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Date: April 19, 2024 Fri
Time: 4:00 pm
Time: 4:00 pm
Results for illegal
4 results foundAuthor: Martin, Esmond Title: The ivory markets of East Asia Summary: This monograph reports on a survey of the ivory trade in four East Asian nations and one Special Administrative Region: China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong. The purpose of the survey was to establish a set of baseline indicators on aspects of the trade in the selected countries. From this, conservationists will be able to monitor and evaluate future changes, in accordance with CITES Resolution Conf 10.10 (Rev.). The target users are national government officers, nongovernment organizations (NGOs) involved in wildlife conservation, and CITES officials. The information in this report can be used to assess the effectiveness of policies, laws and enforcement activities related to ivory trading nationally and internationally. The data can also be used to infer the demand for illegal ivory, which is correlated with elephant poaching. Two investigators working independently between March and May and in December 2002 carried out the surveys. Martin visited Japan and Hong Kong while Stiles covered China, South Korea and Taiwan. The main findings were: - Over 54,000 ivory items were seen in 413 retail outlets in the 11 cities visited. - Hong Kong had by far the most (35,884), followed by China (9,096 in three cities) and then Japan (7,565 in two cities). Taiwan (1,849 in four cities) and South Korea (36 in Seoul) had small quantities of ivory items. - Japan has the most active legal ivory carving industry in East Asia. Most ivory is used to make name seals (~80%), followed by musical instrument parts (10%). - Almost all Japan's worked ivory production is bought locally and stays in Japan. - The most expensive raw and worked ivory is in Japan. Beijing, China, has intermediately expensive worked ivory, while Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taiwanese cities have roughly comparable, lower prices of worked ivory. - China has emerged as the main ivory manufacturing centre for all Asia, surpassing Hong Kong and Japan. Often with the involvement of Hong Kong businessmen, smuggling rings import African ivory, process it, and re-export it through Hong Kong and Macau to Europe, Japan, North America, Singapore and Thailand (the order of importance is unknown). China is probably also the only country in East Asia that has more worked ivory retail outlets now than in 1990. - China had the largest illegal ivory industry in East Asia and was the main destination of illicit African ivory in 2002. Small, private ivory workshops have replaced the larger, governmentowned factories since 1990. These arc unlicensed to deal with ivory and are therefore illegal. Most are located in Guangdong Province. They often use mammoth ivory, bone and stone as cover for elephant ivory working and exports. - Foreigners buy most of China's ivory items. They purchase it either in China or in neighbouring countries. Chinese nationals have been increasing their share of ivory purchases since 1990 as the economy grows. - Both Taiwan and South Korea were primarily transit and/or processing and re-export centres for ivory in the 1 980s and 1 990s. Today the ivory industry of Taiwan is dying and it is already dead in South Korea because of lower global demand for ivory products and increased government law enforcement. - The main buyers of East Asian worked ivory are ethnic Chinese of various nationalities and Japanese. Europeans and Americans also continue to buy worked ivory in Asia. - The internal ivory markets of all the countries surveyed have declined considerably since the CITES ivory international trade ban in 1990. The number of ivory craftsmen has plummeted in East Asia from about 2,200 in 1989 to fewer than 300 in 2002. Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea have no full-time ivory carvers. - The CITES-approved raw ivory sales to Japan from southern Africa in 1999 were not seen as important by ivory dealers outside Japan. Non-Japanese traders interviewed did not think it heralded a relaxing of the international ivory trade ban. Most ivory business people in East Africa were pessimistic about the future of the industry. Taiwanese vendors of worked ivory (the only ones interviewed after the CITES 12th Conference of the Parties in 2002) were not even aware that a second one-off southern African ivory auction had been approved for 2004, subject to certain conditions. - East Asian ivory business people attribute the decline in the industry to the activities of Western conservationists and journalists, which have resulted in a significant drop in Western buyers, who previously were the principal customers. They do not see this situation as susceptible to change. - In recent years East Asian governments have begun to pay more attention to controlling the ivory trade. China and Taiwan, in particular, have introduced new laws and have increased efforts to stop illegal ivory imports and to prosecute smugglers. - More needs to be done by East Asian governments to control effectively the ivory trade and to implement recommendations made in CITES Resolution 10.10 (Rev. CoP 12) and CITES Resolution 12.39. Details: London: Save the Elephants, 2003, 112p. Source: Internet Source: Accessed April 13, 2018 at: http://www.traffic.org/publications/the-ivory-markets-of-east-asia.html?no_redirect=true Year: 2003 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.traffic.org/publications/the-ivory-markets-of-east-asia.html?no_redirect=true Shelf Number: 116671 Keywords: AsiaIllegalIllegal HuntingIllegal tradeIvoryPoachingTransnational Crime |
Author: Clarke, Shelley Title: Trading tails: linkages between Russian salmon fisheries and East Asian markets. Summary: Ongoing efforts to study and conserve salmon species are targeting areas with high natural species diversity, un-degraded spawning habitat and limited existing legal and regulatory protection, and thus the salmon of the Kamchatka peninsula are a particular focus. Import data clearly indicate that East Asian markets receive a large portion of the Russian Far East's salmon catch. These markets may also play an active role in creating incentives for the illegal salmon trade. Therefore, exploring the relationship between markets and fisheries for Russian Far East salmon can provide a unique window on current salmon use practices as well as lead to new insights for sustainable management. In order to examine the roles of Japan, China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in the trade of illegal salmon from the Russian Federation, it is necessary to describe the characteristics of the salmon distribution systems in East Asian markets. This study then compares the total quantity of Russian salmon in these markets to catch estimates from the Russian Federation. After assessing the potential trade in Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing products in this way, recommendations for trade measures to combat IUU activities are formulated. Details: Hong Kong: TRAFFIC East Asia, 2007, 120p. Source: Internet Source Year: 2007 Country: Hong Kong URL: Shelf Number: 117395 Keywords: IllegalIllegal FishingIllegal MarketsPoaching |
Author: New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee Title: Voices of the Disappeared: An Investigative Report of New Jersey Immigrant Detention Summary: This report summarizes the independent findings of a group of citizen activists in New Jersey, the New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee (NJCRDC), who organized in early 2003 to expose and prevent the abuse of immigrants via the government's stepped-up immigration detention program after 9/11. Details: Piscataway, NJ: New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee, 2007. 40p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119418 Keywords: IllegalIllegal AliensImmigrant DetentionImmigrants |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in Federal Government's Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead federal agency responsible for inspecting travelers who seek to smuggle large volumes of cash--called bulk cash--when leaving the country through land ports of entry. It is estimated that criminals smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion a year in bulk cash across the southwest border. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is responsible for reducing the risk of cross-border smuggling of funds through the use of devices called stored value, such as prepaid cards. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent of actions taken by CBP to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country and any challenges that remain, (2) the regulatory gaps, if any, of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements of stored value, and (3) if gaps exist, the extent to which FinCEN has addressed them. To conduct its work, GAO observed outbound operations at five land ports of entry. GAO also reviewed statutes, rules, and other information for stored value. This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2010. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. In March 2009, CBP created an Outbound Enforcement Program aimed at stemming the flow of bulk cash leaving the country, but further actions could be taken to address program challenges. Under the program, CBP inspects travelers leaving the country at all 25 land ports of entry along the southwest border. On the Northern border, inspections are conducted at the discretion of the Port Director. From March 2009 through June 2010, CBP seized about $41 million in illicit bulk cash leaving the country at land ports of entry. Stemming the flow of bulk cash, however, is a difficult and challenging task. For example, CBP is unable to inspect every traveler leaving the country at land ports of entry and smugglers of illicit goods have opportunities to circumvent the inspection process. Other challenges involve limited technology, infrastructure, and procedures to support outbound operations. CBP is in the early phases of this program and has not yet taken some actions to gain a better understanding of how well the program is working, such as gathering data for measuring program costs and benefits. By gathering data for measuring expected program costs and benefits, CBP could be in a better position to weigh the costs of any proposed expansion of the outbound inspection program against likely outcomes. Regulatory gaps of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements exist with the use of stored value. For example, travelers must report transporting more than $10,000 in monetary instruments or currency at one time when leaving the country, but FinCEN does not have a similar requirement for travelers transporting stored value. Similarly, certain anti-money laundering regulations, such as reports on suspicious activities, do not apply to the entire stored value industry. The nature and extent of the use of stored value for cross-border currency smuggling and other illegal activities remains unknown, but federal law enforcement agencies are concerned about its use. FinCEN is developing regulations, as required by the Credit CARD Act of 2009, to address gaps in regulations related to the use of stored value for criminal purposes, but much work remains. FinCEN has not developed a management plan that includes, among other things, target dates for completing the regulations. Developing such a plan could help FinCEN better manage its rulemaking effort. When it issues the regulations, law enforcement agencies and FinCEN may be challenged in ensuring compliance by travelers and industry. For example, FinCEN will be responsible for numerous tasks including issuing guidance for compliance examiners, revising the way in which it tracks suspicious activities related to stored value, and addressing gaps in anti-money laundering regulations for off-shore entities that issue and sell stored value. GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, gather data on program costs and benefits and that FinCEN develop a plan, including target dates, to better manage its rulemaking process. CBP and FinCEN concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-73: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Shelf Number: 120339 Keywords: Border SecurityFinancial CrimesIllegalMoney LaunderingSmuggling |