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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:21 pm
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Results for focused deterrence
13 results foundAuthor: Delaney, Christopher L. Title: The Effects of Focused Deterrence on Gang Homicide: An Evaluation of Rochester's Ceasefire Program Summary: In the late 1990's, a problem oriented policing initiative in Boston, "Operation: Ceasefire", achieved significant reductions in youth homicide by focusing on gang behavior. The program was driven by a concept known as focused deterrence. The success of the Boston program encouraged other jurisdictions across the country to implement their own versions of the Ceasefire project. In recent years, violence in Rochester, NY came to be seen as consistent with the gang driven problem described in Boston and a version of Operation Ceasefire was implemented in October, 2003. This study examines the Ceasefire program as implemented in Rochester, NY from October 2003 to December 2004. Using an interrupted time-series research design, the study finds limited but statistically significant reductions in homicides of black males ages 15-30 during the Ceasefire intervention period. Despite this finding, increases in 2005 homicides of black males ages 15-30 have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the program. A postscript examines the 2005 increase and considers explanations for the increase associated with potential theoretical and operational shortcomings in the Ceasefire program. Details: Rochester, NY: College of Liberal Arts/Public Policy Program, Rochester Institute of Technology, 2005. 157p. Source: Master's Thesis; Internet Resource Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 118682 Keywords: Ceasefire ProgramFocused DeterrenceGang ViolenceGangsHomicideProblem-Oriented Policing |
Author: Wolf, Angela M. Title: Juvenile Call-ins Summary: Focused deterrence, also known as a “call-in,” is a strategy in which community stakeholder groups deliver a nonviolence message to community members who are most likely to commit violence. Call-ins rely on the partnership of community representatives, service providers, and law enforcement to collaboratively deliver a three-point message against violence: (1) violence affects everyone in the community and will not be tolerated; (2) the community cares about at risk individuals, and will provide services and assistance to those who need and want help; and (3) those who continue to commit violence despite this fair warning will face the full consequences of the law, along with the other members of their violent groups. Call-ins have been associated with substantial reductions in gun violence in Boston and Indianapolis (McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, & Corsaro, 2006), and have become a widely used strategy for gang violence intervention throughout the country. As call-in strategies are implemented in more cities throughout the country, some cities are interested in applying focused deterrence to a new target population: high risk juveniles. Most call-ins did not originally include juveniles (Bonner, Worden, & McLean, 2008). Based on differences in age and legal technicalities such as privacy and parental consent requirements, juveniles must be treated differently than adults, and call-ins must be adjusted. This California Cities Gang Prevention Network bulletin draws on academic literature and the experiences of Network cities like Oxnard and Salinas, and other cities including Union City, California; Boston, Massachusetts; and Winston-Salem, North Carolina to provide information about juvenile call-ins. Also, to advise effective implementation of juvenile call-ins, this bulletin provides examples from cities that apply call-ins to juveniles, discusses how call-ins may differ for juveniles and adults, and discusses key elements of effective call-ins. Details: Oakland, CA: National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 2011. 6p. Source: The California Cities Gange Prevention Network: Bulletin 23: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2012 at http://www.ccgpn.org/Publications/CA%20Cities%20Bulletin%2023.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ccgpn.org/Publications/CA%20Cities%20Bulletin%2023.pdf Shelf Number: 124194 Keywords: At-risk YouthFocused DeterrenceJuvenile OffendersViolent Crime |
Author: Smith, Dennis C. Title: An Empirical Assessment of NYPD's "Operation Impact": A Targeted Zone Crime Reduction Strategy Summary: About a decade ago one of the leading students of policing in America, David Bayley in a widely-praised book, Police for the Future, wrote "The Police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, yet the police pretend that they are society's best defense against crime." In making this observation about the "myth" that police prevent crime Bayley was echoing the conclusion written more than two decades earlier of another distinguished expert, James Q. Wilson, who wrote in his pioneering empirical study of eight police departments, Varieties of Police Behavior, that the police administrator "is in the unhappy position of being responsible for an organization that lacks a proven technology for achieving its purpose". Bayley was in the position to go further than Wilson and base his conclusion on research that "consistently failed to find any connection between the number of police officers and crime rates," and studies of "primary strategies adopted by modern police" that found "little or no effect on crime". In the past decade and a half in the crime laboratory called New York City, these dire assessments of the plight of the police and by extension of the public have undergone a substantial revision. At the time Bayley published his commentary on the myth of police efficacy in preventing crime, New York City had used new police resources provided by Safe Streets, Safe City and a new police strategy called "community policing" to begin a reversal of an upward crime trend that had lasted more than a decade, and peaked in 1990 with more than 2,200 homicides. In 1993, a new anti-corruption system that would over time produce a two-thirds reduction in complaints of police corruption had been designed and implemented by then Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, and in 1994 a new management system at the City, Borough, and Precinct level was being introduced that committed the police to fighting crime as the highest priority. Since then, crime has dramatically declined in every borough and every precinct in the City. The remarkable achievement of crime reductions achieved from 1988 though 2001, led many to question whether it would be possible for a new administration to continue the relentless downward trend in crime. The fear that crime had been brought down as much as was possible was not entirely unreasonable. Criminologists have long tracked the cyclical nature of crime patterns, and most people instinctively understand the economic concept of a "declining marginal return on investment," the idea that "low hanging fruit" are found and harvested first, and that the challenges of production grow increasingly more difficult after that. For those who firmly believe, despite evidence, that the economy in New York rebounded after crime came down, that economic trends explain the crime rate, the economic downturn following the 911 attack further fueled pessimism about the prospects of continuing the successful fight against crime in New York. Across the United States, the skepticism expressed in New York has been validated in cities large and small. After a decade long decline in crime in America's big cities, recent national crime statistics show a disturbing upward turn. An October, 2006, Police Executive Research Forum report, "A Gathering Storm: Violent Crime in America," documents that shift, which it finds became evident in the 2005 crime statistics. New York City, which led the national decline, is an exception to this much noted reversal. The New York Times reported in late March, 2007, homicides in New York City were averaging fewer than one per day. Although by the end of May, with the City was recording slightly more than one murder per day, the trend is downward by almost 17% in the first five months of the year. As of the end of May, 2007, NYPD showed an almost 9% drop in total major crimes for the year to date. When crime declined over the past decade, some criminologists pointed to declines in other cities, even though they were less than New York's, to say that NYC was part of a national trend, and thus discounted claims that anything special had been accomplished by NYPD. Now that New York is clearly not following the national pattern, attention returns to the question: what is New York doing to reduce crime? Details: New York: New York University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, 2007. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2015 at: http://urbanizationproject.org/uploads/blog/Dennis_Smith_Impact_Zone_Policing_Report.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://urbanizationproject.org/uploads/blog/Dennis_Smith_Impact_Zone_Policing_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135165 Keywords: Crime PreventionFocused DeterrenceProblem-Oriented Policing (New York City) |
Author: Braga, Anthony A. Title: Managing the Group Violence Intervention: Using Shooting Scorecards to Track Group Violence Summary: This guide begins with a brief description of the shooting scorecard concept and its links to problem analysis and performance measurement systems in police departments. It then presents the key steps in the process and associated data quality issues and then details the use of shooting scorecards by the Boston Police Department as an example of the practical applications of this approach. Group shooting scorecards identify the criminal groups that commit the highest number shootings and experience the greatest number of shooting victimizations during a specific time period. With this information, shooting scorecards support the implementation of focused deterrence strategies to prevent group-involved violence. They also ensure that police departments appropriately focus scarce resources on the groups that consistently generate the most gun violence. The most violent groups then receive systematic considered for focused interventions, such as the National Network for Safe Communities' Group Violence Intervention in which a partnership of community members, law enforcement, and social service providers delivers a "no violence" message, information about legal consequences for further violence, and an offer of help. Managing the Group Violence Intervention: Using Shooting Scorecards to Track Group Violence begins with a brief description of the shooting scorecard concept and its links to problem analysis and performance measurement systems in police departments. It then presents the key steps in the process and associated data quality issues and then details the use of shooting scorecards by the Boston Police Department as an example of the practical applications of this approach. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: http://nnscommunities.org/uploads/Shooting_Scorecards_Guide.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://nnscommunities.org/uploads/Shooting_Scorecards_Guide.pdf Shelf Number: 135369 Keywords: Focused DeterrenceGun-Related ViolenceProblem AnalysisProblem-Oriented PolicingViolent Crime |
Author: Sechrist, Stacy M. Title: Implementation Documentation of the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) in High Point, NC. Summary: The following paper will document the implementation of the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) in High Point, NC. The OFDVI strategy uses focused deterrence policing methods to combat domestic violence. First, we will review the history of focused deterrence and how the model took hold in High Point. The early experience of personnel in High Point with focused deterrence policing assisted in later implementation of the OFDVI strategy. The OFDVI strategy represents a novel approach to combatting domestic violence which will be detailed along with how the strategy transitioned from theory into practice. The process of implementing the strategy will be outlined, including building the necessary partnerships, organizational changes needed for strategy success, data and information system needed to effectively track outcomes, and detailed procedures for identification and notification of offenders and following up with both offenders and victims. Finally, valuable lessons were learned throughout implementation of the strategy, which included some necessary changes which need to occur within the justice system. These will be discussed at the conclusion of the paper as well as next steps for the OFDVI strategy moving forward. Perspectives from key workgroup members responsible for implementing the strategy will be shared throughout the paper to provide a firsthand account of how the strategy has been developed, revamped, and received by those doing the work as well as within the greater community of High Point. Details: Greensboro, NC: University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2012. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2015 at: http://ncnsc.uncg.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/OFDVI-Process-Documentation-v6-FINAL1.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://ncnsc.uncg.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/OFDVI-Process-Documentation-v6-FINAL1.pdf Shelf Number: 135745 Keywords: Domestic Violence Family Violence Focused DeterrenceIntimate Partner Violence |
Author: White, Michael D. Title: Challenges in Implementation and Impact: Lessons from the Cincinnati, Joliet, and Lansing Smart Policing Initiatives Summary: Since 2009, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) has provided more than $14.4 million to 35 local, county, and state law enforcement agencies conducting 38 Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) projects. Though many SPI sites have documented significant crime decreases in the targeted areas with sound research methodologies, others have been less successful. The reasons why some SPI sites have struggled are varied and include implementation problems, data analysis issues, and leadership turnover. Other sites have implemented evidence-based strategies and evaluated those strategies with rigorous research methodologies; but in the end, crime reductions were not realized. We consider such initiatives successful because they identify strategies, practices, and lessons that other jurisdictions can learn from, and they are evidence-based because of the strong research designs they employed. This SPI spotlight reviews the experiences of three sites - Cincinnati (OH), Joliet (IL), and Lansing (MI) - that fall into this last category. All three sites were led by police officials and criminal justice scholars who were well-versed in evidence-based practices and researcher/practitioner partnerships. Each site engaged in intensive data analysis to examine the underlying conditions and causes of the targeted crime problem (robbery in Cincinnati, drug dealing in Lansing, and gun violence in Joliet). Each site implemented a comprehensive, collaborative data-driven strategy to address their respective crime problems, from interventions based on the problem analysis triangle in Cincinnati and hot spots in Joliet, to focused deterrence and offender call-ins in Lansing. Each project was evaluated using rigorous quasi-experimental research designs. Despite these ingredients for success, none of the three sites experienced statistically significant crime declines that could be tied to their SPI. This spotlight identifies a number of common challenges to implementation and impact that were experienced by the three sites, including: lapses in continuous, real-time problem analysis; insufficient program dosage; stakeholder limitations; and tension between operational decision-making and research design integrity. In Cincinnati, for example, geographic analysis of the robbery problem led the SPI team to increase the size of the original target area, which necessarily weakened the intensity of the intervention. In Joliet, probation and parole officers were active participants in the SPI, but restrictions on their authority limited the team's ability to conduct compliance checks and to initiate revocation proceedings. In Lansing, the nature of drug dealing shifted from a traditional turf-based model to mobile transactions coordinated through cell phones, which forced the SPI team to alter their interventions "on the fly." These experiences (and others) in Cincinnati, Joliet, and Lansing highlight the importance of devising a strong process evaluation that allows for detailed documentation of implementation processes and challenges, and for a thorough understanding of why a program did or did not produce the intended crime reduction benefits. The Cincinnati, Joliet, and Lansing SPIs also underscore the importance of thinking broadly about program impact. Impact can be measured in terms of knowledge gained, organizational change, and new partnerships - developments that are not easily quantified in terms of statistical significance but represent positive change in a law enforcement agency. Details: Washington, DC: CNA Analysis and Solutions, 2015. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Spotlight Report: Accessed September 25, 2015 at: http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/sites/all/files/SPI%20Challenges%20Spotlight%202015%20Final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/sites/all/files/SPI%20Challenges%20Spotlight%202015%20Final.pdf Shelf Number: 136876 Keywords: Evidence-Based PracticesFocused Deterrence Hot SpotsPolice ReformSmart Policing Initiative |
Author: Novak, Kenneth J. Title: Kansas City, Missouri Smart Policing Initiative: From Foot Patrol to Focused Deterrence Summary: Kansas City, Missouri has experienced a persistent violent crime problem throughout much of the last decade. From 2010 through 2013, Kansas City ranked among the worst of the 50 largest cities in the United States for homicide, averaging more than 100 per year - for a rate of 22 per 100,000 residents. Kansas City's violent crime rate in 2012 was equally dismal, with nearly 2,500 aggravated assaults and 1,645 robberies. Violent crime in Kansas City is geographically concentrated in three of the department's six patrol divisions. In addition, violence disproportionately involves firearms. From 2010 to 2014, 90 percent of homicides and 42 percent of all aggravated assaults were gun-related. In 2011, the Kansas City Police Department (KCPD) received a grant through the Bureau of Justice Assistance's Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) to team with researchers and develop innovative interventions to reduce violent crime. Over the next four years, KCPD and their research partners at the University of Missouri-Kansas City implemented a multi-pronged effort to address violent crime through evidence-based strategies. In 2011 and 2012, the Kansas City SPI team planned, implemented, and evaluated a replication of the evidence-based Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment. For 90 days, pairs of rookie officers worked foot patrol shifts in four violent crime micro-hot spot areas. Results showed that foot patrol areas witnessed a 26-percent reduction in aggravated assaults and robberies during the 90-day period, and a 55-percent reduction during the first six weeks of the study. No reductions were reported in control areas or in catchment areas surrounding the foot patrol areas. Crime did increase in the target areas during the last seven weeks of the study and returned to pre-treatment levels after the foot patrol treatment ended. In 2013 and 2014, the Kansas City SPI team planned and implemented a comprehensive focused deterrence pulling levers strategy, called the Kansas City No Violence Alliance (KC NoVA). KC NoVA is an offender-focused strategy designed to reduce violent crime by building on the earlier success of the foot patrol project. During 2014, KC NoVA identified 64 groups composed of 884 violent offenders. The team held four call-ins with 149 attendees. As a result of the focused deterrence strategy, 601 offenders met with social service providers, and 142 offenders received a social service assessment. The SPI team conducted interrupted time series analysis to assess impact and found that the focused deterrence strategy produced statistically significant decreases in homicide (40 percent) and gun-related aggravated assaults (19 percent). The crime decline effects were largest immediately after implementation and weakened over time. The Kansas City SPI produced a number of lessons learned for law enforcement leaders and line officers. For leaders, the Kansas City SPI demonstrated the importance of keeping focus on Smart Policing principles in the wake of leadership change, and of effective communication to both internal and external stakeholders. The Kansas City SPI also provided insights regarding different deployment methods of foot patrol. For line officers, it highlighted the importance of determining what officers should actually do during foot patrol assignments, other than be present and visible. Finally, the Kansas City SPI underscores the importance of embracing the two key messages in a focused deterrence strategy: the threat of a law enforcement response to additional criminal activity, and the offer of help for those who want it. Details: Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis and Solutions, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Smart Policing Initiative: Spotlight Report: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/sites/all/files/Kansas%20City%20SPI%20Spotlight%20FINAL%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/sites/all/files/Kansas%20City%20SPI%20Spotlight%20FINAL%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 137710 Keywords: Focused DeterrenceFoot PatrolGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesPulling LeversSmart PolicingViolent Crime |
Author: Abt, Thomas Title: What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study for the Northern Triangle Summary: This report was commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), a United States government effort primarily executed by both USAID and the U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). In preparation for this report, we performed a systematic meta-review of 43 reviews, including over 1,400 studies, to identify what works in reducing community violence. In addition, we supplemented our findings with fieldwork in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States, visiting over 20 sites and conducting over 50 semi-structured interviews. We found that a few interventions, such as focused deterrence and cognitive behavioral therapy, exhibited moderate to strong effects on crime and violence and were supported by substantial evidence. A few others, such as scared straight and gun buyback programs, clearly demonstrated no or negative effects. The vast majority of programmatic interventions, however, exhibited weak or modest effects. We identified six "elements of effectiveness" shared by the most impactful interventions, including maintaining a specific focus on those most at risk for violence; proactive efforts to prevent violence before it occurs whenever possible; increasing the perceived and actual legitimacy of strategies and institutions; careful attention to program implementation and fidelity; a well-defined and understood theory of change; and active engagement and partnership with critical stakeholders. Given the modest effects of most interventions, that violence generally clusters around a small number of places, people, and behaviors, and that violence is not displaced from those clusters when they are targeted, we reach the simple yet powerful conclusion that it is advisable to concentrate and coordinate anti-violence efforts where they matter most. We further conclude that increased attention to program implementation and evaluation is necessary. We close with four recommendations to governmental and non-governmental funders with regard to community violence in the Northern Triangle and globally. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 137993 Keywords: Cognitive Behavioral TherapyFocused DeterrenceGang ViolenceGun ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: National Network for Safe Communities Title: Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide Summary: The National Network for Safe Communities supports communities around the country in implementing two field-tested crime reduction strategies: the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) first launched in Boston, Massachusetts, and the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) first launched in High Point, North Carolina. National Network membership includes law enforcement (e.g., police chiefs; sheriffs; state and federal prosecutors; and corrections, parole, and probation officials), community leaders, mayors, city managers, council members, service providers, street outreach workers, scholars, and others applying these strategies to reduce violent crime. The National Network's GVI has demonstrated that violent crime can be dramatically reduced when law enforcement, community members, and social service providers join together to engage directly with street groups to communicate the following: - A law enforcement message that any future violence will be met with clear, predictable, and certain consequences - A moral message from community representatives that violence will not be tolerated - An offer of help from social service providers for those who want it GVI is now a well-documented approach to reducing serious violence. The strategy is unusual, but it is based on common sense and practical experience. Embedded in empirical analysis of what drives serious violence, and in the schools of thought and practice known as "focused deterrence" and "procedural justice," the strategy follows a basic logic. Evidence and experience show that a small number of people in street groups, cliques, drug crews, and the like cause the majority of violence in troubled neighborhoods. The internal dynamics of the groups and the honor code of the street drive violence between those groups and individuals. The group members typically constitute less than 0.5 percent of a city's population but are consistently linked to 60 to 70 percent of the shootings and homicides. To implement GVI, a city assembles a partnership of law enforcement, community representatives (e.g., parents of murdered children, ministers, street outreach workers, ex-offenders, and other people with moral standing and credibility), and social service providers, all of whom are willing to provide a specific message to group members. A key communication tool of the strategy is the "call-in," a face-to-face meeting between group members and representatives of the GVI partnership. Together, the GVI partners deliver the strategy's antiviolence messages to representatives of street groups and then follow up on those messages. The call-in represents a central shift on the part of law enforcement. At the call-in, law enforcement gives the groups clear notice that it will meet future violence with swift and certain consequences and that it will direct consequences at the group as a whole rather than at individuals. As with ordinary law enforcement, when group members commit violent crimes, those individuals receive enforcement attention. Under GVI, however, law enforcement also holds the entire group accountable for violence. A group member's violent act triggers enforcement against other group members for outstanding warrants, probation and parole violations, open cases, and a variety of other criminal activity. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2013. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2016 at: https://nnscommunities.org/old-site-files/Group_Violence_Intervention_-_An_Implementation_Guide.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://nnscommunities.org/old-site-files/Group_Violence_Intervention_-_An_Implementation_Guide.pdf Shelf Number: 135351 Keywords: Community ParticipationFocused DeterrenceGroup Violence InterventionProcedural JusticeViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Fox, Andrew M. Title: Measuring the Impact of Kansas City's No Violence Alliance Summary: In 2013 and 2014, focused deterrence / lever pulling strategies were developed and deployed in Kansas City. Stakeholders involved in this strategy included the KCPD, Jackson County Prosecutor's Office, US Attorney's Office (WD-MO), Missouri Probation and Parole, Mayor's Office and federal law enforcement. Groups involved with violence were identified utilizing street-level intelligence and analysis, and stakeholders communicated directly and repeatedly to groups the consequences of future violence and opportunities to avoid violence by leveraging social services. Community members complemented this message by challenging the violent norms of the street code of retaliatory violence. Successive Interrupted Time Series analyses indicate that homicide and gun-related aggravated assaults were significantly reduced at 1, 2, 6-month intervals. However evidence also suggests that the deterrent value waned around the 12-month post-intervention period; while homicides continued to decline modestly there was indications that gun-related aggravated assaults began to regress to the mean, raising questions about the long-term effectiveness of focused deterrence. Details: Kansas City, MO: Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Missouri - Kansas City, 2015. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: https://cas.umkc.edu/cjc/pdfs/NoVA-impact-report-Aug2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://cas.umkc.edu/cjc/pdfs/NoVA-impact-report-Aug2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138890 Keywords: Focused DeterrenceGang ViolenceGangsHomicidesViolence PreventionYouth Gangs |
Author: Tomberg, Kathleen A. Title: Street by Street: Cross-Site Evaluation of the OJJDP Community-Based Violence Prevention Demonstration Program Summary: The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) provided funds to the Research and Evaluation Center at John Jay College of Criminal Justice (JohnJayREC) to conduct a process and outcome evaluation of the Office’s Community Based Violence Prevention (CBVP) demonstration in five cities across the United States. Programmatic grants in the CBVP demonstration varied in amount, but were typically $2 million per city. The funds usually supported projects for two to four years between 2010 and 2014. All the city projects in CBVP shared common elements, such as their overall objectives and core principles, an inter-agency collaborative approach, a focus on specific geographic areas, demographic groups and identified "high risk" youth. Cities varied, however, in the implementation of their strategies. Not surprisingly, the cities also differed in the nature, dynamics, and driving factors behind youth violence and gang activity in their local areas. This influenced the overall design and implementation of the program, as well as the type and availability of data. Although the five city projects all included law enforcement, youth services, job training, and other nonprofit social services, the structure and content of these institutional roles assumed different configurations in each location. This is clear in the project management structure across cities. In three sites – Oakland, Newark, and Denver – a specific city agency led project development and implementation, with service provision assigned to nonprofit organizations. In Brooklyn and Washington, DC, nonprofit organizations with strong neighborhood roots designed and implemented the programs. In these cases, they collaborated closely with key city agencies (notably, the police, probation, and youth services) and with other nonprofit service providers. Many details of program implementation were different in each CBVP location, regardless of the institutions involved. Some cities had teams in which a coherent staff group with clear roles supervised the majority of program activities, including monitoring their data about services and outcomes. Other cities had a more diffuse approach, with staff from multiple organizations holding program responsibilities and minimal coordination from a single entity. While one of the strengths of the OJJDP-CBVP funding model was its emphasis on adaptation to local context and needs, this variation across program sites posed serious challenges for the evaluation team’s efforts to assess and compare the experiences and outcomes in each city. The CBVP program in Brooklyn took place in one sector of Crown Heights, a neighborhood with a long record of high crime and violence that more recently began to face gentrification. The Crown Heights CBVP program was arguably the most coherent in its theoretical model and the most comprehensive in its implementation. The Center for Court Innovation, a large and well-known nonprofit organization, developed the program "Save Our Streets (SOS) Crown Heights," which is based entirely on the public health model of violence interruption known as "Cure Violence." The central idea in this approach is that violence is transmitted within a community like a contagious disease, and that law enforcement tactics (arrests, threats of prosecution) are not a sufficient long-term response. The program treats violence as a "virus" that can be "interrupted" or halted through interventions that alter community norms (such as tolerating violence as a 'normal' way to solve conflicts). During the CBVP project, violent crime fell across Brooklyn as a whole, and it was impossible to discern any reduction in crime that could be attributed to the program. A local nonprofit organization led the CBVP project in Washington, DC. The Collaborative Solutions for Communities (known colloquially as The Collaborative) implemented the Creating Solutions Together (CST) program in the Columbia Heights and Shaw neighborhoods of central Washington from 2010 to 2013. The program model was inspired by a previous project, the Gang Intervention Project, which had been in place since 2003 and mapped out gang dynamics and incidents, enabling more focused and strategic responses by police and social services. The CST program employed a core group of outreach workers who were familiar with the youth and their contexts. Outreach workers drew heavily on the public health and violence interruption model of Cure Violence (Chicago) in fashioning their methods for responding to acts of violence—at hospitals, funerals, schools, and in the streets. The outreach workers used mediation and "cooling down" tactics with individuals or groups to prevent retaliation. The program also offered services to at-risk youth who needed help finding pathways out of violence. Services often included counseling, GED education, and job training programs. Crime data from the neighborhoods in Washington, DC were not specific enough to discern a clear effect of the program on youth violence in targeted areas, although the amount of violent crime committed by juveniles citywide declined between 2006 and 2014. In Denver, local government took the lead in program implementation. The Gang Reduction Initiative of Denver (GRID) focused specifically on gang violence in five sectors of Denver and it drew heavily on an established approach: the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM). This model entails social services and supports for youth, in combination with law enforcement "suppression" tactics and the threat of legal penalties for group-affiliated youth who commit gun violence (similar to focused deterrence). Violent crime trends in Denver were generally stable or slightly increasing during the CBVP project period (2010-2014), but the City's crime data were not specific enough to determine whether or not the program was responsible for any of the changes. Denver experienced an increase in gang-related arrests that coincided with GRID implementation, but researchers could not determine whether this was due to the implementation of focused deterrence or if it was simply due to a more general "crackdown" tactic by police. Nonetheless, the GRID program undeniably catalyzed new and constructive inter-agency relationships and approaches to youth and violent crime in general–the effects of which may still emerge. The City of Newark developed the CBVP program under the name Newark United Against Violence (NUAV), and it began implementation in 2013 in the South and Central Wards, with joint leadership by the Newark Office of Reentry and the Newark Police Department. The NUAV, like other CBVP cities, took a hybrid approach to existing violence-reduction models, and combined hotspot policing, focused deterrence, and some elements of the violence interruption public health model (Cure Violence). Data on violent crime and youth crime in Newark, like other cities, showed an overall decline. However, data for the specific program areas and participants were not available in Newark. Thus, it was not possible to determine whether the program had any effect on youth crime in the targeted program area. The City of Oakland, led by the Department of Human Services, implemented its CBVP demonstration project known as Oakland Unite. The primary model that shaped the Oakland project was Cure Violence (public health and violence interruption), although Oakland also added elements of focused deterrence. Oakland Unite focused on specific neighborhoods and on the young people (under 25) most involved in violence, as victims and perpetrators. Data about crime trends in Oakland showed a notable decline in both shootings and homicides from 2012 to 2014. Moreover, the declines were stronger in the specific neighborhoods where Oakland Unite was most active. The intensity of program activity may have been associated with the more dramatic declines in shootings and homicides, but baseline and/or comparison data to determine a clear effect were not available. Oakland Unite is generally seen as an initiative that brought together disparate agencies into a more coherent approach to gang violence, and many of its activities have been sustained past the end of the grant because the City successfully passed new revenue sources dedicated to violence prevention. In two CBVP demonstraton sites, Brooklyn and Denver, the Research and Evaluation Center also conducted an outcome analysis using a survey of households. The surveys measured changes in attitudes and perceptions of violence over a two-year period and focused on four key concepts: disinclination toward gun violence, disinclination toward non-gun violence, perceived sense of safety in the neighborhood, and neighborhood efficacy or pro-social action. The results failed to detect clear effects of CBVP programming. In Brooklyn, the relative difference in neighborhood safety scores actually worsened, but this was due to the fact that equivalent scores in the comparison area improved–for reasons likely unrelated to CBVP. In Denver, there was some improvement in residents’ sense of safety in the program area, but not a statistically significant difference when contrasted with the comparison area. While these results may seem to reflect less change than expected, it should not be surprising that no significant improvements in attitudes and perceptions were evident after only two to three years of program activity. Additional research over a longer period of time and with sufficient complexity to capture the inherent variations in individuals' experiences and involvement with program activities may have revealed more meaningful effects of CBVP intervention. Details: New York, NY: Research and Evaluation Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 2016. 168p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/250383.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/250383.pdf Shelf Number: 141101 Keywords: Community-Based Programs Focused DeterrenceInterventions Neighborhoods and Crime Outreach Workers Violence Violence Prevention Violent Crime Youth Gangs |
Author: Scott, Michael S. Title: Focused Deterrence of High-Risk Individuals Summary: A focused-deterrence approach to dealing with high-risk offenders is, relatively speaking, in the early phases of application and testing across the police profession, but the evidence of its effectiveness and fairness to date is promising. It builds on prior knowledge about responding effectively to repeat offenders, but it goes well beyond that knowledge mainly by harnessing the power of intensive support offered to individuals willing to stop their offending and accept the assistance and the power of deterrence through certain, severe, and swift punishment. Moreover, focused-deterrence harnesses state and community authority in persuading high-risk offenders that everyone's lives, their own included, are better out of a life of crime than in it. Two of the more unexpected aspects of focused deterrence, at least to its skeptics, are that (1) police and prosecutors are sometimes willing to forgo enforcement and assist known persistent offenders, and (2) persistent offenders can heed official warnings or willingly stop offending. Early FDIs have CONCLUSION demonstrated that police and prosecutors have been willing to sacrifice an arrest or a conviction in exchange for a cessation of further offending. In addition, at least some repeat offenders have grown weary of the criminal lifestyle with its constant risks of incarceration, injury, or death and are willing to stop offending if given the right mix of incentives. Focused deterrence challenges deeply held beliefs of police and prosecutors that persistent offenders are incapable of giving up a life of crime, and of persistent offenders that police and prosecutors desire only to make their lives miserable. Adopting a focused-deterrence approach requires a leap of faith on the part of all involved. But, as demonstrated by the several dozen jurisdictions across the country that have implemented FDIs, with proper attention to the important details of developing, implementing, and monitoring an FDI, such a leap can be well rewarded by less crime; fewer crime victims; safer communities; rehabilitated, socially productive ex-offenders; and enhanced perceived police legitimacy. Details: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2017. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Response Guide Series no. 13: Accessed January 19, 2018 at: http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/pdfs/SPI-Focused-Deterrence-POP-Guide.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/pdfs/SPI-Focused-Deterrence-POP-Guide.pdf Shelf Number: 148875 Keywords: Crime PreventionFocused DeterrenceRepeat Offenders |
Author: Kulick, Jonathan Title: Targeted Enforcement against Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products Summary: Illicit trade in tobacco is a substantial and growing problem in the U.S., causing loss of tax revenue, damage to public health, and threats to public safety. Decisions about enforcement against ITTP involve tradeoffs among competing objectives. Good policy design can improve the terms of those tradeoffs but cannot eliminate them. We examine questions about the allocation of enforcement resources against ITTP, and its distribution across activities, individuals, and organizations: in particular, whether and how to differentially target ITTP that involves violence or support for terrorism. We consider the problem of developing effective strategies for enforcement, applying both lessons from experience with markets for illicit drugs and theoretical insights about enforcement targeting and dynamic concentration. We show that targeted enforcement and focused deterrence are more efficient than unfocused enforcement, and that when other policy changes increase the potential rewards to illicit activity - enforcement resources applied earlier (before illicit markets have grown) will have greater impact than enforcement resources applied later (and therefore to larger markets). We discuss additional considerations, ranging from real-world complications left out of the simple models to examination of how insights from behavioral law and economics may modify conclusions based on a theory of deterrence designed for homo economicus. Details: Los Angeles: BOTEC Analysis, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883415 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883415 Shelf Number: 150889 Keywords: Black Markets Cigarette Smuggling Contraband Products Counterfeit Goods Focused DeterrenceIllicit Markets Illicit Trade Targeted Enforcement Taxes Tobacco Violent Crime |