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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:27 pm
Time: 8:27 pm
Results for financing of terrorism
7 results foundAuthor: Great Britain. House of Lords. European Union Committee Title: Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism Summary: In the United Kingdom alone the turnover of the most serious forms of organised crime is perhaps £15 billion a year, two thirds of which is laundered through banks and other bodies. Much of this constitutes the proceeds of drug trafficking. The problem is global, and so must be the response. More than 180 countries are involved as members of or by being associated with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which recommends the action they should take to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and promotes the monitoring of their compliance with those standards. The European Commission has been a member of the FATF from the outset, and the Community has been in the forefront of the fight. For the Member States, the FATF policy is implemented by a Directive which sets out in detail what is expected of them. The first requirement is that they should implement the Directive, and not all have yet done so. The United Kingdom has done so very effectively, but in other respects the Government have been slow. Astonishingly, they have not even signed, much less ratified, the Warsaw Convention on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which would extend to all Council of Europe States arrangements through which to access financial information on money laundering and terrorist financing, and information on assets held by criminal organisations, including terrorist groups. The Warsaw Convention, if in force, would also help with recovery of the proceeds of crime, especially through civil proceedings. This is vital for the prevention and deterrence of drug trafficking and other serious crimes. Freezing the assets of suspected terrorists is another essential weapon, but it must not be abused; those whose assets are frozen have a right to know why, to make representations, and to have them considered. The European Court has led the way to progress in the EU; the United Nations still has some way to go. Details: London: The Stationery Office, 2009. 2 vol. Source: Internet Resource: 19th Report of Session 2008–09. Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/activities/UK_Parlrep.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/activities/UK_Parlrep.pdf Shelf Number: 115780 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismMoney Laundering (U.K.)Organized Crime |
Author: Haigner, Stefan D. Title: Combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism: A survey Summary: Policy programs on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) have largely called for preventive measures like keeping record of financial transactions and reporting suspicious ones. In this survey study, we analyze the extent of global money laundering and terrorist financing and discuss the preventive policies and their evaluations. Moreover, we investigate whether more effective tax information exchange would bolster AML/CFT policies in that it reduced tax evasion, thus the volume of transnational financial flows (i.e. to and from offshore financial centres) and thus in turn cover given to money laundering and terrorist financing. We conclude that such a strategy can reduce financial flows, yet due to a "weakest link problem" even a few countries not participating can greatly undo what others have achieved. Details: Berlin: Economics of Security, DIW Berlin, 2012. 109p. Source: Economics of Security Working Paper 65: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2012 at http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.404013.de/diw_econsec0065.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.404013.de/diw_econsec0065.pdf Shelf Number: 125944 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismMoney Laundering |
Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Regional Risk Assessment on terrorism Financing 2016: South-East Asia & Australia Summary: The Syria-Iraq conflict and the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 have energised extremists and their sympathisers across South-East Asia and Australia. The region is also dealing with long-running domestic conflicts and insurgencies that share the characteristics of terrorism, even if they are not connected to ISIL or violent global extremism. This highly-charged and dynamic security environment has intensified terrorism financing risks in the region, posing new challenges for authorities. Small-cell terrorist activity, foreign terrorist fighter travel and the growing number of lone actors will see continued use of self-funding to raise funds and cash smuggling to move them. These proven, easy-to-use terrorism financing methods reduce the need for terrorists and their supporters to resort to more complex financial activity or adopt new payment systems. The region's porous land and close maritime borders, as well as informal cash-intensive economies, also influence the continued use of established methods. Terrorism financing funds flowing out of the region are currently channelled mainly into the Syria-Iraq conflict, but comprise only a small portion of international funding to factions fighting in that area. While outflows to foreign conflict zones pose a high risk, concern is growing over signs of funding entering the region to support local terrorist actors. Details: Canberra: AUSTRAC, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140160 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismISISIslamic StateRisk AssessmentTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremists |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: Gifts and Graft: How Boko Haram Uses Financial Services for Recruitment and Support Summary: In April 2016, Mercy Corps published a study titled "'Motivations and Empty Promises': Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth," exploring the reasons youth join Boko Haram. In that initial study, we uncovered a number of factors driving support for and recruitment to Boko Haram, including governance grievances and inequality. With support from the Ford Foundation, we conducted this follow-up study to examine in greater depth how inequality drives recruitment, and particularly how Boko Haram uses financial incentives to lure people into the group. We also explored the broader landscape of financial opportunities and barriers to accessing them, with the aim of informing smart policies and programming that address youth needs and help to prevent future participation in violence. Key Findings 1. Boko Haram's financial services provide more than money: they offer the promise of protection and opportunity. Many respondents who accepted financial support and cooperated with the group's demands did so under a protection scheme from Boko Haram. In other cases, community members' desire to improve their financial standing made them receptive to recruitment tactics. 2. Communities see Boko Haram's financial services as more accessible than existing alternatives. Many respondents reported they did not know of viable alternatives to access cash or credit that would allow them to pursue their economic ambitions. They reported that government-provided economic support was not accessible without political connections or bribes. 3. Boko Haram's financial services are used both for recruitment and to gain community support. Respondents reported that Boko Haram used financial support to increase recruitment, achieve tactical aims through local business connections, and broaden popular support. 4. The conditions of Boko Haram's financial support are fluid and unpredictable. While many recipients knew the conditions of their financial assistance at the outset, others did not. Demands could come at any time and without warning and be ideological, tactical, or financial in nature. Recommendations A Increase the quality, availability, and diversity of financial services, particularly to youth with small, informal businesses. In addition to engaging with youth to discuss their financial options and needs, government and private sector financial service providers should expand their products for informal businesses, including micro loans that comply with Islamic financing. A Improve the transparency and accessibility of government-led economic programs. Respondents perceive that government economic development programs are available only to an elite few with money and connections. These programs should be more transparent and accessible for underserved populations and reinforce continued efforts to reduce corruption and address underlying governance grievances. A Expand the role of civil society in developing the Northeast's economic sector. Civil society's role in advocating for equitable economic development and government accountability is crucial to ensuring growth is inclusive and government programs are increasingly transparent. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Gifts_and_Graft_Mercy_Corps_Sept_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Gifts_and_Graft_Mercy_Corps_Sept_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140246 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Nunlist, C. Title: Kidnapping for Ransom as a Source of Terrorism Funding Summary: In recent years, the number of Kidnappings for Ransom (KFR) has increased globally. Especially for Islamist terrorist groups in the Sahel, kidnapping has become a lucrative source of income. Switzerland is engaged on the frontline of the struggle to establish a consistent code of conduct in handling cases of KFR, which will also be an issue in 2014 when Switzerland will chair the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE). Details: Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), 2013. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-141-EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Switzerland URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-141-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 131245 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismKidnapping Ransom |
Author: Durner, Tracey Title: Untangling a Marriage of Convenience: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Summary: Within the realm of policy discussions, anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts are generally treated as a package deal. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the FATF Recommendations, and related guidance documents represent today's international AML and CFT standards and are mirrored in laws and initiatives around the world. Given the "obvious similarities and differences between money laundering and terrorism financing," FATF notes "the risks (of both) are often assessed and managed using the same information flows between public and private sector institutions." This convergence between the types of information and stakeholders relevant to money laundering and terrorism financing is, in part, behind the unification of AML and CFT efforts. From a policy-making standpoint, the combination makes sense. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) already analyze suspicious financial activity, including potential instances of money laundering, often triggered by reports from the private sector resulting from frontline compliance and transaction monitoring procedures. It seems logical to incorporate the deterrence, detection, and tracking of terrorism financing into existing AML frameworks. In practice, critics have argued this "marriage" places undue burden on the private sector to understand the intent of criminals behind the actual transactions.2 Others contend that the very premise of CFT policies are misguided, resulting in ineffective and even harmful outcomes. With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the preponderance of low-cost, lone-actor attacks in North America and Europe, international attention once again has focused on CFT as a central tenet in the fight against terrorism. In 2016, FATF issued a consolidated strategy on CFT, followed by the adoption of an operational plan in 2018. CFT-specific entities such as the Counter ISIL Financing Group have emerged, and the French government in 2018 convened a high-level international conference focused on combating the financing of ISIL and al-Qaida, with a second conference scheduled for Australia in mid-2019. This brief examines where and how AML frameworks are fit for purpose relative to CFT and considers where additional CFT-specific efforts are necessary. It begins with a brief summary of the evolution of money laundering and terrorism financing policies, discussing the unification of the two fields and the key differences between the motivations and typologies of money laundering and terrorism financing crimes. Against that backdrop, it explores the four objectives of CFT efforts (prevent, detect, freeze, and trace) to identify areas where existing unified AML/CFT frameworks are working and areas where more nuance is required to effectively combat threats specific to terrorism financing. Although particular attention is given to the United States and United Kingdom as international financial centers, similar approaches and convergences between AML and CFT policies and practices occur worldwide. The brief concludes with recommendations on how current CFT policy discourse and evolution can meaningfully support broader counterterrorism objectives. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2019. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154691 Keywords: Counter-terrorismFinancial CrimesFinancing of TerrorismMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorism Financing |
Author: Economist Intelligence Unit Title: The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index: Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro Summary: Geography, history and political culture (characterised by high levels of corruption) combine in the economies of the former Yugoslavia (and the Balkans in general) to create a range of issues when it comes to combatting illicit trade. Serbia, for one, lies on a major trade corridor known as the Balkan route, which is used by criminal groups for various activities, including human trafficking and the trafficking of drugs coming from Asia and South America. Montenegro's ports are similarly used as transit points for the unloading and reloading of illicit cargo destined for Central and Western Europe. Bosnia's porous borders with the former two economies, as well as with neighbouring Croatia, enable easy transit from Eastern Europe and the Balkans region to economies in Western Europe. This could be made worse by the adoption of a Visa Liberalisation Agreement between the European Union's (EU) Schengen zone and Kosovo (which lies in an area considered by Serbia to be vulnerable to trafficking), expected by the end of the year. Compounding the problem, the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the accompanying conflicts, is thought to have led to an increased risk of terrorism in the region - with an increase in Islamic radicalisation and in nationals of countries and territories in the region joining the so-called Islamic State (IS) as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Ethnic separatist and religious extremist groups are active in some southern regions of Serbia and Kosovo, whose declaration of independence in 2008 was not recognised by Belgrade. These factors lead to increased terrorist financing and thus money laundering. Bosnia's complex and decentralised government structure has also been an obstacle to reforms, and corruption is prevalent in all three economies. This briefing paper will look at the illicit trade environment in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro across the four categories of the index: government policy, supply and demand, transparency and trade, and the customs environment. It will consider how these economies compare at global and regional levels, as well as looking at some of the details particular to each. Details: New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2018. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Shelf Number: 156582 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtremist GroupsFinancing of TerrorismHuman TraffickingIllegal TradeIllicit TradeOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionTerrorism |