Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:45 am
Time: 11:45 am
Results for illegal weapons
11 results foundAuthor: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: Trace the Guns: The Link Between Gun Laws and Interstate Gun Trafficking Summary: Every year, tens of thousands of guns make their way into the hands of criminals through illegal trafficking channels. These firearms contribute to the more than 12,000 gun murders in the United States each year. This report seeks to explain where crime guns originate, where they are recovered in crimes, and whether state gun laws help curb the flow of these illegal weapons. Details: S.l.: Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/trace_the_guns_report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/trace_the_guns_report.pdf Shelf Number: 119944 Keywords: Gun ControlGun TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal GunsIllegal Weapons |
Author: Women's Institute for Alternative Development Title: Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse Toward a Caribbean Plan of Action Summary: Bank note that murder rates in the Caribbean — at 30 per 100,000 population annually —are higher than for any other region of the world. Understandably, mounting fatalities from illegal weapons worry Caribbean policymakers and citizens alike. In the last two years, at least six Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Member States have held general elections in which crime and security were central issues. The proliferation of illegal small arms threatens the ability of Caribbean states to meet their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As the World Bank (2007) states, “high rates of crime and violence in the Caribbean are undermining growth, threatening human welfare, and impeding social development.” Crime and violence have become development issues in the Caribbean. A major factor in the surge of gun-related criminality is the trafficking of narcotics. Illicit drugs are transshipped through the region from South America to North America and there is a linked movement of illegal weapons from North America to several destinations in the Caribbean. At the same time, the rise of crime has been characterized by the increased use of more powerful weapons, resulting in higher mortality levels. Caribbean countries exhibit crime patterns similar to those of other countries where low economic growth has coincided with large populations of young men. The Latin America and Caribbean region boasts the highest homicide rate of men between the ages of 15 and 29 in the world, more than three times greater than the global average. Indeed, youth violence is a high-priority, high-visibility concern across the Caribbean. Youth are disproportionately represented in the incidence and severity of gun violence, both as victims and perpetrators, and violent crimes are being committed at younger ages in many countries. A wide variety of risk factors contribute to the prevalence of youth violence, including poverty, youth unemployment, large-scale migration to urban areas, drug trafficking, a weak education system, ineffective policing, the widespread availability of weapons, drug and alcohol use, and the presence of organized gangs. Deaths and injuries from youth violence constitute a major public health, social, and economic problem across the Caribbean. Much of the work that seeks to reveal the use and impact of small arms and light weapons in the region has highlighted the masculine perpetrator and victim. Although this is a legitimate sphere of inquiry, it is important to recognize that a more integrated approach is required. The lives of Caribbean men and women are influenced by the gender disparities and structural inequalities that persist in many facets of Caribbean life. In a post-“structurally adjusted” Caribbean region, and as a result of shifting trading arrangements, there remains the persistent challenge of positioning the economies of the region to address the growing levels of poverty. Over the years, the larger economic shifts have seen the growth of the commoditization of violence, which speaks to the fact that an increasing number of citizens have had to rely on criminal violence of various kinds to survive. Details: Belmont, Trinidad and Tobago: Women's Institute for Alternative Development; Waterloo, ONT: Project Ploughshares, 2008. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: WORKING PAPER 08-1: Accessed April 11, 2011 at: http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/WorkingPapers/wp081.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Central America URL: http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/WorkingPapers/wp081.pdf Shelf Number: 121292 Keywords: Economic ConditionsGun ViolenceHomicidesIllegal WeaponsViolence (Caribbean)Violent Crime |
Author: Frandsen, Ronald J. Title: Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2009: Federal and State Investigations and Prosecutions of Firearm Applicants Denied by a NICS Check in 2009 Summary: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) requires criminal history background checks by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state agencies on persons who attempt to purchase a firearm from a licensed dealer. In 2009, the FBI and state agencies denied a firearm to nearly 133,000 persons due to National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) records of felonies, domestic violence offenses, and other prohibiting factors. Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2009 reports on investigations and prosecutions of persons who were denied a firearm in 2009. The report describes how the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) screens denied-person cases and retrieves firearms that were obtained illegally. Statistics presented include charges most often filed against denied persons by United States Attorneys and results of prosecutions. Investigation statistics from two states are also presented. Key statistics are compared for the years 2009 and 2008. Statistical highlights are presented in the body of the report and complete details are included in an Appendix. Details: St. Louis, MO: Regional Justice Information Service, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 121470 Keywords: Brady ActCriminal Background ChecksGun ControlIllegal Weapons |
Author: Cukier, Wency Title: The Illicit Trade in Small Arms: Addressing the Problem of Diversion Summary: Over the last decade, considerable attention has been paid to the global problem of the illicit trafficking of small arms. This paper will analyse the points of diversion and potential mechanisms to prevent diversion using a demand-and-supply framework. Concrete cases are examined to understand the contributing factors and ways in which the Programme of Action addresses these. The paper is structured in four parts: 1) Background, 2) Mechanisms of Diversion, 3) Measures to Reduce Diversion, and 4) Conclusions. The principal findings of the paper are: 1) Increasingly the evidence reaffirms the importance of understanding the root causes of political and criminal violence that drive the demand for illicit small arms. Where demand is strong because of acute insecurity, efforts to reduce diversion by increasing controls over the licit supply are less likely to be successful. Factors driving the demand for small arms include demographics, governance problems; weak and corrupt law enforcement; human rights violations; civil and identity conflicts and the failure of states to protect the vulnerable; social and economic disparities; inadequate post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; and cultural attitudes. 2) Although the definitions vary by context, “licit” small arms are those possessed by states, police, and civilians in accordance with existing international conventions as well as national laws. “Illicit” small arms are those which are possessed in violation of existing international conventions and/or national laws. These may include small arms in the hands of states that are subject to UN Security Council sanctions or regional/subregional embargos or moratoria, or small arms in the hands of non-state actors, as well as small arms illicitly possessed by civilians. The distinctions and interactions between licit and illicit are complex. Distinguishing between licit/ illicit small arms sales is a function of the status of the buyer (entitled or proscribed); the status of the seller (licensed or unlicensed); the status of the weapon (licit or illicit model, licitly acquired or stolen, licit/illicit manufacture); and the details of the transaction (formal or informal). 3) While in some regions there is local craft production of illicit small arms, most illicit small arms begin as licit small arms. Diversion occurs through a variety of means, including: illegal manufacture or reactivation of deactivated weapons, illicit sales by states, illegal brokering, illegal sales by dealers, illegal sales by civilians, theft from state and civilian stockpiles, and illicit importation. 4) A review of cases reveals a wide variety of mechanisms to facilitate illicit sales, including the absence of appropriate controls, falsification of documents and inadequate implementation, and a limited capacity for enforcement. 5) Measures that address licit trade, possession, and use—whether by states, police and other public security agents, or civilians—are essential to reduce the risk that licit small arms will be diverted to licit markets or purposes. A principal purpose of international sanctions and embargos, conventions, programs of action, and national regulations that follow from them is to reduce the risk that licit small arms will be diverted to illicit markets and purposes. Details: Ottawa: Peacebuild; Waterloo, ONT: Project Ploughshares, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2012 at: http://www.muntr.org/v4/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ADDRESSING-THE-PROBLEM-OF-DIVERSION.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.muntr.org/v4/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ADDRESSING-THE-PROBLEM-OF-DIVERSION.pdf Shelf Number: 124914 Keywords: Illegal GunsIllegal WeaponsSmall Arms Trafficking (Canada) |
Author: Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD) Title: A Human Security Concern: The Traffick, Use and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Caribbean Summary: This paper looks at the place of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as a threat to Human Security with specific reference to the Caribbean context. The concept of Human Security for the purpose of this paper is not limited to a State centric realist definition of the concept. Human Security is interpreted and interrogated within a more people centred approach to the concept. The intent of this paper is to outline the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weight weapons within the framework of a compromised Human Security and as a hinderance to development. It further explores the major consideration of Human Security for the Small Island Developing States of the Caribbean region, investigating the political and economic development path as a contributor to and facilitator of this compromised security. Additionally, the unique geopolitics and economics of regional development and the space created for the proliferation of SALW is also looked at in terms of providing as holistic as possible an understanding of the factors which determine the mis-use of SALW within the region. In conclusion, the remedial work undertaken, both at the level of the State and non-State actors, specific to the social and economic fallout consistent with the proliferation and mis-use of SALW will be explored. The initiatives which seek to address the issue of SALW as a threat to human security at the national, regional and international levels. The overarching concerns of the paper are the place of gender within the Human Security and SALW dialogue and the place or impacts on the development agenda for these issues. Details: Trinidad and Tobago: Women's Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD), 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Documentos-8.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Documentos-8.pdf Shelf Number: 125202 Keywords: Human Security (Caribbean)Illegal GunsIllegal WeaponsSmall Arms Trafficking (Caribbean) |
Author: Title: Dismantling Colombia's New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender Summary: The surrender of the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC) in December 2011 risks going down as a failure. Only a fraction of the group took part; leaders may be getting away with short prison sentences; and the underlying criminal and corrupt structures will likely remain untouched. The impact on conflict dynamics in the group’s eastern-plains stronghold has been limited. As worrying, the lack of transparency, including of international oversight, has damaged the credibility of the process, leaving the impression that an illegal armed group has again outwitted state institutions to the detriment of the public and particularly of the victims. The authorities need to draw the right conclusions from the process. Otherwise, the lack of appropriate instruments to manage collective surrenders will continue to hamper efforts to combat groups such as ERPAC that have grown into one of the country’s top security challenges. The surrender of 272 members – slightly more than a third of ERPAC’s total armed strength – was the first time a New Illegal Armed Group (NIAG) with roots in the demobilised paramilitaries had chosen to give up its weapons. Pressure to surrender had been building, externally and within the group, since police killed its founder, alias “Cuchillo”, in December 2010. The former mid-level paramilitary leader had made ERPAC the dominant illegal armed force in parts of Meta, Guaviare and Vichada departments, with a key role in drug trafficking and other organised criminal activities. But with substantial links to the regional and local political elite as well as to parts of the security forces, ERPAC was always more than an ordinary criminal outfit. It exercised strict social control in its strongholds, including through targeted killing of community leaders, and was responsible for displacements, child recruitment and sexual violence. ERPAC members currently face criminal proceedings before ordinary courts. They may seek benefits provided for by the criminal justice system such as the reduction of sentences in return for accepting charges. But they are not eligible for the benefits of the government’s demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. This is because the government considers groups such as ERPAC criminal organisations (BACRIMs in the Spanish acronym) and not part of the internal armed conflict. For the same reason, NIAG members are also not eligible for consideration under transitional justice measures such as the 2005 Justice and Peace Law (JPL). A wholesale extension of DDR and transitional justice mechanisms to NIAGs would be unwarranted, but the exclusive reliance on the ordinary criminal law to try their members has its downsides. First, it leaves victims without legal guarantees and benefits extended to the victims of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries; a March 2012 Constitutional Court ruling might, however, open the door for some NIAG victims to be covered by the new 2011 Victims Law. Secondly, it leaves former fighters without a clear perspective of civilian reintegration, thus increasing risks they will take up arms again. Serious crimes committed by NIAGs need to be fully investigated and prosecuted, but a more expansive approach to dismantling these groups is also required where there is a sufficient link to the armed conflict. Contrary to government hopes, the ERPAC process revealed the limits of its surrender strategy, rather than vindicating it. The attorney general’s office had little choice but to free most of the fighters almost immediately, as only nineteen leaders were originally subjects of an arrest warrant. This obliged prosecutors and the police to recapture ERPAC members one by one, an onerous, still incomplete task. The public outrage was understandable, but more damaging is that the process will likely fail both to punish those responsible for serious crimes and to have a structural impact on ERPAC’s business activities as well as its corrupt links with politicians and security forces. Potential information from rank-and-file members on ERPAC operations appears not to have been fully exploited. Leaders do not face a credible threat of serious criminal charges and thus have little incentive to collaborate seriously with the judicial system. But the problem goes further. The government’s sharp conceptual distinction between parts of the conflict and organised crime groups – upon which the logic of the surrender was built – poorly reflects on-the-ground complexities. Groups such as ERPAC do not fully replicate the paramilitaries, but they cannot and should not be considered in isolation from the broader context of the internal armed conflict. This means that dismantling the NIAGs involves more than investigating and punishing individual criminals. It also requires dismantling corrupt networks, guaranteeing victims’ rights and preventing rearmament. Given its current weakness, reconciling such disparate interests overburdens the judicial system. The Santos administration deliberately left the field to the attorney general’s office, but the shortcomings revealed in the ERPAC experience have highlighted the need for an explicit surrender policy that goes beyond individual criminal prosecution and has active government leadership. After the Uribe administration long downplayed the NIAG threat, President Santos has taken a stronger stand, though results have remained elusive. Combating NIAGs is a complex challenge, involving multiple government agencies and cutting across several policies. But without an explicit surrender policy, the government’s anti-NIAG strategy will continue to fall short. Such a policy could also have benefits beyond future exercises with NIAGs. A more credible and encompassing approach to tackling NIAGs might become a crucial part of guarantees for the new peace talks with the guerrillas that the government is slowly preparing the ground for. RECOMMENDATIONS To facilitate collective surrenders of NIAGs in a manner that ensures their complete dismantlement, including front structures and corrupt networks, guarantees the protection of victims’ rights and prevents rearmament, while avoiding impunity To the Government of Colombia and the Attorney General and other Judicial System Authorities: 1. Ensure police and judicial institutions have the resources, capacity and career-incentives to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of NIAG crimes, including serious offences equivalent to grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), and the corrupt networks behind the groups. 2. Strengthen incentives for rank-and-file NIAG members to surrender and cooperate in revealing information about operations, superiors and enabling networks by clarifying whether and how the “opportunity principle” – which permits the attorney general’s office to suspend or desist from prosecution in a given case that does not involve grave violation of human rights and IHL – applies to them. 3. Improve the civilian perspective for former NIAGs members by introducing basic reintegration benefits, subject to strict criteria of eligibility, judicial records and behaviour. 4. Clarify the handling of young NIAG members, who should be eligible to enter the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF) program for child soldiers, despite the government’s classification of NIAGs as criminal organisations rather than part of the armed conflict. 5. Improve institutional guarantees for NIAG victims by an extensive and pro-victim interpretation of Law 1448 (2011), and if this proves ineffective, consider introducing legislation to ensure equal treatment for them. 6. Strengthen victims’ rights to truth by introducing an administrative program similar in design to Law 1424 (2010), under which NIAG rank-and-file members would receive legal benefits in return for contributing to the establishment of non-legal truth and historical memory; individuals responsible for serious offences should not be eligible for such a program. 7. Increase the credibility and accountability of surrender processes by inviting international organisations, in particular the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organisation of American States (Mapp-OAS), to monitor and accompany them. Details: Bogota; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report N°41: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/41-dismantling-colombias-new-illegal-armed-groups-lessons-from-a-surrender Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/41-dismantling-colombias-new-illegal-armed-groups-lessons-from-a-surrender Shelf Number: 125653 Keywords: Armed Groups (Colombia)Illegal WeaponsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Frandsen, Ronald J. Title: Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2010: Federal and State Investigations and Prosecutions of Firearm Applications Denied by a NICS Check in 2010 Summary: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) requires criminal history background checks by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state agencies on persons who attempt to purchase a firearm from a licensed dealer. In 2010, the FBI and state agencies denied a firearm to nearly 153,000 persons due to National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) records of felonies, domestic violence offenses, and other prohibiting factors. Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2010 reports on investigations and prosecutions of persons who were denied a firearm in 2010. The report describes how the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) screens denied-person cases and retrieves firearms that were obtained illegally. Statistics presented include charges most often filed against denied persons by United States Attorneys and results of prosecutions. Investigation statistics from two states are also presented. Key statistics are compared for the five-year period from 2006 to 2010. Statistical highlights are presented in the body of the report and complete details are included in an Appendix. Details: St. Louis, MO: Regional Justice Information Service, 2012. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2012 at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/239272.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/239272.pdf Shelf Number: 126647 Keywords: Brady ActCrime StatisticsCriminal Background ChecksGun ControlIllegal Weapons |
Author: Cliffe, Lionel Title: Armed violence and poverty in Somalia: a case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative Summary: Somalia represents an extreme case. It has experienced a long period of insecurity and instability; its people have been subject to a wide range of armed violence. Following the overthrow of the military regime in 1991, it has experienced the longest period of statelessness of any country in modern history. A period of intense armed conflict for power between factions based around the clans that make up Somali society eventually gave way to an unresolved stalemate in the capital and the south-central areas. Fighting between smaller militia groups who preyed on the population has continued in most of these areas until the present. In the northeast and northwest a degree of security was slowly negotiated and these areas have enjoyed relative stability and the state-type administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, respectively, which offer examples of control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and armed violence. The case thus allows for analysis of several stages and types of armed violence and of the context of statelessness, but also comparison of the different processes at work in areas of much greater or lesser armed violence and impoverishment. The Republic of Somalia that came into being in 1960 has been subject to intense armed violence for most of its existence (and before). It has experienced military coup, inter-state war, insurgencies, civil war and ‘institutionalised disorder’ and insecurity. Likewise, SALW, as well as heavy weapons, have been widely spread since colonial times and through these stages of violent conflict, supplied by cold war powers, neighbouring governments and an active illegal market. The contending parties in the period of crisis since any semblance of a state with a monopoly of means of violence disappeared in 1991 have included: • Factional militias, mainly clan-based • Business militias, forced into self-protection • Private security guards • Freelance armed groups (mooryan) The problem of SALW is often seen by those bidding for political power in a new Somalia and by international actors as their spread to ‘civilians’. In reality it is their possession by these armed groups that represents a threat now and to a future peace. Without alternative livelihoods there is no solution. However, the juxtaposition of critically insecure with stable regions, which were also awash with SALW, demonstrates that their availability alone is not a single explanatory ‘cause’ of impoverishment. Details: Bradford, UK: Centre of International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, 2005. 31p. Source: Internet Resource:Accessed February 13, 2017 at: https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10454/1002/AVPI_Somalia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2005 Country: Somalia URL: https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10454/1002/AVPI_Somalia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 145769 Keywords: Armed ViolenceIllegal WeaponsMilitia GroupsPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Verleysen, Cindy Title: Preventing Illegal Trafficking of Firearms - Policies and Practices Summary: We believe that illicit trafficking of firearms has not deserved the attention that it should. Even though it is obvious that the illicit trafficking of firearms is a threat to the security of Europe, not much has yet been done to prevent it. By writing this toolbox we would like to mitigate this by recommending certain actions to get started with the prevention. Overall, the research confirms that Europe faces a serious illicit firearms trafficking problem. This is a problem in its own right but also as an important factor contributing to other criminal activities, such as human trafficking, drugs smuggling and terrorist-related activities all of which threaten the security of EU Member States and their citizens. Additionally, trafficking in firearms make firearms more available, which then, contributes to the increased lethality of criminal violence. Details: Brussels: European Crime Prevention Network, 2016. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: EUCPN Tool Box Series, No. 9: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://eucpn.org/sites/default/files/content/download/files/toolbox_9_-_preventing_illegal_trafficking_of_firearms.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://eucpn.org/sites/default/files/content/download/files/toolbox_9_-_preventing_illegal_trafficking_of_firearms.pdf Shelf Number: 141041 Keywords: Crime Prevention Illegal WeaponsTrafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: University of Chicago Crime Lab Title: Gun Violence in Chicago, 2016 Summary: A total of 764 people were murdered in Chicago in 2016. They were sons, brothers, and fathers; sisters, daughters, and mothers; they were, as the title of The New York Times reporter Fox Butterfield's book on urban violence noted, All God's Children. This report represents a first step towards understanding what happened with the goal of helping the city of Chicago prevent another year like the one that just passed. We draw on data obtained from the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and other sources to provide a more complete picture of the change in our city's crime problem in 2016. Our analysis highlights a number of key facts that are important for understanding what happened, but also raises some new puzzles as well. While this report focuses on establishing basic facts and avoids delving too deeply into solutions, we will continue to partner with policymakers, the civic community, and local nonprofits to identify promising approaches for moving forward. We plan to share our thinking about how to reduce violence in Chicago, informed by the best available data and research, in other venues in the future. Between 2015 and 2016, Chicago experienced 58 percent more homicides and 43 percent more non-fatal shootings. Annual increases of this size are not unprecedented among American cities, particularly in recent years, but are rare for a city of Chicago's size. One striking feature of Chicago's increase in gun violence is how sudden it was: as of December 2015, there was no indication that gun violence was on the verge of rising sharply. But in January 2016, homicides and shootings surged relative to their 2015 levels and remained higher in almost every month that followed, threatening 20 years of progress on violent crime in Chicago. This increase was mostly in gun crimes; other crimes did not change by nearly as much. The characteristics of homicide were generally similar in 2016 and 2015; what changed in Chicago was not so much the nature of our violence problem, but rather its prevalence. Most murders involved guns, occurred in public places, and stemmed from what police believe was some sort of altercation. This violence continues to be very regressive in its impact, disproportionately affecting the city's most disadvantaged residents. Most gun violence victims and suspects were African American men, more often than not having had some prior encounter with the criminal justice system. Compared to other cities, a larger share of homicide suspects in Chicago consists of adolescents, although the majority of all homicide suspects are in their 20s or older. The increase in gun violence occurred disproportionately in several disadvantaged neighborhoods on the city's South and West sides, which now account for an even larger share of the city's homicides. Another change is that from 2015 to 2016, the share of homicides that CPD believes stemmed from an altercation, as well as the share of homicide offenders who were recorded by CPD as having a gang affiliation, seemed to decline. What caused Chicago's sudden surge in gun violence in 2016 remains a puzzle. Weather cannot explain the surge in homicides and shootings, since monthly temperatures in 2016 were close to their historical averages. City spending on social services and public education did not change much in 2016 compared to previous years, and while the state budget impasse disrupted funding for many community organizations, this did not seem to change sharply in December 2015. Most relevant measures of police activity did not change abruptly enough to explain the surge in gun violence. Overall arrests declined in 2016, driven by narcotics arrests, but arrests for violent crimes, including homicides and shootings, barely changed. One policing measure that declined was the chance of arrest for homicides and shootings (the "clearance rate"), which was a result of arrests for these crimes not keeping pace with the increase in gun violence. Another policing measure that declined was the number of investigatory street stops. However, for this to explain why shootings increased in Chicago would also require an explanation for why the previous dramatic decline in street stops in New York City did not lead to more gun violence there. We also cannot know the effect of factors not measurable in the available data, such as any change in street gangs or the use of social media. However, given the timing of the recent increase in gun violence, for any alternative explanation to make sense it would need to involve something that changed abruptly near the end of 2015 and disproportionately affected gun crimes. Not knowing the definitive cause of Chicago's sudden and substantial increase in gun violence does not mean the city should be paralyzed in crafting a response. The solution to a problem need not be the opposite of its cause. One key implication of these data is the importance of a policy response that is focused on the core problem: violence concentrated largely in a moderate number of our most disadvantaged neighborhoods, carried out by teens and young adults in public places with illegally owned, and perhaps increasingly lethal, firearms. Details: Chicago: The Crime Lab, 2017. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/store/2435a5d4658e2ca19f4f225b810ce0dbdb9231cbdb8d702e784087469ee3/UChicagoCrimeLab+Gun+Violence+in+Chicago+2016.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/store/2435a5d4658e2ca19f4f225b810ce0dbdb9231cbdb8d702e784087469ee3/UChicagoCrimeLab+Gun+Violence+in+Chicago+2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147255 Keywords: Crime StatisticsGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal WeaponsMurders |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives Summary: Objectives -- The objectives of this audit were to evaluate: (1) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives; (2) ATF compliance with policies governing weapons, munitions, and explosives; and (3) the accuracy of ATF's weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories. The audit covers ATF's weapons and munitions inventories, including firearms, Tasers, ammunition, chemical agents, diversionary devices, and explosives, as well as seized weapons, ammunition, and explosives inventories from fiscal years (FY) 2014 through 2017. To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed ATF personnel, evaluated ATF's policies regarding property management, firearms, ammunition, explosives, and diversionary devices. We also reviewed documentation related to firearms that were reported as lost or stolen during the scope of our audit to determine whether ATF took appropriate action. Finally, we assessed compliance with ATF policy and conducted physical inventories at 16 ATF locations. Results in Brief -- We found that ATF generally has strong physical controls over ATF-owned firearms and explosives. We also found that ATF has strong inventory controls over its firearms. However, we identified deficiencies related to munitions tracking, the accuracy of ATF's munitions inventories, and compliance with munitions and explosives policy. We also identified areas where ATF's policies should be strengthened to improve the safeguarding and accountability of ATF-owned and seized weapons and munitions. Recommendations Our report contains 10 recommendations to improve ATF's controls over its ammunition, explosives, less lethal munitions, as well as its seized weapons and ammunition. ATF's response to the draft report appears in Appendix 2 and our analysis of the response, as well as a summary of actions necessary to close the recommendations, appears in Appendix 3 of this report. Details: Washington, DC: OIG, 2018. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 18-21: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1821.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1821.pdf Shelf Number: 149756 Keywords: Firearms and WeaponsIllegal GunsIllegal WeaponsTrafficking in Weapons |