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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon

Time: 8:14 pm

Results for illegal markets

46 results found

Author: Clarke, Shelley

Title: Trading tails: linkages between Russian salmon fisheries and East Asian markets.

Summary: Ongoing efforts to study and conserve salmon species are targeting areas with high natural species diversity, un-degraded spawning habitat and limited existing legal and regulatory protection, and thus the salmon of the Kamchatka peninsula are a particular focus. Import data clearly indicate that East Asian markets receive a large portion of the Russian Far East's salmon catch. These markets may also play an active role in creating incentives for the illegal salmon trade. Therefore, exploring the relationship between markets and fisheries for Russian Far East salmon can provide a unique window on current salmon use practices as well as lead to new insights for sustainable management. In order to examine the roles of Japan, China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in the trade of illegal salmon from the Russian Federation, it is necessary to describe the characteristics of the salmon distribution systems in East Asian markets. This study then compares the total quantity of Russian salmon in these markets to catch estimates from the Russian Federation. After assessing the potential trade in Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing products in this way, recommendations for trade measures to combat IUU activities are formulated.

Details: Hong Kong: TRAFFIC East Asia, 2007, 120p.

Source: Internet Source

Year: 2007

Country: Hong Kong

URL:

Shelf Number: 117395

Keywords:
Illegal
Illegal Fishing
Illegal Markets
Poaching

Author: Beckert, Jens

Title: In the Shadow: Illegal Markets and Economic Sociology

Summary: Illegal markets differ from legal markets in many respects. Although illegal markets have economic significance and are of theoretical importance, they have been largely ignored by economic sociology. In this article we propose a categorization for illegal markets and highlight reasons why certain markets are outlawed. We perform a comprehensive review of the literature to characterize illegal markets along the three coordination problems of value creation, competition, and cooperation. The article concludes by appealing to economic sociology to strengthen research on illegal markets and by suggesting areas for future empirical research.

Details: Cologne, Germany: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 2011. 29p.

Source: Internet Resource: MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/9: Accessed August 5, 2011 at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp11-9.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp11-9.pdf

Shelf Number: 122306

Keywords:
Economics and Crime
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trade

Author: Baumuller, Heike

Title: Keeping Illegal Fish and Timber off the Market: A Comparison of EU Regulations

Summary: . Illegal fishing and logging, and the international trade in illegally sourced fish and wood products cause enormous environmental and economic damage. Consumer countries contribute to the problem by importing fish and timber without ensuring legality – a problem the EU tries to address with two new regulations. In this briefing paper, Duncan Brack, Heike Baumüller and Katharina Umpfenbach compare the recently adopted EU regulations on illegal fish and timber products. The authors contrast the very different approaches and highlight areas that might need further strengthening. •In response to the global problem of illegal logging and fishing, and the failure of the international community effectively to address the problem, the European Union has moved to tighten its own regulations. •The EU regulation to combat illegal fishing introduces comprehensive certification and traceability requirements for anyone wishing to import fish products into the EU, and provides for extensive enforcement measures that can be used by European authorities to ensure compliance with the regulation. •The EU regulation on illegal logging establishes a licensing system with countries that have entered into voluntary partnership agreements (VPA) with the EU. An additional regulation is currently being developed to try to ensure that illegal timber from all countries is excluded from the EU market. •The broad scope of the illegal fishing regulation, in terms of its geographical reach and its emphasis on enforcement is, at least in part, motivated by the ‘common property’ nature of global fisheries resources, which makes it difficult to address the impacts of illegal fishing at the national level. •The bilateral VPA process recognizes the national character of forest governance. While slow in their implementation, the VPAs – with their emphasis on capacity-building and stakeholder engagement – have the potential to trigger long-lasting governance reforms.

Details: London: Chatham House, 2009. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy%2C%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp1009_fishandtimber.pdf

Year: 2009

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy%2C%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp1009_fishandtimber.pdf

Shelf Number: 122342

Keywords:
Illegal Fishing (Europe)
Illegal Logging
Illegal Markets
Timber
Wildlife Crime

Author: Carcach, Carlos

Title: An Economic Approach to Motor Vehicle Theft

Summary: Motor vehicle theft costs dearly to the Australian economy. Conservative estimates have put the annual cost of this form of illegal activity at 654 million during 1996. A number of initiatives aimed at reducing the incidence and cost of car theft have been implemented in recent years, yet statistics indicate that car theft is on the increase. Several authors have proposed an integrated approach to the regulation of markets for stolen property. Understanding property crime as a market is central to identifying approaches to its control. This paper discusses an industry model of crime and develops it on Australian data. Our model is an adaptation of one originally proposed by Vandeale (1978). It considers a production sector that uses inputs from a market of illegal labour to generate a supply of illegal goods that are traded in a product market. These sectors interact with each other and with a criminal justice sector. The model is applied to the analysis of car theft in Queensland.

Details: Berkeley, CA: Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association (ALACDE) Annual Papers, Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, UC Berkeley, 2010. 23p.

Source: Internet Resource: Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association (ALACDE) Annual Papers: Accessed October 29, 2011 at: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0r72d6sz

Year: 2010

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0r72d6sz

Shelf Number: 123178

Keywords:
Automobile Theft
Car Theft
Illegal Markets
Motor Vehicle Theft (Australia)
Stolen Goods

Author: Owens, Emily G.

Title: The Birth of the Organized Crime? The American Temperance Movement and Market-Based Violence

Summary: Economic theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that the absence of formal contract enforcement increases systemic, or market-based, violence in illegal markets. Lack of substantial variation in market legality has prevented empirical evaluation of the strength of this association. Using a state-level panel of age-specific homicide rates between 1900 and 1940, I demonstrate that criminalization of alcohol markets led to a compression of the age distribution of homicide victims. Specifically, homicide rates for individuals between the ages of 20 and 30 increased relative to homicide rates for individuals under 20 and over 30. The compression of the age distribution of homicide victims was most evident in northern states and in states with large immigrant and urban populations. Using modern homicide data, I show that this age specific change in homicide rates is consistent with an increase in systemic violence, supporting the argument that the temperance movement contributed to the rise of organized crime in the United States. Banning the commercial sale of alcohol appears to have had a protective effect for children and mature adults, but this came at the expense of increasing the rate of violence among young adults.

Details: Unpublished paper, 2011. 43p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865347

Year: 2011

Country: United States

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865347

Shelf Number: 124912

Keywords:
Alcohol Related Crime
Homicide
Illegal Markets
Organized Crime
Prohibition
Violent Crime

Author: Caunte, Irina

Title: Dynamics of the Romanian Illegal Drug Markets

Summary: Globalization has led to an increase in commercial activities running on the illegal markets, its dynamics being largely determined by the balance between profitability and the major risks involved. Revenues are significant, one example being those obtained from drug industry. In recent years, illicit drug trafficking has seen in Romania an unprecedented escalation, as a result of market liberalization and the movement of per sons and because of the extending the phenomenon both among producers and consumers. This article examines the size of the Romanian illegal drug markets, the countries of origin and drug transit routes, as well as the profits made by the drug trafficking networks.

Details: Iasi, Romania: University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, 2011. 12p.

Source: Internet Resource: CES Working Papers III, (2), 2011: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.cse.uaic.ro/WorkingPapers/articles/CESWP2011_III2_CAU.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Romania

URL: http://www.cse.uaic.ro/WorkingPapers/articles/CESWP2011_III2_CAU.pdf

Shelf Number: 125633

Keywords:
Cocaine
Drug Trafficking (Romania)
Heroin
Illegal Markets

Author: Mell, Andrew

Title: Are "Gangstas" Peacocks? The Handicap Principle and Illicit Markets

Summary: Criminals who wear gang colors are acting in a surprisingly brazen way which must increase the probability of being caught and punished by the police. In our model this brazen behavior is a solution to an enforcement problem. The central idea is that less able criminals see lower gains from continued participation in crime because they will be caught and punished more often. Lower future gains imply that reputational concerns will be less effective at enforcing honesty. Only dealing with brazen criminals will become a good way to avoid dealing with incompetent criminals, because they cannot afford to mimic the brazen behavior. The principle is similar to the selection for a handicap in evolutionary biology.

Details: Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, Department of Economics, 2011. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper Series No. 558: Accessed July 24, 2012 at: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/papers/details/department_wp_558/

Year: 2011

Country: International

URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/papers/details/department_wp_558/

Shelf Number: 125755

Keywords:
Criminal Behavior
Gang Colors
Illegal Markets
Illicit Trade

Author: Capuano, Carlo

Title: The Macroeconomic Impact of Organized Crime: A Neo-Kaleckian Perspective

Summary: The paper analyzes how organized crime affects the economy through its impact on the effective demand, following the Neo-Kaleckian approach. From this perspective, the presence of organized crime, on the one hand, tends to reduce the effective demand draining resources through extortion, bribery of public officials and encouraging consumption of criminal goods (illegal goods and goods produced in the underground economy), on the other hand, tends to increase the effective demand using the proceeds of criminal activity in the purchase of legal consumption and investment goods. The model highlights the opposing action of these two forces and identifies the conditions for a negative impact on the degree of capacity utilization and the growth rate. For the latter, these conditions tend to be more stringent, due to the direct impact of organized crime on investment decisions. Overall, the operation of organized crime tends to negatively influence the economic activity to the extent that the income drained from the legal sector is not reused into the same sector.

Details: Naples: Department of Economics, University of Naples, 2012. 33p.

Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 40077: Accessed July 265, 2012 at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40077/1/MPRA_paper_40077.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: Italy

URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40077/1/MPRA_paper_40077.pdf

Shelf Number: 125766

Keywords:
Illegal Markets
Macroeconomics
Organized Crime

Author: Sheingauz, Alexander

Title: Overview of the Forest Sector in the Russian Far East: Production, Industry, and the Problem of Illegal Logging

Summary: Russia and China have been bound by long-standing ties since the middle of the 17th century, with mutual trade as an important aspect. It is natural that regions such as the Russian Far East (RFE) and Southeastern Siberia developed firm links with China, because they are the closest neighbors. These relations, particularly in the timber trade, became even stronger (with some fluctuations) following World War II.

Details: Forest Trends Association, 2004. 62p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2012 at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_115.pdf

Year: 2004

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_115.pdf

Shelf Number: 126077

Keywords:
Illegal Logging (Russia) (China)
Illegal Markets
Timber (Russia) (China)
Timber Smuggling

Author: Lebedev, Anatoly

Title: Siberian and Russian Far East Timber for China: Legal and Illegal Pathways, Players, and Trends

Summary: The preservation and sustainable use of Siberian and Russian Far East (RFE) forests is of global importance for a number of reasons. These forests, which are the traditional environments of many endangered species and indigenous tribes, are now supplying timber to nearby regions and countries that have largely destroyed their own forests. The vast forests of Asian Russia act as reservoirs for one-seventh of the global carbon pool. Russia holds 75 percent of the carbon stored by all of the world’s boreal forests; thus, deforestation is the second largest source of carbon dioxide emissions, after fossil fuel combustion, in Russia, as it is worldwide.

Details: Washington, DC: Forest Trends Association, 2005. 45p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2012 at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_109.pdf

Year: 2005

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_109.pdf

Shelf Number: 126078

Keywords:
Illegal Logging (Russia) (China)
Illegal Markets
Timber (Russia) (China)
Timber Smuggling

Author: Spagens, Toine

Title: Decriminalization as Regulation: The Gambling and Cannabis Markets in the Netherlands

Summary: Decriminalizing an illegal market may be a useful strategy for reducing crime. It is also necessary, however, to have a clear understanding of the nature of the illegal market before undertaking such an endeavor. Experiences in the Netherlands show that decriminalizing illegal markets may indeed result in a substantial reduction of organized crime and other criminal activities, if the regulatory system is designed adequately. These experiences also show that such systems inherently lack flexibility and that criminals are usually quick to re-enter the market when unforeseen developments, particularly technical innovations and internationalization, create new illegal business opportunities.

Details: Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University, 2013. 7p.

Source: Internet Resource: Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 05/2013: Accessed April 17, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107654

Year: 2013

Country: Netherlands

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107654

Shelf Number: 128392

Keywords:
Drug Legalization
Drug Markets
Gambling
Illegal Markets
Marijuana (Netherlands)
Narcotic Drugs

Author: Gounev, Philip Martinov

Title: Backdoor Traders: Illicit entrepreneurs and legitimate markets

Summary: This dissertation examines the factors that determine the behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs in legitimate markets. The particular aspect studied is how such entrepreneurs enter a new market when they immigrate into a new country (Chapter 1). The empirical focus of the thesis is the Bulgarian illegal entrepreneurs involved in the sale of stolen cars. More specifically, the dissertation compares their market behaviour in Bulgaria and in Spain between the late 1990s and 2010. The empirical basis for the dissertation is a comprehensive analysis of summaries of 86 Spanish police investigations against organised crime networks, as well as fieldwork consisting of interviews with 79 offenders, law-enforcement officers, entrepreneurs, and car-dealers in Spain and Bulgaria (Chapter 2). To best understand the intertwining of criminal entrepreneurs and legitimate markets the thesis starts by examining the operations of the car markets in Spain and Bulgaria (Chapter 3). It goes on to explain the ‘car-theft industry’ – focusing on how criminal enterprises and networks are structured and operate (Chapter 4). The analysis then continues by comparing how stolen cars are sold by illegal entrepreneurs in Bulgaria and Spain, and the different ways in which ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ markets intertwine (Chapter 5). The conclusion of this analysis is that Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs failed to enter the market for used cars in Spain, and instead preferred to traffic and sell the stolen cars in Bulgaria. There are two sets of factors that explain the reasons behind this failure. The first one is the local socio-economic and historical legacies in Bulgaria, which explain how illegal entrepreneurs and buyers (typically part of local economic elites) are linked (Chapter 6), and the factors that fuel demand for stolen cars. The role of the Bulgarian immigrant community in Spain is also considered. The second set of factors, examined through the lenses of economic theories, includes the economic / business rationale that influences the illegal entrepreneurs’ behaviour when entering a market (Chapter 7). The thesis goes on to conclude (Chapter 8) that it is the first set, the complex socio-economic and historical factors that best explain the behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs and their failure to sell stolen cars in Spain.

Details: London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011. 307p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 7, 2013 at: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/168/1/Gounev_Backdoor_traders.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Bulgaria

URL: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/168/1/Gounev_Backdoor_traders.pdf

Shelf Number: 129261

Keywords:
Car Theft
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trade (Bulgaria)
Motor Vehicle Theft
Organized Crime
Stolen Goods
Stolen Vehicles

Author: Ablon, Lillian

Title: Markets for Cybercrime Tools and Stolen Data: Hackers' Bazaar

Summary: Markets are good because they facilitate economic efficiency, but when that efficiency facilitates criminal activity, such "black markets" can be deemed harmful. Criminal activities in cyberspace are increasingly facilitated by burgeoning black markets in both the tools (e.g., exploit kits) and the take (e.g., credit card information). As with most things, intent is what can make something criminal or legitimate, and there are cases where goods or services can be used for altruistic or malicious purposes (e.g., bulletproof hosting and zero-day vulnerabilities). This report describes the fundamental characteristics of these markets and how they have grown into their current state in order to give insight into how their existence can harm the information security environment. Understanding the current and predicted landscape for these markets lays the groundwork for follow-on exploration of options that could minimize the potentially harmful influence these markets impart. This report assumes the reader has a basic understanding of the cyber, criminal, and economic domains, but includes a glossary to supplement any gaps. This report should be of interest to cybersecurity, information security, and law enforcement communities. It was sponsored by Juniper Networks as part of a multiphase study on the future security environment.

Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 83p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2014 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR610/RAND_RR610.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR610/RAND_RR610.pdf

Shelf Number: 132082

Keywords:
Black Markets
Computer Crimes
Cybercrimes
Cybersecurity
Hackers
Illegal Markets
Internet Crime

Author: Braga, Anthony A.

Title: SMART Approaches to Reducing Gun Violence

Summary: Despite significant decreases in crime nationwide, America continues to experience criminal gun violence at extraordinarily high levels - more than 11,000 individuals are murdered by firearms and 75,000 are treated for nonfatal gunshot wounds at hospitals annually, and these incidents are certainly undercounted in our statistics. Beyond the devastating toll measured in injuries and loss of life, gun violence also imposes a heavy burden on our standard of living, from increased fear and reduced quality of life to depressed property values. While the public tends to focus its attention on mass shootings, the most common forms of gun violence occur on a daily basis involving gang members, violent youth, and others involved in crime. As a result, local police departments are in a strategic position on the front lines poised to curb or even prevent gun crime, injuries, and deaths. In response, a number of departments are experimenting with new, evidence-based strategies and tactics aimed at addressing the chronic and pervasive gun violence problem. Yet, the question remains: Can the police effectively reduce and prevent gun crimes and associated violence? The Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) emerged on the law enforcement landscape in 2009. With SPI, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) sought to identify effective and efficient solutions to chronic local crime problems, including gun violence. This program provides a valuable opportunity for local police agencies to partner with academic researchers and rigorously assess whether gun violence reduction strategies have the intended effects on crime, violence, and communities. Indeed, nine of thirty-five SPI-funded police agencies nationwide have targeted gun violence as part of their Smart Policing Initiatives (Boston, MA; Los Angeles, CA; Baltimore, MD; Joliet, IL; Las Vegas, NV; Cambridge/Somerville/Everett, MA; Kansas City, MO; Rochester, NY; and East Palo Alto, CA). This Spotlight report reviews the common strategies that police have employed across those nine sites. These evidence-based strategies, which reflect core tenets of the SPI, are grounded in a risk-focused framework that recognizes the importance of targeting efforts on the places, people, and times at greatest threat of violence. The common strategies identified for implementation in the nine SPI sites include: - Targeting persistent gun violence hot spots - Targeting prolific offenders in persistent hot spots - Employing new technologies and advanced crime analysis - Engaging a wide range of collaborative partners - Conducting advanced problem analysis We prepared the Gun Violence Spotlight to further the national conversation on the gun violence problem and to provide a resource for local officials seeking to make informed, evidence-based decisions regarding their prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts. Though many of the SPI projects are ongoing, several sites have produced important findings, derived through rigorous research methodologies, which indicate that their interventions have effectively reduced gun violence: - Boston's problem-oriented strategy focusing on micro-level hot spots reduced aggravated assaults by more than 15 percent, violent crime by more than 17 percent, and robberies by more than 19 percent. - Baltimore's strategy of targeted enforcement within selected crime hot spots reduced homicides by 27 percent; and a related focused deterrence intervention reduced non-fatal shootings in one neighborhood by 40 percent. - Baltimore's Gun Offender Registry reduced gun-related re-offending risks among participants by 92 percent. - Los Angeles' LASER initiative, which combined place and offender strategies with the use of criminal intelligence data, reduced homicides by more than 22 percent per month in the target division (Newton), and gun crimes by 5 percent in each reporting district of the target division. The Boston, Baltimore, and Los Angeles findings are certainly encouraging, and they strongly suggest that the SPI has generated significant declines in gun crime and related violence. Results for other SPI sites will be forthcoming in the near future. This Spotlight identifies a number of next steps for addressing gun violence, most notably the development of supply-side approaches that disrupt illicit gun supply lines and combat illegal gun sales.

Details: Washington, DC: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2014. 36p.

Source: Internet Resource: Smart Policing Initiative Spotlight Report: Accessed April 21, 2014 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/SPIGunViolenceSpotlight.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: United States

URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/SPIGunViolenceSpotlight.pdf

Shelf Number: 132098

Keywords:
Collaboration
Crime Prevention Programs
Gun Control
Gun Violence
Hot Spots
Illegal Markets
Partnerships
Violent Crime

Author: University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne

Title: Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport

Summary: The University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne and the International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS) today released the ground-breaking results of a two-year research programme into sport corruption. It includes startling figures on the scale and scope of the sport-betting market, which is identified as the primary purpose for match-fixing. The report also provides detailed analysis of current efforts to combat corruption and presents guiding principles including practical steps that can be taken by sport, governments and betting. According to the Sorbonne-ICSS Report - 'Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport' - the manipulation of sport competition and betting threatens all countries and regions, with football and cricket the sports most under siege. Other sports affected include: tennis, basketball, badminton and motor racing. The report states that the most manipulated competitions are at a national level but highlights that the 'fixing' of competition and betting is instigated at a transnational level. Size of sport betting market The report shows that manipulation takes place in the context of a growing sports economy, which now accounts for 2% of the global GDP, with a transnational sports-betting market of estimated wagers worth between $200 - 500 billion, more than 80% of which is illegal. The findings reveal: - Asia and Europe represents 85% of the total legal and illegal market - Europe makes up 49% of the legal market, whilst Asia makes up 53% of the illegal market - Legal sports betting currently delivers only $4 billion of official tax revenues for countries - More than 8,000 legal operators offer sports betting - 80% are in territories with a low rate of tax and few inspections. - The number of illegal operators is impossible even to estimate The advent of the internet has led to an unprecedented expansion of sport betting offers, with online betting now representing 30% of the global market. The sports betting market has been transformed into a multi-billion dollar industry with betting exchanges, live betting, betting on more low-profile events and derivative betting formulas, as well as higher return rates for bettors. Significantly though, the evolution of the betting regulatory models hasn't kept up, with authorities often ill-equipped to deal with the illegal and under-regulated betting, together with the related issues of manipulation and money laundering.

Details: Dohar, Qatar: International Centre for Sport Security, 2014. 129p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2014 at: http://www.theicss.org/sport-integrity-forum/

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://www.theicss.org/sport-integrity-forum/

Shelf Number: 132453

Keywords:
Corruption
Gambling
Illegal markets
Money Laundering
Organized Crime
Sporting Events
Sports Betting

Author: Doak, Naomi

Title: Polishing Off the Ivory: Surveys of Thailand's Ivory Market

Summary: Elephants are revered in Thailand and, as an important part of the country's identity, they are an integral part of Thai beliefs and culture. However, despite this, Thailand has one of the world's largest unregulated ivory markets and is consistently highlighted as one of the most problematic countries in the illegal ivory trade. Partly to blame for the current poaching crisis is Thai domestic legislation that permits trade in ivory from domesticated Asian Elephants but provides no effective mechanism or legal framework for the internal regulation of this market nor for the control of the illegal trade in ivory from either wild Asian Elephants Elephas maximus or African Elephants Loxodonta africana. Recent surveys of retail outlets across key locations in Bangkok have revealed a disturbing increase both in the number of retail outlets offering ivory as well as the quantity of ivory available. Surveys of known ivory retail outlets were carried out on a monthly basis from January-April 2013 and October 2013-May 2014. The type and number of ivory items seen for sale were recorded. Retail outlets, including those newly identified and those that only began stocking ivory during the survey period, were repeatedly revisited on subsequent surveys. In January 2013, 61 retail outlets selling ivory were found in key previously-identified locations around Bangkok while less than 12 months later, in December 2013, this figure had increased to 105 retail outlets in the same locations. During this period, the number of individual ivory pieces almost trebled, from 5,715 to 14,512, indicating a growing market and considerably exceeding what could be produced by ivory from the current domesticated elephant population. There are approximately 1,230 adult male captive elephants in Thailand and it is estimated that they could only yield approximately 650 kg of ivory annually, possibly less and typically in small sized pieces owing to the periodic trimming of tusks. This quantity is considerably less than what was observed in Bangkok markets. In addition, the number and size of specific products indicates that larger sized elephant tusks are reaching the market in Thailand and seizure data confirms attempts to move large quantities of African Elephant ivory to Thailand from Africa. Additional retail outlets, including newly established ivory outlets, were recorded in every month of the survey, despite a requirement for registration and monitoring of any retail outlet selling or processing ivory under current legislation (Commercial Registration Act of 1956). These findings are indicative of a lack of implementation of Thailand's CITES Ivory Trade Action Plan, which was drawn up to meet recommendations from the 64th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee. Indeed, the actions outlined in that plan do not appear to be having any impact on the domestic ivory market in Bangkok. The ivory market in Thailand is still thriving and remains one of the largest and most active worldwide, with high turnover of stock and continued sales to foreign tourists.

Details: Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC International, 2014. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 22, 2014 at: http://www.traffic.org/storage/Thailand-market-survey-report.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Thailand

URL: http://www.traffic.org/storage/Thailand-market-survey-report.pdf

Shelf Number: 132727

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Elephants
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trade
Ivory
Wildlife Crimes (Thailand)

Author: KPMG

Title: Illicit Tobacco in Australia

Summary: For the first time since the implementation of Australia's plain packaging experiment we now have hard data to replace the anecdotes and predictions about its true impact, and the data show that since the introduction of this policy the black market has grown while consumption of tobacco overall has not declined. This report shows that smugglers and counterfeiters have been the big winners in Australia since the implementation of plain packaging at a great loss to the treasury. In less than a year, consumption of illegal, branded cigarettes, some of which now enjoy higher market share than legal brands in Australia, has increased by 154 percent. As a result, the government has lost up to AUD1.0 billion in tax revenue, while the criminal gangs behind this activity have lined their pockets. PMI supports reasonable regulation, but we believe governments have a responsibility to ensure the laws they pass meet their stated goals, uphold the rule of law, are evaluated based on objective standards and do not lead to negative consequences, such as boosting the illegal market at the expense of legitimate manufacturers and retailers. As studies quantifying actual changes in behavior and the marketplace since the introduction of plain packaging continue to come out of Australia, it is our hope that this evidence will not be ignored.

Details: London: KPMG, 2014. 74p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: https://www.imperial-tobacco.com/assets/files/cms/KPMG_FY2013_Illicit_Trade_Report___FINAL___11_April_2014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Australia

URL: https://www.imperial-tobacco.com/assets/files/cms/KPMG_FY2013_Illicit_Trade_Report___FINAL___11_April_2014.pdf

Shelf Number: 132880

Keywords:
Counterfeiting
Illegal Markets
Illegal Tobacco (Australia)
Illicit Tobacco
Smuggling
Tax Evasion

Author: International Tax and Investment Center

Title: Asia-14: Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2013

Summary: This study is an update and expansion of our previous research, 'Asia-11 Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012'. In light of newly available data sources, it has been possible to extend the coverage to include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, resulting in full coverage of the 10 ASEAN member countries plus Australia, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and Taiwan. In 2013, 10.9% of cigarettes consumed in Asia-141 were illicit Total Consumption (legal and illicit) across the Asia-14 was an estimated 760.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. Of this, 10.9% or 82.8 billion cigarettes in Asia-14 were estimated to have been illicit. In ASEAN, Total Consumption was an estimated 608.2 billion cigarettes in 2013. Of this, 9.1% or 55.6 billion cigarettes were estimated to have been illicit. In 2013, the share of Illicit Consumption increased in 7 of the 11 markets that were part of the 'Asia-11 Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012' report Nearly three quarters of Illicit Consumption occurred in just three markets: Pakistan (22.8% Illicit), the Philippines (18.1%), and Vietnam (20.7%). In the 11 markets for which estimates are available for both 2012 and 2013 (i.e., the 'Asia-11'), Illicit Consumption is estimated to have increased by 20.1%, from 66.5 billion cigarettes to 79.9 billion cigarettes (an increase of 13.4 billion cigarettes). This was driven primarily by the rise in Illicit Consumption in the Philippines (by 12.7 billion cigarettes, an increase of 198%), underpinned by significant growth in Domestic Illicit Consumption. 7 markets (Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam) saw an increase in the share of Illicit Consumption in Total Consumption of cigarettes between 2012 and 2013. The steepest rise was again in the Philippines. However, Pakistan, and Singapore saw noticeable declines in the share of Illicit Consumption in 2013, the former a result of declining Domestic Illicit volumes, and the latter a consequence of a decline in Contraband. In both cases, however, the share of Illicit Consumption in Total Consumption remained much higher than the Asia-14 average. Domestic and Non Domestic Illicit both contributed to the rise in Illicit Consumption in Asia There was a 181.2% rise in Domestic Illicit Consumption in the Philippines (equal to 11.0 billion cigarettes). A small amount of Domestic Illicit was also identified in Indonesia in 2013. A number of markets saw a rise in Non-Domestic Illicit cigarettes in 2013. Consumption of Contraband cigarettes increased in Indonesia and Taiwan, while consumption of Counterfeit cigarettes rose sharply in the Philippines. There were increases in Non-Domestic Illicit of Unspecified Market Variant in Australia and Vietnam. Asia-14 government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption totalled US$ 3.9 billion in 2013 The tax loss associated with Illicit Consumption of cigarettes increased in 6 markets compared with 2012. In the 11 markets for which estimates are available for both 2012 and 2013, the estimated tax loss from Illicit Consumption increased from US$ 3.4 billion in 2012 to US$ 3.9 billion, an increase of 13.8%. The largest rise in tax loss in absolute terms was in the Philippines (497%). Australia and Indonesia also experienced a significant rise in estimated tax losses from Illicit Consumption. The government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption in the ASEAN region totalled US$ 2.1 billion in 2013.

Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2014. 220p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia-14%20Illicit%20Tobacco%20Indicator%202013.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia-14%20Illicit%20Tobacco%20Indicator%202013.pdf

Shelf Number: 134222

Keywords:
Cigarettes
Contraband
Economic Crimes
Financial Crimes
Illegal Markets
Illegal Tobacco
Illicit Products (Asia)
Illicit Tobacco
Tax Evasion

Author: International Tax and Investment Center

Title: Asia-11: Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2012

Summary: In 2012, 9% of cigarettes consumed in Asia-11 were illicit Total Consumption (legal and illicit) across the Asia-111 markets covered in this report totalled an estimated 736.4 billion cigarettes in 2012, of which 9.0% or 66.5 billion cigarettes are estimated to have been illicit. This includes consumption of illicit imports and illicit products locally manufactured, such as under/non-declared products from local manufacturers. Illicit share was over 25% in five markets Brunei, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan all had estimated shares of illicit cigarettes in Total Consumption of over 25% in 2012. Illicit volumes were highest in Pakistan, Vietnam, and Malaysia In 2012, in both Vietnam and Pakistan, Illicit Consumption was over 20 billion cigarettes. In Malaysia the volume of illicit cigarettes was estimated at almost 8 billion. Domestic illicit cigarette volumes were highest in Pakistan and the Philippines In Pakistan and the Philippines, illicit cigarettes produced by local manufacturers and sold in the market without payment of taxes totalled an estimated 25 billion cigarettes in 2012. Asia-11 government tax revenue losses from Illicit Consumption totaled US$ 3.4 billion in 2012 The biggest tax losses in absolute terms occurred in Australia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Vietnam.

Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2013. 132p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia_11_Illicit_Tobacco_Indicator_2012.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Asia

URL: http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/illicit_trade/Documents/Asia_11_Illicit_Tobacco_Indicator_2012.pdf

Shelf Number: 133908

Keywords:
Cigarettes
Contraband
Economic Crimes
Financial Crimes
Illegal Markets
Illegal Tobacco
Illicit Products (Asia)
Illicit Tobacco
Tax Evasion

Author: International Tax and Investment Center

Title: Asia-11: Illicit Tobacco Indicator: 2013 Update for the Philippines

Summary: Excise rates on the majority of cigarettes in the Philippines (Low-tax tier) rose by 341% on 1st January 2013. Excise rates on brands in the Mid-tax tier increased by 231%, while "premium-price" brands (High-tax tier) saw an increase of 108% in excise rates. This tax increase has contributed to a 59% rise in the pack price of the most sold brands in both the "low-price" and "premium-price" segments. The price increase on the most sold brand in the "super-low price" segment was highest at 175%. Legal Domestic Sales dropped almost 16% in 2013 from a year earlier. However, this decline was almost fully offset by an increased level of Illicit Consumption. As a result, Total Consumption (legal and illicit) was only down 3% in 2013. There has been a sharp rise in Illicit Consumption from 5.9% in 2012 to an estimated 18.1% of Total Consumption or 19.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. This rise primarily relates to increased consumption of Domestic Illicit cigarettes, which has risen sharply from 5.6% of Total Consumption in 2012 to an estimated 16.3% of Total Consumption or 17.1 billion cigarettes in 2013. There has also been an 800% increase in the consumption of Counterfeit cigarettes, which accounted for 1.8% of Total Consumption or 1.8 billion cigarettes in 2013, compared to 0.2% of Total Consumption in 2012. The cigarette tax revenue loss (excise and VAT) has risen to PHP 15.6 billion in 2013, representing an increase of 497% compared to 2012.

Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2014. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/Media/Default/landing-pages/asia11/report-asia11-2014.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Philippines

URL: http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/Media/Default/landing-pages/asia11/report-asia11-2014.pdf

Shelf Number: 134220

Keywords:
Cigarettes (Philippines)
Contraband
Economic Crimes
Financial Crimes
Illegal Markets
Illegal Tobacco
Illicit Products
Illicit Tobacco
Tax Evasion

Author: Stakeholder Democracy Network

Title: Communities not Criminals: Illegal Oil Refining in the Niger Delta

Summary: An estimated 150,000 barrels of crude oil are stolen every day in Nigeria. The vast majority of this is sold internationally, but approximately 25% stays in the Niger Delta for refining and consumption. Illegal oil refining in the region comes with steep economic and social costs. Unless the problem is better understood and key drivers of the illegal economy are analyzed, the trade could come to undermine the stability of Nigeria's legal oil sector. Only five years ago, billions of dollars in oil revenue were effectively locked in because of instability and crime in the Niger Delta. The United Nations Environmental Program (UNDP) Environment Assessment of Ogoniland highlighted that in addition to poor pipeline maintenance by international oil companies, illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta is a major cause of environmental degradation. Whole communities have lost their traditional livelihoods as fisherman and farmers, as the effects of illegal refining, compounded by equipment failure, pollutes their water and land. The refining process may also pose serious health risks. The dangers notwithstanding, organized theft of crude oil and the illegal refining business it feeds also support the families, small businesses and social aspirations of many Niger Delta communities. Interviewees for this report described illegal oil refining as an entrepreneurial, free market response to local economic dysfunction, socioeconomic pressures, the Niger Delta's chronic fuel shortages and government's failure to deliver basic public services. The oil companies operating in the delta and the media regularly draw attention to this illicit industry, noting for instance that some illegal oil refining camps brazenly operate in broad daylight. In response, the military Joint Task Force (JTF), charged with patrolling on-shore oil fields, each year destroys thousands of illegal refineries. However, the set up costs are so low and returns so high that within weeks illegal refiners start up new camps. Some claim the problem is worsening, with suspicions that as the 2014/15 election gets closer, oil theft and the associated environmental damage it causes will get even worse. Evidence also suggests that rogue actors within the JTF actively participate in and profit from theft and illegal refining. This is the first ever study that explores how illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta operates and what is driving its rapid growth. The underlying research attempted to gain an in-depth quantitative and qualitative understanding of how the business works, and to analyze the political, economic and societal drivers, networks and impacts and nature of local oil refining. The findings of this report are based on 12 weeks of field research, undertaken over four months in early 2013. A team of researchers visited nine illegal refining operations across Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states. This was supplemented with 120 key informant interviews with oil companies, government representatives and members of civil society. To ensure the safety of those interviewed, identifies have been protected and this report does not ascribe any quotes to individuals. This is in keeping with SDN's operational research process which seeks to identify trends and solutions, without risks to those involved in the research process either as researchers or interviewees.

Details: London: SDN, 2013. 44p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2014 at: http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/uploads/SDN%20Publications/CommunitiesNotCriminals.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Nigeria

URL: http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/uploads/SDN%20Publications/CommunitiesNotCriminals.pdf

Shelf Number: 133938

Keywords:
Illegal Markets
Illegal Oil Refining
Illicit Goods
Offenses Against the Environment
Oil Theft (Nigeria)
Organized Crime
Stolen Goods

Author: Prieger, James E.

Title: Violence in Illicit Markets: Unintended Consequences and the Search for Paradoxical Effects of Enforcement

Summary: The textbook competitive model of drug markets predicts that greater law enforcement leads to higher black market prices, but also to the unintended consequences of greater revenue and violence. These predictions are not in accord with the paradoxical outcomes evinced by recent history in some drug markets, where enforcement rose even as prices fell. We show that predictions of the textbook model are not unequivocal, and that when bandwagon effects among scofflaws are introduced, the simple predictions are more likely to be reversed. We next show that even simple models of noncompetitive black markets can elicit paradoxical outcomes. Therefore, we argue that instead of searching for assumptions that lead to paradoxical outcomes, which is the direction the literature has taken, it is better for policy analysis to choose appropriate assumptions for the textbook model. We finish with performing such an analysis for the case of banning menthol cigarettes. Under the most plausible assumptions enforcement will indeed spur violence, although the legal availability of electronic cigarettes may mitigate or reverse this conclusion.

Details: Malilbu, CA: Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy, 2014. 43p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 18, 2014 at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=sppworkingpapers

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=sppworkingpapers

Shelf Number: 134133

Keywords:
Black Markets
Illegal Cigarettes
Illegal Markets

Author: Mejia, Daniel

Title: On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from A Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

Summary: This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of coca cultivation in Colombia. We explore the deterrent effects of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb cocaine supply. We exploit variation induced by a diplomatic friction between the governments of Colombia and Ecuador over the possible negative effects of spraying campaigns over Ecuadorian territory. As a result of this friction, Colombia pledged to stop spraying campaigns within a 10 km band along the border with Ecuador in 2006. We estimate the effects of spraying on cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and conditional differences in differences, using satellite data for 1-square-km cells. Our results suggest that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by about 0.02 to 0.065 hectares, consistent with the view that enforcement reduces illegal behavior. However, these effects are too small to make aerial spraying a cost-effective anti-narcotic strategy.

Details: Working Paper, 2014. 31p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2480999

Year: 2014

Country: Colombia

URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2480999

Shelf Number: 135322

Keywords:
Drug Enforcement
Drug Trafficking
Drug War (Colombia)
Illegal Markets
War on Drugs

Author: Fleenor, Patrick

Title: Cigarette Taxes, Black Markets, and Crime: Lessons from New York's 50-Year Losing Battle

Summary: As large state government budget gaps have opened in the past year, lawmakers across the country are turning to cigarette taxes for added revenue. Twenty states raised cigarette tax rates in 2002, and more hikes may be on the agenda during state legislative sessions in 2003. Proponents of high cigarette taxes portray them as innocuous levies that improve public health. Yet those taxes have long been known to have a dark side. Since the first state cigarette taxes were imposed in the 1920s, black markets and related criminal activity have plagued high-tax jurisdictions. Such activity has proven to be resistant to law enforcement curtailment efforts. Thanks to recent city- and state-level tax hikes, New York City now has the highest cigarette taxes in the country-a combined state and local tax rate of $3.00 per pack. Consumers have responded by turning to the city's bustling black market and other low-tax sources of cigarettes. During the four months following the recent tax hikes, sales of taxed cigarettes in the city fell by more than 50 percent compared to the same period the prior year. New York has a long history of cigarette tax evasion. Former governor Malcolm Wilson dubbed the city the "promised land for cigarette bootleggers." Over the decades, a series of studies by federal, state, and city officials has found that high taxes have created a thriving illegal market for cigarettes in the city. That market has diverted billions of dollars from legitimate businesses and governments to criminals. Perhaps worse than the diversion of money has been the crime associated with the city's illegal cigarette market. Smalltime crooks and organized crime have engaged in murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery to earn and protect their illicit profits. Such crime has exposed average citizens, such as truck drivers and retail store clerks, to violence. The failure of New York policymakers to consider the broader effects of high cigarette taxes has been a mistake repeated across the country in the stampede to maximize tax revenue from this demonized product. Too often, policymakers do not consider these effects in the erroneous belief that people do not respond to government-created economic incentives. The negative effects of high cigarette taxes in New York provide a cautionary tale that excessive tax rates have serious consequences-even for such a politically unpopular product as cigarettes.

Details: Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2003. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Analysis no. 468: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa468.pdf

Year: 2003

Country: United States

URL: http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa468.pdf

Shelf Number: 108191

Keywords:
Black Markets
Cigarettes
Contraband Tobacco
Illegal Markets
Tax Evasion
Tobacco Control

Author: Ridgeway, Greg

Title: Strategies for Disrupting Illegal Firearm Markets: A Case Study of Los Angeles

Summary: In 2001, with the support of a grant from the National Institute of Justice, RAND initiated a research and program-development effort to understand the nature of illegal gun markets operating in the city of Los Angeles, California. The primary goal of this project was to determine whether a data-driven, problem-solving approach could yield new interventions aimed at disrupting the workings of local, illegal gun markets serving criminals, gang members, and juveniles in Los Angeles. The authors created a new software tool to help law enforcement analyze patterns in crime-gun data and identify and trace illicit pathways by which criminals acquire guns. Second, the findings were incorporated into an interagency working-group process that developed a community-based intervention designed to disrupt the illegal flow of guns to Los Angeles-area criminals; this intervention may had an impact on straw purchasing. Key participants in the working group included the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Los Angeles Police Department; the U.S. Attorney's Office; state and city prosecutors; academics; and other criminal-justice agencies. Finally, they assessed the utility of retail ammunition-purchase records in identifying prohibited firearm possessors, recommending a cost-benefit analysis on this measure.

Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008. 90p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR512.pdf

Year: 2008

Country: United States

URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR512.pdf

Shelf Number: 113263

Keywords:
Gun-Related Violence
Illegal Firearms
Illegal markets

Author: University of West Indies. Institute of International Relations

Title: Private Security Companies in the Caribbean: Case Studies of St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica

Summary: The origin of this field research project on private security companies (PSCs) in the Caribbean came from a discussion at a workshop jointly hosted by the Institute of International Relations at The University of the West Indies (IIR UWI) and Project Ploughshares (PP) on 20-21 January 2010 at the St. Augustine campus in Trinidad and Tobago. The workshop brought together officials from 14 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member and associate states to advance a regional response to the mounting threats and damage caused by illicit firearms in the Caribbean. Many of the workshop participants were senior police officers from the subregion. They were joined by representatives of Caribbean civil society organizations and regional organizations that included the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), as well as the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). Discussion at this workshop pointed to the effects of illicit gun trafficking and use-as well as some possible solutions-that could be brought into sharper focus by examining the prominent role of PSCs in the Caribbean. PSCs provide security for industries, resorts, and even governments. As such, PSCs often are a first line of observation and response to criminal activities, but can also be a means by which guns move from licit to illicit markets or use. This project contributes to the still limited published information on PSCs in the Caribbean by creating case studies on the private security industry in St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. The research was designed to describe and analyze PSCs in each country, as well as current national laws and regulations related to the industry. The case study data provide a clearer picture of the roles and functions of PSCs, which can be used by government regulators and the industry itself to raise standards of performance, encourage appropriate policy development, and generally improve the security situation for citizens. The case studies also provide a better understanding of how PSCs fit into the CARICOM security architecture.

Details: St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, 2013. 162p.

Source: Internet Resource: Project Ploughshares: Accessed August 10, 2015 at: http://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Priv_Security_Co_Carribean.webFINAL.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Caribbean

URL: http://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Priv_Security_Co_Carribean.webFINAL.pdf

Shelf Number: 136376

Keywords:
Illegal Markets
Illicit Markets
Private Security Industry
Trafficking in Guns
Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Center for the Study of Democracy

Title: Financing of Organised Crime

Summary: Enhancing the knowledge of the financing of organised crime is an indispensable component of more effective and smarter approaches to prevention and investigation. Accessing capital is a significant constraint for some criminals when they seek to become big players in illicit markets for goods and services, yet the processes and structures involved in the financial investment of criminal markets are largely under-researched. Whilst there is general information available regarding the level of financing required for a criminal group's operations in specific illicit markets - for example, the illicit drugs market is relatively well documented and there is a reasonably sound understanding of the pricing available along the entire value chain of operations, from production prices, smuggling and wholesale prices, middle-level dealing, to retail distribution, as well as with costs of the business - this is not the case with a number of other illicit markets such as organised VAT fraud, illicit excisable goods, smuggling/trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting of goods and money, payment card fraud, and trafficking in stolen vehicles, etc. To enter a criminal market at the wholesale level, organised criminals may need significant financial resources including, but not restricted to, credit facilities. Their need for financing concerns every level of organized crime. However, while millions (upfront and/or on credit) may be needed to enter the cocaine market at wholesale level, participation at the retail level requires only modest resources. The same applies to manifestations of organised crime that do not require entrepreneurial characteristics and are based on predatory activities. For example, small criminal groups may need only several tens of thousands of euros to launch an international banking fraud. The entry costs for many e-crimes are insignificant. Various financial mechanisms and opportunities are available for criminal actors to fund new or existing illicit activities. However, fairly little has been done in terms of systematically analysing or targeting individuals or processes that are mainly involved in the financing of criminal structures and organised criminal activities. The financing of organised crime is the type of horizontal issue that several analyses as well as threat and strategic assessments - analyses and assessments that have been previously criticised us unreliable sources of information on organized crime - often skip, focusing instead on the proceeds of crime, criminal assets and/or money laundering. Official and informal financial services may all be used to finance organised criminal operations in one way or another. Previous research has shown that financiers are often behind the financing of large-scale trafficking of commodities such as cigarettes or drugs. Yet despite the influence of these financiers, they remain outside the scope of analysis of organised crime being done at EU level, where such information is largely omitted. Although considerable research has been conducted on the proceeds of crime and the financial management of several organised criminal activities, the financing of terrorism and money laundering, little has been done in terms of analysing or targeting individuals, structures and processes that are involved in the "preceeds" of crime, especially on crimes unconnected with the financing of terrorism. Little has also been done in terms of analysing whether criminal entrepreneurs engage in a process that disguises a legitimate source of funds that are to be used for illegal purposes, a process that has been defined as "reverse money laundering." Following these observations, a number of academics and law-enforcement officials from across Europe were contacted in order to gather information regarding the respective situations in their countries. It was established that many faced a similar situation, where some operational knowledge on the issue existed, yet (excepting the Netherlands) analytical units had not given much specific attention to it. Therefore, an interest was expressed to gather this knowledge at the EU level, as well as to exchange knowledge and experiences with partner countries where this issue has been paid more attention.

Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2015. 464p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317

Year: 2015

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317

Shelf Number: 136598

Keywords:
Human Trafficking
Illegal Markets
Organized Crime
Smuggling
Stolen Vehicles
Terrorist Financing

Author: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Title: Tracking and Certification of Mineral Output in Southern Africa

Summary: The illegal exploitation of minerals and fraudulent manipulation of the volume or the value of exported minerals are enduring challenges for producing countries in Southern Africa. Illegal exploitation of minerals in particular has regularly been linked to instability and conflict in the region. There have been calls for effective mechanisms for regulating the exploitation and movement of the minerals. Regulation of the mining industry in Southern Africa is quite challenging partly because of its history and partly because of its nature. Some of the mineral exploitation occurs in areas with difficult access either because of conflict or because of the nature of the terrain. This makes it difficult to verify any declarations of output issued from such areas. The estimated yield of each mine is based on the scientific analysis of samples collected at various stages of mineral processing. Intimately connected to the prospects for development, the mining industry is also capital intensive and taxing on the personnel and equipment of various stakeholders, including corporate institutions and Governments. This study was conducted against the backdrop of the commitment by SADC member States to gather information on the identity, origin and volume of SADC mineral output in order to develop standardized mechanisms for tracking and certification. This was motivated by the growing conviction within the region that the mineral value chains were being undermined by leakages through neighbouring countries. Gold is said to be illegally imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) into Kenya, Burundi and Uganda and re-exported further. Limited benefit accrues to the DRC as a result of the process. Diamonds are said to be illegally imported from Zimbabwe into Mozambique and South Africa for onward exportation. Similar allegations are heard about illegal tin, coltan and woframite which are exported through Rwanda. Monitoring mineral value streams in the producing countries is complicated by the large informal small-scale mining sector active within them. There are also concerns about such practices as transfer pricing by large-scale mining conglomerates taking advantage of intra-group agreements involving the holding companies based in low tax jurisdictions and the subsidiaries based in the region. Transfer pricing abuses take various forms, including over- or under-invoicing of exports and imports, overloading of costs onto the subsidiary, service contracts and intra-group loans. Through such agreements, the holding companies are able to transfer income and allocate costs in a hidden manner that unfairly favours them. These malpractices reduce revenue which would have accrued to the producing States, thus exacerbating poverty amidst a rich natural resources heritage - the so-called 'paradox of plenty!' (UNECA, 2010). The SADC Mining Protocol was adopted in September 1997 by twelve member States and came into force in February 2000. The SADC Mining Sector Co-coordinating Unit (SMSCU), under the previous SADC structure, promoted adoption of the Mining Protocol. The Protocol recognizes that a 'thriving mining sector can contribute to economic development, alleviation of poverty and the improvement of the standard and quality of life throughout the Region.' In principle, the SADC Protocol seeks to'harmonize national and regional policies, strategies and programmes related to the development and exploitation of mineral resources.' In this spirit, SADC aims to develop and adopt common mineral certification standards, in accordance with internationally acceptable standards, in order to minimize illegal trade in minerals and thereby optimize the benefits to member States. SADC member States intend to 'adopt policies that encourage the exploration for and commercial exploitation of mineral resources by the private sector.' Furthermore, the Protocol seeks to facilitate the development of small-scale mining through, among other initiatives, the establishment of marketing facilities, including exhibitions and mineral exchanges. The study on which this report is based proposes a tracking and certification regime that is motivated by the above tenets. It suggests that the same goals that motivated the formulation and adoption of a tracking and certification system for diamonds in Guyana could be adapted by SADC. The key points are: (a) To provide reliable data to States on producer, exporter and purchaser behaviour; (b) To ensure the payment of the royalties and taxes due to the State; (c) To strengthen the State's oversight function along the mineral value chain; and (d) To prevent the mixing of minerals that are lawfully produced and/or acquired with illicitly produced and/or acquired ones in order to reduce illegal trade in minerals and consequently increase legal revenue flows through legal trade at both the national and subregional levels. The Kimberley Process Certification System (KCPS) was prompted by the concern summed up in (d), specifically that lawful output could and, in several demonstrable instances, had been contaminated by rough diamonds originating from zones of conflict. The study on which this report is based concerns minerals other than diamonds. Since some of them, like emeralds, share many characteristics with diamonds, the study borrows some lessons from the KCPS. The scope of the study determined by the terms of reference, namely: (i) To assess legislation and licensing procedures relating to mining, sale and transportation of minerals to overseas markets and their effectiveness in preventing fraudulent trade in mineral commodities; (ii) To examine national technical reporting requirements for mining and export of SADC mineral products and their efficacy in providing needed data for preventing fraudulent trade in mineral commodities; (iii) To review national, regional and international systems for tracking and certifying mineral products and make proposals for a possible tracking and certification system that would ensure an effective product audit trail of SADC minerals; (iv) To examine export documents and regulations and recommend how they might be adjusted to form part of the certification audit trail; (v) To examine customs conventions and formalities to assess how these might affect the formulation and application of rules of origin for a SADC-wide certificate of origin for SADC mineral products; and (vi) To assess current regional integration efforts in trade and how these might help or hinder the development of a SADC certificate of origin for mineral products. The study considered prevailing legislation and licensing procedures in several countries in order to assess their effectiveness in preventing fraud in the trade of minerals. It found that most national legislation did not prioritize this objective, and could not be considered effective in preventing the most pernicious form of illegality in minerals marketing, namely transfer pricing. It found that a tracking regime on its own is not the appropriate vehicle for policing transfer pricing, and that this could be better done by combining centralization of the marketing of minerals and creating incentives for localized beneficiation of mineral output.

Details: Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Subregional Office Southern Africa, 2014. 54p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 20, 2015 at: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/tracking-and-certification-of-mineral-output-in-southern-africa.pdf

Year: 2014

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/tracking-and-certification-of-mineral-output-in-southern-africa.pdf

Shelf Number: 137044

Keywords:
Crime Prevention
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trade
Kimberley Process
Metal Theft
Mineral Theft
Mining
Theft of Natural Resources

Author: Mounteney, Jane

Title: The internet and drug markets

Summary: The last decade has seen the emergence of new internet technologies that have acted as important facilitators of online drug markets. The internet now hosts a range of virtual marketplaces (both on the surface and deep web) for selling and buying illicit substances, as well as representing a new arena for health and law enforcement interventions. This first EMCDDA investigation into the world of online drug markets brings together state-of-the-art input from over 20 experts - from academia, journalism and frontline practice - and contributes to the knowledge base on this part of the supply chain.

Details: Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2016. 136p.

Source: Internet Resource: Insights no. 21: Accessed February 11, 2016 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2155/TDXD16001ENN.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2155/TDXD16001ENN.pdf

Shelf Number: 137844

Keywords:
Computer Crimes
Drug Markets
Illegal Markets
Internet Crimes

Author: U.S. General Accounting Office

Title: Health Care Fraud: Information on Most Common Schemes and the Likely Effect of Smart Cards

Summary: What GAO Found GAO's review of 739 health care fraud cases that were resolved in 2010 showed the following: - About 68 percent of the cases included more than one scheme with 61 percent including two to four schemes and 7 percent including five or more schemes. - The most common health care fraud schemes were related to fraudulent billing, such as billing for services that were not provided (about 43 percent of cases) and billing for services that were not medically necessary (about 25 percent). - Other common schemes included falsifying records to support the fraud scheme (about 25 percent), paying kickbacks to participants in the scheme (about 21 percent), and fraudulently obtaining controlled substances or misbranding prescription drugs (about 21 percent). - Providers were complicit in 62 percent of the cases, and beneficiaries were complicit in 14 percent of the cases. GAO's analysis found that the use of smart cards could have affected about 22 percent (165 cases) of cases GAO reviewed in which the entire or part of the case could have been affected because they included schemes that involved the lack of verification of the beneficiary or provider at the point of care. However, in the majority of cases (78 percent), smart card use likely would not have affected the cases because either beneficiaries or providers were complicit in the schemes, or for other reasons. For example, the use of cards would not have affected cases in which the provider misrepresented the service (as in billing for services not medically necessary), or when the beneficiary and provider were not directly involved in the scheme (as in illegal marketing of prescription drugs).

Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 46p.

Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-216: Accessed February 22, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674771.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: United States

URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674771.pdf

Shelf Number: 137935

Keywords:
Illegal Markets
Medical Fraud
Prescription Fraud

Author: Hubschle, Annette Michaela

Title: A Game of Horns: Transnational Flows of Rhino Horn

Summary: A multi-sectorial regime of protection including international treaties, conservation and security measures, demand reduction campaigns and quasi-military interventions has been established to protect rhinos. Despite these efforts, the poaching of rhinos and trafficking of rhino horn continue unabated. This dissertation asks why the illegal market in rhinoceros horn is so resilient in spite of the myriad measures employed to disrupt it. A theoretical approach grounded in the sociology of markets is applied to explain the structure and functioning of the illegal market. The project follows flows of rhino horn from the source in southern Africa to illegal markets in Southeast Asia. The multi-sited ethnography included participant observations, interviews and focus groups with 416 informants during fourteen months of fieldwork. The sample comprised of, amongst others, convicted and active rhino poachers, smugglers and kingpins, private rhino breeders and hunting outfitters, African and Asian law enforcement officials, as well as affected local communities and Asian consumers. Court files, CITES trade data, archival materials, newspaper reports and social media posts were also analysed to supplement findings and to verify and triangulate data from interviews, focus groups and observations. Central to the analysis is the concept of "contested illegality", a legitimization mechanism employed by market participants along the different segments of the horn supply chain. These actors' implicit or explicit contestation of the state-sponsored label of illegality serves as a legitimising and enabling mechanism, facilitating participation in gray or illegal markets for rhino horn. The research identified fluid interfaces between legal, illegal and gray markets, with recurring actors who have access to transnational trade structures, and who also possess market and product knowledge, as well as information about the regulatory regime and its loopholes. It is against the background of colonial, apartheid and neoliberal exploitation and marginalization of local communities that a second argument is introduced: the path dependency of conservation paradigms. Underpinning rhino conservation and regulation are archaic and elitist conservation regimes that discount the potential for harmonious relationships between local communities and wildlife. The increasing militarization of anti-poaching measures and green land grabs are exacerbating the rhino problem by alienating communities further from conservation areas and wild animals. The third argument looks at how actors deal with coordination problems in transnational illegal markets. Resolving the coordination problems of cooperation, value and competition are considered essential to the operation of formal markets. It is argued that the problem of security provides an additional and crucial obstacle to actors transacting in markets. The systematic analysis of flows between the researched sites of production, distribution and consumption of rhino horn shows that the social embeddedness of actors facilitates the flourishing of illegal markets in ways that escape an effective enforcement of CITES regulations.

Details: Koln,Germany: International Max Planck Research School, 2016. 418p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 18, 2016 at: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/6685/

Year: 2016

Country: Africa

URL: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/6685/

Shelf Number: 139087

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Illegal Markets
Illegal Wildlife Trade
Ivory
Organized Crime
Rhinoceros
Wildlife Crime
Wildlife Trafficking

Author: KPMG

Title: Illicit Tobacco in Australia. 2015 Half Year Report

Summary: This bi-annual report provides an overview of the nature and dynamics of the legal and illicit tobacco markets and an independent assessment of the size of the illicit tobacco market in Australia. It is commissioned jointly by British American Tobacco Australia, Imperial Tobacco Australia Limited and Philip Morris Limited. Key highlights: - Illicit tobacco consumption declined marginally to 14.3% of total consumption in the twelve months to June 2015. This was the first decline seen since 2012 - The overall decline was driven by a significant decrease in contraband consumption, such as manufactured cigarettes - The decline in illicit tobacco consumption was partially offset by a large rise in unbranded ("Chop Chop") tobacco.

Details: London: KPMG, 2015. 83p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2016 at: https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2015/11/illicit-tobacco-in-australia.html

Year: 2015

Country: Australia

URL: https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2015/11/illicit-tobacco-in-australia.html

Shelf Number: 139255

Keywords:
Counterfeiting
Illegal Markets
Illegal Tobacco (Australia)
Illicit Tobacco
Smuggling
Tax Evasion

Author: Lau, W.

Title: A rapid survey of UK ivory markets

Summary: Although the antiques ivory market in the UK appears to have declined significantly there are still thousands of ivory items on sale in London's markets, according to surveys carried out this April by TRAFFIC. Researchers from TRAFFIC visited 13 antiques markets and two areas with antiques shops across London and also carried out online searches to record the number of ivory items on sale. Their findings are published in A rapid survey of UK ivory markets. They found a wide range of ivory items offered for sale, including figures (56%), household goods (27%), jewellery (9%) and personal items (8%); similar items were found for sale or auction online. However, compared to surveys carried out in 2004, the researchers found fewer individual market stalls offering ivory, declining from around 640 stalls in 2004 to 200 in 2016, while the total number of ivory items for sale also declined, from around 6,000 items to 3,200 over the same period. Links with the current elephant poaching crisis appear tenuous at best, as researchers found no new or raw (unworked) ivory for sale, and only one item that was reportedly after the 1947 cut-off date for antique ivory. The nationality of buyers appeared to have changed too: in 2004 they were mainly American and European tourists, while in 2016 traders reported that travellers and citizens from East Asian countries and territories, including mainland China, Japan and Hong Kong were predominant. Reasons proposed to explain the apparent physical market decline include the emergence of online sales and/or stricter legislation which, according to traders, has led to reduced prices and demand for ivory items. However, according to the study, comparisons should be made with caution as "the surveys conducted in 2004 and 2016 were not identical due to various unavoidable factors." Although the global ivory trade was banned in 1989, antique ivory (carved or "worked" products acquired before 3rd March 1947), and raw or carved "pre-Convention" ivory can be traded under certain circumstances. According to figures from CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora), between 2005 and 2014, the UK was a net (re-)exporter of ivory for commercial purposes, comprising 990 kg and ~54,000 ivory pieces, some 31% of the EU's total. However, the study found evidence of potential irregularity. Of concern was a significant imbalance between the UK's reported exports of only 17 raw tusks, but importers' records showing 109 tusks originating from the UK. Furthermore, according to UK domestic measures, only worked specimens (antique or pre-Convention), not raw ivory, can legally be re-exported for commercial purposes. According to the study "it would be essential to clarify the reasons for these discrepancies." Meanwhile seizure data "show that the UK plays a role in illegal ivory trade...in particular as a transit country, with ivory seizures...having increased in recent years." The researchers found mixed understanding amongst traders of what constitutes legal ivory sales. All traders were aware of there being a specific cut-off date for antiques and many of the stricter rules regarding ivory importation into, for example the USA and China, but some were far less knowledgeable. More worrying, some even suggested transporting ivory items in personal luggage or sending them by post, without documentation. Few dealers were able to provide proof of age or documentation to prove legal acquisition of their ivory for sale.

Details: Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC, 2016. 56p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/27217988/1472570776477/UK-ivory-markets.pdf?token=9dlmId6A55I5yg%2BP8VExwqLxWRk%3D

Year: 2016

Country: United Kingdom

URL: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/27217988/1472570776477/UK-ivory-markets.pdf?token=9dlmId6A55I5yg%2BP8VExwqLxWRk%3D

Shelf Number: 140135

Keywords:
Illegal Markets
Illegal trade
Ivory

Author: Willcox, Daniel

Title: An Assessment of Trade In Bear Bile and Gall Bladder in Viet Nam

Summary: TRAFFIC's research finds the illegal market for bears, bear parts and derivatives in Viet Nam is still strong, with only a moderate decline in open availability following the introduction of legislation to ban their sale in 2006. Released in the margins of the Hanoi Conference on Illegal Wildlife Trade, An assessment of trade in bear bile and gall bladder in Viet Nam (PDF, 6 MB), analysed data from surveys of shops in six cities across Viet Nam in 2012 and 2016. It followed a 2010–2011 TRAFFIC investigation into the bear bile trade across 13 countries and territories in Asia. In the 1990s, bear bile farms were established throughout Viet Nam to address increasing consumer demands. In 2005, the Vietnamese government made it illegal to extract bile from bears but not to keep them, and without a government-backed plan to deal with the thousands of bears then held in captivity, many bear farms kept their animals under the guise of wildlife refuges although owners were required to microchip and register their animals. Under legislation introduced in Viet Nam in 2006, it is illegal to hunt, transport, keep, advertise, sell, purchase and consume bear species or their parts and derivatives.

Details: Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: TRAFFIC, 2016. 46p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2016 at: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/27336117/1479316776523/VN-Bears-Report.pdf?token=mJZIA3Ls2YKqsDGj5YavWfX2%2Fo8%3D

Year: 2016

Country: Vietnam

URL: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/27336117/1479316776523/VN-Bears-Report.pdf?token=mJZIA3Ls2YKqsDGj5YavWfX2%2Fo8%3D

Shelf Number: 147850

Keywords:
Bears
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trafficking
Trafficking in Wildlife
Wildlife Crime
Wildlife Trafficking

Author: Fay, Emily Victoria

Title: Trading in antiquities on eBay: the changing face of the illicit trade in antiquities

Summary: The sale of ancient objects on eBay is presented to buyers as legitimate and ethical. However the antiquities trade is a grey market, where both licit and illicit objects are sold (Bowman, 2008). An unknown percentage of illicit antiquities have entered the market as a consequence of archaeological looting. However, antiquities are fungible by nature, meaning that it is very difficult for buyers to differentiate the licit from the illicit. This thesis is based on the premise that the antiquities trade causes harm through the destruction of archaeological knowledge, and therefore there is a necessity to reduce the size of the market. Using Sutton's market reduction approach, the study sets out to collect empirical data on the market from eBay. The thesis considers three main research questions: First, is the current regulatory framework for the sale of antiquities adequate? Second, what is the scale and scope of the market on eBay for antiquities? Third, what are the routine features of the operation of this market? The thesis adopts routine activity theory to investigate the structural elements of the antiquities market, outlining the actors involved in the market, the reasons why antiquities make "suitable targets", and exploring the range of 'capable guardians' who may play a formal or informal role in the surveillance of this market. The data indicates eBay has expanded the size and reach of the antiquities trade, enabling amateurised actors to trade on a global scale. However, the online "frame" (Goffman, 1969) of eBay auctions creates additional challenges through the separation of goods and actors and the fluidity of identity in cyberspace. The thesis ends with an examination of the distal and proximal nodes of governance in online environments and the ideological, definitional, evidentiary, legislative and structural challenges to addressing the illicit antiquities trade at the market end.

Details: Keele, UK: Keele University, 2013. 436p.

Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December 5, 2016 at: http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/197/1/Fay%20PhD%202013.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: International

URL: http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/197/1/Fay%20PhD%202013.pdf

Shelf Number: 140279

Keywords:
Antiques
Antiquities
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trade
Illicit Trade

Author: Lemboe, Craig

Title: Cigarette Taxes and Smuggling in South Africa: Causes and Consequences

Summary: The main instrument within the broader framework of tobacco control in South Africa has been the more aggressive use of tobacco taxes which since 1999/2000 have increased from 0.12 cents per cigarette to 0.38c in 2009/10. The primary goal of these policies is to reduce cigarette consumption and the attendant negative externality. National Treasury (NT) data seem to suggest that these initiatives and higher taxes in particular have been effective in reducing cigarette consumption. However, the official (NT) data pay little attention to the illegal cigarette market which in South Africa has long been assumed to be only a fraction of total cigarette consumption. Comparing an independent consumption survey with the NT data we find that the level of cigarette smuggling in South Africa is in fact significant, constituting between 40% and 50% of the total market, and that cigarette tax hikes have to a large extent contributed to its continued existence and growth by creating a financial incentive to smuggle. Furthermore, the well-established informal sector in South Africa - which developed under Apartheid rule and is characterised by strong networks with other African countries - implies that there is a greater ability and likelihood of consumers switching from consuming legal cigarettes to consuming illegal cigarettes following a tax-induced price increase. There is also much evidence indicating that illegal cigarettes are of inferior quality which, combined with the tax induced shift to smuggled cigarettes, suggests that cigarette tax hikes could have the perverse effect of raising rather than lowering the overall negative externality.

Details: Stellenbosch, South Africa: Bureau for Economic Research, University of Stellenbosch, 2012. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource:: Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 9/12: Accessed February 10, 2017 at:

Year: 2012

Country: South Africa

URL:

Shelf Number: 147770

Keywords:
Cigarette Smuggling
Illegal Cigarettes
Illegal markets
Taxes

Author: May, Channing

Title: Transnational Crime and the Developing World

Summary: his March 2017 report from Global Financial Integrity, "Transnational Crime and the Developing World," finds that globally the business of transnational crime is valued at an average of $1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion annually. The study evaluates the overall size of criminal markets in 11 categories: the trafficking of drugs, arms, humans, human organs, and cultural property; counterfeiting, illegal wildlife crime, illegal fishing, illegal logging, illegal mining, and crude oil theft. The combination of high profits and low risks for perpetrators of transnational crime and the support of a global shadow financial system perpetuate and drive these abuses. The report also emphasizes how transnational crime undermines economies, societies, and governments in developing countries. National and global policy efforts that focus on curtailing the money are needed to more successfully combat these crimes and the illicit networks perpetrating them. Primary Findings Transnational crime is a business, and business is very good. Money is the primary motivation for these illegal activities. Of the 11 illicit activities studied, counterfeiting ($923 billion to $1.13 trillion) and drug trafficking ($426 billion to $652 billion) have the highest and second-highest values, respectively; illegal logging is the most valuable natural resource crime ($52 billion to $157 billion). The ranges demonstrate the serious magnitude of and threat posed by global transnational crime. The revenues generated from the 11 crimes covered in this report not only line the pockets of the perpetrators but also finance violence, corruption, and other abuses. Very rarely do the revenues from transnational crime have any long-term benefit to citizens, communities, or economies of developing countries. Instead, the crimes undermine local and national economies, destroy the environment, and jeopardize the health and well-being of the public. The report rankings for the illicit markets examined are: Counterfeiting $923 billion to $1.13 trillion Drug Trafficking --$426 billion to $652 billion Illegal Logging $52 billion to $157 billion Human Trafficking -- $150.2 billion Illegal Mining -- $12 billion to $48 billion IUU Fishing -- $15.5 billion to $36.4 billion Illegal Wildlife Trade -- $5 billion to $23 billion Crude Oil Theft -- $5.2 billion to $11.9 billion Small Arms & Light Weapons Trafficking -- $1.7 billion to $3.5 billion Organ Trafficking -- $840 million to $1.7 Total --$1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion Policy Recommendations Transnational crime will continue to grow until the paradigm of high profits and low risks is challenged. In addition to current efforts to fight these crimes, this report calls on governments, experts, the private sector, and civil society groups to seek to address the global shadow financial system by promoting greater financial transparency. This will help cutoff the money flows and the profits, and it will increase the ability to bring these criminals to justice and defeat their illicit transnational networks. GFI recommends several steps governments and other regulatory bodies can take to increase the levels of detection and interdiction of the proceeds of transnational crime: Require that corporations registering and doing business within a country declare the name(s) of the entity's true, ultimate beneficial owner(s) Flag financial and trade transactions involving individuals and corporations in "secrecy jurisdictions" as high-risk and require extra documentation Scrutinize import and export invoices for signs of misinvoicing, which may indicate technical and/or physical smuggling Use world market price databases such as GFTradeTM to estimate the risk of misinvoicing for the declared values and investigate suspicious transactions Share more information between agencies and departments on the illicit markets and actors that exist within a country"s border

Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2017. 166p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: International

URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf

Shelf Number: 144741

Keywords:
Criminal Networks
Developing Nations
Financial Crimes
Illegal Markets
Illicit Markets
Organized Crime
Transnational Crime

Author: Kronick, Dorothy

Title: Prosperity and Violence in Illegal Markets

Summary: Does prosperity generate violence in markets with ill-defined property rights? I consider the consequences of prosperity in drug trafficking markets in Venezuela. Using an original data set constructed from Ministry of Health records, I compare violent death trends in Venezuelan municipalities near trafficking routes to trends elsewhere, both before 1989 - when trafficking volumes were negligible - and after 1989, when heightened counter-narcotics operations in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. I find that, for thirty years prior to 1989, violent death trends and levels were nearly identical in treatment and control municipalities. After 1989, outcomes diverged: violence increased more in municipalities along trafficking routes than elsewhere. I estimate the difference-in-differences as approximately 10 violent deaths per 100,000, a magnitude similar to the overall pre-1989 violent death rate. Together with qualitative accounts, I interpret these findings as evidence in favor of the longstanding notion that, without Leviathan, prosperity creates violence.

Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 55p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/ProsperityViolence_2016July2.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Venezuela

URL: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/ProsperityViolence_2016July2.pdf

Shelf Number: 144742

Keywords:
Drug Trafficking
Homicides
Illegal Markets
Murders
Violence
Violent Crimes

Author: Castillo, Juan Camilo

Title: The Resilience of Illegal Markets

Summary: Why are illegal markets so resilient? Literature on the political economy of enforcement points to weak state capacity, ineffective enforcement technology, or electoral incentives for forbearance-none of which characterize prohibition efforts such as the U.S. war on drugs. We propose instead that governments face a tradeoff between prohibition and low violence. Using a model in which policy affects dynamic interaction among traffickers, we show that reducing the supply of an illegal good can increase profits through higher prices-and higher profits drive violence among traffickers, who invest more in fighting over an increasingly valuable prize. Jailing or killing traffickers makes them short-sighted and splinters their criminal organizations-both of which increase violence. While previous models of illegal markets focus either on supply reduction or on violence, we consider both together, revealing why prohibition is self-limiting: the government achieves one enforcement goal only at the cost of another.

Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2017 at: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/DrugWarfare.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: http://dorothykronick.com/wp-content/uploads/DrugWarfare.pdf

Shelf Number: 144743

Keywords:
Drug Trafficking
Illegal Markets
Illicit Drugs
Violence

Author: Raffo Lopez, Leonardo

Title: Law enforcement and drug trafficking networks: a simple model

Summary: This article presents a theoretical model to explain the performance of illicit drug markets. The analytical framework is based on the oligopoly model of Poret and Tejedo (2006), but the latter is extended in a crucial respect: the influence of drug trafficking networks in the illicit drug markets is considered. The proposed model indicates that Poret and Tejedo were correct: the aggregate quantity of drugs sold is negatively affected by the intensity of the law enforcement policies applied and positively affected by the number of traffickers in the market. We also determined that the individual and aggregate sales in the market are positively affected by the network's average density. Our model is useful for explaining the failure of the war against drugs to halt the reproduction and expansion of illegal activities at a global level during the three past decades.

Details: Cali, Colombia: Universidad del Valle, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Economicas, 2015. 32p.

Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 162: Accessed April 8, 2017 at: http://lacer.lacea.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/53019/lacea2015_drug_trafficking_networks.pdf?sequence=1

Year: 2015

Country: International

URL: http://lacer.lacea.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/53019/lacea2015_drug_trafficking_networks.pdf?sequence=1

Shelf Number: 144749

Keywords:
Drug Enforcement
Drug Markets
Drug Trafficking
Illegal Markets

Author: D'Angelo, Elena

Title: Organized Crime and the Legal Economy: The Italian Case

Summary: Italy's economy is one of the largest, not only in Europe but also with reference to the global context. Its financial and industrial sectors are significant. In addition, domestic organized crime groups, especially the Camorra, the 'Ndrangheta, and the Cosa Nostra, operate across numerous economic sectors, both in Italy and abroad, and their illicit proceeds represent the main source of laundered funds. Illicit markets remain the main source of profit for organized crime groups in Italy, and more broadly in Europe. There have been various attempts to estimate the total revenue of organized crime in Italy. For example, the U.S. Department of State (2015) estimated Italy's black market to be to 12.4% of the country's GDP, approximately $250 billion. The Italian Parliament's Antimafia Commission estimated that the total turnover of endogenous organized crime in Italy valued at L150 billion in 2012. However, the border between illegal and legal activities of organized crime is hard to define. Financial as well as human resources are increasingly being circulated from one sector to the other, without interruption. While maintaining their interests in traditional fields of action related to illicit trade, organized crime groups have been expanding their presence and influence into the legal economy - creating threats to society on an array of levels. Research Questions Two main research questions (RQs) guide the present study: 1. How does organized crime infiltrate the legal economy? 2. What is the impact of organized crime infiltration in the legal economy? The qualitative section of the report answers the first RQ, further detailed in the following subquestions: 1. What are the main reasons behind the diversification of investments into the legal sector? 2. Which is organized crime's modus operandi? 3. How does organized crime exploit existing vulnerabilities and what are the facilitating factors?

Details: Torino, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 2016. 111p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2017 at: http://files.unicri.it/UNICRI_Organized_Crime_and_Legal_Economy_report.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Italy

URL: http://files.unicri.it/UNICRI_Organized_Crime_and_Legal_Economy_report.pdf

Shelf Number: 145251

Keywords:
Illegal Markets
Illicit Trade
Money Laundering
Organized Crime
Proceeds of Crime

Author: Jenzen-Jones, N.R.

Title: Web Trafficking: Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Libya

Summary: The Libyan revolution deposed the Qaddafi regime in 2011, bringing to an end the tight regulation of the domestic arms trade. Military stockpiles were raided, and small arms and light weapons made their way into the hands of non-state armed groups and private sellers. The subsequent conflicts after the fall of the Qaddafi regime have resulted in more weapons flowing into the country. From a virtually non-existent domestic market, the revolution and its aftermath paved the way for a large illicit arms trade. Like their counterparts in many nations, some of the players in this new market now sell their wares via the Internet. Online sales via social media platforms are one of the tools currently being used for this purpose. ARES is delighted to announce that a new Working Paper, authored by ARES Director N.R. Jenzen-Jones & ARES Researcher Ian McCollum, and commissioned by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey, has been released today. Working Paper 26 Web Trafficking: Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Libya provides an in-depth analysis of the trade in SALW in the online marketplaces of Libya. The Working Paper ties together interviews with marketplace participants with detailed analysis of a dataset derived from long-term monitoring of some of the closed social media-based groups listing small arms and light weapons for sale. It explores the types of weapons offered and their likely routes into the Libyan online markets. It concludes with a policy-relevant analysis of the current state of Libya's online markets and discusses the caveats and utility of such online monitoring for supplementing field-based research. The report indicates there is a "booming online black market" for arms and munitions, according to Director Jenzen-Jones. "It is reasonable to conclude that the online illicit weapons marketplace is growing in terms of both demand and supply," he said. Speaking with the Washington Post, Director Jenzen-Jones noted that "Whilst online trades appear to account for only a small portion of the illicit arms trade in Libya, this method's relative anonymity, low barrier to entry, and distributed nature means it is likely to pose unique challenges to law enforcement and embargo monitoring operations." Whilst companies responsible for some of the social media platforms which have been used for illicit arms trading have taken limited steps to curb the practice, the majority rely on users to report violations. ARES has documented several groups which have been shut down, only to reopen days or even hours later, with a core 'nucleus' of the same members. "It is difficult," Director Jenzen-Jones told the Christian Science Monitor, "to moderate these sellers effectively, due to the fluid nature of the trade." Numerous groups remain active in Libya and elsewhere.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 112p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed Mary 4, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-SANA-WP26-Libya-web-trafficking.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Libya

URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-SANA-WP26-Libya-web-trafficking.pdf

Shelf Number: 145313

Keywords:
Black Markets
Illegal Markets
Illicit trade
Online Trade
Small Arms Survey
Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Nkoke, Christopher Sone

Title: Ivory Markets in Central Africa: Market Surveys in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon: 2007, 2009, 2014/2015

Summary: Weak governance, corruption and shifting trade dynamics are significant factors seriously undermining the control of ivory trafficking throughout five countries in Central Africa, according to a new TRAFFIC study launched today. Ivory Markets in Central Africa for investigations and analysis spanning a decade In the first comprehensive assessment of ivory trade in the region in nearly two decades, investigators from TRAFFIC visited major cities across Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Gabon in 2007, 2009 and 2014/2015. The investigators posed as buyers at known and newly identified ivory markets and workshops throughout the Congo Basin, interviewing everyone that they encountered connected to the ivory industry. In addition, discussions were held overtly with major stakeholders, including government officials in the five countries. The illegal and unregulated domestic ivory markets in (each of) the five Central African countries have been one of the main sources fuelling ivory trade in the region, as well as in West and Southern Africa and beyond (especially to Asia) in recent years. The report's findings show that open ivory markets in the region are disappearing, largely due to increased enforcement and competition with underground criminal networks. In its place, high-level corruption and poor governance are helping enable sophisticated international trade. Corruption, Collusion and Weak Political Pressure Current legislation prohibits domestic ivory trade in all countries except Cameroon. However, according to the report "there is a loose and ambiguous interpretation of the law in all countries, not only by the authorities in charge of enforcement, but also by many other actors...enforcement efforts are hampered by corruption, often involving high-level governmental officials, insufficient human and financial resources, mismanagement and weak political will." In DRC, one ivory trader interviewed claimed to have a relative in the army who supplied him with raw ivory. He also alleged that the main suppliers are government officials and, to some extent, UN peace keepers, who have the ability to move around the country frequently. Also in DRC, researchers recorded well-informed claims that the FARDC, the country's official army, was one of the main groups responsible for elephant poaching in Virunga National Park, with the ivory exported by the non-State "Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda" (FDLR) to whom the army would sell arms and military equipment. Open Ivory Markets Shifting Underground Throughout the multi-year investigation, market research showed that the region's open illegal ivory markets are disappearing or going underground, often in the face of increasing pressure from authorities conducting frequent law enforcement operations. TRAFFIC investigators recorded less than 1 kg of ivory products openly displayed in 2014/2015 within CAR, Congo, Gabon and Cameroon, compared to around 400 kg in 2007, and more than 900 kg in 1999 between all four countries. The one exception was the ivory market in Kinshasa, DRC, where over 400 kg of ivory products were recorded in 2015. DRC, however, has recently committed to stronger enforcement against the illegal ivory market in Kinshasa, a milestone which TRAFFIC and WWF supported last month. Carved ivory items were said to be bought by a mixture of African and non-African buyers: the former mainly acting as middlemen for foreign buyers. In 2014/2015 80% of foreign buyers were ethnic Asians, especially Chinese but also Malaysians and Vietnamese. In earlier studies, in 2007 and 2009, other nationalities were more regularly mentioned as buyers including French, Japanese, Koreans, Lebanese, Portuguese, Russians, Spaniards, and US Americans, according to the report. Rising International Criminal Networks "The generally positive news contained in this report about the decline of Central African ivory markets needs to be weighed against the fact that, throughout this sub-region, there are still many issues to be addressed and underlying trade dynamics may be shifting beyond local markets," according to Sone Nkoke of TRAFFIC and lead author of the report. common theme heard throughout the sub-region were allegations concerning Chinese citizens operating within organized criminal networks as key actors in the ivory trade. The sharp increase in raw ivory prices locally in recent years was ascribed to "high demand and limited supply owing to the shift to exportation through transnational ivory networks and syndicates with greater financial resources." The study found that "ivory trade in the region is shifting from an open domestic retail trade of worked ivory to underground transactions with a focus on the export of raw ivory to foreign markets, especially China." Among other key issues identified was the lack of robust and transparent mechanisms in place to ensure effective management of stockpiles in all the target countries. In Kinshasa, DRC, the investigators found raw tusks and worked ivory pieces in unsecured government offices - signalling a high potential for leakage into the local market. In Bangui, Central African Republic, the investigators were unable to perform a stockpile survey in 2015 as the storage facility had been looted by rebels. "Real concerted efforts are needed to address the serious decline in elephant populations throughout Central Africa: this is no longer just a wildlife issue, but an ecological disaster strongly driven by highly-organized crime syndicates. Criminals involved in international ivory trade are regularly exploiting weak State governance, and official collusion, confusion and corruption," said Sone Nkoke. "Clearly Central African countries face significant governance and enforcement challenges in regulating elephant poaching and ivory trafficking. They urgently need to ramp up their efforts to implement a range of commitments that they have made at multiple international fora over the last ten years," said Paulinus Ngeh, Director of the TRAFFIC Central Africa Regional Office. "Such efforts will need to be continuously and transparently monitored for quality and action." Central African States have pledged commitments to stop elephant poaching and illegal ivory trade under CITES, the African Union Common Wildlife Strategy, and other regional strategies, as well as under the United Nations fora on combatting corruption. Follow-through on these commitments is crucial to sustain wildlife in the region.

Details: Yaounde, Cameroon and Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC, 2017. 116p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2017 at: http://www.traffic.org/home/2017/9/7/new-traffic-study-lifts-lid-on-central-africa-ivory-markets.html

Year: 2017

Country: Africa

URL: http://www.traffic.org/home/2017/9/7/new-traffic-study-lifts-lid-on-central-africa-ivory-markets.html

Shelf Number: 147176

Keywords:
Animal Poaching
Elephants
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trade
Illegal Wildlife Trade
Ivory
Organized Crime
Political Corruption
Trafficking in Wildlife
Wildlife Crime

Author: Kruithof, Kristy

Title: The role of the 'dark web' in the trade of illicit drugs

Summary: The Internet has fundamentally changed ways of doing business, including the operations of illegal markets. RAND Europe was commissioned to investigate the role of the Internet in facilitating the drugs trade, particularly in the Netherlands. The Internet has fundamentally changed ways of doing business, including the operations and activities of illegal markets. There are now around 50 online marketplaces on the 'dark web' that trade illegal drugs, novel psychoactive substances (NPS), prescription drugs and other - often illegal - goods and services. These so-called cryptomarkets are accessible with a normal Internet connection, but require special anonymising software to access. The role of these cryptomarkets in facilitating the trade of illicit drugs was first highlighted by the success of Silk Road, an online marketplace for the sale of illegal goods. Silk Road was taken down by the FBI in October 2013; however, other very similar cryptomarkets filled the void within a matter of weeks.

Details: Cambridge, UK: RAND Europe, 2016. 8p.

Source: Internet Resource: Research Brief: Accessed September 27, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9925.html

Year: 2016

Country: Netherlands

URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9925.html

Shelf Number: 147473

Keywords:
Dark Web
Drug Markets
Illegal Drug Trade
Illegal Markets
Internet Crime

Author: Martinez, Cesar

Title: Security Policy in Mexico: Recommendations for the 2018 Presidential Election

Summary: For over ten years, Mexico's security situation has been a consistent public concern and policy priority. Since the 2000 democratic transition, the country's criminal landscape has changed dramatically. The dissolution of implicit organized-crime political agreements, a move toward more confrontational security strategies, and intra- and inter-group fighting have shattered criminal groups, pushed criminal activity into new industries and exploitative practices, and forced the Mexican government to rethink and continuously adjust its security strategy. The result of these changes is that today's organized criminal groups look different from their historic predecessors, which dedicated their time and energy primarily to transporting and cultivating drugs and keeping a low profile. Today's groups experiment with a range of illicit revenue-generating activities and have adopted shockingly brutal and violent tactics. These profits are then funneled into corrupting political institutions at every level, weakening the government's ability to fulfill its mandate and decimating public trust. The overall insecurity also hurts the country's economy, with estimates that it slashes 1.25 percent off the country's GDP every year. In July 2018, Mexico will elect its next president for the following six years. In the backdrop, the country's homicide level is once again on the rise after a two-year drop. Further, almost 60 percent of the population reported in 2016 that insecurity or delinquency was Mexico's principal problem. These ongoing challenges and concerns will ensure that public security features prominently in the upcoming presidential campaigns and will be a central issue for the incoming administration. To address some of these issues, this Policy Research Project on Mexico's security policy- sponsored by the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law-will address Mexico's major security challenges and offer a series of policy recommendations. The report is divided into four chapters, focusing on the overall security strategy, important domestic and international security issues, illicit economic markets, and civil society efforts. Within each chapter, the authors identify the current policies, evaluate their effectiveness, and provide steps for a path forward to a safer and more secure Mexico.

Details: Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 2017. 166p.

Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research Project Report Number 193 ; Accessed December 6, 2017 at: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/61475/prp_193-security_policy_in_mexico-2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Year: 2017

Country: Mexico

URL: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/61475/prp_193-security_policy_in_mexico-2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Shelf Number: 148728

Keywords:
Drug Trafficking
Homicides
Illegal Markets
Illicit Markets
Murders
Organized Crime
Public Security
Violence
Violent Crime

Author: Capler, Rielle

Title: Organized Crime in the Cannabis Market: Evidence and implications

Summary: Claims that portray Canada's current and pre-existing cannabis industry as dominated by organized crime have the potential to misinform government policy and the direction of legislative reform. This briefing note will assess the evidence that suggests that organized crime is currently involved in the marijuana market in Canada, and to what degree; we also canvass the evidence that describes the characteristics of the participants currently involved in the production and distribution of cannabis. Key findings of the best available evidence include: 1. While the label of organized criminal may be accurately applied to a minority of the individuals involved in the illicit cannabis industry, the defining characteristics of the term are not applicable to the majority. 2. Unsubstantiated media and police reports portray the cannabis industry as dominated by organized crime. 3. Evidence suggests a very low involvement of organized crime in the cannabis industry in Canada; the majority of those in the industry tend to be non-violent and have minimal, if any, involvement with other criminal activities. 4. Those involved in cannabis production are typically small-scale growers who are active members of their communities. 5. Those in the cannabis industry have diverse motivations, including supplementing income, reducing costs, pursuing business and personal interest, controlling quality and producing diverse strains, and avoiding the illegal market. 6. Most of those involved in the illicit cannabis market are keen to be part of a legal market.

Details: Vancouver, BC: Canadian Drug Policy Consortium, 2016. 9p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 15, 2019 at: https://drugpolicy.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CDPC_Submission_Cannabis-and-Organized-Crime_Aug9-2016_Full-Final-1.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Canada

URL: https://drugpolicy.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CDPC_Submission_Cannabis-and-Organized-Crime_Aug9-2016_Full-Final-1.pdf

Shelf Number: 155414

Keywords:
Cannabis
Illegal Markets
Illicit Drugs
Marijuana
Organized Crime

Rutgers - School of Law, Newark

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