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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:20 pm
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Results for fraud
95 results foundAuthor: Mitton, Lavinia Title: Factors Affecting Compliance with Rules: Understanding the Behaviour and Motivations Behind Customer Fraud Summary: This report reviews literature which may be applicable to understanding fraud in a range of means-tested benefits in an attempt to bring clarity into customer non-compliance data which can be gleaned from social surveys, public economics, law and social psychology. The author sought to answer two questions: what can we learn abou the reasons for benefit fraud from research in the fields of social policy, public economics, law and social psychology; and can what is learned from the causes of fraud usefully be turned into ideas for reforming the benefits system. Details: London: Department for Work and Pensions, 2009 Source: Working Paper No. 67; Report carried out by the University of Kent on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 115812 Keywords: Fraud |
Author: Great Britain. Audit Commission Title: Protecting the Public Purse: Local Government Fighting Fraud Summary: This report by the U.K. Audit Commission considers the key fraud risks and pressures facing councils and related bodies and identifies good practice in fighting fraud. Details: London: Audit Commission, 2009. 62p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 116392 Keywords: Fraud |
Author: KPMG. Audit, Tax, Advisory Group Title: Profile of a Fraudster: Survey 2007. Summary: This report presents a profile of those who commit fraud, the conditions in which fraud takes place and the resulting actions. Details: London(?): KPMG, 2007. 34p. Source: Year: 2007 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 116494 Keywords: Fraud |
Author: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Title: Mortgage Loan Fraud Connections With Other Financial Crimes: An Evaluation of Suspicious Activity Reports Filed by Money Services Businesses, Securities and Future Firms, Insurance Companies and Casinos. Summary: This study seeks to understand the relationship between mortgage loan fraud and other financial crime and to identify ways in which financial crime extends through multiple financial industries. Previous Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) studies have identified general trends and patterns in Suspicious Activity Reports (SARS) that documented suspected mortgage loan fraud. This study examines the activities of a group of individuals and organizations reported in depository institution SARS (SAR-DIs) for suspected mortgage loan fraud ("MLF subjects") and identifies patterns of activities associated with these MLF subjects evaluating three other types of SARSs: those filed by money services businesses (SAR-MSBs); securities brokers, securities dealers, or insurance companies (SAR-SFs); and casinos or card clubs (SAR-Cs). Details: Vienna, VA: FinCEN, 2009. 24p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 113846 Keywords: Financial CrimeFraud |
Author: Johnson, Mireille Title: Am I Who I Say I Am? A Systems Analysis into Identity Fraud in New Zealand Summary: This thesis examines the systems issues surrounding identity fraud in New Zealand. The research shows that New Zealand does have serious problems in its system, which in some cases facilitate identity fraud. There is a lack of synchronicity between New Zealand Government systems which undermines a whole of government approach to minimizing the risk of identity fraud. Issues in the private sector with identity fraud are just as serious, with financial advantage being one of the main reasons that identity fraud is committed. However, the lack of information sharing between the public and private sectors does not help stem the flow of identity fraud that is currently occurring. Details: Auckland, NZ: Auckland University of Technology, 2009. 193p. Source: Thesis, Institute of Public Policy Year: 2009 Country: New Zealand URL: Shelf Number: 118258 Keywords: FraudIdentity Theft |
Author: Button, Mark Title: Fraud Typologies and Victims of Fraud Summary: This review profiles a wide range of frauds which affect individuals and small businesses. In particular, it looks at mass marketing, identity and small business fraud. The review highlights the diversity within fraud including who perpetrates it. The report also shows the level of innovation and skill involved in committing fraud, thus coining the work 'scampreneurs' to describe these criminals. Details: London: National Fraud Authority, 2009. 38p. Source: Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118269 Keywords: Fraud |
Author: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Committee on Fiscal Affairs Title: Report on Abuse of Charities for Money-Laundering and Tax Evasion Summary: Tax evasion and tax fraud through the abuse of charities is a serious and increasing risk in many countries although its impact is variable. Some countries estimate that the abuse of charities costs their treasury many hundreds of millions of dollars and is becoming more prevalent. This report summarizes the status attached to charities in the countries surveyed and compiles the common methods of the abuse of charities, the sectors at risk and the few attempts so far to quantify those risks. Details: Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration. 2008. 65p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 114341 Keywords: CharitiesCorrupt PracticesFraudMoney LaunderingTax Evasion |
Author: Button, Mark Title: Support for the Victims of Fraud: An Assessment of the Current Infrastructure in England and Wales Summary: There are hundreds of thousands of people who become victims of fraud every year in the U.K. Some do not know they are victims and some know but do not report it. Only a minority of victims (bar identity fraud) report it. The support those victims receive varies from nothing to the most extensive and very best support that could possibly be provided. The structures that exist for fraud victims also vary significantly from other crime victims. There is significant support provided by the private sector, voluntary bodies, and state organizations. This report seeks to capture this infrastructure of support offered to the victims of fraud setting out the strengths, weaknesses and gaps. It does this by mirroring the three main components of the process. First of all, support at the reporting stage is assessed, followed by the reported state, and finally the criminal justice system stage. Details: London: National Fraud Authority, 2009. 37p., app. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118818 Keywords: FraudVictim CompensationVictims of Crime |
Author: Wolf, Robert V. Title: A Full Response to an Empty House: Public Safety Strategies for Addressing Mortgage Fraud and the Foreclosure Crisis Summary: This report presents a detailed snapshot of mortgage fraud and forclosures, including their causes, their impact on neighborhoods, and jurisdictions' responses. The report is intended to serve as a guide to government and law enforcement officials across the U.S. seeking to address these challenges in their own communities. Details: New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2010. 38p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119147 Keywords: FraudMortgage Fraud |
Author: Carol Goldstone Associates Title: Fraud in the Charitable Sector Summary: "The true nature and extent of fraud within and against charities in the United Kingdom is relatively unknown with current understanding based on anecdotal evidence and media accounts of high profile scams. There is a perception that charities are a ‘soft target’ due to their altruistic nature, perceived lack of professionalism, and reliance on the trust and goodwill of staff, volunteers and supporters. This research attempts to improve our understanding of fraud in the charitable sector and to gauge what charities really think about fraud. Although the incidence of reported fraud is relatively low there are still a number of important issues which warrant further consideration and action by charities, their professional advisors, law enforcers and regulators." Details: London: Fraud Advisory Panel, 2009. 34p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118697 Keywords: CharitiesFraud |
Author: Kephart, Janice Title: Fixing Flores: Assuring Adequate Penalties for Identity Theft and Fraud Summary: This Backgrounder proposes statutory language fixes to federal identity theft and aggravated felony language in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 and 1028A to reverse the practical implications of the May 2009 Supreme Court ruling in Flores-Figueroa v. United States. Flores crippled prosecutors’ longstanding practice of using the aggravated identity theft statute by requiring that prosecutors now also prove that a defendant knew he was using a real person’s identity information, as opposed to counterfeit information not connected to an actual person. The statute is an important tool for immigration enforcement. Proving a defendant’s knowledge about his crime is always difficult, and impossible in some cases, even where there is substantial harm and clear victims. This is especially the situation with illegal aliens who buy identity information from third parties. The inevitable result of the Flores decision is to enable perpetrators an easy defense and to tie prosecutors’ hands. The defendant in the case was an illegal alien working at a steel plant in Illinois. The fixes proposed in this report attempt to encapsulate the original intent of Congress when it broadened federal criminal identity theft law in 1998 and added mandatory sentencing guidelines for identity theft in 2004. Ensuring adequate penalties for the ever-evolving crime of identity theft and fraud and better protecting victims of this pervasive crime was of paramount importance both times federal law was amended. Flores identified an inadvertent flaw in the statutory language and has now put the responsibility on Congress to fix the language or deal with the untenable result of an additional burden of proof on prosecutors, resulting in fewer identity theft cases being prosecuted or more defendants being let off the hook for serious crimes due to a legal loophole. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2010. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder, Jan. 2010: Accessed August 19, 2010 at: http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/Flores-Figueroa.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/Flores-Figueroa.pdf Shelf Number: 119628 Keywords: FraudIdentity TheftIllegal Aliens (U.S.)Immigration (U.S.) |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Corporate Crime: DOJ Has Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should Evaluate Effectiveness Summary: Recent cases of corporate fraud and mismanagement heighten the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) need to appropriately punish and deter corporate crime. Recently, DOJ has made more use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs), in which prosecutors may require company reform, among other things, in exchange for deferring prosecution. In June and November 2009, GAO testified on DOJ’s use and oversight of DPAs and NPAs, and this report discusses additional findings, including (1) the extent to which DOJ has used DPAs and NPAs to address corporate misconduct and tracks use of these agreements, (2) the extent to which DOJ measures the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs, and (3) the role of the court in the DPA and NPA process. GAO examined 152 DPAs and NPAs negotiated from 1993 through September 2009 and analyzed DOJ data on corporate prosecutions in fiscal years 2004 through 2009. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials, prosecutors from 13 DOJ offices, 20 company representatives, 11 monitors who oversee company compliance, and 12 federal judges. While not generalizable, these results provide insight into decisions about DPAs and NPAs. GAO recommends that DOJ develop performance measures to assess the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs. DOJ agreed with our recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf Shelf Number: 119649 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCorporate CrimeFraudProsecution |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Better Usage of Electronic Passport Security Features Could Improve Fraud Detention Summary: In 2005, the Department of State (State) began issuing electronic passports (e-passports) with embedded computer chips that store information identical to that printed in the passport. By agreement with State, the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) produces blank e-passport books. Two foreign companies are used by GPO to produce e-passport covers, including the computer chips embedded in them. At U.S. ports of entry, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspects passports. GAO was asked to examine potential risks to national security posed by using foreign suppliers for U.S. e-passport computer chips. This report specifically examines the following two risks: (1) Can the computer chips used in U.S. e-passports be altered or forged to fraudulently enter the United States? (2) What risk could malicious code on the U.S. e-passport computer chip pose to national security? To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials at State, GPO, and DHS relating to the U.S. e-passport design and manufacturing and e-passport inspection systems and procedures. GAO recommends that DHS implement the systems needed to fully verify e-passport digital signatures at U.S. ports of entry, and in coordination with State, implement an approach to obtain the necessary data to validate the digital signatures on U.S. and other nations’ e-passports. DHS agreed with the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 23, 2010 at: http://www.gpo.gov/pdfs/congressional/GAO_Rpt_BorderSecurity.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gpo.gov/pdfs/congressional/GAO_Rpt_BorderSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 117702 Keywords: Border SecurityFraudPassports |
Author: CIFAS Title: The Internal Betrayal: A CIFAS Report on Beating the Growing Threat of Staff Fraud Summary: While attention has traditionally been focused upon external attempts to defraud, increasingly the fraud threat is being mirrored internally. In 2009, CIFAS Staff Fraud Members noted a 45% increase in the number of cases of fraud committed by employees, compared with 2008. This included theft of cash from the organisation or a customer account, or lies on an application form, through to the theft or disclosure of commercial or personal data. The opportunities to commit fraud from the inside are numerous. In The Internal Betrayal, CIFAS and a wide range of fraud prevention bodies and experts have combined to examine the facts about staff fraud. This report looks at the steps that organisations can take in order to combat the threat successfully. From the recruitment process, expenses claims, whistleblowing and corruption, to ensuring that the right anti-fraud philosophy is present at all organisational levels, you will find in this report all that you need to know about combating the threat of staff fraud. Details: London: CIFAS: The UK's Fraud Prevention Service, 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2010 at: http://www.cifas.org.uk/download/The_Internal_Betrayal_CIFAS_Special_Report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cifas.org.uk/download/The_Internal_Betrayal_CIFAS_Special_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 119747 Keywords: Employee FraudEmployee TheftFraudWorkplace Crime |
Author: CIFAS Title: Fraudscape: Depicting the UK's Fraud Landscape Summary: This Report examines and assesses the fraud cases identified by CIFAS Member organisations during 2008 and 2009 to ascertain any key differences between the typology of the frauds seen in 2009 compared with 2008. Fraudscape analyses fraud data, by type of fraud committed and product targeted by the fraudster, and presents some key findings: Total frauds increased by nearly 10% in 2009 compared with 2008. A 32% increase in identity fraud (where a fraudster applies in the name of an innocent victim or uses an entirely fictitious identity) has been driven by identity fraudsters targeting bank accounts, communications, and mail order products. Application fraud (the use of material falsehoods - lies - on applications or false documentation) has decreased by over 25% from levels seen in 2008. The 'typical' victim of identity fraud is still the man in his forties, though the increase in women being impersonated, or having their accounts taken over, indicates that now, as never before, anyone can be a potential target. Bank accounts, communications and mail order are the product types with the greatest proportionate increase in fraud in 2009 compared with 2008. Details: London: CIFAS - The UK's Fraud Prevention Services, 2010. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: http://www.cifas.org.uk/download/Fraudscape-February_2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cifas.org.uk/download/Fraudscape-February_2010.pdf Shelf Number: 119769 Keywords: FraudIdentity FraudMail Order FraudMortgage Frauds |
Author: Kane, John Title: The 2005 National Public Survey on White Collar Crime Summary: Within recent years, instances of white collar crime have become a topic of increasing frequency within the news. Security data breaches and crimes such as identity theft, credit card fraud, disaster fraud, and mortgage fraud have pervaded recent media reports, and scandals involving corporations such as Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, HealthSouth, and ImClone have dominated airtime. Furthermore, monetary estimates from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners approximate the annual cost of white collar crime to be between $300 and $660 billion. Despite the evidence of the widespread nature of white collar crime, there remain few empirical studies devoted to assessing the prevalence of white collar crime as it relates to the general public. In response to this, NW3C conducted the 2005 National Public Survey on White Collar Crime (a follow-up to NW3C’s original National Public Survey on White Collar Crime conducted in 1999). By utilizing household and individual measures, this nationally-representative survey highlights the public’s recent experiences with white collar crime including victimization, reporting behaviors, and perceptions of crime seriousness. Details: Fairmont, WV: National White Collar Crime Center, 2006. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2010 at: http://www.nw3c.org/research/national_public_survey.cfm Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://www.nw3c.org/research/national_public_survey.cfm Shelf Number: 119868 Keywords: Credit Card FraudCrime SurveysFraudIdentity TheftPublic OpinionVictimizationVictims of CrimeWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force Title: Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force: Fifth Anniversary Report to the Attorney General Summary: When it was established in September 2005, the mission of the Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force was to deter, prevent, detect, and punish fraud related to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina. Subsequently, as other hurricanes and disasters, both in and beyond the Gulf Coast region, gave rise to similar patterns of fraud, the work of the Task Force has expanded to provide assistance to United States Attorney’s Offices and federal investigative agencies and Inspectors General in providing a national mechanism for receiving and referring complaints from the public about suspected fraud. In 2010, for example, the earthquakes in Haiti and floods in New England and Tennessee prompted immediate response by the Task Force and its members. In the five years since Katrina, United States Attorney’s Offices across the country have shown remarkable persistence and dedication in continuing to pursue disaster-related fraud. From September 8, 2005 through September 1, 2010, 47 United States Attorney’s Offices across the country have charged more than 1,300 people with various hurricane fraud-related crimes. Depending on the severity of the offenses and the economic losses they caused, some defendants, particularly ringleaders of major schemes, received significant terms of imprisonment, while others – often individuals with no prior criminal records – were convicted of felonies but received sentences of probation and restitution. The Task Force’s record in this regard continues to demonstrate the importance of sustained commitment to disaster-fraud prosecution, not only to seek just punishment for offenders but also to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2010. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2010 at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/katrina/docs/09-13-10katrinaprogress-report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/katrina/docs/09-13-10katrinaprogress-report.pdf Shelf Number: 119885 Keywords: DisastersFraudHurricane Katrina |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: An Asessment of Transnational Organized Crime in Central Asia Summary: Transnational organized crime in Central Asia represents a serious threat to the region inhibiting the emergence of stable societies. This report provides an overview of the scope of the problem of transnational organized crime in Central Asia. The report identifies trafficking in drugs, human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption as the principle and most serious crimes in the Central Asian region. It provides an analytical framework based on causal factors as well as on facilitating and inhibiting factors. Acknowledging the difficulties and limitations associated with research on organized crime in Central Asia, the report is a synthesis of information from a multitude of sources. It includes information provided by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan together with data and information drawn from secondary literature, expert opinions and other sources. An analysis of organized crime in Central Asia must take into account historical, political, social and economic developments in the region. Most states in Central Asia are in a transitional period and are characterized by developing, but still relatively low levels of effective governance. Gaps in governmental capacity and voids created by weak and ineffective state institutions are a strong contributing factor in the proliferation of organized criminal activities. Moreover, cultural, religious and ethnic differences are exploited by organized criminals to achieve their objectives and to facilitate the spread of organized crime. Organized crime, therefore, must be seen as a consequence of the interplay between these various elements. The report discusses the specific structures and modes of operation of the Central Asian criminal groups. It highlights the diversity of those groups and the tendency towards more flexible network organizations. Various types of activities in which criminal groups are engaged are explored in the report, with drug trafficking presenting the most serious problem. With three of the Central Asian states, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, sharing borders with Afghanistan, the largest producer of illicit opiates in the world, Central Asia is an important transit zone for illicit drugs. A consequence of the drug trafficking has been a major increase in drug abuse in the region. However, it is not the only form of criminal activity associated with organized crime in the region. Organized crime activity includes significant—and in some cases growing—incidents of trafficking in human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption. Details: New York: UNODC, 2007. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 116541 Keywords: CorruptionDrug TraffickingFraudHuman TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Title: Identity Theft: Trends, Patterns, and Typologies Reported in Suspicious Activitiy Report Filed by Depository Institute January 1, 2003 - December 31, 2009 Summary: Identity theft was the sixth most frequently reported characterization of suspicious activity within the period of the study, behind structuring/money laundering, check fraud, mortgage loan fraud, credit card fraud, and counterfeit check fraud. Based upon analysis of the study sample, the number of identity theft-related depository institution SAR filings submitted during calendar year (CY) 2009 was 123 percent higher than the number reported in CY 2004. This compares with an 89 percent increase in the numbers of all depository institution SAR filings made in CY 2004 versus CY 2009.6 Over 86 percent of sample depository institution SAR filings bearing either the identity theft suspicious activity characterization or identity theft-associated keywords in their narratives actually described identity theft. Most of the remainder of the filings described identity fraud or provided insufficient information to confirm identity theft. Credit card fraud was the most frequently co-reported suspicious activity characterization with identity theft, appearing in over 45.5 percent of sample filings. In about 30 percent of these filings reporting the successful takeover of an existing credit card account, and 17 percent reporting the successful unauthorized set up of a new credit card account, the alleged identity thief added his/her name to the account as an authorized user. Several types of loan accounts were reportedly abused in 31 percent of filings. In 56.5 percent of filings specifically reporting student loan fraud, subjects included both their name and the victim’s name on the loan application as either the borrower or co-signer. Analysis of the sample indicated that filers reporting auto loan fraud facilitated by identity theft were successful in identifying these loans as fraudulent prior to funding in 49.5 percent of filings. Similarly, filers reporting student loan fraud facilitated by identity theft identified the loans as fraudulent prior to funding in 54.5 percent of filings. Nearly 27.5 percent of sample identity theft SAR narratives reported that the identity theft victim knew the suspected thief, who was usually a family member, friend, acquaintance, or an employee working in the victim’s home. Computer-assisted identity theft was described in 4 percent of filings. Fraud rings that employ identity theft to further their illicit activities were reported in 3.5 percent of filings overall, with the year-to-year trend line strongly up in every period except 2005-2006. Victims reportedly discovered identity theft through review of their own account activity in about 28 percent of filings in the sample. Filers credited routine financial institution account monitoring with uncovering identity theft in nearly another 21 percent of sample filings, and checks of commercial databases at account set-up in 14.5 percent of sample filings. Credit reports, law enforcement investigations, collection agencies, and credit monitoring services were responsible for revealing identity theft in a decreasing percentage of sample filings. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2010. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2010 at: http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports/pdf/ID%20Theft.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports/pdf/ID%20Theft.pdf Shelf Number: 120071 Keywords: Computer CrimesCredit Card FraudFraudIdentity Theft |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Guardianships: Cases of Financial Exploitation, Neglect, and Abuse of Seniors Summary: As individuals age, some become incapable of managing their personal and financial affairs. To protect these individuals, state laws provide for court appointment of guardians, who may be professionals or family members, to protect the incapacitated person's personal and/or financial welfare. State and local courts are responsible for overseeing guardians. In addition, federal agencies may appoint a representative payee, in some cases, the guardian, to manage federal benefits on behalf of incapacitated adults. Previous GAO reports have found that poor communication between state courts and federal agencies may allow guardians to continue abusing their victims. GAO was asked to (1) verify whether allegations of abuse by guardians are widespread; (2) examine the facts in selected closed cases; and (3) proactively test state guardian certification processes. To verify whether allegations are widespread, GAO interviewed advocates for seniors and reviewed court documents. To examine closed criminal, civil or administrative cases with a finding of guilt or liability in the past 15 years, GAO reviewed court records, interviewed court officials, attorneys and victims, and reviewed records from federal agencies. To test state guardian certification, GAO used fictitious identities to apply for certification in four states. GAO's results cannot be projected to the overall population of guardians or state certification programs. GAO could not determine whether allegations of abuse by guardians are widespread; however, GAO identified hundreds of allegations of physical abuse, neglect and financial exploitation by guardians in 45 states and the District of Columbia between 1990 and 2010. In 20 selected closed cases, GAO found that guardians stole or otherwise improperly obtained $5.4 million in assets from 158 incapacitated victims, many of whom were seniors. In some instances, guardians also physically neglected and abused their victims. The guardians in these cases came from diverse professional backgrounds and were overseen by local courts in 15 states and the District of Columbia. GAO found several common themes. In 6 of 20 cases, the courts failed to adequately screen potential guardians, appointing individuals with criminal convictions or significant financial problems to manage high-dollar estates. In 12 of 20 cases, the courts failed to oversee guardians once they were appointed, allowing the abuse of vulnerable seniors and their assets to continue. Lastly, in 11 of 20 cases, courts and federal agencies did not communicate effectively or at all with each other about abusive guardians, allowing the guardian to continue the abuse of the victim and/or others. Using two fictitious identities--one with bad credit and one with the Social Security number of a deceased person -- GAO obtained guardianship certification or met certification requirements in the four states where we applied: Illinois, Nevada, New York, and North Carolina. Though certification is intended to provide assurance that guardians are qualified to fulfill their role, none of the courts or certification organizations utilized by these states checked the credit history or validated the Social Security number of the fictitious applicants. An individual who is financially overextended is at a higher risk of engaging in illegal acts to generate funds. In addition, people with criminal convictions could easily conceal their pasts by stealing a deceased person's identity. The tests raise questions about the effectiveness of these four state certification programs. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-1046: Accessed October 29, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101046.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101046.pdf Shelf Number: 120124 Keywords: Elder AbuseElderly VictimsEmbezzlementFinancial CrimesFraudRestitution |
Author: Great Britain. Audit Commission Title: Protecting the Public Purse 2010: Fighting Fraud Against Local Government and Local Taxpayers Summary: This report identifies and considers the main areas of fraud risk and pressures facing UK councils as well as identifying good practice in fighting fraud. The report describes the action takes by some councils to tackle fraud and provides links to tools to help councils improve their counter-fraud defences. Details: London: Audit Commission, 2010. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2010 at: http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/AuditCommissionReports/NationalStudies/271010protectingthepublicpurse.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/AuditCommissionReports/NationalStudies/271010protectingthepublicpurse.pdf Shelf Number: 120323 Keywords: Fraud |
Author: International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group Title: Mass-Marketing Fraud: A Threat Assessment Summary: Mass-marketing fraud is a term increasingly used around the world to refer to fraud schemes that use mass-communications media – including telephones, the Internet, mass mailings, television, radio, and even personal contact – to contact, solicit, and obtain money, funds, or other items of value from multiple victims in one or more jurisdictions. Although law enforcement and regulatory authorities often use a variety of names to refer to the phenomenon – including “advance-fee fraud,” “419 fraud,” “Internet fraud,” and “telemarketing fraud” – the growing profusion of labels for these fraud schemes tends to obscure the fact that such schemes often are conducted using multiple communications channels to identify and contact victims, as well as identical or highly similar methods of operation that are not dependent on a single communications medium. Today, mass-marketing fraud schemes operate from, and increasingly seek to target victims in, numerous countries on multiple continents. Moreover, such schemes are aware and take advantage of differences between countries in legislative authorities prohibiting such schemes. As a consequence, mass-marketing fraud has become a substantial concern for law enforcement in several regions of the world. The International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group (IMMFWG) prepared this threat assessment to provide governments and the public with a current assessment of the nature and scope of the threat that mass-marketing fraud poses around the world. The IMMFWG, which was established in September 2007, consists of law enforcement, regulatory, and consumer protection agencies from seven countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as Europol. The IMMFWG seeks to facilitate the multinational exchange of information and intelligence, the coordination of cross-border operations to detect, disrupt, and apprehend mass-marketing fraud, and the enhancement of public-awareness and public-education measures concerning international mass-marketing fraud schemes. The information and analysis in this assessment is current through May 2010, and are derived principally from public and non-public law enforcement and non-law enforcement sources in Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Details: International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group, 2010. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2011 at: http://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/immfta.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/immfta.pdf Shelf Number: 120897 Keywords: FraudInternet FraudTelemarketing Fraud |
Author: Australian Crime Commission Title: Organised Crime in Australia 2011 Summary: The Organised Crime in Australia 2011 report is the third and largest report of its kind that the Australian Crime Commission has produced since 2008. The latest edition provides the most comprehensive unclassified profile of organised crime in Australia, including the characteristics of those involved, what drives them, the activities they are involved in and the extent and impact of organised crime. Most organised criminal activities in Australia are focused on illicit drug markets, although organised crime groups also engage in a wide variety of associated criminal activity including tax evasion, money laundering, fraud, identity crime and high tech crime. The impact of organised crime in Australia is serious and far exceeds the direct harm caused by the specific offences. In fact, the activities of high-threat serious and organised criminal enterprises result in significant harm to the Australian community. There are significant losses to the economy, including the redirection of resources that might otherwise be invested in legitimate business, reductions in tax revenue and increasing costs of law enforcement and regulation. The widespread impact extends to costs associated with longer-term health and social harm. The activities of organised criminal enterprises can also undermine public confidence in the integrity of key business sectors and government institutions. Details: Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2011. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2011 at: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/oca/_files/2011/oca2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/oca/_files/2011/oca2011.pdf Shelf Number: 121465 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug TraffickingFraudIdentity TheftMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (Australia)Tax Evasion |
Author: Belli, Roberta Title: Where Political Extremists and Greedy Criminals Meet: A Comparative Study of Financial Crimes and Criminal Networks in the United States Summary: Financial crime poses a serious threat to the integrity and security of legitimate businesses and institutions, and to the safety and prosperity of private citizens and communities. Experts argue that the profile of financial offenders is extremely diversified and includes individuals who may be motivated by greed or ideology. Islamic extremists increasingly resort to typical white-‐collar crimes, like credit card and financial fraud, to raise funds for their missions. In the United States, the far-‐right movement professes its anti-‐government ideology by promoting and using a variety of anti-‐tax strategies. There is evidence that ideologically motivated individuals who engage in financial crimes benefit from interactions with profit-‐driven offenders and legitimate actors that provide resources for crime in the form of knowledge, skills, and suitable co-‐offenders. This dissertation sheds light on the nexus between political extremism and profit-‐driven crime by conducting a systematic study of financial crime cases involving Islamic extremists, domestic far-‐rightists, and their non-‐extremist accomplices prosecuted by federal courts in 2004. Attribute and relational data were extracted from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which is the first open-‐source relational database that provides information on all extremist crimes, violent and non-‐violent, ideological and routine crimes, since 1990. A descriptive analysis was conducted comparing schemes, crimes, and techniques used by far-‐rightists, Islamic extremists, and non-‐extremists, before moving into an in-‐depth social network analysis of their relational ties in co-‐offending, business, and family networks. The descriptive findings revealed considerable differences in the modus operandi followed by far-‐rightists and Islamic extremists as well as the prosecutorial strategies used against them. The subsequent exploratory and statistical network analyses, however, revealed interesting similarities, suggesting that financial schemes by political extremists occurred within similarly decentralized, self-‐organizing structures that facilitated exchanges between individuals acting within close-‐knit subsets regardless of their ideological affiliation. Meaningful interactions emerged between far-‐rightists and non-‐extremists involved in business ventures and within a tax avoidance scheme, indicating that the crime-‐extremism nexus was more prevalent within far-‐right settings compared to Islamic extremist ones. The findings were discussed in light of their implications for criminological theories, criminal justice and crime prevention policies, and methodological advances. Details: Dissertation, City University of New York, 2011. 464p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Shelf Number: 121874 Keywords: Extremist GroupsFinancial CrimesFraudOrganized CrimeTax-EvasionTerrorismTerroristsWhite Collar CrimeWhite Collar Offenses |
Author: Prenzler, Tim Title: Welfare Fraud in Australia: Dimensions and Issues Summary: This paper examines anti-fraud measures currently operating in Australia’s welfare system, administered by the government agency, Centrelink. Using official data, an examination is made of the operations and rationales of different strategies and their impacts, including estimated savings. The paper covers nine strategies, including data-matching, public tip-offs, media campaigns, stepped-up investigations and recovery action. The findings indicate that Centrelink has adopted international best practice measures to combat fraud and appears to be particularly successful at detecting and stopping fraud. At the same time, the main challenge appears to lie in the area of finding and demonstrating more effective primary prevention measures. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 421: Accessed July 11, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 122021 Keywords: Commercial CrimesFraudWelfare Fraud (Australia) |
Author: Larence, Eileen R. Title: Criminal Cartel Enforcement: Stakeholder Views on Impact of 2004 Antitrust Reform Are Mixed, but Support Whistleblower Protection Summary: Criminal cartel activity, such as competitors conspiring to set prices, can harm consumers and the U.S. economy through lack of competition and overcharges. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division’s leniency program offers the possibility that the first individual or company that self-reports cartel activity will avoid criminal conviction and penalties. In 2004, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) was enacted to encourage such reporting. The 2010 reauthorization mandated that GAO study ACPERA’s effect. This report addresses (1) the extent that ACPERA affected DOJ’s criminal cartel enforcement, (2) the ways ACPERA has reportedly affected private civil actions, and (3) key stakeholder perspectives on rewards and antiretaliatory protection for whistleblowers reporting criminal antitrust violations. GAO analyzed DOJ data on criminal cartel cases (1993-2010) and interviewed DOJ officials. GAO also interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys from 17 civil cases and key stakeholders including other antitrust attorneys selected using a snowball sampling technique whereby GAO identified contacts through referrals. What GAO Recommends -- Congress may wish to consider an amendment to add a civil remedy for those who are retaliated against for reporting criminal antitrust violations. DOJ generally agreed with GAO’s findings but did not comment on this matter. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. GAO, 2011. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-619: Accessed July 26, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11619.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11619.pdf Shelf Number: 122164 Keywords: AntitrustCriminal CartelsFinesFraudWhistleblowers |
Author: Doyle, Charles Title: Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law Summary: It is a federal crime to devise a scheme to defraud another of property, when either mail or wire communications are used in furtherance of the scheme, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343. Mail or wire fraud includes schemes to defraud another of honest services, when the scheme involves bribery or a kick back, 18 U.S.C. 1346; Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010). In order to convict, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) used either mail or wire communications in the foreseeable furtherance, (2) of a scheme to defraud, (3) involving a material deception, (4) with the intent to deprive another of, (5) either property or honest services. Offenders face the prospect of imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), an order to pay victim restitution, and the confiscation of any property realized from the offense. Misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may also constitute a violation of one or more other federal crimes. Principal among these are predicate offense crimes, frauds based on jurisdictional factors other than use of mail or wire communications, and other honest services frauds in the form of bribery or kickbacks. The other federal bribery and kickback offenses include bribery of public officials, federal program bribery, extortion under color of official right, and Medicare/Medicaid kickbacks. Mail and wire fraud are money laundering and racketeering predicate offenses. Numbered among the fraud offenses based on other jurisdiction grounds are the false claims and false statement offenses, bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: R41930: Accessed August 9, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41930.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41930.pdf Shelf Number: 122333 Keywords: BriberyExtortionFraudMail FraudMoney LaunderingWire Fraud |
Author: Osterhaus, Anja Title: Alternative to Silence: Whistleblower Protection in 10 European Countries Summary: Whistleblowers play a vital role in exposing corruption, fraud and mismanagement and in preventing disasters that arise from negligence or wrongdoing. Prominent whistleblowers revealed the cover-up of SARS and other dangerous diseases that threatened millions of people in China; they disclosed corruption and nepotism in the European Commission and helped to avoid environmental hazards in the US. In most known cases, whistleblowers expose themselves to high personal risks in order to protect the public good. When speaking out against their bosses, colleagues, business partners or clients, they risk their jobs, their income and security. Nevertheless, rather than being heard and praised for their courage, most whistleblowers face indifference or mistrust and their reports are not properly investigated. They often end up in years of legal litigation, fighting for their own rights or for the case they have disclosed to be adequately investigated. The result can be health problems, depression and early retirement. At the same time, the value and importance of whistleblowing in the fight against corruption is increasingly recognised. International conventions commit the signatory countries to implementing appropriate legislation, and an increasing number of governments is willing to put related regulations in place. Ever more companies, public bodies and non-profit organisations put whistleblowing mechanisms in place for effective risk management and to ensure safe and accountable workplaces. Legal frameworks can be essential in supporting this practice, provided they ensure full protection of the whistleblower as well as adequate and independent follow-up to the disclosure. Given that whistleblowers are in most cases insiders who are the first to detect wrongdoing, functioning internal whistleblowing systems are excellent tools for effective risk management in organisations. With the aim of contributing to more effective whistleblowing frameworks and protection mechanisms in the European Union, this report assesses whistleblowing legislation, policies and practice in 10 European countries. In this report, the concept of whistleblowing is defined as ‘the disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action’. The report builds on in-depth research carried out in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. In addition, it takes existing whistleblowing legislation and best practice into account. The report identifies weaknesses, opportunities and entry points to introduce stronger and more effective whistleblowing mechanisms in these countries. Details: Berlin: Transparency International, 2009. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 12, 2011 at: http://www.transparency.lt/new/images/alternative_to_silence_whistleblower_protection.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transparency.lt/new/images/alternative_to_silence_whistleblower_protection.pdf Shelf Number: 122378 Keywords: CorruptionFraudWhistleblowing (Europe)Witness Protection |
Author: Smyth, Sara M. Title: Measuring the Extent of Cyber-Fraud in Canada: A Discussion Paper on Potential Methods and Data Sources Summary: Central to developing and monitoring the progress of strategies for combating cyber crime is reliable information about crime volume, in terms of the number of incidents and offenders, the prevalence of cyberspace tools for the commission of crime, as well as the number of victims. This discussion paper assesses the potential for using innovative methodologies to estimate the scope of cyber-fraud, identifies existing data sources and gaps, and suggests novel sources of data that may help provide a more accurate picture of the degree of cyber-fraud in Canada. Further, possible ways to determine the proportions of cyber-fraud attributable to criminal networks rather than single individuals are discussed. This research is informed by a literature review and interviews with law enforcement and Information Technology (IT) personnel. The literature review and interviews show that the largest impediment to effectively managing the problem of cyber-fraud is the lack of reliable data. The Government of Canada primarily relies on police-reported data for information about cyber-fraud. Yet, there are a number of reasons why fraud incidents are not reported to police. For example, companies may prefer to handle such matters internally, or individuals may only report that they were defrauded to their financial institution. This research shows that current information about cyber-fraud is being funnelled to a variety of different organizations, including banks, regulatory agencies and various police agencies, or is simply not recorded. There is a clear shortage of data measuring the prevalence and costs of cyber-fraud in Canada and the available information is incomplete and fragmented. The lack of reporting of cyber-fraud incidents by individual and corporate/government victims means that many cases are not recorded or represented in official crime statistics This research demonstrates a strong need for the creation of a national centre to record and measure data relating to cyberfraud across Canada. A central databank of known cyber-fraud offenders and cases across the country could facilitate the identification and tracking of suspects in cyber-fraud cases and could further understanding regarding when one individual, or group of individuals, is committing fraud all over the country. Ultimately, a national databank on cyber-fraud incidents could give law enforcement officials a better understanding of the types of cyber-fraud being committed in Canada. Sophisticated technologies and the global distribution of computer networks also increase the difficulty of detecting and addressing cyber-fraud and hinder the ability to find and prosecute criminals operating online. In addition, there are operational challenges related to ensuring that law enforcement officials have the training and resources they need to adequately address the problem and able to identify perpetrators of cyber-frauds. Attempting to locate a perpetrator is problematic in many cases of cyber-fraud because skilled attackers cover their tracks by using proxies and other technical obfuscation methods. This research suggests that the best source for further information on cyber-fraud is offender populations. Offender interviews may help uncover the network structure of hidden populations and help the law enforcement community to identify key players within the group. Of the options available for hidden populations, a truncated Poisson model is suggested as the most effective model. Ideally, this research could help pave the way for data collection and analysis that would better inform law enforcement officials, investigators, and policy makers about the extent of cyber-fraud and cyber-criminal populations in Canada. This research may contribute toward the enhancement of prevention and suppression strategies, as well as the development of an empirical means for evaluating the effectiveness of initiatives, including elements of Canada’s Cyber Crime Strategy. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2011. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 020, 2011: Accessed November 22, 2011 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/sp-ps/PS14-4-2011-eng.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/sp-ps/PS14-4-2011-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 123422 Keywords: Computer CrimesCybercrime (Canada)FraudIdentity TheftInternet Crimes |
Author: Dionne, Georges Title: Does Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Theft Insurance Fluctuate with the Business Cycle? Summary: The report analyzes the empirical relationship between opportunistic fraud and business cycle. The authors find that residual opportunisitc fraud exists both in the contract with replacement cost endorsement and the contract with no-deductible endorsement in the Taiwan automobile theft insurance market. These results are consistent with previous literature on the relationship between fraud activity and insurance contracting. The authors also show that the severity of opportunistic fraud fluctuates in the opposite direction to the business cycle. Opportunistic fraud is stimulated during periods of recession and mitigated during periods of expansion. Details: Montreal, Canada: CIRRELT, 2011. Source: Internet Resource: CIRRELT-2011-49, Accessed on December 6, 2011 at: https://www.cirrelt.ca/DocumentsTravail/CIRRELT-2011-49.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: https://www.cirrelt.ca/DocumentsTravail/CIRRELT-2011-49.pdf Shelf Number: 123495 Keywords: Automobile TheftCanadaFraudInsuranceTaiwan |
Author: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Title: Economic Crimes Survey: Brazil, 2009 Summary: It is with great pleasure that PricewaterhouseCoopers presents the 5th Global Economic Crimes Survey - 2009, developed with the ultimate goal of capturing the perception of respondents regarding economic crimes, especially in the environment of the economic downturn experienced in the last 12 months. The survey addresses how the effects of the crisis have triggered economic crimes and how the post-crisis economic recovery may impact this crisis-stricken environment. By examining the data, the relationship between the crisis and the incidence of economic crimes can be established, bearing in mind that the countries least affected by the economic slowdown recorded lower occurrences of fraud in comparison with the global figures. Although Brazil has stood out for its resistance and power to bounce back, the global economic downturn environment has contributed to making the country more susceptible to frauds as well as impairing its ability to perceive and monitor the occurrence of economic crimes in a timely manner. For Brazil, 40% of respondents reported a sharp drop in their financial performance in the last 12 months, whereas the global perception was 62% in the same period. In regard to the incidence of economic crimes in the same period, the rates in Brazil were lower than the global figures, namely, 24% for Brazil and 30% globally. Details: Sydney: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://www.pwc.com.br/pt/estudos-pesquisas/assets/pesq-crimes-economicos-10-ingles.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.pwc.com.br/pt/estudos-pesquisas/assets/pesq-crimes-economicos-10-ingles.pdf Shelf Number: 124072 Keywords: Economic Crimes (Brazil)Fraud |
Author: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Office of Investigations Title: Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff's Ponzi Scheme -Public Version- Summary: The investigation did not find evidence that any SEC personnel who worked on an SEC examination or investigation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BMIS) had any financial or other inappropriate connection with Bernard Madoff or the Madoff family that influenced the conduct of their examination or investigatory work. Neither did the investigation find that former SEC Assistant Director Eric Swanson’s romantic relationship with Bernard Madoff’s niece influenced the conduct of the SEC examinations of Madoff and his firm. In addition, the investigation did not find that senior officials at the SEC directly attempted to influence examinations or investigations of Madoff or the Madoff firm, nor was there evidence that any senior SEC official interfered with the staff’s ability to perform its work. The investigation did find, however, that the SEC received more than ample information in the form of detailed and substantive complaints over the years to warrant a thorough and comprehensive examination and/or investigation of Bernard Madoff and BMIS for operating a Ponzi scheme. Had these efforts been made with appropriate follow-up at any time beginning in June 1992 until December 2008, the SEC could have uncovered the Ponzi scheme well before Madoff confessed. The OIG attributes these findings to systematic breakdowns in the manner in which the SEC conducted its examinations and investigation. For this reason, the OIG is issuing under separate cover two audit reports that provide the SEC with specific recommendations for improving how the SEC conducts its enforcement activities. Details: Washington, DC: Office of Investigations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2009. Source: Report No. OIG-509: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 124222 Keywords: Economics and CrimeFinancial Crimes, Madoff, BernardFraud |
Author: Cloud, Morgan Title: Law Deans in Jail Summary: A most unlikely collection of suspects - law schools, their deans, U.S. News & World Report and its employees - may have committed felonies by publishing false information as part of U.S. News' ranking of law schools. The possible federal felonies include mail and wire fraud, conspiracy, racketeering, and making false statements. Employees of law schools and U.S. News who committed these crimes can be punished as individuals, and under federal law the schools and U.S. News would likely be criminally liable for their agents' crimes. Some law schools and their deans submitted false information about the schools' expenditures and their students' undergraduate grades and LSAT scores. Others submitted information that may have been literally true but was misleading. Examples include misleading statistics about recent graduates' employment rates and students' undergraduate grades and LSAT scores. U.S. News itself may have committed mail and wire fraud. It has republished, and sold for profit, data submitted by law schools without verifying the data's accuracy, despite being aware that at least some schools were submitting false and misleading data. U.S. News refused to correct incorrect data and rankings errors and continued to sell that information even after individual schools confessed that they had submitted false information. In addition, U.S. News marketed its surveys and rankings as valid although they were riddled with fundamental methodological errors. Details: Social Science Research Network, 2012. 77p. Source: Working Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2012 at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2014157_code33010.pdf?abstractid=1990746&mirid=1 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2014157_code33010.pdf?abstractid=1990746&mirid=1 Shelf Number: 124396 Keywords: Colleges and UniversitiesEducationFraudMail FraudRacketeeringWire Fraud |
Author: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General Title: Medicaid Managed Care: Fraud and Abuse Concerns Remain Despite Safeguards Summary: We found that although managed care entities (MCE) and States are taking steps to address fraud and abuse in managed care, they remain concerned about their prevalence. States have increasingly adopted managed care in response to Medicaid expenditures, which have nearly doubled in the past decade. CMS requires MCEs to meet specific program integrity requirements as a condition for receiving payment. CMS also requires MCEs to disclose to States certain information, such as ownership and control. States are directly responsible for monitoring MCE operations. CMS's Medicaid Integrity Group (MIG) conducts program integrity reviews of States and MCEs. In 2000, CMS issued guidelines to States for addressing fraud and abuse in Medicaid managed care. The guidelines identified six areas of concern. We surveyed a purposive sample of 46 MCEs and received responses from 45. We conducted structured telephone interviews with the 13 States that contracted with those MCEs. We also reviewed MIG's files from its program integrity reviews of those 13 States and 46 MCEs. All MCEs in our sample reported taking steps to meet the Federal program integrity requirements. All 45 MCEs that responded to our questionnaire provided fraud and abuse safeguard training to their staffs in 2010. Most also reported offering such training to their providers. In 2009, 33 MCEs reported cases of suspected fraud and abuse to their State Medicaid agencies, and 20 MCEs recovered payments from providers that resulted from fraud and abuse. The 13 States in our sample reported taking steps to oversee MCEs' fraud and abuse safeguards. All 13 States conduct desk reviews of MCEs' compliance plans, and 11 States conduct onsite MCE reviews. All 13 States reported requiring that MCEs disclose ownership and control information. Eleven States hold recurring meetings with MCEs and often provide training. The primary concern about Medicaid managed care fraud and abuse-shared by MCEs and States-related to services billed but not received. The major concerns identified in our review largely fall under only one of the six areas included in CMS's 2000 guidelines. Managed care presents challenges in addressing fraud that differ from those in fee-for-service Medicaid. As States increasingly use managed care to deliver Medicaid services, implementing safeguards to protect against fraud and abuse remains essential. We recommend that CMS require that State contracts with MCEs include a method to verify with beneficiaries whether they received services billed by providers. CMS could require States to implement one of several options, such as for MCEs to send explanations of medical benefits to beneficiaries. We also recommend that CMS update guidance to reflect concerns expressed by MCEs and States. CMS could also share best practices and innovative methods that States and MCEs have used to address fraud and abuse concerns and strengthen program integrity oversight. CMS concurred with both recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, Department of Health & Human Services, 2011. 26p. Source: OEI-01-09-00550: Internet Resource: Accessed March 11, 2012 at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-09-00550.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-09-00550.pdf Shelf Number: 124465 Keywords: FraudHealth CareMedicaid |
Author: Cross, Cassandra Title: The Donald MacKay Churchill Fellowship to Study Methods for Preventing and Supporting of Victims of Online Fraud: Final Report Summary: Every day inboxes are being flooded with invitations to invest money in overseas schemes, notifications of overseas lottery wins and inheritances, as well as emails from banks and other institutions asking for customers to confirm information about their identity and account details. While these requests may seem outrageous, many believe the request to be true and respond, through the sending of money or personal details. This can have devastating consequences, financially, emotionally and physically. While enforcement action is important, greater success is likely to come in the area of prevention, which avoids victim losses in the first place. Considerable victim support is also required by victims who have suffered significant losses, in trying to get their lives back on track. This project examined fraud prevention strategies and support services for victims of online fraud across the United Kingdom, United States of America and Canada. While much work has already been undertaken in Queensland, there is considerable room for improvement and a great deal can be learnt from these overseas jurisdictions. There are several examples of innovative and effective responses, particularly in the area of victim support, that are highlighted throughout this report. It is advocated that Australia can continue to improve its position regarding the prevention and support of online fraud victims, by applying the knowledge and expertise learnt overseas to a local context. Details: Canberra City, Australia: Winston Churchill Memorial Trust, 2012. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2012 at: http://www.churchilltrust.com.au/site_media/fellows/2011_Cross_Cassandra.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.churchilltrust.com.au/site_media/fellows/2011_Cross_Cassandra.pdf Shelf Number: 124892 Keywords: Computer CrimesFraudInternet Fraud |
Author: Content First, LLC Title: Counterfeiting and Piracy in Brazil: The Economic Impact Summary: This report, commissioned by the Brazil-U.S. Business Council, reviews the economic costs of counterfeit and pirated goods for the Brazilian economy. Copies of software, compact discs, medicines, mobile phones, food and drink, car parts, tobacco products, and imitation designer fashions are sold every day in the huge Brazilian market of nearly 180 million consumers. New technology means that more goods than ever are vulnerable to copying. Counterfeiting and piracy hurt not only companies doing business in Brazil, but in turn, all Brazilians. Major industries, such as software and music, lose more than half of their sales to these illegal activities. Consequently, there are fewer jobs for Brazilians, the government collects less tax revenue, Brazilian consumers must pay higher prices for inferior products, and counterfeited products endanger the health and safety of consumers. Measuring the full economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy is hard because these activities are clandestine. Even the Brazilian government lacks official data on the economic damages caused by the sales of counterfeit or pirated goods. Despite these limitations, a review of the best available industry estimates indicates that at least $1.6 billion in sales are lost every year to counterfeiting and piracy. The copyright industry alone estimates yearly losses of nearly $800 million. Industry estimates also show that Brazil would net $500 million a year in lost cigarette tax revenue if counterfeiting or piracy were reduced or eliminated. The data developed for this report are based on a survey of major industry sectors, interviews with trade association representatives, and a review of existing reports and literature. Details: Washington, DC: Brazil-U.S. Business Council, 2004. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2012 at: http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/Counterfeiting_and_Piracy_in_Brazil%5B1%5D.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/Counterfeiting_and_Piracy_in_Brazil%5B1%5D.pdf Shelf Number: 124913 Keywords: CounterfeitingFraudIntellectual Property Rights (Brazil)Piracy (Copyright) |
Author: Australian Institute of Criminology Title: Serious and Organised Investment Fraud in Australia Summary: In 2011, Task Force Galilee was established to broaden the understanding of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud and to develop a national response. As at April 2012, the Task Force estimated that Australians’ losses to this type of fraud since January 2007 were in excess of A$113 million, with this figure likely to be conservative. During this period more than 2,600 Australians were victims of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud. These figures have largely been established as a result of intelligence analysis, and do not reflect the actual level of reporting by victims, which remains low. This report has been prepared to provide an insight into the nature and extent of this type of fraud as it currently affects Australia. Since the Task Force’s establishment, knowledge and understanding of Serious and Organised Investment Fraud has grown exponentially, and continues to do so. The information in this report is a compilation of the key characteristics identified via available literature and relevant Task Force member findings. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology and the Australian Crime Commission, 2012. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2012 at: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Galilee%202012/SOIFA_Report_040712.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Galilee%202012/SOIFA_Report_040712.pdf Shelf Number: 125962 Keywords: Economic CrimesFinancial Crimes (Australia)FraudWhite-Collar Crimes |
Author: Ponemon Institute Title: The Risk of Insider Fraud: U.S. Study of IT and Business Practitioners Summary: Ponemon Institute and Attachmate are pleased to present the results of The Risk of Insider Fraud. According to Ponemon Institute research, insider negligence and maliciousness can be one of the major causes of a costly and reputation damaging data breach. As reported in the Ponemon Institute’s most recent Cost of Data Breach study, malicious insiders cause 31 percent of all data breaches and the average cost of such a breach is $318 per lost record. We believe this study is important because it reveals how prevalent insider fraud is in the organizations we studied, the consequences of fraud and how much money is needed to reduce the risk. In our study, we defined insider fraud as the malicious or criminal attacks perpetrated upon business or governmental organizations by employees, temporary employees and contractors. Typically, the objective of such attacks is the theft of financial or information assets – which include customer data, trade secrets and intellectual properties. Sometimes the most dangerous insiders are those who possess strong IT skills or have access to your organization’s critical applications and data. Other risks with potentially severe consequences are the intentional or accidental data misuse or policy violation. The recent case involving a 31-year-old UBS trader illustrates how costly and potentially damaging to an organization’s reputation insider fraud can be. According to the Financial Times, Kweku Adoboli was charged with fraud by abuse of position and two counts of false accounting. The total loss to UBS as a result of his “unauthorized” activity is $2 billion. Using survey methods, we implemented an objective study about how highly experienced individuals in IT, security, compliance and other business fields deal with the risk of fraud perpetrated by malicious insiders. This study attempts to ascertain what these individuals perceive to be the most serious vulnerabilities in their organizations and how they can improve IT, governance and control practices that reduce fraud and ensure compliance with regulations. Our sample consists of 707 individuals (respondents) who have more than 10 years of experience and the vast majority is positioned at or above the manager level within their organizations. Sixty-two percent of respondents are in IT-related roles. While all respondents are located in the United States, many of their organizations are multinational or with operations in other countries. Details: Traverse City, MI: Ponemon Institute, 2011. 22p. Source: Ponemon Institute Research Report: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2012 at http://resources.idgenterprise.com/original/AST-0060002_Ponemon_2011_Insider_Fraud_Survey_Results.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://resources.idgenterprise.com/original/AST-0060002_Ponemon_2011_Insider_Fraud_Survey_Results.pdf Shelf Number: 126156 Keywords: Employee FraudFraudInformation TechnologyWorkplace Crime |
Author: Gregoriou, Greg N. Title: Madoff: A Riot of Red Flags Summary: For more than seventeen years, Bernard Madoff operated what was viewed as one of the most successful investment strategies in the world. This strategy ultimately collapsed in December 2008 in what financial experts are calling one of the most detrimental Ponzi schemes in history. Many large and otherwise sophisticated bankers, hedge funds, and funds of funds have been hit by his alleged fraud. In this paper, we review some of the red flags that any operational due diligence and quantitative analysis should have identified as a concern before investing. We highlight some of the salient operational features common to best-of-breed hedge funds, features that were clearly missing from Madoff’s operations. Details: Nice, France: EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research Centre, EDHEC Business School, 2009. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2012 at http://docs.edhec-risk.com/mrk/000000/Press/EDHEC_PP_Madoff_Riot_of_Red_Flags.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://docs.edhec-risk.com/mrk/000000/Press/EDHEC_PP_Madoff_Riot_of_Red_Flags.pdf Shelf Number: 126415 Keywords: Financial Crimes, Madoff, BernardFraudWhite Collar Crime |
Author: King, Chris Title: Spotlight On: Malicious Insiders and Organized Crime Activity Summary: The term organized crime brings up images of mafia dons, dimly lit rooms, and bank heists. The reality today is more nuanced; especially as organized crime groups have moved their activities online. This article focuses on a cross-section of CERT’s insider threat data, incidents consisting of 2 or more individuals involved in a crime. What we found is that insiders involved in organized crime caused more damage (approximately $3M per crime) and bypassed protections by involving multiple individuals in the crime. As organized crime has made its way online, it has become a significant source of fraud and embezzlement. Several recent news articles have raised awareness of this threat. The online crimes are often committed by individuals inside the organization who are attempting to bypass increasingly sophisticated fraud prevention controls. Analysis of multiple cases of insiders and organized crime has shown that the incidents fall into two primary categories: insiders either formed their own groups to bypass controls, or were recruited by established organized crime groups for a particular task in the commission of a crime. Details: Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute, 2012. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2012 at: www.cert.org/archive/pdf/12tn001.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126469 Keywords: CybercrimeEmbezzlementFraudInsider ThreatsOrganized Crime |
Author: Shimabukuro, Jon O. Title: Whistleblower Protections Under Federal Law: An Overview Summary: Legal protections for employees who report illegal misconduct by their employers have increased dramatically since the late 1970s when such protections were first adopted for federal employees in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Since that time, with the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Congress has expanded such protections for federal employees. Congress has also established whistleblower protections for individuals in certain private-sector employment through the adoption of whistleblower provisions in at least 18 federal statutes. Among these statutes is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). In general, claims for relief under the 18 federal statutes follow a similar pattern. Complaints are typically filed with the Secretary of Labor, and an investigation is conducted. Following the investigation, an order is issued by the Secretary, and a party aggrieved by the order is generally permitted to appeal the Secretary’s order to a federal court. However, because 18 different statutes are involved in prescribing whistleblower protections, some notable differences exist. For example, under the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1987, individuals employed by defense contractors who engage in whistleblowing activities file complaints with the Inspector General rather than the Secretary of Labor. Under some of the statutes, including the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, the Secretary’s preliminary order will become a final order if no objections are filed within a prescribed time period. This report provides an overview of key aspects of the 18 selected federal statutes applicable to individuals in certain private-sector industries. It focuses on the protections provided to employees who believe they have been subject to retaliation, rather than on how or where alleged misconduct should be disclosed. In addition, the report also includes an overview of the Whistleblower Protection Act. While state law may also provide whistleblower protections for employees, this report focuses only on the aforementioned federal statutory provisions. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R42727: Accessed October 1, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42727.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42727.pdf Shelf Number: 126532 Keywords: CorruptionFraudWhistleblowing (U.S.)Witness Protection |
Author: Bucy, Pamela H. Title: RICO Trends: From Gangsters to Class Actions Summary: This article addresses the question: why isn’t RICO used much? RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, both a crime and a civil cause of action, was passed in 1970 with much fanfare. The fanfare was deserved. RICO was an imaginative criminal justice initiative aimed at complex, systemic crime. RICO’s civil cause of action was viewed as a robust tool for plaintiffs and a vital supplement to strained law enforcement resources. After conducting an in-depth analysis of RICO opinions, reported and unreported, rendered by the federal appellate courts during the seven year time period from 2005-2011, this article has an answer to the question. Criminal RICO’s time has come and gone, but civil RICO’s potential has not yet been realized. This article focuses on recent developments in case law that make civil RICO with regard to class actions, and in the pharmaceutical fraud area, newly viable. The data analyzed in this article suggests that criminal RICO is anachronistic. Simpler, more streamlined statutes are now available to achieve, far more easily than RICO, the benefits RICO used to uniquely bestow: providing context for isolated acts, linking far-flung actors, penetrating organizations to reach key players, stiff sentences, obtaining forfeiture of property used to commit crime and reaped from crime. Civil RICO, on the other hand, is an untapped resource. Used properly, civil RICO is an optimal private attorney general tool and a boon for plaintiffs. This is true for two reasons. First, RICO mandates treble damages at a time when, because of court rulings and legislative actions, many plaintiffs are limited to little more than single damages. Second, in light of recent court rulings in RICO cases, RICO’s elements dovetail with class action requirements of commonality and predominance, making RICO class actions newly viable. This article proceeds in eight parts. Part I provides an overview of the RICO statute. Part II explains the methodology used to gather the data in this study. Part III discusses quantitative measurements from the data including how many RICO cases are decided each year and where they are brought. Part IV describes the types of RICO cases brought under both criminal and civil RICO provisions. Part V examines the issues that have dominated RICO court decisions from 2005-2011. Part V discusses how recent court decisions on issues of “enterprise,” proximate causation and “pattern” make civil RICO cases easier than ever to plead and prove. Part VI analyzes the outcome in RICO cases including who wins, who loses, and which circuits favor which side. Part VII focuses on RICO class actions discussing past and future trends, successes, and failures. Part VIII focuses on pharmaceutical fraud cases, noting why they are especially ripe for use of civil RICO. Details: Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama School of Law, 2012. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2179211: Accessed January 17, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179211 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179211 Shelf Number: 127282 Keywords: Business FraudFraudOrganized Crime (U.S.)Pharmaceutical FraudRacketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ActWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Button, Mark Title: Measuring Fraud in Overseas Aid: Options and Method Summary: This report seeks to identify and select an appropriate methodology to measure fraud losses in the different modalities of aid. It explores the experience of other countries, donors and multilateral bodies in measuring fraud in overseas aid and discovers little evidence that bilateral donors, multilateral agencies or UK NGOs use Fraud Loss Measurement Techniques (FLM) to assess fraud levels in their overseas aid budgets. Some governments and multilateral agencies find it useful to have large sampling exercises to collect measures of wider losses due to what they call ‘Improper Payments’ or some similar term. Reported figures vary widely from organisation to organisation and over time: e.g. the total estimated Improper Payments rate for USAID was reported as 0.85% in 2008 and 0.28% for 2009; but the estimated financial impact of irregularities on the budget of the European Anti Fraud Office OLAF rose from 1.13% in 2009 to 1.27% 2010. FLM-type exercises are used by government agencies such as the DWP, HMRC, the NHS and Medicare in the US. Again there is considerable variation between agencies and types of expenditure: the DWP estimated fraud rate varied from 0.0% for pensions to 4.1% for jobseekers allowance; the HMRC estimated a total ‘direct tax gap’ for 2009 at 5.8%; a recent NHS study highlighted a fraud loss rate of 4.7% for a medical locum agency’s invoicing: and the US Medicare reported 7.6% ‘Improper Payments’ in 2009. This report examines the potential for FLM exercises applied to the complex and challenging environment of overseas aid and aid modalities. It shows that FLM approaches, being rare in this context, would be difficult and expensive to apply to a bilateral donor complete budget. However, the report argues that there are elements of the a bilateral budget where FLM can be undertaken and with the development of fraud resilience checks and a fraud loss model much greater understanding of the risk of fraud in different contexts can be gauged. As a result the report concludes on the need to: • Recognise that FLM and the broader development of counter fraud capacity are a form of aid. • Reject attempts to measure total fraud in a ‘super measure’ on all the bilateral donor budget as this is too complex and expensive to achieve. • Seek to use FLM to measure fraud where this is practicable. Work should be focussed upon: the bilateral donor Administration, Direct Purchasing, Developing Countries’ government departments and NGOs receiving aid from the donor. • Carry out further work to: develop resilience checks for the overseas aid fraud context and to create models for predicting range of likely fraud losses. The report also notes the need for a political lead from the top of the bilateral aid donor that enhancing the resilience to fraud should be a condition of aid to governments and international agencies and that multilateral organisations should also move towards enhancing the resilience to fraud as a condition of their aid to countries and to NGOs. The report makes the following recommendations that Bilateral aid agencies: 1. Consider FLM and the broader development of counter fraud capacity as a form of aid. 2. Reject attempts to measure total fraud in its budget as this is too complex and expensive to achieve. 3. Seek to use FLM to measure fraud. These should be focussed upon: – Administration; – Direct Purchasing; – Countries’ government departments and NGOs receiving aid (number depending upon budget). 4. Carry out further work to: – Develop resilience check for overseas aid fraud context; – Create model for predicting range of likely fraud losses. Details: Portsmouth, UK: University of Portsmouth, Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, 2012. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/misc_gov/60908-DFID_FINAL_REPORT_March2012post_david.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/misc_gov/60908-DFID_FINAL_REPORT_March2012post_david.pdf Shelf Number: 128859 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesFraud |
Author: Snowdon, Christopher Title: Drinking in the Shadow Economy Summary: Executive summary: • One in ten bottles or cans of beer sold in the UK have not had duty paid on them and there are growing reports of counterfeit spirits being sold by licit and illicit retailers. HMRC seized almost ten million litres of non-duty paid alcohol in 2010/11, a rise of 30 per cent in two years. The UK loses more revenue from the cross-border movement of alcohol than any other EU state. The aim of this paper is to identify the factors that encourage the production, distribution and purchasing of alcohol in the shadow economy. • Unrecorded alcohol encompasses smuggled alcohol, commercially manufactured counterfeit alcohol, domestic brewing and distilling, surrogate alcohol, alcohol fraud and cross-border shopping. Failing to deal with alcohol’s shadow economy threatens not only the public finances, but also public health and public order. Counterfeit spirits and surrogate alcohol frequently contain dangerous levels of methanol, isopropanol and other chemicals which cause toxic hepatitis, blindness and death. Alcohol smuggling and counterfeiting is linked to other illegal activities, including drug smuggling, prostitution, violence, money-laundering and terrorism. • Factors which lead to shadow economic activity include high taxes and social security payments, low tax morale, complex tax systems, low Gross Domestic Product, weak institutions and corruption. Evidence shows that the illicit alcohol market is also closely associated with high taxes, corruption and poverty. The affordability of alcohol appears to be the key determinant behind the supply and demand for smuggled and counterfeit alcohol. Affordability is low in some countries due to low incomes (e.g. Eastern Europe) and in others because of high alcohol duty (e.g. Scandinavia). The price of alcohol in neighbouring markets also influences rates of unofficial consumption. • Demand for alcohol is relatively inelastic and drinkers have a series of options available to them when real prices increase. They can do as the government hopes and drink less, but they can also do any of the following: (1) make savings elsewhere in the household budget, (2) switch from the on-trade to the off-trade, (3) downshift to cheaper drinks, (4) shop abroad, (5) brew or distil their own alcohol, (6) buy counterfeit or smuggled alcohol, and finally (7) buy surrogate alcohol (e.g. methanol, antifreeze, aftershave). The extent to which consumption patterns change depends on personal income and the affordability of alcohol. • Our analysis indicates that the affordability of alcohol does not have a strong effect on how much alcohol is consumed. Once unrecorded alcohol is included in the estimates, it can be seen that countries with the least affordable alcohol have the same per capita alcohol consumption rates as those with the most affordable alcohol. • Alcohol duty provides significant income to European governments, but maximising these revenues carries significant risks in terms of health, crime and secondary poverty. Lessons can be learnt from countries which have low rates of unrecorded alcohol. We conclude that economic prosperity, moderate taxation and minimal corruption are essential for a country to minimise the size the alcohol black market. Without these preconditions, efforts to tackle the illicit alcohol supply through education, deterrence and enforcement are unlikely to succeed. Details: London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: IEA Discussion paper no. 43: Accessed June 5, 2013 at: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/drinking-in-the-shadow-economy Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/drinking-in-the-shadow-economy Shelf Number: 128964 Keywords: Alcohol IndustryBusiness CrimesCommercial CrimesFraudIllegal Alcohol SalesShadow EconomyTax Evasion |
Author: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Title: Targeting Scams: Report of the ACCC on Scam Activity 2012 Summary: Scam reports •• In 2012 the ACCC continued to observe a high level of scams activity in Australia, with 83 803 scam-related contacts received from consumers and small businesses. •• Estimated scam losses reported to the ACCC totalled $93 423 030, a nine per cent increase from 2011. Actual losses are likely to be higher as many scams go unreported and the ACCC is only one of several agencies that receive scam reports. •• Similar to 2011, the majority of consumers and small businesses contacting the ACCC about scam-related activities in 2012 (nearly 88 per cent) reported no financial loss. The most common category of loss was again between $100 to $499. This indicates the continued use of ‘high volume scams’, which are delivered to large numbers of recipients but cause smaller amounts of loss per victim. At the same time, the ACCC continued to receive reports of individuals suffering very high losses. Most reported scams •• For the fourth consecutive year, advance fee/up-front payment scams were the most commonly reported scam type, constituting 32 per cent of all scam contacts. •• Computer hacking remained the second most reported scam type in 2012, representing just over 13 per cent of total scam reports to the ACCC. The ‘Microsoft’ computer virus scam continued to heavily target Australians. The public was also targeted by a scareware scam where the perpetrators pretended to be from the Australian Federal Police. •• Online shopping scams increased by 65 per cent with reported financial losses totalling $4 038 479. •• The ACCC also received a high level of contacts about banking and online account scams, false billing, job and employment scams, dating and romance, and unexpected prize scams. Age range and location demographics •• In 2012 scams were most commonly reported by persons in the 35 to 44 age category, representing 32 per cent of contacts. This saw a shift from the previous year, where contacts were spread across a wider range of age from 25 through to 54 years. •• The greatest amounts of scam reports to the ACCC came from New South Wales (23.5 per cent), Queensland (21 per cent), Victoria (18 per cent) and South Australia (12.5 per cent). Scam delivery method •• Scams delivered via telephone (landline and mobile) remained the preferred delivery method in 2012, with combined voice and text message scams constituting over half (56 per cent) of all reports to the ACCC. Unsolicited telephone calls represented just over 42 per cent (35 419) of contacts reported to the ACCC, accounting for $24 213 979 in reported losses. Scams delivered via SMS represented over 14 per cent (11 797) of total contacts and $759 986 in reported losses. Details: Canberra: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2013. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 10, 2013 at: http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=1117162&nodeId=18648488db8502f9c2a254d931814e39&fn=Targeting%20scams:%20Report%20of%20the%20ACCC%20on%20scam%20activity%20in%202012.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=1117162&nodeId=18648488db8502f9c2a254d931814e39&fn=Targeting%20scams:%20Report%20of%20the%20ACCC%20on%20scam%20activity%20in%202012.pdf Shelf Number: 129358 Keywords: Consumer Protection and FraudFraudScams |
Author: Internet Crime Complaint Center Title: Internet Crime Report: 2012 Summary: Now in its 13th year of operation, the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has firmly established its role as a valuable resource for both victims of Internet crime and the law enforcement agencies investigating and prosecuting these crimes. For the victims, the IC3 provides a convenient and easy-to-use reporting mechanism that alerts authorities to suspected criminal violations. For law enforcement agencies, the IC3 serves as a conduit to receive Internet-related complaints, to conduct research related to them and to develop analytical reports based on them for state, local, federal, tribal or international law enforcement and/or regulatory agencies. These agencies then develop investigations based on the forwarded information, as appropriate. In 2012, the IC3 received 289,874 consumer complaints with an adjusted dollar loss of $525,441,1101, which is an 8.3-percent increase in reported losses since 2011. In recognition of this increase, the IC3 expanded its efforts to inform the general public about online scams by publishing several public service announcements and providing additional tips for Internet consumers. Details: Washington, DC(?): Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2013 at: http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2012_IC3Report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2012_IC3Report.pdf Shelf Number: 131646 Keywords: Computer CrimesFraudInternet Crimes |
Author: Chilton, Bart Title: Ponzimonium: How Scam Artists are Ripping Off America Summary: In December of 2008, the world learned that legendary investment guru Bernard Madoff made-off with an estimated $50 billion in what was called the Mother of all Ponzi Schemes. Ponzi schemes, named after Charles Ponzi, are scams in which early investors are given sup-posed returns paid through funds provided by later investors. Typically, an investment is made and then some profits are paid out, prompting the investor to assume that his or her money has increased in value. In actuality, the perpetrators of these schemesPonzi, Madoff, or the others described in this booktake the money for themselves. The legal term for this kind of taking is misappropriation. As new investors enter the fraud, supposed returns are offered continually to initial investors, and many times are accompanied by fake account statements. This continues until new money stops flowing in and the investors want their money back. During the 2008 economic downturn, people needed their money back at the same time that there were no new investors. Many house of cards scams have fallen and the perpetrators of the swindles have been caught. Charles Ponzi ran these types of scams in the U.S. until he was deported to Italy, his birth-place, in 1934 as an undesirable alien. Many think that one would have to be foolish to invest in such a scam, but Madoff and other such folks are good at their craft. They often put on a great false front, even fooling the master of illusion, movie director Steven Spielberg. But Spielberg wasn't alone. Even banks we assume would undertake due diligence before funds were invested got caught in Madoff's web. Investors included Austrian, British, Dutch, Swiss, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish banks. Larry King and the owner of the New York Mets, Fred Wilpon, were duped, as was former LA Dodgers pitcher, Sandy Koufax. Actors Kevin Bacon, Kyra Sedgwick, John Malkovich, and Zsa Zsa Gabor, as well as New York University and New York Law School, a union's health care fund, several trusts, endowments, and non-profits such as the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity made the widely publicized victims list. Even the International Olympic Committee wasn't immune from the Madoff scam. While this may have been the largest swindle ever, scores and scores of Ponzis of all sizes and values continue to be unearthed. There have never been more of these scams, and they are occurring all over the world. That's why this publication is called Ponzimonium. The cases described here are just as damaging to the victims as the Madoff scam, and many of them are every bit as complicated and seemingly authentic. Meanwhile, Madoff traded his Manhattan penthouse for a jail cell for the next 150 years, but the damage he did to those he took advantage of cannot be repaired. Their story and others provide an instructive window into how these schemes operate and how to avoid becoming a Ponzi scheme victim. Details: Washington, DC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2011. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2014 at: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/sites/default/files/files/Ebooks/Ponzimonium_PDF.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://bookstore.gpo.gov/sites/default/files/files/Ebooks/Ponzimonium_PDF.pdf Shelf Number: 131862 Keywords: Financial CrimesFraudPonzi SchemesScams |
Author: Australian Crime Commission Title: Organised Crime in Australia 2013 Summary: The Organised Crime in Australia 2013 report provides the most comprehensive contemporary profile of serious and organised crime in Australia. The report provides the context in which organised crime operates in Australia and gives an overview of each of the key illicit markets and the activities which fundamentally enable serious and organised crime. The report provides government, industry and the public with information they need to better respond to the threat of organised crime, now and into the future. Organised Crime in Australia is an unclassified version of the Australian Crime Commission's Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) which is part of the Picture of Criminality in Australia suite of products. The OCTA is a classified assessment of the level of risk posed by various organised crime threats, categorised by activity, market and enabler. Details: Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2014. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 8, 2014 at: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/ACC%20OCA%202013-1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/ACC%20OCA%202013-1.pdf Shelf Number: 132047 Keywords: FraudIllegal GoodsMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime |
Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Identity Crime and Misuse in Australia: Results of the 2013 Online Survey Summary: Identity crime and misuse of personal information affect all sectors in Australia and cost individuals, business and government many millions of dollars annually. In the public sector, the misuse of personal information has been recognised in income tax evasion, customs duty and GST fraud, superannuation fraud, obtaining welfare and health care benefit fraud achieved through the use of false names, immigration fraud and taking English language tests (a key requirement for visas) for someone else. In the private sector, the problem areas have been identified as opening bank accounts in false names to obtain finance, ATM fraud, online and mobile banking and payment card fraud, funds transfer fraud, and securities and investment fraud. In addition to these and other financial crime risks, misuse of identity can also arise in connection with violent crime, such as where individuals have sought to avoid detection and prosecution for murder, robbery and acts of terrorism by pretending to be someone else. In May 2013, in order to explore the nature and scope of identity crime and misuse in Australia, the Australian Institute of Criminology was commissioned by the Attorney-General's Department to undertake a national survey. This project is one of a series of initiatives that are being implemented as part of the National Identity Security Strategy, Australia's national response to enhancing identity security, which seeks to prevent identity crime and misuse, contribute to national security and facilitate the benefits of the digital economy. Subsequently, the Australian Institute of Criminology used an online research panel to generate a sample of 5,000 Australians aged 15 years and over to measure personal experiences of identity crime. The survey covered the number of contacts, responses and victimisation incidents experienced, as well as financial loss and other impacts, reporting and response activities, and victims' perceptions of changing levels of risk. Detailed demographic information was also collected that enabled profiles of victims to be created. This report presents the results of the survey. The findings confirm prior research that has found that identity crime affects a relatively high proportion of Australians who report substantial financial and other impacts. Raising awareness of the risks that individuals face, and gathering sound statistical data on the problem, is an effective way to address the problem. In order to monitor changes from year to year in the nature and extent of identity crime, it is proposed that this survey will be replicated on a regular basis. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2014. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series 128: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/128/rpp128.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/128/rpp128.pdf Shelf Number: 132240 Keywords: Computer CrimesDigital CrimesFinancial CrimesFraudIdentity Theft |
Author: Simpson, Sally S. Title: Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review Summary: BACKGROUND Corporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective strategies to prevent and control it. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite's definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is "the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law." Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance. OBJECTIVES Our overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategiesi.e., the actions and programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate crime. We then assess the impact of these strategies on individual and company offending. Included are legal and administrative interventions such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non-punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES We were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: experimental (e.g., lab studies or vignette surveys), quasi-experimental (e.g., pre/post-tests), and non-experimental (e.g., correlational statistics using secondary data). The studies included also contained a wide variety of data (e.g., data from official agencies, corporate reports, individuals' survey responses, etc.). Our search included published and unpublished articles, reports, documents, and other readily available sources. The outcome of interest, corporate offending, could reflect actual behavior or behavioral intentions as reported by respondents. Out of the 40 possible treatment categories, we were able to calculate a mean effect size for 19. Although most showed a positive albeit non-significant treatment effect, some (including a significant effect) were iatrogenic. Looking at the specific mechanisms, the impact of law on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and geographical level of analysis (there was not enough data to calculate effect sizes for individuals). However, this finding is limited to cross-sectional studies. For punitive sanctions, where there was substantially more data from which to calculate effect sizes, we observe a similar pattern: A tendency toward deterrence across units of analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether data are cross-sectional or longitudinal. The one area where there appears to be a consistent treatment effect is in the area of regulatory policy, but only at the individual level. Effects for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and others iatrogenic) and none are statistically significant. Regarding moderator effects, the least methodologically rigorous designs those that were not experimental versus experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls were associated with a treatment effect. We also found that older studies were associated with stronger deterrent effectsperhaps because the older studies are less methodologically rigorous that those that are newer. Other moderator results were less clear (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; offense type), but given how few of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall we think it is premature to draw any conclusions from these findings and call instead for more methodologically rigorous and focused studies particularly in the punitive sanction and regulatory policy areas. Details: Oslo: Campbell Collaboration, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Campbell Systematic Review 2014:4: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/199/ Shelf Number: 132243 Keywords: Corporate CrimeCrime PreventionDeterrenceFinancial CrimeFraudWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Business, Corruption and Crime in Albania: The impact of bribery and other crime on private enterprise Summary: This survey of private businesses in Albania reveals that corruption and other forms of crime are a great hindrance to private enterprise and have a negative effect on private investment. A significant percentage of businesses pay bribes to public officials repeatedly over the course of the year. Businesses in the Accommodation and Transportation sectors are those most affected by bribery, followed by businesses in the Construction sector. The public officials with the highest risk of bribery in interactions with businesses are police officers, customs officers, tax/revenues officers, municipal or provincial officers and land registry officers. While indicators of corruption perceptions are undoubtedly useful for raising awareness, this survey measures the actual experience of corruption and crime through representative sample surveys of businesses in order to provide a more realistic, evidence-based assessment of corruption and crime affecting the business sector. In so doing it focuses on the extent and pattern of bribery by businesses from five different sectors (accounting for over 83.5 per cent of all businesses in Albania) in their frequent interactions with the public administration. According to the survey, of all the businesses that had contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the survey 15.7 per cent paid a bribe to a public official. The average prevalence of business bribery in Albania is slightly lower than the share of ordinary citizens (19.3 per cent) who experienced the same in UNODC's 2011 general population survey. The examination of the experience of businesses that pay bribes to public officials underlines the fact that corruption plays a role in the daily business of many companies. Bribe-paying businesses pay an average of 4.6 bribes per year, or about one bribe every eleven weeks. The prevalence of bribery is higher among small (10 to 49 employees) businesses than among businesses of other sizes. Half of all the bribes paid to public officials by businesses in Albania are paid in cash (50 per cent), followed by the giving of food and drink (24.4 per cent) in exchange for an illicit "favour" by the public official and the provision of other goods not produced by the company (22.8 per cent). When bribes are paid in cash, the mean amount paid per bribe is 53,000 Lek, or the equivalent of 904 EUR-PPP. As for which party actually broaches the subject of kickbacks, in 22.7 per cent of all bribery cases the payment of a bribe is offered by a representative of the business without a prior request being made, whereas in almost two thirds (63.6 per cent) of cases payment is either explicitly (17.1 per cent) or implicitly (38.2 per cent) requested by the public official or paid after a third-party request (8.3 per cent). The most common purposes for paying bribes cited by businesses is to "speed up business-related procedures" (39.1 per cent of all bribes), "making the finalization of a procedure possible" (16.8 per cent), "receiving better treatment" (7.2 per cent), "reducing the cost of a procedure" (6.6 per cent) and "receiving information" (2.8 per cent). At the same time, almost one out of seven (13.5 per cent) bribes paid serve no specific immediate purpose for the businesses paying them, suggesting that these are "sweeteners" given to public officials to "groom" them for future interactions in the interest of the company. Only 2.2 per cent of the businesses who paid bribes had reported bribery incidents in the 12 months prior to the survey to official authorities in Albania, which suggests that businesses often feel obliged to participate in bribery. This is also reflected in the main reasons cited for not reporting bribery: "giving gifts to public officials is common practice" (36.2 per cent) and "it is pointless to report it as nobody would care" (23.6 per cent). Bribery in the private sector not only comprises bribes paid by businesses to public officials, it also takes place between businesses themselves in order to secure business transactions. Though lower than the prevalence of bribery between the private and public sector, at 3.7 per cent the prevalence of business-to-business bribery indicates that the practice does exist in Albania. This type of corruption is not to be confused with normal marketing or public relations activities, in that it specifically aims, through illegal means, to breach the integrity of the bribe-taker in exchange for a bribe. Less than 0.1 per cent of bribe-paying bribes in the survey reported such business-to business bribery incidents to relevant authorities. Some 3.3 per cent of business representatives decided not to make a major investment in the 12 months prior to the survey due to the fear of having to pay bribes to obtain requisite services or permits, thus the impact of bribery on business activity can be substantial. The consequences of other more conventional crimes on a business's property and economic activities can also be considerable, both in terms of direct costs stemming from physical damage and indirect costs in the form of insurance premiums, security expenditure and lost investment opportunities. For instance, 5.8 per cent of businesses in Albania fall victim to burglary in a year and such businesses are victimized an average of 1.9 times in that period. The annual prevalence rate for fraud by outsiders (4.8 per cent) in the private sector is also significant, as is the average number of times businesses affected fall victim to this crime (2.8). The prevalence rate of vandalism is 1.6 per cent, with businesses being victimized an average of 1.6 times a year. In addition, the prevalence rate of motor vehicle theft (MVT) is 0.5 per cent of all car owning businesses, with victims suffering an average of 1.6 incidents. Moreover, over the past 12 months 0.5 per cent of all businesses in Albania fell victim to extortion, a crime that can be linked to organized criminal groups. In marked contrast to corruption, a larger share of conventional crimes (on average, 49.3 per cent for five crime types) is reported to the police by businesses in Albania. While the majority of business representatives (67.7 per cent) consider that the crime risk for their company has remained stable in comparison to the previous 12 months, around one in twelve (8.6 per cent) think it is on the increase and 19.5 per cent on the decrease. The fear of crime plays an important role in the decision-making process of business leaders when it comes to making major investments. Although there are some differences by economic sector, on average 4.4 per cent of the entrepreneurs in Albania state that they did not make a major investment in the previous 12 months due to the fear of crime. Yet while about 88.8 per cent of businesses in Albania use at least one protective security system against crime, only 18.5 per cent have any kind of insurance against the economic cost of crime. Together corruption and other forms of crime place a considerable burden on economic development in Albania. Putting in place more and better targeted measures for protecting businesses against crimes, as well as for preventing corruption (such as effective internal compliance measures and other policies concerning corruption) could make that burden considerably lighter. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2014. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2014 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Albania_Business_Corruption_2013_EN.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Albania URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Albania_Business_Corruption_2013_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 132258 Keywords: Bribes Crimes Against Businesses Financial CrimesFraudMotor Vehicle TheftPublic Corruption |
Author: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Title: Targeting Scams: Report of the ACCC on Scams Activity 2013 Summary: This report explains key trends in scam activity and highlights the impact of scams on the community. It highlights the cooperative work of the ACCC, other regulators and law enforcement agencies to disrupt scams and educate consumers. Overall contacts levels and financial losses - In 2013 the ACCC continued to observe a high level of scams activity in Australia, with 91 927 scam-related contacts received from consumers and small businesses, an increase of nearly 10 per cent over 2012. - Estimated scam losses reported to the ACCC totalled $89 136 975, representing an almost 5 per cent decrease from 2012 ($93 423 030) - a reversal in trend from 2011 and 2012 where large increases were observed. However, actual losses are likely to be higher as many scams go unreported and the ACCC is only one of several agencies that receive scam reports. Most reported scams - In 2013 dating and romance scams moved to number one position in terms of financial losses, with $25 247 418 reported lost. For the third consecutive year the ACCC has observed a decrease in the conversion rate of people who responded to an approach by a scam admirer and subsequently lost money - from 48 per cent in 2011 to 46 per cent in 2012 to 43 per cent in 2013. However, financial losses continue to remain substantially disproportionate to contacts, with dating and romance scams making up only 3 per cent of all scam-related contacts in 2013. - Similar to previous years, the majority of people contacting the ACCC about scam-related activities in 2013 (slightly over 86 per cent) reported no financial loss. Nearly one third of people who lost money reported losing between $100 and $499, which indicates scammers continuing to prefer 'high volume scams' - that is, scams that are delivered to large numbers of recipients but cause smaller amounts of loss per victim. - At the same time, the ACCC continued to receive reports of individuals suffering significant losses. Over 10 per cent of scam contacts reported losing above $10 000. However, there were only two reports of losses above $1 million in 2013 compared to six reports in 2012. - In 2013 the top 10 scams reported to the ACCC in terms of contact levels remained the same with some minor movements in ranking. The three most commonly reported scams were advance-fee fraud, phishing and identity theft, and computer hacking scams. - The ACCC observed a significant increase in phishing and identity theft scams, with reports increasing by over 73 per cent from 2012 to 15 264 contacts. Actual financial losses remained low, suggesting that scammers are instead seeking personal information for later gain. - Computer prediction software scams saw a significant increase in both contacts and financial losses from the previous year, with an increase of 41 per cent in contact levels and associated losses more than doubling to a total of $9 144 288. This increase is likely attributable to a collapsed gambling system in Victoria, which received widespread media coverage. Age range and location demographics - In 2013, of all individuals who contacted the ACCC and provided their age, scams were most commonly reported by persons in the 45 to 54 age category. The percentage of reports from people who identified as 65 years and over nearly doubled to 18 per cent. - The greatest amount of scam reports came from New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Contact levels and associated losses were largely consistent with the percentage of the Australian population by state and territory. - At the end of 2013 the ACCC updated its data collection process and in 2014 will be able to analyse scam categories against new fields such as a victim's gender, whether they are a small business, or may be disadvantaged or vulnerable. Scam delivery method - In line with a shift in recent years, in 2013 over half (52 per cent) of scams were delivered via phone and text message, with combined total financial losses of $29 391 887. Telephone calls remained the most popular delivery method, with reports and losses rising in parallel by nearly 13 and 14 per cent respectively, and losses totalling $3 335 763. Scams delivered by text message decreased by around 35 per cent, while reported losses more than doubled to $1 848 805. - Despite representing a lower percentage of contacts (40 per cent), scams delivered online caused the greatest financial harm with associated losses totalling $41 781 071. While contacts of reports delivered via email increased by nearly 14 per cent, financial losses almost halved (49 per cent), which could indicate scammers using email to 'fish' for personal information but turning to other online communication platforms such as social networking sites for monetary gain. The ACCC's education and awareness raising activities - The ACCC continued to educate the public about how to identify and avoid scams, and raise community awareness about current scams targeting Australians. SCAMwatch, the Australian Government's website for information about scams that is run by the ACCC, received 1 228 599 unique visitors in 2013, an increase of over 26 per cent from the previous year. - The ACCC also continued to issue SCAMwatch radar alerts to its free subscription base, which in 2013 increased by 30 per cent to reach 29 150 subscribers. A total of 18 SCAMwatch alerts were issued warning about current scams, including joint radars issued with other government agencies and companies about scammers misusing consumer trust in these well-known entities. - The ACCC's SCAMwatch_gov Twitter profile also continued to communicate with its 4374 followers in real time as scams emerged, with 583 tweets posted during the year. - The 2013 National Consumer Fraud Week campaign, 'Outsmart the scammers!' (17-23 June), received significant media coverage as the ACCC and the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce urged people to stay one click ahead of scammers when shopping online. - The Little Black Book of Scams is the ACCC's most popular publication and 91 203 copies were distributed in 2013. A new small business scams factsheet was also produced. The ACCC's collaboration, disruption and enforcement activities - In 2013 the ACCC worked with a range of private and public sector representatives to disrupt scams including online shopping scams and the 'Yellow Pages' small business scam. - The ACCC continued to chair the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce, and hosted a conference and workshop as part of National Consumer Fraud Week where representatives across government, industry and academia explored how to minimise scams activity in the digital economy. - The ACCC successfully prosecuted the perpetrators behind schemes targeting small businesses including the operators of a pyramid selling scheme, an online business directory scam with a philanthropic slant, and an office supply scheme. - The ACCC also commenced planning for a national disruption project aimed at relationship scams, which is a 2014 compliance and enforcement priority. The ACCC will work closely with other agencies on this project, building upon previous work undertaken to disrupt relationship scams. Details: Canberra: ACCC, 2014. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Targeting%20Scams%202013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 132658 Keywords: Consumer Protection and FraudCrimes Against BusinessFinancial CrimesFraudScams |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Identity Theft: Additional Actions Could Help IRS Combat the Large, Evolving Threat of Refund Fraud Summary: Identity theft tax refund fraud is a persistent, evolving threat to honest taxpayers and tax administration. It occurs when an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund. GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the first of a series, examines (1) what IRS knows about the extent of IDT refund fraud and (2) additional actions IRS can take to combat IDT refund fraud using third-party information from, for example, employers and financial institutions. To understand what is known about the extent of IDT refund fraud, GAO reviewed IRS documentation, including the Identity Theft Taxonomy. To identify additional actions IRS can take, GAO assessed IRS and SSA data on the timing of W-2s; and interviewed SSA officials and selected associations representing software companies, return preparers, payroll companies, and others. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that Congress should consider providing Treasury with authority to lower the annual threshold for e-filing W-2s. In addition, IRS should fully assess the costs and benefits of shifting W-2 deadlines, and provide this information to Congress. IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, and it stated it is determining how these potential corrective actions align with available resources and IRS priorities. Details: Washington, GAO, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-633: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665368.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665368.pdf Shelf Number: 133415 Keywords: Financial CrimesFraudIdentity Theft (U.S.)Taxes |
Author: KPMG Title: Global profiles of the fraudster: White-collar crime -- present and future Summary: Fraud specialists have long debated whether it is possible to develop a profile of a fraudster that is accurate enough to enable organizations to catch people in the act of fraud or even beforehand. The prediction of a crime before it occurs is, at least for now, the subject of science fiction. But an analysis of the constantly changing nature of fraud and the fraudster can help organizations stiffen their defenses against these criminal activities. Forewarned is forearmed. Global profiles of the fraudster contains KPMG International's analysis of 596 fraudsters member firms investigated between 2011 and 2013 with insights into the relationship between the attributes of fraudsters, their motivations and the environments in which they flourish. KPMG International gathered data from fraud investigations conducted by KPMG member firms' forensic specialists in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMA), the Americas, and Asia-Pacific regions between August 2011 and February 2013. The survey examined 'white-collar' crime investigations conducted across the three regions where we were able to identify the perpetrator and could provide detailed contextual information on the crime. We have developed a series of themes in order to understand the changing relationship among the fraudster, his/her environment and the frauds committed. And after taking into account the insights of our investigation leaders around the world, we conclude that the type of fraud and the type of fraudster are continually changing. Details: Zurich, SWIT: KPMG, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster/Documents/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster-v2.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster/Documents/global-profiles-of-the-fraudster-v2.pdf Shelf Number: 133560 Keywords: Crimes Against BusinessesFinancial CrimesFraudWhite-Collar CrimeWhite-Collar Offenses |
Author: Wolfe, Simon Title: Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries: Priorities for Action Summary: Background The G20 countries committed in 2010 and 2012 to put in place adequate measures to protect whistleblowers, and to provide them with safe, reliable avenues to report fraud, corruption and other wrongdoing. While much has been achieved as a result of the G20 commitment, on the whole much remains to be done to meet this important goal. Many G20 countries' whistleblower protection laws continue to fail to meet international standards, and fall significantly short of best practice. Lacking strong legal protections, government and corporate employees who report wrongdoing to their managers or to regulators can face dismissal, harassment and other forms of retribution. With employees deterred from coming forward, government and corporate misconduct can be perpetuated. Serious wrongdoing such as corruption, fraud, financial malpractice, public health threats, unsafe consumer products and environmental damage can persist without remedy. Objective This report analyses the current state of whistleblower protection rules in each of the G20 countries, applying to the identification of wrongdoing in both the public and private sectors. It is the first independent evaluation of G20 countries' whistleblowing laws for both the private and public sectors, having been researched by an international team of experts drawn from civil society and academia. While G20 countries do self-reporting on implementation, to date this reporting has been "broad brush", and tends towards a more flattering and less useful picture of progress than may really be the case. By contrast, this report uses recognised principles to provide a more in-depth picture of the state of progress, and whether a case for continued high-level cooperation remains. Each country's laws were assessed against a set of 14 criteria (see Table below), developed from five internationally recognised sets of whistleblower principles for best legislative practice. The report is based on a public consultation draft released in June 2014. Earlier draft findings and the consultation draft were distributed to a wide range of experts and whistleblowing-related NGOs in G20 countries. The consultation draft was also submitted to all G20 governments for comment, through the T20 (Think20) engagement group and the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. This report only analyses the content of laws related to whistleblower protection in each country. This written law is only part of what is necessary to ensure those who reveal wrongdoing are protected in practice, with actual implementation of any law representing a different and ongoing challenge for G20 countries. We stress that positive assessment of the presence and comprehensiveness of legal provisions in this report is not a measure of the extent or quality of actual whistleblower protection in any country. Further, in countries with lower scores, there may be cultural or other norms that in fact indirectly assist in practical protection of whistleblowers. Details: Blueprint for Free Speech, 2014. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf Shelf Number: 133609 Keywords: Corporate CrimeCorruptionFinancial CrimesFraudWhistleblower Law and LegislationWhistleblower ProtectionWhistleblowers (International) |
Author: Gamble, Keith Jacks Title: The Causes and Consequences of Financial Fraud Among Older Americans Summary: Financial fraud is a major threat to older Americans, and this problem is expected to grow as the baby boom generation retires and more retirees manage their own retirement accounts. We use a unique dataset to examine the causes and consequences of financial fraud among older Americans. First, we find that decreasing cognition is associated with higher scam susceptibility scores and is predictive of fraud victimization. Second, overconfidence in ones financial knowledge is associated with fraud victimization. Third, fraud victims increase their willingness to take financial risks relative to propensity-matched non-victims. Details: Boston: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, 2014. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: CRR SP 2014-13: Accessed February 19, 2015 at: http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/wp_2014-13.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/wp_2014-13.pdf Shelf Number: 134653 Keywords: Elderly Victims Financial Crimes (U.S.) Fraud |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Whistleblower Protection; Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOJ's Handling of FBI Retaliation Complaints Summary: The Department of Justice (DOJ) closed 44 of the 62 (71 percent) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whistleblower retaliation complaints we reviewed within 1 year, took up to 4 years to close 15 complaints, and took up to 10.6 years to close the remaining 3. DOJ terminated 55 of the 62 complaints (89 percent) and awarded corrective action for 3. (Complainants withdrew 4.) We found that DOJ terminated many (48 of 62) complaints we reviewed because they did not meet certain regulatory requirements. For example, DOJ terminated at least 17 complaints in part because a disclosure was made to someone in the employee's chain of command or management, such as a supervisor, who was not one of the nine high-level FBI or DOJ entities designated under DOJ regulations to receive such disclosures. Unlike employees of other executive branch agencies, FBI employees do not have a process to seek corrective action if they experience retaliation based on a disclosure of wrongdoing to their supervisors or others in their chain of command who are not designated officials. This difference is due, in part, to DOJ's decisions about how to implement the statute governing FBI whistleblowers. In 2014, DOJ reviewed its regulations and, in an effort to balance competing priorities, recommended adding more senior officials in FBI field offices to the list of designated entities, but did not recommend adding all supervisors. DOJ cited a number of reasons for this, including concerns about the additional resources and time needed to handle a possible increase in complaints if DOJ added supervisors. However, DOJ is already taking other steps to improve the efficiency of the complaint process. More importantly, dismissing retaliation complaints made to an employee's supervisor or someone in that person's chain of command leaves some FBI whistleblowers - such as the 17 complainants we identified - without protection from retaliation. By dismissing potentially legitimate complaints in this way, DOJ could deny some whistleblowers access to recourse, permit retaliatory activity to go uninvestigated, and create a chilling effect for future whistleblowers. We also found that DOJ and FBI guidance is not always clear that FBI employees reporting alleged wrongdoing to a supervisor or someone in their chain of command may not be a protected disclosure. Ensuring that guidance always clearly explains to whom an FBI employee can report wrongdoing will help FBI whistleblowers ensure that they are fully protected from retaliation. DOJ took from 2 to 10.6 years to resolve the 4 complaints we reviewed that DOJ adjudicated, and DOJ did not provide complainants with estimates of when to expect DOJ decisions throughout the complaint process. Providing such estimates would enhance accountability to complainants and provide additional assurance about DOJ management's commitment to improve efficiency. Further, DOJ offices responsible for investigating whistleblower retaliation complaints have not consistently complied with certain regulatory requirements, such as obtaining complainants' approvals for extensions of time. One investigating office does not track investigators' compliance with specific regulatory requirements and does not have a formal oversight mechanism to do so. Effectively monitoring investigators' compliance with such requirements could help assure complainants that their cases are making progress and that they have the information they need to determine next steps for their complaints. Why GAO Did This Study Whistleblowers help safeguard the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse - however, they also risk retaliation by their employers. For example, in 2002, a former FBI agent alleged she suffered retaliation after disclosing that colleagues had stolen items from Ground Zero following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. DOJ found in her favor over 10 years after she reported the retaliation. GAO was asked to review DOJ's process for handling such complaints. GAO examined (1) the time DOJ took to resolve FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints, (2) the extent to which DOJ took steps to resolve complaints more quickly, and (3) the extent to which DOJ complied with certain regulatory reporting requirements. GAO reviewed all DOJ case files for FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints DOJ closed from 2009 to 2013, and interviewed whistleblower attorneys, advocates, and government officials about the complaint process. The interview results are not generalizable. What GAO Recommends Congress may wish to consider whether FBI whistleblowers should have means to seek corrective action if retaliated against for disclosures to supervisors, among others. Further, GAO recommends that DOJ clarify guidance to clearly convey to whom employees can make protected disclosures, provide complainants with estimated complaint decision timeframes, and develop an oversight mechanism to monitor regulatory compliance. DOJ and the Office of the Inspector General concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-112: Accessed February 25, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668055.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668055.pdf Shelf Number: 134671 Keywords: CorruptionFederal Bureau of InvestigationFraudWhistleblowing (U.S. |
Author: Ponemon Institute Title: Fifth Annual Study on Medical Identity Theft Summary: Ponemon Institute is pleased to present the results of our fifth annual study on medical identity theft. This annual study is conducted to determine how pervasive this crime is in the United States, how it affects the lives of victims and what steps should be taken by consumers, healthcare providers and government to stop its proliferation. Since last year's study, medical identity theft incidents increased 21.7 percent. Medical identity theft occurs when someone uses an individual's name and personal identity to fraudulently receive medical services, prescription drugs and/or goods, including attempts to commit fraudulent billing. In the context of this study, medical identity theft can also occur when an individual shares his or her health insurance credentials with others. The research, sponsored by the Medical Identity Fraud Alliance (MIFA), confirms that medical identity theft is costly and complex to resolve. Because the crime can cause serious harm to its victims, it is critical for healthcare providers, health plans and technology/service providers to do more to help victims resolve the consequences of the theft and prevent future fraud. Government's increased influence and involvement in the delivery of healthcare services as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) also requires it to become more proactive in addressing medical identity theft. Details: Traverse, MI: Ponemon Institute, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2015 at: http://medidfraud.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2014_Medical_ID_Theft_Study1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://medidfraud.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2014_Medical_ID_Theft_Study1.pdf Shelf Number: 134740 Keywords: FraudHealthcare FraudIdentity Theft (U.S.) |
Author: Goncharov, Max Title: Russian Underground 101 Summary: This research paper intends to provide a brief summary of the cybercriminal underground and shed light on the basic types of hacker activity in Russia. The bulk of the information in this paper was based on data gathered from online forums and services used by Russian cybercriminals. We also relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums' shopping sites. Online fraud has long since moved from being a mere hobby to a means for cybercriminals to earn a living. This paper examines what is being sold on the most popular cybercrime forums like antichat.ru, xeka.ru, and cardingcc.com; which items are in demand; and what services professional fraudsters offer. The fraudsters consider the Internet a playing field. It has many vulnerable sites and a great deal of unprotected data. While "protected" data do exist, the places they are stored in can still be hacked. Some cybercriminals shared their experience in hacking; generating traffic; and writing code for Trojans, exploits, and other malware via online articles. This paper discusses fundamental concepts that Russian hackers follow and the information they share with their peers. It also examines prices charged for various types of services, along with how prevalent the given services are in advertisements. The primary features of each type of activity and examples of associated service offerings are discussed as well. Each section of this paper focuses on a specific type of criminal activity, good, or service in the Russian underground market. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Russia URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf Shelf Number: 135689 Keywords: Computer CrimeCybercrimeFraudInternet CrimeUnderground EconomyUnderground Markets |
Author: Goncharov, Max Title: Russian Underground Revisited Summary: In 2012, we published "Russian Underground 101," which provided a brief summary of the cybercriminal underground and shed light on the basic types of hacker activity in the region. This year, we revisited the Russian cybercriminal underground market to update the information we provided then. As in the 2012 paper, the bulk of the information in this paper was based on data gathered from online forums and services used by cybercriminals in the region. We also relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums' shopping sites. It also discusses fundamental concepts that hackers follow and the information they share with their peers and compares product and service prices from 2011 to 2013. Primary features of each product or service and examples are also provided. This paper is divided into five main sections - introduction, what characterizes the Russian underground market unique, products, services, and cybercriminal ware offerings in the market. This section discusses how we gathered data, normalized prices, and classified an offering as either a product or a service to answer questions we received when we published the 2012 paper. The second section characterizes the Russian underground market. It differentiates the region's underground market from others. The third and fourth sections, meanwhile, provide detailed descriptions of the most common products and services, respectively, offered in the Russian underground market. The last section provides pricing information on the products and services sold in the market. The cybercriminal underground economy, much like any other type of business economy, experiences pricing highs and lows, depending on demand and supply. In the Russian cybercriminal underground market's case, the huge demand for credit card credentials drives prices up. Then again, incidents such as the massive breaches involving popular retailers a few months ago, which increased the supply of such credentials, drive prices down. Unlike legitimate businesspeople, however, cybercriminals need to keep their identities secret and, as much as possible, hide all traces of their "business" transactions. Factors like this make real-time transactions almost impossible to do in the underground market. That said, business dealings in cybercriminal underground markets are much slower than in the legitimate business world. Even though the prices of most products and services sold in the Russian underground market have been decreasing, that does not mean that business is not doing well for cybercriminals. It can even mean that the market is growing, as we see more and more product and service offerings as time passes. Cybercriminals, like legitimate businesspeople, are also automating processes, resulting in lower product and service prices. Of course, "boutique" products and services remain expensive because these involve specialized knowledge and skills to develop that only a few bad guys have. What we all need to keep in mind is that as long as profit can be made, cybercriminals will continue to offer products and services that can make life easier for themselves and their peers. And as long as customers exist, the cybercriminal underground will thrive. As users and potential victims, we all need to keep an eye out for the latest misdeeds to stay safe from all kinds of digital threats. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-revisited.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Russia URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-revisited.pdf Shelf Number: 135690 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime FraudInternet Crime Underground Economy Underground Markets |
Author: Gu, Lion Title: The Chinese Underground in 2013 Summary: Places in the Internet where cybercriminals converge to sell and buy different products and services exist. Instead of creating their own attack tools from scratch, they can instead purchase what they need from peers who offer competitive prices. Like any other market, the laws of supply and demand dictate prices and feature offerings. But what's more interesting to note is that recently, prices have been going down. Over the years, we have been keeping tabs on major developments in the cybercriminal underground in an effort to stay true to our mission - to make the world safe for the exchange of digital information. Constant monitoring of cybercriminal activities for years has allowed us to gather intelligence to characterize the more advanced markets we have seen so far and to come up with comprehensive lists of offerings in them. The barriers to launching cybercrime have decreased. Toolkits are becoming more available and cheaper; some are even offered free of charge. Prices are lower and features are richer. Underground forums are thriving worldwide, particularly in Russia, China, and Brazil. These have become popular means to sell products and services to cybercriminals in the said countries. Cybercriminals are also making use of the Deep Web to sell products and services outside the indexed or searchable World Wide Web, making their online "shops" harder for law enforcement to find and take down. All of these developments mean that the computing public is at risk of being victimized more than ever and must completely reconsider how big a part security should play in their everyday computing behaviors. We have been continuously monitoring the Chinese underground market since 2011. And by the end of 2013, we have seen more than 1.4 million instant chat messages related to activities in the market from QQ Groups alone. This research paper reviews these millions of messages, along with trends observed and product and service price updates seen in the Chinese underground market throughout 2013. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-chinese-underground-in-2013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: China URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-chinese-underground-in-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 135691 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime FraudInternet Crime Underground Economy Underground Markets |
Author: Merces, Fernando Title: The Brazilian Underground: A Market for Cybercriminal Wannabes? Summary: The Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series (CUES) has established that there is a booming underground market where cybercriminals can buy and sell products and services they use for their activities. This thriving market has provided attackers with the tools and knowledge needed to break barriers and launch cybercrime attacks. Very much like any other market, the laws of supply and demand dictate prices of the products and services being offered. The availability of materials used to inflict harm has increased: toolkits are more visible and their prices are getting cheaper. Interestingly enough, as the prices went lower, the features grew richer. In our continuing effort to closely observe booming underground markets scattered in different countries across the globe, this Trend Micro research paper closely looks at the continuing maturity of the Brazilian underground despite the lack of development in available tools and tactics. Similar to other cybercriminal underground markets like those that exist in China and Russia, the Brazilian underground possesses unique characteristics such as the use of popular social media platforms to commit fraud instead of hiding in the deep recesses of the Web with tools that ordinary users normally don't have access to. Cybercrooks in Brazil make use of popular mediums such as social networks like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Skype, and WhatsApp, as these have turned out to be effective venues. Notably, the underground scene in Brazil also has players that market number generators and checkers or testers for more than just credit cards. They offer tools created for attacks against products and services exclusive in Brazil while also offering training services for cybercriminal wannabes. The Underground Market Scene: Product Offerings: Banking Trojans: Brazil has been known for banking Trojans created by Brazilians to target banking customers in the country. Various Trojan-based techniques are being used to steal user credentials from bolware, including domain name system poisoning, fake browser windows, malicious browser extensions, and malicious proxies. Business application account credentials: Confidential data is of utmost value in Brazil, as in any underground market. In their cybercriminal underground market, credentials for popular business application services provided by Unitfour and Serasa Experian are being sold. Unitfour's online marketing service, InTouch, has the capability to keep and access potential or existing customers' personal information, which made it a target for cybercrooks. Such is the case with Serasa Experia, where plenty of information are used and sold for nefarious purposes. Online service account credential checkers: These are essentially tools used to validate account numbers for online services which they obtain by getting log in information from phishing campaigns. Phishing pages: In Brazil, creating phishing pages is simple-cybercriminals copy everything on the legitimate pages they wish to phish and change the destination the data collected goes to, such as a free webmail account that they own. This is how victims are redirected from legitimate websites without noticing it. Phone number lists: Phone number lists per town or city are usually offered by cybercriminals who sell spamming software and hardware. A mobile phone number list for a small town can be bought as well as home phone number lists used in phone-based scams. The list above is by no means comprehensive. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-brazilian-underground-market.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-brazilian-underground-market.pdf Shelf Number: 135692 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime Fraud Internet Crime Underground Economy Underground Markets |
Author: CIFAS Title: Fraudscape: UK fraud trends Summary: In 2014, there were 276,993 frauds recorded by Cifas Members; an increase of 25% on 2013 levels. While fraud levels often fluctuate year by year, the overall trend is clear - recorded fraud is increasing. Cifas recorded frauds act as a sound barometer for the fraud landscape of the UK. Cifas Members span a range of sectors, including banking, grant giving, credit card, asset finance, retail credit, mail order and online retailer, insurance, telecommunications and public sector. Members report and share confirmed fraud cases using the Cifas National Fraud Database in order to detect and prevent further fraud. In 2014 Cifas Members prevented an estimated $1 billion of fraud through Cifas systems. The data included in this report gives a solid indication of the nature and scale of fraud but it is by no means the full picture. It remains the case that there is no one indicator for fraud levels in the UK, meaning that the true levels of fraud will be far higher. This report explores the key themes and trends from Cifas data in 2014. It is designed to give a simple overview of trends and recommends ideas for further specialist research. Cifas will publish a series of in-depth reports throughout 2015/16. Details: London: Cifas, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2015 at: http://www.cifas.org.uk/secure/contentPORT/uploads/documents/External%20-%20Fraudscape%20main%20report%20for%20website.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cifas.org.uk/secure/contentPORT/uploads/documents/External%20-%20Fraudscape%20main%20report%20for%20website.pdf Shelf Number: 135916 Keywords: Financial CrimesFraudIdentity Theft |
Author: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Title: Economic Crime: A threat to business globally Summary: It comes as no surprise to learn that economic crime - such as fraud, IP infringement, corruption, cybercrime, or accounting fraud - continues to be a major concern for organisations of all sizes, across all regions and in virtually every sector. But, as our 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey reveals, the real story is not so much that economic crime stubbornly persists. The real story is that economic crime is threatening your business processes, eroding the integrity of your employees, and tarnishing your reputation. Which is why this year's report, one of the broadest and most comprehensive economic crime surveys we have ever conducted - with over 5,000 global respondents - is focused not only on breaking down the facts, figures, trends and regions, but also on analysing how and where it may be affecting you. So you can address the issue from both a preventive and strategic perspective. We invite you to explore the rich trove of data, trends and analysis of economic crime uncovered by our 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey - and contact us to learn more Details: s.l.: PWC, 2015. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/downloads.jhtml Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/downloads.jhtml Shelf Number: 136069 Keywords: CybercrimeEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimesFraud |
Author: Argentiero, Amedeo Title: Tax Evasion and Economic Crime. Empirical Evidence from Italy Summary: This paper examines the impact of tax evasion on criminal activities in Italy. Precisely, we consider three types of crime particularly related to economic determinants: property crimes (including robberies, thefts and car thefts), frauds and usury. By using annual data for the Italian provinces (NUTS-3) over the period 2006 to 2010 to estimate a dynamic panel, we show that tax evasion substitutes both, frauds and usury, whereas crimes against the property are positively affected by tax evasion. Interestingly, the degree of substitution for fraud and usury is related to the size of tax burden. Moreover, the estimates indicate that these crimes show a different persistency over time, reflecting different adjustment costs. Finally, we find statistical significance and the expected sign for deterrence only for property crimes whereas frauds and usury are not influenced by any deterrence or clearing-up variable. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute, 36p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 5497: Accessed September 18, 2015 at: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19171717 Year: 2015 Country: Italy URL: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19171717 Shelf Number: 136830 Keywords: Financial Crime FraudProperty Crime Tax Evasion |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Research, Information and Communications Unit Title: Serious and Organised Crime Protection: Public Interventions Model Summary: The public interventions model maps people's vulnerability to financial and cyber crime. The research identifies: - who is at risk from cyber, fraud and financial crime - what makes them vulnerable - how government, law enforcement and cross-sector partners can better protect them from becoming victims Details: London: Home Office, 2016. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 24, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502960/Gov.uk_Serious_Organised_Crime_deck_vF.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502960/Gov.uk_Serious_Organised_Crime_deck_vF.pdf Shelf Number: 137949 Keywords: CybercrimeFinancial CrimesFraudInternet CrimesOnline VictimizationOrganized CrimeSerious Crime |
Author: Great Britain. National Audit Office Title: Fraud landscape review Summary: The exact scale of fraud within government is unknown but excluding tax credit and benefit fraud, detected fraud in 2014-15 across government was equivalent to only 0.02% ($72.9 million) of total expenditure ($306 billion) according to a report by the National Audit Office. However there is a large disparity between what fraud and error is reported and what other available estimates suggest might be occurring which needs explaining. The UK government detected fraud figure of 0.02% of expenditure is significantly lower than some estimates of 3-5% in the EU and US. While these comparisons need to be treated with caution, it suggests there could be significant fraud and error which is unreported or undetected and losses which are not being adequately addressed. Given current fiscal challenges, reducing the level of fraud is one potential way of making savings while protecting services. Government lacks a clear understanding of the scale of the fraud problem and departments vary in their ability to identify and address fraud risks. The data that does exist is patchy, inconsistent and of variable quality. The most comprehensive data relates to areas of known risk - tax credit and benefit fraud - but information across the rest of government is clearly incomplete. It is difficult to formulate solutions if the scale and nature of the problem is unknown. The Cabinet Office has recently started collecting fraud returns from departments but there are gaps and inconsistencies in the data sets. What the data does indicate though is that departments are reporting less fraud loss than expected given the scale of expenditure and range of activities. Some submitted nil returns despite reporting cases of fraud elsewhere. The Cabinet Office is attempting to improve the quality of fraud information and raise departments' ability to address fraud risks. It is difficult to assess if government action is improving fraud detection or prevention because of the lack of data and absence of measures to evaluate performance. Most central activity to date has focussed on getting departments to recognise the risks and establish governance structures and processes to better identify and address fraud, which is a necessary first step to being able to evaluate success. Among the NAO recommendations are that departments should undertake thorough fraud risk assessments of all new policies/programmes and also improve the quality and completeness of fraud data. Once Cabinet Office is confident about the quality of this data, it should publish an annual report on fraud losses across government to improve transparency and raise awareness of fraud. Details: London: NAO, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 850, Session 2015-16: Accessed March 2, 2016 at: https://www.nao.org.uk/report/fraud-landscape-review/ Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.nao.org.uk/report/fraud-landscape-review/ Shelf Number: 138019 Keywords: Corruption and FraudFraudPolitical Corruption |
Author: Hafner, Marco Title: The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Organised Crime and Corruption: Annex II - Corruption Summary: Corruption is a phenomenon with significant negative consequences for the EU and its Member States. This research paper uses a mix of methodologies to quantify the overall costs of corruption in the EU in economic, social and political terms. The findings, based on new analysis, suggest that corruption costs the EU between L179bn and L990bn in GDP terms on an annual basis. Current anti-corruption measures relevant to Member States and the EU as a whole are described and their effectiveness in reducing the levels of, and opportunities for, corruption are assessed. Eight potential areas for EU action are identified that might address the barriers to the effectiveness of current measures. The costs of non-Europe are calculated in relation to two of these, as well as in relation to the implementation of recently created EU laws. Details: Brussels: European Parliament Research Survey, 2016. 157p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_STU(2016)579319_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_STU(2016)579319_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138412 Keywords: CorruptionCosts of CorruptionEconomic CrimesFraud |
Author: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Title: Adjusting the Lens on Economic Crime: preparation brings opportunity back into focus Summary: More than a third of organisations have experienced economic crime in the past 24 months, as reported by over 6,000 respondents to PwC's Global Economic Crime Survey 2016. This year's results show that the incidence of economic crime has come down, for the first time since the global financial crisis of 2008-9 (albeit marginally by 1%). At first glance, this could be evidence of a return on the investments in the preventative measures which organisations have been making over the past few years. But as we look at the data more closely, it is possible that this small decrease is actually masking a worrying trend: that economic crime is changing significantly, but that detection and controls programmes are not keeping up with the pace of change. What's more, the financial cost of each fraud is on the rise. This year's report illustrates how economic crime has evolved over the last two years, morphing into different forms depending on industrial sector and region. Despite this evolving threat, we have seen a decrease in the detection of criminal activity by methods within management's control, with detection through corporate controls down by 7%. What's more, one in five organisations (22%) have not carried out a single fraud risk assessment in the last 24 months. When looked at in the context of the findings in PwC's 19th Annual Global CEO Survey - where two-thirds of chief executives agreed that there are more threats to the growth of their company than ever before (a sharp increase, compared to 59% in 2015) - this points to a potentially worrying trend: that too much is being left to chance. In fact, our findings indicate that one in ten economic crimes are discovered by accident. Details: s.l.: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Global Economic Crime Survey 2016: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138456 Keywords: CybercrimeEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimesFraud |
Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Fraud withing the Commonwealth: A census of the most costly incidents, 2010-11 to 2012-13 Summary: Fraud against the Commonwealth is defined as 'dishonestly obtaining a benefit or causing a loss, by deception or other means'. This definition is set out in the current Commonwealth Resource Management Guide (no. 201) Preventing, detecting and dealing with fraud, issued by the Australian Government Minister for Justice (2014). This form of fraud may be committed by individuals who do not work for government bodies, such as those who dishonestly claim benefits or some other financial advantage (external fraud), or by those employed by entities including staff and contractors (internal fraud). Fraud may also involve collaboration between internal and external parties. Button & Brooks (2009) suggest that the development of an anti-fraud culture is largely targeted at combatting internal fraud. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has defined internal fraud as: ...the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisations' resources or assets (ACFE 2014: 6). This paper aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of internal fraud against the Commonwealth, and the personal background details of those alleged to have committed the deception. It reports on the results of an annual census of Commonwealth entities which collected information on the single 'most costly' incident of internal fraud that they experienced in 2010-11 to 2012-13. During these years, 137 Commonwealth entities reported 7,809 incidents of internal fraud. Of these, 125 chose one incident each year that they considered their most costly internal fraud. Information was provided on how and why fraud was committed, estimated financial losses involved, the personal circumstances of the principal alleged perpetrators, and how the incidents were dealt with in terms of investigation, prosecution and judicial outcomes. Most incidents involved non-corporate Commonwealth entities (formerly governed under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) see Table 1). Entities with more than 1,000 staff contributed more incidents for this study than smaller bodies. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Research in Practice, no. 41: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rip/rip41/rip41.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rip/rip41/rip41.pdf Shelf Number: 138463 Keywords: Financial CrimesFraud |
Author: Rebovich, Donald J. Title: The New Face of Identity Theft: An Analysis of Federal Case Data for the Years 2008 through 2013 Summary: The purpose of this study was to provide empirical evidence on which law enforcement can base enhanced proactive identity theft control and prevention efforts. It focuses on the increasing number of identity theft and fraud cases committed against individuals and organizations in the U.S. As a result of this study of closed United States Attorney Office identity theft/fraud cases (2008-2013), empirical data concerning the way in which criminals are adapting to law enforcement investigative methods by designing new means for committing such crimes are available to law enforcement agencies and corporate security and fraud investigators. The study is intended to serve as a follow-up to CIMIP's first study in this area published in October of 2007, Identity Fraud Trends and Patterns: Building a Data-Based Foundation for Proactive Enforcement (2007, Gordon, Rebovich, Choo and Gordon). One of the goals is to, where possible, compare results from this study with those of the 2007 study to assess the degree to which characteristics of identity fraud have remained consistent or have changed over time. The analysis will help enable law enforcement to move from a reactive posture to a proactive one. The purpose of this project is to provide law enforcement and policy makers with a proactive means of combating identity theft and fraud and enhancing the response to reports of victimization. The data for the study was collected from open source information available on United States Attorney Office identity theft prosecutions. Twenty four hundred and fifty two (2,452) offenders involved in 1,306 cases with an identity theft component, which were prosecuted between 2008 and 2013, were reviewed; data was analyzed on 1,395 convicted offenders (involved in 844 cases), as the other indicted offenders were excluded due to lack of conviction disposition. Details: Utica, NY: Center for Identity Management and Information Protection, Utica College, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed April 22, 2016 at: https://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/cimip/New_Face_of_Identity_Theft.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/cimip/New_Face_of_Identity_Theft.pdf Shelf Number: 138721 Keywords: FraudIdentity Theft |
Author: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Title: Targeting Scams: Report of the ACCC on scams activity 2015 Summary: The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's (ACCC) seventh annual report on scams activity in Australia highlights the significant financial loss and emotional harm incurred by the Australian community as a result of scams. In 2015 the ACCC received over 105 000 scam reports, 14 000 more than in 2014. Reported monetary losses also grew by 4 per cent, to almost $85 million. For this year's report the ACCC has also reviewed data from other jurisdictions that receive reports or detect scams to gain a clearer picture of the significance of losses caused by scam activity in Australia. Reports to the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) revealed losses of over $127 million1. Additionally, various scam disruption programs, operated by the ACCC and other agencies, also detect Australians sending funds to high risk jurisdictions. A combined estimate of losses to this unreported scam activity is $17.1 million. Combining Scamwatch and ACORN data with losses detected through scam disruption work, total scam losses exceed $229 million. This report seeks to explore the nature of scam losses and identify some emerging trends. It focuses on data reported to Scamwatch and statistics provided in the report are in respect of that data unless specifically stated otherwise. By far the most concerning trend in the ACCC's Scamwatch data related to investment scams, which overtook dating and romance scams as the category with the largest financial losses reported by Australians in the last year. Losses to investment scams almost doubled, from $12.5 million to $24.4 million with six people reporting individual losses of $1 million or more. Additionally, ACORN data shows reported losses to investment scams of almost $17 million. This brings total reported losses to more than $41 million and this still does not include those that do not report or may have reported to another organisation. It is not hard to see why many Australians are losing large sums of money in these scams given how difficult they are to identify. These more sophisticated scams often involve scammers who use accurate technical jargon in carefully crafted cold calling scripts and accompany this with glossy brochures backed up by professional-looking websites. Even astute investors have been known to fall victim to these more calculated scams. Losses reported to Scamwatch from dating and romance scams have reduced by more than $5 million (18.5 per cent) to $22.7 million, and are the second highest category in 2015. Together with investment scams, they account for 56 per cent of scam losses reported to Scamwatch in the past year. A further $14.8 million was reported to ACORN. When you add in the $17.1 million identified through disruption initiatives, this brings the total for relationships scams to over $54 million. While investment and dating scams caused the most losses in 2015, the most commonly reported scams to the ACCC have been phishing scams, reclaim scams and upfront payment/advanced fee scams. Over 15 000 reports of phishing scams have been received, resulting in a total reported loss of $363 270. While the number of reports we received are spread across all age groups, it is middle aged and older Australians who are reporting the highest losses. The ACCC has taken a closer look at the risk that scam activity poses to older Australians in this report. Details: Canberra: ACCC, 2016. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2016 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/targeting_scams_-_report_of_the_accc_on_scam_activity_2015.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/targeting_scams_-_report_of_the_accc_on_scam_activity_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 139103 Keywords: Consumer Protection and Fraud Crimes Against BusinessCybercrimeFinancial CrimesFraud Scams |
Author: Cross, Cassandra Title: The Reporting Experiences and Support Needs of Victims of Online Fraud Summary: Although fraud has been practiced throughout history, the advent of the internet has created new and effective avenues for targeting potential victims. Victims of online fraud experience substantial financial and other harms, resulting in annual losses in Australia of more than $2b, significant organisational disruption and devastating human suffering. Prior research in this area has generally been conducted through victim surveys and the analysis of official administrative datasets, but little research has involved speaking with victims of online fraud about their experiences. This paper presents the results of in-depth interviews conducted with a sample of 80 individuals from across Australia who lodged complaints of online fraud involving losses of $10,000 or more over the preceding four years. Their stories illustrate the financial impact of fraud and the emotional, psychological, interpersonal and physical impacts of their victimisation. They also document the barriers they faced in reporting these crimes. The paper concludes by identifying the support needs of victims of online fraud. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2016. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 518: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi518.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi518.pdf Shelf Number: 145630 Keywords: Consumer FraudFraudOnline VictimizationVictims of Crime |
Author: Lonsdale, Jeremy Title: National Trading Standards -- Scams Team Review Summary: Mass marketing fraud (MMF) is broadly defined as a misleading or deceptive business practice in which uninvited contact and false promises are used to con people out of money. These could include lottery and prize draw scams, inheritance scams, get-rich-quick schemes and the selling of bogus products and services. Relatively inexpensive modes of communications, such as the Internet, telephone and direct mail, have transformed MMF activities in the UK and worldwide. National Trading Standards (NTS) established a Scams Team in 2012, initially as a pilot, hosted by East Sussex County Council Trading Standards. It was developed out of a desire to deal more effectively with MMF on a local, regional and national level, and to support victims. The Scams Team's activities are guided by five objectives: To identify victims of fraud To intervene and protect victims from further victimisation To investigate criminal activity To inform local authorities and agencies on how to work with and support scam victims To influence people at local, regional and national levels to take a stand against scams Goals During 2015 and 2016, NTS commissioned RAND Europe to undertake an independent review of the Scams Team to help inform its future development, delivery and effectiveness. The review included: An assessment of the Scams Team in its current form Recommendations for service improvements and future provision in the context of the Consumer Landscape Reforms, building on ideas generated by delivery partners Recommendations for existing measures and measure of consumer detriment Methodology The project team used four main sources to carry out the review: A review of academic and grey literature Interviews with partners, local authorities, Scams Team and NTS members A survey of all 200 local Trading Standards Services A review of documents and data provided by the Scams Team and NTS, which included data on 30,000 UK victims of MMF In addition, the researchers also held a 'Theory of Change' workshop with staff from the Scams Team, to examine how the Team's activities are expected to lead to the overall objectives, also to examine the Team's current methodology for measuring consumer detriment and savings. Findings Based on the analysis of data on 30,000 UK victims of MMF, it was found that these victims lost, on average, $6,744 to scams over their lifetime. The amount lost varied across victims, with the majority losing around $100 to $100; however, one per cent were found to lose more than $100,000. Older people tended to be the most prominent victims of MMF; however, no particular group should be isolated or ignored as potential victims. MMF was found to affect all members of society regardless of their age, class, occupation, socio-economic background, race or gender. Many perpetrators of MMF are based outside the UK, making it a truly global issue. In addition, these perpetrators are often linked to international organised crime, as they are selling MMF models internationally and also involved in other types of crime. There is clear evidence that the work of the Scams Team has helped to identify more victims of MMF and, through interventions with local Trading Standard Services, has helped to reduce the impact of MMF on these victims. The Scams Team has facilitated a coordinated national approach to tackling MMF in the UK, while also introducing a variety of innovative approaches and pilot projects. Based on the evidence available, the Scams Team appears to be delivering significant value for money. Through its work, it was estimated that the Team is saving $27 per $1 invested. Even when only taking into account the savings that the Scams Team is able to identify with a high degree of precision, these are still high - $12 per $1 invested over three years. Details: Santa Monica, CA; Cambridge, UK: RAND, 2016. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1510/RAND_RR1510.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1510/RAND_RR1510.pdf Shelf Number: 140263 Keywords: Consumer FraudFraudMass Marketing FraudScamsWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Cross, Cassandra Title: Improving responses to online fraud victims: An examination of reporting and support Summary: This study was developed to understand the needs of fraud victims through in-depth interviews conducted with 80 individuals from across Australia who lodged complaints of online fraud involving losses of $10,000 or more in the preceding four years to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's (ACCC) "Scamwatch" website or hotline. The aims of the study were: to document the various impacts and harms that victims of online fraud experience; to examine the reasons why some individuals choose to report online fraud to authorities, while others fail to make reports; and to determine how the support needs of this group of victims might best be met. The personal stories of those interviewed describe the financial impact of what occurred, as well as a range of emotional, psychological, interpersonal and physical impacts resulting from their victimisation. In addition, the barriers to reporting the crimes they suffered officially are documented. The report concludes by identifying what victims of online fraud really want in terms of support from government and non-government bodies, friends, relatives and counsellors. Research participants The 80 participants ranged in age from 30 to 77 years, with a mean age of 56. Forty-six (58%) were male and thirty-four (42%) were female. Participants identified as being from a wide range of countries of birth, predominantly Australia (68%), the United Kingdom (11%) and New Zealand (5%). Participants resided in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. Financial impact Reported financial losses ranged from $10,000 to approximately $500,000. In many cases, participants were not able to indicate precisely how much money they had lost to online fraud, as often losses had been incurred over a lengthy period of time (up to several years) while in other cases, victims had simply lost track of how much money they had sent. Some victims, however, suffered substantial and debilitating financial impacts. Some of the current participants described losing all their superannuation, being 'sucked dry', having to pay off loans over periods of months or years, 'losing everything', losing their life savings, not being able to afford to buy food, and 'throwing good money after bad' by hiring lawyers or pursuing civil proceedings against perpetrators. Details: Sydney: Criminology Research Advisory Council, 2016. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2016 at: http://www.crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1617/29-1314-FinalReport.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1617/29-1314-FinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 145372 Keywords: Corporate CrimeFinancial CrimesFraudOnline VictimizationScams |
Author: Blascak, Nathan Title: Identity Theft as a Teachable Moment Summary: This paper examines how a negative shock to the security of personal finances due to severe identity theft changes consumer credit behavior. Using a unique data set of linked consumer credit data and alerts indicating identity theft, we show that the immediate effects of fraud on consumers are typically negative, small, and transitory. After those immediate effects fade, identity theft victims experience persistent, positive changes in credit characteristics, including improved risk scores (indicating lower default risk). We argue that these changes are consistent with increased salience of credit file information to the consumer at the time of severe identity theft. Details: Philadelphia: Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2016. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: RB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 16-27 : Accessed November 10, 2016 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2859366 Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2859366 Shelf Number: 146277 Keywords: Consumer ProtectionFraudIdentity Theft |
Author: Australia. Attorney-General's Department Title: Identity crime and misuse in Australia 2016 Summary: This is the third in a series of reports that seek to analyse the nature and extent of identity crime and misuse in Australia. These reports compile data from Commonwealth, state and territory agencies, as well as the private sector and other non-government sources. The Attorney-General’s Department leads the development of these reports as a key initiative of the National Identity Security Strategy. Cost of identity crime The annual cost of identity crime in Australia is $2.2b. This includes the direct and indirect losses incurred by government agencies and individuals; and the cost of identity crimes recorded by police. The costs of preventing and responding to identity crime are estimated to be a further $390m, bringing the total economic impact of identity crime in Australia to approximately $2.6b per year. These figures represent a revised estimate of the cost of identity crime in Australia to $2.2b compared to the estimate of $2b from the 2013–14 report. This is due to better availability of data and is not necessarily an indicator of change over the intervening time. Details: Canberra: Attorney-General's Department, 2016. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2016 at: https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/Identity-crime-and-misuse-in-Australia-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/Identity-crime-and-misuse-in-Australia-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147922 Keywords: Computer CrimesCosts of CrimeCybercrimeFinancial CrimesFraudIdentity Theft |
Author: Shores, Michael Title: Informal Networks and White Collar Crime: An Extended Analysis of the Madoff Scandal Summary: Understanding the nature of white collar crime is a central issue in public policy. Testing the theories presented by Benson, Madensen and Eck (2009), I examine the role of informal religious networks in the criminal activity of Bernard Madoff, perpetrator of one of the largest white collar crimes in United States history. In contrast to previous studies that suggest that religion may reduce the incidence of criminal behavior, I show that the opposite can also be true. Most white collar crimes, like those perpetrated by Madoff, are exploitations of trust, which can be fostered by a shared religious identity between the victim and perpetrator. Using data from the National Center of Charitable Statistics, I construct two measures of Jewish religious network strength at the county level: the concentration of Jewish non-profit organizations and the revenue of Jewish non-profit organizations. Additionally, using data from the Jewish Community Center Association of North America and several U.S. Kosher certification organizations, I construct the number of Jewish community centers and the number of kosher restaurants per county. I show that conditional on the number of high income individuals in a county, residents of counties in which there were stronger Jewish networks were more likely to have been victimized by Madoff. In addition, I show that residents of areas where Madoff lived or worked were more likely to be victims, but that Jewish network strength appears to counteract this "distance effect." Non-profit organizations, which were also victims of Madoff, were less affected by the strength of this informal network. Details: Ithaca, NY: Department of Policy Analysis & Management Cornell University, 2010. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/15068/Michael%20Shores%20May10%20thesis.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/15068/Michael%20Shores%20May10%20thesis.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 141253 Keywords: Criminal NetworksFinancial CrimeFraudWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Fraud within the Commonwealth: A census of the most costly incidents 2014. Summary: From financial years 2010-11 to 2014-14, Commonwealth entities experienced 9,467 incidents of internal fraud, with losses of over $12.7m. This study analysed information about the most costly incidents each entity experienced each year and those who perpetrated these. The majority of the 166 frauds related to employee entitlements or financial benefits, and most were committed through the misuse of documents or technology. The findings provide an insight into the fraud risks facing the Commonwealth and how these might best be addressed. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Statistical Bulletin 02: Accessed March 7, 2017 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/sb/002/sb002.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/sb/002/sb002.pdf Shelf Number: 146416 Keywords: Consumer ProtectionCosts of CrimeCrime StatisticsFinancial CrimesFraud |
Author: Shentov, Ognian Title: Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe Summary: The current report, prepared by the Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) – the largest indigenous good governance initiative in SEE – makes an important contribution to the regional approach to anticorruption. It provides a civil society view of the state of corruption and comes in the wake of the 2014 SELDI comprehensive assessment of the various aspects of the legal and institutional anticorruption environments of nine SEE countries. In 2016, SELDI followed up on these assessments with an update of corruption monitoring and a special focus on state capture in the energy sector and the corruption– hidden economy nexus. The report underscores the need for broader political action for reform, which seems blocked or narrowing across the region. Inside pressure for such action has been suffocated by economic necessity and/or ethnic divisions, and the ossification of political and economic establishments. Outside pressure, delivered mostly by the European Union, has been seen as wanting in relation to the size of the problems in the past couple of years due to a succession of internal and external crises. In none of the countries in the region has there been a clear and sustained policy breakthrough in anticorruption, although efforts to deliver technical solutions and to improve the functioning of the law enforcement institutions, mostly with support from the EU, have continued and even intensified in some cases. This has led to further slow decline in administrative corruption levels but at the expense of waning public support for reforms and of declining trust in national and European institutions. SELDI's Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) – its analytical tool for measuring corruption – has identified three trends in the dynamics of corruption in the region: • Since the early 2000s when SELDI started its monitoring the overall levels of corruption in the SEE countries have gone down, and the public has become more demanding of good governance. • Yet, progress has been slow and erratic, and corruption continues to be both a major preoccupation for the general public and a common occurrence in the civil service and senior government. Specifically, in the 2014 – 2016 period corruption pressure – the primary quantitative indicator for the levels of corruption in a country – has relapsed in some countries, but the overall improvement in the region was negligible. • The combination of stubbornly high rates of rent-seeking from corrupt officials and rising expectations for good governance related mostly to EU accession aspirations in SEE have shaped negatively public expectations about potential corruption pressure. More than half of the population of the SELDI countries believe it is likely to have to give a bribe to an official to get things done. This indicates that the restoration of trust in institutions would be much more difficult than the mere reduction in the levels of administrative corruption. As a result, public trust in the feasibility of policy responses to corruption – a critical ally to successful anticorruption reforms – which reflects the share of the population who believe in the anticorruption efforts of their governments has stayed below the 50% threshold in 2016 for all SEE countries but Montenegro and Turkey. This further exacerbates the unwillingness of politicians to engage in anticorruption policies, and shows the need for a broad-based social movement to sustain an anticorruption focus. The overall conclusion from the 2016 round of the SELDI CMS is that the policies which target corrupt behaviour at administrative level and those seeking to change trust in government need to be pursued in concert. If not complemented by strengthened public demand for integrity in government and sustained improvement in economic well-being, stricter enforcement of penal measures cannot have a sustainable effect. Law enforcement would likely be seen either as useless repression when targeting lower government levels alone or as political witch-hunt when intermittently directed at higher levels. Conversely, intensifying awareness-building measures would only fuel cynicism and resignation in the public if it is not accompanied by visible efforts for cracking down on (high-level) rent-seeking officials Details: Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI); Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 24, 2017 at: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf Shelf Number: 144577 Keywords: AnticorruptionCorruptionEconomic CrimeFinancial CrimesFraudHidden EconomyPolitical Corruption |
Author: Miller, Rena S. Title: Trade-Based Money Laundering: Overview and Policy Issues Summary: Trade-based money laundering (TBML) involves the exploitation of the international trade system for the purpose of transferring value and obscuring the true origins of illicit wealth. TBML schemes vary in complexity but typically involve misrepresentation of the price, quantity, or quality of imports or exports. Financial institutions may wittingly or unwittingly be implicated in TBML schemes when such institutions are used to settle, facilitate, or finance international trade transactions (e.g., through the processing of wire transfers, provision of trade finance, and issuance of letters of credit and guarantees). TBML activity is considered to be growing in both volume and global reach. Although TBML is widely recognized as one of the most common manifestations of international money laundering, TBML appears to be less understood among academics and policymakers than traditional forms of money laundering through the international banking system and bulk cash smuggling. Nevertheless, TBML has emerged as an issue of growing interest in the 114th Congress, especially as Members and committees examine tools to counter terrorist financing. The U.S. government has historically focused on TBML schemes involving drug proceeds from Latin America, particularly the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Although a number of anecdotal case studies in recent years have revealed instances in which TBML is used by known terrorist groups and other non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah, the Treasury Department’s June 2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment concluded that TBML is not a dominant method for terrorist financing. The United States is combating TBML in a number of ways: The Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issues advisories and geographic targeting orders and applies special measures to jurisdictions determined to be of primary money laundering concern. The United States is also an active participant in the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created in 1989 to develop and promote guidelines on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). FATF has addressed TBML methods and best practices to combat TBML in periodic reports and mutual evaluations of its members. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (ICE/HSI) unit, maintains a Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) in Washington, DC. The TTU has U.S. Department of State funding and Treasury Department support. DHS has since developed a network of counterpart TTUs in almost a dozen countries abroad. The TTUs examine trade anomalies and financial irregularities associated with TBML, customs fraud, contraband smuggling, and tax evasion. This report discusses the scope of the TBML problem and analyzes selected U.S. government policy responses to address TBML. It includes a listing of hearings in the 114th Congress that addressed TBML. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: R44541: Accessed March 28, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44541.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44541.pdf Shelf Number: 144600 Keywords: Contraband Smuggling Financial Crimes FraudInternational Trade Money Laundering Tax Evasion |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Identity Theft Services: Services Offer Some Benefits but Are Limited in Preventing Fraud Summary: Identity theft services offer some benefits but have limitations. Credit monitoring helps detect new-account fraud (that is, the opening of new unauthorized accounts) by alerting users, but it does not prevent such fraud or address existing-account fraud, such as misuse of a stolen credit card number. Consumers have alternatives to credit monitoring, including requesting a low-cost credit freeze, which can prevent new-account fraud by restricting access to the consumers' credit report. Identity monitoring can alert consumers to misuse of certain personal information by monitoring sources such as public records or illicit websites, but its effectiveness in mitigating identity theft is unclear. Identity restoration seeks to remediate the effects of identity theft, but the level of service varies: some providers offer hands-on assistance, such as interacting with creditors on the consumer's behalf, while others largely provide self-help information, which is of more limited benefit. Identity theft insurance covers certain expenses related to the process of remediating identity theft but generally excludes direct financial losses, and the number and dollar amount of claims has been low. These services also typically do not address some types of threats, such as medical identity or tax refund fraud. Various factors affect government and private-sector decision making about offering identity theft services, and federal guidance related to these services could be improved. In the federal sector, legislation requires certain agencies to provide identity theft services. For example, legislation requires the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to provide these services to individuals affected by its 2015 data breaches for 10 years, as well as provide $5 million in identity theft insurance. However, this level of insurance coverage is likely unnecessary because claims paid rarely exceed a few thousand dollars. Requirements such as this could serve to increase federal costs unnecessarily, mislead consumers about the benefit of such insurance coverage, and create unwarranted escalation of coverage amounts in the marketplace. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has guidance on agencies' response to data breaches, but this guidance does not address the effectiveness of these services relative to lower-cost alternatives, in keeping with OMB's risk management and internal control guidance. Further, OPM provided duplicative identity theft services for about 3.6 million people affected by both of its 2015 breaches, and OMB has not explored options to help federal agencies avoid potentially wasteful duplication. In addition, contrary to key operational practices previously identified by GAO, OPM's data-breach-response policy does not include criteria or procedures for determining when to offer identity theft services, and OPM has not always documented how it chose to offer them in response to past breaches, which could hinder informed decision making in the future. In the private sector, companies often offer consumers affected by a data breach complimentary identity theft services for reasons other than mitigating the risk of identity theft, such as avoiding liability or complying with state law. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-254: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683842.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683842.pdf Shelf Number: 144731 Keywords: Credit Card Theft FraudIdentity Theft |
Author: NetNames Title: Counting the Costs of Counterfeiting: A NetNames Report Summary: Today, the ease and reach of digital commerce presents extraordinary opportunities and serious threats to businesses, brands and consumers alike. The collision of counterfeiting, globalization and the fast-growing digital world has created a perfect storm, allowing the supply and demand for fake goods to converge. EXTRAORDINARY GROWTH In an environment where counterfeiting is as profitable as illegal drugs, but remains far less risky for criminals, we are seeing explosive growth. Expanding by over 15% every year, counterfeiting now costs more than 2% of total global economic output, or around $1.8 trillion per year. There is little doubt as to the crucial role played by the digital world in this meteoric rise, with a 15% increase in sales of counterfeit goods online last year. The internet has made counterfeiting a shifting problem that is difficult to combat. Rogue websites, online auctions and digital piracy all give counterfeiters lucrative and anonymous channels for their activities. PHARMA WORST AFFECTED While counterfeiting is a major challenge for every industry, pharma is the worst affected sector by any metric. Counterfeiters have claimed around a third of the entire market - worth some $200 billion - and are implicated in the deaths of up to one million people each year due to toxic or ineffective drugs. ENTER THE DRAGON: THE ROLE OF CHINA The United States, Europe and Australasia - the largest markets for fake goods - are all attempting to harmonize and intensify their multi-pronged strategy to combat counterfeiting and digital piracy. However, the tidal wave of counterfeit and grey-market goods from China shows little sign of being stemmed, remaining responsible for 70% of worldwide seizures. While global companies depend on Chinese manufacturing, this same ecosystem provides a haven of cheap labor and raw materials for counterfeiters. COST AND CONVENIENCE DRIVE CONSUMERS TO COUNTERFEITS Consumers remain largely innocent victims in this struggle, with 90% seeing counterfeiting as morally wrong. However, the demand for branded goods and the desire to find lower prices online mean that 28 consumers unknowingly buy fake goods for every person that does so intentionally. When consumers do deliberately consume counterfeit and pirated goods, cost and convenience are the major factors in their decision: 19% purchase fake products when the original is too expensive, while 22% will turn to digital piracy when there is no legal alternative. THE HEAVY TOLL ON BRANDS Counterfeiting creates a heavy financial burden for brands eroding profitability, market share and outside investment. While fake goods destroy around 10% of top-line revenues, they also force brands to make further investments in combatting the problem, and leave them less able to invest in future innovations. Even more insidious are the risks to both brand reputations and customers. Online, reputations can be instantly damaged in front of a global audience: 78% of consumers would shun a brand if they found themselves on a bogus website, even though the company itself was not negligent. Meanwhile, the risks to customers are not just financial, but also physical. G20 countries now see an estimated 3,000 deaths annually due to counterfeit consumer goods alone. NEW TECHNOLOGIES CREATE NEW RISKS Counterfeiters will continue to exploit the potential of new technologies and the digital world to further their reach, profitability and anonymity. The rise of mobile and social is fragmenting the online landscape - exposing brands not just to counterfeiting, but also to evolving threats such as phishing, cybersquatting, traffic diversion and other forms of online fraud. ACTION IS ESSENTIAL New technologies will also be critical to the fight against counterfeiting, with RFID, digital authentication and new generic top-level domains (gTLDs) all allowing brands to strengthen their posture against fraudsters. In particular, given the skyrocketing risks from the combination of digital channels and fake goods, a proactive and effective online anti-counterfeiting strategy is now essential for every brand to safeguard customers, revenues and reputation. Details: London: Digital Citizens Alliance, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2017 at: https://www.netnames.com/assets/shared/whitepaper/pdf/NetNames-Counterfeiting-Report-A4-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.netnames.com/assets/shared/whitepaper/pdf/NetNames-Counterfeiting-Report-A4-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 144902 Keywords: Consumer FraudConsumer ProtectionCosts of CrimeCounterfeit GoodsCounterfeitingFake GoodsFraudOnline Victimization |
Author: Reurink, Arjan Title: Financial fraud: A literature review Summary: This paper describes the empirical universe of financial fraud as it has been documented in the academic literature. More specifically, it describes the different forms of fraudulent behavior in the context of financial market activities, the prevalence and consequences of such behavior as identified by previous research, and the economic and market structures that scholars believe facilitate it. To structure the discussion, a conceptual distinction is made between three types of financial fraud: financial statement fraud, financial scams, and fraudulent financial mis-selling. What emerges is a picture of financial fraud as a complex phenomenon that can take very different forms, depending on the market segments in which it occurs, the financial instruments it pertains to, and the actors involved. Moreover, the findings of the literature review highlight a number of recent developments that scholars think have facilitated the occurrence of financial fraud, including: (1) the development of new fundamental conflicts of interest and perverse incentive structures in the financial industry; (2) an influx of unsophisticated, gullible participants in the financial marketplace; (3) the increasing complexity involved in financial market transactions as a result of rapid technological, legal, and financial innovation and an ever-widening menu of financial products; (4) an increase in the use of justified secrecy in the form of strict confidentiality rules around banking and legal services and the use of off-balance-sheet constructions and shell companies located in secrecy jurisdictions. Details: Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: MPIfG Discussion Paper 16/5: Accessed May 2, 2017 at: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp16-5.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp16-5.pdf Shelf Number: 145232 Keywords: Economics and Crime Financial Crimes Financial Fraud Fraud |
Author: Great Britain. National Audit Office Title: Online Fraud Summary: Growth in the use of the internet and advances in digital technologies mean that citizens and businesses can now do more online. For the UK, this means there are opportunities for greater innovation and economic growth, but also more opportunities for online crime. While traditional crimes such as vehicle offences and house burglary have declined substantially in recent years, fraud, more than half of which is committed online, is becoming more common and is a growing threat. Online criminals can target thousands of victims at the same time from anywhere in the world and so are hard to trace and prosecute. Online fraud can harm citizens financially and emotionally and harm businesses' finances and reputations. The true cost of online fraud is unknown, but is likely to be billions of pounds. One estimate was that individuals lost around L10 billion and the private sector around L144 billion to fraud in 2016. In the year ending 30 September 2016, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) estimated that there were 1.9 million estimated incidents of cyber-related fraud in England and Wales, or 16% of all estimated crime incidents. Online fraud includes criminals accessing citizens' and businesses' bank accounts, using their plastic card details, or tricking them into transferring money. The Home Office (the Department) is responsible for preventing and reducing crime, including online fraud. Many other bodies also play a role including the police, banks, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), which records fraud offences and shares information with police forces, and Action Fraud, the national reporting centre for fraud. In 2016, the Department set up the Joint Fraud Taskforce to improve collaboration between government, industry and law enforcement in tackling online fraud. In the same year, the government published its National Cyber Security Strategy to 2021, which includes the government's plans for tackling cyber crime, including cyber-enabled fraud and data theft. Scope of this report This report focuses on the Department, which is responsible for preventing and reducing online fraud. We have examined how the Department works with other bodies to tackle the crime. We have not evaluated whether the Department is achieving value for money in tackling online fraud as the true scale of online fraud and the overall cost to the government is not known. In this report we sometimes refer just to fraud as often the government and other bodies, as well as data sources, do not distinguish between online and offline fraud. We have examined: - the nature and scale of the current threat (Part One); - how the Department and others have responded to the threat (Part Two); and - the challenges and opportunities the Department and others face in reducing and preventing online fraud (Part Three). The report does not cover fiscal fraud, such as benefit fraud, committed against the government. This was covered in a National Audit Office report in 2016. In addition, this report does not cover the major international cyber attack which occurred in May 2017 when we were finalising this report. The incident affected the NHS and other organisations in the UK and shows the serious risk and challenges that cyber crime presents to the UK government as well as citizens and businesses. Details: London: NAO, 2017. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Online-Fraud.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Online-Fraud.pdf Shelf Number: 146594 Keywords: Computer CrimesCybercrimeFraudInternet CrimesOnline FraudOnline Victimization |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Refugees: Actions Needed by State Department and DHS to Further Strengthen Applicant Screening Process and Assess Fraud Risks Summary: Increases in the number of USRAP applicants approved for resettlement in the United States from countries where terrorists operate have raised questions about the adequacy of applicant screening. GAO was asked to review the refugee screening process. This report (1) describes what State and DHS data indicate about the characteristics and outcomes of USRAP applications, (2) analyzes the extent to which State and RSCs have policies and procedures on refugee case processing and State oversees RSC activities, (3) analyzes the extent to which USCIS has policies and procedures for adjudicating refugee applications, and (4) analyzes the extent to which State and USCIS have mechanisms in place to detect and prevent applicant fraud. GAO reviewed State and DHS policies, analyzed refugee processing data and reports, observed a nongeneralizable sample of refugee screening interviews in four countries in 2016 (selected based on application data and other factors), and interviewed State and DHS officials and RSC staff. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that State (1) develop outcome-based indicators to measure RSC performance and (2) monitor against these measures; USCIS (1) enhance training to temporary officers, (2) develop a plan to deploy additional officers with national security expertise, and (3) conduct regular quality assurance assessments; and State and DHS jointly conduct regular fraud risk assessments. State and DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-706: Accessed August 24, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686310.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686310.pdf Shelf Number: 146888 Keywords: Asylum Seekers FraudRefugees |
Author: Kroll Title: Global Fraud & Risk Report: Forging New Paths in Times of Uncertainty. 10th Annual Edition Summary: Businesses saw a significant rise in fraud and risk incidents during 2016. Although companies have taken significant strides toward building resiliency, more is needed. We have expanded the scope of this year's Report - it's now the annual Kroll Fraud & Risk Report, breaking out specific cyber and security threats to better reflect the growing challenges that our clients are facing around the world. The 2017/2018 Kroll Global Fraud & Risk Report, based on a survey commissioned by Kroll and carried out by Forrester Consulting, shares the experiences of executives worldwide. As in prior years, the Kroll Report includes detailed analyses for fraud-, cyber-, and security-related incidents by major industries and by regions We believe you will find the knowledge and insight contained in this year's Kroll Report to be valuable in your organization's efforts to anticipate, detect, mitigate, and respond to current and emerging risks. Key survey findings include: All-time high incidence levels. Businesses reported all-time high levels of fraud (84%), cyber (86%), and security (70%) incidents. Information increasingly targeted. For the first time in the Kroll Report's 10-year history, information theft, loss, or attack was the most prevalent type of fraud experienced (29%). Greater concerns over potential risk exposure. More than ever, executives say their companies are vulnerable to fraud, cyber, and security risks. Details: Kroll, 2018. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed February 6, 2018 at: http://www.hippogriff.tech/docs/Kroll%20Global%20Fraud%20Risk%20Report%202017-18.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://www.hippogriff.tech/docs/Kroll%20Global%20Fraud%20Risk%20Report%202017-18.pdf Shelf Number: 149011 Keywords: Crimes Against BusinessCybercrimeFraud |
Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Tightening the net: The Metropolitan Police Service's response to online theft and fraud Summary: The internet is changing the nature of crime -- The internet has revolutionised the way that we live our lives. But it has also changed the way that criminals operate: increasingly, there is a cyberdimension to almost all types of crime. Our investigation focused on how the internet has enabled criminals to commit acquisitive crimes - those that involve taking goods or money from a victim - in different ways. We found that, while crimes such as burglary are falling, a whole new collection of online crimes have emerged. One crime in particular has been transformed by the internet: fraud. Around 70 per cent of frauds are now "cyber-enabled" and the internet provides an opportunity for fraudsters to expand their activities on a huge scale. Unlike in the past, fraudsters can target large numbers of victims, often at next to no cost. The types of online scams are wide-ranging. Cyber-criminals tailor frauds to the individual; as one expert told us, we are all at risk. We do not know enough about the perpetrators of online crime. What is clear is that cyber-criminals do not fit into a typical mould. Organised crime groups are responsible for an element of online crime in London. But - in addition to these groups - many local, known criminals have expanded their day-to-day criminal activities into London's cyberspace. Computer literacy is no barrier to becoming a cyber-criminal - in fact, you need no more skill than to be able to log on. This, combined with a lower personal risk of being caught, makes online crime appealing to another, perhaps less expected, group of perpetrators: those new to crime. Committing crime using the internet offers anonymity - many would not commit a similar crime if it involved face-to-face contact with the victim. Like the perpetrators of online crime, its victims no longer fit into a typical group or category. Our research found that victims came from different ethnic groups, social grades and areas of London. We also found that becoming a victim of an online crime can be just as distressing as if it were a traditional crime, even when there has been no financial loss. Even the mere thought that someone had impersonated or tricked them can cause a great deal of stress for the victim. A greater understanding and sensitivity to victims' experiences will be an essential part of the police's response to online crime. We do not know the extent of online theft and fraud Crime statistics should help us to measure the extent - and the trend - of online crime. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) uses two headline measures for trends in total crime over time: police-recorded crime and the Crime Survey for England and Wales. Both sets of data tell a similar story crime in England and Wales has fallen sharply in the last decade. But both measures contain flaws, not least that they are failing to capture a range of crimes committed using the internet. Many online crimes will not appear in police-recorded statistics because often victims choose not to report crimes to the police in the first place. This may be because victims feel embarrassed at being tricked by a fraudster or that there is little the police can do to catch the perpetrator. Due to the hidden nature of many online frauds, often victims cannot report the offence immediately because they are unaware that it has been committed against them in the first place. The Crime Survey for England and Wales is not capturing trends in online crime either. It has failed to keep up as the public's experience of victimisation has evolved: the survey does not currently ask respondents about a range of crimes committed using the internet and excludes many crimes, such as fraud, from its headline results. The effect of this omission on the overall level of crime that the survey measures is significant. In light of the current limitations with both police-recorded crime and the Crime Survey, we commissioned our own victimisation survey to better understand the extent of online crime in London. Our findings paint an alarming picture of the balance between old and new crimes. Among the 1,004 Londoners we surveyed, we found that a higher proportion had been a victim of an online crime than of a more traditional form of property crime. Perceptions differ too: higher proportions of respondents felt online crimes have increased in recent years relative to traditional crimes. And respondents were also more worried about online crimes than they were traditional crimes. The police should reflect on our results as it develops its approach to online crime. The police service has been slow to respond to the emergence of online crime The police are behind the curve when it comes to tackling online crime. The research base for policing the cyber-threat is not as well developed as in other areas of policing and, in some cases, there is a lack of appetite among police forces and officers to tackle offences such as cyber-fraud, often not seen as exciting crimes to investigate. In order to improve the police service's response, the Government changed the system for reporting fraud. Action Fraud - the UK's national reporting centre for fraud and internet crime - has had a number of successes, such as improving the level of crime reporting and the ways in which positive outcomes are sought for victims. But, while the new system represents an improvement on that which preceded it, one problem stands out: there is still a need to raise awareness among the public - and even among parts of the police - about Action Fraud. To increase reporting of crime in London, the Mayor, MOPAC and the Met should all work with the City of London Police to help to raise awareness about online crime and the role of Action Fraud. Better co-operation between the police and other organisations is needed as well. The police service has claimed that banks and others do not routinely report offences because they do not wish to reveal how vulnerable they are. Some have argued that these and other organisations should be encouraged or even compelled to share fraud data with law enforcement agencies. MOPAC and the Met have started to take the problem seriously The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) recognises that online crime is a significant problem in London. So far, MOPAC's approach has focused mainly on online crimes against businesses. This is important: some small businesses are particularly vulnerable. But MOPAC must not let the Met lose focus on individual victims of online crime. And, to help the Met to avoid viewing cyber-crime in isolation, all MOPAC's future strategies should directly address pertinent internet risks, something missing in its recently published Hate Crime Reduction Strategy for London. Like MOPAC, the Met is also aware of the difficulty in tackling online crime. It has created a new Fraud and Linked Crime Online (FALCON) command, with substantially increased resources, to reduce the harm caused by fraud and cyber-criminals in London. Given the potential scale of online crime, FALCON must make choices to meet this objective and secure the best value for money from its resources. Since many online crimes do not align with policing, national or international boundaries, enforcing the law can be difficult. As the FALCON command matures, it needs to develop its methods for disrupting criminals and preventing crimes from happening in the first place. It must also build a workforce with the right balance between police officers and civilian staff: piling in loads of uniformed officers is not the way to deal with online fraud. One of the reasons that many victims of online crime do not report the offence to the police is that they do not think the police will do anything about it. In order to show that they are taking online crime seriously, MOPAC and the Met need to demonstrate that they are making a difference. Measuring the level of online victimisation through prevalence surveys is perhaps the most effective way of doing that. We ask that MOPAC collects data in its future surveys and publishes the results on a regular basis. The Met faces challenges in the future The Met's decision to establish a new command to tackle fraud and online crime clearly demonstrates that it is taking these threats seriously. But this approach is not without risks. We are concerned that the FALCON command might become siloed from the rest of the Met. Given that that there is increasingly a cyber-dimension to almost all crimes, the Met needs to ensure that all of its officers and staff are as comfortable policing London's cyberspace as they are London's streets; it must not be left to specialists alone. Both inside and outside of the FALCON command, the Met needs to determine what skills and training its workforce needs to tackle the challenge of online crime. Aside from formal training, we heard that the Xbox and PlayStation generation of police officers are already well prepared to fight online crime. The Met should tap into this resource which is already among its ranks. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Tightening%20the%20net_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Tightening%20the%20net_0.pdf Shelf Number: 149034 Keywords: Acquisitive CrimesComputer CrimeCybercrimeFraudInternet CrimeOnline VictimizationProperty CrimeTheft |
Author: Newman, Graeme R. Title: Identity Theft Summary: This guide addresses identity theft, describing the problem and reviewing factors that increase the risks of it. It then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze your local problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem, and what is known about them from evaluative research and police practice. The term identity fraud is sometimes used to include the whole range of identity theft related crimes (Economic Crime Institute 2003). Identity theft is a new crime, facilitated through established, underlying crimes such as forgery, counterfeiting, check and credit card fraud, computer fraud, impersonation, pickpocketing, and even terrorism. It became a federal crime in the United States in 1998, with the passage of the Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act.1 This act identifies offenders as anyone who ...knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law. A significant feature of identity theft is the offender's repeated victimization of a single person. This may include repeatedly using a stolen credit card, taking over a card account, or using stolen personal information to open new accounts. A victimization survey conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that 16 percent of victims whose credit cards were misused said the people responsible had also tried to "take over" the accounts by doing such things as changing the billing address or adding themselves to the card as an authorized user (Federal Trade Commission 2003a).[Full Text] Congressional hearings on identity theft in the 1990s revealed that police generally did not regard those whose identities had been stolen as the true victims, since the credit card companies took the financial loss. In addition, the companies typically did not report their losses to local police (or to anyone else, for that matter). Studies also showed that victims rarely reported the loss or theft of a card to the police, since they believed that the card company would cover the loss. However, because the repeated use of a victim's identity caused serious disruption and emotional damage, more victims began to report the offense. It is likely that your initial exposure to identity theft will be the request of a victim for a police report about the incident. Credit-reporting agencies now require that victims do so as part of the an "identity theft affidavit." that the victim submit a police report. Until recently, victims had a hard time getting such reports from the police. However, in response to growing media coverage and congressional testimony concerning identity theft, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) adopted a resolution in 2000 urging all police departments to provide incident reports and other assistance to identity theft victims. It is also possible that people you have stopped or questioned have given you a fake ID-or a legitimate ID acquired with a false or forged document. - WHEREAS, reports of identity theft to local law enforcement agencies are often handled with the response 'please contact your credit card company,' and often no official report is created or maintained, causing great difficulty in accounting for and tracing these crimes, and leaving the public with the impression their local police department does not care... RESOLVED, that the International Association of Chiefs of Police calls upon all law enforcement agencies in the United States to take more positive actions in recording all incidents of identity theft and referring the victims to the Federal Trade Commission..." (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000). It is difficult, though not impossible, for local police to influence some important factors that contribute to identity theft. These concern the ways that businesses and government agencies manage clients' personal information (for example, the procedures your motor vehicle department uses to authenticate driver's license applications); and the policies and practices of financial institutions in dealing with fraud (for example, the ease with which they provide applicants with credit cards and convenience checks). That said, this guide will help you determine what you can do to prevent identity theft and help victims in your jurisdiction. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2--4. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific Guides Series No. 25: Accessed May 21, 2018 at: http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/Identity_Theft.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/Identity_Theft.pdf Shelf Number: 94153 Keywords: Credit Card Theft FraudIdentity Theft |
Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Identity crime and misuse in Australia: Results of the 2016 online survey Summary: Identity crime involving misuse of personal information is arguably one of the most prevalent criminal activities in Australia, affecting individuals, businesses and government agencies alike. It is estimated that identity crime affects hundreds of thousands of Australians each year (AGD 2016). In April 2007, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to the National Identity Security Strategy to protect the identities of Australians in a more regulated and efficient way. This arose out of emerging evidence at the time that large numbers of Australians experience misuse of their personal information for criminal purposes each year (Cuganesan & Lacey 2003; OAIC 2007). The strategy sought to enhance identification and verification processes throughout Australia and to develop other measures to combat identity crime, including the creation of a national Document Verification Service to verify the authenticity of identity credentials and the development of reliable, consistent and nationally interoperable biometric security measures for use in all jurisdictions (AGD 2012). The strategy also recognised the need to quantify the nature and extent of identity crime and misuse of personal information, particularly the victimisation experiences of Australians. It recommended the creation of an identity crime and misuse longitudinal measurement framework that could be used to measure the effectiveness of policy and practice throughout Australia. As part of the measurement framework, large-scale surveys have been conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) to determine respondents' experiences of victimisation-over their lifetime and during the preceding 12 months-and their perceptions of the risk of identity crime in the ensuing 12 months. This report presents the results of the latest identity crime and misuse survey, undertaken by the AIC in May 2016. It updates information obtained in earlier surveys, undertaken in 2013 and 2014, and provides an indication of how the identity crime and misuse of personal information environment has changed in Australia since 2013. Future surveys will continue to track not only changes in victimisation rates but also the economic impact of identity crime and misuse. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Statistical Report 06: Accessed May 29, 2018 at: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr6 Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr6 Shelf Number: 159376 Keywords: Crime StatisticsFraudIdentity TheftVictimization |
Author: Bangpan, Mukdarut Title: Fraud and error in financial, welfare and revenue services: A Systematic Map of the empirical research evidence with particular reference to 'notification of changes of circumstances' Summary: The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) recognises that, in order to meet its strategic objectives, it is crucial to pay the right amount of benefit to the right person at the right time. During 2008/09, the DWP spent approximately L135.6 billion on benefits, of which it is estimated that about two per cent (L2.7 billion) was overpaid due to fraud and error. Recent estimates suggest that there were about L550 million of over-payments of Income Support (IS) and Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) (about five per cent of total spending on this type of benefit), L770 million on Housing Benefit (HB) (about 4.5 per cent of the total) and L340 million on Pension Credit (about 4.6 per cent of the total). Despite the increased measures undertaken to reduce fraud and error in the benefit system, the DWP acknowledges that new strategies for improving correctness of benefit payments are a priority. In the light of this official commitment to reducing overpayments, there is considerable interest in the process of notifying a 'change of circumstances (CoCs)' and in potential strategies to reduce fraud and error. This project aimed to identify and describe existing research literature on issues within related fields of financial products/services, welfare provision, taxation, and tax credit systems. This review is part of a wider programme of systematic review work commissioned by the DWP and carried out by the EPPI-Centre. Methodology The review described in this report is a 'systematic map' of the research evidence. The map does not aim to provide an answer to a specific policy question. Instead, the aim is to answer a question about the scope, nature and content of empirical research that has been carried out on a particular topic. This means that the question is broad, searching is extensive, and the results are presented in the form of a descriptive analysis of the research literature in the field. The mapping exercise followed a standardised systematic review process designed to minimise bias in the identification, selection and coding of primary studies. The results of this systematic map are derived from studies that explored people's attitudes towards financial products/services, welfare provision, and/or taxation/tax credit systems, and studies that investigated intervention programmes or initiatives aiming to reduce fraud and error. Details: Leeds: Corporate Document Services, 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper 97: Accessed August 3, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214394/WP97.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214394/WP97.pdf Shelf Number: 151017 Keywords: Financial CrimeFraudTax FraudWelfare Fraud |
Author: Kroll Title: Anti-Bribery and Corruption Benchmarking Report - 2018. Converging Third Party Risks: Regulation, Reputation, and Information Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In today's global, hyper-connected economy, we find anti-bribery and corruption programs in the midst of an evolution that is driven by converging organizational risks and priorities. Regulatory mandates, critical reputational factors, and data security issues are increasingly intertwined as compliance teams strive to protect their organizations from ABC risks. The common thread running through all these risks is the high volume of direct and indirect third parties that partner with and supply services to organizations. Forty-five percent of respondents work with at least 1,000 third parties per year, a six percentage point increase over the 2017 Report. Individually, regulatory, reputational, and data security risks are persistent challenges that compliance and ethics professionals know very well. The convergence of these risks is driving greater collaboration between the organization's compliance and information security teams, which can make for stronger, more compliant anti-bribery and corruption programs. Leadership engagement, always a key and essential contributor to program effectiveness, is especially critical for ensuring enterprise-wide support for compliance efforts. Doing business ethically and maintaining an up-to-date anti-bribery and corruption program is not just about avoiding the pitfalls of reputational or legal risk. Investors are finding that a focus on ethical business dealings can translate into rewarding financial outcomes. By way of example, the publicly traded companies among Ethisphere's 2018 World's Most Ethical Companies ("Honorees") outperformed U.S. Large Cap Indices by 4.88 percent over the last three years, demonstrating that ethics and performance are well-suited companions and valued in the marketplace. Despite the increased focus and engagement of organizational resources on compliance efforts, a staggering 93 percent of respondents believe their ABC risks will remain the same or worsen in 2018. Those who expect greater ABC risks attribute the rise to increased enforcement of existing regulations, followed closely by new regulations. Given these expanding regulatory pressures, a holistic, multidisciplinary approach may hold the key to sustainable improvements in the future. Some key findings from our study include: ABC PROGRAMS: ONGOING CHALLENGES Overall, the results of this year's survey were consistent with those in our last report; namely, that third party risks - particularly reputational issues - were of greatest concern to respondents. In a shift from last year, however, respondents singled out increased enforcement of existing regulations along with the prospect of new regulations as the top reasons why they expect their anti-bribery and corruption risks to grow in 2018. A significant percentage of respondents continue to worry that they are not prepared to address the risks that their third parties present. Indeed, 58 percent of respondents uncovered legal, ethical, or compliance issues with a third party after initial due diligence. Most often, organizations' due diligence practices - such as ongoing and active monitoring - are responsible for bringing these issues to light. However, in a growing number of cases, third parties are self-disclosing infractions, a clear reflection of changing cultural and regulatory trends, including heightened concerns over personal liability. Risk-based segmentation, ongoing monitoring that incorporates regular data refresh, and periodic program evaluations have emerged as best-practice features of effective anti-bribery and corruption programs. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE RISKS ON THE RISE The most notable year-over-year change in survey responses was the increased concern over opaque ownership structures, which rose this year to become the third most common reason why third parties are failing to meet an organization's standards. However, current mitigation efforts have not translated into confidence for compliance teams: less than a quarter of respondents reported that they are very comfortable with their ability to effectively address the risks associated with beneficial ownership. A global expansion of regulatory mandates that demand attention to ownership is driving much of the greater focus on the matter. Broader societal expectations, however, are also playing a critical role; the potential for significant, long-lasting reputational damage has made the effort to track ownership an imperative. ABC AFTER ONBOARDING: ONGOING MONITORING AND DATA REFRESH In the fast-changing global marketplace, organizations cannot expect that a third party's risk profile and/or ownership will remain static after initial on-boarding due diligence. In fact, regulatory guidance has made ongoing monitoring an expectation for an effective and engaged anti-bribery and corruption program. However, there is no clear mandate as to what monitoring should entail or how often it should be done. To be expected - and consistent with prior data -respondents reported a number of different approaches to monitoring. This year, however, we introduced the topic of third party data refresh into our survey and found many organizations using the practice to one degree or another. Refreshing baseline information on their third-party universe can help ensure organizations are conducting diligence or other monitoring practices corresponding with the actual risk presented by their third parties. With anti-bribery and corruption programs increasingly driven by technology, data integrity is a growing factor in risk mitigation and defense. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Virtually the same percentage of respondents reported their organizations had engaged in M and A activity in 2017 as did in the prior year (62 percent and 67 percent, respectively). However, M and A continues to challenge compliance professionals from an anti-bribery and corruption perspective. The data shows that respondents are still not consistently meeting regulatory guidance, which expects organizations to thoroughly understand who they are acquiring. Similar to last year, respondents report collecting less information on the third parties of their transaction targets than on direct third parties. In a more positive development, Kroll experts have noted that some organizations, particularly those looking to be acquired, are turning this exercise into a competitive advantage. "Clean-up" work on their own third-party universe or supply chains can help make target companies more attractive to buyers and accelerate the transaction process. NEW RESOURCES EMERGE AS ABC AND ENTERPRISE RISKS CONVERGE A convergence of risk factors - specifically regulatory, reputational, and data security - is driving home the realization that greater collaboration and support from resources across the enterprise can help anti-bribery and corruption programs better mitigate risks. Increasingly stringent data privacy laws - including the imminent adoption of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - are making information - gathering on third parties a minefield. Across all survey respondents, 85 percent described themselves as somewhat or very concerned about data security risks. Meanwhile, mobile technology and applications such as WhatsApp and WeChat are creating internal vulnerabilities. Growing collaboration between compliance and information security/technology teams is proving instrumental in making due diligence efforts compliant and comprehensive. Overall, ABC programs are receiving greater investments from their organizations; however, nearly half of this year's respondents (47 percent) feel they need more resources. Measuring the effectiveness of programs can be the key to ensuring appropriate funding levels. Indeed, the survey data shows a link between program measurement and high levels of leadership engagement, which plays a critical role in anti-bribery and corruption program effectiveness. Beyond regulatory compliance, leaders are aiming to safeguard brands and organizational reputations. Details: New York: 2018. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.kroll.com/en-us/abc-report Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://1okg7q3ipr08ql7es2x3ip4634-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Kroll_2018_ABC_Report_Digital.pdf Shelf Number: 154046 Keywords: ABC ProgramsAnti-BriberyBribery Bribes Corruption Crimes Against BusinessesFinancial Crimes FraudGeneral Data Protection RegulationSecurity Risks |
Author: Pattison, Deborah Title: Safeguarding Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Whistleblower Protections and Tips Hotlines in Special-Purpose and Local Governments Summary: Savvy and opportunistic fraudsters increasingly target smaller governmental organizations. Insufficient transparency and disjointed accountability over controls nurture the hidden nature of occupational fraud and allow wrongdoing to escalate during decades of routine operations. Criminal sentencings confirm local government and education officials misusing their positions and placing their own interests above those of their communities. Both primary case studies - a municipal crime in the City of Dixon, Illinois and corruption inside Roslyn, New York's Union Free School District - illustrate how embezzling more than $65 million remained undetected over thirty years until tip disclosure. The extension of unmerited trust created insufficient segregation of duties among employees and low monitoring left public resources vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption. The project holds ternary importance for risk management since one-third of small entities experience fraud, traditional external auditing identifies fraud in less than five percent of instances, and receiving anonymous tips through reporting hotlines improves detection by up to 20% and reduces losses (ACFE, 2016). The project examined stakeholder speak-up strategies including whistleblower protections and tips hotline (WP&TH) initiatives to understand how organizational context, willful blindness, information access, and citizen engagement affect local governments focus on fraud detection and remediation. Case studies show WP&TH initiatives to be financially and operationally superior in identifying risk and promoting transparency in small local governments. Third-party, 24/7 call centers and anonymous, two-way dialog web/text are underutilized tools for recognizing fraud precursors and stopping them before they aggregate, escalate, or become institutional norm. Details: New York, NY: Utica College, 2017. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019 at: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1985001622.html?FMT=ABS Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1985001622.html?FMT=AI Shelf Number: 154134 Keywords: Abuse of AuthorityAccountabilityCorruptionEmbezzlementFraudRisk ManagementTips HotlineWasteWhistleblower |
Author: Skidmore, Michael Title: More than Just a Number: Improving the Police Response to Victims of Fraud Summary: INTRODUCTION Fraud is estimated to make up 31 per cent of all crime in England and Wales, with 3.24 million fraud offences estimated to have taken place in the twelve months to March 2018. Research has found that 45 per cent of fraud victims felt that the financial loss they experienced had an impact on their emotional wellbeing and 37 per cent reported a significant psychological or emotional impact. Despite the scale and impact of the problem, it is widely agreed among policymakers, academics and law enforcement officials that fraud and the harms it causes are not prioritised by the police. This study is intended as a response to this imbalance between the scale and impact of fraud and the response it receives from policing. Its aim is to achieve a better understanding of the police response to fraud, to consider how appropriate this is and to suggest how policy and practice could be improved. To achieve this aim, the research set out to answer the following questions: - How is the police response to fraud organised across national, regional and local agencies? - How do police forces and partner agencies prioritise fraud? - Who is affected by fraud and what support is available to them? - How do the various organisations and agencies work together to respond to fraud and what roles and powers do they have to achieve this? - What impact has the internet had on the nature and volume of fraud? - What is being done to protect victims and identify vulnerability in local areas? - What determines whether the response to fraud is effective or not and what are the barriers to this? - Are there examples of emerging good practice which, if replicated, would improve the overall effectiveness of the response to fraud? In order to gain a full understanding of the subject, the research looked at the fraud response from both a local and national perspective. The majority of the locally based research was conducted in three police force areas - Avon and Somerset, Kent and Essex. Work included interviews with local practitioners, analysis of local data sets and a survey of the local police workforce. The research also included interviews with regional and national stakeholders, a survey of fraud leads across police forces across England and Wales and analysis of national fraud data sets. Details: London, UK: The Police Foundation, 2018. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2019 at: http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/publication/more-than-just-a-number-improving-the-police-response-to-victims-of-fraud/ Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/2017/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/more_than_just_a_number_exec_summary.pdf Shelf Number: 154180 Keywords: EnglandFinancial LossFraudLaw EnforcementPolice ResponsePolicing |
Author: Harrell, Erika Title: Victims of Identity Theft, 2016 Summary: Presents data on the prevalence and nature of identity theft against persons age 16 or older in 2016, including how victims discovered the crime; financial losses and other consequences; reporting the incident to credit card companies, credit bureaus, and police; the level of distress experienced by victims; lifetime prevalence rates of identity theft; and preventive action taken to reduce the risk of identity theft. Highlights: In 2016, 10% of persons age 16 or older had been victims of identity theft during the prior 12 months. For 85% of identity-theft victims, the most recent incident involved the misuse or attempted misuse of only one type of existing account, such as a credit card or bank account. One percent of persons age 16 or older had experienced the opening of a new account or misuse of personal information apart from misuse of an existing credit card or bank account or other existing account. An estimated 12% of identity-theft victims had out-of-pocket losses of $1 or more; 88% either had no out-of-pocket losses or had losses of less than $1. More than half (55%) of identity-theft victims who resolved associated financial or credit problems did so in one day or less. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2019. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2019 at: https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit16.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit16.pdf Shelf Number: 154654 Keywords: Crime Statistics FraudIdentity Theft Victims of Crime |