additional benefits of improved international cooperation and enhanced capacity of law enforcement and financial management officials. This StAR-OECD publication reports on how OECD countries are performing on asset recovery. Drawing on data collected between 2006 and 2012, the report provides recommendations and good practices and suggests specific actions for development agencies. Few and Far is primarily intended to support the anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts of developed and developing jurisdictions, with a particular focus on actions for development agencies. In addition, civil society organizations engaged in governance and development issues may wish to use these findings and recommendations in their reports and advocacy efforts. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/few_and_far_the_hard_facts_on_stolen_asset_recovery.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/few_and_far_the_hard_facts_on_stolen_asset_recovery.pdf Shelf Number: 133288 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Stolen Assets White-Collar Crimes

Author: Cohen, Mark A. Title: Willingness to Pay to Reduce White Collar and Corporate Crime Summary: Consumer protection and financial regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) regulate various types of consumer, investor and financial frauds. Whether required or not, rulemaking proceedings oftentimes include some form of cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the benefits of proposed regulations - whether fully quantified or not - are an increasingly important component of rulemaking decisions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the impact on victims in some cases include significant time and financial hardships and even pain, suffering and reduced quality of life. Further, the existence of these offenses causes non-victims to take costly precautionary behavior and might even inhibit legitimate business activities. Yet, little is known about the true costs of consumer and financial crimes other than the out-of-pocket monetary losses incurred by victims. To the extent society wishes to optimally deter such crimes, without better data on nonmonetary costs, any cost-benefit analyses of criminal justice or prevention programs designed to reduce these crimes will inevitably underestimate program benefits. This paper provides an initial framework and empirical estimates of the willingness-to-pay to reduce four types of white collar and corporate offenses - consumer fraud, financial fraud, corporate crime and corporate financial crime. Utilizing a contingent valuation survey approached that has been used to estimate the cost of street crimes, the average willingness to pay for a 10% reduction in each of these four offenses is estimated to range between $70 and $75 per household. In the case of consumer fraud and financial fraud - where estimates of prevalence are available, this translates into a willingness to pay of $2,700 per consumer fraud and $21,000 for financial fraud. In contrast, the out-of-pocket costs to victims of consumer fraud have been estimated to average about $100, and about $200 to $250 for various types of financial frauds. These figures also compare favorably to the willingness to pay for a reduced household burglary of $18,000. Details: Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Law School; Resources for the Future: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486220 Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486220 Shelf Number: 133299 Keywords: Consumer Fraud (U.S.) Consumer Protection Corporate Crime Financial Crimes Financial Fraud White-Collar Crime

Author: Banfield, Jessie Title: Crime and Conflict: The new challenge for peacebuilding Summary: This report is offered as a contribution to the growing effort to understand the nexus between organised crime, armed violence and fragility, and to design effective responses. At the heart of the document is the hypothesis that an application of the approaches and overall lens of peacebuilding can enrich broader efforts to reduce and transform contemporary armed violence and fragility linked to organised crime. This approach has not been widely tested in practice, but when it has the results are promising. Over the course of the 20th century, a major period of inter-state warfare and wars of decolonisation gave way to an era of predominantly civil conflicts. The last decade points to further shifts, with far fewer civil wars now recorded worldwide. In their wake, observers seem to agree that conflict is again changing, but a common narrative as to the dominant direction of these changes, and hence the contours of the global peace and security agenda, has yet to gel. However, one major factor correlated to current changing forms of armed violence is now known to be the effect of new patterns, as well as increased scope and scale, both of organised crime and shadow economies operating at national and sub-national levels. Overlapping and blurred categorisations of a raft of non-state armed groups are often strung together in attempts to describe the complexities involved. We can identify three broad dimensions to organised crime and its relationship to armed violence and fragility that can help us hone in on the key problems to be tackled. First, its connection to power holders and political interests poses challenges to governance and statebuilding approaches where the state itself is complicit. Second, attention to the incentives that pull and/or push individuals into crime helps us to identify broad-based response strategies. Third, globalized market structures in key crime commodities, such as illegal drugs, point to the need to look inwards as much as outwards in their response in countries where high demand sustains the financial flows and profits of organised crime. This paints a complex picture. Given this complexity, the degree of consensus on the limitations of current approaches to the problem is perhaps not surprising. For example: - There is widespread recognition that notions of sovereignty can protect state officials complicit in organised crime; - The emphasis on locking up criminals as a major component of the global response to the problem may actually exacerbate violence in some cases; - Little headway has been made in reducing the receptivity of fragile contexts to criminal enterprise; and - Peacebuilding interventions have yet to adequately frame the issue of organised crime within overall responses to conflict and violence. Organised crime has hitherto been treated primarily as a law and order problem. The shift away from an exclusive focus on law enforcement has begun, but it is very recent. Nevertheless, attention to the relationship between organised crime and state fragility is increasing in development policy agendas, and is the subject of a number of recent reports and seminars. This reflects growing recognition that levels of armed violence and associated fragility related to organised crime in different settings demand policy-makers and practitioners to work across the range of factors and policy arenas involved, such as law enforcement and crime prevention, security and diplomacy, development and peacebuilding, and public health. The peacebuilding sector has been slow to come to the table, no doubt influenced by funders' priorities and institutional silos that currently work against the types of joined-up responses that are needed. However, designing interventions that are broad-based and transformative in intent can help to underpin a new generation of responses. In particular: - Conflict analysis is crucial for understanding the dynamics at play. Rounded analysis through a peace and conflict lens, differentiating between root causes, proximate causes and triggers, will help to inform more holistic responses and ensure that projects 'do no harm' - avoiding the unintentional reinforcement of negative conflict dynamics; - Dialogue - often initiated, facilitated and sustained by third parties who are trusted for their impartiality and/or expertise - can bring together the actors involved in and affected by the problem in order to generate solutions; and - Civic activism and empowerment emphasise the importance of bringing a wider range of actors to the fore. The capacity to leverage lasting solutions is to be found beyond state institutions and within and across communities. This includes not only non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but also business leaders, women's organisations, religious institutions and academics. In its concluding section, this report offers five priority areas for action: 1. Conflict-sensitive approaches need to be brought to bear on law enforcement. Law enforcement will remain a key response mechanism to the nexus between organised crime, armed violence and fragility. However, it needs to adopt a 'do no harm' approach as advocated by the peacebuilding sector in relation to development assistance. 2. There is a need for improved analysis and information flow across the whole range of local, national and global dimensions of organised crime. While there has been a flurry of attention to the issues, enormous knowledge gaps remain. Greater analytical purchase across all dimensions will facilitate better monitoring of the impact of policy responses. 3. There needs to be a more innovative and creative way of dealing with predatory power holders. Current state-building approaches require a deeper understanding of the role of predatory power holders, including how criminal agendas can be factored into peace negotiations and processes. Details: London: International Alert, 2014. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2014 at: http://international-alert.org/sites/default/files/CVI_CrimeConflict_EN_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://international-alert.org/sites/default/files/CVI_CrimeConflict_EN_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133394 Keywords: Armed Violence Financial Crimes Organized Crime Shadow Economies Violence and Conflict

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Identity Theft: Additional Actions Could Help IRS Combat the Large, Evolving Threat of Refund Fraud Summary: Identity theft tax refund fraud is a persistent, evolving threat to honest taxpayers and tax administration. It occurs when an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund. GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the first of a series, examines (1) what IRS knows about the extent of IDT refund fraud and (2) additional actions IRS can take to combat IDT refund fraud using third-party information from, for example, employers and financial institutions. To understand what is known about the extent of IDT refund fraud, GAO reviewed IRS documentation, including the Identity Theft Taxonomy. To identify additional actions IRS can take, GAO assessed IRS and SSA data on the timing of W-2s; and interviewed SSA officials and selected associations representing software companies, return preparers, payroll companies, and others. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that Congress should consider providing Treasury with authority to lower the annual threshold for e-filing W-2s. In addition, IRS should fully assess the costs and benefits of shifting W-2 deadlines, and provide this information to Congress. IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, and it stated it is determining how these potential corrective actions align with available resources and IRS priorities. Details: Washington, GAO, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-633: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665368.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665368.pdf Shelf Number: 133415 Keywords: Financial Crimes Fraud Identity Theft (U.S.) Taxes

Author: KPMG Title: Global profiles of the fraudster: White-collar crime -- present and future Summary: Fraud specialists have long debated whether it is possible to develop a profile of a fraudster that is accurate enough to enable organizations to catch people in the act of fraud or even beforehand. The prediction of a crime before it occurs is, at least for now, the subject of science fiction. But an analysis of the constantly changing nature of fraud and the fraudster can help organizations stiffen their defenses against these criminal activities. Forewarned is forearmed. Global profiles of the fraudster contains KPMG International's analysis of 596 fraudsters member firms investigated between 2011 and 2013 with insights into the relationship between the attributes of fraudsters, their motivations and the environments in which they flourish. KPMG International gathered data from fraud investigations conducted by KPMG member firms' forensic specialists in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMA), the Americas, and Asia-Pacific regions between August 2011 and February 2013. The survey examined 'white-collar' crime investigations conducted across the three regions where we were able to identify the perpetrator and could provide detailed contextual information on the crime. We have developed a series of themes in order to understand the changing relationship among the fraudster, his/her environment and the frauds committed. And after taking into account the insights of our investigation leaders around the world, we conclude that the type of fraud and the type of fraudster are continually changing. Details: Zurich, SWIT: KPMG, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster/Documents/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster-v2.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster/Documents/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster-v2.pdf Shelf Number: 133560 Keywords: Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Fraud White-Collar Crime White-Collar Offenses

Author: International Tax and Investment Center Title: Asia-14: Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2013 Summary: This study is an update and expansion of our previous research, 'Asia-11 Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012'. In light of newly available data sources, it has been possible to extend the coverage to include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, resulting in full coverage of the 10 ASEAN member countries plus Australia, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and Taiwan. In 2013, 10.9% of cigarettes consumed in Asia-141 were illicit Total Consumption (legal and illicit) across the Asia-14 was an estimated 760.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. Of this, 10.9% or 82.8 billion cigarettes in Asia-14 were estimated to have been illicit. In ASEAN, Total Consumption was an estimated 608.2 billion cigarettes in 2013. Of this, 9.1% or 55.6 billion cigarettes were estimated to have been illicit. In 2013, the share of Illicit Consumption increased in 7 of the 11 markets that were part of the 'Asia-11 Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012' report Nearly three quarters of Illicit Consumption occurred in just three markets: Pakistan (22.8% Illicit), the Philippines (18.1%), and Vietnam (20.7%). In the 11 markets for which estimates are available for both 2012 and 2013 (i.e., the 'Asia-11'), Illicit Consumption is estimated to have increased by 20.1%, from 66.5 billion cigarettes to 79.9 billion cigarettes (an increase of 13.4 billion cigarettes). This was driven primarily by the rise in Illicit Consumption in the Philippines (by 12.7 billion cigarettes, an increase of 198%), underpinned by significant growth in Domestic Illicit Consumption. 7 markets (Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam) saw an increase in the share of Illicit Consumption in Total Consumption of cigarettes between 2012 and 2013. The steepest rise was again in the Philippines. However, Pakistan, and Singapore saw noticeable declines in the share of Illicit Consumption in 2013, the former a result of declining Domestic Illicit volumes, and the latter a consequence of a decline in Contraband. In both cases, however, the share of Illicit Consumption in Total Consumption remained much higher than the Asia-14 average. Domestic and Non Domestic Illicit both contributed to the rise in Illicit Consumption in Asia There was a 181.2% rise in Domestic Illicit Consumption in the Philippines (equal to 11.0 billion cigarettes). A small amount of Domestic Illicit was also identified in Indonesia in 2013. A number of markets saw a rise in Non-Domestic Illicit cigarettes in 2013. Consumption of Contraband cigarettes increased in Indonesia and Taiwan, while consumption of Counterfeit cigarettes rose sharply in the Philippines. There were increases in Non-Domestic Illicit of Unspecified Market Variant in Australia and Vietnam. Asia-14 government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption totalled US$ 3.9 billion in 2013 The tax loss associated with Illicit Consumption of cigarettes increased in 6 markets compared with 2012. In the 11 markets for which estimates are available for both 2012 and 2013, the estimated tax loss from Illicit Consumption increased from US$ 3.4 billion in 2012 to US$ 3.9 billion, an increase of 13.8%. The largest rise in tax loss in absolute terms was in the Philippines (497%). Australia and Indonesia also experienced a significant rise in estimated tax losses from Illicit Consumption. The government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption in the ASEAN region totalled US$ 2.1 billion in 2013. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2014. 220p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia-14%20Illicit%20Tobacco%20Indicator%202013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia-14%20Illicit%20Tobacco%20Indicator%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 134222 Keywords: Cigarettes Contraband Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Illegal Markets Illegal Tobacco Illicit Products (Asia) Illicit Tobacco Tax Evasion

Author: International Tax and Investment Center Title: Asia-11: Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012 Summary: In 2012, 9% of cigarettes consumed in Asia-11 were illicit Total Consumption (legal and illicit) across the Asia-111 markets covered in this report totalled an estimated 736.4 billion cigarettes in 2012, of which 9.0% or 66.5 billion cigarettes are estimated to have been illicit. This includes consumption of illicit imports and illicit products locally manufactured, such as under/non-declared products from local manufacturers. Illicit share was over 25% in five markets Brunei, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan all had estimated shares of illicit cigarettes in Total Consumption of over 25% in 2012. Illicit volumes were highest in Pakistan, Vietnam, and Malaysia In 2012, in both Vietnam and Pakistan, Illicit Consumption was over 20 billion cigarettes. In Malaysia the volume of illicit cigarettes was estimated at almost 8 billion. Domestic illicit cigarette volumes were highest in Pakistan and the Philippines In Pakistan and the Philippines, illicit cigarettes produced by local manufacturers and sold in the market without payment of taxes totalled an estimated 25 billion cigarettes in 2012. Asia-11 government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption totaled US$ 3.4 billion in 2012 The biggest tax losses in absolute terms occurred in Australia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2013. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia_11_Illicit_Tobacco_Indicator_2012.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia_11_Illicit_Tobacco_Indicator_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 133908 Keywords: Cigarettes Contraband Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Illegal Markets Illegal Tobacco Illicit Products (Asia) Illicit Tobacco Tax Evasion

Author: International Tax and Investment Center Title: Asia-11: Illicit Tobacco Indicator: 2013 Update for the Philippines Summary: Excise rates on the majority of cigarettes in the Philippines (Low-tax tier) rose by 341% on 1st January 2013. Excise rates on brands in the Mid-tax tier increased by 231%, while "premium-price" brands (High-tax tier) saw an increase of 108% in excise rates. This tax increase has contributed to a 59% rise in the pack price of the most sold brands in both the "low-price" and "premium-price" segments. The price increase on the most sold brand in the "super-low price" segment was highest at 175%. Legal Domestic Sales dropped almost 16% in 2013 from a year earlier. However, this decline was almost fully offset by an increased level of Illicit Consumption. As a result, Total Consumption (legal and illicit) was only down 3% in 2013. There has been a sharp rise in Illicit Consumption from 5.9% in 2012 to an estimated 18.1% of Total Consumption or 19.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. This rise primarily relates to increased consumption of Domestic Illicit cigarettes, which has risen sharply from 5.6% of Total Consumption in 2012 to an estimated 16.3% of Total Consumption or 17.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. There has also been an 800% increase in the consumption of Counterfeit cigarettes, which accounted for 1.8% of Total Consumption or 1.8 billion cigarettes in 2013, compared to 0.2% of Total Consumption in 2012. The cigarette tax revenue loss (excise and VAT) has risen to PHP 15.6 billion in 2013, representing an increase of 497% compared to 2012. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2014. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/Media/Default/landing-pages/asia11/report-asia11-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Philippines URL: http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/Media/Default/landing-pages/asia11/report-asia11-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 134220 Keywords: Cigarettes (Philippines) Contraband Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Illegal Markets Illegal Tobacco Illicit Products Illicit Tobacco Tax Evasion

Author: Wolfe, Simon Title: Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries: Priorities for Action Summary: Background The G20 countries committed in 2010 and 2012 to put in place adequate measures to protect whistleblowers, and to provide them with safe, reliable avenues to report fraud, corruption and other wrongdoing. While much has been achieved as a result of the G20 commitment, on the whole much remains to be done to meet this important goal. Many G20 countries' whistleblower protection laws continue to fail to meet international standards, and fall significantly short of best practice. Lacking strong legal protections, government and corporate employees who report wrongdoing to their managers or to regulators can face dismissal, harassment and other forms of retribution. With employees deterred from coming forward, government and corporate misconduct can be perpetuated. Serious wrongdoing such as corruption, fraud, financial malpractice, public health threats, unsafe consumer products and environmental damage can persist without remedy. Objective This report analyses the current state of whistleblower protection rules in each of the G20 countries, applying to the identification of wrongdoing in both the public and private sectors. It is the first independent evaluation of G20 countries' whistleblowing laws for both the private and public sectors, having been researched by an international team of experts drawn from civil society and academia. While G20 countries do self-reporting on implementation, to date this reporting has been "broad brush", and tends towards a more flattering and less useful picture of progress than may really be the case. By contrast, this report uses recognised principles to provide a more in-depth picture of the state of progress, and whether a case for continued high-level cooperation remains. Each country's laws were assessed against a set of 14 criteria (see Table below), developed from five internationally recognised sets of whistleblower principles for best legislative practice. The report is based on a public consultation draft released in June 2014. Earlier draft findings and the consultation draft were distributed to a wide range of experts and whistleblowing-related NGOs in G20 countries. The consultation draft was also submitted to all G20 governments for comment, through the T20 (Think20) engagement group and the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. This report only analyses the content of laws related to whistleblower protection in each country. This written law is only part of what is necessary to ensure those who reveal wrongdoing are protected in practice, with actual implementation of any law representing a different and ongoing challenge for G20 countries. We stress that positive assessment of the presence and comprehensiveness of legal provisions in this report is not a measure of the extent or quality of actual whistleblower protection in any country. Further, in countries with lower scores, there may be cultural or other norms that in fact indirectly assist in practical protection of whistleblowers. Details: Blueprint for Free Speech, 2014. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf Shelf Number: 133609 Keywords: Corporate Crime Corruption Financial Crimes Fraud Whistleblower Law and Legislation Whistleblower Protection Whistleblowers (International)

Author: Ardizzi, Guerino Title: Measuring the underground economy with the currency demand approach: a reinterpretation of the methodology, with an application to Italy Summary: We contribute to the debate on how to assess the size of the underground or shadow economy with a reinterpretation of the traditional Currency Demand Approach (CDA) a la Tanzi. We introduce three main innovations. First, we take as dependent variable in the money demand equation a direct measure of the value of cash transactions: the flow of cash withdrawn from current accounts relative to total non-cash payments. This avoids use of the Fisher equation and so overcomes two severe criticisms of the traditional CDA. Second, instead of the tax burden, usually taken as the main motive for non-compliance, we include among the covariates two direct indicators of detected tax evasion. Finally, we also control for the role of illegal economic activity, such as drug dealing and prostitution, which - jointly with the shadow economy - contributes to the larger aggregate of the unobserved economy and represents a significant component of total cash payments. We then propose an application of this "modified CDA" to a panel of 91 Italian provinces for the years Details: Bank of Italy, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 864: Accessed October 13, 2014 at: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td12/td864_12/en_td864/en_tema_864.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Italy URL: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td12/td864_12/en_td864/en_tema_864.pdf Shelf Number: 133888 Keywords: Financial Crimes Tax Evasion Underground Economy (Italy)

Author: Masciandaro, Donato Title: Worldwide Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: Estimating Costs and Benefits Summary: The aim of this article is to offer a simple framework for estimating the benefits and costs of anti-money laundering regulation, based on a prudent estimation of the economic value of the worldwide money laundering. Using the multiplier model of the relationship between criminal markets revenues and money laundering activities and data for 2004, the value of money laundering is equal to US$ 1.2 trillions (2.7%of the world GDP), while the maximum theoretical benefit in combating money laundering using financial regulation - in steady state - is equal to S$ 280 billion (0.6% of the world GDP). If the aggregate figures keep to the previous more conservative estimates, the methodology is the crucial innovation. The estimates are the product of a explicit macro framework, and they can be replicated, improved using more consistent data, or contrasted implementing alternative models. Details: Milan: Bocconi University - Department of Economics, 2008. Source: Internet Resource: Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2008-12 : Accessed October 30, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136107 Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136107 Shelf Number: 133976 Keywords: Cost-Benefit Analysis Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Halliday, Terence Title: Global Surveillance of Dirty Money: Assessing Assessments of Regimes to Control Money-Laundering and Combat the Financing of Terrorism. Summary: The International Monetary Fund's (IMF, Fund) program on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) has been integrally involved in the global system for AML/CFT in coordination with other key players, particularly the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). AML/CFT assessments, whether by the Fund or other assessor bodies, contribute to the key Fund activities of surveillance, financial support and technical assistance in support of domestic and international financial stability. These evaluations are taken seriously by both assessors and assessed. It is timely to evaluate the IMF's involvement in the AML/CFT system and to reconsider relevant aspects of the FATF standards, methodologies and practices more generally. The Center on Law and Globalization (CLG) obtained agreement from the IMF to conduct an independent critical analysis of IMF Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) during the 3rd round with the intent that the appraisal of past practices might inform advances in IMF and FATF methodologies and practices. Findings of the study are based on extensive interviews at the IMF and the FATF, detailed analysis of documents, close examination of four IMF assessments, site visits to three countries, and review of related literatures. This study finds that the IMF has contributed significantly to efforts that will improve the standards and methodology for assessing AML/CFT systems worldwide. The IMF has shown an openness to independent investigation of its practices; a willingness to ask baseline questions about the objectives and efficacy of AML/CFT regimes; a commitment to experimentation in assessment techniques; an impetus to clarify AML/CFT goals and objectives; leadership in the drive for assessments to appraise whether effective outcomes have resulted from implementation of standards; an investment in highly-qualified experienced assessment teams; undertaken initiatives to find new forms of valid and reliable data; intentions to forge tighter linkages between specific AML/CFT tools and targeted problems in financial systems, e.g., tax evasion, corruption; and effectiveness in raising donor moneys to invest in technical assistance to countries in need of reforms. Details: Chicago: The Center on Law and Globalization (CLG), 2014. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed November 10, 2014 at: http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20Money%201.30.2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20Money%201.30.2014.pdf Shelf Number: 134007 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Tax Evation Terrorist Financing

Author: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Title: Identification and Quantification of the Proceeds of Bribery: Revised Edition Summary: Confiscation and recovery of the proceeds of bribery are key elements inthe international framework to fight corruption. The two key international legal standards are the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) and the 2005 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). This study focuses on the identification and quantification of the proceeds of active bribery. It was undertaken as a joint effort between the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (Working Group) and the World Bank-UNODC Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (StAR) in order to support countries' efforts to confiscate the proceeds of active bribery, which is required of Parties to both the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and UNCAC. The final text, approved following a peer review process in the context of the StAR initiative, was discussed and adopted officially by the OECD Working Group on Bribery on 23 June 2011. The study is intended to provide practitioners, legislators and policy makers with practical information on the technical issues of identification and quantification of proceeds of active bribery. It provides examples of how proceeds have been identified and quantified in different jurisdictions; we use mostly examples from cases that have actually occurred. Details: Paris: OECD; Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2012. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative: Accessed November 12, 2014 at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/50057547.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/50057547.pdf Shelf Number: 134052 Keywords: Asset Recovery Bribery Bribes Corruption Financial Crimes

Author: Australia. Auditor General Title: Fraud Control Arrangements: Across Entities Summary: 1. Fraud against the Commonwealth is defined as 'dishonestly obtaining a benefit, or causing a loss, by deception or other means.' Fraud against the Commonwealth can be broadly categorised as being either external (fraud committed by clients or customers, service providers and members of the public) or internal (fraud committed by employees and contractors). In some cases, fraud against the Commonwealth may involve collusion between external and internal parties, which may not only result in loss for the Commonwealth, but may also involve corrupt conduct such as bribery and secret commissions. 2. The consequences of fraud against the Commonwealth include financial and material loss which can impact on the Australian Government's ability to deliver services and achieve its policy objectives. More broadly, fraud can result in reputational damage to government and responsible entities, and potential loss of confidence in Australian Government administration. 3. Fraud threats are ongoing and can affect any Australian Government entity. In 2010-11, external and internal fraud losses against the Commonwealth were estimated at $119 million. Approximately $116 million of these estimated losses related to external fraud, while some $3 million related to internal fraud. Details: Sydney: Australian National Audit Office, 2014. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: ANAO Report No. 3 3014-15: Accessed November 12, 2014 at: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2014%202015/Report%203/AuditReport_2014-2015_3.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2014%202015/Report%203/AuditReport_2014-2015_3.pdf Shelf Number: 134062 Keywords: Bribery Costs of Crimes Financial Crimes Fraud (Australia) Fraud Investigations

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce: results of the 2013 online consumer fraud survey Summary: Since 2007, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) has collected information on consumer scams by conducting an online survey of Australians who have received scam invitations during the preceding 12 months. The research is conducted on behalf of the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce (ACFT), which comprises 22 government regulatory agencies and departments in Australia and New Zealand.The annual survey seeks to obtain a snapshot of the public's exposure to consumer scams, to assess the range of ways in which scams can affect victims and their families, to determine how victims respond and to identify emerging typologies, and look at issues that could be used to inform fraud prevention initiatives. As in previous years, a high proportion of respondents to the survey had received a scam invitation (97%), with just over a third of the respondents responding to the scam invitation in some way. Last year, four percent of respondents reported having lost money to a scam, with the median amount of money reported as being lost per incident was $2,150-just over $1,110,000 lost in total. Fraudulent lottery and prizes wins were the most prevalent scam type experienced by respondents in 2013. While email remained the most commonly used method by which scams were delivered, consistent with previous years, scams delivered via landline and mobile telephones continued to increase. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2015 76p. Source: Internet Resource: AIC Reports, Technical and Background Paper 58: Accessed February 26, 2015 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tbp/tbp058/tbp058.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tbp/tbp058/tbp058.pdf2015. 76p. Shelf Number: 134678 Keywords: Consumer Fraud (Australia) Consumer Protection Financial Crimes

Author: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Title: Report on Cybersecurity Practices Summary: Like many organizations in the financial services and other sectors, broker-dealers (firms) are the target of cyberattacks. The frequency and sophistication of these attacks is increasing and individual broker-dealers, and the industry as a whole, must make responding to these threats a high priority. This report is intended to assist firms in that effort. Based on FINRA's 2014 targeted examination of firms and other related initiatives, the report presents FINRA's latest work in this critical area. Given the rapidly evolving nature and pervasiveness of cyberattacks, it is unlikely to be our last. A variety of factors are driving firms' exposure to cybersecurity threats. The interplay between advances in technology, changes in firms' business models, and changes in how firms and their customers use technology create vulnerabilities in firms' information technology systems. For example, firms' Web-based activities can create opportunities for attackers to disrupt or gain access to firm and customer information. Similarly, employees and customers are using mobile devices to access information at broker-dealers that create a variety of new avenues for attack. The landscape of threat actors includes cybercriminals whose objective may be to steal money or information for commercial gain, nation states that may acquire information to advance national objectives, and hacktivists whose objectives may be to disrupt and embarrass an entity. Attackers, and the tools available to them, are increasingly sophisticated. Insiders, too, can pose significant threats. This report presents an approach to cybersecurity grounded in risk management to address these threats. It identifies principles and effective practices for firms to consider, while recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to cybersecurity. Key points in the report include: 00 A sound governance framework with strong leadership is essential. Numerous firms made the point that board- and senior-level engagement on cybersecurity issues is critical to the success of firms' cybersecurity programs. 00 Risk assessments serve as foundational tools for firms to understand the cybersecurity risks they face acrosacross the range of the firm's activities and assets-no matter the firm's size or business model. 00 Technical controls, a central component in a firm's cybersecurity program, are highly contingent on firms' individual situations. Because the number of potential control measures is large and situation dependent, FINRA discusses only a few representative controls here. Nonetheless, at a more general level, a defense-in-depth strategy can provide an effective approach to conceptualize control implementation. 00 Firms should develop, implement and test incident response plans. Key elements of such plans include containment and mitigation, eradication and recovery, investigation, notification and making customers whole. 00 Broker-dealers typically use vendors for services that provide the vendor with access to sensitive firm or client information or access to firm systems. Firms should manage cybersecurity risk exposures that arise from these relationships by exercising strong due diligence across the lifecycle of their vendor relationships. 00 A well-trained staff is an important defense against cyberattacks. Even well-intentioned staff can become inadvertent vectors for successful cyberattacks through, for example, the unintentional downloading of malware. Effective training helps reduce the likelihood that such attacks will be successful. 00 Firms should take advantage of intelligence-sharing opportunities to protect themselves from cyber threats. FINRA believes there are significant opportunities for broker-dealers to engage in collaborative self defense through such sharing. Details: Washington, DC: FINRA, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2015 at: https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20on%20Cybersecurity%20Practices_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20on%20Cybersecurity%20Practices_0.pdf Shelf Number: 134961 Keywords: Computer Security Cybercrime Cybersecurity Financial Crimes Internet Crime Risk Assessment

Author: Kenyon, Will Title: Diagnosing Bribery Risk: Guidance for the conduct of effective bribery risk assessment Summary: Transparency International's guidance provides specific, practical advice based on real-life experience on how to conduct an effective bribery risk assessment. Identifying and evaluating bribery risk is essential to the design and implementation of an effective anti-bribery programme. It's fundamentally a management responsibility, supported by compliance, internal audit and other functions as appropriate. Law enforcement agencies and regulators around the world have made it clear that bribery risk assessment is the foundation of an anti-bribery programme. In the UK, risk assessment is one of the six principles enshrined in the Ministry of Justice Guidance and is also a focus of the thematic reviews carried out by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (now the Financial Conduct Authority or FCA). Furthermore, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) in the US have recently published their resource guide The Transparency International guide includes: - 10 good practice principles for bribery risk assessment - A risk assessment template - with an illustrated documented example - Bribery risk assessment process check list Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/678-diagnosing-bribery-risk Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/678-diagnosing-bribery-risk Shelf Number: 135138 Keywords: Bribes (U.K.) Corruption Financial Crimes Risk assessment

Author: Reuter, Peter Title: Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries Summary: A growing concern among those interested in economic development is the realization that hundreds of billions of dollars are illicitly flowing out of developing countries to tax havens and other financial centers in the developed world. This volume assesses the dynamics of these flows, much of which is from corruption and tax evasion. What causes them, what are their consequences and how might they be controlled? The chapters by authors from a variety of backgrounds, including criminologists and practicing lawyers as well as economists, examine many dimensions of the phenomenon. For example, one chapter examines the political economy of the issue; to what extent is this the consequence of a more general failure of governance, so that it is more a manifestation of government weakness or can it be identified with a few specific features? Two other chapters examine major illegal markets (drug trafficking and human smuggling) to assess how they contribute to these flows. Other chapters are concerned with the corporate role in the phenomenon, particularly the possibility that transfer pricing (in which firms set prices for international trade among wholly owned affiliates) might play a major role in moving money illicitly. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2012. 531p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-8869-3 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-8869-3 Shelf Number: 135376 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Human Smuggling Illegal Markets Money Laundering

Author: Passas, Nikos Title: Financial intermediaries - Anti-money laundering allies in cash-based societies? Summary: Many informal cash-based economies run parallel financial systems that are very different to the Western banking concept. Such countries are perceived to have a high risk of money laundering. Looking at Afghanistan, Somalia, and India - where anti-money laundering efforts have yielded mixed results - this paper draws lessons from the operations of financial intermediaries. These countries are considered high risk not only for money laundering and terrorism financing, but also for corruption and political and legal concerns. The issues at hand - risk assessments for remittances, strategies of engaging on the ground, resource management, and alternatives to the existing financial networks - are also valid for other cash-based, low-income societies. In fact, informal remittance channels may provide opportunities to strengthen regulatory and governance capacities. Details: Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issue, April 2015, no. 10: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/financial-intermediaries-anti-money-laundering-allies-in-cash-based-societies/ Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/financial-intermediaries-anti-money-laundering-allies-in-cash-based-societies/ Shelf Number: 135403 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Risk Assessment Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Identity Theft and Tax Fraud: Enhanced Authentication Could Combat Refund Fraud, but IRS Lacks an Estimate of Costs, Benefits and Risks Summary: Why GAO Did This Study IRS estimated it prevented $24.2 billion in fraudulent identity theft (IDT) refunds in 2013, but paid $5.8 billion later determined to be fraud. Because of the difficulties in knowing the amount of undetected fraud, the actual amount could differ from these point estimates. IDT refund fraud occurs when an identity thief uses a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information to file a fraudulent tax return and claims a refund. GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the second in a series, assesses (1) the quality of IRS's IDT refund fraud cost estimates, and (2) IRS's progress in developing processes to enhance taxpayer authentication. GAO compared IRS's IDT estimate methodology to GAO Cost Guide best practices (fraud is a cost to taxpayers). To assess IRS's progress enhancing authentication, GAO reviewed IRS documentation and interviewed IRS officials, other government officials, and associations representing software companies, return preparers, and financial institutions. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends IRS improve its fraud estimates by (1) reporting the inherent imprecision and uncertainty of estimates, and (2) documenting the underlying analysis justifying cost-influencing assumptions. In addition, IRS should estimate and document the economic costs, benefits and risks of possible options for taxpayer authentication. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated, as appropriate. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-119: Accessed May 6, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667965.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667965.pdf Shelf Number: 135527 Keywords: Financial Crimes Identity Theft (U.S.) Tax Fraud

Author: Howard, Marilyn Title: Unequal, Trapped and Controlled: Women's experience of financial abuse and potential implications for Universal Credit Summary: inancial abuse is often misunderstood but can have a devastating impact. This coercive and controlling behaviour can leave women with no money for basic essentials such as food and clothing. It can leave them without access to their own bank accounts, with no access to any independent income and with debts that have been built up by abusive partners set against their names. Underreported and poorly recognised, financial abuse affects women across the income distribution and in a range of different ways. Even those who may have a full-time salary or who share joint accounts with their partners are not safe from financial abuse. It is also important to understand that it seldom happens in isolation: in most cases perpetrators use other abusive behaviours to threaten and reinforce the financial abuse they are conducting. It is therefore vital that action is taken to improve understanding of the nature and impact of financial abuse among staff in all frontline services that may come into contact with domestic violence survivors. There is also a particular need for organisations such as banks to pay specific attention to customers who may be experiencing abuse and to support them to access money that is rightfully theirs and find safety. Universal Credit poses a particular challenge. A benefit that is set to be paid on a household basis sits uneasily with the realities of financial abuse, where men in some households use money to abuse their partners. Under current plans they will be able to do so more easily once Universal Credit is rolled out. But there is a range of ways the system could be improved to ensure that it does not collude with or exacerbate financial abuse. These include automatically paying Universal Credit to the main carer and making the payments more frequent than monthly. These changes, alongside ensuring that women fleeing violence are fast tracked to new claims and that joint claim processes include opportunities for confidential reporting, could help ensure that women experiencing abuse can be supported. Details: London: Trade Union Congress, 2015. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/UnequalTrappedControlled.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/UnequalTrappedControlled.pdf Shelf Number: 135547 Keywords: Credit Card Fraud Financial Abuse Financial Crimes Intimate Partner Violence Victims of Crimes Violence Against Women

Author: Australia. Attorney-General's Department Title: Identity crime and misuse in Australia: Key findings from the National Identity Crime and Misuse Measurement Framework Pilot Summary: Efforts to combat identity crime require a reliable evidence base that quantifies the complete nature and extent of the problem. In Australia and also internationally, there are limited sources of comprehensive, reliable data about identity crime and its consequences. To address this gap in knowledge, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed in 2012 that work should be undertaken to develop a national measurement framework for identity crime to better inform efforts to implement the National Identity Security Strategy (NISS). This report presents the key findings from a pilot data collection exercise that was undertaken as part of the project established to develop this measurement framework. Key finding: Each year around 4 to 5% of Australians (around 750,000 to 937,000 people) experience identity crime resulting in a financial loss. However, the true extent of identity crime is likely to be unknown, as a considerable proportion of incidents go unreported. The Australian Institute of Criminology conducted a 5,000-person online community survey (the AIC Survey) in 2013 as part of this pilot. They found that 9.4 percent of respondents reported having their personal information stolen or misused in the previous 12 months, with five percent reporting that they suffered financial losses as a result (Smith & Hutchings 2014). Identity crime is likely under-reported by both individual victims and organisations. For example, recent research has shown that only 50 percent of credit card fraud victims and 66 percent of identity theft victims reported the incident to a formal institution, such as law enforcement or a financial institution (ABS 2012). Key finding: Compared with other personal and theft-related crimes (i.e. assault, robbery, break-ins and motor vehicle theft), identity crime is one of the most prevalent crime types affecting Australians each year. Key finding: The price of fraudulent identity credentials suggests they are relatively cheap and easy to obtain. This is reflected in the variety of ways that these credentials are used to commit identity fraud. Information on data breaches (many of which go unreported) also suggests that the personal information needed to create fraudulent identity documents is also available to those willing to seek it out. Key finding: State and territory police detect up to an estimated 30,000 identity crimes each year, with around 24,000 offences proven guilty in a court of law. As identity crimes are often recorded under other related offences such as fraud, the actual number of identity crimes is likely much higher. Key finding: The majority of identity victims lose relatively small amounts of money (up to $1,000), although in some cases losses can run to hundreds of thousands of dollars. A significant proportion of victims also experience demands on their time or other adverse impacts to their mental or physical health, reputations or general wellbeing. Key finding: Only a small proportion of victims of identity crime report the incident to relevant organisations. Court-issued victims' certificates appear significantly underutilised as a mechanism to assist victims in recovering from the consequences of identity crime. Key finding: There are an increasing number of identity credentials that can be verified through the Document Verification Service (DVS), as well as a growing demand for the service amongst government and private sector organisations. Key finding: The estimated economic impact of identity crime in Australia is likely to exceed $1.6 billion per year. In light of the limited data available and the underreporting of identity crime, by both individuals and organisations, this is likely to be a conservative estimate. Key finding: Aside from underreporting, the single biggest limitation on efforts to measure identity crime is the lack of standardisation between organisations over definitions and how incidents are recorded. Details: Barton, ACT: Attorney-General's Department, 2014. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/IdentityCrimeAndMisuseInAustralia.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/IdentityCrimeAndMisuseInAustralia.pdf Shelf Number: 135442 Keywords: Computer Crimes Credit Card Fraut Crime Statistics Crimes Against Businesses Cybercrime Financial crimes Identity Theft

Author: Insurance Fraud Bureau Title: Crash for Cash: Putting the Brakes on Fraud Summary: Definition: to stage or deliberately cause a road traffic collision solely for the purpose of financial gain. Costing around $400m a year, 'Crash for Cash' scams are run by fraudsters who manufacture collisions, sometimes with innocent road users, hoping to profit from fraudulent insurance claims. With claims from a single collision potentially worth tens of thousands of pounds, organised fraudsters are orchestrating scams that involve multiple collisions and can be worth millions of pounds. Details: London(?): IFB, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: https://www.insurancefraudbureau.org/media/1036/ifb_crash_for_cash_report_online.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.insurancefraudbureau.org/media/1036/ifb_crash_for_cash_report_online.pdf Shelf Number: 135771 Keywords: Financial Crimes Insurance Fraud Traffic Accidents

Author: Quercioli, Elena Title: The Economics of Counterfeiting Summary: This paper develops a new tractable strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game played by good and bad guys. There is free entry of bad guys, who choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop and use a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. We prove that the passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high notes. Our predictions are consistent with time series and cross-sectional patterns in a unique data set that we assemble largely from the U.S. Secret Service: (1) One plus the seized/passed ratio rises in the note, but less than proportionately; (2) The passed rate rises 40-fold from $1 to $20, and levels off, dropping at higher notes; (3) Counterfeit quality rises in the note; (4) Since 1970, the seized-passed ratio is down 90%, and the passed rate is up 75%; (5) Inexpensive digital production leaped up in 1994-8; and (6) Canada's introduction of color notes temporarily nearly stopped counterfeiting. Details: Unpublished paper, 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1325892 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1325892 Shelf Number: 135896 Keywords: Counterfeiting Economics of Crime Financial Crimes

Author: CIFAS Title: Fraudscape: UK fraud trends Summary: In 2014, there were 276,993 frauds recorded by Cifas Members; an increase of 25% on 2013 levels. While fraud levels often fluctuate year by year, the overall trend is clear - recorded fraud is increasing. Cifas recorded frauds act as a sound barometer for the fraud landscape of the UK. Cifas Members span a range of sectors, including banking, grant giving, credit card, asset finance, retail credit, mail order and online retailer, insurance, telecommunications and public sector. Members report and share confirmed fraud cases using the Cifas National Fraud Database in order to detect and prevent further fraud. In 2014 Cifas Members prevented an estimated $1 billion of fraud through Cifas systems. The data included in this report gives a solid indication of the nature and scale of fraud but it is by no means the full picture. It remains the case that there is no one indicator for fraud levels in the UK, meaning that the true levels of fraud will be far higher. This report explores the key themes and trends from Cifas data in 2014. It is designed to give a simple overview of trends and recommends ideas for further specialist research. Cifas will publish a series of in-depth reports throughout 2015/16. Details: London: Cifas, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2015 at: http://www.cifas.org.uk/secure/contentPORT/uploads/documents/External%20-%20Fraudscape%20main%20report%20for%20website.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cifas.org.uk/secure/contentPORT/uploads/documents/External%20-%20Fraudscape%20main%20report%20for%20website.pdf Shelf Number: 135916 Keywords: Financial Crimes Fraud Identity Theft

Author: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Title: Economic Crime: A threat to business globally Summary: It comes as no surprise to learn that economic crime - such as fraud, IP infringement, corruption, cybercrime, or accounting fraud - continues to be a major concern for organisations of all sizes, across all regions and in virtually every sector. But, as our 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey reveals, the real story is not so much that economic crime stubbornly persists. The real story is that economic crime is threatening your business processes, eroding the integrity of your employees, and tarnishing your reputation. Which is why this year's report, one of the broadest and most comprehensive economic crime surveys we have ever conducted - with over 5,000 global respondents - is focused not only on breaking down the facts, figures, trends and regions, but also on analysing how and where it may be affecting you. So you can address the issue from both a preventive and strategic perspective. We invite you to explore the rich trove of data, trends and analysis of economic crime uncovered by our 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey - and contact us to learn more Details: s.l.: PWC, 2015. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/downloads.jhtml Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/downloads.jhtml Shelf Number: 136069 Keywords: Cybercrime Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Fraud

Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara Summary: The Sahara has been a pipeline for smuggling and trafficking of many types of goods for well over a thousand years. Libya, which has ties to Europe dating back to the Roman Empire, has always been a key destination and transit area for many of these illicit flows. Since the fall of Gaddafi, the smuggling and trafficking business involving both armed groups and organized crime networks has increased dramatically in Libya. Instability and state breakdown has allowed the traditional tribal trans-Sahara trade, in drugs, counterfeit products and migrants and arms to grow to around US$43-80m at most, distributed among a large number of traffickers, clans and groups. The increase in flows of money and illegal goods are having repercussions across North Africa and the Sahel. Illicit finances and weaponry from Libya helped facilitate the rebellion in Mali in 2010, and continues to fuel conflict today. More significantly, the high number of migrants along the North African coast has enabled the development of a far more lucrative coastal migrant trade, valued now at US$ 255 - 323 million per year in Libya alone. The value of this trade dwarfs any existing trafficking and smuggling businesses in the region, and has particularly strengthened groups with a terrorist agenda, including the Islamic State. Drawn from a range of open source data and a number of recent interviews across the Saharan region, this brief documents the current scope and scale of trans-Saharan criminal economies and highlights their possible implications on stability and security. The goal of this brief is to provide a timely update of the evidence base on potential conflict drivers in the greater Sahara region, for the benefit of policy-makers, practitioners and researchers. The brief is a collaboration between the Norwegian Centre for Global Analysis (Rhipto) and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. The brief concludes that given the level of illicit revenue it is currently possible to generate from the migrant flow, preventing Islamic State and coastal Libyan armed groups from becoming involved in or profiting from migrant smuggling should be of greater priority than attempting to cut off the long-established trans-Saharan trade routes passing through the Sahel towards Libya. Details: Geneva: The Global Initiative, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Libya URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 136144 Keywords: Financial crimes Illegal Trade Terrorist Terrorist Financing

Author: Fung, Ben Title: Counterfeit Quality and Verification in a Monetary Exchange Summary: Recent studies on counterfeiting in a monetary search framework show that counterfeiting does not occur in a monetary equilibrium. These findings are inconsistent with the observation that counterfeiting of bank notes has been a serious problem in some countries. In this paper, we show that counterfeiting can exist as an equilibrium outcome in a model in which money is not perfectly recognizable and thus can be counterfeited. A competitive search environment is employed in which sellers post offers and buyers direct their search based on posted offers. When sellers are uninformed about the quality of the money, their offers are pooling and thus buyers can extract rents by using counterfeit money. In this case, counterfeit notes can coexist with genuine notes under certain conditions. We also explicitly model the interaction between sellers' verification decisions and counterfeiters' choices of counterfeit quality. This allows us to better understand how policies can affect counterfeiting. Details: Ottawa: Bank of Canada, 2011. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 2011-4: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/wp11-4.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/wp11-4.pdf Shelf Number: 136146 Keywords: Counterfeit Currency Counterfeiting Financial Crimes

Author: Leslie, Chris Title: Circling the Loan Sharks. Predatory lending in the recession and the emerging role for local government Summary: 200,000 people in Britain are at risk from illegal loan sharks because they cannot access credit from traditional lenders according to a new report published today (Mon). A combination of the reduction in sub-prime lending, often known as "door-step lending", and the economic downturn may lead to more people having to use illegal money lenders according to the independent think tank the New Local Government Network. The report predicts that an additional 35,000 people are likely to have to use loan sharks during the recession but admit that the figure could be even higher. The think tank is urging local authorities to put additional resources into local credit unions and even to use new Council Banks to offer affordable credit to people who can't access high-street loans. NLGN warns that the legal sub-prime market has declined since the recession. It predicts that an additional 250,000 people will lose access to doorstep lending under the downturn. This period has also seen the number of loan refusals by the Government's emergency Social Fund increase from 316,000 to 596,000. The report warns that customers who would have previously used these services may now have to turn to loan sharks. It argues that local authorities need to step in to protect vulnerable people in their local community by offering a range of support including more Credit Unions, mapping predatory lending and enhancing enforcement against loan sharks. Details: London: New Local Government Network, 2009. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://www.nlgn.org.uk/public/wp-content/uploads/circling-the-loan-sharks.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nlgn.org.uk/public/wp-content/uploads/circling-the-loan-sharks.pdf Shelf Number: 136288 Keywords: Financial Crimes Loan Sharks

Author: Fraschini, Giorgio Title: Illicit Assets Recovery in Italy. Summary: Transparency International Italy (TI -It), in collaboration with the Chamber of Commerce of Naples, presents today, February 27th, the report "ILLICIT ASSETS RECOVERY IN ITALY - Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation" at the Chamber of Commerce in Naples. The report is the result of a research carried out within the European project "Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches" ( www.confiscation.eu), commissioned and funded by the European Commission. Transparency International Italy participates in the project along with two other national chapters of Transparency International: Transparency International Romania and Bulgaria. The cooperation among European partners is even more important now in light of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament two days ago in order to facilitate the confiscation proceedings and the cooperation among national authorities of EU Member States. The Italian report digs into our illicit assets confiscation system, through a detailed analysis of the legislation, interviews and statistics. It investigates the weaknesses of the system and also promotes practical recommendations. Considering the urgency of fighting corruption in Italy, confiscation of assets coming from illegal activities, such as corruption, becomes crucial, because it has both a punitive and preventive value. "Italian legislation reflects this duality, which is almost a unique worldwide: Italy has in fact both a criminal and preventive system of confiscation" - researchers Chiara Putaturo and Giorgio Fraschini say - "The strong precautionary power of confiscation lies mainly in the re-use of assets for social purposes. If properly implemented , it has a high educational and exemplary value for the entire community". Maria Teresa Brassiolo, Past President of Transparency International Italy, highlights one of the main risks: "Unfortunately, most confiscated companies are not efficiently managed. This must to be solved immediately. The weakness or the closure of legal businesses can create a strong negative image of a context where criminal organisations can run their activities and create jobs, hiding the dark side of illegality, such as tax evasion, labour and insurance violations. Criminals, at the same time benefit, without paying, from infrastructure , schools, hospitals, which are finanaced by citizens and legal firms". TI-It offers a list of recommendations: - A consolidated act of law on confiscation - Speeding up judicial and assignment procedures - Strengthening of the National Agency for the administration and the assignment of the goods seized and confiscated from criminal organizations - Computerising the system - Immediate availability of funds recovered through the sale of movable assets to support the effective management of immovable assets and companies - allocation and efficient use of resources of the Justice Unique Fund for the management of seized companies, too - Involvement of expert with managerial skills - Implementation of the support units at the Prefectures - Establishment of a monitoring system Details: Naples: Transparency International Italia, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches" project report: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-IT_en_Illicit_Assets_Recovery_in_Italy.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Italy URL: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-IT_en_Illicit_Assets_Recovery_in_Italy.pdf Shelf Number: 136290 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Corruption Financial Crimes Organized Crime

Author: Australian Crime Commission Title: Serious and Organised Investment Fraud in Australia Summary: Serious and organised investment fraudsters target Australian investors with promises of high investment returns, using 'cold call' techniques and backing up their claims with fraudulent websites to which the criminals can direct unsuspecting investors. This type of fraud involves the illegal and often aggressive selling of worthless or overpriced shares. It is generally highly organised, spans multiple jurisdictions and uses sophisticated technology. This type of fraud also involves non-compliance with share-listing requirements, making fraudulent statements to shareholders and using false identities. Serious and organised investment frauds place high pressure on people to take up the investment offer. Typically based off shore, these investment frauds use the internet to conduct their illegal operations. They are incredibly sophisticated and very difficult for even experienced investors to identify. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/SOIFA_Report_030812.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/SOIFA_Report_030812.pdf Shelf Number: 136291 Keywords: Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption Internet Crimes Investment Fraud Organized Crime

Author: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Title: Evading the Net: Tax Crime in the Fisheries Sector Summary: The fisheries sector is a large and thriving industry within the global economy, with strategic importance for many developed and developing countries. Worldwide, the sector has an annual value in excess of USD 217.5 billion, and over 500 million people in developing countries depend, directly or indirectly, on fisheries and aquaculture for their livelihoods. This report looks at the issue of tax crime in the fisheries sector, including frauds over taxes on profit and earnings, customs duties, VAT and social security, with examples from real cases. These include crimes that rely on features characteristic of the fisheries sector, as well as those seen in other industries. The report discusses aspects of the sector that make it vulnerable to tax crime, including a lack of transparency and difficulty in obtaining beneficial ownership information resulting from the use of offshore companies and the practice of registering vessels under flags of convenience. Strategies used by tax administrations and other authorities to prevent, detect and investigate tax offences are outlined and the report makes recommendations for steps countries can take, alone or in co-operation, to combat these crimes. Details: Paris: OECD, 2013. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/crime/evading-the-net-tax-crime-fisheries-sector.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/crime/evading-the-net-tax-crime-fisheries-sector.pdf Shelf Number: 136303 Keywords: Financial Crimes Fishing Industry Organized Crime Tax Evasion

Author: Council of Europe. Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) Title: Typologies Report on Laundering the Proceeds of Organised Crime Summary: 1. The project to examine the laundering methods used by organised crime (OC) was approved by the 41st MONEYVAL Plenary in April 2013. It was agreed that the project team should examine the methods used by organised criminal groups to launder illegally earned profits and should try to assess potential regional vulnerabilities. It was also agreed that trends, methods, red flags and indicators, the means of identification and analysis of organised crime money flows should all be addressed in the report in order to enhance the capabilities of competent authorities in such cases. 2. Two expert meetings were held in the context of this research: the inaugural meeting of delegations was organised in October 2013 in Strasbourg; this was followed by a second meeting, bringing together prosecutors and judges in May 2014 in San Marino. 3. The reason for conducting this research is the recognition that OC presents one of the major threats to the Rule of Law in Europe and globally. A large percentage of all the criminal proceeds that are laundered world-wide are laundered by or on behalf of OC. 4. The report highlights a number of significant challenges to the effective investigation and prosecution of laundering the funds derived from organised crime and achieving final confiscation of assets. Some of these problems arise due to a lack of resources or relevant expertise, some due to reluctance of prosecutors in some jurisdictions to tackle difficult cases and some are caused by the very nature of the laundering techniques themselves. The main problems identified were: - Lack of financial, accounting and IT expertise; - Intelligence gaps; - Lack of adequate risk analysis; - Inadequate domestic coordination; - Failure to use the full range of powers and practices available; - The perception of some prosecutors that they have always to identify a specific predicate offence from which the proceeds are derived for a successful 3rd party prosecution; - Reluctance of prosecutors to tackle difficult cases; - Delay in applying provisional measures rendering any subsequent confiscation orders less effective; - Transnational transactions and difficulties caused by mutual legal assistance; - Exploitation of new technologies by organised crime groups; - Lack of transparency of corporate vehicles. 5. The report sets out a number of recommendations on measures that jurisdictions can adopt in order to improve the investigation and prosecution of OC-related ML and the final confiscation of their criminal proceeds. In particular, the report highlights the need to make full use of the powers available to investigators and prosecutors. The recommended measures include: - Ensuring that there is more high-level commitment to prosecuting OC ML and pursuing deterrent confiscation orders in those cases; - Including any special issues raised by OC in the ML national risk assessment; - Ratifying the Warsaw Convention and implementing the revised Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 2012 (in particular Recommendation 30 (Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative agencies)); - Focusing on confiscation; - Focusing on third party money laundering; - Making full use of FIU powers and expertise; - Using financial profiling, trained specialists and expert witnesses; - Developing national cooperation, coordination and feed-back and improving domestic information exchange; - Expediting international information exchange; - Increasing the transparency of information on the real owners of companies and trusts; - Improving financial supervision; - Utilising media campaigns, particularly in relation to the risks of persons being exploited unintentionally by OC as money mules. 6. The report draws conclusions on trends from the responses received. It is noted that OCGs will in practice use all available means to launder the proceeds of crime and have the ability to adapt quickly to changing law enforcement and AML/CFT environments. Nonetheless, a number of particular trends were identified, including exploitation of poorly regulated financial institutions and DNFBPs, as well as an increasing use of international transactions by OCGs. The main trends are, however, mostly typical of money laundering generally, but specifically in the OC context include: - Exploitation of poorly regulated sectors; - Development of transnational infrastructures to launder funds; - Use of legal persons to hide criminally derived funds; - Use of professionals; - Use of new technologies. 7. The report assesses some of the techniques that have proved successful in investigating and prosecuting the laundering of the proceeds from OC and achieving final confiscations. The analysis considers risk identification as a strategic starting point, ways of detecting potential OC-related transactions (both at the level of FIUs and LEAs), the analytical processes involved, financial investigations and financial profiling and also covers challenges to and best practices for the achievement of convictions and confiscations. 8. It appears that OC and ML are rarely analysed at a strategic level by decision-makers together in jurisdictions. The report suggests that a better collective understanding of the OC vulnerabilities and threats is critical for those who are responsible for overall resource allocation for investigation and prosecution of OC cases. 9. The ability of the reporting entities themselves to detect OCG-related funds for reporting purposes seems limited. Financial institutions rely typically on the information available on the internet or from public and commercial databases. 10. At the FIU level, in order to identify potential OCG indicators, the analysts mostly rely on the number of persons involved in suspicious transaction reports (STR). There are no distinctive procedures for OCG-related STRs but, when recognised, such cases are prioritised and analysed in more detail. 11. Financial investigations are always a key element in ML cases, whether the proceeds result from OC activities or not. This survey revealed that, when deciding upon the initiation of parallel financial investigations, there are no differences between an organised crime case and any other case. 12. In some jurisdictions, the criteria for initiation of a parallel financial investigation is provided by legislation and can be activated automatically in proceeds-generating cases. In other jurisdictions the decision is taken by investigators and prosecutors on a case-by-case basis. There are no special investigative powers dedicated to financial investigations carried out in OC cases. The report concludes that wider use of the power to monitor bank accounts and/or to postpone transactions should increase effectiveness in the asset tracing and freezing processes. 13. One useful tool in asset recovery which has been identified is the use of financial profiles. These are descriptions of the investigated persons' licit income compared with their expenditure and lifestyle. Building such profiles can better assist the authorities to identify unexplained wealth. Nonetheless, such profiles are not routinely conducted in OC financial investigations. In some jurisdictions they are made exclusively in the pre-trial stage and do not always constitute admissible evidence. In order to create accurate profiles, LEAs may need access to a variety of information held by others, including Tax, Customs and the FIU. In some jurisdictions this access is on-line; in others formal requests to another authority need to be made. 14. There appears to be a direct link between the international element of ML cases related to OCG, and the duration of the investigation and prosecution processes. These processes frequently become prolonged because of delays in receiving responses to mutual legal assistance requests. The report notes that prosecutors may sometimes request mutual legal assistance, where the evidence required may be capable of proof in other ways, through the more focused use of domestically available circumstantial evidence. 15. In order to increase timeliness and success of prosecutions, some jurisdictions have introduced special courts and/or prosecutors' offices as part of the judicial system, which have nationwide competences and jurisdiction for a series of specific offenses. This system has the advantage of reducing the possibility of local influence and corruption and deepening specialisation of judges and prosecutors in OC-related cases. 16. The report found that various FIUs and other LEAs, with long-standing experience in the ML area (including in its OC component), are capable individually of addressing the issues related to the fight against the legalisation of OC profits, but that often these efforts are fragmented and the overall outcome is limited. The report identifies obstacles in this area. Some of the most frequently noted difficulties related to obtaining evidence from abroad (especially from offshore jurisdictions) and to the continuing lack of transparency of the ownership of investigated corporate vehicles. The complexity of the financial flows which can be involved create particular challenges for investigators and prosecutors. 17. On a more positive note, valuable tools for OC asset tracing, freezing and confiscation were identified in the course of the research. These include exploitation of the analysis by the FIUs, use of FIU powers (monitoring of transactions, postponement), and use of financial profiling techniques. In addition, the more active use of Joint Investigations Teams (JITs) in appropriate transnational OC investigations is recommended. 18. The report identifies that some jurisdictions achieve success in autonomous ML cases without the necessity to establish precisely from which predicate offenses the laundered property comes. These cases are usually based on inferences drawn from facts and circumstances. This is particularly helpful in OC cases. However, the survey also indicated that there still remains resistance in many jurisdictions to challenging the courts with these types of autonomous and stand-alone cases. The report explains some of the jurisprudence in England and Wales on autonomous and stand-alone ML that has been followed in several other jurisdictions. The case studies also describe some of the successes that have been achieved following this line of jurisprudence. It is strongly recommended that more jurisdictions challenge their courts with cases based on this line of jurisprudence where there are OC connections. 19. The infiltration of financial institutions by OC through corruption (or by other means) is sometimes associated with identified criminal activities, such as illicit waste disposal, trafficking in endangered species, illegal investment in real estate projects, the facilitation of illegal immigration, drug and weapons trafficking, document counterfeiting and crimes which can be facilitated only with the authorisations of local or national administrations. While the incidence of this finding is not measured, it is considered that jurisdictions where the above-mentioned predicate offenses are prevalent, should be more alert to the risks of OC infiltrating financial institutions for ML purposes. 20. Finally the report focuses on typologies of ML cases where OC proceeds were laundered. It appears that the most common proceeds-generating crimes are of a financial nature (all forms of fiscal frauds, including tax evasion and internet-related frauds). The survey revealed that the FIUs' capacity and expertise in financial analysis is underused by law enforcement. Details: Strasbourg: COE, 2015. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Typologies/MONEYVAL(2015)20_typologies_launderingtheproceedsoforganisedcrime.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Typologies/MONEYVAL(2015)20_typologies_launderingtheproceedsoforganisedcrime.pdf Shelf Number: 136350 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Criminal Investigations Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: European Commission. Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security Title: Study on "Best Practices in Vertical Relations between the Financial Intelligence Unit and (1) Law Enforcement Services and (2) Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Reporting Entities with a View to Indicating Effective Models for Feedback on Fol" Summary: The objective of the study was to make an inventory on the provision of feedback between the Reporting Entities (REs), the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and Law enforcement Authorities (LEAs). 25 Member States were visited and a large number of interviews were held. Feedback should be provided and received in the following ways: (1) Feedback should be received by the REs in reaction to the financial reports (STRs) the REs are legally obligated to send to the FIUs of the different Member States. (2) Feedback should be provided by LEAs to the FIUs in reaction on the dissemination by the FIU of financial information on the basis of the STRs received from the REs. The interviews of personnel from the REs, FIUs and LEAs indicated a level of feedback (FIU->RE) as generally recommended in the Best practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback, published in 1998 by the FATF. There are some new developments like indications on quality of STRs being fed back to the REs. The main forms of feedback between those entities (FIU->RE) are however still based on the recommendations of the FATF. Feedback in the 25 Member States consists mainly of general feedback (the organisation of AML-meetings, workshops, statistics, typologies, trends, sanitised cases etc.) and specific feedback (individual or case to case) on the outcome of specific STRs reported by the REs. This last form of feedback seems to be provided in an informal way in most Member States. Some forms of formal obligations to provide specific feedback between FIUs and LEAs and from the FIUs to REs were found in some Member States. It was also found that even if there was a formal obligation for LEAs and the FIU to provide feedback to each other and the REs, this not always meant that feedback was supplied to the REs. The general impression of the AML activities in relation to feedback within the Member States visited by the Team is that most Member States still rely on the "old" recommendations of the FATF (1998) on feedback. New ways to provide feedback are hardly developed. Good communication and information exchange with the REs is not sufficiently implemented in a lot of Member States. Contacts between reporting Entities and the FIU as well as Law enforcement authorities seem to have decreased in some Member States. "The number of meeting, conferences and training sessions have become less and less, AML information is not sent as frequently as in the past, the relation between FIUs, Reporting Entities and Law enforcement, in relation to the money laundering approach has cooled down". General Remarks like this by a number of REs seem to suggest a declining interest in AML activities. A possible explanation for this may be the lack of communication and cooperation within the AML chain (REs, FIUs and LEAs), continuous organisational changes that some institutions are facing, complicated AML legislation and lack of sufficient results in the form of ML convictions. Audits performed in some Member States on the effectiveness of AML Institutions showed few achievements in the fight against ML, and as a consequence, usually a reorganisation of the AML institutions was undertaken in some countries. Some examples of these changes are The Netherlands (2006 MOT to the FIU the Netherlands), The United Kingdom (2006 NCIS to SOCA) and presently Italy (2008). Other Member States have relocated their FIU organisation or created new functions like a police liaisons within their units, e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary and Estonia. In addition, FIUs and REs expressed their concern about the increasing number of tasks that have been assigned to them in relation to the traditional AML activities and or new specific tasks regarding the financing of terrorism. This report certainly does not pretend to be of a scientific nature but merely an introduction to the problem of feedback. One thing is certain, there is a lot of improvement to be made in the communication and cooperation between the different AML institutions. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2008. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_fiu_and_terrorism_financing_en.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_fiu_and_terrorism_financing_en.pdf Shelf Number: 136357 Keywords: Criminal Investigation Financial Crimes Information Sharing Law Enforcement Money Launderings Organized Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: Kopp, Pierre Title: Organized Crime: Strategies and Countermeasures Summary: While there have been vast numbers of studies on criminal money-laundering, the great majority of them appear to be devoted exclusively to evaluating the amounts of money involved. These essentially quantitative analyses are inadequate because they give us only an abstract view of the money-laundering problem and provide no precise information about its impact on the legal economy or about the true threat that the existence of such illegal activities presents to society. Concentrating as they do on the extent of money-laundering, studies of this kind tend to focus attention on the methods used by criminal organizations to remove their income from police surveillance, at the expense of an analysis of the strategies these organizations use to obtain income to the detriment of society. Public policy in the fight against money-laundering has focused too much on the use of the most sophisticated techniques put at our disposal by the international financial system, whereas most criminals who launder their income continue to use the most elementary methods, and among those methods the most primitive of all - namely consumption. Hardly more sophisticated are the shifting of cash from one place to another and the opening of several bank accounts, which often constitute the only precautions taken. Complex scenarios such as those uncovered in the Jurado affair are put in hand by only a minority of criminals, among whom the large criminal organizations occupy the first rank. Many of our methods of combating money-laundering have been designed to prevent, or render extremely difficult, the sophisticated use of banking and financial mechanisms, which has led the law enforcement authorities to practices. Because of its growing complexity, the campaign against money-laundering - confined to its most sophisticated aspects - has acquired a kind of autonomous status which is too often unrelated to the real struggle against criminal organizations; and this limits the efficiency of the campaign. The law enforcement authorities have had to admit their inability to oversee the whole network of international transactions themselves. As a consequence they have had to delegate this function to the banking and financial system. Since they are not in a position to impose a mandate directly on that system, they have had to offer special incentives to secure its cooperation. Banks and financial institutions are required, under pain of sanctions, to oversee their clients. Criminals must therefore either give up money-laundering or else resort to more complex and costly arrangements, which is in itself an indirect way of checking laundering. We shall show in this report that government policy in the fight against money-laundering, as commonly implemented, reflects these concerns that are too exclusively focused on the use of methods designed to increase the cost of laundering, to slow down its implementation and to limit the sums of money whose criminal origins can effectively be disguised. The public authorities base their actions on assumptions regarding the behaviour of the actors involved (criminals and banks) which accord great confidence to the effectiveness of incentive arrangements whose foundations are at best uncertain. Details: Vienna: Vienna International Center, 1999. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://www.pierrekopp.com/downloads/organizedcrime.pdf Year: 1999 Country: Europe URL: http://www.pierrekopp.com/downloads/organizedcrime.pdf Shelf Number: 136362 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Fraud against the Commonwealth: Report to Government 2010-11 to 2012-13 Summary: Public sector fraud continues to be of concern to the Commonwealth Government. Not only does it reduce funds available for government programs, but it also creates a negative and counterproductive atmosphere within affected workplaces. Fraud can destroy working relationships, reduce productivity and lead to loss of staff, with immeasurable direct and indirect harms being suffered both by the public sector and the community at large. Understanding the nature and extent of the problem is the first step in devising workable preventive strategies and effective solutions. This report presents the results of a longitudinal census of fraud incidents experienced by Commonwealth entities and the ways in which fraud risk has been managed and controlled. Previous Commonwealth fraud surveys published by the Australian Institute of Criminology have presented data for single financial years. In this report, an opportunity has been taken to present trend information for the first time in respect of the three most recent years for which census data were available - 2010-11 to 2012-13. Of the 154 or more Commonwealth entities that responded to the Australian Institute of Criminology's census each year, almost 40 percent experienced one or more suspected incidents of fraud. Unfortunately, between 2010-11 and 2012-13, both the number of suspected incidents of fraud and the funds at stake increased. In total, 265,866 incidents of suspected fraud involving losses of $530m were reported over the three years. Each year, more than 1,000 defendants have been prosecuted for fraud against the Commonwealth in respect of charges involving, on average, approximately $50m each year. Of those convicted, most received non-custodial sentences, with approximately 10 percent being sentenced to terms of immediate imprisonment. Only a small proportion of funds are recovered each year. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2015. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: AIC Monitoring Reports 24> Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/mr/mr24/mr24.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/mr/mr24/mr24.pdf Shelf Number: 136366 Keywords: Crime Statistics Dishonesty Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption

Author: Desta, Tu'emay Aregawi Title: ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion Summary: Money laundering and terrorist financing are major, interconnected problems for East Africa and the Horn. As the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 makes clear, they pose a significant threat not only to security but also to development. Both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have identified a number of states in the subregion as demonstrating weak implementation of international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). Some states in the subregion (Ethiopia and Kenya) have even been placed within the FATF International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) process, which can ultimately lead to obstacles to engagement with the international financial system. There is consequently a growing recognition that states in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) subregion stand to benefit in multiple ways from a more concerted effort to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There is also, however, a chronic limitation of data and knowledge about the problems of money laundering and terrorist financing and about AML/CFT vulnerabilities, risks, and capacities in the subregion. States of the subregion have their own specific vulnerabilities, challenges, weaknesses, and strengths, even as they share certain cross-cutting challenges. In this Baseline Study, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) set out with support from the Royal Government of Denmark to provide a more detailed and nuanced analysis of AML/ CFT challenges and opportunities in the IGAD region, to inform a better allocation of resources to risk and to potential return on investment. The study is a joint effort developed in response to repeated requests by the ISSP's and the CGCC's governmental, intergovernmental, private sector, and civil society partners in the subregion who sought assistance in obtaining baseline data about money laundering risks and AML capacity in the region and guidance on the data's potential use for CFT efforts. Throughout the project design and execution, emphasis has been placed on local ownership. Experts from the East African and Horn subregion coordinated and conducted the project and, where appropriate, also drew on outside expertise. This included input from members of the Danish, Malawian, and Nigerian financial intelligence units (FIUs). The study was prepared by a project team of 10 independent researchers with logistical support and analytical guidance from the ISSP and the CGCC and an informal advisory group of interested officials, academics, and business professionals from the subregion, serving in a personal capacity. That advisory group met twice in Addis Ababa: in October 2011 to help frame the project and develop the research methodology and in March 2012 to critique the resulting analysis and a draft version of this report. The final draft report was shared with all IGAD member states for further review, interagency discussion, comment, and revision. The ISSP and the CGCC approved this report before publication. This study does not provide an exhaustive catalogue or review of money laundering and terrorist financing risks or AML/ CFT efforts in the subregion. Also, it does not purport to provide a categorical assessment of specific AML/CFT projects in the subregion or a country's "performance." This study did not set out to replicate the technical proficiency or political legitimacy of a FATF or ESAAMLG assessment or peer review. Instead, this study represents the collected views of stakeholders in the subregion, gathered by a group of independent analysts, convened by the ISSP and the CGCC, and guided by our Advisory Group. Our aim was not to pass judgment but to provide some starting points for an inclusive and, we hope, coordinated and evidence-based discussion in the years ahead among many stakeholders - national, international, private sector, and civil society - regarding strengthening AML/CFT capacities in the IGAD subregion. This study explores AML/CFT efforts in Djibouti; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; Somalia, including Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and non-TFG efforts; South Sudan; Sudan; and Uganda and at the regional and subregional level (the African Development Bank [AfDB], the African Union [AU], the East African Community [EAC], the East African Development Bank [EADB], the ESAAMLG, and IGAD). Researchers developed desk analysis that was tested through roughly week-long field visits, during which researchers met with relevant local and foreign government officials, civil society actors, private sector entities, and independent analysts. Twenty to 25 interviews were conducted for most jurisdictions - approximately 160 in all - over the course of 60 days of fieldwork. Interviewers used a semistructured format responding to a common set of research questions. The names and institutional affiliations of interviewees have been withheld to ensure confidentiality; a list of institutions that participated may be provided on request. Due to limited resources and concerns about the physical security of the researchers, a methodology not involving field visits by external researchers was used for Eritrea and Somalia. Analysis for these jurisdictions should be read with additional caution, as further verification of the results may be necessary before they can serve as the basis for policy development. A separate chapter of the Baseline Study addresses each of the covered jurisdictions. As far as possible, each chapter addresses similar issues. - Money laundering and terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities and how they are perceived by different stakeholders. - An overview of AML/CFT efforts, including discussion of capabilities and resources (material, legal, human, financial, and political) and how they are perceived by different stakeholders. - An identification of key entry points for international assistance and support to local stakeholders to promote AML/CFT efforts. Details: New York; Addis Ababa: Center on Global Counterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AML_Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AML_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 136482 Keywords: Counterterrorism Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: Sharman, Jason Title: Chasing kleptocrats' loot: Narrowing the effectiveness gap Summary: International measures to counter the laundering of looted wealth have not had a significant impact, despite their apparent strength. Evidence, including an original case study of Papua New Guinea, suggests that only a small fraction of funds derived from corruption are intercepted. This effectiveness gap is caused principally by the laxity of banks in controlling wire transfers and the willingness of corporate service providers to supply untraceable shell companies. Current policy evaluation fails because it equates inputs with effectiveness and does not include clear measurement of results. This can be remedied by testing the ease of making suspect transactions or forming shell companies, using either audit studies or field experiments. Two such studies of shell company formation show that rules mandating sensitivity to customer corruption risk are ineffective. Such studies are cheap, practical, and suitable for use by development agencies and their partners in developing countries. Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issue, 2012, no. 4: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/chasing-kleptocrats-loot-narrowing-the-effectiveness-gap/ Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/chasing-kleptocrats-loot-narrowing-the-effectiveness-gap/ Shelf Number: 136583 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Litina, Anastasia Title: Corruption and Tax Evasion: Reflections on Greek Tragedy Summary: We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into. We address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents: citizens and politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes. Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. We show that multiple self-fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities, indicating that "corruption" may corrupt. Furthermore, we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. Instead, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium. Details: Athens: Back of Greece, Economic Analysis and Research Department, 2015. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 193: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper2015193.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Greece URL: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper2015193.pdf Shelf Number: 136614 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Political Corruption Tax Evasion

Author: Haigner, Stefan D. Title: The Financial Flows of Terrorism and Transnational Crime Summary: Yearly revenues from transnational criminal activity account for USD 1 to 1.6 trillion, and a wide variety of methods is employed to transfer those revenues across borders and launder it. The specific type of crime largely determines the choice of methods. Terrorists, for example, use both "legal" as well as illegal activity, in particular drug dealing, to raise funds, and largely employ the formal financial sector as well as physical cross-border transfers to move funds across borders. Money attributable to terrorism, however, accounts only for a tiny share of international proceedings from illicit activity. Details: Berlin: EUSECON - Department of Development and Security, German Institute for Economic Research, 2012. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: EUSECON Policy Briefing 17: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.399439.de/diw_eusecon_pb0017.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.399439.de/diw_eusecon_pb0017.pdf Shelf Number: 136663 Keywords: Financial Crimes Organized Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: Healy, D. Title: Crime, Punishment and Inequality in Ireland Summary: The linkages between crime, punishment, policing and inequality are multifaceted. There is good empirical evidence that certain types of offending, especially homicide, are positively correlated with inequality. In addition a theoretical argument can be made to the effect that inequality creates opportunities for the kinds of corporate and white collar misconduct which, even if not criminal in a narrow legal sense, have far-reaching and damaging social repercussions. For example, the enormous scale of reckless lending, balance sheet manipulation and cynical underestimation by Irish banks will place a greater financial burden on this country's taxpayers than the harms wrought by generations of robbers, burglars and thieves. Other countries caught up in the financial crises that defined the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century will have similar experiences. An exaggerated emphasis on financial success, to the virtual exclusion of other markers of achievement, becomes problematic in a context where there are few restraints on the means chosen to increase wealth. Traditional modes of crime prevention and control have proved insufficiently flexible to deal with a new category of harms perpetrated by a new class of offender; investigating financial malpractice requires new tools and new models of criminal justice. Details: Amsterdam: Amsterdams Instituut voor Arbeids Studies (AIAS), Universiteit van Amsterdam , 2013. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: GINI Discussion Paper 93: Accessed September 11, 2015 at: http://www.uva-aias.net/uploaded_files/publications/93-4-5-4.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Ireland URL: http://www.uva-aias.net/uploaded_files/publications/93-4-5-4.pdf Shelf Number: 136714 Keywords: Financial Crimes Inequality Poverty Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime White Collar Crime

Author: Artavanis, Nikolaos Title: Tax Evasion across Industries: Soft Credit Evidence from Greece Summary: We document that in semiformal economies, banks lend to tax-evading individuals based on the bank's assessment of the individual's true income. This observation leads to a novel approach to estimate tax evasion. We use microdata on household credit from a Greek bank, and replicate the bank underwriting model to infer the banks estimate of individuals' true income. We estimate that 43%-45% of self-employed income goes unreported and thus untaxed. For 2009, this implies 28.2 billion euros of unreported income, implying foregone tax revenues of over 11 billion euros or 30% of the deficit. Our method innovation allows for estimating the industry distribution of tax evasion in settings where uncovering the incidence of hidden cash transactions is difficult using other methods. Primary tax-evading industries are professional services - medicine, law, engineering, education, and media. We conclude with evidence that contemplates the importance of institutions, paper trail and political willpower for the persistence of tax evasion. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper No. 21552: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21552 Year: 2015 Country: Greece URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21552 Shelf Number: 136778 Keywords: Financial Crimes Tax Evasion White-Collar Crime

Author: Voorhout, Jill Coster van Title: Curbing Illicit Financial Flows: The Post-2015 Agenda and International Human Rights Law Summary: Corruption, which was identified as a cross-cutting theme in our Institute's program of work for 2013, is not only a problem in its own right but also part of the "larger" issue of illicit financial flows (IFFs). Simply put, IFFs deprive governments in both developed and developing countries of resources that might otherwise be invested in public goods such as health, agriculture, infrastructure, and education. IFFs concern both illicit money and in- and outflows of money, and corruption is both their cause and consequence. Corruption often "generates" the illicit money, which also can stem from fraud or trafficking of persons, drugs, weapons, or other illegal goods. In addition, abuse of entrusted power for private gain - as corruption is commonly defined - often lures in in- and outflows of money - for instance, when illegal money is laundered to leave via the regular financial system or when local authorities negotiate tax concessions and incentives for (foreign) investment for states, companies, or individuals. Often corruption and IFFs are mutually reinforcing, and have a negative spiraling effect on a country's economy, weakens governance, and affects the rule of law. For example, illegal money fuels the commission of further crimes and the potential for in- and outflows of capital, whether legally or illegally "earned", poses opportunities for corruption and other illegal acts. Therefore, we include corruption under the definition of IFFs but exclude the legal practice of tax avoidance (as opposed to tax evasion, which is illegal per se). A comprehensive approach is taken to IFFs at the intersection of peace, security and justice, by combining perspectives of conflict prevention, rule of law, and global governance. The result is two policy recommendations: (i) to incorporate the rule of law in the post-2015 agenda, also under draft goal 12e aimed at tackling IFFs, and (ii) to use human rights obligations and responsibilities to curb IFFs. These recommendations are made to three audiences: (a) policymakers, who work at the national and international level and through multilateral institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (b) business representatives, who can contribute both positively and negatively to IFFs and their control, and (c) "facilitators" of IFFS such as lawyers and accountants. Our ultimate aim with these recommendations is to encourage post-2015 funding by a coalition of public-private and state-nonstate financiers, and promote human rights obligations for states and responsibilities for businesses, including law and accountancy firms, and "facilitators" of IFFS. Details: The Hague: The Hague Institute for Global Justice, 2014. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 8: Accessed September 21, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/financial-crime/global/Hague%20Institute%20for%20Global%20Justice%20-%20Curbing%20Illicit%20Financial%20Flows%20Post%202015%20-%20May%202014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/financial-crime/global/Hague%20Institute%20for%20Global%20Justice%20-%20Curbing%20Illicit%20Financial%20Flows%20Post%202015%20-%20May%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 136840 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Ghosal, Vivek Title: Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions Summary: While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U.S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties imposed across the policy regimes. The more recent regimes are characterized by far fewer cartels prosecuted, but with substantially higher penalties levied on firms and individuals. While effective deterrence is one explanation for these patterns, we are more inclined to conclude that US cartel enforcement has seen an underlying shift away from focusing on smaller cartels to larger and multinational firms. In terms of political effects, our results reveal no clear inter-political party effect on cartel prosecutions, but there appear to be interesting intra-political party effects. We find that particular Presidencies matter for cartel prosecutions, and variation across Presidential administrations led to marked shifts in the total number of cartels prosecuted. Overall, the shifts in the number of cartels prosecuted and penalties levied portray changing policy priorities and a search for the optimal enforcement design to curtail one of the clearest sources of welfare loss, collusion. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, 2015. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Papers No. 5543: Accessed October 21, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2659486 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2659486 Shelf Number: 137047 Keywords: Financial Crimes Price-Fixing Prosecutions Punishment White-Collar Crime

Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: Illicit Financial Flows: The Most Damaging Economic Condition Facing the Developing World Summary: The book features five condensed and updated quantitative country studies on illicit financial flows (IFFs) from India, Mexico, Russia, the Philippines, and Brazil by GFI Chief Economist Dr. Dev Kar, as well as chapters written by GFI President Raymond Baker and Managing Director Tom Cardamone. Dr. Thomas Pogge, Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, writes on the human rights impact of illicit financial flows. The relationship between illicit flows and development is considered by Erik Solheim, the chair of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2015. 192p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed October 28, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Ford-Book-Final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Ford-Book-Final.pdf Shelf Number: 137168 Keywords: Bribery Developing Countries Financial Crimes Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Mutual Evaluation of Mexico. Interim Follow-Up Report Summary: The level of compliance of Mexico's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations was evaluated in 2008 by a team conformed by representatives from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the FATF-Style Regional Body for South America (GAFISUD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The evaluation led to the country's Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), which was adopted by the FATF Plenary in October 2008. The MER identified several strengths in the country's AML/CFT regime, but also areas of opportunity for its improvement in full consistency with the FATF Recommendations. In this sense, specific observations were made to the case of Mexico, and the country entered into a regular follow-up process. In terms of the FATF regular follow-up process, the Government of Mexico (GOM) has kept the FATF and its members informed of its actions and achievements to fully comply with the observations included in the country's MER. The GOM has previously submitted follow-up reports in October 2010 and October 2011. The GOM is now submitting its Third Follow-up Report. This report intends to provide the FATF and the international community with a comprehensive overview of the overall progress that the GOM has made in the prevention and combating of ML/FT during the past four years. Since the MER was adopted, the GOM has substantially increased its efforts in the fight against ML/FT. These efforts have resulted in important actions to establish a complete and sound AML/CFT legal and institutional framework. As a result, we are convinced that Mexico's current AML/CFT regime is far more advanced than it was before, when the MER was conducted. Details: Paris: FATF, 2012. 192p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Interim%20Follow-up%20Report%20Mexico.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Interim%20Follow-up%20Report%20Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 137220 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: Council of Europe Title: Impact Study on Civil Forfeiture Summary: From the late 1980s onwards, the imperative for those (at both international and national levels) seeking to combat serious organised crime and other transnational offences (including corruption, economic crime and drug trafficking) has been to deprive those benefiting from such criminality of the financial rewards that they thereby obtain. As a result, one of the key changes in approach has been a shift in sentencing policy both nationally and as expressed in international instruments from the traditional aim which centred on penal measures up to and including imprisonment, rather than denying criminals of their illicit gains. Although confiscation had been available to courts in a number of jurisdictions from much earlier on, it tended to relate to confiscation of items such as seizure and destruction of drugs, or to weapons if used as instrumentalities to commit crimes. To address the modern trend of increasingly acquisitive (and very often cross-border) criminality the traditional approach was found to be insufficient as the fruits of the offending were still available for a criminal's enjoyment at the end of a prison sentence. The criminal justice sector across regions came to recognize that, if the aim of sentencing policy was to be effective deterrence, then it needed to hit the true aim of such criminality: making a profit. International instruments such as the 1988 Vienna Convention on Drug Trafficking, as the pioneering instrument, introduced the mechanism of confiscation for drug trafficking. This paved the way for extending confiscation to all other acquisitive crimes, including for bribery and corruption (first in a limited way in the UN Convention on Transnational and Organised Crime (UNTOC) and then, in 2003, more comprehensively in the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)). Meanwhile, in Europe, both the Council of Europe and the EU led the way in taking decisive steps to obligate their respective member states to put in place a framework for the restraint/seizure and confiscation of illicitly obtained assets. This was achieved through, in particular, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism 2005 (the Council of Europe 2005 Convention) and four key EU Framework Decisions (2001/500/JHA; 2003/577/JHA; 2005/212/JHA; 2006/783/JHA). It should be noted, however, that the international instruments, although seminal to the development of asset recovery, have focused on post-conviction confiscation/asset recovery and have not, generally, addressed the subject matter of this study, civil forfeiture (sometimes referred to as confiscation in rem). They have certainly not discouraged it and, to that extent, they have left the way open to states to introduce it, but they have not taken the concept forward in any concerted way. The exception, and a powerful indicator of the importance of civil forfeiture in countering corruption, is UNCAC, which obligates each state party to consider whether civil forfeiture should be introduced within its jurisdiction . As a result of the (understandable and necessary) drive to establish a post-conviction confiscation framework in states, the reader is likely to be familiar with the legal mechanism for the recovery of illicitly obtained assets through criminal proceedings, where, at the end of a criminal trial, the Court, upon the application of the prosecution, or as a requirement of law, considers whether property derived from criminal activity should be forfeited so as to deprive the convicted person from enjoying the fruits of his criminality. This is the usual course of events and will, generally speaking, be the preferred option where the accused is found in the territory of a State and there is sufficient evidence to support a criminal prosecution. Indeed, this is, today, the position in most states. Details: Belgrade: Council of Europe, Belgrade Office, 2013. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Publications/CAR/Impact%20Study%20on%20Civil%20Forfeiture_EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Publications/CAR/Impact%20Study%20on%20Civil%20Forfeiture_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 137221 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Financial Crimes Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime

Author: Ayogu, Melvin D. Title: Illicit Financial Flows and Stolen Assets Value Recovery Summary: Value recovery of stolen assets is both an enforcement of anti-money laundering laws and a potent weapon against corruption. When obtainable, it represents society's credible commitment to ensure that "crimes do not pay." We explore these linkages by reviewing international experiences on the implementation of value recovery. Lessons suggest country-level studies that are more likely to strengthen local initiatives, leading to regional strategies capable of improving negotiations for assistance and cooperation at the global level. Details: Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 364: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP364.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP364.pdf Shelf Number: 149108 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Jensson, Arnar Title: Crime should not pay. Iceland and the International Developments of Criminal Assets Recovery Summary: This study concludes that present circumstances related to the collapse of the three largest Icelandic banks in fall of 2008 and the fact that around 90 criminal investigations are ongoing against many of their directors, managers and largest shareholders call for extraordinary measures to be implemented. The most powerful legal instrument to retrieve the vast sums allegedly transferred out of these banks before their collapse is non-conviction based confiscation under civil legal procedures. This modern instrument is the centrepiece of a new, progressive assets recovery model for Iceland, recommended in the final chapter of this paper. Globalization has not only abolished barriers of communication, opened up global markets and interconnected gateways but also birthed new criminal opportunities. With ever increasing profits, serious international crime has made it possible for the leaders to distance themselves from the actual criminal acts, rendering a conviction nearly unattainable. In recent years most state authorities and international organizations have realized that traditional approach of pursuing criminal sanctions against serious, international crime has failed because of the immense proceeds it generates. The new international approach has been called "proceeds of crime strategy" or "assets recovery strategy" where illegal revenues and assets of the alleged offenders are directly targeted. Iceland has been slow to react on these international developments. Comparison between measures taken in Iceland and EU, Ireland and Norway reveals that Iceland is far behind these countries. Firstly, Iceland has neither governmental nor law enforcement policy in this area, resulting in de-motivating effects through the administration and the law enforcement. Secondly, Icelandic authorities need to strengthen the legal framework considerably, both domestic legal provisions and cooperation agreements on mutual assistance and orders for seizures, freezing and confiscation of criminal assets. Thirdly, Iceland does not have a designated Assets Recovery Office as all neighbour states and fourthly, knowledge and experience within the law enforcement and judicial system of international assets recovery is scarce and fragmented. Details: The Haag: School of Social Sciences, University of Haskoli Islands, 2011. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/10146/25325/1/MA_ritg_Arnar_Jensson_-_sept_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Iceland URL: http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/10146/25325/1/MA_ritg_Arnar_Jensson_-_sept_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 137224 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Corruption Financial Crimes Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime

Author: Kao, Albert L. Title: Increased Anti-Money Laundering Banking Regulations and Terrorism Prosecutions Summary: After 9/11, anti-money laundering banking regulations were increased to counter terrorism finance. This study attempts to identify whether increasing banking regulations has countered terrorism finance by reviewing terrorism prosecutions. This study looked at federal terrorism prosecutions from January 2004 through April 2009. The study reviewed court documents and case backgrounds for indicators that anti-money laundering banking regulations were useful to the terrorism prosecution by either detecting terrorism financing or by supporting other charges, such as money laundering. The study did not find that banking regulations detected terrorist financing. The avoidance of banking regulations was used to support money laundering charges in two cases; however, pre-9/11 regulations would have sufficed. The study found that increasing anti-money laundering banking regulations had limited effects on countering terrorism financing. How anti-money laundering banking regulations are implemented within a counterterrorism finance regime should be reevaluated. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 1090p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736328 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736328 Shelf Number: 137763 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: Sharma, Saswot Raj Title: Terrorist, White Collar and Organized Crime Financing Case Study and Forensic Audit Summary: Terrorism, white collar crime and organized crime usually are inevitable fact and black truth on human civilization. They need funds for operation and all the illicit money gathered cannot be used for operation until and unless it is cleaned by the means on Money laundering. Money laundering usually occurs in three steps: Placement is the transfer of illegal activities' proceeds into financial systems without attracting the attention of financial institutions and government authorities. Money launderers accomplish this by dividing their tainted cash into small sums and executing transactions that fall beneath banks' regulatory reporting levels. Layering is the process of generating a series of transactions in order to distance the proceeds from their illegal source and to obfuscate the audit trail. Common layering techniques include outbound electronic funds transfers, usually directly or subsequently into a - bank secrecy haven,- or a jurisdiction with lax recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and withdrawals of already placed deposits in the form of highly liquid monetary instruments, such as money orders or travelers checks. Integration, the final money laundering stage, is the unnoticed reinsertion of successfully laundered, untraceable proceeds into an economy. This is accomplished through a variety of spending, investing and lending techniques and cross-border, seemingly legitimate transactions. Independent auditors have a responsibility under SAS no. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, to be aware of the possibility that illegal acts may have occurred, indirectly affecting amounts recorded in an entity's financial statements. If an accountant believes the consequences of the money laundering have not been properly accounted for or disclosed on the financial statements, SAS 54 states that the auditor should Criminal Financing Forensic Audit 5 Saswot Raj Sharma /ICAI/ Feb 14 express a qualified or adverse opinion on the financial statements. If the client refuses to accept the auditor's modified report, the auditor should resign. Punishment: Generally internationally the punishment is usually as follows: (a) A person who finances in terrorist activities shall be punished by an imprisonment up to five years and a fine equal to the amount used in offence and where such amount is not identified up to five hundred thousand rupees. (b) A person who commits money laundering offence under Chapter-2 of the AMLA except one mentioned in Sub-Section (1) shall be punished by an imprisonment between one and four years and a fine equal to the amount used in the offence. (c) An additional punishment of ten percent shall be awarded where a public official or the chief or official of a bank, financial institution or non-financial institution is involved in the offence. Details: Kirtipur, Nepal: Tribhuvan University, 2014. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Shelf Number: 137580 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing White-Collar Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. Mexico Summary: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering In South America (GAFISUD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have jointly conducted an assessment of the implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) standards in Mexico. - Mexico has made good progress in developing its system for combating ML and TF since its last assessment by the FATF in 2004. The laws criminalising ML and TF do not however fully meet international standards, and there is scope to significantly improve their implementation. - Laws and procedures do not adequately provide for the freezing without delay of terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. - Co-ordination arrangements amongst relevant government authorities have been strengthened recently but need to be further developed. Further resources are needed for some authorities. - The FIU has strengthened its financial intelligence infrastructure and capacity. It does not currently have direct access to criminal records and the number of staff is low relative to its tasks. - AML/CFT preventive measures are comprehensive, contain risk-based elements, and are being implemented across principal sectors of the financial system. Nonetheless, AML/CFT regulations are still evolving, particularly in non-deposit taking sectors. - All supervisory authorities are implementing fairly comprehensive on-site AML/CFT supervision, though this could benefit from more risk-based processes. - Trust services are the only DNFBP for which AML/CFT measures are in place. Also, no review has been conducted of the non-profit sector to support adoption of measures to prevent unlawful use of legal persons for ML and TF. - Mexican authorities have been co-operating effectively with other countries, particularly in the area of mutual legal assistance and extradition involving ML and related crimes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2008. 338p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf Shelf Number: 137228 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money-Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Ayogu, Melvin D. Title: Governance and Illicit Financial Flows Summary: Insofar that it corrodes governance, engendering opportunistic crimes, grand corruption lies at the core of the problem of illicit financial flows. We identify at least two likely antagonistic circles in the illicit flow process - a virtuous circle and a vicious circle - both rooted in one common factor, namely, the strategic complementarity between corruption and governance. Also, we consider the scope of global governance architecture in encouraging banks to "do the crime, pay the fine, and do no time." Given this structure, the observed, rampant impudence of banks' participation in illicit financial flows is understandable and society would not be shocked should global mega-banks increasingly resemble a police establishment run by ex-convicts. Curbing illicit flows in such a circumstance would be daunting. Therefore, civil society must live up to its civic responsibilities by displacing the vicious cycle first through creating the right incentives for politicians to identify negatively with illicit financial flows. Details: Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute, 2014. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 366: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP366.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP366.pdf Shelf Number: 137229 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Transparency International UK Title: Gold Rush: Investment visas and corrupt capital flows into the UK Summary: In this report "Gold rush: Investment visas and corrupt capital flows into the UK" Transparency International UK highlights how the UK's Tier 1 Investor scheme can be vulnerable as a tool to launder the proceeds of corruption from around the world. In particular, it is highly likely that substantial amounts of corrupt wealth stolen from China and Russia have been laundered into the UK through the UK's 'golden' visa programme. In return for $2m of qualifying investments, a foreign investor can receive a UK golden visa and, after five years, permanent residency in the UK. Our analysis shows that, out of 3,048 golden visas granted by the UK since the scheme began in 2008, 60% have been awarded to Chinese and Russian nationals. The Tier 1 Investor scheme is open to abuse through the lack of effective, up-front and transparent checks on Tier 1 Investor visa applicants by the UK authorities. If illicit money has entered the UK economy through the golden visa scheme, there are also widespread doubts as to whether the UK's system of anti-money laundering checks can be relied on to ensure that suspicions of money laundering of corrupt wealth are reported and acted upon in an effective manner. According to the Government's own assessment, the UK's anti-money laundering system has significant weaknesses in its supervisory structure and in terms of the level of compliance and reporting standards across relevant private sectors. To help prevent corrupt wealth from entering the UK through the golden visa scheme, we recommend that the UK Government: -Establish greater integrity and transparency in the Tier 1 Investor visa scheme -Improve mechanisms for international cooperation to identify and recover corrupt assets -Improve law enforcement capacity and the effectiveness of AML supervision in the UK Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/1347-gold-rush-investment-visas-and-corrupt-capital-flows-into-the-uk Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/1347-gold-rush-investment-visas-and-corrupt-capital-flows-into-the-uk Shelf Number: 137767 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Illegal Assets Money Laundering

Author: Spain. Ministry of Interior Title: White Paper on Best Practices in Asset Recovery. CEART Project Summary: The recovery of assets with a criminal origin is one of the priorities of criminal policy within the European Union, as reflected in several legal instruments on this topic that have been adopted in recent years. The CEART Project, which tries to be a small contribution to the efforts carried out by the European Union in this field, had some ambitious objectives that could not have been reached without the unconditional support of its partners: Rey Juan Carlos University, Europol and the Asset Recovery Offices from Belgium, Scotland (United Kingdom), Hungary and Poland. With the publication of this White Paper on Best Practices in Asset Recovery, a compendium of the most effective current practices in the asset recovery field, in both the European Union and United States and Canada, one of the main goals of the CEART project has been achieved. The exchange of best practices is already included as a key point in Decision 2007/845/JHA, of 6 December 2007 concerning co-operation between Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identifying proceeds from, or other property related to crime, a regulation that represents one of the cornerstones in the field of asset recovery in the European Union. Likewise, the CEART Project has given great importance to the training of the people working in this field. Without these two key points, training and the exchange of best practices, it is difficult to improve the effectiveness of the efforts of the Member States in the tracing and identification of assets coming from crime. Both topics were already highlighted in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 20 November 2008 - Proceeds of organized crime: ensuring that "crime does not pay". Details: Madrid: Ministry of Interior, 2012. 292p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://vangogh.fcjs.urjc.es/~jesus/Home_files/WBoBPiAR_CEART_2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://vangogh.fcjs.urjc.es/~jesus/Home_files/WBoBPiAR_CEART_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 137295 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Financial Crimes Money Laundering Proceeds of Crime

Author: Frontier Economics Title: The economic and social impacts of counterfeiting and piracy in Turkey Summary: This study is the first attempt to estimate the magnitude and costs of counterfeiting in Turkey. The magnitude of counterfeiting in the economy includes the value of imported, domestically produced, and digitally retrieved counterfeit products, and adds up to 1% of the GDP. The costs of counterfeiting include tax losses, additional welfare payments, health costs, as well as costs to the wider economy such as lost FDI and exports. Estimates on employment losses due to all these factors also are included. These estimates are based on a Frontier-developed methodology that is built on work by the OECD, and show that counterfeiting is a serious problem for Turkey. Counterfeiting is not only a law enforcement issue, but is also a core problem that is relevant for economic policy-makers. The recently published Global Competitiveness Report 2011-12 by the World Economic Forum classifies Turkey as a transition economy passing from an efficiency-driven to innovation-driven stage. Completing this transition will necessitate a tough stance against counterfeiting. Firms in an efficiency-driven economy compete and grow by cutting down costs, while firms in an innovation-driven economy compete and grow by creating unique value at the global level. Illicit entities that produce counterfeit products may "compete" on cost, but they cannot act as building blocks of an innovation-driven economy. They are destined to stay as small enterprises that generate little or self-employment with low wages, all the while skirting the law. Entities involved in counterfeiting are necessarily driven into informal, illicit markets. They are excluded not only from the tax collection system, but also from the global manufacturing value-chains of modern corporations that bring local firms opportunities to scale up to the global level. Needless to say, informal firms have limited access to bank credit and venture capital, further limiting their growth prospects. If the Turkish economy is to upgrade to an innovation-driven stage, it will be based on high-impact enterprises that are able to scale-up to the global level by creating unique value. Only firms that are not involved in counterfeiting can acquire and retain global customers and investors in the long-run. It is natural to see this value be distributed to wider society in form of larger employment with higher wages. This is why avoiding counterfeiting should be an economic-policy priority. Tackling counterfeiting is a difficult challenge. It requires not only close enforcement, but the necessary incentives to create long-lasting transformation in the habits of entrepreneurs. To create a policy environment against counterfeiting requires a high level of policy coordination among different departments in the government. Dialogue and coordination among the ministries of Culture and Tourism, Justice, Health, the Interior, Economy, Customs and Trade, as well as institutions such as the Turkish Patent Institute and the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), as well as between public institutions and private sector representatives are essential. To ensure coordination and dialogue among so many different agents, political will is critical. This report is a first step in building this political will by revealing the large magnitude and long list of costs associated with counterfeiting and piracy in Turkey. Details: Ankara: BASCAP (Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 16, 2015 at: www.iccwbo.org Year: 2011 Country: Turkey URL: www.iccwbo.org Shelf Number: 137281 Keywords: Counterfeit Products Counterfeiting Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Illicit Markets Pirated Goods

Author: Frontier Economics Title: Estimating the Global Economic and Social Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy Summary: Government efforts to stabilize the economy and stimulate economic growth, trade and employment must include the critical and pervasive role that intellectual property (IP) protection plays in driving, innovation, development and jobs. The massive infiltration of counterfeit and pirated products, or IP theft, creates an enormous drain on the global economy - crowding out billions in legitimate economic activity and facilitating an "underground economy" that deprives governments of revenues for vital public services, forces higher burdens on tax payers, dislocates hundreds of thousands of legitimate jobs and exposes consumers to dangerous and ineffective products. Reliable information on the scope, scale, costs and impacts of counterfeiting and piracy is critical for helping policymakers to better understand that the trade in fake goods is damaging their economies, threatening the health and safety of their citizens and stifling innovation and creativity. Policymakers with better information on of how counterfeiting and piracy undermine IP, innovation, economic growth and employment are better able to make the fight against IP theft a higher public policy priority and take the actions needed to prevent the damage inflicted by counterfeiting and piracy. In this regard, government efforts to strengthen IP enforcement regimes can more appropriately be considered as investments that pay tangible dividends to economic development and society. Because counterfeiters and pirates operate outside the law, estimating the extent of counterfeiting and piracy and the harm these activities cause is extremely challenging. Illegal businesses do not report information on their activities to any government agency so measuring their size must be done using indirect methods. For this reason, Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP), an initiative of the International Chamber of Commerce, is commissioning experts (including Frontier for this report) to examine the issue and to develop methodologies for estimating the economic and social impacts of counterfeiting and piracy. No one report or approach will yield a complete picture or provide all the answers, but BASCAP is committed to learning from as many sources of expertise as possible. Details: Paris: BASCAP (Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy), 2011. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 16, 2015 at: www.iccwbo.org Year: 2011 Country: International URL: www.iccwbo.org Shelf Number: 137282 Keywords: Counterfeit Goods Counterfeiting Economic Crimes Fake Goods Financial Crimes Pirated Products

Author: Warren, Rob Title: Insight into awareness and impact of the Bribery Act 2010 Summary: The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) commissioned a survey of 500 small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs); 95% of these were exporting goods. The purpose of the survey was to find: -the awareness of the Bribery Act 2010 among SMEs that export, or plan to export goods and/or services -their use of guidance and advice on bribery prevention procedures (including who supplied the advice and how much it cost) -the extent to which SMEs had put in place anti-bribery procedures and how much they cost -how the Act had affected their exports and operational behaviour overseas -any specific concerns or problems they had experienced as a result of the Act or MoJ guidance Details: London: HM Government, 2015. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 16, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/440661/insight-into-awareness-and-impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/440661/insight-into-awareness-and-impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010.pdf Shelf Number: 137305 Keywords: Bribery Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes

Author: Kar, Dev Title: Flight Capital and Illicit Financial Flows to and from Myanmar: 1960-2013 Summary: Myanmar is the most porous economy we have studied in depth. Long isolation, trade restrictions, and attempts to regulate currency exchange rates have combined to drive a substantial part of the economy underground. Totaling the flight capital numbers indicates that Myanmar has experienced largely unregulated financial movements of nearly US$120 billion over the period (a small portion of flight capital may be licit), while total illicit flows amounted to almost US$100 billion. In 2013 alone, unregulated financial inflows totaled some US$10 billion, over 20 percent of GDP. Purely illicit inflows were on a similar scale in that year, at 17 percent of GDP. And these numbers do not include the smuggling of drugs, timber, precious stones, and other goods, transported across various routes and mountain passes to and from India and China, as indicated by a brief selection of satellite images included in the pages following. Interestingly, the greater part of what we can analyze as illicit flows have been inward, in reaction to import controls and to escape import levies. Undervalued and smuggled imports have sustained the weakened economy through years of insularity, isolation, and instability. Tax collection to GDP at seven percent is one of the lowest in the world, undermining the ability of the state to provide adequate health and education services. Corruption, according to Transparency International's Perceptions Index, places Myanmar among the bottom 20 in the world. These are extremely serious challenges for a nation just beginning, haltingly, to emerge from its shadows. Within our focus on financial transparency concerns, we recommend that Myanmar 1) make concerted efforts to adopt and enforce Financial Action Task Force anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing regulations, 2) provide its Customs Department with real-time world market trade pricing data, 3) greatly improve its statistical capabilities, and 4) enhance border security and curtailment of smuggling. For this the nation will need sustained external financial and technical assistance for years to come. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Burma URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Shelf Number: 137330 Keywords: Border Security Financial Crimes Money Laundering Smuggling Tax Evasion Terrorist Financing

Author: Fleming, Matthew Hitchcock Title: An examination of the means of establishing the efficacy of asset recovery and anti-money laundering policies Summary: Asset recovery (AR) refers to the process through which criminals are deprived of the proceeds of crime. Despite strong support for AR in the policy arena, virtually no work to date has confirmed that it reduces (or should theoretically reduce) crime. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in understanding. The thesis begins with an examination of the theoretical support for AR, drawing on the economics of criminal behaviour. This chapter probes the claims made throughout the literature, illustrating how different approaches to AR should have different impacts on crime. AR powers are likely ineffective in reducing crime if offenders' spending/saving behaviour renders them with little to recover. This next chapter examines offenders' spending/saving using data from the UK's Joint Assets Recovery Database. Offenders can and will take steps to hide the fruits of their labours, and AR will be toothless if offenders can do so. Most AR regimes include anti-money laundering (AML) components to prevent offenders from hiding their proceeds. The crime-reduction efficacy of AML policies is a function of the ability of offenders to reduce their exposure to AR of banks/etc. to alert law enforcement when they know/suspect that an offender is laundering and of law enforcement to make use of the information provided. The latter two issues are considered in turn. Banks/etc. must alert law enforcement (by filing suspicious activity reports, or SARs) if they know/suspect that an offender is laundering proceeds. While this requirement likely deters some criminality, reporting does not deter all offenders. This chapter explores whether banks/etc. targeting of laundering represents more signal than noise. Finally, as the criminality of the undeterred who have been identified by banks/etc. will only be reduced if law enforcement uses the SARs sent to them, the final chapter explores the law enforcement's actual use and management of SARs. Details: London: University of London, 2008. 220p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December 2, 2015 at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1444207/1/U591509.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1444207/1/U591509.pdf Shelf Number: 137418 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Asset Recovery Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Ribadu, Nuhu Title: Show Me the Money: Leveraging Anti-Money Laundering Tools to Fight Corruption in Nigeria. An Insider Story Summary: The Financial Action Task Force was created during the 1989 G-7 summit in Paris in response to growing concerns over money laundering. It is an intergovernmental body that develops policies and measures to prevent criminals from using the financial system. It studies money laundering and terrorism financing trends and techniques, develops and promotes adequate measures to fight these financial crimes, and monitors its 34 member countries' progress implementing these measures. In 1990, the task force published a plan of action to fight money laundering embodied in a set of 40 recommendations. These recommendations were revised in 1996, and again in 2003, to reflect the evolution of money laundering techniques. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF mandate was expanded to support the global fight against terrorism. In October 2001, the Task Force published another set of eight recommendations, dealing specifically with terrorism financing. Another recommendation was added in October 2004, completing what is now known as the FATF's 40+9 Recommendations. These recommendations cover the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulations, and international cooperation. They are meant to prevent financial institutions from becoming safe havens for criminal activities. In the late 1990s, the FATF cast its net beyond its members with an initiative seeking to identify major weaknesses in anti-money laundering systems worldwide. The idea was to encourage countries identified as weak links to implement international standards. In 2000 and 2001, the task force reviewed laws and regulations in 47 countries, selected on the basis of FATF members' experience. The review pitted rules and practices in these countries against 25 criteria. Of the 47 countries, 23 were found to be severely lacking and were declared non-cooperative. Nigeria was one of these 23 black sheep. In June 2001, following the lack of response to its letters, the FATF concluded that Nigeria was unwilling or unable to cooperate in the review of its system, and therefore should be blacklisted. The task force noted a lack of obligation from financial institutions to identify their clients or report suspicious transactions, inadequate criminalization of money laundering, incompetence or corruption within government, judicial or supervisory authorities, and an obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to requests. In 2002, the U.S. Treasury followed suit and issued an advisory warning to its financial institutions to use extra caution and scrutiny when dealing with transactions involving Nigeria. This was bad news for Nigeria. Being branded as non-cooperative meant that Western financial markets held up their noses. Financial institutions around the world, and particularly those in major financial centers, further scrutinized transactions involving Nigeria, resulting in crippling delays. Nigerian banks had trouble dealing with foreign counterparts. Nigerians wanting to do business abroad faced extra hurdles and were viewed with suspicion. Foreign banks were hesitant to grant letters of credit or loans to Nigerians. The country was becoming a financial pariah. Unlike the high echelons of government, which were blissfully unaware of the FATF decision for a while, local banks and businesses were directly affected and knew all about it. At the same time, Nigerian authorities were keen to obtain relief from the $30 billion in foreign debt owed to the Paris Club of creditors. In a country blessed with such mineral wealth, this crippling debt was another symptom of the mismanagement and corruption that had plagued Nigeria for decades. With the FATF frowning at Nigeria's financial practices and safeguards - or lack thereof - donors were unlikely to be in a debt-forgiving mood. Failure to correct course could result in escalating measures from the FATF. The original blacklisting meant that foreign financial institutions were advised to use extra caution when dealing with Nigeria. But continued failure to cooperate could result in FATF member countries adopting further countermeasures, which could ultimately result in the suspension of all financial transactions with Nigeria. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Showmethemoney.pdf?resourceurlname=Showmethemoney.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Showmethemoney.pdf?resourceurlname=Showmethemoney.pdf Shelf Number: 137739 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Proceeds of Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: Center for Global Development Title: Unintended Consequences of Anti-Money Laundering Policies for Poor Countries Summary: Money laundering, terrorism financing and sanctions violations by individuals, banks and other financial entities are serious offenses with significant negative consequences for rich and poor countries alike. Governments have taken important steps to address these offenses. Efforts by international organizations, the US, UK and others to combat money laundering and curb illicit financial flows are a necessary step to increase the safety of the financial system and improve security, both domestically and around the world. But the policies that have been put in place to counter financial crimes may also have unintentional and costly consequences, in particular for people in poor countries. Those most affected are likely to include the families of migrant workers, small businesses that need to access working capital or trade finance, and recipients of life-saving aid in active-conflict, post-conflict or post-disaster situations. And sometimes, current policies may be self-defeating to the extent that they reduce the transparency of financial flows. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2015. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-WG-Report-Unintended-Consequences-AML-Policies-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-WG-Report-Unintended-Consequences-AML-Policies-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137758 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing

Author: Levi, Michael Title: The Implications of Economic Cybercrime for Policing Summary: London, as one of the world's leading financial centres, had a daily turnover in the foreign exchange market of L2,626 billion in April 2013 - all dependent on a highly interconnected electronic infrastructure and supporting technology. Yet this same technology that underpins and enables these global transactions also opens up businesses and individuals to new risks, in particular relating to cybercrime. The introduction of sophisticated technology has brought about a step-change in the way economic crime is committed - enabling frauds to be perpetrated at scale, at great speed, and at a distance, with no physical contact necessary between criminal and victim. It can be much harder to identify the individuals initiating crime, and often the location will be outside UK jurisdiction. These factors have resulted in a sharp escalation of such activities in recent years, bringing new challenges for policing and industry in preventing and tackling such crime. The City of London Police is the National Policing Lead for Economic Crime, and is playing a key role in proactively addressing these challenges including developing a national strategy. One major challenge has been coordinating information about criminal activity where this can be geographically widely dispersed. In addition to investigating some of the most serious frauds in the country, the City of London Police hosts the national reporting database - Action Fraud. This current research piece undertakes new analysis of data held by Action Fraud and its partner unit, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) also hosted by the City of London Police. It finds that between October and December 2014 alone there were 106,681 reported fraud cases, a third of which related to banking and credit industry frauds. The median amount lost to fraudsters across all fraud types ranged from L112 lost through misuse of contracts in the telecom industry, to 38,974 lost from pension fraud. However the annual 250,000 crime reports received present only a limited view of several million crimes that are taking place within the UK annually to the cost of some $30billion. Under-reporting presents a challenge both in terms of research and policy responses. City of London Police initiatives to reduce fraud include training both the private and public sector in specialist skills through their Economic Crime Academy, piloting a focused victim care unit in London - the Economic Crime Victim Care Unit - and working closely with law enforcement across the UK to share information and co-ordinate action. Most importantly they include the formation of new national police fraud and cyber strategies focused on prevention at a national and local level. This research report highlights the necessity of working in partnership, both around primary prevention and building in security protection, and working with other agencies to disrupt criminal activities and pursue and prosecute offenders. Details: London: City of London Corporation, 2015. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-publications/Documents/Research-2015/Economic-Cybercrime-FullReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-publications/Documents/Research-2015/Economic-Cybercrime-FullReport.pdf Shelf Number: 137785 Keywords: Computer Crimes Computer Fraud Cybercrimes Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Internet Crimes Police Technology

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Specific Risk Factors in Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption: Assistance to Reporting Institutions Summary: 1. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, the first FATF Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) effort in the area of corruption, discussed the interrelationship between corruption and money laundering, discovered the most common methods used to launder the proceeds of corruption, and highlighted the vulnerabilities leading to an increased risk of corruption-related money laundering. It listed some of the most significant grand corruption cases and created a useful historical understanding and reference point for further work in understanding the interrelationships between corruption and money laundering. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption ultimately concluded that significant acts of corruption are fruitless without the politically exposed person (PEP) involved having a secondary capability to move and disguise the proceeds of his crime. 2. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption identified areas in which future work could be done, including gaining an understanding of the correlation between certain risk factors and corruption. It also concluded that while effective anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CTF) systems can assist in the detection of the proceeds of corruption and prevent the perpetrators of corruption-related offences from enjoying the proceeds of corruption, historically, reporting institutions have not been effective in detecting corruption-related proceeds. This has occurred for a number of reasons, including that in a number of instances, reporting institutions have failed to engage in appropriate customer identification or otherwise failed to apply AML/CFT controls effectively. In some instances, they were actually complicit, and sometimes willfully blind, in the laundering of funds. 3. This paper is written to assist reporting institutions - those financial and non-financial institutions that have a legal obligation to file suspicious transaction reports, or otherwise engage in AML/CFT due diligence - to better analyse and better understand specific risk factors that may assist them in identifying situations posing a heightened risk of corruption-related money laundering risk. It seeks to answer the question: Are there specific types of business relationships, customers, or products which should lead a reporting institution to pay particular attention to the risk of corruption-related money laundering? As with all FATF typology projects, we seek to answer the question by looking to reported cases to see if we can detect commonalities. In addition, we draw on the industry's and academia's best thinking about risk, as reflected in the published literature, to determine what situations truly represent risk. 4. Within the FATF standards3, Recommendation 12 requires a reporting entity to have in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP. It must also take specific measures, in addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures for business relationships, with foreign PEPs: senior management approval for establishing (or continuing) business relationships, take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth or funds, and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring. For domestic PEPs and persons entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation, reporting institutions are required to apply the specific enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures set out in Recommendation 12 where there is a higher-risk business relationship. This scrutiny stands at the forefront of the effort to detect and deter the laundering of proceeds of corruption and is certainly necessary. The premise behind the effort is clear: customers in these categories can pose an inherently high risk for money laundering. 5. Understanding risk within the Recommendation 12 context is important for two reasons: First, Recommendation 12 requires a reporting entity to have "appropriate" risk management systems in place to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner is a foreign PEP, and take "reasonable measures" to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or an individual entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation. To gauge whether a system is "appropriate," or whether "reasonable measures" have been taken, requires an assessment of risk. Second, understanding risk is important after identifying domestic PEPs or relevant individuals from international organisations, in order to assess what level of EDD is necessary. 6. Moreover, experience teaches us that combating corruption-related money laundering must be more than simply ensuring that PEPs receive an appropriate level of scrutiny. Rather, an effective AML scheme requires an assessment of corruption-related risk and protecting against the laundering of corruption proceeds across the spectrum of customers and business relationships, regardless of whether a FATF-defined PEP is involved. 7. Such an approach acknowledges the realities of the methods of laundering the proceeds of corruption. It is a rare case (although not unheard of) for a PEP to enter a financial institution and deposit (or transfer) significant amounts of suspicious money; such action would likely create unacceptable risks to the PEP of detection by reporting institutions. Instead, as Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption noted, corrupt PEPs will take great pains to disguise the identity and the source of the funds in order to place corrupt money in the financial system without suspicion. PEPs use corporate vehicles, sophisticated gatekeepers, cash, and countries with weak money laundering controls to disguise their funds. Their corrupt transactions will often involve an intermediary of some kind, (including family members and close associates), whether within the PEP's jurisdiction or beyond. In some cases, corrupt PEPs will also try to control the mechanisms of detection and regulation within their home jurisdiction to "game the system" in order to disguise the proceeds before the money gets to another jurisdiction. In such cases, implementation of Recommendation 12 by other jurisdictions is necessary, but is not sufficient to detect and deter the movement of corrupt proceeds. Details: Paris: FATF, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf Shelf Number: 137796 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Proceeds of Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: IRS Whistleblower Program: Billions Collected, but Timeliness and Communication Concerns May Discourage Whistleblowers Summary: Tax whistleblowers who report on the underpayment of taxes by others have helped IRS collect almost $2 billion in additional revenue since 2011, when the first high-dollar claim was paid under the expanded program that pays qualifying whistleblowers a minimum of 15 percent of the collected proceeds. These revenues help reduce the estimated $450 billion tax gap - the difference between taxes owed and those paid on time. GAO was asked to review several aspects of the whistleblower program. Among other things, this report (1) assesses the WO claim review process, (2) assesses how the WO determines awards, (3) evaluates how the WO communicates with external stakeholders, and (4) evaluates IRS's policies and procedures for protecting whistleblowers. GAO reviewed the files of all 17 awards paid under 26 U.S.C. � 7623(b) through June 30, 2015; reviewed IRS data; reviewed relevant laws and regulations, and the WO's policies, procedures and publications; and interviewed IRS officials, five whistleblowers that independently approached GAO, and nine whistleblower attorneys who were recommended by IRS or other attorneys. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider providing whistleblowers with legal protections against retaliation from employers. GAO makes ten recommendations to IRS including, tracking dates, strengthening and documenting procedures for award payments and whistleblower protections, and improving external communications. IRS agreed with our recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-20: Accessed February 9, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673440.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673440.pdf Shelf Number: 137817 Keywords: Financial Crimes Tax Evasion Whistleblowers White Collar Crime White Collar Offenses

Author: Bridgewater, Kevin Title: Don't Look, Won't Find: Weaknesses in the Supervision of the UK's Anti-Money Laundering Rules Summary: Radical overhaul of the UK's anti-money laundering system is needed, if the UK is to close the door to the billions of pounds in corrupt money coming into the country every year, according to a new report by Transparency International UK (TI-UK). A system not fit for purpose: -Poor oversight - The majority of sectors covered in this research are performing very badly in terms of identifying and reporting money laundering. Major problems have been identified in the quality, as well as the quantity, of reports coming out of the legal, accountancy and estate agency sectors. One supervisor even admitted it carried out no targeted AML monitoring at all during 2013. -Lack of transparency - 20/22 supervisors fail to meet the standard of enforcement transparency demanded by the Macrory standards of effective regulation. -Ineffective sanctions - Low fines, in relation to the amounts being laundered, failing to be effective deterrents. Of the 7 HMRC regulated sectors, that includes estate agents, the total fines in 2014/15 amounted to just $768,000. -Independence questioned - Just 7/22 supervisors control for institutional conflicts of interest, whilst 15 are also lobby groups for the sectors they supervise. The research highlights that: -A third of banks dismissed serious money laundering allegations without adequate review -In the accountancy sector, at least 14 different supervisors have some responsibility - leading to widespread inconsistency and variations. -In property, only 179 cases deemed suspicious by estate agents in 2013/14. -Just 15 suspicious cases reported through art and auction houses. Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2015. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2016 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/dont-look-wont-find-weaknesses-in-the-supervision-of-the-uks-anti-money-laundering-rules/ Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/dont-look-wont-find-weaknesses-in-the-supervision-of-the-uks-anti-money-laundering-rules/ Shelf Number: 137923 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering White Collar Crime

Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Research, Information and Communications Unit Title: Serious and Organised Crime Protection: Public Interventions Model Summary: The public interventions model maps people's vulnerability to financial and cyber crime. The research identifies: - who is at risk from cyber, fraud and financial crime - what makes them vulnerable - how government, law enforcement and cross-sector partners can better protect them from becoming victims Details: London: Home Office, 2016. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 24, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502960/Gov.uk_Serious_Organised_Crime_deck_vF.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502960/Gov.uk_Serious_Organised_Crime_deck_vF.pdf Shelf Number: 137949 Keywords: Cybercrime Financial Crimes Fraud Internet Crimes Online Victimization Organized Crime Serious Crime

Author: Arlen, Jennifer Title: Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution Summary: Over the last decade, federal corporate criminal enforcement policy has undergone a significant transformation. Firms that commit crimes are no longer simply required to pay fines. Instead, prosecutors and firms enter into pretrial diversion agreements (PDAs). Prosecutors regularly use PDAs to impose mandates on firms creating new duties that alter firms' internal operations or governance structures. This Article evaluates PDA mandates to determine whether and when prosecutors can appropriately use them to deter corporate crime. We find that mandates can be justified. But, contrary to DOJ policy favoring mandates for any firm with a deficient compliance program at the time of the crime, we find that mandates should be imposed more selectively. Specifically, mandates are only appropriate if a firm is plagued by "policing agency costs" - in that the firm's managers did not act to deter or report wrongdoing because they benefitted personally from tolerating wrongdoing or from deficient corporate policing. We show that this policing agency cost justification provides guidance on how to reform federal policy to make appropriate use of mandates, guidance which reveals that many mandates are inappropriate. Details: New York: New York University School of Law, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-04 ; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-06 : Accessed February 25, 2016 at: Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: Over the last decade, federal corporate criminal enforcement policy has undergone a significant transformation. Firms that commit crimes are no longer simply required to pay fines. Instead, prosecutors and firms enter into pr Shelf Number: 137960 Keywords: Corporate Crime Financial Crimes White-Collar Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Italy. Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted an assessment of Italy's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) system, based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations, and using the 2013 Methodology. The assessment is a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of Italy's AML/CFT system and its level of compliance with the FATF Recommendations. Italy has a strong legal and institutional framework to fight ML and TF. Authorities have a good understanding of the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks the country faces. There is generally good policy cooperation, coordination, and financial intelligence gathering and use. The authorities are able to successfully undertake large and complex money laundering and terrorist financing investigations and prosecutions, and beneficial ownership information is generally accessible to authorities. There are areas where improvements are needed. Italy should enhance its ML investigative and prosecutorial action on risks associated with self-laundering, stand-alone money laundering, and foreign predicate offenses, and the abuse of legal persons. Italy should enhance the accessibility of relevant information and dissemination of analysis by its FIU, strengthen sanctions, and improve financial sectors' and DNFBPs' understanding and implementation of requirements for beneficial ownership identification Details: Paris: FATF, 2016. 230p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Italy-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Italy URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Italy-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 137998 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Cameron, Lisa Title: China's Sex Ratio and Crime: Behavioral Change or Financial Necessity? Summary: This paper uses survey and experimental data from prison inmates and comparable non-inmates to examine the drivers of rising criminality in China. Consistent with socio-biological research on other species, we find that China's high sex-ratios are associated with greater risk-taking and impatience amongst males. These underlying behavioral impacts explain some part of the increase in criminality. The primary avenue through which the sex-ratio increases crime, however, is the direct pressure on men to appear financially attractive in order to find a partner in the marriage market. These marriage market pressures result in a higher propensity to commit financially rewarding crimes. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9747: Accessed March 2, 2016 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9747.pdf Year: 2016 Country: China URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9747.pdf Shelf Number: 138021 Keywords: Crime Rates Families Financial Crimes Marriage One Child Policy Risk-Taking

Author: Great Britain. National Audit Office Title: Tackling tax fraud: how HMRC responds to tax evasion, the hidden economy and criminal attacks Summary: According to a report by the National Audit Office published today, HMRC estimates that losses to tax fraud amount to $16 billion each year. This is nearly half of HMRC's estimate of the tax gap ($34 billion): the difference between the amount of tax HMRC should collect each year and the amount it actually collects. Today's report is the first in a series of reports which will evaluate how effectively HMRC tackles different aspects of tax fraud, a longstanding problem not only for HMRC but for tax administrations around the world. Reducing the amount of tax that is lost due to tax fraud is a high priority for HMRC. To do this it will need to make better use of its data and develop its analysis. In 2014/15 HMRC reported $26.6 billion[1] additional revenue from all its compliance work, including work to tackle tax fraud but also work to tackle other parts of the tax gap like error and tax avoidance. HMRC has only partial data on how much of the total yield is derived from its work to counter tax fraud. For example it has more complete information on its work to tackle organised crime than tax evasion. We estimate that between 30% and 40% of total compliance yield is generated by HMRC's activities to tackle tax fraud, but this is an estimate based on partial evidence. HMRC assesses that two groups, smaller businesses and criminals, are responsible for 17 of the 21 biggest tax fraud risks. Of these, 8 relate to organised crime and 9 involve medium-sized, small or micro-businesses. HMRC believes these businesses are responsible for tax losses of $17 billion, almost half of the total tax gap, but does not consider its internal estimate of how much of this is the result of tax fraud robust enough for publication. HMRC has assessed that using its powers to investigate by civil means is usually the best way to recover missing tax at the lowest cost. It pursues criminal prosecution for cases where it believes it needs to send a strong deterrent message or when, given the severity of the fraud, it considers prosecution the only appropriate action. HMRC met its target to increase prosecutions by 1,000 a year by 2014-15, but recognises that it needs to better prioritise the cases it selects for criminal investigation. Although HMRC cannot demonstrate that this was the right number, the target had the effect of prompting the department to change its processes and make its investigations more efficient. This led it to focus on less complex cases, in particular a large number of prosecutions for people who had evaded income tax, VAT and tobacco duty. HMRC has recognised that it needs to prosecute cases that more closely correspond with its analysis of tax fraud risks. HMRC has more to do to understand what benefits it has achieved by increasing the number of prosecutions. In 2014-15, HMRC claimed $295 million in yield from the deterrent effect of its additional 1,000 prosecutions. However, in 2015 HMRC evaluated the deterrent effect of these prosecutions and found that it could not verify their monetary value. HMRC research found increased awareness of prosecutions but could not find evidence they led to changes in behaviour or increases in tax revenues. HMRC is now taking a broader look at its strategy by, for example, starting to shift the balance of its work, placing more emphasis on measures to prevent losses rather than relying so much on investigating them afterwards. It has also improved its assessment of risk, including what risks might occur in the future. It is also working to improve the quality and amount of data it uses as part of an ambitious long-term strategy to transform its business. [1] A significant element of the yield calculation relies on estimates of current and future benefits and is not the amount of cash generated each year from HMRC's enforcement and compliance activities Details: London: NAO, 2016. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 610, Session 2015-16: Accessed March 2, 2016 at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Tackling-tax-fraud-how-HMRC-responds-to-tax-evasion-the-hidden-economy-and-criminal-attacks.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Tackling-tax-fraud-how-HMRC-responds-to-tax-evasion-the-hidden-economy-and-criminal-attacks.pdf Shelf Number: 138024 Keywords: Financial Crimes Tax Evasion Tax Fraud White Collar Crime

Author: Connery, David Title: A Web of Harms: Serious and organised crime and its impact on Australian interests Summary: This special report examines transnational, serious and organised crime and the harms it causes to Australia's interests. The report aims to encourage a reinvigorated discussion among Australians about this critical matter. The harms include negative impacts upon individuals and the community and unfair competition for some legitimate businesses. Serious and organised crime - whether transnational or domestic - also imposes costs on Australian governments and denies them revenue. What's more, serious and organised crime groups acting overseas work against Australia's foreign policy interests and increase risks to Australians (and others) who live, invest and travel abroad. There's an urgent need for the Australian community to discuss the criminal threats facing it in a more deliberate and broader-reaching way. That�s because dealing with serious and organised crime is not a task for government alone: the Australian public and business have key roles. After all, consumer demand creates illicit markets that serious and organised crime seeks to supply. Additionally, the internet is increasing the speed, reach and depth of penetration by serious and organized crime into the lives of all Australian families and businesses. Simply put, you don't need to go to nightclubs in red-light districts to meet organised crime: you need go only as far as your computer. It's also worth examining better ways to increase the roles of non-law-enforcement agencies, business and the community in efforts to address serious and organised crime. We should bring the full range of social, education, regulatory and health instruments into the fight, and subdue the potential of internet-enabled financial crime to damage our current and future prosperity. International cooperation in this fight is essential, especially given the role of overseas actors in our crime challenge. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Initiative, 2015. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 9, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/a-web-of-harms-serious-and-organised-crime-and-its-impact-on-australian-interests/SR81_Web_Harms.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/a-web-of-harms-serious-and-organised-crime-and-its-impact-on-australian-interests/SR81_Web_Harms.pdf Shelf Number: 138147 Keywords: Financial Crimes Internet Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human beings and Smuggling of Migrants Summary: Criminals are increasingly turning to the trafficking of human beings and the smuggling of migrants given the high profitability of these illegal activities. The money generated by such activities finds its way into the financial system. The FATF has carried out a study which describes the money flows related to these two distinct problems and attempts to assess their scale. The key objectives of the report are the following: - To assess the scale of the problem; - To identify different trends in trafficking in human beings/ migrant smuggling; - To identify from case studies where money laundering is occurring and what form it is taking; - To inform law enforcement agencies on the laundering of funds coming from human trafficking/ migrant smuggling; - To identify red flag indicators to assist financial institutions in their identification of money laundering from human trafficking/ migrant smuggling, and in the reporting of suspicious transaction reports; - To increase the possibility of the proceeds of human trafficking/migrant smuggling being identified and confiscated, and thereby discouraging the activity of human trafficking or migrant smuggling. Details: Paris: FATF, 2011. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 15, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trafficking%20in%20Human%20Beings%20and%20Smuggling%20of%20Migrants.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trafficking%20in%20Human%20Beings%20and%20Smuggling%20of%20Migrants.pdf Shelf Number: 138243 Keywords: Financial Crimes Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Migrant Smuggling Migrants Money Laundering

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Fraud within the Commonwealth: A census of the most costly incidents, 2010-11 to 2012-13 Summary: Fraud against the Commonwealth is defined as 'dishonestly obtaining a benefit or causing a loss, by deception or other means'. This definition is set out in the current Commonwealth Resource Management Guide (no. 201) Preventing, detecting and dealing with fraud, issued by the Australian Government Minister for Justice (2014). This form of fraud may be committed by individuals who do not work for government bodies, such as those who dishonestly claim benefits or some other financial advantage (external fraud), or by those employed by entities including staff and contractors (internal fraud). Fraud may also involve collaboration between internal and external parties. This paper aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of internal fraud against the Commonwealth, and the personal background details of those alleged to have committed the deception. It reports on the results of an annual census of Commonwealth entities which collected information on the single 'most costly' incident of internal fraud that they experienced in 2010-11 to 2012-13. During these years, 137 Commonwealth entities reported 7,809 incidents of internal fraud. Of these, 125 chose one incident each year that they considered their most costly internal fraud. Information was provided on how and why fraud was committed, estimated financial losses involved, the personal circumstances of the principal alleged perpetrators, and how the incidents were dealt with in terms of investigation, prosecution and judicial outcomes. Most incidents involved non-corporate Commonwealth entities (formerly governed under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) see Table 1). Entities with more than 1,000 staff contributed more incidents for this study than smaller bodies. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Research in Practice No. 41: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rip/rip41/rip41.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rip/rip41/rip41.pdf Shelf Number: 138318 Keywords: Crimes against Businesses Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption

Author: Pieth, Mark Title: Multistakeholder Initiatives to Combat Money Laundering and Bribery Summary: Intensified economic globalisation has had positive and negative effects. It has left nation states struggling to deal with the negative fall-out. National regulation against abuses has, however, proven increasingly ineffective, especially since companies have the freedom to move their hazardous activities to under-regulated areas. States have stepped up cooperation and coordination on a bilateral as well as a multilateral basis: international organisations and treaties become more and more relevant to the regulation of international trade relations. However, the traditional instruments of international law are frequently considered too cumbersome and slow. Increasingly international law is created by unconventional means: 'task forces' prove to be far more expedient, since they prefer 'soft law' to treaty law. Political enforcement by peer-pressure becomes more relevant than by juridical instruments (e.g. courts and tribunals). Furthermore, regulation goes well beyond law-making by legislators and government bodies; non-state actors contribute extensively, especially in the area of regulating international trade relations. Details: Basel: Basel Institute on Governance, 2006. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series No. 02: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/publications/biog_working_paper_02.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/publications/biog_working_paper_02.pdf Shelf Number: 138434 Keywords: Bribery Bribes Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Title: Adjusting the Lens on Economic Crime: preparation brings opportunity back into focus Summary: More than a third of organisations have experienced economic crime in the past 24 months, as reported by over 6,000 respondents to PwC's Global Economic Crime Survey 2016. This year's results show that the incidence of economic crime has come down, for the first time since the global financial crisis of 2008-9 (albeit marginally by 1%).​ At first glance, this could be evidence of a return on the investments in the preventative measures which organisations have been making over the past few years. But as we look at the data more closely, it is possible that this small decrease is actually masking a worrying trend: that economic crime is changing significantly, but that detection and controls programmes are not keeping up with the pace of change. What's more, the financial cost of each fraud is on the rise.​ This year's report illustrates how economic crime has evolved over the last two years, morphing into different forms depending on industrial sector and region.​ Despite this evolving threat, we have seen a decrease in the detection of criminal activity by methods within management's control, with detection through corporate controls down by 7%. What's more, one in five organisations (22%) have not carried out a single fraud risk assessment in the last 24 months. When looked at in the context of the findings in PwC's 19th Annual Global CEO Survey - where two-thirds of chief executives agreed that there are more threats to the growth of their company than ever before (a sharp increase, compared to 59% in 2015) - this points to a potentially worrying trend: that too much is being left to chance. In fact, our findings indicate that one in ten economic crimes are discovered by accident.​ Details: s.l.: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Global Economic Crime Survey 2016: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138456 Keywords: Cybercrime Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Fraud

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Fraud withing the Commonwealth: A census of the most costly incidents, 2010-11 to 2012-13 Summary: Fraud against the Commonwealth is defined as 'dishonestly obtaining a benefit or causing a loss, by deception or other means'. This definition is set out in the current Commonwealth Resource Management Guide (no. 201) Preventing, detecting and dealing with fraud, issued by the Australian Government Minister for Justice (2014). This form of fraud may be committed by individuals who do not work for government bodies, such as those who dishonestly claim benefits or some other financial advantage (external fraud), or by those employed by entities including staff and contractors (internal fraud). Fraud may also involve collaboration between internal and external parties. Button & Brooks (2009) suggest that the development of an anti-fraud culture is largely targeted at combatting internal fraud. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has defined internal fraud as: ...the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisations' resources or assets (ACFE 2014: 6). This paper aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of internal fraud against the Commonwealth, and the personal background details of those alleged to have committed the deception. It reports on the results of an annual census of Commonwealth entities which collected information on the single 'most costly' incident of internal fraud that they experienced in 2010-11 to 2012-13. During these years, 137 Commonwealth entities reported 7,809 incidents of internal fraud. Of these, 125 chose one incident each year that they considered their most costly internal fraud. Information was provided on how and why fraud was committed, estimated financial losses involved, the personal circumstances of the principal alleged perpetrators, and how the incidents were dealt with in terms of investigation, prosecution and judicial outcomes. Most incidents involved non-corporate Commonwealth entities (formerly governed under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) see Table 1). Entities with more than 1,000 staff contributed more incidents for this study than smaller bodies. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Research in Practice, no. 41: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rip/rip41/rip41.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rip/rip41/rip41.pdf Shelf Number: 138463 Keywords: Financial Crimes Fraud

Author: Queensland Organised Crime Commission of Inquiry Title: Report Summary: The Commission commenced on 1 May 2015, by Commissions of Inquiry Order (No. 1) 2015, to make inquiry into the extent and nature of organised crime in Queensland and its economic and societal impacts. The otherwise very broad nature of such an inquiry was somewhat narrowed by the Terms of Reference within the Order in Council, which focused the Commission on four key areas: - the major illicit drug and/or precursor markets - online child sex offending, including the child exploitation material market - financial crimes, primarily investment/financial market fraud and financial data theft - the relationship between organised crime and corruption in Queensland. The Commission was also required to investigate the extent to which organised crime groups use various enabling mechanisms or services: in particular, money laundering, cyber and technology-enabled crime, identity crime, professional facilitators, violence and extortion. In carrying out the Inquiry, the Commission was to examine the adequacy and appropriateness of current responses to organised crime by law enforcement, intelligence, and prosecution agencies, as well as the adequacy of legislation and of the resources available to such agencies. The six-month timeframe given for the Inquiry was limited, given the areas required to be examined. Details: Sydney: The Commission, 2015. 578p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://www.organisedcrimeinquiry.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/935/QOCCI15287-ORGANISED-CRIME-INQUIRY_Final_Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.organisedcrimeinquiry.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/935/QOCCI15287-ORGANISED-CRIME-INQUIRY_Final_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 138491 Keywords: Child Sexual Exploitation Corruption Cybercrime Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Financial Crimes Identity Theft Money Laundering Motorcycle Gangs Organized Crime

Author: Europol Title: The THB Financial Business Model: assessing the current state of knowledge Summary: Europol's Report on Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) Financial Business Model 2015 is now available online. This document has been prepared by experts at Europol and is oriented towards explaining the current crime situation, providing an overview of all relevant factors e.g. organised crime groups (OCGs), criminal markets, and geographical dimension. The main key findings detailed in the report show how OCGs involved in THB tend to work independently from other groups and launder their own criminal proceeds with little use of experts. These OCGs are mainly small and based on family and ethnic ties. The family cell is used to support trafficking operations and money laundering activities. There are no new methods of money laundering specific to THB groups, but the exploitation of innovative technologies is increasing. Financial institutions, money service businesses and other types of financial providers are at most risk of being exploited by the money laundering activities of OCGs. Details: The Hague: Europol, 2015. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2016 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/trafficking-human-beings-financial-business-model Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/trafficking-human-beings-financial-business-model Shelf Number: 138650 Keywords: Financial crimes Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime

Author: Goodrich, Steve Title: Paradise Lost: Ending the Uk's role as a safe haven for corrupt individuals, their allies and assets Summary: Paradise Lost is a thorough analysis of the UK's role in global corruption, outlining the multitude of ways in which the UK is enabling corrupt individuals to enjoy luxury lifestyles and cleanse their reputations. This includes: -The ability to buy UK property anonymously through foreign companies. -The UK's Overseas Territories offering secretive company ownership -Lack of powers for law enforcement to seize stolen assets. -Role of UK based accountants, lawyers, estate agents and other "professional enablers" in making it easy for corrupt individuals to hide their cash. -An anti-money laundering system that is easy to bypass in order to launder money with impunity. Key recommendations include: -Ensure the UK's Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies introduce centralised public registers of beneficial ownership, and ensure corrupt individuals cannot buy UK property with impunity. -Act on unexplained wealth by increasing the capabilities of the UK's asset recovery regime to seize corrupt funds. -Fix the flaws in the UK's anti-money laundering regime - overhauling the supervision of the rules, and prosecuting complicit professional enablers. The Panama Papers and the UK's complicity: -Of the 214,000 corporate entities exposed, over half were registered in the British Virgin Islands. -Our research showed 36,000 properties in London are owned by companies registered in offshore jurisdictions. -The UK was the second most popular place for the Mossack Fonseca firm to operate. According to the ICIJ, Mossack Fonseca worked with 1,924 UK professional enablers to set up companies, foundations and trusts for customers. Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2016 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/paradise-lost/ Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/paradise-lost/ Shelf Number: 138652 Keywords: Corruption Financial crimes Money Laundering

Author: Carlisle, David Title: Targeting Security Threats Using Financial Intelligence: The US Experience in Public-Private Information Sharing since 9/11 Summary: Since the founding of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989, global efforts on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing have rested on the principle that co-operation between the public and private sectors is essential in generating financial intelligence. Recently, however, a consensus has emerged in both the public and private sectors that the frequency and quality of financial information sharing is inadequate. Observers argue that governments do not supply the private sector with sufficient detail about key threats, such as terrorism, for financial institutions to generate high-quality financial intelligence (FININT). On the other hand, private sector reporting of FININT through the traditional Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) process is often slow and inefficient, hindering the ability of governments to act against criminals or terrorists. Fortunately, one relatively longstanding model for public-private information sharing does exist. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001, President George W Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act. One aim of the Act was to elevate the role of FININT in identifying and disrupting security threats. Two sections of the Act have particular relevance for promoting public-private information sharing to this end: Sections 314 and 311. Set alongside the traditional SARs regime, Sections 314 and 311 help to sustain a robust, if still maturing, public-private partnership aimed at protecting the US financial system against a broad array of illicit finance threats. This paper offers an overview of the aims of US policy, an examination of the US experience in implementing Sections 314 and 311 of the PATRIOT Act, and a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the US approach. It also draws lessons from US experience and provides seven principles for policy-makers to consider when developing public-private information-sharing arrangements at the national or international level. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper, 2016: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_op_financing_patriot_act_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_op_financing_patriot_act_final.pdf Shelf Number: 138894 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Financial Crimes Money Laundering Patriot Act Terrorist Financing

Author: Australia. Department of Social Services Title: Review of Illegal Offshore Wagering Report Summary: Across the global gambling market, online games and wagering are the fastest growing market segments over recent years. These sectors of the gambling market are also subject to a range of regulatory restrictions in a number of Australian jurisdictions. Wagering is the fastest growing gambling sector in Australia. Fast growth in a market of this size, particularly where the platforms are largely online, raises concerns about the harmful impacts on our community, especially on the largely young male audience to whom these interactive products are marketed. As operators in these markets are operating outside the regulatory reach of Australian law enforcement and regulators, strategies to mitigate harm are particularly important. A key determinant of the relative size of the legal and illegal market is the ability of the regulatory framework to attract offshore bookmakers operating illegally to move onshore and submit to Australian regulatory requirements. This is in part influenced by a regulatory framework that places legal operators on a competitive footing with the illegal market. Key elements of the regulatory framework that may influence the relative size of the legal and illegal markets include taxation levels, the types of services and product fees permitted or prohibited (such as online in-play wagering on sporting events) and the range and scope of regulatory harm minimisation measures. The importance of appropriate harm minimisation measures to ensure adequate consumer protection is well documented, as is the need to manage the social and economic impacts of both problem gambling and illegal offshore wagering. Australia's online gambling market is subject to a range of regulatory measures that aim to protect our community and industry from potentially harmful gambling activities. Successive governments have acknowledged that enforcement of Australian regulations against illegal offshore online wagering operators is difficult, and previous studies have highlighted the challenges of bringing illegal offshore wagering activities into a regulated onshore environment. The Interactive Gambling Act 2001 (the Act) is directed at controlling the provision of online gambling services to Australians. Under the Act, it is an offence to provide certain interactive gambling services to consumers located in Australia. This carries a maximum penalty of $360,000 per day for individuals and $1.8 million per day for corporations, which applies to all providers whether they are located in Australia or offshore. On 7 September 2015, the Commonwealth announced a review of the illegal offshore wagering market in Australia (the Review). The Review has involved extensive consultation and engagement with a broad range of community, industry and government stakeholders directed to strengthening enforcement of the Act and ensuring Australians are adequately protected from the impacts of illegal offshore wagering operators. Details: Canberra: Department of Social Services, 2015. 188p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2016 at: https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/04_2016/review_of_illegal_offshore_wagering_18_december_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/04_2016/review_of_illegal_offshore_wagering_18_december_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138897 Keywords: Financial Crimes Gambling and Crime Illegal Gambling Organized Crime Sports Gambling

Author: Heggstad, Kari Title: How Banks Assist Capital Flight from Africa: A Literature Review Summary: Systematic studies of the banking sector's involvement in facilitating capital flight from developing countries are limited. This paper was commissioned by Norad's Anti-Corruption Project (ANKOR) for the purpose of summarising key lessons from the existing literature and to identifying knowledge gaps. It focuses on capital flight from Africa and how much needed public finances are hidden abroad. The study is a desk study, based on a review of library and online literature databases and reports and documentation from national and international organisations. The material reviewed does not provide the information necessary to draw firm conclusions as to what constitutes "best practice" in providing donor support for better regulation of banks and financial institutions in Africa. The term "best practice" itself is unclear and depends much on the environment within which finance institutions work. The review shows that banks should not be disregarded as passive players when analysing capital flight. Banks play an active role in facilitating capital flight from Africa. However, to improve the regulation of the banking and finance sectors, there is a need for more detailed knowledge on how banks actually operate as facilitators and the mechanisms applied. Details: Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2010. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2016 at: http://www.cmi.no/file/?972 Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cmi.no/file/?972 Shelf Number: 138905 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Verizon Title: 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report Summary: Our ninth Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) pulls together incident data from 67 contributors around the world to reveal the biggest IT security risks you'll face. This year's dataset is made up of over 100,000 incidents, of which 3,141 were confirmed data breaches. Of these, 64,199 incidents and 2,260 breaches comprise the finalized dataset that was used in the analysis and figures throughout the report. We address the reasons for culling the dataset in Victim Demographics and provide additional details when we discuss motives in Breach Trends. Of course, we would never suggest that every last security event of 2015 is in this report. We acknowledge sample bias, and provide information about our methodology as well as links to resources that we encourage you to look into to help collect and analyze incident data within your own organization, in Appendix E. Details: New York?: Verizon, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2016 at: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016/ Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016/ Shelf Number: 138913 Keywords: Cyber Security Cybercrime Financial Crimes

Author: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Title: Targeting Scams: Report of the ACCC on scams activity 2015 Summary: The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's (ACCC) seventh annual report on scams activity in Australia highlights the significant financial loss and emotional harm incurred by the Australian community as a result of scams. In 2015 the ACCC received over 105 000 scam reports, 14 000 more than in 2014. Reported monetary losses also grew by 4 per cent, to almost $85 million. For this year's report the ACCC has also reviewed data from other jurisdictions that receive reports or detect scams to gain a clearer picture of the significance of losses caused by scam activity in Australia. Reports to the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) revealed losses of over $127 million1. Additionally, various scam disruption programs, operated by the ACCC and other agencies, also detect Australians sending funds to high risk jurisdictions. A combined estimate of losses to this unreported scam activity is $17.1 million. Combining Scamwatch and ACORN data with losses detected through scam disruption work, total scam losses exceed $229 million. This report seeks to explore the nature of scam losses and identify some emerging trends. It focuses on data reported to Scamwatch and statistics provided in the report are in respect of that data unless specifically stated otherwise. By far the most concerning trend in the ACCC's Scamwatch data related to investment scams, which overtook dating and romance scams as the category with the largest financial losses reported by Australians in the last year. Losses to investment scams almost doubled, from $12.5 million to $24.4 million with six people reporting individual losses of $1 million or more. Additionally, ACORN data shows reported losses to investment scams of almost $17 million. This brings total reported losses to more than $41 million and this still does not include those that do not report or may have reported to another organisation. It is not hard to see why many Australians are losing large sums of money in these scams given how difficult they are to identify. These more sophisticated scams often involve scammers who use accurate technical jargon in carefully crafted cold calling scripts and accompany this with glossy brochures backed up by professional-looking websites. Even astute investors have been known to fall victim to these more calculated scams. Losses reported to Scamwatch from dating and romance scams have reduced by more than $5 million (18.5 per cent) to $22.7 million, and are the second highest category in 2015. Together with investment scams, they account for 56 per cent of scam losses reported to Scamwatch in the past year. A further $14.8 million was reported to ACORN. When you add in the $17.1 million identified through disruption initiatives, this brings the total for relationships scams to over $54 million. While investment and dating scams caused the most losses in 2015, the most commonly reported scams to the ACCC have been phishing scams, reclaim scams and upfront payment/advanced fee scams. Over 15 000 reports of phishing scams have been received, resulting in a total reported loss of $363 270. While the number of reports we received are spread across all age groups, it is middle aged and older Australians who are reporting the highest losses. The ACCC has taken a closer look at the risk that scam activity poses to older Australians in this report. Details: Canberra: ACCC, 2016. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2016 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/targeting_scams_-_report_of_the_accc_on_scam_activity_2015.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/targeting_scams_-_report_of_the_accc_on_scam_activity_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 139103 Keywords: Consumer Protection and Fraud Crimes Against Business Cybercrime Financial Crimes Fraud Scams

Author: EY Title: Fraud and corruption -- Driving away talent? Asia-Pacific Fraud Survey 2015 Summary: Given the ongoing war for talent in Asia-Pacific (APAC), our APAC Fraud Survey 2015 reveals a compelling new reason for executives and boards to revisit their fraud, bribery and corruption risk mitigation strategies. To date, the incentives to get compliance right have centered on minimizing financial losses, reducing the management time required to investigate and remediate issues, and preventing the reputational damage caused by corruption. But with a vast majority of our more than 1,500 respondents rating ethical practices as important - and nearly 80% saying they would be unwilling to work for organizations involved in bribery and corruption - there's a new imperative to manage fraud, bribery and corruption risks effectively. Failing to do so could see promising talent avoid working for organizations and cause the best employees to jump ship, leading to higher attrition rates and expensive recruitment campaigns. In markets where it's already difficult to recruit and retain staff, the consequences could be catastrophic. As this survey discusses, to avoid putting their valued talent and growth strategies at risk, APAC companies will need a holistic fraud prevention and detection framework - backed by strong leadership, with up-to-date and well-enforced internal controls, policies and procedures. Organizations also need to improve the way they handle whistleblower hotline complaints, with far fewer respondents willing to use a hotline when compared to our 2013 survey. Our 2015 survey also concludes that the answer to increasing regulatory enforcement and stretched in-house compliance teams lies in leveraging big data through forensic data analytics (FDA), as well as involving the entire C-suite in preparing for a possible cybercrime incident. Details: s.l.: EY, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2016 at: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-apac-fraud-survey-2015/$FILE/ey-apac-fraud-survey-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-apac-fraud-survey-2015/$FILE/ey-apac-fraud-survey-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 139139 Keywords: Bribes Crimes Against Business Cybercrime Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption

Author: Avis, Eric Title: Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians Summary: Political corruption is considered a major impediment to economic development, and yet it remains pervasive throughout the world. This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil's anti-corruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Based on our estimated model, the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived threat of the non-electoral costs of engaging in corruption. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper 22443: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22443.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22443.pdf Shelf Number: 139820 Keywords: Economic Crimes Financial crimes Political Corruption

Author: Grudnoff, Matt Title: Corporate Malfeasance in Australia Summary: This paper estimates the extent of corporate wrong-doing in Australia, based on data published by: �h Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) �h Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) �h Australian Tax Office (ATO) �h Fair Work Ombudsman �h Fair Work Commission �h Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) There are fewer cops patrolling the corporate beat than there were three years ago. The regulators and other government agencies that monitor corporate malfeasance have had staffing cut by 3,926 people (or 14.9 per cent) between the numbers budgeted for in 2013-14 and that for the present year, 2015-16. It is difficult to understand the rationale for these cuts, given the official publications of the relevant agencies show that corporate wrongdoing is widespread in Australia. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is responsible for promoting competition and protecting consumers and small businesses against other businesses. Based on its press releases, over the last 10 years the ACCC has taken action against 669 companies: 167 for competition issues, 489 safeguarding consumers and against unfair trade and 13 others. We examined the top 50 Australian listed companies which accounted for 29 of the court appearances. Of those Wesfarmers (Coles) was top of the list and involved in seven cases closely followed by Woolworths (6), Telstra (4), AGL (4) and Origin (3). However, if other out-of-court actions are included Woolworths tops the list being the subject of 29 issues identified in the press releases. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission��s (ASIC) performance was also examined over the four and a half years to December 2015 during which it successfully concluded 3,115 cases against corporations, of which 2,095 were criminal matters. This is unlikely to represent the full extent of non-compliance by corporations with relevant legal requirements because ASIC, like most regulators, has limited resources and a reluctance to take formal proceedings unless there is a very high prospect of success and other cheaper enforcement options have been exhausted. Recently ASIC reported on the special case of the construction industry and reported incidents of alleged misconduct. This is a much wider category than the cases already referred to. Nevertheless ASIC reports a large number of incidents with 10,667 cases over those five years. Details: Canberra: The Australia Institute, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.tai.org.au/sites/defualt/files/P247%20Corporate%20malfeasance%20in%20Australia.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.tai.org.au/sites/defualt/files/P247%20Corporate%20malfeasance%20in%20Australia.pdf Shelf Number: 139842 Keywords: Corporate Crime Financial Crimes

Author: Cortes, Darwin Title: Economic Shocks and Crime: Evidence from the Crash of Ponzi Schemes Summary: In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock. Details: Caracas, Venezuela: CAF (Development Bank of Latin America), 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Working papers No. 2016/01: Accessed September 17, 2016 at: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/11880/dt185.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/11880/dt185.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 147940 Keywords: Economics of Crime Financial Crimes Ponzi Schemes Property Crime

Author: KPMG Title: Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey: 2014 Summary: KPMG launched its online survey in November 2013. The survey was distributed to AML and compliance professionals in the top 1,000 global banks, according to the 2013 edition of The Banker Magazine, as well as to KPMG's AML contacts in over 40 countries. The overarching aims of this year's global AML survey include: - Identifying emerging trends, opportunities and threats; - Capturing industry perceptions on regulation, cost, and effectiveness; and - Benchmarking AML efforts in the financial services industry. In addition to the topics covered in our previous surveys, the 2014 survey also asked respondents to consider money laundering in relation to the following: - Trade Finance - FATCA andTax Evasion - Insurance Sector - Asset Management Sector Details: London: KPMG, 2014. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2016 at: https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/global-anti-money-laundering-survey-v3.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/global-anti-money-laundering-survey-v3.pdf Shelf Number: 145588 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce: Results of the 2014 online consumer fraud survey Summary: The Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce (ACFT) is a group of 22 government regulatory agencies and departments in Australia and New Zealand. It works with private sector, community and non-government partners to prevent fraud. The ACFT has run a range of fraud prevention and awareness-raising activities since 2005. One of its key initiatives is to run an annual consumer fraud survey to take a snapshot of the public's exposure to consumer fraud and fraudulent invitations, to assess their impact, determine how victims respond, and identify emerging typologies and issues. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), as a taskforce member and chair of its research subgroup, hosts the survey on behalf of the ACFT. It should be noted that the survey participants were not randomly sampled and so survey findings are not representative of the general population. This report presents the results of the 2014 survey, which ran for six months from 1 January 2014. This period encompassed National Fraud Prevention week, which coincides with global fraud awareness-raising activities. The theme of the 2014 campaign was Know who you're dealing with, and it was aimed at raising awareness about relationship scams by asking people to think twice before transferring money to people they did not know personally. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2016. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2016 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rr/001/rr001.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rr/001/rr001.pdf Shelf Number: 145574 Keywords: Consumer Fraud Consumer Protection Financial Crimes

Author: Cross, Cassandra Title: Improving responses to online fraud victims: An examination of reporting and support Summary: This study was developed to understand the needs of fraud victims through in-depth interviews conducted with 80 individuals from across Australia who lodged complaints of online fraud involving losses of $10,000 or more in the preceding four years to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's (ACCC) "Scamwatch" website or hotline. The aims of the study were:  to document the various impacts and harms that victims of online fraud experience;  to examine the reasons why some individuals choose to report online fraud to authorities, while others fail to make reports; and  to determine how the support needs of this group of victims might best be met. The personal stories of those interviewed describe the financial impact of what occurred, as well as a range of emotional, psychological, interpersonal and physical impacts resulting from their victimisation. In addition, the barriers to reporting the crimes they suffered officially are documented. The report concludes by identifying what victims of online fraud really want in terms of support from government and non-government bodies, friends, relatives and counsellors. Research participants The 80 participants ranged in age from 30 to 77 years, with a mean age of 56. Forty-six (58%) were male and thirty-four (42%) were female. Participants identified as being from a wide range of countries of birth, predominantly Australia (68%), the United Kingdom (11%) and New Zealand (5%). Participants resided in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. Financial impact Reported financial losses ranged from $10,000 to approximately $500,000. In many cases, participants were not able to indicate precisely how much money they had lost to online fraud, as often losses had been incurred over a lengthy period of time (up to several years) while in other cases, victims had simply lost track of how much money they had sent. Some victims, however, suffered substantial and debilitating financial impacts. Some of the current participants described losing all their superannuation, being 'sucked dry', having to pay off loans over periods of months or years, 'losing everything', losing their life savings, not being able to afford to buy food, and 'throwing good money after bad' by hiring lawyers or pursuing civil proceedings against perpetrators. Details: Sydney: Criminology Research Advisory Council, 2016. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2016 at: http://www.crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1617/29-1314-FinalReport.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1617/29-1314-FinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 145372 Keywords: Corporate Crime Financial Crimes Fraud Online Victimization Scams

Author: Financial Services Authority (UK) Title: Anti-bribery and corruption systems and controls in investment banks Summary: 1.1 Introduction 1 This report describes how investment banks and firms carrying on investment banking or similar activities in the UK (collectively referred to here as "firms" are managing bribery and corruption risk in their businesses and sets out the findings of our recent thematic review. We expect regulated firms in all sectors to consider our findings and examples of good and poor practice, as they may also be relevant to firms in other sectors which are subject to our financial crime rules in SYSC 3.2.6R or SYSC 6.1.1R.1 2 We require regulated firms to establish and maintain effective systems and controls to mitigate financial crime risk. Financial crime risk includes the risk of bribery and corruption. (We summarise regulated firms' regulatory responsibilities in this area in Section 2.4.) In addition to these regulatory requirements, bribery, whether committed in the UK or abroad, is a criminal offence under the Bribery Act 2010, which has consolidated and replaced previous anti-bribery and corruption legislation in the UK. We do not enforce, or give guidance on, the Bribery Act. 1.2 Findings 3 We found that, although some investment banks had completed a great deal of work to implement effective anti-bribery and corruption (ABC) controls, most had more work to do. Our key findings are set out below: a) Most firms had not properly taken account of our rules covering bribery and corruption, either before the Bribery Act or after. There are fundamental differences between the two described in this report. For example, our rules require firms to put in place systems and controls to mitigate bribery and corruption risk and we do not need to find evidence of bribery taking place to take action against firms that fail to meet our requirements. b) Nearly half the firms in our sample still did not have an adequate ABC risk assessment, although progress has been made since the implementation of the Bribery Act. c) Management information (MI) on ABC provided to senior management was poor, making it difficult for us to see how firms' senior management could carry out their oversight functions effectively. d) The majority of firms had not yet thought about how to monitor the effectiveness of their ABC controls. Only two firms had either started or carried out specific anti-bribery and corruption internal audits. e) Firms' understanding of bribery and corruption was often very limited. f) There were significant weaknesses in firms' dealings with third parties used to win or retain business, including in relation to compliance approval; due diligence; politically exposed persons (PEP) screening; ensuring and documenting a clear business rationale; risk assessment; and regular review. g) Many firms had recently tightened up their gifts, hospitality and expenses policies by prohibiting facilitation payments, increasing senior management oversight of expenses and introducing or revising limits. But few had processes to produce adequate MI, for example, to ensure gifts and expenses in relation to particular clients/projects were reasonable on a cumulative basis. h) Firms had well-established vetting processes in place when staff were recruited, but bribery and corruption risk had not usually been a factor in identifying high-risk roles which should be subject to enhanced vetting. i) Since the implementation of the Bribery Act, firms had generally provided adequate basic training to staff. But most (i) were still developing training for staff in higher risk roles and (ii) had no processes in place to assess the effectiveness of existing training. Details: London: FSA, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2016 at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/anti-bribery-investment-banks.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/anti-bribery-investment-banks.pdf Shelf Number: 146009 Keywords: Banking Industry Bribery Correction Financial Crimes

Author: Smith, Marcus Title: Procedural impediments to effective unexplained wealth legislation in Australia Summary: Australia’s unexplained wealth laws form part of a range of measures introduced in response to growing concern about the prevalence and impact of organised crime. The confiscation of criminal assets, including through the use of unexplained wealth legislation, seeks to undermine the business model of organised crime by removing its financial return, punishing offenders, compensating society, preventing the improper use of assets and deterring participation in crime (Bartels 2010a). The Australian Crime Commission has conservatively estimated that serious and organised crime cost Australia $36b in 2013–14 (ACC 2015). According to published national statistics, the total value of assets confiscated in Australian jurisdictions between 1995–96 and 2013–14 was approximately $800m, averaging around $44m annually. The discrepancy between these two amounts clearly shows more needs to be done to target the profits of organised crime. This paper reviews Australia’s current approaches to confiscating unexplained wealth and aims to identify any barriers to their implementation, to inform effective procedural reforms to the laws and better target the proceeds of crime of Australia’s most serious criminals. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2016. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 523: Accessed December 5, 2016 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi523.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi523.pdf Shelf Number: 140298 Keywords: Asset Forfeitures Financial Crimes Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime

Author: Australia. Attorney-General's Department Title: Identity crime and misuse in Australia 2016 Summary: This is the third in a series of reports that seek to analyse the nature and extent of identity crime and misuse in Australia. These reports compile data from Commonwealth, state and territory agencies, as well as the private sector and other non-government sources. The Attorney-General’s Department leads the development of these reports as a key initiative of the National Identity Security Strategy. Cost of identity crime The annual cost of identity crime in Australia is $2.2b. This includes the direct and indirect losses incurred by government agencies and individuals; and the cost of identity crimes recorded by police. The costs of preventing and responding to identity crime are estimated to be a further $390m, bringing the total economic impact of identity crime in Australia to approximately $2.6b per year. These figures represent a revised estimate of the cost of identity crime in Australia to $2.2b compared to the estimate of $2b from the 2013–14 report. This is due to better availability of data and is not necessarily an indicator of change over the intervening time. Details: Canberra: Attorney-General's Department, 2016. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2016 at: https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/Identity-crime-and-misuse-in-Australia-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/Identity-crime-and-misuse-in-Australia-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147922 Keywords: Computer Crimes Costs of Crime Cybercrime Financial Crimes Fraud Identity Theft

Author: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: United States. Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: 1. This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures in place in the United States at the date of the on-site visit (18 January 2016 to 5 February 2016). It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations, the level of effectiveness of its AML/CFT system, and makes recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. A. Key Findings  The AML/CFT framework in the U.S. is well developed and robust. Domestic coordination and cooperation on AML/CFT issues is sophisticated and has matured since the previous evaluation in 2006. The understanding of money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks is well-supported by a variety of ongoing and complementary risk assessment processes, including the 2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) and National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NTFRA), which were both published. The national AML/CFT strategies, key priorities and efforts of law enforcement and other agencies seem to be driven by these processes and are coordinated at the Federal level across a vast spectrum of agencies in a number of areas.  The financial sectors bear most of the burden in respect of required measures under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). Financial institutions (FIs), in general, have an evolved understanding of ML/TF risks and obligations, and have systems and processes for implementing preventive measures, including for on-boarding customers, transaction monitoring and reporting suspicious transactions.  However, the regulatory framework has some significant gaps, including minimal coverage of certain institutions and businesses (investment advisers (IAs), lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, trust and company service providers (other than trust companies). Minimal measures are imposed on designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), other than casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones, and consist of the general obligation applying to all trades and businesses to report transactions (or a series of transactions) involving more than USD 10 000 in cash, and targeted financial sanctions (TFS) requirements. Other comprehensive AML/CFT obligations do not apply to these sectors. In the U.S. context the vulnerability of these minimally covered DNFBP sectors is significant, considering the many examples identified by the national risk assessment process.  Law enforcement efforts rest on a well-established task force environment which enables the pooling of expertise from a wide range of law enforcement agencies (LEAs), including prosecutors, to support quality ML/TF investigation and prosecution outcomes. Overall, LEAs have access to a wide range of financial intelligence, capabilities and expertise allowing them to trace assets, identify targets and undertake expert financial ML/TF investigations. There is a strong focus on following the money in predicate offence investigations at the Federal level. A similar focus on identifying terrorist financiers in terrorism-related investigations applies. The U.S. investigates and prosecutes TF networks aggressively in line with its risk profile. International cooperation in these areas is generally effective though improvements are underway to further improve the timely handling of (a large volume) of mutual legal assistance (MLA) and extradition requests.  Lack of timely access to adequate, accurate and current beneficial ownership (BO) information remains one of the fundamental gaps in the U.S. context. The NMLRA identifies examples of legal persons being abused for ML, in particular, through the use of complex structures to hide ownership. While authorities did provide case examples of successful investigations in these areas, challenges in ensuring timely access to and availability of BO information more generally raises significant concerns, bearing in mind risk and context.  At the Federal level, the U.S. achieves over 1 200 ML convictions a year. Many of these cases are large, complex, white collar crime cases, in line with the country’s risk profile. Federal authorities have the lead role in all large and/or international investigations. There is however no uniform approach to State-level AML efforts and it is not clear that all States give ML due priority. The AML system would benefit from ensuring that a range of tax crimes are predicate offenses for ML.  The Federal authorities aggressively pursue high-value confiscation in large and complex cases, in respect of assets located both domestically and abroad. The authorities effectively resort to criminal, civil and administrative tools to forfeit assets. At State and local levels, there is little available information, though it appears that civil forfeiture is vigorously pursued by some States.  The U.S. authorities effectively implement targeted financial sanctions for both terrorism and proliferation financing purposes, though not all U.N designations have resulted in domestic designations (mainly on the basis of insufficient identifiers). Most designations take place without delay, and are effectively communicated to the private sector. The U.S. Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) is used by thousands of FIs across the U.S. and beyond which gives the U.S sanctions regime a global effect in line with the size, complexity and international reach of the U.S. financial system. The U.S has had significant success in identifying the funds/other assets of designated persons/entities, and preventing them from operating or executing financial transactions related to terrorism and proliferation. Only minor improvements are needed in this area.  AML/CFT supervision of the banking and securities sectors appears to be robust as a whole, and is evolving for money services businesses (MSBs) through greater coordination at the State level. The U.S. has a range of sanctions that it can and does impose on FIs as well as an array of dissuasive remedial measures, including informal supervisory actions. These measures seem to have the desired impact on achieving the supervisory objectives. The most significant supervisory gap is lack of comprehensive AML/CFT supervisory processes for the DNFBPs, other than casinos. Details: Paris, FATF, 2016. 266p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140443 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Risk Assessment Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. House. Committee on Financial Services Title: Stopping Terror Finance: Securing the U.S. Financial Sector Summary: Terrorist financing describes a form of financial crime in which an individual or entity solicits, collects, or provides funds "with the intention that [these funds] may be used to support terrorist acts or organizations." While terrorists can benefit from big donations of deep-pocketed financiers sympathetic to their cause, terrorist financing often involves relatively small-dollar amounts and itself is just a subset melting into the larger stream of all financial crime occurring in the international financial system. The threat to national security from terrorist financiers is real, so while U.S. policymakers have long recognized the idea that "following the money" through the retail banking system can help combat terrorism and related forms of illicit finance, new financing technologies have arisen since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks that require constant renewal of detection and disruption methods. In December 2015, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) warned that "further concerted action urgently needs to be taken … to combat the financing of … serious terrorist threats...." Two months later, in February 2016, FATF noted that the scope and nature of terrorist threats had "globally intensified considerably." According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department), these threats collectively represent a source of risk generally to the United States, and to the financial system in particular. Specifically, Treasury concludes: [t]he central role of the U.S. financial system within the international financial system and the sheer volume and diversity of international financial transactions that in some way pass through U.S. financial institutions expose the U.S. financial system to TF [terrorist financing] risks that other financial systems may not face. The bipartisan Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing of the Financial Services Committee (Task Force) was authorized for two six-month terms during the 114th Congress to probe the growing terrorist financing problem. The Task Force held eleven hearings, and its 21 Members systematically examined how select terror groups and actors acquire and move funds illicitly. The hearings featured expert testimony from current and former U.S. government employees, with witnesses from both the U.S. and overseas, on a wide range of topics. The Task Force recently concluded its work with two wrap-up hearings, one of which featured testimony from two senior Treasury Department officials on how the agency is coordinating its efforts to fight terrorist financing. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, 2016. 191p. Source: Internet Resources: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/terror_financing_report_12-20-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/terror_financing_report_12-20-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147795 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) Title: CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013: Securing the Region Summary: I. The ideals of the CARICOM integration movement and the pillars of its foundation can only be realised in a safe and secure Community. The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS) constitutes an historic and defining moment for the Community in clearly articulating its security interests within the wider context of the shifting balance of global geopolitical power, increasing market competitiveness, public debt financing and profound economic uncertainties, threats of climate change and scarcity of key resources.This current situation is further exacerbated by profound influence of new technology and social media, the increasingly asymmetric nature of conflict, and the growing power of non-state actors, including transnational organized crime. II. The multidimensional and multifaceted nature of the risks and threats faced by CARICOM Member States are increasingly interconnected, cross-cutting, network-centric and transnational. The repercussions of emerging threats now propagate rapidly around the world, so that events in any part of the world are now far more likely to have immediate consequences for the Caribbean region. This rapidly - evolving set of security scenarios - and the absence of a common analysis of the risks and threats that affect CARICOM Member States - make this Strategy vitally necessary. III. The Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE) at its 5th Meeting mandated the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) to develop a "Regional Crime and Security Strategy" (hereafter called the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy). IV. The Strategy is guided by the principles and values of democratic choice, freedom, justice, prosperity, respect for territorial integrity, respect for and promotion of human rights and good governance all of which reflect the deepest convictions of the Community. V. The goal of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy is to significantly improve citizen security by creating a safe, just and free Community, while simultaneously improving the economic viability of the Region. VI. The Strategy identifies and prioritises the common security risks and threats which CARICOM is facing now, and likely to face in the future. It articulates an integrated and cohesive security framework to confront these challenges,and will therefore guide the coordinated internal and external crime and security policies adopted by CARICOM Member States, under their respective legal frameworks to the fullest extent. VII. The risks and threats identified in the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy are prioritised into four (4) Tiers: • Tier 1 -Immediate Significant Threats. These are high-probability, high-impact events. They are the currentand present dangers. • Tier 2 - Substantial Threats. These are both likely and high-impact, but are not as severe as Tier 1 Threats. • Tier 3 - Significant Potential Risks. These are high-impact, but low-probability. • Tier 4 - Future Risks. These are threats where the probability and impact cannot be assessed at this stage. VIII. Tier 1 Threats consist of the mutually-reinforcing relationship between transnational organised criminal activities involving illicit drugs and illegal guns; gangs and organised crime; cyber-crime; financial crimes and corruption. Tier 1 Threats are the main drivers of current criminality levels, and has the potential to cripple the already fragile socio-economic developmental progress in CARICOM and the advancement of CSME. Tier 1 Threats are the Immediate Significant Threats to the Community and are primarily responsible for the Caribbean having one of the highest homicide rates in the world -30 people killed for every 100,000 inhabitants; (compared to a world average of 5). IX. The criminality perpetuated by the Tier 1 Threats is driven by the desire and pursuit of profit, power and prestige. The criminals are supported by the facilitatorswhich consist of unscrupulous and corrupt professionals within key sectors of the economy such as the financial, legal, justice, law enforcement and security, public officials and even government officialswho help them to secure and conceal their assets. X. Organised crime depends on the facilitators of criminality. It is the facilitators who operate both in the licit and illicit world who shield organised crime and allow it to flourish. There are also a range of social factors that enable and support this criminality, including large economic disparities, poverty, the rising cost of living, social exclusion and marginalisation, unemployment and multiple governance failures. XI. Tier 2 Threats are Substantial Threats to the Region. They include human trafficking and smuggling, natural disasters and public disorder crimes. XII. Tier 3 Risks consist of Significant Potential Risks and include attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorism. XIII. Tier 4 Risks consist of Future Risks, with unknown probabilities and consequences. They include climate change, pandemics and migratory pressure. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210844.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Caribbean URL: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210844.pdf Shelf Number: 146969 Keywords: Financial Crimes Gangs Human Trafficking Illegal Guns Illicit Drugs Organized Crime Public Disorder

Author: Kowalczyk-Hoyer, Barbara Title: Top Secret: Countries Keep Financial Crime Fighting Data to Themselves Summary: Financial systems depend on trust from citizens and businesses to function. A vital part of this trust is the belief that banks are not holding funds on behalf of corrupt individuals and organisations, criminals, or terrorists. In recent years, the financial sector has provided ample reason to question this belief. The majority of large-scale corruption scandals, from Ukraine to Brazil, have featured banks transferring or managing funds for the perpetrators and their associates. An analysis of 200 cases of grand corruption by Global Witness has identified 140 banks involved in handling a total of at least US$56 billion in corrupt proceeds. Following the Petrobras corruption scandal in Brazil, for example, Switzerland’s attorney general froze US$400 million held at more than 30 Swiss banks with suspected ties to the case3 . Corruption and money laundering (ML) – the act of disguising the origin of illegal and corrupt proceeds – undermine the basic rule of law, weaken democratic institutions and damage economies and societies. In 2013 alone, developing countries lost an estimated US$ 1.1 trillion to Illicit Financial Flows – illegal movements of money from one country to another. Effective anti-money laundering measures, in both developed and developing countries, are essential to end these illicit flows. Experience in recent years has time and again shown that the financial sector cannot be relied upon to police itself when it comes to dirty money in the system, requiring strong consistent and effective anti-money laundering (AML) supervision by authorities. Just like health and safety inspectors in restaurants, national financial supervisors have the power to visit and inspect banks (on-site monitoring), identify and record failings in their systems, and impose sanctions where necessary. Prosecutors also have the power to investigate and prosecute money laundering cases, including requesting information across borders, and judges have the power to sanction individuals and corporate entities found guilty of crimes. Public scrutiny is essential for the accountability of these mechanisms, but this report shows that in countries hosting major financial centres, data on anti-money laundering prevention and enforcement is treated as if it were Top Secret. Just one in three basic anti-money laundering indicators drawn from internationally accepted guidelines is available to the public and up to date across 12 countries hosting major financial centres, including the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Switzerland and Luxembourg. This low level of public data availability is a major obstacle to any independent monitoring of the effectiveness of anti-money laundering by civil society and the media. Details: Berlin: Transparency International, 2017. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Top-Secret-financial-data-report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Top-Secret-financial-data-report.pdf Shelf Number: 144841 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Proceeds of Crime

Author: Miller, Rena S. Title: Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview for Congress Summary: Anti-money laundering (AML) refers to efforts to prevent criminal exploitation of financial systems to conceal the location, ownership, source, nature, or control of illicit proceeds. Despite the existence of longstanding domestic regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as well as international commitments and guidance on best practices, policymakers remain challenged to identify and address policy gaps and new laundering methods that criminals exploit. According to United Nations estimates recognized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, criminals in the United States generate some $300 billion in illicit proceeds that might involve money laundering. Rough International Monetary Fund estimates also indicate that the global volume of money laundering could amount to as much as 2.7% of the world's gross domestic product, or $1.6 trillion annually. Money laundering is broadly recognized to have potentially significant economic and political consequences at both national and international levels. Despite robust AML efforts in the United States, the ability to counter money laundering effectively remains challenged by a variety of factors. These include:  the scale of global money laundering;  the diversity of illicit methods to move and store ill-gotten proceeds through the international financial system;  the introduction of new and emerging threats (e.g., cyber-related financial crimes);  the ongoing use of old methods (e.g., bulk cash smuggling);  gaps in legal, regulatory, and enforcement regimes, including uneven availability of international training and technical assistance for AML purposes; and  the costs associated with financial institution compliance with global AML guidance and national laws. AML Policy Framework In the United States, the legislative foundation for domestic AML originated in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 and its major component, the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act. Amendments to the BSA and related provisions in the 1980s and 1990s expanded AML policy tools available to combat crime, particularly drug trafficking, and prevent criminals from laundering their illicitly derived profits. Key elements to the BSA’s AML legal framework, which are codified in Titles 12 (Banks and Banking) and 31 (Money and Finance) of the U.S. Code, include requirements for customer identification, recordkeeping, reporting, and compliance programs intended to identify and prevent money laundering abuses. Substantive criminal statutes in Titles 31 and 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the U.S. Code prohibit money laundering and related activities and establish civil penalties and forfeiture provisions. Moreover, federal authorities have applied administrative forfeiture, non-conviction based forfeiture, and criminal forfeiture tools. In response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, Congress expanded the BSA's AML policy framework to incorporate additional provisions to combat the financing of terrorism (CFT). Although CFT is not the primary focus of this CRS report, post- 9/11 legislation provided the Executive Branch with greater authority and additional tools to counter the convergence of illicit threats, including the financial dimensions of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. Policy Outlook for the 115th Congress Although CFT will likely remain a pressing national security concern for policymakers and Congress, some see the beginning of the 115th Congress as an opportunity to revisit the existing AML policy framework, assess its effectiveness, and propose regulatory and statutory changes. Such efforts could further address issues raised in hearings and proposed legislation during the 114th Congress, including beneficial ownership, the application of targeted financial sanctions, and barriers to international AML information sharing. Drawing from past legislative activity, the 115th Congress may also revisit proposals to require the Executive Branch to develop a roadmap for identifying key AML policy challenges and balancing AML priorities in a national strategy. Some observers have gone further to propose broader changes to the BSA/AML regime. The 115th Congress may also seek to address tensions that remain in balancing the policy objectives of improving financial services access and inclusion while also accounting for money laundering risks and vulnerabilities that may result in the exclusion (or "de-risking") of others from the international financial system. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44776: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44776.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44776.pdf Shelf Number: 145581 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering National Security Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime Terrorist Financing

Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Fraud within the Commonwealth: A census of the most costly incidents 2014. Summary: From financial years 2010-11 to 2014-14, Commonwealth entities experienced 9,467 incidents of internal fraud, with losses of over $12.7m. This study analysed information about the most costly incidents each entity experienced each year and those who perpetrated these. The majority of the 166 frauds related to employee entitlements or financial benefits, and most were committed through the misuse of documents or technology. The findings provide an insight into the fraud risks facing the Commonwealth and how these might best be addressed. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Statistical Bulletin 02: Accessed March 7, 2017 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/sb/002/sb002.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/sb/002/sb002.pdf Shelf Number: 146416 Keywords: Consumer Protection Costs of Crime Crime Statistics Financial Crimes Fraud

Author: Hunter, Marcena Title: Follow the Money: Financial Flows Linked to Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining in Sierra Leone: A Case Study Summary: Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) has largely been dismissed as an economically insignificant, subsistence based activity in Sierra Leone. This is in sharp contrast to the artisanal diamond sector, which has historically been seen as a much more significant livelihood option. As one Mining Ministry agent stated: it's different with diamonds, you understand. If you are in diamonds, you want the license, because it's worth so much. But with gold, not so much: it's small and quick and just for survival. However, an investigation into the sector reveals that Sierra Leone's ASGM sector is not only active and vibrant, but also generating significant economic value. Despite government and civil society efforts at formalisation, Sierra Leone's ASGM remains largely in the informal sector. Investigations reveal most of Sierra Leone's gold never enters the formal supply chains within its borders. Rather, gold is mined, bought, sold and exported through informal networks that only occasionally and selectively intersect with formal supply and value chains prior to crossing the border. Consequently, the country records minimal gold exports and the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) reaps little benefit from the gold sector through formal channels of taxation. This is not to say the sector is not benefitting the people of Sierra Leone. ASGM is providing rural communities a critical livelihood option across Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone registers some of the most challenging development and poverty statistics in the entire world, ranking 181 out of 188 countries on the Human Development Index. The Ebola crisis (2014 - 2016) seriously exacerbated these challenges, extracting a massive socio-economic toll on the country. ASGM has evolved in this context as a strong economic magnet, drawing in old stakeholders and new entrants alike. In addition, ASGM plays a vital economic function in many communities, providing investment opportunities, an economic social safety net, an avenue to social mobility, and contributing to local economic growth. While a number of positive attributes can be linked to ASGM in Sierra Leone, the informality of the sector also results in undesirable outputs and impacts including: value from the ASGM sector is not equitably distributed; evidence of bribery and corruption of traditional and government officials; negligible protections against environmental degradation; and opportunity for money laundering and criminal exploitation. In turn, while there are a number of short-term benefits to informality, persistent informality has the potential to undermine long-term development and governance aims. The informality of Sierra Leone's gold sector is perpetuated and exacerbated by downstream illicit financial flows (IFFs). Defined as 'money illegally earned, transferred or used', IFFs are paradoxically dualistic. On the one hand, IFFs linked to ASGM serve a critical economic function, fuelling an informal sector which plays an important role in poverty alleviation and economic development in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, IFFs are facilitating complicated layers of exploitation and victimisation by opportunistic actors along the value chain. In the Sierra Leonean context, many upstream financial transactions (i.e. those which take place at the mine site) are better characterised as informal transactions, while those that take place further downstream (i.e. the buying and selling of smuggled gold) are IFFs. Upstream actors who engage in IFFs tend to reinvest profits back into the ASGM sector, thus perpetuating supply chains and financial relationships reliant on informal and illicit activity at all levels. In turn, IFFs are a bulwark against ASGM sector formalisation efforts in Sierra Leone. Any attempt must acknowledge the complex nature and impacts of IFFs if they are to hope to be successful without further marginalizing vulnerable populations. Without appreciating the extent and efficiency of ASGM and related IFFs to meet local economic needs, formalisation efforts will fail to replace them, and at worst could have devastating consequences. As a government agent stated, gold mining is a livelihood activity, so it is difficult to strongly enforce laws that are perceived to be harmful to local people (GOV080716c). Details: Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/sierra-leone_06.03.17.compressed.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Sierra Leone URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/sierra-leone_06.03.17.compressed.pdf Shelf Number: 146411 Keywords: Financial Crimes Gold Mining Illicit Gold Money Laundering Organized Crime Poverty Smuggling Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime

Author: Shentov, Ognian Title: Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe Summary: The current report, prepared by the Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) – the largest indigenous good governance initiative in SEE – makes an important contribution to the regional approach to anticorruption. It provides a civil society view of the state of corruption and comes in the wake of the 2014 SELDI comprehensive assessment of the various aspects of the legal and institutional anticorruption environments of nine SEE countries. In 2016, SELDI followed up on these assessments with an update of corruption monitoring and a special focus on state capture in the energy sector and the corruption– hidden economy nexus. The report underscores the need for broader political action for reform, which seems blocked or narrowing across the region. Inside pressure for such action has been suffocated by economic necessity and/or ethnic divisions, and the ossification of political and economic establishments. Outside pressure, delivered mostly by the European Union, has been seen as wanting in relation to the size of the problems in the past couple of years due to a succession of internal and external crises. In none of the countries in the region has there been a clear and sustained policy breakthrough in anticorruption, although efforts to deliver technical solutions and to improve the functioning of the law enforcement institutions, mostly with support from the EU, have continued and even intensified in some cases. This has led to further slow decline in administrative corruption levels but at the expense of waning public support for reforms and of declining trust in national and European institutions. SELDI's Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) – its analytical tool for measuring corruption – has identified three trends in the dynamics of corruption in the region: • Since the early 2000s when SELDI started its monitoring the overall levels of corruption in the SEE countries have gone down, and the public has become more demanding of good governance. • Yet, progress has been slow and erratic, and corruption continues to be both a major preoccupation for the general public and a common occurrence in the civil service and senior government. Specifically, in the 2014 – 2016 period corruption pressure – the primary quantitative indicator for the levels of corruption in a country – has relapsed in some countries, but the overall improvement in the region was negligible. • The combination of stubbornly high rates of rent-seeking from corrupt officials and rising expectations for good governance related mostly to EU accession aspirations in SEE have shaped negatively public expectations about potential corruption pressure. More than half of the population of the SELDI countries believe it is likely to have to give a bribe to an official to get things done. This indicates that the restoration of trust in institutions would be much more difficult than the mere reduction in the levels of administrative corruption. As a result, public trust in the feasibility of policy responses to corruption – a critical ally to successful anticorruption reforms – which reflects the share of the population who believe in the anticorruption efforts of their governments has stayed below the 50% threshold in 2016 for all SEE countries but Montenegro and Turkey. This further exacerbates the unwillingness of politicians to engage in anticorruption policies, and shows the need for a broad-based social movement to sustain an anticorruption focus. The overall conclusion from the 2016 round of the SELDI CMS is that the policies which target corrupt behaviour at administrative level and those seeking to change trust in government need to be pursued in concert. If not complemented by strengthened public demand for integrity in government and sustained improvement in economic well-being, stricter enforcement of penal measures cannot have a sustainable effect. Law enforcement would likely be seen either as useless repression when targeting lower government levels alone or as political witch-hunt when intermittently directed at higher levels. Conversely, intensifying awareness-building measures would only fuel cynicism and resignation in the public if it is not accompanied by visible efforts for cracking down on (high-level) rent-seeking officials Details: Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI); Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 24, 2017 at: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf Shelf Number: 144577 Keywords: Anticorruption Corruption Economic Crime Financial Crimes Fraud Hidden Economy Political Corruption

Author: Australia. Senate. Economics References Committee Title: 'Lifting the fear and suppressing the greed': Penalties for white-collar crime and corporate and financial misconduct in Australia Summary: n 25 November 2015, the Senate referred the matter of inconsistencies and inadequacies of current criminal, civil and administrative penalties for corporate and financial misconduct or white-collar crime to the Economics References Committee for inquiry and report. The terms of reference were as follows: (a) evidentiary standards across various acts and instruments; (b) the use and duration of custodial sentences; (c) the use and duration of banning orders; (d) the value of fine and other monetary penalties, particularly in proportion to the amount of wrongful gains; (e) the availability and use of mechanisms to recover wrongful gains; (f) penalties used in other countries, particularly members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]; and (g) any other relevant matters. Details: Canberra: Australia Parliament, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/economic_references_ctee_lifting_the_fear_march_2017report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/economic_references_ctee_lifting_the_fear_march_2017report.pdf Shelf Number: 144727 Keywords: Corporate Crime Financial Crimes White-Collar Crime

Author: Australian National Audit Office Title: Proceeds of Crime: Australian Federal Police; Australian Financial Security Authority Attorney-General's Department Summary: The objective of this audit was to examine the effectiveness of the Australian Federal Police's, the Australian Financial Security Authority's and the Attorney-General's Department's administration of property and funds under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Background 1. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (the POCA) provides a scheme (the"POCA scheme") to trace, restrain and confiscate the proceeds of crimes against Commonwealth law. It seeks to disrupt, deter and reduce crime by undermining the profitability of criminal enterprises, depriving persons of the benefits derived from crime, and preventing reinvestment of the proceeds in further criminal activity. 2. The POCA also provides a scheme that allows for confiscated funds to be given back to the community in an endeavour to prevent and reduce the harmful effects of crime in Australia. This mechanism has provided funding to non-government and community organisations, local councils, as well as Commonwealth and state police forces and Commonwealth criminal intelligence entities. Audit objective and criteria 3. The audit objective was to assess whether the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA) and the Attorney-General's Department (AGD) effectively carried out key operational and advisory functions related to property and proceeds under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 4. To form a conclusion against the audit objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level audit criteria: effective restraint is achieved by the AFP and/or AFSA through the timely implementation of appropriate court orders; AFSA administers restrained property in an efficient and economical manner and consistent with relevant court orders; AFSA disposes of forfeited property in an appropriate manner and transfers the net proceeds to the Confiscated Assets Account; AGD provides advice to the Minister for Justice on which proposals for funding from the Confiscated Assets Account represent the best value for money; and the AFP and AFSA report against benchmarked performance measures. Conclusion 5. The AFP, AFSA and AGD effectively carry out key operational and advisory functions related to property and proceeds under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 6. Risk based planning procedures are in place for deciding which property should be restrained and what conditions should be placed on the property when seeking a restraining order. The manner in which restraining orders are implemented depends on the type of property under restraint. For the major classes of property, AFP and AFSA processes have worked well and custody and control of property has been achieved in a way that minimises the risk of the property being dissipated. 7. AFSA has appropriate custodial arrangements in place for all types of property. Legislative and administrative constraints currently limit the ability the of Official Trustee to achieve improved rates of return from the substantial amount of funds held in the restrained and forfeited monies bank accounts and the Confiscated Assets Account. AFSA also manages property in a way that is consistent with the relevant court orders and disposes of forfeited property in an appropriate manner in order to maximise the sale proceeds. 8. The AGD has established effective processes to identify the possible use of funds from the Confiscated Assets Account. It has also advised the Minister for Justice on proposals to assist in achieving value for money from expenditure. During the financial years 2010-11 to 2015-16, the main beneficiaries of funding have been Commonwealth law enforcement and criminal intelligence agencies. Significant funding has also been approved for non-government, community organisation and local council projects, with the New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland police forces also receiving funding. 9. The AFP publicly reports the estimated recovery value of property restrained each year. When combined with the Australian Crime Commission's (ACC's) public reporting of the estimated value of property confiscated each year, this illustrates the trends in the amount of criminal proceeds intercepted by the POCA scheme. AFSA also undertakes limited public reporting on its administration of property. This reporting does not include information on the costs of administering property under its custody and control, which is an important aspect of its overall performance in relation to the proceeds of crime. However, AFSA has made some improvements in its internal reporting capacity about the costs of managing property and is in the early stages of developing benchmarks for some aspects of these costs. Supporting findings Restraining property 10. Planning and decision-making procedures by the Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce investigators and litigators relating to restraint are risk-based. Where the AFP has judged that the risk of dissipation is high, restraining order applications include a provision for custody and control of the property to be granted to AFSA. 11. Restraining orders are implemented in a timely manner and in a way that minimises the risk of property being dissipated. However, the AFP could do more to register orders involving motor vehicles on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR) in a timely manner. Custody and disposal of property 12. Custodial arrangements for property that has been placed into the custody and control of AFSA vary depending on the type of property restrained. Testing demonstrates that appropriate custodial arrangements are in place for all types of property. Management of the funds held in the restrained and forfeited monies bank accounts and the Confiscated Assets Account reflect legislative and administrative constraints that limit the ability of the Official Trustee to achieve improved rates of return from the substantial amount of funds held in these accounts. 13. AFSA manages property in a way that is consistent with the relevant court orders. Where consent, variation and/or exclusion orders are granted by the court, AFSA has acted consistently with the court order. 14. In 2015-16, the disposal processes utilised by AFSA have achieved sale proceeds from forfeited property which have exceeded the estimated value of the property, as determined by an independent and/or certified valuer, in 76 per cent of matters, including all of the higher-value property. How funds from the Confiscated Assets Account are used 15. The processes through which the possible use of funds - stand-alone projects or grant programs-are identified and submitted for the Minister for Justice's approval have evolved over time. In recent years, more structured and targeted processes have been implemented in order to assist in achieving better overall outcomes from Confiscated Assets Account funding. The AGD provided the Minister with relevant advice to assist him in meeting his decision making obligations. 16. The main beneficiaries of funding from the Confiscated Assets Account have been Commonwealth criminal intelligence or law enforcement entities. Significant funds have been approved for non-government, community organisation and local council projects, mainly through the Safer Streets Programme. The New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland police forces have also received funding. Performance Monitoring and Reporting 17. The AFP publicly reports on the estimated recovery value of property restrained each year and whether the AFP has met the benchmark set for that year. It also internally monitors another key performance measure-the estimated value of property confiscated each year-which is publicly reported by the ACC. These two measures illustrate the trends in the criminal proceeds intercepted by the POCA scheme. In the context of a current AFP wide review of performance measures, additional metrics could be developed to provide better information both on the AFP's performance in litigating POCA cases and, in the longer term, the effect of the POCA scheme on the underlying criminal economy. 18. AFSA's public reporting on its administration of property under its custody and control is limited to high-level information. It is in the early stages of developing an improved internal reporting capacity to monitor the costs of managing property under AFSA custody and control. This work could be also be used to enable public reporting of the costs to administer such property, which is an important aspect of AFSA's overall performance and responsibilities under the POCA scheme. Details: Canberra: ANAO, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: ANAO Report No. 43 2016-17: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017_43_0.pdf_43_0.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 144738 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Criminal Assets Financial Crimes Proceeds of Crime

Author: May, Channing Title: Transnational Crime and the Developing World Summary: his March 2017 report from Global Financial Integrity, "Transnational Crime and the Developing World," finds that globally the business of transnational crime is valued at an average of $1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion annually. The study evaluates the overall size of criminal markets in 11 categories: the trafficking of drugs, arms, humans, human organs, and cultural property; counterfeiting, illegal wildlife crime, illegal fishing, illegal logging, illegal mining, and crude oil theft. The combination of high profits and low risks for perpetrators of transnational crime and the support of a global shadow financial system perpetuate and drive these abuses. The report also emphasizes how transnational crime undermines economies, societies, and governments in developing countries. National and global policy efforts that focus on curtailing the money are needed to more successfully combat these crimes and the illicit networks perpetrating them. Primary Findings Transnational crime is a business, and business is very good. Money is the primary motivation for these illegal activities. Of the 11 illicit activities studied, counterfeiting ($923 billion to $1.13 trillion) and drug trafficking ($426 billion to $652 billion) have the highest and second-highest values, respectively; illegal logging is the most valuable natural resource crime ($52 billion to $157 billion). The ranges demonstrate the serious magnitude of and threat posed by global transnational crime. The revenues generated from the 11 crimes covered in this report not only line the pockets of the perpetrators but also finance violence, corruption, and other abuses. Very rarely do the revenues from transnational crime have any long-term benefit to citizens, communities, or economies of developing countries. Instead, the crimes undermine local and national economies, destroy the environment, and jeopardize the health and well-being of the public. The report rankings for the illicit markets examined are: Counterfeiting $923 billion to $1.13 trillion Drug Trafficking --$426 billion to $652 billion Illegal Logging $52 billion to $157 billion Human Trafficking -- $150.2 billion Illegal Mining -- $12 billion to $48 billion IUU Fishing -- $15.5 billion to $36.4 billion Illegal Wildlife Trade -- $5 billion to $23 billion Crude Oil Theft -- $5.2 billion to $11.9 billion Small Arms & Light Weapons Trafficking -- $1.7 billion to $3.5 billion Organ Trafficking -- $840 million to $1.7 Total --$1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion Policy Recommendations Transnational crime will continue to grow until the paradigm of high profits and low risks is challenged. In addition to current efforts to fight these crimes, this report calls on governments, experts, the private sector, and civil society groups to seek to address the global shadow financial system by promoting greater financial transparency. This will help cutoff the money flows and the profits, and it will increase the ability to bring these criminals to justice and defeat their illicit transnational networks. GFI recommends several steps governments and other regulatory bodies can take to increase the levels of detection and interdiction of the proceeds of transnational crime: Require that corporations registering and doing business within a country declare the name(s) of the entity's true, ultimate beneficial owner(s) Flag financial and trade transactions involving individuals and corporations in "secrecy jurisdictions" as high-risk and require extra documentation Scrutinize import and export invoices for signs of misinvoicing, which may indicate technical and/or physical smuggling Use world market price databases such as GFTradeTM to estimate the risk of misinvoicing for the declared values and investigate suspicious transactions Share more information between agencies and departments on the illicit markets and actors that exist within a country"s border Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2017. 166p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf Shelf Number: 144741 Keywords: Criminal Networks Developing Nations Financial Crimes Illegal Markets Illicit Markets Organized Crime Transnational Crime

Author: Frontier Economics Title: The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy. Report prepared for BASCAP and INTA Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Counterfeiting and piracy are highly pervasive across countries and sectors, representing a multi-Billion-dollar industry globally that continues to grow. Measuring the scale of counterfeiting and piracy helps us to understand the size of the problem, and the related social costs. It also helps inform policymakers so that they can target resources appropriately towards combating counterfeiting and piracy. 1.1 Extending the findings of the OECD/EUIPO Our starting point is the recent work undertaken by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to measure the extent of piracy and counterfeiting in international trade. The OECD/EUIPO Report builds on a previous, ground-breaking study by the OECD in 2008. Since the publication of the initial report, researchers at the OECD have been able to bring significant enhancements to their research methodology, including improved econometric modelling, greater magnitudes of data and increased primary data from customs experts. The OECD/EUIPO estimates that trade in counterfeit and pirated products accounted for as much as 2.5% of the value of international trade, or $461 Billion, in 2013.2 Notably, this figure represents an increase of more than 80% over the OECD's findings in 2008. Our report seeks to quantify the global value of counterfeiting and piracy and related economic and social costs. As revealing as the OECD/EUIPO Report is, its focus is on one specific aspect of counterfeiting and piracy: the international trade of counterfeits across borders. We therefore draw on and extend the OECD/EUIPO Report to include additional types and impacts of counterfeiting and piracy delineated, but not quantified, in their analysis. Specifically, this study quantifies three additional categories of losses: (i) the value of domestically produced and consumed counterfeit goods, (ii) the value of digital piracy, and (iii) wider economic impacts. Our approach and analysis is a follow-on study from our 2011 report for BASCAP, which built on the OECD's 2008 analysis. Our analysis consists of the following four dimensions. - Quadrant 1: Internationally traded counterfeit and pirated goods. We reprise the OECD/EUIPO's recent estimates of the value of counterfeit and pirated physical goods in international trade. This captures the value of counterfeit goods that cross international borders. We also develop projections of this value to 2022. - Quadrant 2: Domestically produced and consumed counterfeit and pirated goods. We estimate the value of domestically produced and consumed counterfeit and pirated goods using the findings of the OECD/EUIPO Report as a starting point. This captures the value of counterfeits that are produced and consumed within the borders of a country. - Quadrant 3: Piracy distributed through the Internet, mainly by peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing and streaming. We estimate the value of digital piracy in film, music, and software, which is not captured in the OECD/EUIPO Report as it is based on physically traded goods. Our analysis draws on industry data and studies. - Quadrant 4: Wider economic and social impacts. Building on the magnitudes calculated in quadrants 1-3, we measure related economic and social impacts of counterfeiting and piracy. Specifically, we: - Develop an econometric estimate of the impact of counterfeiting and piracy on foregone economic growth. □ Present effects of the displacement by counterfeiting and pirating activities of legitimate activities on employment, FDI, and sales tax revenues. - Estimate costs of criminality related to counterfeiting and pirating activities 1.2 Key findings Our analysis shows that the scale of counterfeiting and piracy globally is large, that it has grown since previous estimates, and that this growth is expected to continue. Our estimates of these values across all four quadrants are shown in Table 1.S below. We estimate that the value of international and domestic trade in counterfeit and pirated goods in 2013 was $710 -$ 917 Billion. We estimate that, in addition to this, the global value of digital piracy in movies, music and software in 2015 3 was $213 Billion. We estimated wider economic costs associated with the effects of counterfeiting and piracy on the displacement of legitimate economic activity. This estimate also provides a starting point for inferring fiscal losses. We also estimated the effects of counterfeiting and piracy on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and crime. We find significant effects on the job market through the displacement of legitimate economic activity by counterfeiting and piracy. We estimate net job losses in 2013 to lie, globally, between 2 and 2.6 million, and we project net job losses of 4.2 to 5.4 million by 2022. We also estimated the effects of changes in the incidence of counterfeiting and piracy on economic growth. Our econometric model, estimating the impact of changes in the intensity of counterfeiting and piracy on economic growth, suggests that a percentage point reduction in the intensity of counterfeiting and piracy would be worth between $30 Billion to $54 Billion in 2017 for the 35 OECD countries. Our forward projections begin with OECD/EUIPO's estimates of international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, augmented by forecasts of growth in import volumes and the ratio of customs seizures to real imports. Using these, we forecast that the value of trade in counterfeit and pirated goods could reach $991 Billion by 2022. We carry out a similar exercise to illustrate how the size of domestic production and consumption of counterfeit and pirated goods may change over time. We use data on recent and forecast rates of growth in global trade and GDP, and projected growth in the rate of counterfeiting. Using this approach, we forecast that the value of domestically produced and consumed counterfeit and pirated goods could range from $524 - $959 Billion by 2022. Applying the methodology used in our previous study, we combine two different approaches to project digital piracy into the future. The first approach assumes that digital piracy will maintain its share of total counterfeiting and piracy over time. The second approach assumes that digital piracy grows proportionally to global IP traffic. Combining these two approaches, we forecast that the value of digital piracy in movies, music and software could reach from $384 - $856 Billion by 2022. Details: Brussels: Frontier Economics, 2017. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 14, 2017 at: http://www.inta.org/Communications/Documents/2017_Frontier_Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.inta.org/Communications/Documents/2017_Frontier_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 144910 Keywords: Counterfeit Goods Counterfeiting Digital Piracy Economic Crimes Fake Goods Financial Crimes Pirated Products

Author: Lemieux, Pierre Title: The Underground Economy: Causes, Extent, Approaches Summary: The underground economy (or illegal economy) covers market production of goods and services, legal and illegal, which are sold or purchased illegally. It is composed of both the irregular economy, where legal goods and services are produced and exchanged under illegal conditions, and (productive) black markets, the preserve of goods and services that are illegal but satisfy all the parties involved. History presents us with a large number of prohibition and taxation events that gave rise to contraband. However, smuggling and other forms of underground markets are not only a historical phenomenon, but an everyday fixture of contemporary economies: drugs, alcohol, fuel, tobacco, etc. One should not think of the underground economy as only black markets or smuggling on irregular markets. The irregular economy mainly includes otherwise legal services sold "under the table" like labour services sold to businesses or individuals (in residential construction and renovation, for example). [�] To deal with the underground economy, four public policy approaches are possible. Details: Montreal: Montreal Economic Institute, 2007. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2017 at: http://www.iedm.org/files/cdr_nov07_en.pdf Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://www.iedm.org/files/cdr_nov07_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145350 Keywords: Financial Crimes Illegal Economy Illegal Markets Illegal trade Shadow Economy Smuggling Tax Evasion Underground Economy

Author: Tavares, Cynthia Title: Money laundering in Europe Report of work carried out by Eurostat and DG Home Affairs Summary: Statistics on crime and criminal justice represent one of the newest areas of Eurostat's activities. The collection of data on this subject from the Member States began in response to the mandate issued by the European Council in the Hague Programme in 2004: ... the European Council welcomes the initiative of the Commission to establish European instruments for collecting, analysing and comparing information on crime and victimisation and their respective trends in Member States, using national statistics and other sources of information as agreed indicators. Eurostat should be tasked with the definition of such data and its collection from the Member States1. In response to this challenge, Eurostat has established contact with the organisations principally responsible for crime statistics in each of the European Union Member States. These organisations have contributed substantially to the development of an international collection of crime statistics within the framework of the European Statistical System. Eurostat wishes to thank the colleagues concerned in these organisations for their co-operation in this field. The progress made to date may be followed on the Eurostat website and in successive issues of the series Statistics in Focus. It has always been evident that comparable information on 'traditional' types of crime such as theft and assault would be easier to obtain than in so-called 'new areas' such as for example cybercrime, human trafficking, fraud and corruption. For such types of offence (which are often associated with the concept 'organised crime') the absence of an international framework of methods and definitions has necessitated a far more intensive process of conceptual development. This process has been undertaken in active collaboration with the Member States and according to the strategy set out in the Action Plan adopted by the Commission to implement the Hague Programme. The present publication represents the first fruits of this process. The specific crime of money-laundering is among the priority areas identified in the Action Plan and data has been collected by Eurostat from the Member States in several stages, followed each time by a careful analysis of the figures received and subsequent adjustment of the methodology. The contribution to this process of the Commission's Directorate-General for Home Affairs is gratefully acknowledged. It is recognised that the current state of the results does not entirely comply with the stringent requirements of the European Statistics Code of Practice. Further development is planned to improve data quality in future collections. Nevertheless the political demand for this information is such that it seems opportune to make it available at this stage in the form of a Eurostat Working Paper. This implies that suitable caution should be exercised in interpreting the figures, and that the methodological notes and caveats provided should be rigorously taken into account in all subsequent analysis. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2017 at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3888793/5846749/KS-RA-10-003-EN.PDF/d6540680-3944-4c22-9b8b-8109ec0b6d92?version=1.0 Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3888793/5846749/KS-RA-10-003-EN.PDF/d6540680-3944-4c22-9b8b-8109ec0b6d92?version=1.0 Shelf Number: 145400 Keywords: Crime Statistics Cybercrime Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Anderson, Helen Title: Phoenix Activity: Recommendations on Detection, Disruption and Enforcement Summary: Phoenix activity occurs where the business of a failed company is transferred to a second (typically newly incorporated) company and the second company's controllers are the same as the first company's controllers. Phoenix activity can be legal as well as illegal. Phoenix activity is illegal where the controllers' intention is to shift assets from the predecessor company to the successor company to avoid liabilities such as unsecured debts, employee entitlements, taxes, adverse court judgments and fines. Phoenix activity has become a significant concern for governments because of the number of individuals promoting illegal phoenix activity, the significant loss of tax revenue it causes, and the recognition of the potentially devastating impact it has on creditors and employees. This report is the third by the authors dealing with phoenix activity. The first report examines the various historical attempts to define phoenix activity and identifies five categories of phoenix activity ranging from legitimate business rescue to complex illegal phoenix activity and provides examples of each. The second report captures all available data relating to the incidence, cost and enforcement of laws dealing with illegal phoenix activity. In this report, the authors propose reforms aimed at better detection, disruption, punishment and deterrence of illegal phoenix activity. Details: Melbourne, AUS: Melbourne Law School, 2017. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924277 Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924277 Shelf Number: 145806 Keywords: Business Crimes Corruption Financial Crimes Tax Evasion

Author: Savona, Ernesto U. Title: Assessing the risk of money laundering in Europe: final report of project IARM Summary: Project IARM develops an exploratory methodology for assessing the risk of money laundering (ML). In particular, it develops a composite indicator of money laundering risk: - at geographic area level - at business sector level The methodology is tested in three pilot countries (Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and follows 7 methodological steps, which include: - identifying ML risk factors across areas and sectors; - operationalising risk factors into a set of proxy variables to allow measurement; - combining the variables, through various statistical techniques, into a final indicator of ML risk; - validating the indicator through a sensitivity analysis and comparison with other measures of ML. IARM adopts a quantitative approach which complements the qualitative perspective of most existing national and supranational ML risk assessments (NRA and SNRA). It responds to the need, stressed by regulatory developments at both EU and national level, to develop objective and robust methodologies for ML risk assessment. Risk factors In each of the three pilot countries, a country-specific set of risk factors is identified on the basis of: - the relevant international and national literature (e.g. FATF guidelines, FIU reports, judiciary evidence, academic literature); - interviews with experts (e.g. FIU officers, investigators, policy-makers, private sector); - data availability: because it is not possible to find the same data and variables in all the three countries. Risk factors are distinguished between ML threats and vulnerabilities, as suggested by FATF and as depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Details: Milano: Transcrime - Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2017. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2017 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ProjectIARM-FinalReport.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ProjectIARM-FinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 1406083 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime

Author: Burnett, Jason Title: Exploring Elder Financial Exploitation Victimization: Identifying Unique Risk Profiles and Factors To Enhance Detection, Prevention and Intervention Summary: Statement of Purpose: Explore risk factors across the socioecological framework (i.e. individual, perpetrator and community-levels) to identify the most important factors that differentiate elder financial exploitation (FE) from other forms of abuse as well as pure FE from hybrid FE. Description of Research Subjects: Older adults 65 years and older with a confirmed case of abuse (i.e. financial exploitation, caregiver neglect, physical abuse, emotional abuse) by Texas Adult Protective Services between the years 2009 - 2014. Methods: Secondary data analysis of a 5�- year statewide aggregated cohort of Texas Adult Protective Services confirmed cases of abuse between the years 2009 - 2014. Case investigation data such as demographics, reported and confirmed abuse types, victim and perpetrator mental and physical health, substance use, social and financial factors along with community-level data (Geographic Information Systems) were analyzed. Supervised Learning, which provides a step-by-step statistical decision-making process was used to identify the most reliable, interpretive and predictive risk factor models. Training and test sampling was included for replication purposes. Results: Financially-based variables are the best predictors of FE versus other forms of abuse, but apparent injury appears to be the most important indicator of other forms of abuse even in the presence of FE. Hybrid FE may be strongly related to poorer outcomes compared to pure FE however, the most predictive model found negative effects of others, alcohol and substance use by others as well as foreclosure and inadequate medical supplies to be the most important predictors of hybrid FE. Models that accounted for less linearity between the variables resulted in greater accuracy in group classification indicating the need to account for complex interactions across the socio-ecological context. Conclusion: Different factors across the socio-ecological context are needed to reliably differentiate between elder FE and other forms of abuse as well as pure versus hybrid FE. These factors will also vary depending on the perspective one takes regarding the linearity of the interactions between the different factors. The findings provide support for the need to differentiate between types of abuse and subtypes of elder FE and the need for frontline workers and social service agencies and researchers to account for variables across the socio-ecological context when developing surveillance, intervention and prevention programs. Details: Houston: The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, 2017. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250756.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250756.pdf Shelf Number: 146140 Keywords: Elder Abuse Elderly Victims Financial Crimes Financial Exploitation

Author: Schmid, Juan Pedro Title: How Much Anti-Money Laundering Effort is Enough: The Jamaican experience Summary: The worldwide fight against money laundering (AML) is escalating. Individuals and businesses that conduct and depend on legitimate international financial transactions are feeling the impact of measures meant to counter illegitimate ones. Countries flagged as having weak AML regulations encounter substantial challenges maintaining correspondent banking relations. However, recent experiences have shown that fulfilling the AML standards, albeit necessary, is not sufficient to persuade financial institutions to keep international financial relations. This is particularly the case with international fund transfers via correspondent banks. Jurisdictions such as Jamaica--even if generally complying with AML standards--face challenges to use banks for correspondent services. Reasons to avoid having correspondent banking relations with certain financial institutions include the following: First, correspondent banking is risky in itself, given the difficulty for the respondent to effectively supervise the AML capacity of the correspondent. In addition, the risk of a transaction depends on country-specific factors, most notably the strength and enforcement of a sound AML system and the type of clients. Money services businesses constitute one category that is perceived as more vulnerable to money laundering. Given these elements, respondent banks may simply decide to sever correspondent banking relations to avoid risks--real or perceived--altogether. This tendency to avoid perceived risks makes finding a potential solution challenging. Not only would countries have to attain the highest possible level of compliance with AML standards, they would also need to develop a communication strategy that effectively conveys that the government and private sector recognize and embrace the money laundering issue and are committed to the implementation of AML efforts. Details: Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, No. IDB-PB-242: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6904/IDB-PB-242_How%20Much%20Anti_Money%20Laundering%20Effort%20is%20Enough_The%20Jamaican%20Experience.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: Jamaica URL: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6904/IDB-PB-242_How%20Much%20Anti_Money%20Laundering%20Effort%20is%20Enough_The%20Jamaican%20Experience.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 146272 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Hayes, Ben Title: The impact of international counter-terrorism on civil society organisations: Understanding the role of the Financial Action Task Force Summary: This report examines the impact of international counterterrorism frameworks on the work of civil society organisations. In particular, it explains the role of the Financial Action Task Force in setting international standards that affect the way in which civil society organisations are regulated by nation-states, their access to financial services, and their obligations to avoid proscribed organisations and other entities deemed to pose a 'terrorism' risk. The introduction to the report frames these developments in the context of the 'shrinking space' of civil society organisations. This narrative describes a new generation of restrictions and attacks on the legitimacy and actions of non-profits and social justice organisations. Chapter two introduces the counterterrorism frameworks that have most affected civil society. This includes UN Security Council measures on combating terrorism, the new international CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) agenda, the FATF's counterterrorist financing requirements, and the EU's development and implementation of these measures. Chapter three examines the worldwide proliferation of restrictive civil society laws and their relationship to the FATF's recommendations on the regulation of the non-profit sector. It draws on existing research showing how these have been used as a vehicle for the imposition of restrictive legislation across the globe, and augments this discourse with new evidence, examples and case studies. It also considers the prospects for reform, and the potential for the FATF to engage proactively in preventing further restrictions. Chapter four addresses a relatively newer phenomenon: the financial exclusion of civil society organisations and resulting from the 'due diligence' obligations mandated by the FATF. Driven by ever-tighter demands on financial institutions to scrutinise their customers for links to terrorism, crime and corruption - and underscored by substantial fines for failures due diligence - banks and intermediaries are cutting ties with non-profits and refusing to process "suspicious" cross-border transactions. This is a process that economists have termed 'de-risking'. While more research is needed, examples show how financial exclusion can fundamentally compromise the ability of affected non-profits to implement their programmes and fulfil their mandates. Chapter five examines the impact of terrorist 'blacklisting' and sanctions regimes more widely on activities such as peacebuilding and the provision of humanitarian assistance. It shows how the rigid interpretation of states' obligations by the FATF is exacerbating what have become often intractable problems for conflict resolutions organisations and NGOs working at close proximity to conflict zones or 'suspect communities'. The report draws three main conclusions. First, without fundamental reform to the FATF's non-profit sector recommendations, the proliferation and legitimisation of restrictive counterterrorism laws is likely to continue unabated. Second, the FATF is undermining international law by directly promoting laws that contravene states' human rights obligations, even where the draft laws have been criticised by UN mandate holders. Third, a rights-based approach to financial services in which the onus is on the banks and regulators to service non-profits and process transactions is the only way to address this particular problem of de-risking. The report makes 11 recommendations to civil society organisations, national and regional parliamentary committees, national governments and the FATF. It also encourages civil society organisations concerned about the developments described in this report to join the international coalition of organisations established to engage with the FATF and create and 'enabling environment' for civil society. Details: Berlin: Bread for the World - Protestant Development Service Protestant Agency for Diakonie and Development, 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis 68: Accessed June 24, 2017 at: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Shelf Number: 146364 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Countering Extremism Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing Violent Extremism

Author: Australia. The Treasury Title: Black Economy Taskforce. Interim report Summary: The black economy is a significant, complex and growing economic and social problem. Black economy activities: undermine the community's trust in the tax system; create an unfair commercial environment which penalises businesses and individuals doing the right thing; enable and entrench the exploitation of vulnerable workers; undermine tax revenue; and enable abuse of the welfare system. If unchecked, increasing black economy participation can lead to a dangerous dynamic. It can foster a culture which legitimises and supports this participation, spurring its further growth. As revenues fall, those remaining in the formal economy may ultimately be faced with higher tax burdens, giving them a greater incentive to move into the shadows. All other OECD countries are grappling with the black economy issue. Australia is not alone. While the black economy is a long-standing problem, new vulnerabilities and threats are emerging as a result of fundamental economic, social and technological changes. The high cost of tax and non-tax regulatory burdens, pressure on business margins, the proliferation of new business models (including the sharing economy) and forms of work, complex interactions with illegal activities, exploitation of workers (including migrants), and changing social norms are influencing this landscape. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimated in 2012 that the black economy had grown to 1.5 per cent of GDP ($25 billion per year in today's dollars) in Australia. In the absence of a concerted and sustained whole-of-government effort, this figure can be expected to continue to grow. Given the linkages between different manifestations of the black economy, long-term multi-agency strategies and operations are needed. We must move beyond the business as usual mindset, recognising the limitations of traditional tax enforcement approaches. There is a clear need to act now. Community views on tax avoidance and evasion (particularly by large firms and multinationals) have noticeably hardened in recent years. At the same time, businesses, both large and small, are operating in a more competitive commercial environment, tempting some to push the boundaries (in their supply chain management, use of contractors and payment of wages). But this challenge is also an opportunity. With the intelligent application of emerging technologies, better use of data and a genuine whole-of-government focus, the tools we need are available. It is not too late, but we need to act now rather than wait. Business as usual is not an option. We can't audit our way out of this problem through traditional means. We have seen considerable innovation from other OECD countries in this area. A 21st century black economy strategy is needed in this country. The Black Economy Taskforce is a partnership between Australian Government agencies and the private sector. It is led by an independent chair and supported by a Secretariat in the Commonwealth Treasury. The Government has asked the Taskforce to develop a forward-looking, innovative and whole-of-government black economy strategy. This is our Interim Report, which sets out our initial findings and identifies a number of early actions. Our Final Report will be delivered to the Government in October 2017. Details: Canberra: The Taskforce, 2017. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2017 at: https://consult.treasury.gov.au/tax-framework-division/black-economy-taskforce/supporting_documents/BE_IR.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://consult.treasury.gov.au/tax-framework-division/black-economy-taskforce/supporting_documents/BE_IR.pdf Shelf Number: 146999 Keywords: Black Economy Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Tax Evasion Underground Economy

Author: Lain, Sarah Title: Corporate Raiding in Russia: Tackling the Legal, Semi-Legal and Illegal Practices that Constitute Reiderstvo Tactics Summary: This paper explores Russian corporate raiding (reiderstvo) tactics, which are used to pressure and/or steal businesses, often with the complicity of corrupt state authorities. Due to its complexity, defining reiderstvo in a way that is helpful can be challenging, but looking at the tactics involved in the practice, rather than the final result - the stealing of the business - can help to focus attention on some of the threats facing business in Russia and the damage done to the country's investment climate. Russian reiderstvo can be a complex process and defining it can be challenging. Indeed, the author found that experts disagree about whether supposedly modern-day examples of reiderstvo - such as the cases of the oil company Bashneft, the chemical producer Togliattiazot and Domodedovo airport - can be labelled as such. In their detailed analysis of how reiderstvo works, Louise Shelley and Judy Deane describe the practice as the use of a "host of illegal tactics ranging from bribery, forgery, corruption, intimidation, and violence employed by raiders to steal companies from their owners, making massive and rapid profits by selling off assets and laundering the proceeds'. This definition certainly holds true for many historical cases, where detailed analysis has revealed a fuller picture of the details and motivations. However, to understand problems associated with reiderstvo today, this definition narrows the focus too much. In reality, the definition is broader. Reiderstvo is not necessarily a single crime aimed at the theft of a business. Reiderstvo tactics are used as a means to achieve multiple and often contrasting ends. This makes the term itself somewhat misleading and at times unhelpful. Although corruption is usually involved, those using reiderstvo tactics do not exclusively rely on illegal practices; indeed, they blur the lines between legal, semi-legal and illegal practices. Often reiderstvo tactics are used as a way to pressure businesses to comply with corrupt requests for personal gain, rather than being used to steal a business outright. Studying the tactics used to pressure businesses as part of a broader view of reiderstvo, rather than concentrating conceptually on reiderstvo, can help to better focus attention on some of the significant threats facing business in Russia and the damage done by reiderstvo to the country's investment climate. Taking this view will assist in better articulating specific measures that need to be taken to combat the various tactics used by those engaged in the practice. This paper, therefore, mostly refers to 'reiderstvo tactics', rather than just 'reiderstvo', in an attempt to capture the wide range of ways that businesses are put under pressure in Russia. Reiderstvo tactics continue to be a concern for businesses in Russia, despite the issue having a lower public profile than during the 1990s and late 2000s. It is difficult to accurately measure the full extent of reiderstvo in Russia, in part because they are often included within broader legislative definitions, such as 'economic crimes', which do not cover or differentiate between the various tactics. It is also difficult because the state agencies tasked with investigating and enforcing against corporate crime are the very agencies that are frequently involved in reiderstvo tactics. These include the tax authorities, security services, courts and legal system, regulatory control agencies, local and regional administrations and law enforcement. Moreover, false accusations of reiderstvo can also be used by state authorities or corporate competitors to falsify criminal cases or pressure business. A key issue is the apparent lack of strong political will to implement comprehensive and consistent measures to protect businesses, despite rhetoric from President Vladimir Putin. The research for this paper - which included an in-depth review of the relevant academic literature and legislation, and interviews with business people, consultants and academic experts - revealed that - apart from a few high-level public cases - reiderstvo tactics are often used at the local level in Russia, frequently involving local political corruption. Initiatives such as the business ombudsman have raised awareness of the need for business protection, but the office is still limited politically in how far it can intervene, and structural issues remain at various levels of government that enable the abuse of power. The paper does not seek to duplicate previous work on reiderstvo, and it is by no means a comprehensive analysis of past and present reiderstvo cases. Instead, this paper seeks to address some of the assumptions surrounding reiderstvo, suggesting that it is more useful to refocus attention on the array of individual legal, semi-legal and illegal means used to pressure businesses. The sum is arguably less important than the parts in understanding how reiderstvo has evolved. By concentrating on reiderstvo tactics rather than the end result, this paper provides a new and improved framework through which Russian business associations and authorities could and should target initiatives to protect business rights. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper: Accessed September 2, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201707_rusi_corporate_raiding_in_russia_lain.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Russia URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201707_rusi_corporate_raiding_in_russia_lain.pdf Shelf Number: 147009 Keywords: Corporate Crime Crime Against Businesses Financial Crimes Political Corruption

Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: Restricting or Abolishing Cash: An Effective Instrument for Fighting the Shadow Economy, Crime and Terrorism? Summary: This paper has four goals: First, the use of cash as a possible driving factor of the shadow economy is investigated. Second, the use of cash in crime, here especially in corruption, is also econometrically investigated. The influence is somewhat larger than on the shadow economy, but it is certainly not a decisive factor for bribery activities. Some figures about organized crime are also shown; the importance of cash is diminishing. Third, some remarks about terrorism are made and here a cash limit doesn't prevent terrorism. Fourth, some remarks are made about the restriction or abolishment of cash on civil liberties, with the result that this will extremely limit them. The conclusion of this paper is that cash has a minor influence on the shadow economy, crime and terrorism, but potentially a major influence on civil liberties. Details: Paper presented at International Cash Conference 2017 - War on Cash: Is there a Future for Cash? 25 - 27 April 2017, Island of Mainau, Germany. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2017 at: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf Shelf Number: 147226 Keywords: Bribery Civil Liberties Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime Shadow Economy Terrorist Financing

Author: Great Britain. HM Treasury Title: National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2017 Summary: The 2017 national risk assessment (NRA) of money laundering and terrorist financing comes amidst the most significant period for the UK's anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) regime for over a decade. In 2015, the UK published its first NRA, recognising that the same factors which make the UK attractive for legitimate financial activity also make it attractive for criminals and terrorists. In 2016, the government set out how it would address the risks identified in the 2015 NRA when it published its action plan for AML and CTF. This action plan outlined wide-ranging reforms to the law enforcement response to illicit finance, to the AML/CTF supervisory regime and to the way in which we engage internationally to tackle these risks, all underpinning by a strengthened public-private partnership. As a result of the action plan a number of major changes have been implemented, including through the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA), and the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (MLRs). Other changes have transformed the way our AML/CTF regime works, including the expansion of the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT), which facilitates information sharing between the financial sector and law enforcement. The JMLIT has delivered concrete outcomes in disrupting money laundering and terrorist financing and has provided a model for other countries to follow. These reforms and others, alongside the 2017 NRA, provide a strong foundation for the UK to build on for its 2017/18 mutual evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF is the international inter-governmental body which sets the global standards for AML and CTF. The FATF will assess the UK next year against these standards, as part of its regular peer review cycle, culminating in a published report known as a mutual evaluation report (MER). This will be the UK's first FATF peer review since 2007, and the final report will be published in December 2018. Central to all of this remains the principle of developing and maintaining a robust and shared national understanding of money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks. This assessment serves as a stocktake of our understanding of these risks, including how they have changed since the 2015 NRA, and will inform the government's continuing work to prevent terrorists and criminals moving money through the UK. Details: London: Home Office, 2017. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655198/National_risk_assessment_of_money_laundering_and_terrorist_financing_2017_pdf_web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655198/National_risk_assessment_of_money_laundering_and_terrorist_financing_2017_pdf_web.pdf Shelf Number: 148018 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Risk Assessment Terrorist Financing

Author: Le Moglie, Marco Title: "Mafia Inc.": When Godfathers Become Entrepreneurs Summary: We study the investment of criminal organizations in the legal economy. We focus on Italy, a country historically plagued by a conspicuous presence of mafia-type organizations. By using the exogenous credit contraction imposed by the 2007 financial crisis we highlight how the consequences for newly established enterprises have been less severe in areas with organized crime. Although criminal organizations are largely detrimental for local economic conditions, their economic activity might act as an economic stabilizer in the short-run, especially in a context of weak institutional presence. The investment in the legal economy allows criminal organizations to launder money, make profits, and raise social consensus through the provision of alternative sources of social insurance. Details: Zurich: University of Zurich, Department of Economics, 2017. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series; Working Paper No. 251: Accessed November 7, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958737 Year: 2017 Country: Italy URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958737 Shelf Number: 148071 Keywords: Financial crimes Mafia Organized Crime

Author: The Sentry Title: The Terrorists' Treasury: How a Bank Linked to Congo's President Enabled Hezbollah Financiers to Bust U.S. Sanctions. Summary: The same banks used by kleptocratic governments to divert state assets can also be used by terrorist financing networks. This is what has taken place at one prominent bank in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Individuals and entities subject to U.S. sanctions, in connection with Hezbollah, used the bank to move money through the international banking system, despite several warnings from bank employees that doing so could violate U.S. sanctions. This was not just any bank. BGFIBank DRC, the institution that processed the transactions, is run by President Joseph Kabila's brother and has been mentioned in a recent scandal in Congo involving the alleged diversion of public funds from state-owned mining companies and the national electoral commission. As set out in this report, in 2011 bank employees at BGFIBank DRC raised the alarm with senior officials at the bank, in writing, about a series of transactions. The concern was that the transactions involved companies linked to financiers of Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based terrorist group and political party. The main entities in question were subsidiaries of Kinshasa-based business conglomerate Congo Futur, a company under U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions. Among the recipients of the warnings was Francis Selemani Mtwale, the bank's CEO and brother of President Joseph Kabila. But the bank's relationship with Hezbollah-linked companies continued. BGFIBank DRC even went so far as to request that certain transactions be unblocked by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) after other banks refused to process them. And BGFIBank DRC continued to engage in correspondence with Congo Futur-affiliated company representatives in 2016. This raises major questions about the bank's ability and willingness to fulfill its sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance obligations. BGFIBank DRC has been reported to have been used to divert significant public funds in Congo, including millions of dollars in withdrawals by Congo's electoral commission, and transfers of $8 million in cash in irregular "tax advances" from Congo's largest state-owned mining company, Gecamines. Published reports raise serious questions about the bank's regulatory and compliance regime. Inadequate anti-money laundering compliance and sanctions enforcement standards at banks can empower a wide range of criminal groups and corrupt actors�and ultimately undermine governance and contribute to instability in Congo and elsewhere. Members of civil society have suggested that business interests could be part of the reason Kabila, who has sparked a violent nationwide political crisis by recently overstaying his presidential term limits, has maintained an iron grip on the presidency. In the example profiled in this report, BGFIBank DRC's approach to enforcing sanctions has allowed Kassim Tajideen - described by the U.S. government as "an important financial contributor" who "has contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hizballah" - and his network to maintain access to the global financial system despite being placed under U.S. sanctions in 2009 and 2010. The documents reviewed by The Sentry also show links between Congo Futur and other firms under Kassim Tajideen's control. These documents indicate that Congo Futur subsidiaries used BGFIBank DRC to operate accounts and make wire transfers after both Congo Futur and Kassim were placed under U.S. sanctions, despite warnings from bank employees that the bank should not do so. This is despite repeated public assertions from both Kassim and one of his brothers who is not under U.S. sanctions, Congo Futur General Manager Ahmed Tajideen, that the Kinshasa-based conglomerate had no links to any of the Tajideens under U.S. sanctions. Congo Futur has continued to thrive in Congo despite U.S. sanctions; it even maintains financial ties to the Congolese government and has received government contracts. These continued relations raise serious questions about the Congolese government's reliability in the fight against global terrorism, transnational crime, and illicit finance. Congo Futur has risen and remained prominent despite facing sanctions and the Kabila regime's decreasing legitimacy. BGFIBank DRC has been used to facilitate Congo Futur's access to the U.S. financial system, despite sanctions. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentry Project, 2017. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2017 at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/TerroristsTreasury_TheSentry_October2017_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: Shelf Number: 148095 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Transparency International Title: Hiding in Plain Sight: How UK companies are used to launder the proceeds of corruption Summary: In April 2016 the Panama Papers - a major leak of 11.5 million files from a Panamanian law firm - gave a unique insight into the secretive global corporate networks that help to facilitate corruption. The Paradise Papers - the latest expose on the offshore world, covering 13.4 million files - continue to shine a light on how opaque structures conceal the identities of individuals as well as the origin of their wealth. These scandals highlight the importance of anonymous 'shell' companies to these schemes, as well as the individuals and businesses which create complex networks of these corporate vehicles to aid high-end financial crime. Much attention has been paid to Mossack Fonseca and Appleby - the firms at the centre of these two scandals - which have helped to set-up and manage hundreds of thousands of companies. However, the UK was the second most popular destination for intermediaries and middlemen used by Mossack Fonseca to create and maintain this network, and it is easy to see why. The UK is home to a thriving company formation industry and is a hub for professional corporate services. It is also one of the easiest places in the world to start a company, making it attractive to legitimate and illegitimate business alike. Costing as little as $12 and taking around 15 minutes to complete the forms, UK companies can be created on a large scale for a fraction of the price of those registered in other financial centres. UK companies also carry a veneer of legitimacy due to the country's well established global status. Alongside a range of corporate vehicles, the UK's company formation industry also offers a variety of services, from so-called 'nominee directors' and mailing addresses - giving companies a layer of secrecy - to offshore bank accounts allowing access to the global financial system. Often there will be no trail whatsoever to indicate who sold companies which then go on to be misused. These factors have contributed to the UK featuring as a central location in which to set-up companies for laundering illicit wealth. Using open-source analysis, we have identified 51 major money laundering schemes made possible by the use of UK companies. Financially these scandals could amount to $80 billion or more in illicit wealth, with some of them threatening the financial stability of whole economies. The human damage inflicted on the victims of these crimes is still being counted. By analysing the Trust and Company Service Provider (TCSP) sector and past money laundering cases we have found that, far from being the first line of defence against money laundering, some of these businesses have either been unwitting accomplices or complicit enablers for financial crime. Central to government's recent efforts to tackle money laundering has been introducing public access to information about who really controls companies incorporated in the UK. This constitutes real progress and has put the UK at the forefront of global corporate transparency. Yet this threatens to be undermined by three key issues we have identified during our research into the TCSP sector: Insufficient controls on company formation: there are practically no barriers to UK companies being incorporated by money launderers and no way of tracing their use after they have been established. Lack of checks on the UK company register: Companies House has neither the power nor the resources it needs to ensure the integrity of the UK company register, allowing inaccurate and misleading information being submitted by those wishing to hide illicit activity. Inadequate anti-money laundering (AML) supervision: the UK's patchwork of AML supervisors is not providing a credible deterrent to money laundering failings, which is allowing poor levels of compliance within the TCSP sector covered by the UK's Money Laundering Regulations (MLR). There is also a whole industry of overseas professionals setting-up and managing UK companies who are subject to little or no AML supervision. In this paper we have sought to analyse the potential nature, scale and impact of these problems by looking at the available evidence of what is going wrong. What we have found is that light-touch regulation is coming at a cost, both to the UK's international reputation as a responsible place to do business, and in countries like Ukraine and Azerbaijan who suffer from rampant corruption facilitated by UK companies. We have proposed ten recommendations in three themes that, if implemented, could help end the use of UK companies in laundering corrupt wealth and ensure the UK remains a world leader when it comes to corporate transparency. Details: London: Transparency International, 2017. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2018 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/hiding-in-plain-sight/#.WmNkMKinHcs Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/hiding-in-plain-sight/#.WmNkMKinHcs Shelf Number: 148889 Keywords: Corporate Crime Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Weisel, Deborah Lamm Title: The Problem of Bank Robbery Summary: This guide begins by describing the problem of bank robbery and reviewing the factors that increase its risks. It then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze your local bank robbery problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem of bank robbery as identified through research and police practice. Bank robbery is but one aspect of a larger set of problems related to robbery and to financial crimes involving banks. This guide is limited to addressing the particular harms created by bank robbery. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2007. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific Guides Series No. 48: Accessed January 30,l 2018 at: http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/bank_robbery.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/bank_robbery.pdf Shelf Number: 106192 Keywords: Bank Robbery Financial Crimes Robbery

Author: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Title: Illicit Financial Flows: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa Summary: The 4th Joint African Union Commission/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (AUC/ECA) Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development was held in 2011. This Conference mandated ECA to establish the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa. Underlying this decision was the determination to ensure Africa's accelerated and sustained development, relying as much as possible on its own resources. The decision was immediately informed by concern that many of our countries would fail to meet the Millennium Development Goals during the target period ending in 2015. There was also concern that our continent had to take all possible measures to ensure respect for the development priorities it had set itself, as reflected for instance in the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Progress on this agenda could not be guaranteed if Africa remained overdependent on resources supplied by development partners. In the light of this analysis, it became clear that Africa was a net creditor to the rest of the world, even though, despite the inflow of official development assistance, the continent had suffered and was continuing to suffer from a crisis of insufficient resources for development. Very correctly, these considerations led to the decision to focus on the matter of illicit financial outflows from Africa, and specifically on the steps that must be taken to radically reduce these outflows to ensure that these development resources remain within the continent. The importance of this decision is emphasized by the fact that our continent is annually losing more than $50 billion through illicit financial outflows. Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: The Commission, 2015. 126p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2018 at: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf Shelf Number: 149020 Keywords: Financial Crimes Flow of Funds Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering

Author: Martin, Rowan Title: Assessing the Extent and Impact of Illicit Financial Flows in the Wildlife and Tourism Economic Sectors in Southern Africa Summary: This study on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) in the Wildlife and Tourism sectors in Southern Africa emanated from the TrustAfrica (TA) and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) project "Assessing the extent and impact of illicit financial flows in key economic sectors in Southern Africa". The three components of the project are mining, agriculture and wildlife. IFFs are illicit movements from one country to another of money or products that are illegally acquired. The money typically originates from three sources in the private sector: commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing. However, other types of criminal activity can produce IFFs, which in this study include the trafficking of live animals and plants and their products and associated corruption (bribery and theft by corrupt government officials) through which the proceeds end up in another country. This wildlife trade and tourism IFF study is the first of its kind and the methodologies involved a combination of population modelling, estimated product offtakes and open source trade data. The trade research is limited to eight species groups - elephants, rhinos, lions, pangolins, crocodiles, abalone, sharks and rays, and cycads. The study concluded that for the period 2006-2014, Southern Africa lost almost US$ 1.5 billion in illicit transfers of funds or products overseas, or close to 50% of all wildlife commodity exports. Surprisingly, illegal exports of abalone meat made up almost half of this amount. The IFFs in the wildlife tourism sector were much larger, estimated at over US$ 22 billion in the ten years 2006-2015, and deriving mainly from tax evasion and trade misinvoicing, sometimes involving offshore shell companies. We predicted that more than US$3 billion could have been lost in 2016 in the eight countries covered in this study. The main causes of the huge losses to the economies of Southern Africa in wildlife trade were CITES trade bans and the fact that local communities were not empowered to manage what should rightfully be their resources on their land. Trade bans and disenfranchisement led communities to harvest illegally and to sell wildlife products to illegal exporters. The only way to mitigate these losses would be to do away with trade bans, bring most species into the legal sector, and establish supply and demand regulatory systems that would ensure conservation of the species while also satisfying legitimate stakeholder interests, primarily those of communities and enterprises that live in association with the wildlife and which share common habitats. Note: Disclaimer: The findings in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of TA and OSISA. Details: TrustAfrica and the Open Society for Southern Africa (OSISA), 2017. 177p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2996874 Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2996874 Shelf Number: 149025 Keywords: Financial Crimes Illegal Wildlife Trade Illicit Financial Flows Tax Evasion Trafficking in Wildlife Wildlife Crime Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Verizon Title: 2017 Data Breach Investigations Report Summary: The 2017 DBIR reveals what's really happening in cyber security. This year's report is based on analysis of over 40,000 incidents, including 1,935 confirmed data breaches. That means you get a detailed insight into the cyber security threats you face. Read the report and discover: The biggest cyber security threats in your sector and what you can do to mitigate them. Who's behind the attacks and how they're getting in. What motivates the cybercriminals. How nine incident patterns can help you predict what the cybercriminals will do next. No system is 100% secure. But understanding the threats you face will help you improve your security. Cybercriminals are using all the information they can get hold of to up their game - you should too. Details: Verizon, 2017. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2018 at: https://www.ictsecuritymagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2017-Data-Breach-Investigations-Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.ictsecuritymagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2017-Data-Breach-Investigations-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 149077 Keywords: Cyber Security Cybercrime Financial Crimes

Author: Malhotra, Anjana Title: Ironbound Underground: Wage Theft and Workplace Violations Among Day Laborers in Newark's East Ward Summary: Day laborers are workers who are employed on a day-by-day, temporary basis. Each morning, at informal hiring sites throughout the country known as "shape-up sites," day laborers and employers negotiate short-term employment arrangements in an "open-air market." For employers, these day labor markets provide easy access to a large pool of workers that they can hire when needed and release them when not. While there is limited official information on the nature and size of the day laborer workforce, the United States Government Accounting Office ("U.S. GAO") and the 2004 National Day Labor Survey indicate that the day laborer community consists of mostly males with limited English proficiency that have recently migrated to the United States. Government reports and national surveys indicate that on any given day there are approximately 117,600 to 260,000 day laborers looking for work in the United States. Day laborers work in many different industries, including manual labor, construction, landscaping, moving, and food services. Homeowners also frequently employ day laborers for simple maintenance and home improvement projects. In the State of New Jersey, day laborers are entitled to the same legal protections that apply to all workers, regardless of immigration status. However, both federal government reports and the New Jersey Governor's Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel on Immigrant Policy have found that day laborers are among the most economically vulnerable workers. Day laborers are exposed to workplace abuses because they are often unaware of their rights, fearful of complaining to authorities, have limited English proficiency, and work in high risk jobs. U.S. government reports have also found that due to inadequate data on day laborers, state and local government agencies responsible for enforcing workplace laws have failed to appropriately investigate workplace violations or enforce day laborers' workplace rights. This report attempts to fill this information gap by profiling for the first time, the large contingent of day laborers that congregate daily in the Ironbound section of Newark to look for work. Following intake, and know your rights sessions, the Immigrant Workers' Rights Clinic ("IWR Clinic") at Seton Hall University Law School's Center for Social Justice systematically investigated and analyzed the status of day laborers in the Ironbound section of Newark for this comprehensive report. Between February and April 2010, the IWR Clinic under supervision of Anjana Malhotra and Bryan Lonegan studied the problem by engaging directly with community leaders, government officials, police officers, business owners, national and local experts, and the day laborers themselves. The IWR Clinic observed and documented conditions at the Ironbound site where workers gather for work each morning on a daily basis, regularly attended several of the day laborers' weekly meetings and conducted a survey of approximately half of the workers at the Ironbound site. As a result of its investigation, the IWR Clinic found that the Ironbound Day Laborers Endure a Significant Level of Workplace Violations, Especially in Wage Theft; the Financial Loss to the Workers Due to Wage Theft is Substantial; Workers Have Limited Recourse to Obtain Unpaid Wages; and Working Conditions and the Transient Nature of the Ironbound Shape-Up Site is Dangerous. Details: Newark: Seton Hall University School of Law, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Seton Hall University School of Law 254274: Accessed February 14, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413032 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413032 Shelf Number: 149148 Keywords: Day Laborers Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Immigrants Wage Theft Worker Exploitation

Author: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Title: Pulling fraud out of the shadows: Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 1028 Summary: PwC's 2018 Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey finds that 49% of global organisations say they've experienced economic crime in the past two years. But what about the other 51%? Have they avoided falling victim - or simply don't know about it? Since fraud hides in the shadows, one of the most powerful weapons in a fraudster's armoury is a lack of awareness within organisations. It's time for all businesses to recognise the true nature of the threat: not as just a nuisance or cost of doing business, but a shadow industry with tentacles in every country, sector and function Details: s.l.: PWC, 2018. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2018 at: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html Shelf Number: 149430 Keywords: Corruption and Fraud Economic Crimes Financial Crimes White Collar Crime

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Fraud against the Commonwealth: Report to Government 2014-2015 Summary: The Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report for 2014-15 presents research findings on the level of fraud risk affecting Commonwealth entities and the government's approach to preventing and responding to acts of dishonesty perpetrated within and against the Commonwealth. For the three years 2012-13 to 2014-15, 417,480 incidents of suspected fraud were detected worth over $1.208b with more than one third of Commonwealth entities experiencing fraud. During the three years, 3,699 defendants were prosecuted for fraud by the Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. In 2014-15, almost one third of sentences imposed involved actual imprisonment. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: AIC Report; Statistical Report 03: Accessed March 29, 2018 at: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr3 Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr3 Shelf Number: 149609 Keywords: Crime Statistics Dishonesty Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption

Author: African Union Commission. Department of Economic Affairs Title: Mobilisation of Domestic Resources: Fighting against Corruption and Illicit Financial Flows Summary: Illicit financial flows and corruption have long been at the centre of discussions on development in Africa, particularly due to the existence of a wide consensus on their negative impacts on development financing in Africa. It is now so widespread that Africa loses USD 50 billion annually. However, this figure is well below reality due to the difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics, and the secretive nature of such funds. The African Union's initiative to dedicate the year 2018 to combatting corruption under the theme "Winning the Fight against Corruption: A Sustainable Path for Africa's Transformation" is eloquent proof of the willingness of the African Union to combat poor financial governance, which affects the Continent's inclusive socio-economic development of the, as illicit financial flows are obstacles to productive investments, resulting in distortions in allocations of budgetary resources, and systematically increasing inequalities. The mobilization of adequate resources is essential in order for Africa to emerge from its weak economic conditions, and increase the level of development of its populations. Indeed, after two decades (80s and 90s) of weak growth with a nearly zero average, Africa has experienced strong economic growth, despite the recent downturn observed with the decline in commodity prices. The average growth rate has been around 5% since 2000, with considerable heterogeneity in growth patterns between countries, at a time when other regions have experienced a decline or stagnation in their economic activity. However, this growth has not substantially reduced poverty and inequality or led to job creation. The processes for industrialization, economic diversification and the modernization of agriculture have also been very limited. Despite progress made, more than 50% of the African population is living on less than USD 1.9/day, that is, about 389 million people (World Bank, 2016). In terms of income distribution, six of the top ten most unequal countries in the world were located in Africa, particularly in Southern Africa, with a GINI coefficient increasing from 0.42 to 0.46 between 2000 and 2010 (African Development Bank, 2012). Africa's infrastructure needs range from USD 130 to 170 billion per year (Authorized Economic Operator, 2018). On the basis of these findings and in view of the current limited budgetary resources and the scarcity of development aid, African countries should explore options for mobilizing domestic resources to finance productive activities, generate growth and mitigate the increasing social demands as a result of the continuing unprecedented population growth. This should start with the recovery of funds lost through illicit financial flows to invest in the social sectors (education, health, social safety nets, etc.) in order to rapidly harness the demographic dividend, and to place the Continent on the path to rapid, inclusive and sustainable growth. The African Union could address the issue at political level by putting in place a common continental strategy on which national strategies will be anchored, and by advocating for the strengthening of international cooperation in combatting tax evasion, money laundering, crime, corruption, false invoicing and mispricing of imported or exported goods practices. This paper takes stock of illicit financial flows and corruption in Africa, with a detailed presentation at regional and country levels. It is structured as follows: the first part essentially discusses the importance of domestic resource mobilization, and combatting corruption and illicit financial flows (IFFs) to ensure the sustainable development of Africa. The second part takes stock of the IFFs in Africa based on data provided by the organization, Global Financial Integrity (GFI). The third part addresses the issue of corruption and financial mismanagement in Africa, and the last part proposes recommendations Details: African Union (Addis Ababa ), 2018. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2018 at: http://iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/paper_2018_mobilization_of_domestic_resources_fighting_against_corruption_iff_english_0.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: http://iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/paper_2018_mobilization_of_domestic_resources_fighting_against_corruption_iff_english_0.pdf Shelf Number: 149884 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) Title: Money Laundering Resulting from the Counterfeiting of Pharmaceuticals in West Africa Summary: This study was aimed at understanding the nature and magnitude of the money- laundering phenomenon resulting from the counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals in West Africa. The methodology employed involved the selection of four countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo) for the purpose of in-depth country level study, while the remaining countries responded to a questionnaire. From the country reports and the responses provided by the member States to the questionnaire and the case studies provided by law enforcement authorities, the linkage between Money Laundering (ML) and counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals was analysed. Details: s.l.: GIABA, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Typologies Report: Accessed April 26, 2018 at: https://www.giaba.org/media/f/1038_GIABA_Typologies%20Report%20on%20ML%20and%20Counterfeit%20Pharmaceutical.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://www.giaba.org/media/f/1038_GIABA_Typologies%20Report%20on%20ML%20and%20Counterfeit%20Pharmaceutical.pdf Shelf Number: 149896 Keywords: Counterfeit Drugs Financial Crimes Money Laundering

Author: Newman, Graeme R. Title: Check and Card Fraud Summary: This guide describes the problem of check and card fraud, and reviews factors that increase the risks of it. It then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze your local problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem, and what is known about them from evaluative research and police practice. The guide covers fraud involving (1) all types of checks and (2) plastic cards, including debit, charge, credit, and "smart" cards. Each can involve a different payment method . While there are some obvious differences between check and card fraud, the limitations and opportunities for fraud and its prevention and control by local police are similar enough to warrant addressing them together. Furthermore, some cards (e.g., debit cards) are used and processed in a similar way to checks, and electronic checks are processed in a similar way to cards, so that the traditional distinction between cards and checks is fast eroding. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2003. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific Guides Series No. 21: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/check_and_card_fraud.pdf Year: 2003 Country: United States URL: http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/check_and_card_fraud.pdf Shelf Number: 91477 Keywords: Check Fraud Credit Card Fraud Financial Crimes

Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Commonwealth fraud investigations 2015-16 Summary: Public sector fraud involves dishonestly obtaining a benefit or causing a loss by deception or other means, and can be perpetrated by public servants or by members of the public or corporations. It can lead to a loss of revenue, damage to morale and long-lasting damage to trust in government services. The AIC has been conducting a Commonwealth fraud census since 2006, following on from an Attorney-General's Department data collection established in 1995. This paper reports the findings of the most recent annual census of fraud against Commonwealth entities and the measures taken to prevent fraud. It highlights the substantial cost of fraud to the Commonwealth, particularly from external suspects targeting Commonwealth monies or resources. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: AIC Statistical Reports no. 7: Accessed June 15, 2018 at: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr7-0 Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr7-0 Shelf Number: 150553 Keywords: Crime Statistics Dishonesty Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption

Author: Hunter, Marcena Title: Measures that Miss the Mark: Capturing proceeds of crime in illicit financial flows models Summary: Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are generally viewed as the financial side of criminal activity, and there is widespread agreement IFFs are a global threat. There is also agreement that IFFs, particularly prevalent and damaging in the context of weak, developing and fragile states, are a threat to sustainable development. International recognition of IFFs as a development threat include Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) target 16.4, which states: "[b]y 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial flow". However, the concept remains vague and its content controversial. Furthermore, misalignment between terminology used to define IFFs and methodology to measure the scale of IFFs has troubling implications for policy response. Terminology encompasses a wide variety of illicit flows, while existing measures tend to be narrower and inherently give greater weight to IFFs linked to the classifications of commerce, as compared to those generated by crime and corruption. Furthermore, IFFs from the least developed states are at high risk of being undervalued. This paper examines how terminology and measurement frameworks can better reflect the form and scale of IFFs linked to crime.Due to the complex nature of the phenomenon, a more accurate and multifaceted approach to defining and measuring crime-related IFFs is critical to better reflect the detrimental impact these types of flows have on development and to formulating effective responses. Continuing to treat IFFs as a single, indivisible phenomenon inhibits the development of comprehensive and effective responses. Disaggregation of analysis and measures of IFF types is therefore essential.Key recommendations: Develop more accurate terminology and definitions, including better accounting for elements especially relevant to developing nations and crime IFFs; Represent estimates of IFFs more accurately and transparently; Adopt a multi-step model that makes use of both crime- and country-specific assessments and the gravity model, as well as information from both quantitative and qualitative sources; and, Utilize assessment frameworks that go beyond monetary values and account for harm. Details: Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TGIATOC-Illicit-Financial-Flows-report-1941-hi-res-2-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TGIATOC-Illicit-Financial-Flows-report-1941-hi-res-2-1.pdf Shelf Number: 150735 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime

Author: Amodio, Francesco Title: Bribes vs. Taxes: Market Structure and Incentives Summary: Firms in developing countries often avoid paying taxes by making informal payments to tax officials. These bribes may raise the cost of operating a business, and the price charged to consumers. To decrease these costs, we designed a feedback incentive scheme for business tax inspectors that rewards them according to the anonymous evaluation submitted by inspected firms. We show theoretically that feedback incentives decrease the equilibrium bribe amount, but make firms with more inelastic demand more attractive for inspectors. A tilted scheme that attaches higher weights to the evaluation of smaller firms limits the scope for targeting and decreases the bribe amount to a lesser extent. We evaluate both schemes in a field experiment in the Kyrgyz Republic and find evidence that is consistent with the model predictions. By decreasing bribes, our intervention reduces the average cost for firms and the price they charge to consumers. Since fewer firms substitute bribes for taxes, tax revenues increase. Our study highlights the role of firm heterogeneity and market structure in shaping the relationship between firms and tax inspectors, and provides clear evidence of pass-through of bribes to consumers Details: Bonn: Institute of labor Economics (IZA), 2018. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 11668: Accessed August 16, 2018 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp11668.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp11668.pdf Shelf Number: 151150 Keywords: Bribes Financial Crimes Tax Evasion

Author: Vladimirov, Martin Title: Russian Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans: Corruption and State Capture Risks Summary: Over the past decade, Russia has increasingly sought to reassert its position as a global power and to present itself as alternative to the Euro-Atlantic model of liberal democracy and a free market economy. The Western Balkans is one of the regions in which Russia has been most active in this respect. Thus far, the region has more or less stayed on its course toward NATO and the European Union (EU). But Russia's meddling in the region has enhanced space domestically for political opportunists to try to avoid implementing necessary reforms, particularly those related to strengthening the rule of law and curbing of autocratic tendencies - as a result undermining civil society and the media, leading to democratic backsliding and an economic slowdown. NATO nevertheless could accept Montenegro as a member, while the EU has put forward the Berlin Process, which aims to speed up economic development and transformation. In 2018, the EU will propose a new Enlargement strategy aimed at providing a clear path for the Balkans to integrate into Europe. Tackling outstanding "governance gaps" - deficits in the rule of law, and weak democratic and market institutions - in the Western Balkans is critical to limiting the effects of so-called "corrosive capital" - funds flowing from non-democratic states such as Russia that both take advantage of, and exacerbate the challenges facing struggling democracies - and to restoring the region's democratic transformation. The tools Russia has used to expand its presence in the region are not new: political pressure; soft power, including cultural, media, and religious campaigns; and economic leverage ranging from the control and acquisition of critical energy assets to the financing of political parties and media. These tools are underpinned by a concerted Kremlin narrative designed to counter Euro-Atlantic values. The seeds of this narrative have landed on fertile ground in the Western Balkans, where a climate of unstable institutions of governance and rule of law, and protracted and systemic corruption at both the administrative and political levels, often lead to policy, regulatory or even state capture. The mixture of weak institutions of rule of law and kleptocratic tendencies, media propaganda and geopolitical pressure from Russia (as well as from other countries), has led many Western Balkan governments to adopt policies inconsistent with their national security or development interests. This situation calls for a better understanding and re-assessment of the political and economic factors that threaten the region's development now, and in the future. Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2018. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2018 at: http://wap.southeasteurope.org/~igardev/typo3/artShow.php?id=18228 Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://wap.southeasteurope.org/~igardev/typo3/artShow.php?id=18228 Shelf Number: 151250 Keywords: Economic Crimes Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption Political Corruption

Author: Acierno, Ronald Title: National Elder Mistreatment Survey: 5 year follow-up of victims and matched non-victims Summary: 1. PURPOSE The purpose of the completed project was to follow the first National Elder Mistreatment Study, which provided prevalence estimates, with a second study of a subset of the same participants to measure the effects of elder abuse in terms of (1) health and mental health outcomes and (2) criminal justice system participation and satisfaction, as well as to specify additional predictors of these effects. 2. SUBJECTS Data were collected from 774 older adults 8 years following their participation in Wave I of the NEMS. This represented the results of contacting every locatable participant who reported psychological, physical, or sexual (but not financial) abuse at Wave I (achieved subsample n = 183 of the original 753 Wave I victims) and a comparison sample of 591 randomly selected Wave I non-victims from the remaining 2,149 working phone numbers of the original 5024 non-victims (at Wave I). As mentioned, financial abuse classification at Wave I was not used to identify the victim subgroup prior to sampling, however retrospective analysis indicated that the two aforementioned sampling groups (every working phone number of Wave I victims of psychological, physical, and sexual abuse AND every working phone number of the 2,149 comparison Wave I participants) accounted for all but 7 financial abuse victims identified as such at Wave I (i.e., no other financial abuse victims at Wave I could have possibly been re-contacted). The cooperation rate (upon contact), for Wave I victims of psychological, physical, or sexual abuse was 66%; the cooperation rate of comparison Wave I participants was 57%. (Note: we had originally proposed to conduct propensity matching once the sample of Wave I victims was re-contacted, however by conserving funds during this first phase, we were able to expand from propensity matching to random selection of a much larger group of over 2,149, for a final derived sample of 774. This does not preclude future analysis using propensity matching). Overall, 183 (23.6%) participants reported experiencing either emotional (n = 163, 21.1%), physical (n = 18, 2.3%), sexual (n = 3, 0.4%), or neglectful (n = 2, 0.3%) mistreatment since turning 60 years (ie, elder abuse since age 60) at Wave I, indicating that our oversampling of mistreatment cases from Wave I was successful. We used 'any mistreatment since age 60 at Wave I' to classify adults as elder abuse victims or non-victims, rather than 'past year mistreatment at Wave I' because this sampling frame occurred 8 years following the original Wave, and the distinction between 'past year' and 'any since age 60' was largely irrelevant. Instead, the relevant comparisons were between elder abuse victims at Wave I (not just recent victims) and non-victims at Wave I in terms of current, past year outcomes. Demographic information, overall, and in terms of Wave I mistreatment status are given in Table 1. Married individuals were significantly more likely to report having experienced mistreatment at Wave I, as were those reporting experiencing prior trauma, poor health at Wave I, low income, that they needed help with DLTs, and low social support at Wave II. Details: Charleston: Medical University of South Carolina, 2018. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 29, 2018 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252029.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252029.pdf Shelf Number: 151277 Keywords: Elder Abuse Elderly Victims Financial Crimes Victims of Crime

Author: Atkinson, Colin Title: A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Asset-Focussed Interventions Against Organised Crime Summary: Asset-focussed interventions (AFIs) against organised crime are measures that target assets and finance deriving from crime or intended for use in a crime. They seek to deplete organised criminal finance and so reduce organised crime. This systematic review set out to conduct two types of analysis: a meta-analysis of the 'effect size' of asset focused interventions against organised crime; and a realist synthesis of the theory and knowledge around these types of interventions, using the EMMIE framework. In the absence of quantitative outcome evidence to measure effect, the review focuses on discussion of the other elements of the EMMIE framework. Alongside the full review, a narrative summary of the work is published here, along with a research protocol which was produced at the start of the work, setting out our approach to methodology. Asset-focussed interventions (AFIs) against organised crime are measures that target assets and finance deriving from crime or intended for use in a crime. They seek to deplete organised criminal finance and so reduce organised crime. Details: Glasgow: Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, University of Glasgow, 2017. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: What Works: Crime Reduction Systematic Review Series, 9: Accessed September 13, 2018 at: http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Systematic_Review_Series/Documents/Organised_crime_SR.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Systematic_Review_Series/Documents/Organised_crime_SR.pdf Shelf Number: 151520 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Financial Crimes Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime

Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: Kenya: Potential Revenue Losses Associated with Trade Misinvoicing Summary: Trade misinvoicing is a reality impacting Kenya and every other country of the world. Imports coming into a country can be over-invoiced in order to shift money abroad. Or imports can be under-invoiced in order to evade or avoid customs duties or VAT taxes. Similarly, exports going out of a country can be under-invoiced in order to shift money abroad. And exports are occasionally over-invoiced, for example in order to reclaim VAT taxes. Global Financial Integrity finds that trade misinvoicing is the most frequently utilized mechanism facilitating measurable illicit financial flows. Misstating import and export values has become normalized in much of commercial trade, and the same facilitating shadow financial system is used to move money of criminal and corrupt origin. We are dealing with a systemic problem that merits serious concerted attention. Parties to trade who engage in misinvoicing do so because it is profitable to them. That is, they will incur some costs (including the expected cost of getting caught) but do so because the expected benefits to them of misinvoicing are larger than their expected costs. While those parties benefit from misinvoicing, there are additional social costs to nations affected by such activity. Trade misinvoicing redirects economic resources away from their most productive use (i.e., it is a type of "rent-seeking" activity) and that can result in social inefficiencies in the allocation and distribution of resources. While any country may be affected by misinvoicing, the problem is particularly acute for developing countries where productive capacities may already be limited. The social costs of misinvoicing can undermine sustainable growth in living standards in developing countries as well as exacerbate already pronounced inequities in the distribution of income and wealth. Moreover, by depressing government revenues and exacerbating inequality, those social costs can also impede progress in the developing world on important social goals, such as poverty reduction. In this analysis we seek to provide an approximate measure of revenues lost to the Kenyan government due to trade misinvoicing. We illustrate this in the first section of the report for 2013 (the last year for which comprehensive data for Kenya are available). For that year, we can reasonably identify potential revenue losses in excess of US$907 million, or about 8 percent of total Kenyan government revenues. That is a conservative figure, as it does not encompass many aspects of trade misinvoicing and other illicit financial flows that do not show up in official statistics. Moreover, the detailed data available for estimating trade misinvoicing in Kenya comprise a fraction of all of that country's trade flows. Furthermore, we take one aspect of this problem - import under-invoicing - and subject it to detailed analysis utilizing detailed bilateral trade data. We find that Kenyan imports of cereal from Pakistan, mineral fuels from India and, more generally, imports from China to be particularly prone to potential revenue loss to the government of Kenya due to under-invoicing. All researchers on this issue of trade misinvoicing are constantly seeking better data and better analytical methodologies. Even as we work toward these goals, what is most important is to appreciate the order of magnitude of the problem and the potential for development revenues if the problem is curtailed. Recognizing the shortcomings in data, Global Financial Integrity has developed GFTrade, a database of current world market prices of 80,000 categories of goods in the Harmonized System, as traded by 30 of the largest global economies. This enables emerging market and developing country customs and revenue authorities to assess instantly the risk that trade misinvoicing may be a reality in transactions as they are coming in or going out. GFTrade is in use in Africa now. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 10, 2018 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/GFI-Kenya-Potential-Revenue-Losses-Associated-with-Trade-Misinvoicing.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Kenya URL: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/GFI-Kenya-Potential-Revenue-Losses-Associated-with-Trade-Misinvoicing.pdf Shelf Number: 152890 Keywords: Corporate Crime Corrupt Practices Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Transparency International Title: European Getaway: Inside the Murky World of Golden Visas Summary: Burgundy passports are turning gold, as EU governments sell residency and citizenship to the ultra-rich. By their nature, these schemes pose inherent risks for corruption, as people who steal money from their home countries need other jurisdictions to escape to when the going gets tough. Golden visa schemes offer fast-track citizenship and/or residency to foreign nationals in exchange for lots of cash. European golden visas are particularly appealing, as they give their owners free reign to move throughout the EU, unconstrained by interference or checks. There are numerous examples of high-risk business people and oligarchs enjoying all the benefits that golden visas have to offer. Finding safe haven through these schemes is simpler than you might think if you have a lot of money to spare. Despite the risks posed by golden visa schemes, several of the governments selling residency and citizenship do not seem to question where applicants' money comes from. This perhaps contributes to the EU: Welcoming over 6,000 new citizens and close to 100,000 new residents through golden visas schemes in the last decade. Attracting around �25 billion in foreign direct investment through golden visas over the last ten years. While some nations are profiting from the sales of golden visas, all EU citizens take the sizeable hit due to the ethical implications and risks embedded in the current practice. Nonetheless, secrecy continues to obscure even basic information about these schemes and EU citizens do not have the information necessary to decide whether selling residency or citizenship is a risk worth taking. We have worked with Transparency International to change this, investigating publicly available sources and reaching out to national governments for additional information. In our latest report, we are able to shine some light on the shady situation, revealing a telling though still incomplete picture of the golden visa scheme. RECOMMENDATIONS: With Transparency International, we call upon EU institutions to: Set EU-wide standards for golden visa schemes, including enhanced due diligence and transparency; Identify and regularly assess the risks posed by schemes for the EU as a whole and mitigate accordingly; Seek to broaden anti-money laundering rules so they apply to all players in the golden visa industry; Establish mechanisms for collecting and coordinating information on applications, investment and rejections; Start legal proceedings against member states whose schemes could undermine the collective security of EU nations. Details: Berlin: Transparency International and Global Witness, 2018. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2018 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/european-getaway/ Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/european-getaway/ Shelf Number: 152914 Keywords: Financial Crimes Illegal Trade Money Laundering Passports Security

Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: Nigeria: Potential Revenue Losses Associated with Trade Misinvoicing Summary: Analysis of trade misinvoicing in Nigeria in 2014 shows that the potential loss of revenue to the government was approximately $2.2 billion for the year, according to a new study by Global Financial Integrity. To put this figure in context, this amount represents four percent of total annual government revenue as reported to the International Monetary Fund. Put still another way, the estimated value gap of all imports and exports represents approximately 15 percent of the country's total trade. The report, titled Nigeria: Potential Revenue Losses Associated with Trade Misinvoicing, analyzes Nigeria's bilateral trade statistics for 2014 (the most recent year for which sufficient data are available) which are published by the United Nations Comtrade. The detailed breakdown of bilateral Nigerian trade flows in Comtrade allowed for the computation of trade value gaps that are the basis for trade misinvoicing estimates. Import gaps represent the difference between the value of goods Nigeria reports having imported from its partner countries and the corresponding export reports by Nigeria's trade partners. Export gaps represent the difference in value between what Nigeria reports as having exported and what its partners report as imported. The portion of revenue lost due to the misinvoicing of exports was $1.3 billion during the year which was related to a reduction in corporate income taxes. The portion of revenue lost due to the misinvoicing of imports was $880 million. This amount can be further divided into its component parts: uncollected VAT tax ($100 million), customs duties ($365 million), and corporate income tax ($415 million). Lost revenue due to misinvoiced exports was $1.3 billion for the year which is related to lower than expected corporate income and royalties. "The practice of trade misinvoicing has become normalized in many categories of international trade" according to GFI President Raymond Baker. "It is a major contributor to poverty, inequality, and insecurity in emerging market and developing economies. The social cost attendant to trade misinvoicing undermines sustainable growth in living standards and exacerbates inequities and social divisions, issues which are critical in Nigeria today." Examination of the underlying commodity groups which comprise Nigeria's global trade show that a large amount of lost revenue ($200 million) was related to import under-invoicing of just five product types. Those products and the related estimated revenue losses include: vehicles ($100 million), iron and steel products ($40 million), electrical machinery ($20 million), ceramics ($20 million), and aluminum products ($20 million). Lost revenue due to mispriced exports ($1.3 billion) may be related to the mineral fuels trade given this category of goods makes up over 90 percent of all exports. Trade misinvoicing occurs in four ways: under-invoicing of imports or exports, and over-invoicing of imports or exports. In the case of import under-invoicing fewer VAT taxes and customs duties are collected due to the lower valuation of goods. When import over-invoicing occurs (i.e. when companies pay more than would normally be expected for a product), corporate revenues are lower and therefore less income tax is paid. In export under-invoicing the exporting company collects less revenue than would be anticipated and therefore reports lower income. Thus, it pays less income tax. Corporate royalties are also lower. Total misinvoicing gaps related to imports can be broken down by under-invoicing ($2.4 billion) and over-invoicing ($1.9 billion). It should be noted that these figures represent the estimated value of the gap between what was reported by Nigeria and its trading partners. The loss in government revenue is a subset of these amounts and is based on VAT tax rates (5 percent), customs duties (15.2 percent), corporate income taxes (22.4 percent), and royalties (.2 percent) which are then applied to the value gap. Export misinvoicing gaps were a massive $5.9 billion for export under-invoicing and $5.6 billion for export over-invoicing. Lost corporate income taxes and royalties are then applied to export under-invoicing amounts to calculate lost government revenue. Details: Washington, DC: GFI, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2018 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Nigeria-Report-2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Nigeria URL: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Nigeria-Report-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 153244 Keywords: Corporate Crime Corrupt Practices Financial Crimes Illicit Financial Flows Money Laundering Tax Evasion

Author: Kroll Title: Anti-Bribery and Corruption Benchmarking Report - 2018. Converging Third Party Risks: Regulation, Reputation, and Information Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In today's global, hyper-connected economy, we find anti-bribery and corruption programs in the midst of an evolution that is driven by converging organizational risks and priorities. Regulatory mandates, critical reputational factors, and data security issues are increasingly intertwined as compliance teams strive to protect their organizations from ABC risks. The common thread running through all these risks is the high volume of direct and indirect third parties that partner with and supply services to organizations. Forty-five percent of respondents work with at least 1,000 third parties per year, a six percentage point increase over the 2017 Report. Individually, regulatory, reputational, and data security risks are persistent challenges that compliance and ethics professionals know very well. The convergence of these risks is driving greater collaboration between the organization's compliance and information security teams, which can make for stronger, more compliant anti-bribery and corruption programs. Leadership engagement, always a key and essential contributor to program effectiveness, is especially critical for ensuring enterprise-wide support for compliance efforts. Doing business ethically and maintaining an up-to-date anti-bribery and corruption program is not just about avoiding the pitfalls of reputational or legal risk. Investors are finding that a focus on ethical business dealings can translate into rewarding financial outcomes. By way of example, the publicly traded companies among Ethisphere's 2018 World's Most Ethical Companies ("Honorees") outperformed U.S. Large Cap Indices by 4.88 percent over the last three years, demonstrating that ethics and performance are well-suited companions and valued in the marketplace. Despite the increased focus and engagement of organizational resources on compliance efforts, a staggering 93 percent of respondents believe their ABC risks will remain the same or worsen in 2018. Those who expect greater ABC risks attribute the rise to increased enforcement of existing regulations, followed closely by new regulations. Given these expanding regulatory pressures, a holistic, multidisciplinary approach may hold the key to sustainable improvements in the future. Some key findings from our study include: ABC PROGRAMS: ONGOING CHALLENGES Overall, the results of this year's survey were consistent with those in our last report; namely, that third party risks - particularly reputational issues - were of greatest concern to respondents. In a shift from last year, however, respondents singled out increased enforcement of existing regulations along with the prospect of new regulations as the top reasons why they expect their anti-bribery and corruption risks to grow in 2018. A significant percentage of respondents continue to worry that they are not prepared to address the risks that their third parties present. Indeed, 58 percent of respondents uncovered legal, ethical, or compliance issues with a third party after initial due diligence. Most often, organizations' due diligence practices - such as ongoing and active monitoring - are responsible for bringing these issues to light. However, in a growing number of cases, third parties are self-disclosing infractions, a clear reflection of changing cultural and regulatory trends, including heightened concerns over personal liability. Risk-based segmentation, ongoing monitoring that incorporates regular data refresh, and periodic program evaluations have emerged as best-practice features of effective anti-bribery and corruption programs. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE RISKS ON THE RISE The most notable year-over-year change in survey responses was the increased concern over opaque ownership structures, which rose this year to become the third most common reason why third parties are failing to meet an organization's standards. However, current mitigation efforts have not translated into confidence for compliance teams: less than a quarter of respondents reported that they are very comfortable with their ability to effectively address the risks associated with beneficial ownership. A global expansion of regulatory mandates that demand attention to ownership is driving much of the greater focus on the matter. Broader societal expectations, however, are also playing a critical role; the potential for significant, long-lasting reputational damage has made the effort to track ownership an imperative. ABC AFTER ONBOARDING: ONGOING MONITORING AND DATA REFRESH In the fast-changing global marketplace, organizations cannot expect that a third party's risk profile and/or ownership will remain static after initial on-boarding due diligence. In fact, regulatory guidance has made ongoing monitoring an expectation for an effective and engaged anti-bribery and corruption program. However, there is no clear mandate as to what monitoring should entail or how often it should be done. To be expected - and consistent with prior data -respondents reported a number of different approaches to monitoring. This year, however, we introduced the topic of third party data refresh into our survey and found many organizations using the practice to one degree or another. Refreshing baseline information on their third-party universe can help ensure organizations are conducting diligence or other monitoring practices corresponding with the actual risk presented by their third parties. With anti-bribery and corruption programs increasingly driven by technology, data integrity is a growing factor in risk mitigation and defense. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Virtually the same percentage of respondents reported their organizations had engaged in M and A activity in 2017 as did in the prior year (62 percent and 67 percent, respectively). However, M and A continues to challenge compliance professionals from an anti-bribery and corruption perspective. The data shows that respondents are still not consistently meeting regulatory guidance, which expects organizations to thoroughly understand who they are acquiring. Similar to last year, respondents report collecting less information on the third parties of their transaction targets than on direct third parties. In a more positive development, Kroll experts have noted that some organizations, particularly those looking to be acquired, are turning this exercise into a competitive advantage. "Clean-up" work on their own third-party universe or supply chains can help make target companies more attractive to buyers and accelerate the transaction process. NEW RESOURCES EMERGE AS ABC AND ENTERPRISE RISKS CONVERGE A convergence of risk factors - specifically regulatory, reputational, and data security - is driving home the realization that greater collaboration and support from resources across the enterprise can help anti-bribery and corruption programs better mitigate risks. Increasingly stringent data privacy laws - including the imminent adoption of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - are making information - gathering on third parties a minefield. Across all survey respondents, 85 percent described themselves as somewhat or very concerned about data security risks. Meanwhile, mobile technology and applications such as WhatsApp and WeChat are creating internal vulnerabilities. Growing collaboration between compliance and information security/technology teams is proving instrumental in making due diligence efforts compliant and comprehensive. Overall, ABC programs are receiving greater investments from their organizations; however, nearly half of this year's respondents (47 percent) feel they need more resources. Measuring the effectiveness of programs can be the key to ensuring appropriate funding levels. Indeed, the survey data shows a link between program measurement and high levels of leadership engagement, which plays a critical role in anti-bribery and corruption program effectiveness. Beyond regulatory compliance, leaders are aiming to safeguard brands and organizational reputations. Details: New York: 2018. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.kroll.com/en-us/abc-report Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://1okg7q3ipr08ql7es2x3ip4634-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Kroll_2018_ABC_Report_Digital.pdf Shelf Number: 154046 Keywords: ABC Programs Anti-Bribery Bribery Bribes Corruption Crimes Against Businesses Financial Crimes Fraud General Data Protection Regulation Security Risks

Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: South Africa: Potential Revenue Losses Associated with Trade Misinvoicing Summary: Executive Summary This report analyzes South Africa's bilateral trade statistics for 2010 - 2014 (the most recent years for which sufficient data are available) which are published by the United Nations (Comtrade). The detailed breakdown of bilateral South African trade flows allowed for the computation of trade value gaps that are the basis for trade misinvoicing estimates. Import gaps represent the difference between the value of goods South Africa reports having imported from its partner countries and the corresponding export reports by South Africa's trade partners. Export gaps represent the difference in value between what South Africa reports as having exported and what its partners report as imported. Analysis of trade misinvoicing in South Africa from 2010-2014 shows that the potential loss of revenue to the government is $7.4 billion annually or, a total of $37 billion during the period. The average portion of revenue lost due to import misinvoicing each year is $4.8 billion. This amount can be further divided into its component parts: uncollected VAT tax ($2.1 billion), customs duties ($596 million), and corporate income tax ($2.1 billion). Lost revenue due to misinvoiced exports was $2.6 billion on average each year which is related to lower than expected corporate income and royalties. The study also examined trade data from the South African Revenue Service in order to conduct an in-depth examination of import under-invoicing. This process analyzed approximately 7.4 million trade transactions which included more than 8,200 commodity types for the period 2010-2015. A key conclusion is that goods categories with a preponderance of under-invoicing tend to be associated with higher effective tax rates than other classes of imports. The data show that the top five categories for potential revenue loss related to import under-invoicing are machinery, knitted apparel, electrical machinery, non-knitted apparel, and vehicles. Three of these commodities (machinery, electrical machinery, and vehicles) are among the most commonly imported goods into South Africa. Trade misinvoicing occurs in four ways: under-invoicing of imports or exports, and over-invoicing of imports or exports. In the case of import under-invoicing fewer VAT taxes and customs duties are collected due to the lower valuation of goods. When import over-invoicing occurs (i.e. when companies pay more than would normally be expected for a product), corporate revenues are lower and therefore less income tax is paid. In export under-invoicing the exporting company collects less revenue than would be anticipated and therefore reports lower income. Thus, it pays less income tax. Corporate royalties are also lower. Total misinvoicing gaps related to imports can be broken down by under-invoicing ($16.3 billion) and over-invoicing ($9.8 billion). It should be noted that these figures represent the estimated value of the gap between what was reported by South Africa and its trading partners. The loss in government revenue is a subset of these amounts and is based on VAT tax rates (12.9 percent), 2 Global Financial Integrity customs duties (3.7 percent), corporate income taxes (21.7 percent), and royalties (1 percent) which are then applied to the value gap. Export misinvoicing gaps were $11.6 billion for export under-invoicing and $8.6 billion for export over-invoicing. Lost corporate income taxes and royalties are then applied to export under-invoicing amounts to calculate lost government revenue. The practice of trade misinvoicing has become normalized in many categories of international trade. It is a major contributor to poverty, inequality, and insecurity in emerging market and developing economies. The social cost attendant to trade misinvoicing undermines sustainable growth in living standards and exacerbates inequities and social divisions, issues which are critical in South Africa today. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8. 2019 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/report/south-africa-potential-revenue-losses-associated-with-trade-misinvoicing/ Year: 2018 Country: South Africa URL: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/South-Africa-Report-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154289 Keywords: Custom Duties Financial Crimes Financial Fraud Revenue Losses South Africa Tax Fraud Trade Misinvoicing Underinvoicing

Author: Adeba, Brian Title: A Hijacked State: Violent Kleptocracy in South Sudan Summary: On September 12, 2018, the South Sudanese government and the armed opposition signed a peace deal that could potentially end the 5-year-old conflict, if elites exercise the political will required to implement the agreement. The South Sudanese conflict is rooted in the violent kleptocratic system of governance that the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) began building in 2005, after the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). When President Salva Kiir became the chair of the SPLM and the leader of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan from 2005 to 2011, a network of allies formed and positioned itself to make decisions about the distribution of influence and oil wealth. In 2011, Kiir became president of newly independent South Sudan, and these key allies drafted the Transitional Constitution, which vested immense powers in Kiir's hands that allowed him, for instance, to prorogue (discontinue without dissolving) the national legislature, fire elected governors, and dissolve legislative assemblies in the country's states. The destructive competition over power and access to opportunities for corruption resulted in a slow expulsion of some elites from the center of power and a consequential rise in power of others, dividing the ruling party into two factions, for and against Kiir. Those opposed to President Kiir largely coalesced behind Vice President Riek Machar. South Sudan's oil production was at its height in 2011 when the global prices of crude oil averaged over 100 U.S. dollars per barrel, which allowed the country to pocket a monthly average of 500 million U.S. dollars from its share. When South Sudanese authorities shut down oil production because of conflict with Sudan that had turned violent along the border, production remained suspended for 15 months-between January 2012 and March 2013-quickly creating a significant deficit in a young economy so heavily reliant on oil for its revenues and gross domestic product (GDP). The government's sudden loss of over 90 percent of cash from oil revenues disrupted entrenched patterns of corruption and tested the limits of the violent kleptocratic system, culminating in a bloody conflict in December 2013. This crisis in turn plunged South Sudan into a series of interrelated economic, fiscal, security, political, and humanitarian crises. In South Sudan's system of violent kleptocracy, leaders have hijacked institutions and stoked violent conflict, committed mass atrocities, and created a man-made famine. Amid the chaos of war, the ruling elites ransacked various sectors of the economy. South Sudan's violent kleptocracy has distorted the country's institutions, heaping catastrophic consequences on the national monetary reserve and creating an atmosphere in which too many hands are left to freely and repetitively reach into the public treasury with impunity. Services remain undelivered, business practices undermine the rule of law, and corruption abounds. While poor regulatory mechanisms made it easy to loot the public treasury with little consequence, the ruling elites could have chosen to improve institutions of accountability rather than deliberately dis-empower them. South Sudan's leaders have incorporated corrupt practices inherited from the north-south war into the current government. Without strong and effective institutions in place, military leaders dominate the decision-making processes on public spending to wield both power and money opportunistically. These leaders have abused their positions of power to steal from public coffers, wage war, and enlarge patronage networks. Violent conflict in South Sudan today stems from competitive corruption that has characterized governance since 2005. Leaders use violence as a means of capturing the national economy and budget and to prolong their stay in power for the purpose of self-enrichment. Oil has represented the key prize in South Sudan since independence. The political elites enrich themselves with oil revenues at the public's expense and to the detriment of the economy and ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, the status quo could be different. U.S. policymakers and international partners can now use the power of the U.S. dollar and the international financial system-on which South Sudanese leaders rely almost exclusively - to target these leaders' finances and the networks that enable the violent kleptocracy to continue to harm the South Sudanese people. In September 2017, the U.S. Department of the Treasury initiated a process of holding South Sudan's leaders accountable for the egregious corruption that feeds war in their country. In the wake of the recently concluded peace agreement, the financial pressures enacted by the Treasury Department must continue because the deal itself lacks meaningful stipulations to end the endemic corruption, heightening the potential for a return to conflict. To be fully effective in thwarting the interests of leaders who may choose to violate the latest peace deal, network sanctions, anti-money laundering measures, prosecutions, and enhanced travel bans must be applied in a genuinely concerted and comprehensive manner. It is also crucial to focus on grievances, inequalities, and violence at the ground level. Primarily, the international community and the region should make it clear they stand with the people of South Sudan: implement and aggressively enforce these enhanced measures of financial pressure that can begin to build leverage over the competing elites, and deliver justice and accountability for the many victims of the war to foster long-term stability. There needs to be a greater focus on removing the rewards of competitive corruption by focusing on both South Sudan's decision-makers and the international firms that enable them. The priority should be to monitor these entities and implement the necessary pressures needed to stop them and thereby dismantle the entrenched violent kleptocratic system, which is a prerequisite for lasting peace, good governance, and human rights in South Sudan. Instead of trying to forge comfortable power-sharing agreements, the focus from the region and broader international community must be on creating consequences for bad actors, as this is the only path to a transformed and reformed functional state in South Sudan. These pressures can help deny the leaders material resources used to perpetuate large-scale violence in South Sudan. This pressure also needs to extend in the region. In June 2018, the U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Sigal Mandelker, traveled to Uganda and Kenya to deliver a strong message on the need for action against the proceeds of South Sudanese corruption that are laundered into neighboring banking systems. This message must continue to be developed with specific pressures delivered not only by the United States, but also by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, European Union, African Union, and regional bodies. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2019. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2019 at: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/AHijackedState_Enough_February2019-web.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Sudan URL: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/AHijackedState_Enough_February2019-web.pdf Shelf Number: 154610 Keywords: Exploitation of Natural Resources Financial Crimes Political Corruption Violent Conflict

Author: Durner, Tracey Title: Untangling a Marriage of Convenience: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Summary: Within the realm of policy discussions, anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts are generally treated as a package deal. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the FATF Recommendations, and related guidance documents represent today's international AML and CFT standards and are mirrored in laws and initiatives around the world. Given the "obvious similarities and differences between money laundering and terrorism financing," FATF notes "the risks (of both) are often assessed and managed using the same information flows between public and private sector institutions." This convergence between the types of information and stakeholders relevant to money laundering and terrorism financing is, in part, behind the unification of AML and CFT efforts. From a policy-making standpoint, the combination makes sense. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) already analyze suspicious financial activity, including potential instances of money laundering, often triggered by reports from the private sector resulting from frontline compliance and transaction monitoring procedures. It seems logical to incorporate the deterrence, detection, and tracking of terrorism financing into existing AML frameworks. In practice, critics have argued this "marriage" places undue burden on the private sector to understand the intent of criminals behind the actual transactions.2 Others contend that the very premise of CFT policies are misguided, resulting in ineffective and even harmful outcomes. With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the preponderance of low-cost, lone-actor attacks in North America and Europe, international attention once again has focused on CFT as a central tenet in the fight against terrorism. In 2016, FATF issued a consolidated strategy on CFT, followed by the adoption of an operational plan in 2018. CFT-specific entities such as the Counter ISIL Financing Group have emerged, and the French government in 2018 convened a high-level international conference focused on combating the financing of ISIL and al-Qaida, with a second conference scheduled for Australia in mid-2019. This brief examines where and how AML frameworks are fit for purpose relative to CFT and considers where additional CFT-specific efforts are necessary. It begins with a brief summary of the evolution of money laundering and terrorism financing policies, discussing the unification of the two fields and the key differences between the motivations and typologies of money laundering and terrorism financing crimes. Against that backdrop, it explores the four objectives of CFT efforts (prevent, detect, freeze, and trace) to identify areas where existing unified AML/CFT frameworks are working and areas where more nuance is required to effectively combat threats specific to terrorism financing. Although particular attention is given to the United States and United Kingdom as international financial centers, similar approaches and convergences between AML and CFT policies and practices occur worldwide. The brief concludes with recommendations on how current CFT policy discourse and evolution can meaningfully support broader counterterrorism objectives. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2019. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154691 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Financial Crimes Financing of Terrorism Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorism Financing

Author: van der Veen, H.C.J. Title: National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba) Summary: Dutch policy to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing is based on the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and European Union (EU) directives and regulations. The FATF - an intergovernmental body set up by the G7 in 1989 - focuses on the global combat of money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. Members of the FATF, including the Netherlands, have committed themselves to implementing the 40 FATF recommendations on taking preventive and repressive measures by obliged entities, and to implementing measures to improve national legal and regulatory systems and international cooperation in this field. In addition, the FATF supervises the correct functioning and effectiveness of those (legal) measures. The majority of the FATF's recommendations has been adopted into the fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, applicable to all EU member states. Article 7 of this directive obliges EU member states to implement a risk-based policy against money laundering and terrorist financing and to establish a National Risk Assessment (NRA). In 2017, the Research and Documentation Centre (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoeken Documentatiecentrum, WODC) of the Ministry of Justice and Security1 conducted an NRA on money laundering and an NRA on terrorist financing for the European Netherlands. These NRAs identified and categorised the ten most significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks in terms of their potential impact. Both studies also gave an insight into the extent to which the existing policy instruments (legislation and regulation) reduce the identified risks. The risks for the Caribbean part of the Netherlands were not included in these NRAs. These overseas Caribbean territories, i.e. Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (indicated in this report as Caribbean Netherlands or BES islands) have had the status of 'public bodies' or 'special municipalities' since 10 October 2010. The BES islands - with a total population of around 24,000 inhabitants (on 1 January 2017) and a total surface area of 322 km� - are situated in the Caribbean Sea at a distance of 7,000-8,000 kilometres from the European Netherlands. Bonaire is situated east of Aruba and Cura�ao, at 80 kilometres from the continental coast of Venezuela. Sint Eustatius and Saba are situated south of Sint Maarten and northwest of Saint Kitts and Nevis. Bonaire is situated at around 800 kilometres' distance from Sint Eustatius and Saba. Because of significant differences between the Caribbean and European Netherlands in terms of geographical, demographic, economic and socio-cultural characteristics (context factors) that make these parts alternately more or less vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing, a separate NRA has been conducted for the BES islands. There are also differences between both parts in terms of the existing policy instruments to combat the risks and the way this fight is carried out. The aim of this NRA is to identify the most significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks in terms of their potential impact and to assess the 'resilience' of the policy instruments designed to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Resilience entails the functioning of policy instruments, whereby the following is applicable: the greater the resilience, the more effectively the instruments combat the risk. This NRA also describes a number of lessons learned that could be taken into account in subsequent NRAs. Different research activities were executed for this NRA to gain an insight into existing threats relating to money laundering and terrorist financing on the BES islands, namely a literature study, an email survey, interviews with expert organisations and other involved organisations, and an expert meeting. Although this provided a considerable amount of information about the subject of money laundering in the Caribbean Netherlands, it did not lead to any clear signals of threats relating to terrorist financing. This does not necessarily mean terrorist financing does not occur on the BES islands; however, interviewees and participants in the expert meeting were unable to substantiate the few rumours about terrorist financing to the extent that they should be considered a threat. Also, the written and online sources that were consulted gave no indication of the existence of threats relating to terrorist financing. Because of this, the report and this summary focus on the subject of money laundering. Details: the Hague: Ministry of Justice and Security, Research and Documentation Center, 2018. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Cahiers 2018-17a: Accessed April 1, 2019 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202018-17a_2689g_Full%20text_tcm29-379590.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202018-17a_2689g_Full%20text_tcm29-379590.pdf Shelf Number: 155256 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Risk Assessment Terrorist Financing

Author: Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia Title: Vulnerability to Money Laundering and Crime Deterrence: Evidence from Italy Summary: This paper examines the economy's vulnerability to money laundering in a given region. Assuming that criminals are rational investors who take into account risks and returns of both legal and illegal investments, we define vulnerability as a function of well-identified drivers. Proxies of these variables are used to empirically investigate the relationship between the institutional/economic characteristics of Italian provinces and their vulnerability to money laundering in the 2008-2013 period. We focus on the impact of the reporting of suspicious transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit, by using instrumental variables to address endogeneity in the relationship between the number of reports made and our measure of vulnerability. Results highlight positive effects of the institutional policies adopted to fight money laundering, especially as far as the reporting of suspicious transactions is concerned. Further dimensions of local vulnerability are outlined: time-invariant heterogeneity across provinces, showing that certain areas are more systematically vulnerable because of persistent local features that cannot be individually identified; and idiosyncratic vulnerability, which pinpoints the fact that some provinces have been periodically subject to abnormally intense money-laundering activity. Details: Milan: Universita Bocconi, 2017. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2017-66: Accessed April 12, 2019 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3090994 Year: 2017 Country: Italy URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3090994 Shelf Number: 155373 Keywords: Crime Deterrence Financial Crimes Money Laundering