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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:40 am
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6 results foundAuthor: Steward, Dwight Title: Don't Mind If I Take a Look, Do Ya? An Examination of Consent Searches and Contraband Hit Rates at Texas Traffic Stops Summary: With the passage of Texas Senate Bill 1074 (S.B. 1074) in 2001, law enforcement agencies must now annually report detailed statistics concerning the race of individuals who are stopped and searched in their jurisdictions. For this study, reports from 1,060 agencies were collected, with a focus on search and contraband data. Specifically, analyses were conducted of total search figures, consent search figures, and contraband figures to determine if racial disparities existed – if so, such would indicate the targeting of certain racial groups for selective enforcement. Particular attention was given to examining potential racial disparities in consent searches, thereby eliminating from the analysis searches which may be outside of an officer’s discretion. Analyses of search data – combined with contraband hit rate data – would also help gauge the efficiency and legitimacy of current police practices. The entire dataset collected for this study includes several million police-civilian contacts representing the majority of traffic stops in Texas. This report analyzes each contributing agency’s self-reported statistics, as well as the quality of the reports produced, in order to better inform policy leaders, law enforcement agencies, and community members as they address the problem and the perception of racial profiling. This is the largest set of racial profiling data that has ever been collected and analyzed, and it is the first inter-department review of contraband data collected by Texas law enforcement agencies. The goals of this report are three-fold: • Analyze the racial distribution of total searches, consent searches, and contraband hit rates in Texas using self-reported data submitted by police and sheriff’s departments. • Review the quality of the racial profiling data collected and reported by law enforcement agencies. • Recommend solutions to better analyze and monitor racial profiling figures and deter ineffective law enforcement practices. Key Findings include the following: (1) Texas law enforcement agencies continue to search Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos: approximately 2 out of 3 agencies reported searching Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos following a traffic stop. 66% of agencies searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos, while 69% of agencies searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos. (2) Of the agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates often, 7 out of 10 (71%) searched Blacks at least 50% more frequently than they searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Blacks. Of the agencies that searched Latinos at higher rates, 9 out of 10 (90%) searched Latinos at least 50% more frequently than they searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Latinos. (3) Consent searches – performed without any legal basis to search – contributed significantly to general search disparities: approximately 3 out of 5 agencies reported consent searching Blacks and Latinos at higher rates than Anglos following a traffic stop. 61% of agencies consent searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos, while 59% of agencies consent searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos. (4) Of the agencies that consent searched Blacks at higher rates often, 3 out of 4 (75%) consent searched Blacks at least 50% more frequently than they consent searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Blacks. Of the agencies that consent searched Latinos at higher rates, 3 out of 4 (74%) consent searched Latinos at least 50% more frequently than they consent searched Anglos, representing a significant disparity in treatment between Anglos and Latinos. (5) Patterns of over-searching Blacks and Latinos are consistent. Approximately 3 out of 4 agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos also searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos (75%), while 3 out of 5 agencies that consent searched Blacks at higher rates than Anglos also consent searched Latinos at higher rates than Anglos (61%). (6) Of the agencies that searched Blacks at higher rates, 51% were likely to find contraband in the possession of Anglos at higher rates than Blacks – meaning Anglos and Blacks were equally likely to be found with contraband. Of the agencies that searched Latinos at higher rates, 58% were likely to find contraband in the possession of Anglos at higher rates than Latinos – meaning Anglos were slightly more likely than Latinos to be found with contraband. (7) Racial disparities in search rates appear to be growing. Approximately 3 out of 5 agencies reported searching Blacks or Latinos at higher rates in 2003 than 2002 (60%). Note: this figure includes agencies with any increase in rates for Blacks or Latinos from 2002 to 2003. (8) The vast majority of agencies provided no mitigating information or insight to explain disparate search rates between Anglos and minorities, nor did contraband hit rates suggest efficient law enforcement practices were being utilized. (9) Auditing of data is non-existent or unreliable. Over half of agencies did not report using any data auditing procedures or audio-video review to ensure against human errors, technical errors, or data falsification. (10) Imprecision in both data quality and reporting restricts the usefulness of analysis. Ultimately, the lack of a generally accepted uniform reporting standard limited the accuracy of analysis involved for some reports filed by law enforcement agencies. Initial findings show that Blacks and Latinos in Texas communities are more likely to be searched, though Anglos are equally likely or more likely to be found with contraband during searches. High minority search rates are particularly evident in the area of consent searches – where searches cannot be explained by outside factors such as probable cause or outstanding warrants. Without some explanation of mitigating factors by law enforcement agencies, this would indicate that police are not only engaging in race-based policing but are ineffectively and inefficiently utilizing law enforcement resources. Agencies should identify and authenticate legitimate law enforcement practices that may be contributing to racial disparities in their data. Furthermore, in the absence of an explanation for disparate search and contraband rates, law enforcement leadership and policy-makers should take steps to monitor and reduce race-based policing. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Criminal Justice Colition, 2005. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/publicsafety/racial_profiling_report_2005.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/publicsafety/racial_profiling_report_2005.pdf Shelf Number: 121457 Keywords: Consent SearchesContrabandIllegal GoodsPolice DiscretionRacial DisparitiesRacial Profiling (Texas)Search and SeizureTraffic Stops |
Author: Australian Crime Commission Title: Organised Crime in Australia 2013 Summary: The Organised Crime in Australia 2013 report provides the most comprehensive contemporary profile of serious and organised crime in Australia. The report provides the context in which organised crime operates in Australia and gives an overview of each of the key illicit markets and the activities which fundamentally enable serious and organised crime. The report provides government, industry and the public with information they need to better respond to the threat of organised crime, now and into the future. Organised Crime in Australia is an unclassified version of the Australian Crime Commission's Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) which is part of the Picture of Criminality in Australia suite of products. The OCTA is a classified assessment of the level of risk posed by various organised crime threats, categorised by activity, market and enabler. Details: Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2014. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 8, 2014 at: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/ACC%20OCA%202013-1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/ACC%20OCA%202013-1.pdf Shelf Number: 132047 Keywords: FraudIllegal GoodsMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime |
Author: EPS Consulting Title: Tackling the Black Market and Retail Crime Summary: Retail Ireland, in August 2012, published a major new report 'Tackling the Black Market and Retail Crime', which says the Exchequer is losing L861 million annually because of illegal black market activity and retail theft. The group said the recession had led to an increase in retail crime, including shoplifting, fuel smuggling and the sale of smuggled cigarettes, and called for a zero tolerance approach from the Gardai and courts. Key facts in the report include: - At least 12% of all diesel sold in Ireland is illegal. Since 2010, 19 oil laundries have been detected and closed, and 690,000 litres of oil seized - Figures on the size of the illegal tobacco market range from L250m upwards. - Attempts to import counterfeit goods increased by a quarter to 1277 from 2009 to 2010; 66853 counterfeit articles were intercepted in 2010 - Industry estimates that 770,000 individuals in Ireland have down-loaded music/films illegally, costing the industry and Exchequer millions - Ireland ranks 11th out of 22 countries in Europe for shop-lifting, with employee theft accounting for one-third, the highest rate in Europe Details: Dublin: Retail Ireland, 2012. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2014 at: http://www.ibec.ie/IBEC/Press/PressPublicationsdoclib3.nsf/vPages/Newsroom~black-market-costing-exchequer-E861-million-annually-20-08-2012/$file/Retail+Ireland+-+Tackling+the+Black+Market+and+retail+Crime.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Ireland URL: http://www.ibec.ie/IBEC/Press/PressPublicationsdoclib3.nsf/vPages/Newsroom~black-market-costing-exchequer-E861-million-annually-20-08-2012/$file/Retail+Ireland+-+Tackling+the+Black+Market+and+retail+Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 133058 Keywords: Counterfeit GoodsCrimes Against BusinessesEmployee TheftIllegal GoodsRetail CrimeShoplifting |
Author: Przyswa, Eric Title: Counterfeit Medicines and Criminal Organisations Summary: Counterfeit Medicines are a major threat that is spreading dangerously across the globe and the International Institute of Research Against Counterfeit Medicines (IRACM) has decided to present a study report to decipher the relationship between organized crime and medicine counterfeiting. Today, every country, every person can come into contact with counterfeit medicines. The risk of taking counterfeit medicines "involuntarily" is increased exponentially for any potential patient of the "global village". This risk can become a real danger to individual lives, but also a global threat to public health. The IRACM wishes to alert the public by publishing this report to raise awareness among governments and citizens and help consumer-patients to make careful choices, whether on the internet or at markets in developing countries where drugs are sold on stalls at lower prices. The purpose of such a report is a hot topic as medicine counterfeiting issues have escalated to worrying heights with the growth of international trade and the Internet. This problem now generates major public health issues on an international scale. As for criminal organizations, they are often perceived simplistically in public debate and this research on this new subject seeks to attempt to characterize the structures that exist. The study focuses not only on Western countries but also on Russian and especially Chinese aspects, often regarded as strategic. This novel research report includes the best international academic sources and seeks to identify the logic behind the most significant criminal strategies rather than provide a hypothetical exhaustive list of organizations involved in such illegal trafficking. Many criminal organizations Based on our research, it is clear that criminal organizations are involved in medicine counterfeiting and three types of organization can be identified: Small-sized organizations (two to five people) often created by opportunistic individuals motivated by short-term gains. These organizations offer specific products at attractive prices. Medium-sized transnational organizations whose criminal profile varies: these may be structures stemming from organized crime (Wuppertal case1), opportunistic businessmen using sophisticated techniques to manage their organization (Arnaud B. case2) or people more directly connected to the pharmaceutical industry (Gillespie case). Large-scale and transnational organizations as seen in two significant cases: - The RxNorth case involving a Canadian distributor which, in parallel with its business, organized a complex system to import counterfeit medicines made in China into the United States, transiting them through Hong Kong, the Middle East, the UK and the Bahamas. - Another, even more complex example: a so-called "Jordanian-Syrian" network created in 2003 during the U.S. invasion of Iraq and which, through a succession of opportunities, evolved into multiple subnetworks in the region (Jordan, Palestinian territories, Egypt, Syria), then moved to the West with a counterfeit cancer drug whose network transited through several countries (Egypt, Turkey, Switzerland, Great Britain) before finally reaching the U.S. market. This case, which has received little media coverage, is thought to be the largest criminal network of medicine counterfeiting still active. Chinese organized crime has a very strategic role and it is important to distinguish Chinese criminal cases involving the Western market (the case of Kevin Xu, a businessman who specialized in exports), from cases mostly involving the local market where the criminals often have connections to the healthcare sector. Lastly, there are foreign structures that create local companies that serve to build transnational networks based in this leading region for the manufacture of counterfeit medicines. On the Internet there are two types of criminal structures. The first category includes opportunistic online networks set up on an ad hoc basis by being grafted onto "real" trade with the end consumer in the distribution phase. The second category of organizations is dedicated exclusively to online distribution with globalized affiliation techniques and aggressive advertising on search engines or through spam. The most significant case of a cybercrime organization in recent years involves the Russian Glavmed and SpamIt affiliation programs. The affiliates of these two networks benefited from "prefabricated" online pharmacies and a dozen SpamIt affiliates earned over $1 million in commission on their website. Vast criminal organizations Generally speaking, certain analytical limitations in deciphering these organizations have been identified and differentiate our analyses from most sources on the subject. Despite the proven involvement of Italian criminal organizations in the counterfeiting of luxury goods and the healthcare sector, their presence in the organization of counterfeit medicine trafficking is difficult to prove. However, the report raises the theoretical possibility of the Mafia's involvement in certain strategic locations such as harbours. As for the Chinese Triads, analysing their involvement has proven to be difficult, as research in mainland China is complex. In short, we must be cautious regarding the presence of traditional criminal organizations in our field of study. The involvement of terrorist organizations is also difficult to prove, despite many reports seeking to document money laundering linked to counterfeit medicine trafficking. But the explanations given are often related to broader geopolitical issues, raising doubts over the objectivity of such analyses (Hezbollah for example). However, the involvement of the IRA in the organization of a vast counterfeit veterinary drug trafficking network in the early 90s between Northern Ireland and Florida has been clearly proven. In sum, the report identifies these criminal organizations and their activities and characterizes them in several ways: - Fragmented crime through better access to illegal activities. The "massification" of printing, production and distribution techniques has clearly facilitated such developments. - Criminal organizations often operate based on a "structural holes" approach, seeking to maximize the systemic flaws in the supply chain or on a broader scale (free trade zones, tax havens, servers hosted in "protected" areas, etc.). - On a large scale, these organizations are characterized by a hybrid network structure, where licit operators can cooperate with illicit ones or be directly involved in such criminal trafficking. - In terms of timelines, it is important to distinguish between organizations likely to generate a major risk over a relatively short period of time, and that need to be dismantled as quickly as possible, and large hybrid organizations whose total elimination can take years. - To our knowledge, there are no sustainable large-scale transnational criminal organizations that combine trafficking on the Internet and trafficking in the "real" world. - Paradoxically, networks on the Internet often seem to have a more structured and consistent organization than organizations involved in medicine counterfeiting in the "real" world, which are more difficult to observe. - The counterfeit medicines distributed are no longer limited to "convenience" drugs but also include major diabetes and cancer treatments. Details: Paris: Institut de Recherche Anti-Contrefacon de Medicaments, 2013. 129p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2015 at: http://www.iracm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Contrefacon-de-Medicaments-et-Organisations-Criminelles-EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.iracm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Contrefacon-de-Medicaments-et-Organisations-Criminelles-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 135203 Keywords: Counterfeit GoodsCounterfeit MedicinesCybercrimeIllegal GoodsOrganized CrimePharmaceuticals |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: A Review of ATF's Undercover Storefront Operations Summary: In this review the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) use of undercover storefront operations - an investigative technique in which law enforcement operates a fake business or establishment from a location where illicit merchandise is exchanged or services are rendered. In 2013 ATF's use of undercover storefront operations came under scrutiny after news reporting about a storefront operation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin described numerous problems, including the theft of firearms, improper handling of sensitive information, and the alleged targeting of persons with disabilities. These and other reports about flaws in ATF's storefront operations prompted members of Congress to request the OIG to initiate this review. The OIG examined five ATF undercover storefront operations to: (1) determine whether there are any systemic deficiencies in ATF's storefront policies; and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of ATF's Monitored Case Program (MCP) as an oversight tool for the storefront operations. ATF established the MCP to provide for heightened management scrutiny of the agency's most sensitive cases. We selected five undercover operations that continued or began after the inception of the MCP; these operated in Boston, Milwaukee, Pensacola, St. Louis, and Wichita. The storefront in Boston was mobile and operated from a cargo van. In addition, due to allegations that ATF was targeting persons with disabilities for enforcement action, we examined this issue at ATF's storefront in Portland, Oregon, as well as the other storefronts identified above. Our review determined that while undercover operations can be an important component of ATF's efforts to fight violent crime, ATF failed to devote sufficient attention to how it was managing its undercover storefront operations. It lacked adequate policies and guidance for its agents, and in some cases supervision, necessary to appropriately address the risks associated with the use of this complex investigative technique. Although we did not find overarching problems with ATF's storefront policies as revised following disclosure of problems with the Milwaukee storefront, we determined that ATF should make additional changes to further improve them. We also found that ATF needed to make adjustments to its MCP to better focus on the most significant risks in ATF's investigative operations, including storefronts. We found no evidence that ATF targeted or used individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities in its storefront investigations because of their disability. However, we determined during the course of this review that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had failed to apply Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, which prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, to its federal law enforcement activities. This Act imposes important compliance responsibilities on DOJ's law enforcement components, which include ATF, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). When we inquired with ATF and the other DOJ law enforcement components about their compliance responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act, we found that they lacked policies that addressed the Rehabilitation Act's applicability to law enforcement operations. The OIG raised this important issue with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and, on September 3, 2015 the OIG wrote to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to request quarterly updates on DOJ's efforts to ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. The OIG intends to carefully monitor DOJ's progress in meeting its significant duties under the Act. We provided 13 recommendations to assist ATF with its storefront operations. ATF concurred with all of them and has committed to their full implementation. They address the following issues: initiation, planning, safety and security, oversight, intelligence, vulnerable populations, revisions to the Storefront Investigations Manual, and training. In addition to strengthening ATF's policies, improving the MCP, and helping ATF and DOJ to meet their obligations under federal disability law, the recommendations will assist ATF to address three other areas of concern we identified during the review. The first involves predication and targeting. We believe ATF must do a better job in future storefront operations defining the crime problem that the storefront is designed to address and explaining how the strategy underlying it will lead to the apprehension of persons warranting federal prosecution. Our recommendations request ATF to make clear in the storefront initiation paperwork how the storefront will be targeted and how the resulting prosecutions will serve a substantial federal interest. Second, ATF underestimated the level of experience, training, and expertise necessary to manage and oversee its storefront operations, which led to mistakes. Undercover storefront operations are complex and require the management of significant manpower and financial resources. ATF's assignment of inexperienced and shifting staff to run and supervise these operations without adequate Headquarters support and oversight had predictably negative consequences. Our recommendations request that ATF's Undercover Branch designate undercover agents/case agents with significant storefront expertise to work on-scene for the initial period of each storefront's operation to assist with planning, set-up, and early operations; that ATF minimize the turnover of supervisors during the operations; and that at least one undercover agent or the case agent on a storefront team have completed advanced undercover training, including training on storefront operations, before the storefront becomes operational. Third, and closely related to the second issue above, is the problem told to us about ATF Headquarters' historic reluctance to intrude on the domain of its Special Agents-in-Charge. We believe that in addition to supplementing the expertise available for storefront operations, ATF Headquarters units - the Special Operations Division and its Undercover Branch - need to be stakeholders in future operations and provide active oversight of them. ATF undercover storefront operations should not proceed unless experts within these units concur that they are properly designed and are being implemented appropriately. We have included recommendations in our report to encourage this oversight. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Oversight & Review Division 16-06: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1606.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1606.pdf Shelf Number: 140265 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsIllegal GoodsLaw Enforcement InvestigationsUndercover Operations |
Author: Behner, Peter Title: Fighting counterfeit pharmaceuticals: New defenses for an underestimated - and growing - menace Summary: With sales ranging from L150 billion to L200 billion (US$163 billion to $217 billion) per year, according to industry estimates, counterfeit pharmaceuticals are the most lucrative sector of the global trade in illegally copied goods. Fraudulent drugs harm or kill millions around the world and inflict serious damage on the brand names and bottom lines of major pharmaceutical manufacturers. Although less developed markets have long been their stronghold, pharma counterfeiters are now using digital channels to penetrate developed countries, where traditional physical drug distribution networks are well protected. Companies have plowed billions of euros into defensive measures, but their efforts haven’t slowed counterfeiters. Common anti-counterfeiting tactics block about half of the fake drugs, at most. New regulatory initiatives, meanwhile, leave large gaps for criminals to exploit. Yet a new survey by Strategy&, PwC's strategy consulting business, finds that pharmaceutical executives generally aren't inclined to spend more to fight fakes, despite their awareness that current measures don’t go far enough. Not only do these executives misjudge their own vulnerability, but they also overlook the opportunities awaiting those that capitalize on rapidly evolving anti-counterfeiting technologies that do more than improve on existing supply chain safeguards. Companies that adopt these technologies will reap a range of new benefits, and gain an edge over rivals relying on yesterday's solutions. Details: Strategy and PWC, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2019 at: https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Fighting-counterfeit-pharmaceuticals.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Fighting-counterfeit-pharmaceuticals.pdf Shelf Number: 155037 Keywords: Consumer Protection Counterfeit Drugs Counterfeit Medicines Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals Illegal Goods |