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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:38 am
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Results for illicit trafficking
8 results foundAuthor: Bateman, Sam Title: Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia Summary: This policy paper examines the threats to good order at sea in Southeast Asia . Threats to good order include piracy and armed robbery against ships, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking in drugs and arms, people smuggling, pollution, illegal fishing and marine natural hazards. This paper reviews the current situation and makes recommendations for non-governmental actions that would enhance cooperation in addressing the problem. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Policy Paper: Accessed August 20, 2010 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Shelf Number: 119644 Keywords: Drug SmugglingHuman SmugglingIllegal FishingIllicit TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOffenses Against the EnvironmentPiratesWildlife Crime |
Author: Riccardi, Michele Title: The Theft of Medicines from Italian Hospitals Summary: Along with counterfeiting, theft of medicines is emerging as the new frontier of pharmaceutical crime. In Italy between 2006 and 2013 one hospital out of ten has registered thefts of pharmaceuticals, suffering, on average, an economic loss of about 330 thousands euro each episode. This report represents the first study on this booming but almost unknown criminal phenomenon. In particular it carries out: - An exploration of the background behind pharmaceutical theft and of the drivers that influence the demand and the supply of stolen medicines; - An analysis, based on cases reported by media, of thefts of medicines from Italian hospitals between 2006 and 2013 Details: Milan, IT: Transcrime, 2014. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2014 at: http://www.transcrime.it/pubblicazioni/the-theft-of-medicines-from-italian-hospitals/ Year: 2014 Country: Italy URL: http://www.transcrime.it/pubblicazioni/the-theft-of-medicines-from-italian-hospitals/ Shelf Number: 132812 Keywords: HospitalsIllicit TraffickingMedicinePharmaceutical Crime (Italy)Pharmaceutical IndustrySmugglingTheft |
Author: Kemp, Walter Title: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Toward an Integrated Multilateral Response to Organized Crime Summary: Since the end of the Cold War, organized crime has moved from being a marginal problem in a few cities and regions to being a mainstream threat to national stability and international peace and security. While the threat has become transnational, the multilateral response has been slow, disjointed, and reactive. Broad structural changes are needed to deal more effectively with illicit trafficking and other activities of organized criminal groups. This report-the third in a trilogy of publications by the "Peace without Crime" project of the International Peace Institute (IPI)1-calls for a more integrated multilateral response to organized crime. It highlights the impact of organized crime, provides an overview of international efforts made to tackle the problem, and suggests steps toward a more effective response. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 22, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/general/global/1409_margins_to_mainstream_toc.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/general/global/1409_margins_to_mainstream_toc.pdf Shelf Number: 134438 Keywords: Criminal NetworksIllicit TraffickingOrganized Crime |
Author: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Title: A Comprehensive Approach to Combating Illicit Trafficking Summary: Responsible for more than $300 billion per year in trade and comprising a wide variety of products shipped over a complex web of interlocking transport routes, illicit trafficking constitutes a major security challenge that no single country or anti-trafficking organization could possibly manage alone. Indeed, the cross-border and transnational nature of the trade, combined with its diversity and the increasing agility and technological sophistication of the traffickers involved, demands a multilateral and multidimensional response from those who hope to combat it. An effective response, moreover, will require much closer coordination between the public and private sectors than exists today, as well as sturdier partnerships between and among the many national, regional, and international agencies - including a host of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) - now charged with responsibility for one or another dimension of the illicit trafficking challenge. Indeed, pooling the expertise and resources of all the relevant stakeholders in support of an overarching comprehensive approach that leverages their collective capabilities is arguably the only way to make As for the specifics of a comprehensive approach, it must address several underlying characteristics of the current trafficking problem that are not widely understood and remain difficult to manage. First, in addition to the multi-product and inter-regional aspects of illicit trafficking noted above, a comprehensive approach must come to grips with the way in which many legal activities - including those performed by white-collar, middle-class collaborators - are intertwined with and help to facilitate illegal activities in the trafficking realm. Second, such an approach must also understand (and target) the many linkages that exist between and among the various trafficking streams for the shipment of drugs, small arms and light weapons (SALW), chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, counterfeit products, laundered money, and human beings, as well as the way in which control over the transit route for one type of commodity may allow traffickers to control the flow of other goods, both legal and illegal, that pass along the same route. Third, and on a related note, the anti-trafficking community must fully expect, and prepare for the prospect, that illicit traffickers will try to shift their shipments, if at all possible, from route to route - and from one form of transport to another - in order to avoid detection and interception. Closing off one trafficking flow, therefore, may simply trigger the opening of a new route in a less carefully monitored part of the world. Further on this last point, in today's globalized economy, illicit traffickers are increasingly inclined to base their operations in remote and poorly governed areas, where they can conduct business relatively free of outside interference. They appear to be especially partial to what the head of the UN's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently referred to as "geographic blind spots" - that is, largely forgotten areas in failed or failing states that are "out of government control, and too scary for investors and tourists," where radar, satellite, and other forms of surveillance are limited or nonexistent. Operating from such locations, traffickers can run fleets of ships, planes, and trucks loaded with a mix of products with little fear of disruption. Many of these areas, moreover, are burdened with large numbers of unemployed youth who are often all too willing to provide the traffickers with a local workforce that has few alternatives to make money, and is likely to remain compliant. Hence, in addition to better surveillance and interdiction capabilities, any serious effort to stem illicit trafficking must also include a development component aimed at easing (if not eradicating) the socio-economic and political vulnerabilities in "blind spot" territories that traffickers seek to exploit. As suggested above, yet another increasingly important dimension of illicit trafficking to bring under a comprehensive approach is the ever-expanding and more sophisticated use of technology by traffickers. Access to the latest technology, including satellite hook-ups, cell phones, and GPS equipment, is effectively what has empowered loose bands of poor, illiterate Somalis to capture ocean-going vessels operated and/or relied upon by the world's richest and most powerful countries. So, too, cyber crime has allowed traffickers in remote areas to steal the identities of people half a world away, while also facilitating money laundering via lax banks and/or corrupt officials. In the not too distant future, access by traffickers to the technical skills and equipment necessary to handle CBRN-related materials could easily promote a growth in the trade of these key components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Getting a better handle on the many ways in which technology is likely to be used by traffickers and their fellow travelers in the years to come, therefore, will require input from a wide array of public- and private-sector technology experts. Equally important, a public-private initiative along these lines holds the best chance of discovering how the anti-trafficking community itself can leverage technology to detect and disrupt smuggling and related crimes. There is also a need for much greater informa eater information sharing between and among anti-trafficking groups with regard to current and emerging trafficking routes, the products and services being trafficked along these routes, the number of traffickers using these routes, and the inter-relationships between and among these traffickers. Closer institutional collaboration on such matters would be particularly helpful within regions (and between adjacent regions) where illicit trafficking is well entrenched, but where intra- and inter-regional cooperation may be hampered by ethnic and sectarian rivalries, unresolved border disputes, and contrasting approaches to law enforcement. Important steps have been taken in this regard, including ongoing efforts to strengthen countersmuggling capabilities along the infamous Great Silk Road via national and IGO support for the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) in Romania and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) in Kazakhstan. Similar initiatives can and should be pursued in other regions where traffickers now thrive. Details: Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2010. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://www.sipri.org/research/security/transport/files/existing-good-practice/united-states-4 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.sipri.org/research/security/transport/files/existing-good-practice/united-states-4 Shelf Number: 136363 Keywords: Human TraffickingIllegal TradeIllicit TraffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Thematic Programme on Action Against Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking, Including Drug Trafficking Summary: This Thematic Programme on Action Against Transnational Organized Crime provides the framework for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) work against organized crime for the period 2011-2013. It outlines the context, the problems addressed and the challenges faced in preventing and combating organized crime in a globalized world. It describes the work of UNODC to assist countries in developing strategies, policies, action plans, programmes and projects in relation to all aspects of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its three Protocols, as well as the three Universal Drug Conventions." Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2015 at: www.cpahq.org Year: 2011 Country: International URL: www.cpahq.org Shelf Number: 136538 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illicit TraffickingOrganized Crime |
Author: Schouwstra, Robert Title: Strengthening the security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain Summary: In its resolution 2013/38 entitled "Combating transnational organized crime and its possible links to illicit trafficking in precious metals," the Economic and Social Council calls upon the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) to conduct a comprehensive study on the possible links between transnational organized crime, other criminal activities and illicit trafficking in precious metals. UNICRI has developed a programme to promote an international strategy to combat illicit trafficking in precious metals, in which the comprehensive study requested in ECOSOC resolution 2013/38 is the major component of an Assessment Phase to be followed by an Operational Phase. An Expert Meeting on "Promoting an international strategy to combat illicit trafficking in precious metals," organised by UNICRI in September 2015 in Turin (Italy), allowed the collection of experts' views on the issues and challenges that needed to be addressed and emphasized in the study. The present technical report aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the current trends related to precious metals trafficking, in particular it focuses on the precious metals supply chain, the different threats and challenges hanging over this market - including the involvement of organised crime groups and associated criminal activities - as well as the regulatory frameworks and initiatives in place to guarantee the integrity of the supply chain. The knowledge acquired throughout this report is used to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to address the challenges. A series of recommendations concerning the implementation of an international strategy to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in precious metals are included in the assessment. The report is intended to address the following research questions and sub-questions: - What is the extent of illicit trafficking in precious metals? - Is illicit trafficking in precious metals linked to transnational organized crime and other associated criminal activities? - Is illicit trafficking in precious metals linked to terrorist activities? - What are the vulnerabilities of the precious metals supply chain? - How can illicit trafficking in precious metals be prevented and countered? - What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing initiatives? Details: Torino - Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 2016. 123p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2017 at: http://files.unicri.it/PM_draft_onlinev.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://files.unicri.it/PM_draft_onlinev.pdf Shelf Number: 145328 Keywords: Illicit TraffickingNatural ResourcesOrganized CrimePrecious MetalsSupply Chain SecuritySupply ChainsTerrorismTrafficking in Metals |
Author: de Tessieres, Savannah Title: At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger Summary: Key findings Terrorism At the crossroads of the region's most violent conflicts, Niger has served as a primary transit point for armed criminal and terrorist groups operating in the various conflict theatres that surround it. Everything from people, weapons, and low-tech communications pass through Niger's borders, providing a rich source of intelligence that is critical to understanding the nature of cross-border relationships and networks of trafficking and terrorist groups. Niger presents a privileged arena in which to observe the array of terrorist dynamics across the Sahel, and to take action against them. The country has become a major partner in counter-terrorism strategies for regional and western powers. Relatively spared by the threat of terrorism until 2015, the increase in terrorist attacks in Niger since then, first by Boko Haram and then by AQIM-related groups or splinter cells, run in parallel with the enhanced engagement of the Nigerien authorities against terrorism in the region, including MNJTF, MINUSMA, and G5 Sahel efforts. While the north of the country is particularly affected by armed banditry, the south has suffered the bulk of terrorist attacks. In 2016, Boko Haram was responsible for perpetrating 80 per cent of the terrorist attacks carried out on Nigerien soil, but 2017 saw a surge in deadly attacks against security positions near the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali by AQIM- and IS-related groups based in Mali. Sahelian terrorist groups find Niger a fertile recruiting ground and exploit long-standing community divisions, which are in turn exacerbated by increasing insecurity. Arms trafficking Niger has served as a key transit route for weapons heading to conflict zones in the region, but the deterioration of the country's security situation has resulted in an increase in the domestic demand for weapons, particularly for small arms and ammunition. Arms seized from terrorists or en route to terrorist groups in Niger over the past five years include explosives, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and associated ammunition (including MANPADS, mortar rounds, and machine guns). Vehicles were also seized. Terrorist groups operating in Niger, including those based in Mali and Nigeria, have been obtaining materiel from a variety of sources-including from national stockpiles in the region-following the collapse of state control over arsenals, as in Libya or northern Mali, attacks against security positions, or diversion in countries such as Niger or Nigeria. Ammunition held by terrorist groups, other armed actors, and civilians is very similar, indicating common sources of illicit ammunition, including past rebellions and national stockpiles from Niger and neighbouring countries. However, it does vary between the regions: while chains of transfers in the north originate mainly from Libya and Mali, materiel in the south-east comes mainly from Chad and Nigeria. While Libya continues to be a source for illicit weapons in Niger, including converted blank'firing handguns, trafficking from Libya has declined significantly since 2014 due to the depletion of Qaddafi's SALW stockpiles, national demand reinvigorated in light of renewed conflict in Libya, and increased levels of surveillance and counteraction in Niger with the deployment of Operation Barkhane. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Niger URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Shelf Number: 149854 Keywords: Arms TraffickingIllicit TraffickingTerrorismTerroristsTrafficking in ArmsViolence |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation and Production Summary: Key Findings Area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 63 percent since 2016, reaching a new record high. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 hectares in 2017, a 63 percent increase or 127,000 hectares more compared to the previous year. This level of opium poppy cultivation is a new record high and exceeds the formerly highest value recorded in 2014 (224,000 hectares) by 104,000 hectares or 46 percent. Strong increases were observed in almost all major poppy cultivating provinces. In Hilmand province alone, cultivation increased by 63,700 hectares (+79 percent) which accounted for about half of the total national increase. Strong increases were observed also in Balkh (+10,000 hectares or almost five times more than in 2016), Kandahar (+7,500 hectares or +37%), Nimroz (+6,200 hectares or +116%), and Uruzgan (+6,000 hectares or +39%). The majority (60%) of cultivation took place in the South of the country. The Western region accounted for 17% of total cultivation, the Northern region for 13% and the Eastern region for 7%. The remaining regions (North-eastern and Central) together accounted for 3%. Hilmand remained the country's major opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Badghis, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, Farah, Balkh, Nimroz and Badakhshan. Opium poppy cultivation expanded to new regions and intensified where there was cultivation before. In 2017, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan decreased from 13 to 10. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation increased from 21 to 24. Ghazni, Samangan and Nuristan provinces lost their poppy-free status. Ghazni had been poppy-free for more than two decades (since 1995), Samangan and Nuristan for almost 10 years (since 2007). Starting in 2014, the Northern region experienced a rapid expansion of opium poppy cultivation. In 2014, a total of 574 hectares was cultivated in three out of seven provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari-Pul); in 2017, only one province remained poppy-free (Bamyan) and some 43,000 hectares were cultivated in the other six provinces. Cultivation in Balkh, which was poppy-free until 2014, expanded from 204 hectares in 2015 to 12,100 hectares in 2017. In Jawzjan, which was poppy-free between 2008 and 2015, cultivation increased from 409 hectares in 2016 to 3,200 hectares in 2017. In Sari-Pul (last time poppy-free in 2013), cultivation expanded from 195 hectares in 2014 to 3,600 hectares in 2017. Opium poppy cultivation intensified in the main opium-poppy cultivating provinces by holding a more significant share of the available agricultural land. In Hilmand, a third of the arable land was dedicated to opium poppy in 2017, whereas only 20% was under cultivation in 2016. Less drastically, but still significant increases in density could be observed in Uruzgan and Nangarhar where a fourth of the arable land was under opium poppy cultivation in 2017 compared to 19% in Uruzgan and 16% in Nangarhar in 2016. Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 395 hectares but remained very low. In 2017, 750 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 14 provinces (355 hectares in 7 provinces in 2016). During the 2017 eradication campaign, six lives were lost and eight persons were injured. In 2016, eight lives were lost and seven persons were injured. Potential opium yield and production increased in 2017. Potential opium production was estimated at 9,000 tons in 2017, an increase of 87% from its 2016 level (4,800 tons). The increase in production is mainly a result of an increase in area under opium poppy cultivation, while an increase in opium yield per hectare also contributed. In 2017, the average opium yield amounted to 27.3 kilograms per hectare, which was 15% higher than in 2016. Yields increased in the Southern region by 19% (from 22.0 kilograms per hectare in 2016 to 26.2 kilograms per hectare in 2017), in the North-eastern region by 14% (from 31.2 to 35.4 kilograms per hectare) and in the Eastern region by 8% (from 32.4 to 34.9 kilograms per hectare). In the Central and Northern regions, yields decreased by 5% and 6% respectively and remained stable in the Western region. Accounting for 57% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan. With 16% of national production, the Northern region was the second most important opium-producing region in 2017, followed by the Western region (13%) and Eastern region (9%). In response to the increased supply of opium, 2017 prices at harvest time decreased in all regions (between -7% in the Western region and - 50% in the North-eastern region) of Afghanistan except in the Southern region where prices only dropped in the months after the harvest. At almost US$ 1.4 billion (1.2 - 1.5 billion), equivalent to roughly 7% of Afghanistan's estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production increased by 55% in 2017 as compared to past year. Reasons for the increase. There is no single reason for the massive 2017 increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The multiple drivers are complex and geographically diverse, as many elements continue to influence farmers' decisions regarding opium poppy cultivation. Rule of law-related challenges, such as political instability, lack of government control and security, as well as corruption, have been found to be main drivers of illicit cultivation. Also impact farmers' decisions, for example scarce employment opportunities, lack of quality education and limited access to markets and financial services continue to contribute to the vulnerability of farmers towards opium poppy cultivation. A combination of events may have exacerbated some of these elements and may have led to the large increase in 2017. The shift in strategy by the Afghan government - focusing its efforts against anti-government elements (AGE) in densely populated areas - may have made the rural population more vulnerable to the influence of AGE. This may have subsequently contributed to the strong increase in the area under opium poppy cultivation. Political instability and increased insecurity particularly affected the Northern region, where opium poppy cultivation expanded drastically in the last couple of years. Generally, the weaker engagement of the international aid community may also have reduced the socio-economic development opportunities in rural areas. In Hilmand province, additional factors may have played a role. In 2017, reports from the field indicate that more cheap labour for harvesting might have become available. In combination with increasing yields in 2016, this could have motivated many farmers to take up or expand opium poppy cultivation. The opium harvest requires a large number of skilled labourers, who often come from other provinces of Afghanistan and even from neighbouring countries. In past years, there have been reports of a lack of workers, caused by the on-going fights within Hilmand, which may have led farmers to restrict their investments in opium poppy cultivation to avoid the risk of unharvested fields. The continuing advances in agriculture, including the use of solar panels for powering irrigation pumps and fertilizers and pesticides, may have made opium poppy cultivation increasingly profitable even under unfavourable natural conditions. Solar panels for irrigation seem to have replaced diesel pumps in many areas. These panels require a sizable initial investment, but have lower running costs than diesel-powered pumps and thus can turn desert areas into highly productive arable land at a relatively low cost. The nation-wide high opium farm-gate prices of 2016 might have facilitated some of these investments. Future challenges The 2017 record levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan create multiple challenges for the country, its neighbours and the many other countries that are transit for or destination of Afghan opiates. The significant levels of opium poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates will probably further fuel instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. More high quality, low cost heroin will reach consumer markets across the world, with increased consumption and related harms as a likely consequence. Addressing the opiate problem in Afghanistan remains a shared responsibility. Only a small share of the revenues generated by the cultivation and trafficking of Afghan opiates reaches Afghan drug trafficking groups. Many more billions of dollars are made from trafficking opiates into major consumer markets, mainly in Europe and Asia. Moreover, the transformation of opium into heroin is likely to bring increased trafficking of precursor substances. Tons of precursor chemicals will potentially be diverted from licit international markets and smuggled into Afghanistan to supply manufacturers of heroin. In Afghanistan, one of the least-developed countries worldwide, the impact of the illicit drug cultivation and production on economic, environmental and social development, continues to be multifaceted. The large increase in opium production will reinforce the negative consequences of the already existing large-scale production of opiates. The expanding illicit economy, which in many provinces has permeated rural societies and made many communities dependent on the income from opium poppy, will further constrain the development of the licit economy and potentially further fuel corruption. The increased levels of opium poppy cultivation also have the potential to exacerbate existing environmental damage caused by over-exploitation of the land for opium. The increased availability of opium and heroin in the country might further raise the social and economic costs associated with the consumption of opiates for drug users, their families, and for society in general. To support the Afghan Government in its efforts to counter illicit crop cultivation, continuing analysis and monitoring of the links between the rule of law, illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking is required. The forthcoming MCN/UNODC socio-economic survey report will discuss these factors in detail, presenting an in-depth analysis of the risk factors related to illicit cultivation of opium, as well as the possible consequences and policy considerations for Afghanistan and the international community following this year's record cultivation. Details: Vienna, Austria: 2017. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: http://mcn.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Opium%20Survey%202017%20(Cultivation%20and%20Production).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/access-to-information/14115/14116 Shelf Number: 154100 Keywords: Development AssistanceDrug CultivationDrug TraffickingFarm-Gate ValueIllicit Crop CultivationIllicit EconomyIllicit TraffickingOpium Poppy CultivationOpium ProductionOpium YieldRule of Law |