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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:52 am
Time: 11:52 am
Results for illicit economies
2 results foundAuthor: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies Summary: Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through the suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country‟s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socioeconomic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_latin_america_crime_felbab_brown.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_latin_america_crime_felbab_brown.pdf Shelf Number: 147800 Keywords: Illicit EconomiesMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePolice EffectivenessPolice Legitimacy |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Afghanistan Affectations: How to Break Political-Criminal Alliances in Contexts of Transition Summary: The case of Afghanistan analyzes how counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction dynamics have interacted with the generalized predatory criminality in Afghanistan and how the latter became the crux of Afghanistan's dire and fragile predicament. The transition choices by the Afghan government and the international community, particularly the embrace of problematic warlords for the sake of short-term military battlefield advantages and as tools of political cooptation, shaped and reinforced criminality and corruption in post-2001 Afghanistan and thus delegitimized the post-Taliban political dispensation. The analysis identifies four possible inflection points where the international community and the Afghan government could have fundamentally altered the course after the initial choices of the informal distribution of power and its connections to criminality were made in 2001. These four possible inflection points provided opportunities for tackling corruption and criminality in order to limit power abuse and strengthen the rule of law and political inclusiveness-namely: (1) the 2004 disarmament effort; (2) the beginning of the Obama administration and its surge of resources in Afghanistan; (3) the 2014 formation of the NUG whose two protagonists crucially campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; and (4) the 2015 missed opportunity to react resolutely to the Taliban's takeover of Kunduz City. But the international community and the Afghan government failed to take advantage of these possible inflection points. Or to the extent that they tried, such as during the first two years of the Obama administration, other strategic directives, timelines, and imperatives interfered with them and directly contradicted them. Thus, the anti-corruption and anti-criminality efforts were not underpinned by political heft and power, such as cutting off aid to or otherwise sanctioning particular powerbrokers. Hence pernicious individual powerbrokers and the political system quickly learned how to ride the anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts, further delegitimizing the system and enabling a significant intensification of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan. No doubt, the Taliban itself has become deeply involved in all kinds of illicit economies, including drugs, timber, and gems. This involvement has grown over time despite the fact that since its inception in 1994 and as a product of the brutality and chaos of the 1990s civil war, the Taliban defined its purpose as improving governance in Afghanistan and acting against the rampant criminality that swept the country. Indeed, during the administration of President George W. Bush, it was the Taliban's involvement in the drug economy that received most international attention out of all the illicit economies, corruption, and predatory criminality that went on in Afghanistan. Yet the counternarcotics policies which were chosen both failed to accomplish their stated goal of bankrupting the Taliban and turned out to be highly counterproductive. Far from delegitimizing the Taliban in the eyes of local populations as a mere cartel or as narco-guerrillas, efforts to eradicate opium poppy cultivation as well as particular designs of drug interdiction allowed the Taliban to present itself a protector of people's livelihoods and thereby to obtain significant political capital. Thus, the international community mounted the most intense efforts precisely against the wrong type of illicit economy and criminality: the labor-intensive poppy cultivation that underpins much of the country's economic growth and provides elemental livelihoods and human security to vast segments of the rural population. Instead, the anti-crime efforts should have focused on the predatory criminality and non-labor intensive aspects of transactional crimes, such as drug smuggling. The Obama administration at least defunded eradication, but its efforts against predatory crime ultimately proved unsatisfactory. Its efforts against predatory criminality were held hostage to the administration's own strategic decision to define the mission there as principally one of limited couterterrorism and to de-emphasize state-building and also to impose restrictive and counterproductive timeliness on U.S. assistance, particularly military, efforts. Thus, from the very beginning of the U.S. intervention, when there was the largest window of opportunity to embrace Afghan aspirations for good governance and shape the outcome, and throughout 2014 when the number of U.S. troops in Aghanistan was radically reduced, Washington neglected to commit itself to rebuilding Afghanistan in the right way. And earlier inflection point that perhaps could have countered the basic mis-governance trends in the country and the rise of predatory criminality was in 2004 when the first disarmament effort was undertaken. However, that opportunity was missed, with most of the crucial warlords not fully and sufficiently disarmed. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Crime-Conflict Nexus Series: No 8: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2442/Afghanistan-Affectations-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2442/Afghanistan-Affectations-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf Shelf Number: 146319 Keywords: Crime-Conflict NexusDrug SmugglingDrug WarlordsIllegal EconomiesIllicit DrugsIllicit EconomiesOpiumPolitical Corruption |