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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
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Results for firearms trafficking
18 results foundAuthor: Goodman, Colby Title: U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: New Data and Insights Illuminate Key Trends and Challenges Summary: Recent news reports that 72 people were summarily executed by an organized crime group in northern Mexico highlight again the horrific violence that has gripped much of the country. The victims (mostly migrants) are the latest tragic reminder that large amounts of sophisticated firearms and ammunition in the hands of violent criminals have made their enterprise more deadly and have complicated law enforcement efforts to bring them under control. It is not surprising, then, that the government of Mexico has made curbing firearms trafficking a top priority in its efforts to dismantle organized crime. Additionally, Mexico has made disrupting arms trafficking networks from the United States a priority issue in the U.S.-Mexico security cooperation agenda. This report provides answers to some of the critical questions about U.S. firearms trafficking to Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute; San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Accessed September 14, 2010 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/U.S.%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico-%20Goodman%20Final.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/U.S.%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico-%20Goodman%20Final.pdf Shelf Number: 119791 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking WeaponsViolence (Mexico)Violent Crime |
Author: Feinstein, Dianne Title: Halting U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: A Report ....to the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, One-Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session Summary: Military-style weapons are arming Mexico's brutal drug trafficking organizations at an alarming rate. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of firearms recovered at crime scenes and traced by Mexican officials originate in the United States. These guns have contributed to Mexico's dangerous levels of violence. Since the start of the administration of President Felipe Calderon in December 2006, according to Mexican government estimates, 34,612 people have died in organized crime-related killings in Mexico. The killings reached their highest level in 2010, increasing by almost 60 percent to 15,273 deaths from 9,616 the previous year. As the U.S. partners with Mexico to combat drug-related violence, we must enhance our efforts to curb firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. This report provides background information on firearms trafficking and makes recommendations to Congress and the Obama Administration on key next steps. Details: Washington, DC: The Authors: 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=143589&coll=limited Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=143589&coll=limited Shelf Number: 121828 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun Control (U.S.)Gun ViolenceOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Violence Policy Center Title: Iron River: Gun Violence and Illegal Firearms Trafficking on the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: Mexico is under siege, its democratic governance is at risk. This report examines the role of the U.S. civilian gun market in the drug-related violence in Mexico that is creeping northward into the United States. Part One provides an overview of the conflict and its links with the United States. These links include the “drug war,” the U.S. civilian firearms market, and transnational street gangs involved in drug and firearms trafficking. Part Two outlines in more detail the role of the U.S. civilian gun market in fueling the war in Mexico. It focuses on weak regulation and the deliberate introduction of military-style firearms that today define the civilian market. Part Three suggests ways to control the firearms traffic. It emphasizes “upstream” measures to inhibit the movement of firearms from legal commerce into illegal trade, as opposed to only law enforcement efforts, which are aimed “downstream” and focus on apprehending and prosecuting smugglers after the damage is done. Some steps can be taken immediately by strong presidential leadership without the need for new legislation. Others require legislation or rule-making procedures. Details: Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2009. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2012 at: http://www.vpc.org/studies/ironriver.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.vpc.org/studies/ironriver.pdf Shelf Number: 116390 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun Trafficking (U.S., Mexico)Gun ViolenceTrafficking in WeaponsViolent Crime |
Author: Pierce, Glenn Title: New Approaches to Understanding and Regulating Primary and Secondary Illegal Firearms Summary: The major objective of this study is to enhance understanding of the characteristics and regulation of primary and secondary illegal firearms markets. The study has two major components: 1) a national study of illegal firearm markets based on ATF firearm trace data for all firearms recovered by law enforcement between 2003 and 2006, and 2) a California focused study based ATF traced firearms recovered in California between 2003 and 2006 that were crossed referenced with California Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) data to yield information on the last-known purchaser of a firearm. The national study was designed to: - Develop an enhanced understanding of illegal firearms markets using ATF trace data - Assess the potential impact of State firearm laws on firearms trafficking using ATF trace data The California analysis was designed to: • Enhance the tactical and strategic value of firearms trace data by tracing crime-related guns to last-known dealers/purchasers - Improve our overall understanding of illegal secondary markets The national study found that the stringency of state level firearms laws and regulations on time-to-crime and, in the case of California, the regular enforcement of state regulations lead to consistently longer time-to-crime for firearms recovered within their jurisdictions. These patterns persist for whether firearms were purchased within the recovery jurisdiction or in another state. With the addition, of other potential indicators of time-to-crime into the analysis, the effect of firearm laws is mediated in a manner that conforms to the expectations of how firearms regulations can operate to control the illegal distribution guns. Specifically, when dealer related variables are entered into the overall model of time-to-crime the effects of states with more stringent laws and regulations are reduced more than states without such laws, as would be expected given that state firearms laws and regulations should work through their regulation on dealers. In addition, a number of other potential determinants of time-to-crime have effects on time-to-crime that indicate they are potentially useful indicators of illegal firearms trafficking. The California analysis compared illegal firearm market characteristics using information from ATF trace data (based primarily on first-time, retail-sourced information) with illegal firearms market characteristics based on ATF trace data updated with California DROS information. This comparison revealed that including information on the last known purchaser of 2 a firearm significantly reduced the median time-to-crime of California-sourced crime guns relative to time-to-crime calculations based on standard ATF trace data. This finding indicates that guns sometimes move very rapidly from subsequent market transactions to use in crime. These finding suggest that enhanced firearm trace data can be very useful in guiding law enforcement actions against gun traffickers and criminals directly acquiring firearms through secondary market sources. Details: Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2013. 177p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: New Approaches to Understanding and Regulating Primary and Secondary Illegal Firearms Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127610 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal Firearms Markets (U.S.)Illegal GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment Summary: Key Findings • The flow of cocaine through West Africa appears to have declined to about 18 tons, down from a peak of 47 tons in 2007. These 18 tons would be worth US$1.25 billion at wholesale in Europe, providing West African traffickers with substantial income. • Modes of conveyance for cocaine from South America to Europe via West Africa have shifted over time in response to enforcement efforts. Much of the cocaine headed to West Africa today comes from Brazil, where Nigerian crime groups are exporting the drug. Recently, these groups have been moving into containerized consignments and maritime shipping, adopting these methods in addition to their traditional methods of air couriering and postal shipments. From West Africa, an increase in the use of Benin as a departure point for air couriers has been noted. • Methamphetamine production in the region is a growing concern, with two methamphetamine laboratories detected in Nigeria in 2011-2012. The main market for West African-made meth is East Asia, and to a lesser extent, South Africa. The income from trafficking West African-made methamphetamines to East Asia is remarkably high for such a new flow, but the long-term prospects are limited in light of competition from producers located in the destination markets. • Due to the economic downturn, the flow of smuggled migrants from West Africa to Europe has declined in recent years. The prominence of the many routes has shifted significantly, with routes moving eastwards. • Given the number of weapons still circulating from past conflicts in the region, there is very little need to import large numbers of weapons into West Africa. Most of the illicit flow of weapons in the region is diverted or stolen from licit national stocks held by to 20,000 firearms from Libya does represent a serious threat to stability in the region, a threat that appears to have been realized in northern Mali. • The prevalence of fraudulent medicines is highest not in the markets where profits would be the greatest, but in those where chances of detection are lowest. At least 10% of the imported medicines circulating in West Africa are fraudulent, posing a grave threat to public health and safety. • Maritime piracy has generated renewed attention in the Gulf of Guinea, with 22 pirate attacks occurring off the coast of Benin in 2011. In 2012, Togo became the new hotspot for attacks on petroleum tankers. These vessels are attacked because there is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa. • Unless the flows of contraband are addressed, instability and lawlessness will persist, and it will remain difficult to build state capacity and the rule of law in the region. Each of these flows requires a tailored response, because the commodities involved respond to distinct sources of supply and demand. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 127736 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingFraudulent MedicinesHuman SmugglingMaritime CrimeMethamphetaminesOrganized Crime (West Africa)Piracy/Pirates |
Author: McDougal, Topher Title: The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Traffic Across the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: This new study estimates the volume and value of arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. We apply a unique GIS-generated county-level panel dataset (1993-1999 and 2010-2012) of Federal Firearms Licenses to sell small arms (FFLs) and we create a demand curve for firearms based on the distance by road from the nearest point on the U.S.-Mexico border and official border crossing. We use a time-series negative binomial model paired with a post-estimation population attributable fraction (PaF) estimator. In this way, we are able to estimate a total demand for trafficking, both in terms of firearms and dollar sales for the firearms industry. Details: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarape Institute; San Diego, University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2013. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2013 at: http://pt.igarape.org.br/the-way-of-the-gun-estimating-firearms-traffic-across-the-u-s-mexico-border/ Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://pt.igarape.org.br/the-way-of-the-gun-estimating-firearms-traffic-across-the-u-s-mexico-border/ Shelf Number: 128044 Keywords: Border SecurityFirearms TraffickingGun TraffickingGun Violence (U.S., Mexico)HomicidesMurders |
Author: Goodman, Colby Title: U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Guatemala and Mexico: A Working Paper Summary: Following an 18-month joint investigation between the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. authorities arrested Joel Linares Soberanis, a Guatemalan national, Fernando Argenis Huezo, and Fernando's common-law wife, Jenni Otilia Cortez, on March 11, 2010 in Conroe, Texas on alleged drug and firearms related crimes. From September 2008 to early 2010, both Huezo and Cortez allegedly purchased scores of firearms at U.S. gun stores in Texas, including Glock semi-automatic pistols and AR-15 assault-type rifles, with the intention of sending them across the U.S. border. At least 15 of these firearms were recovered by law enforcement authorities in both Mexico and in Guatemala. Three of these firearms were found in Guatemala within two weeks of their purchase. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers discovered these activities when they noticed heroin in the drive shaft of a dodge pick-up truck owned by Huezo attempting to enter the United States. In July 2010, Cortez was sentenced to 45 months in prison for falsifying forms to buy a firearm. Although the above case highlights yet another example of U.S. firearms trafficking to Mexico, it also provides a glimpse into a relatively unknown phenomenon: the illicit movement of U.S.-origin firearms to Guatemala. While U.S. public attention has focused on arms, particularly hand and rocket propelled grenades, moving from Guatemala or El Salvador to Mexico, there has been little research into U.S. firearms flowing into Central America, particularly the northern triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Based largely on an ATF examination of just one Guatemalan military bunker with firearms recovered from FY 2006 to FY 2009, ATF determined that 2,687 of the 6,000 firearms (40 percent) had a nexus with the United States (either because the firearms were U.S. manufactured or U.S. imported). In the last few years, there have also been at least 34 U.S. prosecutions related to firearms trafficking to Guatemala involving a total of 604 U.S.-origin firearms trafficked. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2013 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/US%20Firearms%20to%20Guatemala%20and%20Mexico_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/US%20Firearms%20to%20Guatemala%20and%20Mexico_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129474 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal GunsTrafficking in Weapons (Guatemala, Mexico) |
Author: Title: Tunisia's Borders: Jihadism and Contraband Summary: Tunisia is embroiled in recurrent political crises whose origins in security concerns are ever more evident. While still of low-intensity, jihadi attacks are increasing at an alarming rate, fuelling the rumour mill, weakening the state and further polarising the political scene. The government coalition, dominated by the Islamist An-Nahda, and the secular opposition trade accusations, politicising questions of national security rather than addressing them. Meanwhile, the gap widens between a Tunisia of the borders - porous, rebellious, a focal point of jihadism and contraband and a Tunisia of the capital and coast that is concerned with the vulnerability of a hinterland it fears more than it understands. Beyond engaging in necessary efforts to resolve the immediate political crisis, actors from across the national spectrum should implement security but also socio-economic measures to reduce the permeability of the country's borders. The security vacuum that followed the 2010-2011 uprising against Ben Ali's regime - as well as the chaos generated by the war in Libya - largely explains the worrying increase in cross-border trafficking. Although contraband long has been the sole source of income for numerous residents of border provinces, the introduction of dangerous and lucrative goods is a source of heightened concern. Hard drugs as well as (for now) relatively small quantities of firearms and explosives regularly enter the country from Libya. Likewise, the northern half of the Tunisian-Algerian border is becoming an area of growing trafficking of cannabis and small arms. These trends are both increasing the jihadis' disruptive potential and intensifying corruption of border authorities. One ought neither exaggerate nor politicise these developments. Notably, and against conventional wisdom, military equipment from Libya has not overwhelmed the country. But nor should the threat be underestimated. The war in Libya undoubtedly has had security repercussions and armed groups in border areas have conducted attacks against members of the National Guard, army and police, posing a significant security challenge that the return of Tunisian fighters from Syria has amplified. By the same token, the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and of the Libyan war has provoked a reorganisation of contraband cartels (commercial at the Algerian border, tribal at the Libyan border), thereby weakening state control and paving the way for far more dangerous types of trafficking. Added to the mix is the fact that criminality and radical Islamism gradually are intermingling in the suburbs of major cities and in poor peripheral villages. Over time, the emergence of a so-called islamo-gangsterism could contribute to the rise of groups blending jihadism and organised crime within contraband networks operating at the borders - or, worse, to active cooperation between cartels and jihadis. Addressing border problems clearly requires beefing up security measures but these will not suffice on their own. Even with the most technically sophisticated border control mechanisms, residents of these areas - often organised in networks and counting among the country's poorest - will remain capable of enabling or preventing the transfer of goods and people. The more they feel economically and socially frustrated, the less they will be inclined to protect the country's territorial integrity in exchange for relative tolerance toward their own contraband activities. Weapons and drug trafficking as well as the movement of jihadi militants are thus hostage to informal negotiations between the informal economy's barons and state representatives. Since the fall of Ben Ali's regime, such understandings have been harder to reach. The result has been to dilute the effectiveness of security measures and diminish the availability of human intelligence that is critical to counter terrorist or jihadi threats. In an uncertain domestic and regional context, restoring trust among political parties, the state and residents of border areas is thus as crucial as intensifying military control in the most porous areas. In the long term, only minimal consensus among political forces on the country's future can enable a truly effective approach to the border question. On this front, at the time of writing, an end to the political crisis seems distant: discussions regarding formation of a new government; finalising a new constitution and new electoral law; and appointing a new electoral commission are faltering. Without a resolution of these issues, polarisation is likely to increase and the security situation to worsen, each camp accusing the other of exploiting terrorism for political ends. Overcoming the crisis of trust between the governing coalition and the opposition is thus essential to breaking this vicious cycle. Yet the current political impasse should not rule out some immediate progress on the security front. Working together to reinforce border controls, improving relations between the central authorities and residents of border areas as well as improving relations among Maghreb states: these are all tasks that only can be fully carried out once underlying political conflicts have been resolved but that, in the meantime, Tunisian actors can ill-afford to ignore or neglect. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Middle East and North Africa Report N148: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Tunisia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Shelf Number: 132473 Keywords: Border SecurityContrabandDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingJihadismOrganized Crime |
Author: European Commission. Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services Title: Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the European Union Summary: The purpose of the study was to: - Analyse the current legal framework in all Member States including the definitions of specific offences relating to firearms trafficking, the sanctions, the liability of legal and natural persons and the notions of intent, negligence and aggravating or mitigating circumstances; - Analyse the implementation of the above-mentioned offences in practice and identify possible obstacles in police and judicial cooperation due to the existence of different legal systems; - Make recommendations as to the advisability of the approximation of certain offences and sanctions and suggest specific provisions if appropriate. The purpose of this study was to provide DG Home with information required for the Impact Assessment to determine the most appropriate policy option within the context of possible changes to the 2008 Directive. The research involved desk research to examine legal frameworks and other information, a survey of key stakeholders, an interview programme, and three workshops covering the Benelux countries, Baltic States and the Western Balkans, Austria and Hungary, which were attended by representatives from a total of 11 Member States. 2. Main Conclusions The study's main findings and conclusions are summarised below under three sub-headings - the problem of illicit firearms trafficking, existing legal frameworks to combat illicit arms trafficking, and policy objectives and evaluation of policy options. 2.1 The problem of illicit firearms trafficking Overall, the research confirms that Europe faces a serious illicit firearms trafficking problem. This is a problem in its own right but also as an important factor contributing to other criminal activities such as drugs smuggling and human trafficking as well as terrorist-related activities that threaten the security of EU Member States and their citizens. Trafficked firearms also contributes to increased lethality of criminal violence by adding to firearms availability. The nature and scale of illicit firearms trafficking in the EU is difficult to assess given the hidden nature of the problem. Two approaches could be used - a broad indicator based on the number of unregistered firearms and a narrower measure based on firearms seizures - but they give widely differing estimates (there are 67 million unregistered firearms in the EU or 79% of the 81 million total licit and illicit firearms; seizures are estimated to account for around 1% or 81,000 of the total). The first of these approaches is likely to be very much an overestimate of the quantity of illicit firearms whilst the second calculation is almost certainly an underestimate. Informed estimates by national enforcement authorities or other institutions using various other methodologies are illuminating but also unreliable. The conclusion is that the illicit firearms trafficking cannot be estimated precisely and only quantified in terms of a broad range. Notwithstanding the methodological complications in measuring the phenomenon, most of the literature suggests however that illicit arms trafficking takes place on a considerable scale. In many respects, the scale of the illicit firearms trafficking problem is usefully measured by the number of firearms-related homicides. It is estimated that illicit firearms trafficking has been directly responsible for at least 10,000 firearms-related deaths in EU Member States over the past decade. Some other estimates (e.g. by the UNODC) put the deaths at a higher level than this (around 1,200 p.a.). Availability of firearms during violent incidents tends to substantially increase the lethality of injuries. In addition to murders committed by individuals, illegally-held firearms are often used by organised crime groups to coerce and to intimidate their victims. Moreover, the use of illicit firearms in organised crime activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and money laundering leads to further deaths (e.g. from drugs use). Terrorists and extremists have also used illicit firearms to carry out attacks. Overall, the use of firearms is a significant destabilising factor in European societies. In terms of the drivers of illicit firearms trafficking, three main types of players can be identified on the demand and supply sides of the problem. On the demand-side, the illicit firearms end users of most concern are criminal or terrorist individuals and groups that procure firearms illegally to use in the pursuit of their goals. Secondly, traffickers and other intermediaries are involved in the actual trafficking of firearms either for profit or other reasons (e.g. being linked to a criminal conspiracy). Lastly, on the supply-side, suppliers are individuals and organisations that provide a source of illicit firearms (either intentionally or unintentionally) who are again likely to be motivated by financial considerations, at least where the act of supplying illicit weapons is intentional. The main sources of illegal weapons in the EU are the reactivation of neutralised weapons, burglaries and thefts, embezzlement of legal arms, legal arms diverted to the illegal market, firearms retired from service by army or police, and the conversion of gas pistols. Most illicit firearms originate from cross-border trafficking, often from outside the EU. Since the early 1990s, the firearms illicitly trafficked have originated from three main sources that have replaced each other: first of all the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact bloc were a source of illicit firearms due to the fall of the iron curtain; then, during the wars of Yugoslav succession, the Western Balkans became an important source of illicit firearms; and more recently, North Africa has superseded the former, with a pool of weapons available and following some of the main drug trafficking routes into the EU. According to Europol, the amount of heavy firearms and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in circulation in the EU seems to satisfy much of the demand at present and suppliers in south-eastern Europe have the capacity to meet any rise in demand in the foreseeable future. There is already extensive cross-border cooperation between EU Member States and their law enforcement agencies to combat illicit firearms trafficking. Whilst there are many examples of successful operations to intercept weapons before they can be used, there are also cases where police and/or judicial cooperation has been made more difficult because of differences in legal frameworks in different countries. There are also significant complications of tackling cross-border illicit firearms trafficking of a non-legal nature. 2.2 Existing legal frameworks to combat illicit arms trafficking At present, there are significant differences with regard to EU Member States' legal frameworks for combatting illicit firearms trafficking. This applies to the definition of offences, the types and levels of penalties applicable to legal and natural persons, the treatment of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent. International and EU legal frameworks that have a bearing on illicit firearms trafficking are broadly defined and leave signatories with considerable discretion on how key provisions are implemented. Example provisions on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking are included in the UNODC's Model Law. However, the Model Law itself has no binding force on EU Member States. What is more, to leave a 'margin of discretion' for national legislators to implement the instruments in the most appropriate manner in line with their legal traditions, neither the Model Law clauses nor the other international or EU instruments are prescriptive as regards the various legal elements of an illicit firearms trafficking offence. Similarly, the relevant provisions of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Firearms Protocol to the UN Convention on Organised Crime also leave considerable scope for discretion on these matters. As a result of the different legal histories and cultures and the non-prescriptive approach at international/EU level, there is a diversity of legal frameworks in relation to illicit firearms trafficking at the national level. Differences exist with regard to the definition of offences, penalties and sanctions, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the possibility of a negligent illicit firearms trafficking offence. Other important issues where there are differences relate to the ways in which firearms trafficking offences are prosecuted (as mere possession in some instances) and seizure in transit (and tracing issues). However, divergences in national legislation are not per se a rationale for EU intervention. The relevant issue is whether, pursuant to Article 83(1) TFEU, there is a need to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of illicit firearms trafficking with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of this offence or from a special need to combat such trafficking on a common EU basis. Minimum, EU-wide rules on illicit firearms trafficking would have the benefit of reducing legal uncertainty produced by these divergences for national police and investigating authorities, facilitate prosecutions, ensure that criminals are unable to exploit loopholes, and reduce incentives for criminals forum shop between EU jurisdictions. The research indicates that divergences do indeed affect cross-border police and judicial cooperation - and that, given the intrinsically cross-border nature of illicit firearms trafficking, there is a strong need to combat the offence on an EU-wide basis. However, the evidence also suggests that practical issues such as lack of resources, conflicting policy priorities (for example with anti-terror legislation) and lack of enforcement of existing laws are equally significant impediments to cross-border efforts to combat illicit firearms trafficking than differences in national legislation in this area. Feedback from the research indicates that cooperation between the police and other law enforcement agencies on cross-border cases is generally good, if often cumbersome and dependent on the quality of networks of contacts. However, at the judicial stage, e.g. in seeking permission for controlled deliveries or asking for a prosecutor to take up a case following an investigation, these differences in legal frameworks can cause complications. In considering any EU initiative, however, it should be acknowledged that there are likely to be political sensitivities in approximating some elements of the illicit firearms trafficking offence given that questions of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, sanctions and penalties, and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent touch on fundamental principles of criminal law at the national level. 2.3 Policy Objectives and Evaluation of Policy Options The overall policy objectives of any new EU-level initiative should be to help Member States to combat illicit firearms trafficking more effectively and by doing so, enhancing the common area of freedom, security and justice. More specific goals include deterring criminal offences related to firearms, improving cooperation between law enforcement authorities in preventing detecting, disrupting, investigating and prosecuting illicit arm trafficking; and providing a model which can be promoted in discussions with third countries on firearms risk reduction. Operational goals are defined as being to minimize the differences in definitions of firearms offences and levels of sanctions across the EU; to put in place a system for regular monitoring the effectiveness of efforts to disrupt firearms crime, and to further encourage the sharing of information and intelligence. Several Policy Options have been defined and assessed in the report. To summarize: - Policy Option 1: Status Quo - continuation of the current situation with no new EU intervention. - Policy Option 2(a): Non-legislative action - promoting closer collaboration between Member States rather than introducing new EU-level initiatives (although these may be necessary to promote close collaboration). This option would include non-statutory intervention, either as a first step or supporting action for implementing EU legislation in the future. - Policy Option 2(b): Minimum legislative intervention at the EU level - a minimum level of legislative intervention at EU level to strengthen cross-border cooperation between law enforcement agencies by making certain types of cooperation obligatory. - Policy Option 3: Comprehensive legislative solution at EU level - EU action to introduce legally-binding common minimum standards across Member States with regard the definition of criminal offences and their sanctions related to illicit arms trafficking and linked offences. - Policy Option 4 - Combination of legislative and non-legislative actions, i.e. Policy Options 2 and 3. In essence, Policy Option 1 entails a continuation of the status quo as defined in the problem assessment (this could mean a potential worsening of the problem caused by illicit firearms trafficking) with the 'advantageous effects' of Policy Options 2 and 3 being measured against this baseline. Because it is difficult to quantify what impact different Policy Options might have on the current level of illicit firearms trafficking, the assessment of the merits and drawbacks of different Policy Options is essentially qualitative. Drawing on the results of the analysis of expected financial and economic, social and other impacts, including the implications for fundamental rights, the conclusion is that Policy Option 4 (i.e. a combination of Policy Options 2 and 3) will have the most advantageous effect on the problem and on promoting EU policy aims. Policy Option 4 is therefore the recommended option. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014. 204p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/general/docs/dg_home_-_illicit_fireams_trafficking_final_en.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/general/docs/dg_home_-_illicit_fireams_trafficking_final_en.pdf Shelf Number: 136351 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain Summary: Violent crimes committed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico often involve firearms, and a 2009 GAO report found that many of these firearms originated in the United States. ATF and ICE have sought to stem firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. GAO was asked to undertake a follow-up review to its 2009 report (GAO-09-709) addressing these issues. This report examines, among other things, (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced by ATF, (2) the extent to which collaboration among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved, and (3) the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed program information and firearms tracing data from 2009 to 2014, and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States take steps to formally monitor implementation of the 2009 MOU between ATF and ICE. GAO also recommends that ONDCP establish comprehensive indicators that more accurately reflect progress made in efforts to stem arms trafficking to Mexico. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-223: Accessed January 12, 2016 at: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 137468 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingHomeland SecurityTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Building Partner Capacity: U.S. Agencies Can Improve Monitoring of Counter-Firearms Trafficking Efforts in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico Summary: Trafficking of illicit materials, including firearms, is widespread across Mexico's more than 700-mile southern border with Guatemala and Belize. Such trafficking presents a challenge for law enforcement in all three countries and for U.S. security interests. State and other U.S. agencies, such as ATF, have provided support to build the capacity of their counterparts in these three countries to address problems related to firearms trafficking. GAO was asked to review U.S. support to the governments of Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico to stem firearms trafficking across their shared border. This report examines, for these three countries, (1) the activities undertaken by U.S. agencies to build partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking and the extent to which they considered key factors in selecting the activities and (2) progress the United States has made in building such capacity. GAO analyzed program documentation and conducted interviews with U.S., Belizean, Guatemalan, and Mexican officials. To examine progress, GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight key activities based on a number of factors, including whether the activity addressed firearms trafficking. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that (1) ATF establish and document performance targets for its key counter-firearms trafficking activities in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, as appropriate, and (2) State work with other U.S. agencies and implementers to help ensure that progress reports identify key challenges and plans to address them. ATF and State agreed with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-235: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674640.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674640.pdf Shelf Number: 137754 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingPartnershipsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: A Review of the Department of Justice's and ATF's Implementation of Recommendations Contained in the OIG's Report on Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver Summary: In September 2012, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a 471-page report that described the findings of our review of two Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) firearms trafficking investigations, one code named "Operation Fast and Furious" and the other "Operation Wide Receiver." Our review identified serious management flaws in both investigations and we made six recommendations to address the deficiencies we found. We requested that the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) examine ATF's law enforcement policies to ensure that they comply with the Department's guidelines and policies, and evaluate the sufficiency of ATF's case review procedures for matters that present heightened risk to the public or agents. We also believed that ATF should institute training; we requested the Department work with ATF to develop guidance on how agents should investigate gun trafficking organizations. The remainder of our recommendations were focused on the Department itself or its law enforcement components other than ATF. We requested that the Department evaluate the policies of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) to ensure that they are sufficient to address the concerns we identified from the conduct of Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver. We also recommended that the Department more carefully scrutinize wiretap applications and regularly convene a working group of leaders from the Department's law enforcement components to ensure appropriate coordination among them. In its initial written response to the report, the Department stated that it agreed with our recommendations and committed to implementing them. In this follow-up review we evaluated the Departments efforts to implement our recommendations. We determined that four of the six recommendations can be closed. The two remaining recommendations have been resolved, but additional work needs to be completed in order for them to be closed. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Oversight & Review Division 16-01: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1601.pdf#page=1 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 137964 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun traffickingOperation Fast and FuriousOperation Wide ReceiverTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Schroeder, Matt Title: Dribs and Drabs: The Mechanics of Small Arms Trafficking Summary: There are over 550 million firearms in worldwide circulation. That's one firearm for every 12 people on the planet. The only question is: How do we arm the other 11? (Lord of War, 2005) This iconic line from the 2005 film Lord of War conveys widely held assumptions about international arms traffickers: that they are ambitious, well-connected, globe-trotting entrepreneurs who single-handedly arm criminals and militias throughout the world. The film's fictional protagonist, Yuri Orlov, is based on five actual arms dealers, including Russian businessman Viktor Bout, whose vast global network of shell companies and unsavoury clients earned him the moniker 'the Merchant of Death' (Gilchrist, 2005). The composite image of Bout and his peers has become the archetypal arms trafficker, the image that comes to mind whenever the illicit arms trade is discussed. Yet most arms traffickers bear little resemblance to that image. The 'merchants of death' do indeed fuel conflicts and stock the arsenals of dictators, but there is little evidence to suggest that they dominate the illicit arms trade. Most arms trafficking is less flashy, less centralized, and even more difficult to stop. The following Issue Brief analyses this side of the illicit small arms trade, which receives far less attention than the multi-ton shipments arranged by rogue brokers. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-IB17-Mechanics-of-trafficking.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-IB17-Mechanics-of-trafficking.pdf Shelf Number: 138305 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingIllegal tradeIllicit TradeSmuggling of WeaponsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Lamb, Robert Dale Title: Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens Summary: Individuals and groups who use violence in ways that threaten the United States, its allies, or its partners habitually find or create ways to operate with impunity or without detection. Whether for private financial gain (e.g., by narcotics and arms traffickers) or for harmful political aims (e.g., by insurgents, terrorists, and other violent extremists), these illicit operations are most successful "and most dangerous" when their perpetrators have a place or situation that can provide refuge from efforts to combat or counter them. Such places and situations are often called safe havens, and potential safe havens are sometimes called ungoverned areas. A key component of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stabilization, peacekeeping, and other such efforts is to reduce the size and effectiveness of the safe havens that protect illicit actors. Agencies in defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and other areas all have capabilities that can be applied to countering such threats and building the capacity and legitimacy of U.S. partners to prevent ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas from becoming safe havens. To do this effectively requires careful consideration of all the geographical, political, civil, and resource factors that make safe havens possible; a sober appreciation of the complex ways those factors interact; and deeper collaboration among U.S. government offices and units that address such problems - whether operating openly, discreetly, or covertly - to ensure unity of effort. This report offers a framework that can be used to systematically account for these considerations in relevant strategies, capabilities, and doctrines/best practices. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2008. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Shelf Number: 146248 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingPublic SafetySafe HavensViolenceViolent Extremists |
Author: Martyniuk, Anton Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine Summary: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine is the fourth case study in a series examining the measurement of illicit arms flows in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16. Based on interviews carried out in Kiev in addition to desk research , this analysis outlines the sources of illicit arms flows in Ukraine and the status of government plans or action to counter the problem, the trafficking routes used to smuggle weapons, and key indicators of illicit arms flows in the period 2010-2016. Key findings: Ukrainian civilians possess large numbers of unregistered small arms. The conflict in the east has contributed to significant diversion and losses from national stockpiles and the proliferation of a wider array of weapons types. The conflict and the concomitant increase in insecurity correlate with increased seizures from 2013 to 2014, although efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons have recovered only a modest number of illicit firearms. Ukraine still has no primary law regulating the manufacture, purchase, and possession of firearms and no central state register of civilian-held firearms. This makes it difficult even to differentiate between legal and illegal firearms in the country - and, by extension, complicates efforts to monitor and address illicit arms flows. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed May 3, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP3-Ukraine.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Ukraine URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP3-Ukraine.pdf Shelf Number: 145253 Keywords: Firearms Trafficking Illicit Arms Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Heley, Frank Anton Title: .Assessment and Policy Recommendation On Domestic Illegal Firearms Trafficking Summary: This report examined the nature of domestic illegal firearms trafficking, including key features and predictors of firearms trafficking, and rationalizes the defining of domestic illegal firearms trafficking into three levels that are indicative of the seriousness and features inherent to the particular level of trafficking. This report also examined the scope of the trafficking situations at their respective levels, the means already being utilized to address firearms trafficking problems, and their effectiveness. Finally, this report recognizes that the differing levels of trafficking may require varied and differing efforts be used in combating firearms trafficking and policy recommendations involving both legislative and enforcement efforts are detailed at the respective levels of trafficking. Details: Fargo, ND: North Dakota State University, 2012. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://library.ndsu.edu/ir/bitstream/handle/10365/19540/Frank%20Anton%20Heley.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://library.ndsu.edu/ir/bitstream/handle/10365/19540/Frank%20Anton%20Heley.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 147260 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingIllegal FirearmsTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking Weapons |
Author: Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo Title: The Northern Triangle Criminal Network: Arms Trafficking Across Central America Summary: This document includes a model and analysis of a transnational criminal network that involves nodes/agents participating in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The document has 4 parts. In the first part it is presented the methodology and concepts related to Social Network Analysis. In the second part it is discussed the modeled judicial case and the sources gathered and analyzed. The third part includes characteristics of the modeled criminal structure, such as types of nodes/agents, interactions established and the nodes/agents with the highest indicators of direct centrality and betweenness. In the last section, conclusions are presented and discussed. Details: Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks, 2017; Bogota, Colombia; Vortex Foundation. 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks - Research Paper No. 18. VORTEX Working Papers No. 32: Accessed November 17, 2017 at: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_77362051de3e49f9841f2b5ecd5e5c53.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Central America URL: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_77362051de3e49f9841f2b5ecd5e5c53.pdf Shelf Number: 148217 Keywords: Criminal Networks Firearms TraffickingOrganized Crime Social Network Analysis Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Savona, Ernesto U. Title: Fighting Illicit Firearms Trafficking Routes and Actors at European Level: Final Report of Project FIRE Summary: Project FIRE - Fighting Illicit firearms trafficking Routes and actors at European level (www. fireproject.eu) - was carried out with the financial support of the European Commission, DG Home Affairs, within the Prevention of and the Fight against Crime (ISEC) Programme. The research is an exploratory study on the illicit trafficking of firearms (ITF) in the EU. Based on the results obtained, it also provides recommendations on how to improve the fight against and the prevention of ITF. For the purposes of the study, ITF has been defined as every case in which the illicit acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts or ammunition occur from, to, or within the territory of the EU. Background The availability of firearms is recognised as an increasingly pressing issue because of the lethal impact that firearms can have in terms of violence and terrorism. For this reason, the EU is currently revising its Firearms Directive, and the fight against organised crime and terrorism ranks high on the European security agenda. However, the role that ITF plays in feeding into violence within the EU has long been disregarded. This has been mirrored by a lack of priority given to rigorous investigation of the origins of firearms involved in the commission of crimes-and a lack of scientific research in the field. In addition, there is a lack of public official data on ITF. Approach Project FIRE adopts an integrated market perspective to address these difficulties and to study ITF within a wider framework of illicit markets. This approach makes it possible to combine analysis of both the various stages within the illicit supply chain of ITF and the demand for illicit firearms. It develops a methodology based on the collection and analysis of data from online news and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and custom press releases, providing high level of detail and a large number of variables. For this purpose, firearm seizures have been considered as a proxy for the ITF, and deadly and non-deadly shootings as proxies for the demand for illicit firearms. This study represents a first step towards better understanding of the ITF in the EU. It is accordingly an important resource for both public and private institutions and researchers. The results from the project have been grouped into three parts: - ITF in the EU (Part I) - The EU's regulatory framework to counter ITF (Part II) - Recommendations on how to improve the prevention of and fight against ITF (Part III). Details: Milano: Transcrime - Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 2017. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2018 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FIREFinalReport.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FIREFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 149749 Keywords: FirearmsFirearms TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in WeaponsWeapons |