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Date: April 18, 2024 Thu
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37 results foundAuthor: Bergen, Peter Title: ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism Summary: On Friday, November 13, 2015, France had its 9/11. At least 129 people were killed at multiple locations in and around Paris, including a concert hall, a soccer stadium, and a popular restaurant, the kinds of venues that ordinary Parisians flock to on a Friday night. At, or near, these venues the attackers deployed a mix of terrorist tactics, including multiple suicide attackers, an assault using more than one gunman willing to fight to the death, hostage-taking, and bombings. In the years after 9/11, we have seen various forms of this terrible news story play out before: the multiple bombs on trains in Madrid that killed 191 in 2004; a year later, the four suicide bombings in London that killed 52 commuters; the attacks in Mumbai by 10 gunmen willing to fight to the death in 2008, who killed 166; and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015 that killed 12 people. The attackers in Paris seemed to have learned lessons from all these attacks. French President Francois Hollande blamed ISIS for the Paris attacks. It is still early in the investigation, but already leading media outlets are reporting that as many as six French nationals who have been identified as among the perpetrators of the attacks had traveled to Syria, while one of the leaders of the attack is a Belgian citizen who also spent time in Syria. According to French prosecutors, one of the attackers identified by fingerprints is a French national known to police, and a Syrian passport was found on one of the bodies of the attackers. Hitherto, the only case of a Western fighter in Syria returning and conducting a deadly terror attack in the West was French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche, who is accused in the May 24, 2014, shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, that left four people dead. Returning militants like Nemmouche are a worrying source of terror attacks. And two major factors place Europe at far greater risk of "returnee" violence from veterans of the Syrian conflict than the United States - the much larger number of European militants who have gone to fight in Syria and the existence of more developed jihadist networks in Europe. So who exactly are the estimated 4,500 Westerners who have been drawn to join ISIS and other militant groups in Syria and how great of a threat do they pose? In order to provide some answers to that question, New America collected information on 474 individuals from 25 Western countries who have been reported by credible news sources as having left their home countries to join ISIS or other Sunni jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq. Details: Washington, DC: New America, 2015. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2015 at: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Shelf Number: 137432 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISSuicide BombingTerroristTerrorists |
Author: Grantham, David Title: Shutting Down ISIS' Antiquities Trade Summary: The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, reminded the world that the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is at war with western civilization. The U.S. government desperately needs a more comprehensive strategy for combating this threat than simply drone warfare and piecemeal deployments of "specialized expeditionary targeting forces." And a top priority of a new, broader campaign should be the destruction of ISIS' financial networks. ISIS and Antiquities. ISIS poses a national security threat to the United States primarily because of the resources it commands. The organization boasts an impressive network of revenue streams, ranging from oil proceeds and racketeering profits to money seized from local banks. But ISIS also profits from its lucrative trade in pilfered Roman, Greek, and other antiquities found in Syria and northern Iraq. This lucrative operation presents a national security dilemma because it helps fund ISIS's international war machine. The U.S. government and international bodies have tried in the past to undermine the global trade in looted antiquities by international conventions that disallow signatory countries from participating in the theft and transportation of looted antiquities. But the illegal antiquities market remains notoriously difficult to regulate. Moreover, officials often treat the illegal antiquities trade as a victimless crime run by criminal organizations. Few acknowledge the definitive links between illegal antiquities and terrorism. The challenges of enforcement and lack of attention keeps the market for illicit antiquities strong. This Is Not a Recent Phenomenon. During World War II, Nazis looted public and private collections from across Europe. Looters reaffirmed the importance of the antiquities market by ransacking regional museums in Iraq in the wake of the First Gulf War. Between the end of the war in 1991, and 1994, eleven museums lost 3,000 artifacts and 484 manuscripts to theft. A majority have yet to be recovered. Years later, the Taliban earned a reputation as a broker of Afghan antiquities, even though it spent enormous time and energy destroying historical landmarks throughout the country. Al Qaeda was also involved in the trade. In 1999, Mohamed Atta, who piloted the plane that crashed into Tower Two of the World Trade Center, tried to sell Afghan antiquities to a German university professor. Atta "claimed that he was selling artifacts in order to purchase an airplane." The Iraqi museums looted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 only reiterated the national security implications surrounding unprotected antiquities. As of 2008, authorities have only recovered about 6,000 of the 15,000 items stolen. Experts fear that Al-Qaeda offshoots like ISIS are today selling some of the unaccounted for antiquities to fund their terrorist operations. Details: Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief No. 185: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Shelf Number: 137760 Keywords: AntiquitiesIllegal TradeISISIslamic StateNational SecurityTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Blanchard, Christopher M. Title: The Islamic State and U.S. Policy Summary: The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that controls large areas of Iraq and Syria, has adherents in several other countries, and disrupts regional and international security with violence and terrorism. A series of terrorist attacks attributed to the group outside of Iraq and Syria has demonstrated IS supporters' ability to threaten societies in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States, including in countries with sophisticated and capable intelligence and security forces. The U.S.-led campaign to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) appears to be entering a new phase in early 2016, as Administration officials implement planned changes in military strategy and tactics, pursue new diplomatic and coalition building initiatives, and consider alternative proposals. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria remain focal points in this regard, but a series of terrorist attacks inspired or directed by the Islamic State have claimed hundreds of lives on four continents since November 2015, creating a more global sense of urgency about combatting the group and reversing its spread. The group has stated its intent to attack inside the United States, and the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, have been attributed to IS supporters who did not have apparent links to the organization but were praised by the group. Debate continues over whether IS elements overseas have the capability to direct, support, and/or carry out further attacks in the United States. The group's statements suggest it seeks to provoke reactions from targeted populations and spur confrontations between various Muslim sects and between Muslims and non-Muslims. The interdependent nature of the conflicts and political crises in Iraq, Syria, and other countries where IS fighters operate complicate efforts to address and eliminate the IS threat. President Obama has stated that the goals of U.S. strategy are to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State using various means including U.S. direct military action and support for local partner forces. U.S. military operations against the group and its adherents in several countries, as well as U.S. diplomatic efforts to reconcile Syrian and Iraqi factions, are ongoing. Parallel U.S. political and security efforts in North Africa, West Africa, and South Asia also seek to mitigate local IS-related threats. This report provides background on the Islamic State organization, discussing its goals, operations, and affiliates, as well as analyzing related U.S. legislative and policy debates. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R43612: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Shelf Number: 137859 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateMuslimsRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence Summary: Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), looks at the Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 in the context of rivalry among Indonesian ISIS leaders in Syria and different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. The bombing and shooting in Indonesia's capital killed four civilians and four terrorists. The Jakarta attack is now known to have been locally organised - not directed from Syria as originally thought - but it almost instantly resulted in instructions from a Syria-based leader to his followers to do one better," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. "Leaders of Indonesia's tiny pro-ISIS camp are competing to prove their fighting credentials." The report examines how these rivalries emerged. The Jakarta attack appears to have been carried out by members of a group known as Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK), whose ideological leader is detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman has fallen out with the top Indonesian in Syria, Bahrumsyah, who commands Katibah Nusantara, the main Indonesian-Malaysian military unit in ISIS. He is close to Bahrumsyah's rival, Abu Jandal, who heads a dissident unit. Bahrumsyah is the Indonesian with best access to central ISIS leaders and funds, but the fact that official ISIS media claimed credit for the Jakarta attacks may have boosted Abu Jandal's position. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No.25: Accessed march 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Shelf Number: 138035 Keywords: ExtremistsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Ubaydi, Muhammad Title: The group that calls itself a state : understanding the evolution and challenges of the Islamic State Summary: In an attempt to paint a more complete picture of the Islamic State (IS), this report identifies key areas where the IS has shown strength, learning, and adaptation. This report also highlights key areas of weakness, mistake, and failure. In doing so, the reader should be well aware that this product provides such an overview with the explicit understanding that there is more to learn in each of these areas. The report proceeds as follows. The first section traces the historical evolution of the group, with emphasis on the fact that well executed design and an ability to take advantage of accidents led to the creation of the IS. The second section provides a very brief and preliminary comparison of the IS to other prominent militant organizations against which the United States has fought: al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. This section is followed by a third that outlines and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the IS as a whole, noting that the IS's success comes from its ability to leverage all parts of its organization to achieve maximum gain. This section also points out that, despite this success, the fact that the IS is attempting to operate across multiple functional areas will test the group's ability to adapt over time and will ultimately expose the group's shortcomings. The fourth and final section steps back to examine, at the strategic level, some of the challenges faced and opportunities available to those combating the IS. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Shelf Number: 138260 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Shatz, Howard J. Title: The Islamic State We Knew: Insights Before the Resurgence and Their Implications Summary: The group calling itself the Islamic State poses a grave threat, not just to Iraq and Syria but to the region more broadly and to the United States and its global coalition partners. A deadly and adaptive foe, the Islamic State seemed to come out of nowhere in June 2014, when it conquered Mosul. However, the Islamic State of today is the direct descendant of a group that Iraq, the United States, and their partners once fought as al-Qa'ida in Iraq and then as the Islamic State of Iraq. The wealth of publicly available information about the group indicates that the Islamic State's reemergence in 2014, and especially its methods and goals, should not have come as a surprise, although the strength and scope of that reemergence were rightfully shocking. The history considered in this report provides information known by the end of 2011 about the group's origins, finances, organization, methods of establishing control over territory, and response to airpower. Now that the Islamic State has reemerged, countering it can rely, in part, on the great deal of accumulated knowledge available. Because Iraqis and coalition forces routed the group once, the group's history can inform four components of a successful strategy against the Islamic State: degrading the group's finances, eliminating its leadership and potential leadership, creating a better strategy to hold recaptured territory, and making use of airpower. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Shelf Number: 138326 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateJihadistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The ISIS Impact on the Domestic Islamic Extremist Threat: Homegrown Islamic Extremism 2009-2015 Summary: In 2015, 80 U.S. residents were linked to terror plots and other activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology. They were either arrested, charged or otherwise publicly identified for their involvement in crimes ranging from providing support, attempting to fund or traveling to join terrorist groups abroad, or planning or assisting in plots here at home. This is a level of activity by U.S. residents inspired by foreign terrorist organizations never before seen. The 2015 numbers - up 180% from 2014 - are a result of a confluence of global trends, technological advances and the constant tide of terrorist messages and propaganda. In 2015 for the first time, nearly as many Americans were killed by domestic Islamic extremists as by white supremacists. And the spike in arrests and violence does not seem to be confined to 2015. In the first month of 2016, at least 6 U.S. residents were linked criminal activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideologies. Following on the heels of the record-breaking number of terror related arrests in 2015, these new arrests further underscore the persistent nature of the threat. Ongoing unrest in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war, continued to provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to operate and gain strength. As in 2014, the majority of the U.S. residents linked to terror in 2015 supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS or ISIL), which is based in Syria and Iraq and has affiliates in a number of other countries including Egypt, Libya and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, ISIS and other terrorist groups continue to take advantage of technology to mobilize followers, spread their messages and expand their influence worldwide. The internet and social media sites in particular, remain a pivotal element of the modern radicalization process. Online social interactions facilitate the spread of extremist messages - making them available to almost anyone, virtually anywhere - and create a climate where susceptible individuals are simultaneously targeted by recruiters and are able to develop remote networks that reinforce their burgeoning extremist allegiances. Understanding the progression of U.S. residents engaged in activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology can provide valuable insights into future security challenges. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Shelf Number: 138415 Keywords: Extremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Dodwell, Brian Title: The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail Summary: This report contains an analysis of over 4,600 unique Islamic State personnel records that were produced by the group primarily between early 2013 and late 2014. The importance of this data for understanding the Islamic State and, in particular, the foreign fighter flow, cannot be overstated. To put it simply, it is the largest cache of primary source documents produced by the Islamic State available in the open-source as of this date. These particular documents were acquired by NBC News from an Islamic State defector and subsequently provided to the CTC (and other entities). This report provides a window into the organization's global workforce, revealing information about foreign fighters' countries of origin, citizenship, points of entry into Syria, marital status, skills and previous occupations, education levels, religious knowledge, fighting role preferences in the group, and previous jihadist experience. In addition to analyzing the data at the macro-level, the report also highlights numerous anecdotes of individual fighters. Taken together, the analysis in this report reveals an organization that is attempting to vet new members, manage talent effectively within the organization, and deal with an incredibly diverse pool of recruits. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Shelf Number: 138704 Keywords: CaliphatesISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Robinson, Linda Title: Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for Adaptation Summary: This report assesses the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIL), focusing on the military and political lines of effort. The capabilities and motivations of the various counter-ISIL forces on the battlefield are assessed, as well as the U.S.-led efforts to provide training, equipment, advice, and assistance, including air support. While the campaign has degraded ISIL by targeting leadership and retaking a portion of territory, achieving lasting defeat of ISIL will be elusive without local forces capable of holding territory. Successful conclusion of the campaign will require significantly increased effort on two fronts. First, more-comprehensive training, advising, and assisting will be required to create more-capable, coordinated indigenous forces of appropriate composition and enable them to regain and hold territory. Second, political agreements must be forged to resolve key drivers of conflict among Iraqis and Syrians. Without these elements, resurgent extremist violence is likely. Many factors complicate the prospects for success, including sectarian divisions in Iraq, Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, the Syrian civil war, and Russian intervention to support the besieged regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, the Syrian regime also lacks sufficient competent local forces and is heavily reliant on external militia support. The government in Iraq, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, has pledged decentralization efforts to address Sunni concerns, but lacks sufficient Shia support to enact them. This report offers recommendations for a more comprehensive advisory approach, emphasizing the political line of effort, and achieving synergy between the military and political efforts. Key Findings U.S. Efforts to Bolster Counter-ISIL Forces Have Achieved Limited Results - The advisory effort was circumscribed by location, unit, and function. Lack of advisers at the operational level in Iraq and lack of support to Syrian opposition fighters limited effectiveness of indigenous forces. - The training effort was also limited: Some 20,000 Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces were trained in 18 months, including 2,000 Iraqi special operations personnel. Efforts to arm and train Sunni tribes were halting. Anti-ISIL Forces Suffer from Capability Gaps and Lack of Coordination Among Disparate Forces - Iraqi's military crumbled after the 2014 ISIL offensive due to cumulative weaknesses. - Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service carried the brunt of the fighting, suffering extensive casualties and materiel losses. - Shia militias, some of them advised and supported by Iran, were not integrated with the overall military effort. Effective command and control of the overall effort was lacking. - In Syria, most territory was retaken by the Syrian Kurdish militia, and other efforts such as the New Syrian Forces were inadequate in numbers and capability. Coordination was also lacking among Syrian forces. Detailed Political Strategies to Resolve Underlying Conflicts Were Not Developed and Not Synchronized with the Military Effort for Maximum Effect - The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi articulated proposals to address Sunni concerns, but insufficient Shia support was provided to implement them. U.S. senior-level engagement with Abadi was also limited. - No overarching Syria strategy was developed. Relying on Syrian Kurds has escalated tensions with Turkey dramatically and created concern among Syrian Arabs. Recommendations - More comprehensive advisory support from senior echelons through the brigade level to increase coordination of forces, morale, and leadership. - A long-term training and equipping effort will be required to create capable indigenous security forces that incorporate sufficient Sunnis. - The successful support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service provides a replicable model. - An unconventional warfare approach may regain Mosul and Raqqa from ISIL with less material damage by leveraging internal discontent and underground forces. - Syria's counter-ISIL effort cannot succeed in seizing and holding key terrain without Syrian Arabs; their support may require unified effort with the counter-Assad campaign. - Increased materiel aid to anti-Assad forces including tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless guided weapon systems and surface-to-air missiles may preserve the moderate opposition and create leverage in negotiating a transition under the Geneva terms. - The Abadi government and Shia parties should craft proposals with international support to resolve the political drivers of conflict in Iraq. Visible, high-level U.S. support to such detailed political proposals may include linkage with military support. - The United States should elevate its focus on advisory support to indigenous forces, not just eliminating ISIL leadership and resources. It should, above all, prioritize the political line of effort, backed by military measures. Syrian opposition fighters may become increasingly radicalized in the absence of greater U.S. commitment and coordination. U.S. allies have backed disparate opposition groups, increasing the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the Syrian opposition. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Shelf Number: 138893 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorist |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "We Feel We Are Cursed": Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya Summary: In February 2015 the extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) began taking over the Mediterranean port city of Sirte, Libya. By the following August ISIS had turned Sirte into its largest stronghold outside of Iraq and Syria. This report documents serious crimes committed by ISIS in Sirte including the executions of 49 people the group accused of "spying," "sorcery," and "insulting God." "We Feel We Are Cursed," based on research including interviews with 45 Libyans who lived under ISIS in Sirte, details how the group imposed its severe interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) on all aspects of life. Meanwhile, ISIS has failed to provide basic necessities to the local population, diverting food, medicine, fuel, and cash, along with homes of residents who fled, to its fighters and functionaries. With war-wracked Libya's institutions in near-collapse, countries able to exercise criminal jurisdiction should take immediate steps to apprehend and prosecute those responsible for atrocities by ISIS and other parties. The International Criminal Court should prioritize an investigation of ongoing serious crimes in Libya as well. The United Nations Human Rights Council should appoint an independent expert to document serious, ongoing abuses in Libya. The Security Council should impose sanctions on those found responsible for serious crimes in Libya while ensuring appropriate due process. International parties have repeatedly failed to act on their promises to identify and punish the perpetrators of serious crimes in Libya. Continued failure to act will result in more horrific crimes by groups including ISIS. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Libya URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 139336 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHuman Rights AbusesISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorists |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: Investing in Iraq's Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism Summary: According to new Mercy Corps research, the success of armed groups in Iraq - such as the Islamic State (ISIS) - is rooted less in deep-seated sectarianism than in poor governance. Where the government is perceived to be unjust, support for non-state armed actors among marginalized groups is high. But support for groups like ISIS can shift quickly and dramatically when public perceptions of government institutions and services improve. Forging a just, peaceful future for Iraq will require a comprehensive good governance approach. Building on a series of nationwide public opinion surveys between 2013 and 2015, and in-depth interviews with Iraqi citizens, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society leaders, government officials, and activists, this report finds that improving governance in Iraq will require new partnerships with civil society. The timing has never been better: civil society is gaining acceptance in Iraq and is increasingly seen as bridging the gap between citizens and government. But the clock is ticking. The rise of sectarian militias will likely present new challenges to the future of a cohesive state. Donor support for civil society and good governance in Iraq is waning. Meanwhile, popular goodwill toward the current government may diminish if meaningful reforms are not implemented. In popular demonstrations throughout the country, thousands of Iraqi youth have, in recent months, peacefully advocated for an end to sectarianism and corruption. Iraq must capitalize on this energy, or it risks antagonizing a new generation. Key findings 1. Poor governance that results in injustice, real or perceived, is a key driver of conflict: Iraq's instability is rooted in poor governance, not in ancient group rivalries. When marginalized groups begin to believe the government is going to be more responsive and fair, support for armed violence decreases. 2. While sectarianism is often incorrectly credited for being the main source of conflict, it is nonetheless a threat to future stability: As the violent conflict continues or escalates, sectarian divisions have the potential to increase as political opportunists-both domestic and foreign - stoke tensions to gain power. 3. Civil society is vital to improving governance and advancing reconciliation: Though civil society is playing a critical role bridging the gap between citizens and government, the key question is whether, in the face of rising expectations and frustrations, it can direct new energies into nonviolent change. 4. Iraqi youth, too often side-lined, are of vital importance to governance and civil society efforts: Iraq's political, social and economic future hinges on its youth. Building a peaceful future for Iraq will require empowering the country's youth and positively channeling their energies. Recommendations - Build a stronger cooperative relationship between civil society and government on key policy issues by formalizing relations with civil society actors and encouraging donors to commit multi-year investments in Iraqi civil society. - Improve the capacity of local actors to play an active role in good governance by engaging civil society partners more deeply in informing programs, and facilitating stronger relationships between youth activities and civil society. - Avert further conflict by ensuring governance investments are long-term and informed by local feedback, strengthening Iraq's Reconciliation Committee, and continuing to improve government responsiveness and accountability. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 139390 Keywords: Extremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspectives Summary: This Research Paper by Dr. Alex P. Schmid opens with a brief exposition of the foreign (terrorist) fighter (FTF) phenomenon, concentrating on Salafist jihadists and their astonishing growth after the Caliphate was proclaimed in mid-2014. The author then discusses various definitions of FTFs. Subsequently, Dr. Schmid seeks to bring structure and order into the widely diverging estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters. He then identifies problems posed by foreign fighters for European democracies with Muslim diasporas, focusing on the range of motivations driving vulnerable young men and women - mainly second generation immigrants and recent converts to Islam - to join the so-called "Islamic State". Having identified push and pull as well as resilience factors that facilitate or inhibit young Muslims joining ISIS, he argues that stopping them from departing to Syria is not enough; political solutions have to be sought. Details: The Hague: international Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Shelf Number: 139408 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateLone-Wolf TerrorismMuslimsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Johnston, Patrick B. Title: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 Summary: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 draws from more than 140 recently declassified documents to present a comprehensive examination of the organization, territorial designs, management, personnel policies, and finances of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), both predecessors of the Islamic State. These records paint a clear picture of ISI practices and standard operating procedures. Leadership consciously designed the organization not just to fight but also to build an Islamic state governed by the laws dictated by its strict Islamist ideology. ISI was a vertically integrated organization with a central management structure and functional bureaus. It sought to replicate these structures at multiple lower geographic levels across territory. Each geographic unit had substantial autonomy to pursue the group's strategic objectives but was required to send frequent reports to the group's leadership; the central organization used these reports to inform decisions and provide strategic guidance. ISI paid its personnel a wage that would draw true believers rather than opportunists; trained and allocated its membership with an eye toward group effectiveness; raised revenues locally through diversified sources; and was able to maintain itself, albeit at much reduced strength, in the face of a withering counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy put in place by its opponents, starting in late 2006. An analysis of the Islamic State predecessor groups is more than a historical recounting. The lessons from examining the group's history are useful for setting expectations about the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Islamic State and its ability to combat its opponents, designing a coordinated and effective campaign against it, and understanding why it might be able to survive such an effort and sustain itself in the future, albeit perhaps at a lower level of threat. Defeating the Islamic State will require persistence. The record of counter-ISI operations from 2006 through 2010 shows that military action and political accommodation can work together to degrade the group substantially, if not defeat it. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 348p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Shelf Number: 139437 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Cultural Property: Protection of Iraqi and Syrian Antiquities Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other groups have seized upon the conflicts in Iraq and Syria to destroy, loot, and traffic cultural property, including antiquities. According to the United Nations (UN), this destruction and looting has reached unprecedented levels. The UN has also reported that since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, ISIS has used the sale of looted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property to generate income to strengthen its capabilities to carry out attacks. Under the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, signed into law in 1983, and other laws, the United States has restricted the importation of certain, but not all, Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. GAO was asked to examine the protection of Iraqi and Syrian cultural property, including views of art market experts. This report describes (1) activities undertaken by U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian Institution to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property since 2011, and (2) art market experts' suggestions for improving U.S. government activities. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed U.S., international, and foreign officials. GAO interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of U.S.-based art market experts representing different categories of the art market to obtain suggestions for potentially improving U.S. government activities. GAO then asked experts to rate the importance of these suggestions and obtained U.S. officials' views on experts' top-rated suggestions. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-673: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679061.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679061.pdf Shelf Number: 140094 Keywords: AntiquitiesArt CrimesCultural PropertyISISIslamic StateLooting |
Author: Meitz, Eric Title: What About the Women? Understanding and Addressing the Problem of ISIS Female Recruitment in the Western Balkans Summary: In many ways, female recruits, both from the Western Balkans and other regions, are attracted to the Islamic State for the exact same reasons as men, highlights BCSP guest researcher Eric Mietz. This policy paper aims to bring attention to an oft-neglected security problem in the Western Balkans: women being recruited by and migrating to the Islamic State. The roles of women in the Islamic State and the messaging the group uses to lure women to migrate to Syria and Iraq are sufficiently different to warrant a gender-based perspective in countering violent extremism (CVE) policymaking. The first part of the paper looks at the numbers of women leaving from the Western Balkans to Islamic State-held territory, the profiles of women who migrate, and the roles they take on in the Islamic State. To explain why women are influenced to migrate, the second part examines the "push" and "pull" factors of Islamic State recruitment. The last part focuses on the efforts of Western Balkans governments to criminalize participation in or support of the Islamic State and the disadvantages of relying solely on this policy Details: Belgrade, Republic of Serbia: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Shelf Number: 140145 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadicalizationRecruitment, WomenTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Regional Risk Assessment on terrorism Financing 2016: South-East Asia & Australia Summary: The Syria-Iraq conflict and the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 have energised extremists and their sympathisers across South-East Asia and Australia. The region is also dealing with long-running domestic conflicts and insurgencies that share the characteristics of terrorism, even if they are not connected to ISIL or violent global extremism. This highly-charged and dynamic security environment has intensified terrorism financing risks in the region, posing new challenges for authorities. Small-cell terrorist activity, foreign terrorist fighter travel and the growing number of lone actors will see continued use of self-funding to raise funds and cash smuggling to move them. These proven, easy-to-use terrorism financing methods reduce the need for terrorists and their supporters to resort to more complex financial activity or adopt new payment systems. The region's porous land and close maritime borders, as well as informal cash-intensive economies, also influence the continued use of established methods. Terrorism financing funds flowing out of the region are currently channelled mainly into the Syria-Iraq conflict, but comprise only a small portion of international funding to factions fighting in that area. While outflows to foreign conflict zones pose a high risk, concern is growing over signs of funding entering the region to support local terrorist actors. Details: Canberra: AUSTRAC, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140160 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismISISIslamic StateRisk AssessmentTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremists |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Islamic State's Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement Summary: Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: - The Departed - Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. - The Returned - American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. - The Inspired - Americans lured - in part - by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests: - The Lost - Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. - The Others - Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad. Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following: - Watchlisting - the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. - Preemption - efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44521: Accessed September 6, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Shelf Number: 140169 Keywords: Foreign FightersHomeland SecurityISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Cassim Cachalia, Raesah Title: The dynamics of youth radicalisation in Africa: Reviewing the current evidence Summary: Youth radicalisation towards violent extremism is a global phenomenon that threatens peace, security and stability. This paper reviews the evidence on the factors that may contribute to the dynamics of youth radicalisation. Available findings from East Africa and the Horn of Africa, West Africa and the Sahel, and North Africa are used to understand the dynamics that may contribute to radicalisation and, potentially, to violent extremism. Many factors emerge including political, economic, social and individual factors. Religion, identity and gender also arise as topics for further analysis. Youth radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that cannot be attributed to any one explanation or set of factors. This paper recognises these complexities, offers recommendations and identifies additional issues that should be explored further. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 296: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140598 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Milton, Daniel Title: Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State's Media Efforts Summary: This report breaks down the Islamic State's media activities through a two-fold approach. First, it examines a small number of declassified documents captured from the group's predecessors to provide a baseline understanding its present-day media structure and operations. Second, through an examination of over 9,000 Islamic State official media products, this report offers detailed insight into what the group is saying and what a study of its propaganda can tell us about its strengths, weaknesses, and struggles. A number of findings emerge from these analyses. First, the Islamic State's media network is adaptive and complex. Second, the group publishes products on a variety of themes, only one of which has to do with the violence for which the group is so well-known. Third, the frequency of the group's products has declined significantly since its high-point in the summer of 2015. Fourth, the Islamic State's provincial media bureaus are not all equal in terms of their production content. Finally, although advances have been made in limiting the group's media activities, there is still more than can be done to limit the group's outreach efforts. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Shelf Number: 145442 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateSocial MediaTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Parvez, Tariq Title: The Islamic State in Pakistan Summary: - The Islamic State, or Daesh, formally established its Khorasan branch for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and nearby areas in January 2015. - There is currently no evidence of Daesh's central leadership directing terrorist activities in Pakistan, but its ideology has inspired individuals and groups to recruit, raise funds, and carry out attacks to demonstrate their support. - Daesh's far-reaching ideology -- which includes opposition to the Shia minority, the Pakistani state, and the West, and support for a global Islamic Caliphate - can make it appealing to both existing and potential militants in Pakistan. - A comprehensive response to this threat by the Pakistani government would include greater security cooperation with Afghanistan, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prioritizing police training in national counterterrorism strategies, and promoting programs to counter Daesh's dangerous ideology. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 2013: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 145074 Keywords: Extremist GroupsISISIslamist StateRadical GroupRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Amnesty International Title: 'Punished for Daesh's Crime': Displaced Iraqis Abused by Militias and Government Forces Summary: Paramilitary militias and government forces in Iraq have committed serious human rights violations, including war crimes, by torturing, arbitrarily detaining, forcibly disappearing and extrajudicially executing thousands of civilians who have escaped areas controlled by the armed group calling itself the Islamic State (IS), said Amnesty International in a new report published today. The report 'Punished for Daesh's crimes': Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces exposes the terrifying backlash against civilians fleeing IS-held territory, raising alarm about the risk of mass violations as the military operation to recapture the IS-held city of Mosul gets underway. The report is based on interviews with more than 470 former detainees, witnesses and relatives of those killed, disappeared or detained, as well as officials, activists, humanitarian workers and others. After escaping the horrors of war and tyranny of IS, Sunni Arabs in Iraq are facing brutal revenge attacks at the hands of militias and government forces, and are being punished for crimes committed by the group," said Philip Luther, Research and Advocacy Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International. "Iraq is currently facing very real and deadly security threats from IS, but there can be no justification for extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture or arbitrary detention. "As the battle to retake Mosul begins, it is crucial that the Iraqi authorities take steps to ensure these appalling abuses do not happen again. States supporting military efforts to combat IS in Iraq must demonstrate they will not continue to turn a blind eye to violations." The report highlights widespread revenge attacks and discrimination faced by Sunni Arabs suspected of being complicit in IS crimes or supporting the group. Many were displaced during major military operations in 2016 across the country, including in Falluja and surrounding areas (in the governorate of Anbar), al-Sharqat (Salah al-Din governorate), Hawija (Kirkuk governorate) and around Mosul (Ninewa governorate). The predominantly Shi’a militias involved in abuses, known as the Popular Mobilization Units, have long been backed by the Iraqi authorities, which have provided them with financial support and weapons. They were officially designated part of the Iraqi forces in February 2016. The government's responsibility for these violations cannot be ignored and states supporting or participating in the ongoing military effort to combat IS in Iraq should have rigorous checks in place to ensure that any support or equipment they provide does not contribute to abuses. Mass abductions, killings and torture Amnesty International's research reveals that war crimes and other gross human rights violations were committed by predominantly Sh'ia militias, and possibly government forces, during operations to retake Falluja and surrounding areas from IS in May and June 2016. In one shocking incident at least 12 men and four boys from the Jumaila tribe who fled al-Sijir, north of Falluja, were extrajudicially executed after they handed themselves in to men wearing military and federal police uniforms on 30 May. Men and older boys were separated from the women and younger children before being lined up and shot dead. At least 73 other men and older boys from the same tribe were seized a few days earlier and are still missing. Details: London: AI, 2016. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2016 at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/punished_for_daeshs_crimes.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/punished_for_daeshs_crimes.pdf Shelf Number: 145773 Keywords: Extrajudicial ExecutionsHuman Rights AbusesISISIslamic StateMilitiasTorture |
Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed. Title: Beyond Convergence: World Without Order Summary: The world order built upon the Peace of Westphalia is faltering. State fragility or failure are endemic, with no fewer than one-third of the states in the United Nations earning a "high warning" -- or worse -- in the Fragile States Index, and an equal number suffering a decline in sustainability over the past decade. State weakness invites a range of illicit actors, including international terrorists, globally networked insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The presence and operations of these entities keep states weak and incapable of effective governance, and limit the possibility of fruitful partnerships with the United States and its allies. Illicit organizations and their networks fuel corruption, eroding state legitimacy among the governed, and sowing doubt that the state is a genuine guardian of the public interest. These networks can penetrate the state, leading to state capture, and even criminal sovereignty. A growing number of weak and corrupt states is creating gaping holes in the global rule-based system of states that we depend on for our security and prosperity. Indeed, the chapters of this book suggest the emergence of a highly adaptive and parasitic alternative ecosystem, based on criminal commerce and extreme violence, with little regard for what we commonly conceive of as the public interest or the public good. The last 10 years have seen unprecedented growth in interactivity between and among a wide range of illicit networks, as well as the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of both terrorist and criminal groups. In a convergence of interests, terrorist organizations collaborate with cartels, and trafficking organizations collude with insurgents. International terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, engage energetically in transnational crime to raise funds for their operations. Prominent criminal organizations like Los Zetas in Mexico and D-Company in Pakistan have adopted the symbolic violence of terrorists—the propaganda of the deed—to secure their “turf.” And networked insurgents, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have adopted the techniques of both crime and terror. An Emerging Criminal Ecosystem The unimpeded trajectory of these trends -- convergence, hybridization, and state capture -- poses substantial risks to the national security interests of the United States, and threatens international security. Illicit networked organizations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system. Fragile and failing states are both prey to such organizations, which feed on them like parasites, and Petri dishes for them, incapable of supporting effective security partnerships. The Westphalian, rule-based system of sovereign polities itself is at risk of fraying, as fewer and fewer capable states survive to meet these challenges, and populations around the world lose faith in the Westphalian paradigm. The emergence of an alternative ecosystem of crime and violence threatens us all and much of the progress we have seen in recent centuries. This dark underworld weakens national sovereignty and erodes international partnerships. We should not take for granted the long-term durability of the Westphalian system. It was preceded by millennia of much less benign forms of governance, and alternative futures are imaginable. This book describes "convergence" (the interactivity and hybridization of diverse illicit networks), the emergence of new networks and new domains or "battlespaces," and the threat illicit networks pose to national and international security. It examines dystopian visions of a world in which these trajectories go indefinitely unimpeded, and concludes by discussing possible countermeasures to be explored. While some recognize the growing threat to the global system of governance that these new phenomena impose, others are skeptical. According to the conventional wisdom, TCOs and international terrorist organizations are unlikely candidates for partnership. Such analysis suggests that criminals are motivated by the pursuit of wealth in defiance of law, morality, or ideology. They typically prefer to remain undetected, and have little interest in the violence committed by, or risks taken by, international terrorists. Already pursued by law enforcement, criminals are not keen to receive the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency or SEAL Team Six. International terrorists and insurgents, on the other hand, are politically motivated; driven by ideological, religious, or nationalistic motives; and repelled by the vulgar materialism and greed of criminals. They have no desire to get on the radar of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or other national or international law enforcement agencies. This logic is understandable, and may have prevailed in previous times, but the evidence of extensive interconnectivity -- if not explicit partnership -- between TCOs, international terrorists, and globally networked insurgents is compelling. Recent research undertaken by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reveals that, "criminals and terrorists are largely subsumed (98 percent) in a single network as opposed to operating in numerous smaller networks."4 In its Performance Budget Congressional Submission for FY 2014, the DEA stated that by "the end of the first quarter of FY 2013, 25 of the 67 organizations on the Attorney Generals Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) List are associated with terrorist organizations." According to a more recent DEA statement, roughly half of the Department of State's 59 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations have been linked to the global drug trade. The six degrees of separation that may have once divided people is a relic of the past—today, international terrorists, insurgents, and criminals are merely a click away from each other. It might be argued that terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime have existed since time immemorial, and that their modern iterations represent nothing new. Such an argument naively discounts modern enablers such as information and communication technology, transportation advances, and the unprecedented volumes of money generated in illicit markets. These are game changers. They permit illicit actors to avail themselves of lethal technology, military-grade weaponry, real-time information, and professional services of the highest quality, including legal, accounting, technological, security, and paramilitary services. Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists and some insurgents, can now out-man, outspend, and outgun the governments of the countries where they reside. They can communicate across the globe in real time, using widely available and inexpensive technology. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attackers used satellite phones, internet communications, and global positioning systems, under the direction of Pakistan-based handlers to carry out an atrocious binge of murder and terror. The string of ISIL attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016 further illustrates the global consequences of this technological acceleration. International travel has never been easier or cheaper than it is today, and would-be terrorists, traffickers, launderers, and even assassins can fly nearly undetected from continent to continent, in the sea of traveling humanity. Though it is clear that this connectivity is widespread and threatens global security, the details of the agreements or arrangements between terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminal organizations remain murky. A partial exception to this is in instances where both organizations wish for new relationships to be known, such as the 1998 merger of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 Other relationships, such as between the FARC and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are opaque as neither organization has an interest in revealing the relationship. It is unclear in the majority of cases what kinds of partnerships these are, and we are often unable to discern whether such instances of cooperation are one-time affairs or longer-term arrangements. This lack of information handicaps our response and threatens global security. The purposeful opacity of illicit organizations presents a vexing challenge to mapping and understanding these actors. Operating by intention outside the vision of regulators or researchers, their activities and revenues are hidden. So how do we determine the magnitude of their operations, or the harm they inflict? How do we know the value of their transactions? We extrapolate from extremely inexact evidence, such as seizures, arrests, convictions, and the associated testimony of witnesses, often themselves members of such organizations and motivated to dissemble. Analysts still rely on the nearly 20-year-old "International Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range," of "$1 to $3 trillion" or "two to five percent" of global product. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, provided that estimate of the amount of money laundered annually across the globe. Given what we know about global trafficking in drugs, persons, weapons, counterfeits, and other contraband it seems unlikely that the value of illicit trade has decreased over the past 20 years. Even at a “mere” two to five percent of global product, Camdessus described the magnitude of the problem as “almost beyond imagination….”9 Less difficult, but still challenging and far more visceral to calculate, is the cost of global terrorism in human lives. At publication, the most recent estimates suggest that 2014 saw an increase of 35 percent in the number of terrorist attacks globally, with total fatalities rising to nearly 33,000 by some counts; 2015 is likely to mark another increase, as ISIL continues its brutal global campaign, and Boko Haram terrorizes the Lake Chad Basin.10 This does not take into account nonfatal injuries, the destruction of families and communities, and the economic costs. These cannot be monetized, but few would deny that the opportunity cost of the "global war on terror" (GWOT) has been huge. A 2008 estimate by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes put the long-term costs of the Iraq War at $3 trillion. The Cost of War Project puts the total economic cost of America's post-9/11 campaigns at $4.4 trillion through FY 2014.12 These two sets of costs -- the global illicit market plus the costs associated with the GWOT -- comprise a staggering portion of global product, and give a plausible indication of the magnitude of the emerging alternative ecosystem. Consider the drag on global productivity and development if so much of human activity is dedicated to transnational crime and terrorism. Adding to this, the cost of networked insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan, suggests that an unconscionable proportion of global resources is being expended by efforts to undermine the well-being of citizens worldwide. Imagine what might be accomplished for all mankind if those resources were available for more constructive investment. Net Systemic Costs Not only do these networks divert economic resources globally, but they also reduce the capacity of states to govern, rendering them incapable of effectively governing their territory or borders, let alone exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or providing other vital public services. The net systemic harm is imposed at four levels: the inability of states to govern their populations and territories, which creates seedbeds for international terrorism, networked insurgency, and transnational crime, causing immense human suffering; the regional spillover effect from state fragility and instability, that sometimes penetrates key U.S. allies and partners; the growing feral regions that serve as launch pads for attacks against U.S. national security interests worldwide, as well as potentially direct attacks on the homeland, as occurred on September 11, 2001; and the cost associated with the decline of the global, rule-based system and the shrinking Westphalian domain. A cursory examination of a few key states shows the toll illicit networks take on our national security interests. Though Mexico's death rate has subsided somewhat over the past two years, the wars between the narcotics cartels and state authorities, and between the cartels themselves, are thought to have caused as many as 130,000 deaths between 2007 and 2013, or over 20,000 per year. Mexican cartels today work hand-in-hand with the criminal gangs of Central America's Northern Triangle -- comprised of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala -- resulting in some of the highest homicide rates in the world. El Salvador's official forensic unit estimated the homicide rate in 2014 at nearly 70 per 100,000. Despite their collaborative intentions, these countries are under such duress that their security partnership contributions cannot yet inspire confidence. Indeed, in 2014, nearly 70,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico made their way through Mexico to the United States to escape the tormented lands of their births. Another key security partner, Nigeria is the most populous African state with the largest economy, and a major oil producer. Nigeria could and should play a stabilizing role throughout the continent. In fact, Nigerian forces were critical in staunching the civil wars that hemorrhaged West Africa in the 1990s through the 2000s. Yet today, Nigeria is hobbled by the burgeoning Boko Haram insurgency in the north, and resurgent gang insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the Boko Haram scourge has bled into the neighboring countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The once-hopeful suppositions that Iraq and Afghanistan could act as U.S. security partners now seem to be wishful thinking. Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars to bolster the capacity of these two potential partners, effective collaboration seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan today struggles to survive the attacks of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and more recently ISIL. Though the Government of Afghanistan welcomes U.S. engagement, its effectiveness as a security partner remains questionable. Similarly, Iraq struggles to survive as an autonomous state, depending on Kurdish and Shia nonstate militias in its fight with ISIL. Afghanistan and Iraq may continue to act as incubators for terrorist groups planning attacks against the United States well into the future. Though the nature or extent of the connections between these terrorist and criminal organizations is not transparent, what is clear is that when they desire to interact, they are able to do so. Joint training, learning, and sharing of experience are certainly likely, if not yet joint operations. While states unwillingly and unwittingly act as safe havens for destabilizing global actors, even more troubling are instances in which there is clear collusion between such groups and elements of sovereign states. For example, Iran's Quds Force, a special forces unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been both directly engaged in terrorist acts around the world, and is supportive of other terrorist organizations. Ominously, in 2011, an attempt by the Quds Force to collaborate with the Los Zetas cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was intercepted. That this effort was interdicted by the vigilant DEA is extremely fortunate -- at that particular moment in time, with the combustible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Sunni and Shia throughout the Islamic world, the consequences of the intended assassination are difficult to imagine. One need only consider the consequences of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo just a century ago to put this into perspective. This effort by the Quds Force to conspire with Los Zetas, now fully documented in U.S. case law, demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the potential collusion of sovereign states and terrorist organizations with criminal organizations. This type of collusion is not limited to the Middle East. As Douglas Farah has written, Venezuela has utilized the state's diplomatic tools to support criminal and terrorist activity. North Korea has long been known as a hub of illicit activity, allegedly including smuggling, counterfeit trade, production of controlled substances, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Pyongyang's infamous Bureau 39 is thought to generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year from such illicit activities. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016. 402p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Shelf Number: 144992 Keywords: Counterfeit TradeIllicit NetworksISISNational SecurityOrganized CrimeSmugglingTerrorismTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Crabtree, Ben Title: The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking: Syria and the wider region Summary: Evidence of drug seizures shows that captagon has become the major drug in the Middle East, enriching criminal and terrorist networks and fueling conflict across the region, sidelining other drug routes such as the billion-dollar business of Afghan heroin via the Balkan route. With seizures of 69.5 million pills in Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon in 2015 alone, the captagon market has exploded. One captagon pill, sold on the streets in the Gulf countries, would fetch US 10-20$. Thus, the market can be estimated at a worth as much as 1.39$ billion. This means that millions of dollars are being raised from drug trafficking and directly benefit different groups involved in the Syrian conflict. This Global Initiative investigation shows that captagon has become the conflict drug of choice -- not only in directly financing the ever deteriorating war in Syria but also slowly fueling the appetite for conflict: Evidence suggests that ISIS is also not only involved in captagon trafficking but also in prescription drug trafficking and abuse (tramadol). Both captagon and tramadol are used by ISIS fighters to suppress feelings of pain, induce feelings of euphoria and thereby increase levels of violence. In addition, migration and displacement feed into another vicious cycle. As drug trafficking sprawls, so does the potential for increased abuse and addiction by Syrian nationals both within the country and among the refugee populations. Further evidence suggests the increasing vulnerabilities and mental health issues of the displaced population, leading to spiking levels of drug abuse. This new Global Initiative report, launched on 1st of November, is a timely piece of analysis based on field research in six countries. It examines the dimensions of regional drug trafficking and highlights the troubling consequences for the possible resolution of the Syria conflict and the region's long-term stability. This report finds that despite limited reliable information: Drug trafficking and its impact on the rule of law is extensive and chronic, and its impact goes beyond the borders of Syria. This must be factored into development implementations in a post-conflict Syria. Development policies should have a mid- to long term focus understanding the local needs and conflicts and development of the rule of law as a cornerstone for success. Captagon production within Syria has been occurring for at least a decade. However, the current conflict has merely exploited the breakdown of the rule of law to intensify production and trafficking and added a regional facet to the issue, because The current level of conflict within Syria has forced some traffickers to move production of captagon to Lebanon and Turkey and potentially other countries within the region including Sudan. If the conflict worsens for either the regime, FSA, or ISIS and extremist groups, captagon drug trafficking could be moved on a larger scale to neighboring countries. It is unclear if ISIS is a net exporter of captagon due to other more reliable sources of funding (oil, extortion). However, there are clear links between tramadol trafficking and ISIS. Destination markets for captagon are predominantly in the Arab Peninsula and East Africa with consumption in Turkey and Syria also rising precipitously. Overall, drug trafficking and serious organized crime are a significant challenge to some countries in the region, due to newer priorities and limited capacity of law enforcement. Details: Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/global-initiative-the-nexus-of-conflict-and-illicit-drug-trafficking--syria-and-the-wider-region-november-2016_low.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Syria URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/global-initiative-the-nexus-of-conflict-and-illicit-drug-trafficking--syria-and-the-wider-region-november-2016_low.pdf Shelf Number: 144991 Keywords: Drug TraffickingISISOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Grounds for Concern: Belgium's Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks Summary: In November 2015, coordinated attacks by armed extremists killed 130 people in Paris. Four months later, attackers struck in Brussels, killing 32. The attacks were the deadliest in France and Belgium in decades. In both cases, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed responsibility. Perpetrators in both strikes had connections to Belgium. The Belgian authorities responded by enacting a ra of counter-terrorism laws and deploying 1,800 soldiers in major cities. The police have carried out several hundred raids, detentions, and stops-and-searches. These actions have helped the authorities charge and convict dozens of terrorism suspects. But as Grounds for Concern reveals, these laws, particularly if enforced arbitrarily or in ways that could be perceived as discriminatory, threaten basic rights including those to movement, liberty, free expression and privacy. In addition, some police operations have involved alleged beatings or other use of excessive force. Human Rights Watch investigated 26 incidents of alleged police abuse. In all but one case those targeted were Muslim. The Belgian authorities should amend and monitor counter-terrorism laws and policies to ensure they do not erode fundamental rights and enforce zero tolerance for police abuse. Governments have a responsibility to protect people from attack and to hold those responsible to account. But disproportionate responses are not only unlawful, they also risk driving a wedge between the Belgian authorities and communities that feel targeted—the very outcome that ISIS seeks to provoke. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Shelf Number: 147308 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist ViolenceExtremistsHuman Rights AbusesISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Whiteside, Craig Title: Lighting the Path: the Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-2016) Summary: The media products of the revolutionary movement known as the Islamic State (also IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) have received a significant amount of attention from analysts and journalists alike. While extremely helpful, most of this effort is focused at performing content analysis of fairly recent products. As part of the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication (CTSC) project's effort to better understand propaganda messaging in the 21st century, the author of this Research Paper examined primary documents and other media published by the Islamic State movement during its entire existence in order to develop a history of the media department since 2003. The framework for analysis focused on the interaction between key media leaders, the ever-expanding structure and institutions, and the process of innovation used to experiment with different media techniques in different phases of the group's evolution. Based on this history, the paper presents six observations about the media department and its role in the larger movement – in the hopes that this knowledge will be helpful in efforts to combat this particular group and its inevitable imitators in the future. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 144914 Keywords: Counter-terrorismISISIslamic StateMediaRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Dodwell, Brian Title: Then and Now: Comparing the Flow of Foreign Fighters to AQI and the Islamic State Summary: Using two different sets of data derived from internal, bureaucratic documents produced by the Islamic State (and its predecessor group) during two distinct periods of time (2006-2007 and 2011-2014), this report evaluates how the make-up, scale, and scope of the Iraq- and Syria-bound foreign fighter problem has changed over the last decade. It does so across three dimensions. First, it outlines the similarities and differences that exist in the backgrounds of the foreign fighters who joined the Islamic State during separate blocks of time. Second, it provides insight into the local travel and flow of foreign fighters across time as well as the mobilization infrastructure that the Islamic State had in place to facilitate the travel of recruits into Syria or Iraq. Third, it details changes in the preferences of foreign fighters, as reflected by the roles they wanted to fill within the organization. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Then-and-Now.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Then-and-Now.pdf Shelf Number: 144885 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateTerrorism |
Author: United States Institute of Peace Title: The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond Summary: The West failed to predict the emergence of al-Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate — and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strategies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analysis and diverse views. his report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, and jihadism who held a series of conferences between August and November 2016. "The Jihadi Threat" reflects the broad — and often diverse — views of the coauthors. Not every one agreed on all points, but the variety of findings, trend lines, and scenarios for the future covers the best thinking about the evolution of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. The United States Institute of Peace was the primary sponsor of this initiative, with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Fifteen other think tanks and universities were represented in the Working Group on Extremism. The goal was always to reflect the widest expertise and the full spectrum of views. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 146146 Keywords: Al QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Davis, Lynn E. Title: A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat Summary: The debate in the past over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the focus to policies beyond the military dimension. Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on removing the underlying conditions sustaining ISIL and other violent jihadist groups, i.e., the lack of security, justice, and political representation. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with future territorial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria. In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspective: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Shelf Number: 145032 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland SecurityISIS Islamic StateRadical Groups Terrorist |
Author: Pape, Robert Title: The American face of ISIS: Analysis of ISIS-related terrorism in the US: March 2014-August 2016 Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is mobilising sympathisers in the US at rates much higher than seen for previous terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. To understand this new American face of ISIS, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) study examined 112 cases of individuals who perpetrated ISIS-related offences, were indicted by the US Justice Department for such offences, or both, in the US between March 2014 and August 2016. This is the first comprehensive analysis of ISIS-related cases to examine the profiles of indictees overall, as well as to identify characteristics associated with each of the offence types. The findings are striking, and provide a valuable contribution to understanding the contemporary face of ISIS-related terrorism in the US. Details: Barton ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Shelf Number: 145772 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Patel, Sophia Title: The Sultanate of Women: Exploring female roles in perpetrating and preventing violent extremism Summary: This paper examines the appeal of Islamic State (IS) to Western women and explores how women can be employed in countering violent extremism (CVE) structures to prevent further involvement. It aims to deliver a comprehensive analysis for academics, policymakers and practitioners working in CVE program and policy design and implementation in order to bridge the gap between community development work and security and intelligence. Two case studies of Australian women - Zehra Duman (a.k.a. Umm Abdullatif al-Australi) and Zaynab Sharrouf (a.k.a. Umm Hafs) - illustrate the appeal as well as the contradictions. A series of recommendations suggests changes to existing CVE structures and their approaches to integrating, women. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 145767 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateViolent Extremism |
Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al QaedaCounter-TerrorismCountering-ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Almohammad, Asaad Title: The ISIS Prison System: Its Structure, Departmental Affiliations, Processes, Conditions, and Practices of Psychological and Physical Torture Summary: This paper endeavors to explore the ISIS prison system, the arrest or abduction, interrogation and confession and total detention processes; as well as the condition of detention facilities, and the physical and psychological torture taking place within the terrorist organization's jails. Fifty-five ISIS cadres (defectors, returnees or prisoners) and 17 Syrian civilian interviewees who had been detained by ISIS were interviewed regarding their knowledge of and first experiences of incarceration in ISIS prison facilities. Their reports are compiled and dissected into three phases: 1) abduction/arrest, 2) initial processing including interrogation and confession phases, and 3) post interrogation processing. The accounts obtained from ISIS cadres, detainees and sources on the ground provided a chilling portrayal of ISIS' prison system. The detention facilities are run by different entities. These entities are namely: the Islamic police, military police, hisbah (morality police), raid squads, and Emni (security forces). Methods of detention, conditions, and torture and punishment varied across the aforementioned entities. Throughout their abduction/arrest and interrogation, detainees are subjected to a number of psychological methods of torture. These include the threat of execution, promises to receive similar fates as other tortured fellow detainees, solitary confinement, and the placement of severed heads in cages in which detainees are being held. Elaborate physical torture includes seven methods named as follows: Lashing, the Fuel, Bisat al-Rih (Flying Carpet), Shabeh (Ghost), German Chair, the Biter, and the Tire. It is hard to assess whether ISIS operatives gained actionable information or confessions as result. For many of the tortured interviewed detainees as well as the defectors, confessions meant that they would be executed by the terrorist organization. Though, detainees appear to collectively develop coping mechanisms and strategies including sharing information to avoid coerced confessions to inhibit the effectiveness of ISIS' interrogations. The use of torture serves as a reinforcement of ISIS' brand of terror. In that sense, torture is a violent method that scares civilians into submitting to ISIS' theological codes and socio-political aims. Throughout detainees' time in shared cells, they were expected to participate in sharia courses. The first course was called Redemption. The sharia lectures were often delivered by highly ranked sharia figures. The courses are carried out to indoctrinate detainees in ISIS ideology prior to their release. The last phase of the incarceration starts when the interrogation is concluded. Former detainees reported that they were not made aware beforehand of meeting sharia judges. Detainees who have been cleared of their purported offences and those who have survived ISIS' punishment are subjected to conditional release. ISIS is reported to offer former detainees to either make a ransom-like payment, or for those with skills needed by the terrorist organization to work for ISIS directorates. ISIS operatives try to coerce former detainees who can neither make the payment nor possess the skills deemed valuable by the terrorist organization to commit suicide operations. The presented findings illustrate that ISIS jailors cooperate with media operatives to use, most probably coerced, pre-execution testimony for its propaganda. The current paper also puts forth a number of names and details on ISIS operatives engaged in detaining, torturing, and extorting civilians to supply the terrorist organization with material support. Evidence of the terrorist organization's handling of hostages suggests that they were subjected to various methods of psychological and elaborate physical torture. The category of detainees that ISIS uses as sabaya or sex slaves include the Yazidis captured in Iraq, wives and daughters of captured Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al Nusrah cadres. These women are either sold or given to foreign fighters, ISIS cadres or outsiders or held in detention facilities in both Syria and Iraq. Those held in detention centers are subjected to repeated rapes by ISIS cadres who are given access to them as a reward for service. The report also demonstrates a level of sophistication in the organizational structure and governance of ISIS' prison system and interrogation processes. Based on evidence provided throughout the paper, ISIS has been observed to move its detention facilities when fearing territorial loss. This trend may be informative in reading future movements of the terrorist organization. Alongside ISIS cash reserves and ISIS leadership, the cities of Mayadin and al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor received a significant number of detainees and hostages. The aforementioned indicators suggest the operational significance of the two cities in taking the fight to ISIS. Details: International Center for the Study of Violent Extremists, 2017. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 29, 2017 at: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-prison-system-its-structure-departmental-affiliations-processes-conditions-and-practices-of-psychological-and-physical-torture/ Year: 2017 Country: Syria URL: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-prison-system-its-structure-departmental-affiliations-processes-conditions-and-practices-of-psychological-and-physical-torture/ Shelf Number: 146928 Keywords: ISISPrisonersPrisonsTerroristTortureViolent Extremists |
Author: Greenberg, Karen J., ed. Title: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States: The ISIS Cases Summary: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States - The ISIS Cases is the third in a series of reports issued by the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School on federal prosecutions of individuals accused of ISIS-related crimes. Notably, this report reveals several new trends since the Center's last report was published. 2016 was a year of growing concern about the threat ISIS posed within the United States. In addition to a record number of terrorism arrests carried out since 9/11, there had been several attacks that resulted in deaths, including the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando - the latter particularly noteworthy because it doubled the casualties resulting from jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks that had occurred cumulatively between 9/11 and 2015. By contrast, 2017 has shown a decline in incidents of ISIS-related terrorist attacks and attempted attacks. At the same time, there has been a significant decrease in the number of federal indictments for ISIS-related crimes. The 2017 edition of Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States examines these and other trends in an effort to glean insight concerning both the individual defendants accused of ISIS-related crimes and the dispositions of the criminal cases against them in federal court. This report has several new features meant to illustrate these developments. First, the charts include illustrations of changes over time. In addition, this edition of our ongoing study on terrorism includes, where possible, comparisons between terrorism prosecutions and U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. The findings contained in this year's report are summarized as follows: Finding No. 1: Although the federal courts have shown a capacity to handle these cases, the dispositions of these cases differ markedly from those of U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. ISIS cases are more likely to go to trial than federal cases generally. Those terrorism prosecutions that have been resolved have proceeded more quickly through the courts than the average case. ISIS defendants are granted pre-trial release with much less frequency than criminal defendants overall. Every case that has been resolved has resulted in conviction, in contrast to the national average conviction rate of 92.5%. Sentences are comparatively higher in these cases, exceeding the national average by 10 years. In fact, the average ISIS sentence of 14.5 years more than triples the average federal sentence of 3.75 years. Finding No. 2: ISIS-related prosecutions rely increasingly on the use of FBI undercover agents or informants. The use of informants, a controversial strategy challenged by civil liberties groups, has continued to rise in ISIS prosecutions. In 2014, 33% of the ISIS-related cases involved government informants or undercover agents. However, the share of ISIS prosecutions involving FBI undercover agents or informants has since increased to 65%. For the new cases in 2017, it is even higher- 83%. Finding No. 3: The personal details of the individual defendants differ from those of non-terrorism defendants generally. Terrorism defendants are significantly younger than typical criminal defendants. They are more frequently American citizens. They are less likely to have spent prior time in prison than their criminal justice counterparts overall. Finding No. 4: ISIS-related defendants are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam than Muslim by birth. This year's findings show Muslim defendants in ISIS-related cases are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam. In addition, there were fewer allegations of interfamilial coconspirators, and fewer incidences of romantic ties among and between co-conspirators. In sum, federal terrorism prosecutions in the 16 years since 9/11 are still not normalized in terms of their disposition. The use of material support statutes that are relied upon in the majority of these cases, as well as the terrorism enhancements available in sentencing guidelines, have provided the legal framework for this trend, while the details of investigation, prosecution, and litigation have, as this report shows, solidified the harsh practices evident for terrorism cases. Nor are terrorism prosecutions trending towards normalization. Instead, it seems, the federal courts have made an exception - one that maximizes the punitive aspect of criminal justice - for these cases, and continue to do so. More than a decade and a half since the Sept. 11 attacks, this report suggests that it's time to acknowledge that terrorism cases have evolved from the prosecutions of complex, sophisticated, trained networks of individuals towards individual actors in search of purpose and attention. As such, normalization of these criminal proceedings might appropriately lie on the horizon. Details: New York: Center on National Security, Fordham University School of Law, 2017. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Shelf Number: 147247 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateProsecutionsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Mahmood, Omar S. Title: Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the first in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger). The report examines factionalism within Boko Haram, while the accompanying report profiles current responses and challenges. In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups - Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), led by long-time militant Abubakar Shekau. The rupture occurred after some militants opposed to the continuation of Shekau's rule secured the support of Islamic State, replacing him with al-Barnawi. Shekau rejected the demotion, and instead began commanding a faction comprised of fighters loyal to him. The roots of the rupture have been present for some time, and revolve around a few key concerns: Shekaus dictatorial leadership style, a need to revive the movement during a period of territorial loss, and most pertinently, a debate over who is an acceptable target of the group's violence. In particular, ISIS-WA and JAS differ ideologically in terms of whether Muslim civilians can and should be targeted. JAS has argued that anyone who does not actively support the group is essentially a government collaborator, and thus is worthy of attack. ISIS-WA holds a stricter view with regards to Muslim civilian targeting and has advocated shifting the locus of violence back towards government forces and installations instead. The divergent paths each group has taken in the nearly two years since their split can be traced back to this ideological divide. JAS has been responsible for a wave of suicide attacks, frequently deploying female and child bombers, against civilian soft targets in the region. ISIS-WA has on the other hand preferred to engage in less frequent but more large-scale assaults primarily targeting military structures. Both conduct violence outside this dichotomy, while it is also likely that some militants do not fully subscribe to either faction - but this overall trend explains a significant proportion of attack patterns in the Lake Chad region since 2016. The factions themselves have largely ignored each other since the split, both in terms of messaging and violence, though sporadic clashes have occurred. Geographically JAS remains confined to south-central Borno around the Sambisa Forest, and along the Cameroonian border. ISIS-WA initially established a stronghold in Lake Chad and along the Niger border, but has subsequently expanded southwards, now with a presence in Yobe State and parts of south-central Borno as well. The enlarged areas of influence place the factions in a few areas of general overlap, but the situation remains fluid, as both adjust to continued military pressure. Neither ISIS-WA nor JAS have demonstrated substantial external linkages, although ISIS-WA's messaging continues to be coordinated with Islamic State media outlets, while the faction itself is still allied to Islamic States global network of terrorist affiliates. Nonetheless, little evidence of practical ties on the ground has emerged, including with other Islamic State-aligned groups operating in the Sahel and North Africa. Rather both groups rely predominately on local means to sustain themselves. Financing is emblematic of this dynamic, as both generate revenue by extorting those living in areas of their influence, taxing the trade of commodities such as cattle and fish, and conducting high-profile kidnapping operations. A priority for ISIS-WA has been to resurrect relations with the civilian populace after militant excesses under Shekau's leadership. This shift can be seen in the reduced rate of civilian casualties during ISIS-WA attacks, Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-2.pdf Shelf Number: 151028 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Violence Extremists ISISIslamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Vigilantism Violent Extremism |
Author: Counter Extremism Project Title: Extremists and Online Propaganda Summary: Official propaganda materials produced by the media arms of groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and al-Shabab are intentionally crafted to radicalize, inspire, and incite individuals to violence. These groups have produced propaganda in a myriad of textual, audio, and video forms - from music videos to glossy magazines - that have helped to convince individuals around the world to travel abroad to join extremist groups and to conduct deadly attacks in their home countries. At times, they have even offered specific guidance on how to do so. Abdirizak Warsame, who was arrested at the age of 19 for attempting to join ISIS abroad, stated that while watching violent ISIS execution videos on YouTube, he started to believe that he was "doing something for a greater cause --- for good" by supporting the group. Warsame was one of 57 individuals documented by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) who attempted to join an extremist group abroad, and one of 72 individuals who accessed explicitly violent propaganda materials. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev - who detonated two homemade bombs along with his brother, Tamerlan, at the April 2013 Boston Marathon - told investigators that he and his brother built the bombs using instructions from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula"s Inspire propaganda magazine. The Tsarnaev brothers were two of 26 individuals documented who successfully enacted an act of terror, and two of 25 individuals who accessed propaganda materials that provided instructions on how to prepare or execute violent terrorist acts. (Sources: U.S. Department of Justice 2013, Slate, Foreign Policy, CBS News) Official extremist group propaganda materials are easily disseminated and accessed on the Internet. The individuals documented in this report accessed extremist group propaganda on a variety of social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, Google Plus, Skype, Paltalk, and WhatsApp. Several individuals also played a part in further propagating extremist propaganda materials. Of the 168 individuals documented by CEP, at least 51 disseminated propaganda materials either online, in person, or via mail, and 59 viewed or discussed propaganda materials with another individual. Even if extremist groups lose control over territory in their respective regions of operation, their ability to reach out and spread propaganda online will allow them to continue to attract support from across the globe. For example, even as ISIS steadily lost ground in Iraq and Syria throughout 2017, U.S. permanent resident Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov was still inspired by the group's propaganda videos to carry out a vehicular attack in New York City on October 31, 2017, that killed eight people. As long as extremist groups continue to produce compelling propaganda that plays a part in inspiring and inciting individuals to violence - and remains easily accessible online - terrorism in the name of these extremist groups will remain a threat worldwide. (Source: U.S. Department of Justice 2017) Details: New York, NY: Counter Extremism Project, 2018. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists-online-propaganda Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Extremists%20and%20Online%20Propaganda_040918.pdf Shelf Number: 154062 Keywords: al-Qaedaal-ShababCounter Extremism ProjectExtremismInternet ISISRadicalizationSocial MediaTalibanTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "Everyone Must Confess:" Abuses Against Children Suspected of ISIS Affiliation in Iraq Summary: Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities have arrested thousands of children for alleged affiliation with ISIS, used torture to coerce confessions, and have convicted hundreds of children of terrorism in hasty, unfair trials. Children may be prosecuted for any association with ISIS, including working as a cook or driver, or taking part in a religious training course. They may be detained in prison for years, with no access to rehabilitation or education. "Everyone Must Confess": Abuses against Children Suspected of ISIS Affiliation in Iraq is based on Human Rights Watch research conducted since 2016, including interviews conducted in November 2018 with 29 boys and youth who had been detained for alleged ISIS association by the KRG, family members of 8 other children who had been arrested by Iraqi authorities as ISIS suspects, child protection advocates, local lawyers, and other legal experts. The consequences of Iraqi and KRG punitive policies are profound, creating long-term stigma, family separation, displacement, and severely limiting youths' ability to reintegrate into society and support themselves. Once branded as ISIS, these children fear revenge attacks if they return home after their release from detention. Children who have been arrested and detained by Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq risk re-arrest by Iraqi forces if they return to areas falling under Baghdad's control. Some child ISIS suspects believe they have no option beyond living indefinitely in camps for displaced persons or leaving the country. Details: New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2019. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2019 at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/06/everyone-must-confess/abuses-against-children-suspected-isis-affiliation-iraq Year: 2019 Country: Iraq URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iraq0319_web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 155141 Keywords: At-Risk YouthChild AbuseChild ExploitationInternally Displaced PersonsIraqISISRecruitmentTerrorismTerrorist Organizations |