Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 19, 2024 Fri
Time: 2:22 am
Time: 2:22 am
Results for investigations
2 results foundAuthor: Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice Inspectorate Title: Royal Mail Group: An Inspection of the Royal Mail Group Crime Investigations Function Summary: The Royal Mail Group maintains a security function responsible for investigating crime against its businesses. Royal Mail pursues its local prosecutions through the Northern Ireland criminal justice system. This inspection looks at the investigative function of the Royal Mail Group using the five main elements of the common core: Openness, Partnership, Equality, Learning and Results. Inspectors found that the methods of case submission in Northern Ireland differed from England and Wales and there had been some anomalies in case outcomes. Details: Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2008 Source: Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 115756 Keywords: Investigations |
Author: Marin, Andre Title: Oversight Unseen: Investigation into the Special Investigations Unit's operational effectiveness and credibility Summary: Canada received considerable unfavourable international attention last fall when millions witnessed the graphic video images of the last terrifying moments in the life of Robert Dziekanski. After a long and delayed international flight from his native Poland, Mr. Dziekanski arrived at Vancouver Airport, only to spend hours wandering hopelessly, unable to communicate or to obtain the assistance he needed to exit and meet up with his mother. As Mr. Dziekanski became increasingly confused and agitated, RCMP officers arrived and, within minutes, stunned him with a Taser. He was then restrained, and died shortly thereafter. In the aftermath of this tragedy, public accusations were made of cover-up and police using excessive force. People demanded assurance that the truth surrounding his ill-fated encounter with police would be revealed, and many voiced distrust of any investigation that would involve police investigating police. To Ontario's great credit, incidents in this province involving serious injury and death of civilians resulting from police contact are not investigated by police officials, but by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a civilian criminal investigative agency. Created in 1990, the SIU's existence is a testament to the strength of democratic principles in this province, and the value our government has placed on reinforcing public confidence in policing. Unfortunately, over the past two years, several serious concerns have been raised by individuals, families, lawyers and community advocates who complained to my Office about the credibility and effectiveness of the SIU. As previous independent reviews have documented, the SIU's early history was marked by successive governments failing to provide it with adequate resources, and by police officials aggressively resisting its oversight. While its resources have increased over time, and regulatory requirements now more clearly define police obligations, my investigation found that the Special Investigations Unit continues to struggle to assert its authority, maintain its balance against powerful police interests, and carry out its mandate effectively. The SIU is still very much a fledgling organization. It does not have its own constituting legislation, its mandate lacks clarity, it is administratively and technically challenged and it is dependent on the Ministry of the Attorney General. In turn, the Ministry of the Attorney General has relied on the SIU to soothe police and community sensibilities and to ward off controversy. But in doing so, it performance is subjectively evaluated and rewarded, compromising the SIU's structural integrity and independence. Its credibility as an independent investigative agency is further undermined by the predominant presence and continuing police links of former police officials within the SIU. It is so steeped in police culture that it has, at times, even tolerated the blatant display of police insignia and police affiliation. In addition to lacking the necessary statutory authority to act decisively when police officials fail to comply with regulatory requirements, the SIU often ignores the tools it does have, such as public censure, and adopts an impotent stance in the face of police challenge. Delays in police providing notice of incidents, in disclosing notes, and in submitting to interviews are endemic. Rather than vigorously inquiring into and documenting delays and other evidence of police resistance, the SIU deals with issues of police non-co-operation as isolated incidents. It ignores systemic implications and attempts to solve individual problems through a conciliatory approach. The SIU has not only become complacent about ensuring that police officials follow the rules, it has bought into the fallacious argument that SIU investigations aren't like other criminal cases, and that it is acceptable to treat police witnesses differently from civilians. Police interviews are rarely held within the regulatory time frames, and are all too often postponed - for weeks, sometimes even months. The SIU will not inconvenience officers or police forces by interviewing officers off duty. When it encounters overt resistance from police officials, the SIU pursues a low-key diplomatic approach that flies under the public radar. If disagreement cannot be resolved, the SIU more often than not simply accepts defeat. The SIU also fails to respond to incidents with rigour and urgency - at times inexplicably overlooking the closest investigators, and following routines that result in precious investigative minutes, sometimes hours, being lost. It has become mired in its own internal events, and introspective focus. The SIU's system of oversight is out of balance. It must not only ensure accountability of police conduct, but be perceived by the public as doing so. At present, the public is expected to trust that the SIU conducts thorough and objective investigations and accept that its decisions are well founded when it decides, for example, not to charge officers. But much remains hidden from public view, including Director's reports and significant policy issues. In order to properly serve the function it was created to fulfill, greater transparency is required with respect to the SIU's investigative outcomes, as well as those of the police disciplinary system triggered by SIU investigations. In theory, the SIU is a fundamental pillar of accountability in Ontario. However, the reality is that the SIU is capable of much more than it is achieving at present. It is incumbent on government to provide the agencies it creates with the means to fully accomplish their mandates. The citizens of Ontario are entitled to a Special Investigations Unit with the necessary resources and tools to be the best that it can be. With that in mind, I have made 46 recommendations in this report, addressed at improving the system. The first 25 recommendations focus on the SIU itself. I believe that there is much that the SIU can do on its own to enhance and inject more rigour into its investigative practices, and its response to challenges to its authority. I have also made recommendations to address the issues created by a lingering police culture within the SIU, and to achieve greater transparency. Details: Ottawa: Ombudsman Ontario, 2008. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Canada URL: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Shelf Number: 136686 Keywords: Complaints Against the PoliceInvestigationsOmbudsmanPolice AccountabilityPolice BehaviorPolice MisconductPolice OversightPolice Use of Force |