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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:43 am
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Results for islamic state
59 results foundAuthor: Fanusie, Yaya J. Title: Monumental Fight: Countering the Islamic State's Antiquities Trafficking Summary: As the nation's largest professional organization of archaeologists on the Middle East holds its annual meeting this week in Atlanta, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) has released a new report analyzing the strategic role of antiquities trafficking in funding the terrorist group known as Islamic State (IS). The report, "Monumental Fight: Combatting Islamic State's Antiquities Trafficking," provides the most comprehensive look to date at IS's involvement in the illicit trade. The report is co-authored by former CIA intelligence analyst Yaya J. Fanusie, now director of analysis at FDD's Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF), and Alex Joffe, an archaeologist and historian specializing in the Middle East and contemporary international affairs. The report explains how antiquities looting evolved in the region, analyzes how it fits within IS's overall system of territorial control and governance, and identifies strategies to stem the illegal trade. Fanusie and Joffe explain that although antiquities trafficking may not provide IS as much money as other revenue streams like oil smuggling, "the importance of the antiquities trade for IS lies ... in the market's strategic and operational benefits." Excavation sites are unlikely to be targeted by coalition military strikes. Moreover, they note, looting antiquities does not alienate the local population like IS's other common practices of extortion and theft. To capitalize on this strategic resource, IS completely dominates the antiquities trade in the areas under its control, forcing civilians to be licensed by IS before they can dig for artifacts, and takes 20 percent or more of the revenue from any items sold to smugglers, the report finds. The authors note that IS also leverages its plundering for its global propaganda. The group video records choreographed destruction of pre-Islamic heritage sites in Iraq and Syria to portray itself as a defender of religious purity. The authors point out the irony of IS's antiquities trade; the group makes money through end-buyers who mainly come from the U.S. and Europe--representatives of the very societies IS has pledged to destroy. The authors explain that although the precise smuggling routes, middlemen, and buyers are difficult to uncover because of the market's opacity, a review of official trade data shows an uptick in antiques exiting the Levant since the Syrian civil war began. They argue it is likely that much of this increase comes from looted items masqueraded as legally owned artifacts. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 2015. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/new-report-outlines-ways-to-combat-islamic-states-antiquities-trafficking/ Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/new-report-outlines-ways-to-combat-islamic-states-antiquities-trafficking/ Shelf Number: 137732 Keywords: AntiquitiesArt TheftIllicit TradeIslamic StateLootingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Grantham, David Title: Shutting Down ISIS' Antiquities Trade Summary: The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, reminded the world that the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is at war with western civilization. The U.S. government desperately needs a more comprehensive strategy for combating this threat than simply drone warfare and piecemeal deployments of "specialized expeditionary targeting forces." And a top priority of a new, broader campaign should be the destruction of ISIS' financial networks. ISIS and Antiquities. ISIS poses a national security threat to the United States primarily because of the resources it commands. The organization boasts an impressive network of revenue streams, ranging from oil proceeds and racketeering profits to money seized from local banks. But ISIS also profits from its lucrative trade in pilfered Roman, Greek, and other antiquities found in Syria and northern Iraq. This lucrative operation presents a national security dilemma because it helps fund ISIS's international war machine. The U.S. government and international bodies have tried in the past to undermine the global trade in looted antiquities by international conventions that disallow signatory countries from participating in the theft and transportation of looted antiquities. But the illegal antiquities market remains notoriously difficult to regulate. Moreover, officials often treat the illegal antiquities trade as a victimless crime run by criminal organizations. Few acknowledge the definitive links between illegal antiquities and terrorism. The challenges of enforcement and lack of attention keeps the market for illicit antiquities strong. This Is Not a Recent Phenomenon. During World War II, Nazis looted public and private collections from across Europe. Looters reaffirmed the importance of the antiquities market by ransacking regional museums in Iraq in the wake of the First Gulf War. Between the end of the war in 1991, and 1994, eleven museums lost 3,000 artifacts and 484 manuscripts to theft. A majority have yet to be recovered. Years later, the Taliban earned a reputation as a broker of Afghan antiquities, even though it spent enormous time and energy destroying historical landmarks throughout the country. Al Qaeda was also involved in the trade. In 1999, Mohamed Atta, who piloted the plane that crashed into Tower Two of the World Trade Center, tried to sell Afghan antiquities to a German university professor. Atta "claimed that he was selling artifacts in order to purchase an airplane." The Iraqi museums looted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 only reiterated the national security implications surrounding unprotected antiquities. As of 2008, authorities have only recovered about 6,000 of the 15,000 items stolen. Experts fear that Al-Qaeda offshoots like ISIS are today selling some of the unaccounted for antiquities to fund their terrorist operations. Details: Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief No. 185: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Shelf Number: 137760 Keywords: AntiquitiesIllegal TradeISISIslamic StateNational SecurityTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Simcox, Robin Title: "We Will Conquer Your Rome": A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West Summary: The Islamic State (IS) presently controls significant amounts of land throughout Iraq and Syria. However, its ambitions are not restricted to this territory. Within days of announcing its 'Caliphat', the self-appointed 'Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi vowed that IS would eventually "conquer Rome". IS precursor groups and the individuals which have trained alongside them have displayed an interest in attacking the West for years. However, an audio message released on 21 September 2014, saw Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, an IS spokesman, attempt to ratchet up the threat. He instructed IS supporters to carry out attacks in the West - no matter how crude. There has subsequently been an increase in IS-linked plots that have emerged in the West. "We Will Conquer Your Rome:" A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West by research fellow Robin Simcox studies all those that have been reported since the declaration of the 'Caliphate', and attempts to draw conclusions about any trends that may be developing. The report studies over a year's worth of Islamic State plots. It examines which countries were most commonly targeted; the age; nationality; background; terrorist training and combat experience of the perpetrators; relevance of the Internet; which sectors are most commonly targeted for attack; and assesses the extent to which the Islamic State directed, assisted or simply just inspired these plots. It concludes that since the declaration of IS's 'Caliphate', there have been, on average, over two plots related to IS that either are foiled or take place in the West every month. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf Shelf Number: 137847 Keywords: Cyber SecurityInternet CrimesIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Blanchard, Christopher M. Title: The Islamic State and U.S. Policy Summary: The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that controls large areas of Iraq and Syria, has adherents in several other countries, and disrupts regional and international security with violence and terrorism. A series of terrorist attacks attributed to the group outside of Iraq and Syria has demonstrated IS supporters' ability to threaten societies in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States, including in countries with sophisticated and capable intelligence and security forces. The U.S.-led campaign to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) appears to be entering a new phase in early 2016, as Administration officials implement planned changes in military strategy and tactics, pursue new diplomatic and coalition building initiatives, and consider alternative proposals. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria remain focal points in this regard, but a series of terrorist attacks inspired or directed by the Islamic State have claimed hundreds of lives on four continents since November 2015, creating a more global sense of urgency about combatting the group and reversing its spread. The group has stated its intent to attack inside the United States, and the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, have been attributed to IS supporters who did not have apparent links to the organization but were praised by the group. Debate continues over whether IS elements overseas have the capability to direct, support, and/or carry out further attacks in the United States. The group's statements suggest it seeks to provoke reactions from targeted populations and spur confrontations between various Muslim sects and between Muslims and non-Muslims. The interdependent nature of the conflicts and political crises in Iraq, Syria, and other countries where IS fighters operate complicate efforts to address and eliminate the IS threat. President Obama has stated that the goals of U.S. strategy are to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State using various means including U.S. direct military action and support for local partner forces. U.S. military operations against the group and its adherents in several countries, as well as U.S. diplomatic efforts to reconcile Syrian and Iraqi factions, are ongoing. Parallel U.S. political and security efforts in North Africa, West Africa, and South Asia also seek to mitigate local IS-related threats. This report provides background on the Islamic State organization, discussing its goals, operations, and affiliates, as well as analyzing related U.S. legislative and policy debates. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R43612: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Shelf Number: 137859 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateMuslimsRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Shelf Number: 137895 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland SecurityIslamic StateIslamistsJihadLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Summary: The mandate of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was expanded in 2001 to address the funding of terrorists acts and terrorist organisations. Since that time, combatting terrorist financing (TF) has been a very significant challenge. Important work was done in 2008 to identify a wide variety of TF methods terrorists use to raise, move and use funds. That study addressed the terrorist requirement for funds to include direct costs associated with specific operations and broader organisational costs to maintain infrastructure and promote ideology for the terrorist organisation. Given the rapid development of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), there is a need to understand those funding requirements and associated TF risk. This study represents a snapshot of the revenue sources and financial activities of ISIL been identified to date. However, gaps remain and more work is needed to develop the full picture of ISIL's financial activities and to identify the most effective countermeasures to prevent ISIL from using accumulated funds and disrupting sources of funding. ISIL financing is a constantly changing picture and a very difficult and complicated area to address given the operational situation on the ground. It should be emphasized that terrorism and those who support terrorism can never be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group. ISIL represents a new form of terrorist organisation where funding is central and critical to its activities. This report identifies ISIL's primary sources of revenue which are mainly derived from illicit proceeds from its occupation of territory. These sources include bank looting and extortion, control of oil fields and refineries and robbery of economic assets. Other sources include the donors who abuse Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) and cash smuggling (areas where FATF has conducted in-depth research), to new and emerging typologies which have not yet been addressed by the FATF, such as the extortion of goods and cash transiting territory where ISIL operates and grass-root funding strategies. A number of unique and diverse "case studies" have been provided by countries which describe how ISIL obtains funding and economic support as well as describing mechanisms to utilize these funds. The need for vast funds to meet organisational and governance requirements represents a vulnerability to ISIL's infrastructure. In order to maintain its financial management and expenditures in areas where it operates, ISIL must be able to seize additional territory in order to exploit resources. It is unclear if ISIL's revenue collection through the illicit proceeds it earns from occupation of territory, including extortion and theft, will be sustainable over time. Cutting off these vast revenue streams is both a challenge and opportunity for the global community to defeat this terrorist organisation. While insight into ISIL's oil-related activities is limited, this report provides a snapshot of ISIL's control of gas and oil reservoirs. While this revenue stream was significant after ISIL's initial control of numerous oil fields, their ability to efficiently extract oil, refine it and sell petroleum products have significantly diminished ISIL's earnings. This is need for refined crude and declining oil prices. There have been efforts to suppress the sale of ISIL oil and oil products on regional markets, such as enhanced counter smuggling efforts of the Turkish authorities in the past two years, as well as recent steps taken by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraqi Government authorities to seize suspected ISIL-related shipments of oil and oil products. This has reduced oil's importance relative to other sources of revenue. There is still a need to better identify the origin, middlemen, buyers, carriers, traders and routes through which oil produced in ISIL-held territory is trafficked. This report provides limited insight into the role of financial institutions and Money and Value Transfer Services (MVTS) in ISIL-held territory as well as the role of the larger international financial sector. However, a significant portion of the data related to this subject is of a sensitive nature and could not be included in this public report. There is a risk that MVTS companies in ISIL held territory continue to maintain connections to regional counterparts through which ISIL could conduct funds transfers. At the same time, both the Iraqi government and many major global financial institutions have taken steps to prevent banks in ISIL-held territory from accessing the international financial system.due to coalition air strikes, ISIL. Details: Paris: FATF, 2015. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf Shelf Number: 137994 Keywords: Islamic StateTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence Summary: Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), looks at the Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 in the context of rivalry among Indonesian ISIS leaders in Syria and different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. The bombing and shooting in Indonesia's capital killed four civilians and four terrorists. The Jakarta attack is now known to have been locally organised - not directed from Syria as originally thought - but it almost instantly resulted in instructions from a Syria-based leader to his followers to do one better," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. "Leaders of Indonesia's tiny pro-ISIS camp are competing to prove their fighting credentials." The report examines how these rivalries emerged. The Jakarta attack appears to have been carried out by members of a group known as Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK), whose ideological leader is detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman has fallen out with the top Indonesian in Syria, Bahrumsyah, who commands Katibah Nusantara, the main Indonesian-Malaysian military unit in ISIS. He is close to Bahrumsyah's rival, Abu Jandal, who heads a dissident unit. Bahrumsyah is the Indonesian with best access to central ISIS leaders and funds, but the fact that official ISIS media claimed credit for the Jakarta attacks may have boosted Abu Jandal's position. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No.25: Accessed march 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Shelf Number: 138035 Keywords: ExtremistsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Williams, Lauren Title: Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media Summary: Islamic State's use of social media to disseminate its propaganda is generally well understood. What receives far less attention is how the group also uses the Western mainstream media to spread its key messages. Islamic State tailors the production and release of its material to the needs of mainstream media outlets and to the media cycle. The danger involved in sending Western journalists to Syria and Iraq has made the media more reliant on material produced by Islamic State. The group's propaganda is often unwittingly used by the mainstream media in ways that serve Islamic State's objectives. Islamic State's propaganda effort is central to its ability to recruit new members, intimidate its opponents, and promote its legitimacy as a state. Countering that effort means more than just combatting it online and cancelling Twitter accounts. Counter-messaging efforts need to take place through the mainstream media as well as social media. The mainstream media also has a responsibility to treat Islamic State's material more critically, including by providing more contextual coverage of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and using less sensationalist or polarising rhetoric when it discusses terrorism. The adoption of better standards and practices can help the mainstream media to limit the appeal of Islamic State propaganda in ways that do not detract from media independence and the public-s right to know. Details: Sydney: Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 5, 2016 at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Shelf Number: 138119 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Challenging the Narrative of the "Islamic State" Summary: ISIS has brought terrorist propaganda to a new level, targeting its main audiences in nearly two dozen languages with up to 90,000 tweets every day. Governments have generally been at a loss as how to counter the ISIS narrative with persuasive counter-arguments to reduce its attraction for rebellious Muslim youths in Western diasporas and Muslim-majority countries. At the core of ISIS' narrative are themes familiar to most Muslims. ISIS has appropriated and instrumentalised them for its main purpose: to expand the Caliphate proclaimed in mid-2014. In this Research Paper, Dr. Alex Schmid identifies a dozen narrative themes of ISIS and discusses them from theological, historical and other angles in an attempt to show vulnerabilities and point the way towards developing convincing counter-arguments. While the potential of this approach is demonstrated, Dr. Schmid argues that a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic, inter-disciplinary teamwork, is required to develop successful counter-narratives and that these need to be tested on audiences with a cultural affinity to ISIS main target groups before being utilised by credible Muslim voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational and faith-based arguments. The Research Paper concludes with the observation that developing counter-narratives, while necessary, is not enough. It is even more necessary to develop credible alternative narratives - narratives that can give a new sense of purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they have no future in their and our societies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138159 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic StateOnline CommunicationsRadical Groups Religious ExtremismSocial MediaViolent Extremism |
Author: Winter, Charlie Title: Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Summary: This report illuminates the strategic thinking behind Islamic State's propaganda machine. Building on the theoretical framework established in 'The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy', the following analysis is based upon an exhaustive 30-day survey of Islamic State's media output. At 24 hour intervals from 17 July to 15 August 2015, the Islamic month of Shawwal, all media output from Islamic State's official outlets, from the provincial offices to the central foundations, was compiled for aggregated analysis. A total of 1146 separate events - discrete batches of propaganda - were recorded in the data collection period: a mixture of photo essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, theological essays, and so on. After the data collection period had ended, the archive was translated and refined, as events were grouped according to their primary narrative and, if applicable, sub-narratives. Following this, the data was rigorously tested against a number of variables to determine inconsistencies and anomalies. Then, the archive was broken down into its various narrative groupings, which were qualitatively assessed both in isolation of, and respect to, each other. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Shelf Number: 138172 Keywords: CaliphateIslamic StateMediaRadical Groups Radicalization Social MediaTerrorism Terrorists |
Author: Rafiq, Haras Title: Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State Summary: The following report discusses the appeal of the Islamic Sate 'caliphate' to women. To do this, the authors have embarked upon a close analysis of Islamic State's official propaganda and unofficial proselytisers. In the process, four promises "empowerment, deliverance, participation and piety" are identified as the organisation's key pull factors. -The promise of empowerment conveyed by Islamic State's official and unofficial propaganda encourages women to understand joining the organisation as a means to reverse the ills that they face in life outside the 'caliphate'. By joining Islamic State, the line goes, women can defiantly take charge of their lives in the same way that men can: through living in Islamic State's "caliphate" and supporting its jihad by marrying a fighter, women are led to believe that they can emancipate themselves from kufr (disbelief). - The deliverance promise focuses on the idea that, by joining Islamic State, grievances that women suffer in the West are immediately resolved. Women can be freed from daily degradations and disbelief, and are instead assimilated into a tight-knit collective sisterhood that will provide them with a network of support and friendship. Reflective of this, the ideas of redemption and deliverance tend to be directed to females by females. - The participation promise incentivizes women to join Islamic State even though their role is strictly non-military. It conveys a sense that there is more to the 'caliphate's' jihad than fighting and that, for women, there is a specific state-building role. A constant theme in Islamic State propaganda is that supporting the 'caliphate', making it grow and flourish, is the job of everyone. For women, this takes the role of providing, maintaining and educating its 'cubs', the next generation of fighters, as well as supporting their soldier spouses. - The last promise of Islamic State's women-orientated propaganda is piety, something built up the theological imperative to join the group. The alleged pristine nature of an 'Islamic existence' in the "caliphate" is a means of justifying each stress and sacrifice and also acts as a means for recruiters to exert peer pressure to push others to make hijra (migrating). - These four themes alone do not cause female supporters of Islamic State in the West to make hijra. However, when combined with the group's copious amounts of audio-visual propaganda, they play a crucial role in the rhetorical armoury of the 'caliphate's' recruiters. „-The discussion on the radicalisation of women is overly gendered and, all too often, predicated on misconceptions. In reality, when it comes to joining violent extremist causes, women are susceptible to the very same processes as men: narratives, ideology, grievances, and various push and pull factors. Reflecting this, the last part of this report delivers policy recommendations on how we must reappraise our attempts to counter the twin processes of female radicalisation and recruitment, in line with general counter-radicalisation, but using women as specific entry points. The four promises used in Islamic State propaganda, and cited in this report, are not exhaustive. There are a multitude of factors that contribute to an individual's radicalisation, of which propaganda can play an important part. As such, research into the key narratives employed by the 'caliphate' can shine an important individual's journey to jihad. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Shelf Number: 138173 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7 Summary: The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government's disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process' four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government's newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) - which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise - to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures. The report recommends the following: - Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation. - Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners. - Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counter-extremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. - Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities. - Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts. - Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism. - Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships. - Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures. - Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention. - Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism. - Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. - Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively. - Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism. - Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role. - Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. - Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities. - Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries. - Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds. While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly - at this critical time - practical recommendations to strengthen the UK's counter-extremism efforts. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Shelf Number: 138174 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-TerrorismDe-radicalizationIslamic State Media MuslimsRadical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Winter, Charlie Title: The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy Summary: The following report sheds light on the strategic motivations of, and implications to, Islamic State's media operation. By analysing the organisation's propaganda output over the twelve months that followed its 'caliphate' declaration in June 2014, it has been possible to dismantle the brand into its constituent narratives and the various target audiences into their composite parts. In doing so, the report demystifies the Islamic State propaganda machine and cuts through much of the unhelpful rhetoric surrounding it. By applying Jacques Ellul's theoretical framework to Islamic State's official messaging, this paper unambiguously demonstrates that, with all its complexity and gloss, the organisation's propaganda is not singularly responsible for radicalising individuals, let alone their joining the jihadist cause abroad or carrying out attacks at home. That being said, it does catalyse the Islamist extremist's passage from tacit supporter to active member. However, this is just one of the many functions of Islamic State's propaganda - as the following report demonstrates, it is much more than a matter of inciting and intimidating. From the following pages, ten key conclusions emerge: 1. For the international audience, the use of brutality by Islamic State is a red herring. While, it serves to warn against local dissent and gratify sympathisers, on an international level, its prevalence has fatally derailed mainstream understanding of the organisation and its appeal to its many thousands of foreign recruits. 2. Islamic State's propaganda has generated a comprehensive brand, one that offers an alternate way of living. Like any mass movement, it captures the imaginations of its potential recruits by offering both immediate change and the ability to transform their future in the long term. 3. This brand is composed of six non-discrete narratives - brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism - each of which is analysed in detail separately, and relation to, each other. 4. While brutality is easily the most prominent of these narratives in the West, utopianism is by far the most important narrative for Islamic State's propagandists; it is the organisation's utopian offer that is most alluring to new recruits. Unless we understand what makes up this 'utopia', any attempt to challenge the ideas is doomed to failure. 5. By outsourcing its propaganda dissemination, Islamic State has insulated itself from government-led schemes to censor its content. Its disseminators are, most of the time, self-appointed and have no official position in the organisation, virtual or otherwise. They receive no reward for their activism other than gratification from within the Islamic State echo chamber. 6. It is not just dissemination that Islamic State has outsourced. By saturating the online jihadist marketplace of ideas with official content, it also provides an abundance of raw material for 'jihobbyists' to produce their own unofficial propaganda. In doing so, the organisation is able to constantly direct the trajectory of its online narrative from afar and without direct involvement. 7. Islamic State's propagandists constantly create bespoke propagandistic material for a range of audiences. They are not just seeking to attract new supporters and intimidate enemies, but are also working to polarise international publics, sustain their organisation's global relevance (in jihadist and non-jihadist spheres) and present their enlisters with 'evidence' to convince potential recruits to become active members. 8. There is no such thing as a 'recruiter', in the traditional sense of the word. Recruitment to the Islamic State organisation involves a range of different actors and processes. First, one must be recruited to the cause. It is only then that an individual is actually enlisted. The 'recruiter to the cause' is not the same individual as the 'enlister to the organisation'. 9. Social media has emerged as this decade's 'radical mosqu'. While radicalisation, for the most part begins offline, Islamic State, along with other groups, has nurtured a situation in which the curious are able to have direct contact with former or current fighters, hear first-hand accounts from the battlefield and swap logistical advice. In decades gone by, this was a function served by so-called 'radical mosques'. In the digital era, social media platforms are the space where this happens. Crucially, social media platforms are not the reason for radicalisation or recruitment, just as 'radical' mosques and bookshops were never the reason. 10. People are not radicalised by propaganda, nor are they recruited by it. There must always be an external human influencer to spark and sustain the radicalisation process. This could be a friend, family-member or stranger. Whatever the case, exposure to Islamic State’s propaganda alone is not the reason that someone becomes a supporter. What propaganda does do, though, is catalyse the individual's radicalisation and concentrate their already-held sympathies. If we are to effectively counter Islamic State's media strategy - something which, at the time of writing, we are certainly failing at - we must first understand it. The propaganda behemoth can and must be broken down into its constituent parts; doing so facilitates a more nuanced, considered approach to the information war on Islamic State. Unless we understand the strategy behind the organisation's media machine, misconceptions about what drives its supporters - be they potential migrants or potential domestic terrorists - will continue to flourish. It is imperative that the coalition formed to degrade and destroy Islamic State recognises that there is no 'Golden Fleece' solution to this problem. There is no one counter narrative, nor is there any one audience that needs targeting. The coalition's information war machine, though better funded and potentially more numerous, is dwarfed by that of Islamic State. Unless its information architecture is revolutionised, the international coalition will always lose the battle for ideas. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 138175 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 Summary: This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of "global jihad", terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and re-emphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies. Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism recommendations: To the International Community: - Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan. - Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices. - Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions. - Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them. - Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 'value transfer' system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. - Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. - Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138176 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Ubaydi, Muhammad Title: The group that calls itself a state : understanding the evolution and challenges of the Islamic State Summary: In an attempt to paint a more complete picture of the Islamic State (IS), this report identifies key areas where the IS has shown strength, learning, and adaptation. This report also highlights key areas of weakness, mistake, and failure. In doing so, the reader should be well aware that this product provides such an overview with the explicit understanding that there is more to learn in each of these areas. The report proceeds as follows. The first section traces the historical evolution of the group, with emphasis on the fact that well executed design and an ability to take advantage of accidents led to the creation of the IS. The second section provides a very brief and preliminary comparison of the IS to other prominent militant organizations against which the United States has fought: al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. This section is followed by a third that outlines and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the IS as a whole, noting that the IS's success comes from its ability to leverage all parts of its organization to achieve maximum gain. This section also points out that, despite this success, the fact that the IS is attempting to operate across multiple functional areas will test the group's ability to adapt over time and will ultimately expose the group's shortcomings. The fourth and final section steps back to examine, at the strategic level, some of the challenges faced and opportunities available to those combating the IS. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Shelf Number: 138260 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Shatz, Howard J. Title: The Islamic State We Knew: Insights Before the Resurgence and Their Implications Summary: The group calling itself the Islamic State poses a grave threat, not just to Iraq and Syria but to the region more broadly and to the United States and its global coalition partners. A deadly and adaptive foe, the Islamic State seemed to come out of nowhere in June 2014, when it conquered Mosul. However, the Islamic State of today is the direct descendant of a group that Iraq, the United States, and their partners once fought as al-Qa'ida in Iraq and then as the Islamic State of Iraq. The wealth of publicly available information about the group indicates that the Islamic State's reemergence in 2014, and especially its methods and goals, should not have come as a surprise, although the strength and scope of that reemergence were rightfully shocking. The history considered in this report provides information known by the end of 2011 about the group's origins, finances, organization, methods of establishing control over territory, and response to airpower. Now that the Islamic State has reemerged, countering it can rely, in part, on the great deal of accumulated knowledge available. Because Iraqis and coalition forces routed the group once, the group's history can inform four components of a successful strategy against the Islamic State: degrading the group's finances, eliminating its leadership and potential leadership, creating a better strategy to hold recaptured territory, and making use of airpower. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Shelf Number: 138326 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateJihadistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The ISIS Impact on the Domestic Islamic Extremist Threat: Homegrown Islamic Extremism 2009-2015 Summary: In 2015, 80 U.S. residents were linked to terror plots and other activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology. They were either arrested, charged or otherwise publicly identified for their involvement in crimes ranging from providing support, attempting to fund or traveling to join terrorist groups abroad, or planning or assisting in plots here at home. This is a level of activity by U.S. residents inspired by foreign terrorist organizations never before seen. The 2015 numbers - up 180% from 2014 - are a result of a confluence of global trends, technological advances and the constant tide of terrorist messages and propaganda. In 2015 for the first time, nearly as many Americans were killed by domestic Islamic extremists as by white supremacists. And the spike in arrests and violence does not seem to be confined to 2015. In the first month of 2016, at least 6 U.S. residents were linked criminal activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideologies. Following on the heels of the record-breaking number of terror related arrests in 2015, these new arrests further underscore the persistent nature of the threat. Ongoing unrest in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war, continued to provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to operate and gain strength. As in 2014, the majority of the U.S. residents linked to terror in 2015 supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS or ISIL), which is based in Syria and Iraq and has affiliates in a number of other countries including Egypt, Libya and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, ISIS and other terrorist groups continue to take advantage of technology to mobilize followers, spread their messages and expand their influence worldwide. The internet and social media sites in particular, remain a pivotal element of the modern radicalization process. Online social interactions facilitate the spread of extremist messages - making them available to almost anyone, virtually anywhere - and create a climate where susceptible individuals are simultaneously targeted by recruiters and are able to develop remote networks that reinforce their burgeoning extremist allegiances. Understanding the progression of U.S. residents engaged in activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology can provide valuable insights into future security challenges. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Shelf Number: 138415 Keywords: Extremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Secretary of State Title: Counter-Extremism Strategy Summary: 1. Life in our country is based on fundamental values that have evolved over centuries, values that are supported and shared by the overwhelming majority of the population and are underpinned by our most important local and national institutions. These values include the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs. 2. All people living in Britain are free to practise a faith or to decide not to follow any faith at all. We are free to build our own churches, synagogues, temples and mosques and to worship freely. We are free to establish our own faith schools and give our children - boys and girls alike - the best education possible. 3. Our values are not exclusive to Britain, nor have they been arrived at by accident, or imposed from above. They have been shaped by our history. Our acceptance of the freedom of religious choice was born of religious conflict, which taught us that the alternative to tolerance is violence and bloodshed. Our support for democracy developed over centuries as a guard against the abuse of power. Our belief in equality followed a history in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation. 4. These values are under attack from extremists operating at a pace and scale not before seen. We will meet this challenge with a new and more assertive approach to defeat extremists. We will challenge their ideology, and defend and promote the values that unite us, not just because we are proud of these values, but because they are the means by which we have made a diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society succeed. Our society works because we have responsibilities as well as rights. We all have the freedom to live how we choose, but in return it is vital that we respect the choices made by others. 5. The greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism. We see this in the violence of Al Qa'ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The appalling attack in Tunisia in June 2015 took the lives of 38 people, 30 of them British. More than 750 UK-linked individuals have travelled to take part in the Syrian conflict. Worryingly we have seen examples of women, children and families buying into ISIL's extremist narrative and travelling to live under their brutal regime. Islamist extremists have also inspired the overwhelming majority of over 40 terrorist plots which have been disrupted since the London bombings of 2005. 6. Islamist extremism is not the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups. In 2013 Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year old British Muslim from Birmingham, was murdered by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme-right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially-motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales, and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was 'revenge for Lee Rigby', and extreme-right publications were found at his home. The Government is determined that such violence, and the Islamophobia that underpins it, will be defeated and perpetrators brought to justice. Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Cm 9148: Accessed March 31, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Shelf Number: 138503 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Benotman, Noman Title: The Children of Islamic State Summary: The future of children born and raised in Islamic State is a pertinent and pressing problem, requiring the immediate attention of the international community. There are currently 31,000 pregnant women within the 'caliphate'. As many as 50 children from the United Kingdom are growing up on jihad in Islamic State, and no prior research examines what will happen to them if they choose to return. This report attempts to fill this gap by addressing the reintegration, re-education, and rehabilitation challenges of returning or escaping children. Over the last six months, Quilliam researchers have archived, translated, and analysed propaganda released by Islamic State featuring children. This is the first database of its kind, and reveals the following: - The largest amount of Islamic State media featuring children relates to violence, comprising either of children directly participating in violence, or being exposed and normalised to violence. - Islamic State's wilayats in Iraq have released the most images showing children and teens in combat and acting as suicide bombers. - In the last six months, Islamic State propaganda depicts 12 child executioners, and one child participating in a public execution. The report highlights the following exclusive findings which pertain to the recruitment and training of child soldiers in the Islamic State: - Direct coercion into joining Islamic State generally occurs through abductions. However, Islamic State also engages in more indirect, systemic coercion where people, specifically children, are pressured to join the group out of fear. - Children can not only assist in meeting the present needs of the 'caliphate', but can continue to propagate its existence and expansion once they grow up, thus securing the long-term survival of the 'caliphate'. - The current generation of fighters sees children as better and more lethal fighters than themselves. Rather than being converted into radical ideologies, children have been indoctrinated into extreme values from birth or at a young age. - Schools and the education system are central to shaping the hearts and minds of the next generation. The indoctrination that begins in schools intensifies in training camps, where children between the ages of 10 and 15 are instructed in shari'a, desensitised to violence, and are taught specific skills to best serve the state and take up the banner of jihad. - Boys learn a rigid Islamic State curriculum, where drawing, philosophy and social studies, the 'methodology of atheism', have been removed. Instead, children churn out memorised verses of the Qur'an and attend 'Jihadi Training', which includes shooting, weaponry and martial arts. Girls, also known as the 'pearls of the caliphate', are veiled, hidden, confined to the home, and taught to look after husbands. - The prolonged exposure and desensitisation to violence that children experience affects their physical and psychological well-being, both in the short term and in the long term. Looking to the future, it is inevitable that these children will suffer from severe physical and mental trauma, as well as systematic extremist indoctrination. By coupling in-depth fieldwork with extensive research, Quilliam was able to discern not only what life for children within Islamic State is like, but the extent of the challenge of re-integration to come. Based on our findings, the report proposes a thorough assessment process for children who return or escape from Islamic State. This procedure evaluates the extent of radicalisation of the child, their degree of agency in joining Islamic State, the trauma and abuse they have suffered, and the immediate and long-term needs for ensuring effective Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation DDR(R). The recommendations detail a multi-structural support network for monitoring a child's progress. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2725/files/2016/04/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 147741 Keywords: CaliphateChild SoldiersCounter-terrorismExtremismIslamic StateJihadRadicalizationTerrorist |
Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy Summary: This Research Paper aims to analyse in depth the global propaganda strategy of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) by looking at the methods through which this grand strategy is carried out as well as the objectives that IS wants to achieve through it. The authors first discuss IS' growth model, explaining why global expansion and recruitment of foreign fighters are pivotal to IS success. Having in mind this critical role, the authors then explore the narratives and themes used by the group to mobilise foreign fighters and jihadists groups. Third, the paper analyses how IS deploys its narratives in those territories where it has established a foothold. Fourth, it outlines IS' direct engagement strategy and how it is used to facilitate allegiance of other jihadist groups. The final section of the paper offers a menu of policy options that stakeholders can implement to counter IS' global propaganda efforts. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138589 Keywords: Islamic StateJihadistsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Dodwell, Brian Title: The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail Summary: This report contains an analysis of over 4,600 unique Islamic State personnel records that were produced by the group primarily between early 2013 and late 2014. The importance of this data for understanding the Islamic State and, in particular, the foreign fighter flow, cannot be overstated. To put it simply, it is the largest cache of primary source documents produced by the Islamic State available in the open-source as of this date. These particular documents were acquired by NBC News from an Islamic State defector and subsequently provided to the CTC (and other entities). This report provides a window into the organization's global workforce, revealing information about foreign fighters' countries of origin, citizenship, points of entry into Syria, marital status, skills and previous occupations, education levels, religious knowledge, fighting role preferences in the group, and previous jihadist experience. In addition to analyzing the data at the macro-level, the report also highlights numerous anecdotes of individual fighters. Taken together, the analysis in this report reveals an organization that is attempting to vet new members, manage talent effectively within the organization, and deal with an incredibly diverse pool of recruits. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Shelf Number: 138704 Keywords: CaliphatesISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Robinson, Linda Title: Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for Adaptation Summary: This report assesses the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIL), focusing on the military and political lines of effort. The capabilities and motivations of the various counter-ISIL forces on the battlefield are assessed, as well as the U.S.-led efforts to provide training, equipment, advice, and assistance, including air support. While the campaign has degraded ISIL by targeting leadership and retaking a portion of territory, achieving lasting defeat of ISIL will be elusive without local forces capable of holding territory. Successful conclusion of the campaign will require significantly increased effort on two fronts. First, more-comprehensive training, advising, and assisting will be required to create more-capable, coordinated indigenous forces of appropriate composition and enable them to regain and hold territory. Second, political agreements must be forged to resolve key drivers of conflict among Iraqis and Syrians. Without these elements, resurgent extremist violence is likely. Many factors complicate the prospects for success, including sectarian divisions in Iraq, Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, the Syrian civil war, and Russian intervention to support the besieged regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, the Syrian regime also lacks sufficient competent local forces and is heavily reliant on external militia support. The government in Iraq, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, has pledged decentralization efforts to address Sunni concerns, but lacks sufficient Shia support to enact them. This report offers recommendations for a more comprehensive advisory approach, emphasizing the political line of effort, and achieving synergy between the military and political efforts. Key Findings U.S. Efforts to Bolster Counter-ISIL Forces Have Achieved Limited Results - The advisory effort was circumscribed by location, unit, and function. Lack of advisers at the operational level in Iraq and lack of support to Syrian opposition fighters limited effectiveness of indigenous forces. - The training effort was also limited: Some 20,000 Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces were trained in 18 months, including 2,000 Iraqi special operations personnel. Efforts to arm and train Sunni tribes were halting. Anti-ISIL Forces Suffer from Capability Gaps and Lack of Coordination Among Disparate Forces - Iraqi's military crumbled after the 2014 ISIL offensive due to cumulative weaknesses. - Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service carried the brunt of the fighting, suffering extensive casualties and materiel losses. - Shia militias, some of them advised and supported by Iran, were not integrated with the overall military effort. Effective command and control of the overall effort was lacking. - In Syria, most territory was retaken by the Syrian Kurdish militia, and other efforts such as the New Syrian Forces were inadequate in numbers and capability. Coordination was also lacking among Syrian forces. Detailed Political Strategies to Resolve Underlying Conflicts Were Not Developed and Not Synchronized with the Military Effort for Maximum Effect - The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi articulated proposals to address Sunni concerns, but insufficient Shia support was provided to implement them. U.S. senior-level engagement with Abadi was also limited. - No overarching Syria strategy was developed. Relying on Syrian Kurds has escalated tensions with Turkey dramatically and created concern among Syrian Arabs. Recommendations - More comprehensive advisory support from senior echelons through the brigade level to increase coordination of forces, morale, and leadership. - A long-term training and equipping effort will be required to create capable indigenous security forces that incorporate sufficient Sunnis. - The successful support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service provides a replicable model. - An unconventional warfare approach may regain Mosul and Raqqa from ISIL with less material damage by leveraging internal discontent and underground forces. - Syria's counter-ISIL effort cannot succeed in seizing and holding key terrain without Syrian Arabs; their support may require unified effort with the counter-Assad campaign. - Increased materiel aid to anti-Assad forces including tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless guided weapon systems and surface-to-air missiles may preserve the moderate opposition and create leverage in negotiating a transition under the Geneva terms. - The Abadi government and Shia parties should craft proposals with international support to resolve the political drivers of conflict in Iraq. Visible, high-level U.S. support to such detailed political proposals may include linkage with military support. - The United States should elevate its focus on advisory support to indigenous forces, not just eliminating ISIL leadership and resources. It should, above all, prioritize the political line of effort, backed by military measures. Syrian opposition fighters may become increasingly radicalized in the absence of greater U.S. commitment and coordination. U.S. allies have backed disparate opposition groups, increasing the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the Syrian opposition. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Shelf Number: 138893 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorist |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "We Feel We Are Cursed": Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya Summary: In February 2015 the extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) began taking over the Mediterranean port city of Sirte, Libya. By the following August ISIS had turned Sirte into its largest stronghold outside of Iraq and Syria. This report documents serious crimes committed by ISIS in Sirte including the executions of 49 people the group accused of "spying," "sorcery," and "insulting God." "We Feel We Are Cursed," based on research including interviews with 45 Libyans who lived under ISIS in Sirte, details how the group imposed its severe interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) on all aspects of life. Meanwhile, ISIS has failed to provide basic necessities to the local population, diverting food, medicine, fuel, and cash, along with homes of residents who fled, to its fighters and functionaries. With war-wracked Libya's institutions in near-collapse, countries able to exercise criminal jurisdiction should take immediate steps to apprehend and prosecute those responsible for atrocities by ISIS and other parties. The International Criminal Court should prioritize an investigation of ongoing serious crimes in Libya as well. The United Nations Human Rights Council should appoint an independent expert to document serious, ongoing abuses in Libya. The Security Council should impose sanctions on those found responsible for serious crimes in Libya while ensuring appropriate due process. International parties have repeatedly failed to act on their promises to identify and punish the perpetrators of serious crimes in Libya. Continued failure to act will result in more horrific crimes by groups including ISIS. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Libya URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 139336 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHuman Rights AbusesISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorists |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: Investing in Iraq's Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism Summary: According to new Mercy Corps research, the success of armed groups in Iraq - such as the Islamic State (ISIS) - is rooted less in deep-seated sectarianism than in poor governance. Where the government is perceived to be unjust, support for non-state armed actors among marginalized groups is high. But support for groups like ISIS can shift quickly and dramatically when public perceptions of government institutions and services improve. Forging a just, peaceful future for Iraq will require a comprehensive good governance approach. Building on a series of nationwide public opinion surveys between 2013 and 2015, and in-depth interviews with Iraqi citizens, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society leaders, government officials, and activists, this report finds that improving governance in Iraq will require new partnerships with civil society. The timing has never been better: civil society is gaining acceptance in Iraq and is increasingly seen as bridging the gap between citizens and government. But the clock is ticking. The rise of sectarian militias will likely present new challenges to the future of a cohesive state. Donor support for civil society and good governance in Iraq is waning. Meanwhile, popular goodwill toward the current government may diminish if meaningful reforms are not implemented. In popular demonstrations throughout the country, thousands of Iraqi youth have, in recent months, peacefully advocated for an end to sectarianism and corruption. Iraq must capitalize on this energy, or it risks antagonizing a new generation. Key findings 1. Poor governance that results in injustice, real or perceived, is a key driver of conflict: Iraq's instability is rooted in poor governance, not in ancient group rivalries. When marginalized groups begin to believe the government is going to be more responsive and fair, support for armed violence decreases. 2. While sectarianism is often incorrectly credited for being the main source of conflict, it is nonetheless a threat to future stability: As the violent conflict continues or escalates, sectarian divisions have the potential to increase as political opportunists-both domestic and foreign - stoke tensions to gain power. 3. Civil society is vital to improving governance and advancing reconciliation: Though civil society is playing a critical role bridging the gap between citizens and government, the key question is whether, in the face of rising expectations and frustrations, it can direct new energies into nonviolent change. 4. Iraqi youth, too often side-lined, are of vital importance to governance and civil society efforts: Iraq's political, social and economic future hinges on its youth. Building a peaceful future for Iraq will require empowering the country's youth and positively channeling their energies. Recommendations - Build a stronger cooperative relationship between civil society and government on key policy issues by formalizing relations with civil society actors and encouraging donors to commit multi-year investments in Iraqi civil society. - Improve the capacity of local actors to play an active role in good governance by engaging civil society partners more deeply in informing programs, and facilitating stronger relationships between youth activities and civil society. - Avert further conflict by ensuring governance investments are long-term and informed by local feedback, strengthening Iraq's Reconciliation Committee, and continuing to improve government responsiveness and accountability. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 139390 Keywords: Extremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspectives Summary: This Research Paper by Dr. Alex P. Schmid opens with a brief exposition of the foreign (terrorist) fighter (FTF) phenomenon, concentrating on Salafist jihadists and their astonishing growth after the Caliphate was proclaimed in mid-2014. The author then discusses various definitions of FTFs. Subsequently, Dr. Schmid seeks to bring structure and order into the widely diverging estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters. He then identifies problems posed by foreign fighters for European democracies with Muslim diasporas, focusing on the range of motivations driving vulnerable young men and women - mainly second generation immigrants and recent converts to Islam - to join the so-called "Islamic State". Having identified push and pull as well as resilience factors that facilitate or inhibit young Muslims joining ISIS, he argues that stopping them from departing to Syria is not enough; political solutions have to be sought. Details: The Hague: international Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Shelf Number: 139408 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateLone-Wolf TerrorismMuslimsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Johnston, Patrick B. Title: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 Summary: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 draws from more than 140 recently declassified documents to present a comprehensive examination of the organization, territorial designs, management, personnel policies, and finances of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), both predecessors of the Islamic State. These records paint a clear picture of ISI practices and standard operating procedures. Leadership consciously designed the organization not just to fight but also to build an Islamic state governed by the laws dictated by its strict Islamist ideology. ISI was a vertically integrated organization with a central management structure and functional bureaus. It sought to replicate these structures at multiple lower geographic levels across territory. Each geographic unit had substantial autonomy to pursue the group's strategic objectives but was required to send frequent reports to the group's leadership; the central organization used these reports to inform decisions and provide strategic guidance. ISI paid its personnel a wage that would draw true believers rather than opportunists; trained and allocated its membership with an eye toward group effectiveness; raised revenues locally through diversified sources; and was able to maintain itself, albeit at much reduced strength, in the face of a withering counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy put in place by its opponents, starting in late 2006. An analysis of the Islamic State predecessor groups is more than a historical recounting. The lessons from examining the group's history are useful for setting expectations about the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Islamic State and its ability to combat its opponents, designing a coordinated and effective campaign against it, and understanding why it might be able to survive such an effort and sustain itself in the future, albeit perhaps at a lower level of threat. Defeating the Islamic State will require persistence. The record of counter-ISI operations from 2006 through 2010 shows that military action and political accommodation can work together to degrade the group substantially, if not defeat it. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 348p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Shelf Number: 139437 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Cultural Property: Protection of Iraqi and Syrian Antiquities Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other groups have seized upon the conflicts in Iraq and Syria to destroy, loot, and traffic cultural property, including antiquities. According to the United Nations (UN), this destruction and looting has reached unprecedented levels. The UN has also reported that since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, ISIS has used the sale of looted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property to generate income to strengthen its capabilities to carry out attacks. Under the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, signed into law in 1983, and other laws, the United States has restricted the importation of certain, but not all, Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. GAO was asked to examine the protection of Iraqi and Syrian cultural property, including views of art market experts. This report describes (1) activities undertaken by U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian Institution to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property since 2011, and (2) art market experts' suggestions for improving U.S. government activities. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed U.S., international, and foreign officials. GAO interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of U.S.-based art market experts representing different categories of the art market to obtain suggestions for potentially improving U.S. government activities. GAO then asked experts to rate the importance of these suggestions and obtained U.S. officials' views on experts' top-rated suggestions. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-673: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679061.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679061.pdf Shelf Number: 140094 Keywords: AntiquitiesArt CrimesCultural PropertyISISIslamic StateLooting |
Author: Meitz, Eric Title: What About the Women? Understanding and Addressing the Problem of ISIS Female Recruitment in the Western Balkans Summary: In many ways, female recruits, both from the Western Balkans and other regions, are attracted to the Islamic State for the exact same reasons as men, highlights BCSP guest researcher Eric Mietz. This policy paper aims to bring attention to an oft-neglected security problem in the Western Balkans: women being recruited by and migrating to the Islamic State. The roles of women in the Islamic State and the messaging the group uses to lure women to migrate to Syria and Iraq are sufficiently different to warrant a gender-based perspective in countering violent extremism (CVE) policymaking. The first part of the paper looks at the numbers of women leaving from the Western Balkans to Islamic State-held territory, the profiles of women who migrate, and the roles they take on in the Islamic State. To explain why women are influenced to migrate, the second part examines the "push" and "pull" factors of Islamic State recruitment. The last part focuses on the efforts of Western Balkans governments to criminalize participation in or support of the Islamic State and the disadvantages of relying solely on this policy Details: Belgrade, Republic of Serbia: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Shelf Number: 140145 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadicalizationRecruitment, WomenTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Regional Risk Assessment on terrorism Financing 2016: South-East Asia & Australia Summary: The Syria-Iraq conflict and the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 have energised extremists and their sympathisers across South-East Asia and Australia. The region is also dealing with long-running domestic conflicts and insurgencies that share the characteristics of terrorism, even if they are not connected to ISIL or violent global extremism. This highly-charged and dynamic security environment has intensified terrorism financing risks in the region, posing new challenges for authorities. Small-cell terrorist activity, foreign terrorist fighter travel and the growing number of lone actors will see continued use of self-funding to raise funds and cash smuggling to move them. These proven, easy-to-use terrorism financing methods reduce the need for terrorists and their supporters to resort to more complex financial activity or adopt new payment systems. The region's porous land and close maritime borders, as well as informal cash-intensive economies, also influence the continued use of established methods. Terrorism financing funds flowing out of the region are currently channelled mainly into the Syria-Iraq conflict, but comprise only a small portion of international funding to factions fighting in that area. While outflows to foreign conflict zones pose a high risk, concern is growing over signs of funding entering the region to support local terrorist actors. Details: Canberra: AUSTRAC, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140160 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismISISIslamic StateRisk AssessmentTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremists |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Islamic State's Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement Summary: Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: - The Departed - Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. - The Returned - American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. - The Inspired - Americans lured - in part - by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests: - The Lost - Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. - The Others - Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad. Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following: - Watchlisting - the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. - Preemption - efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44521: Accessed September 6, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Shelf Number: 140169 Keywords: Foreign FightersHomeland SecurityISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Gold, Zack Title: Salafi Jihadist Violence in Egypt's North Sinai: From Local Insurgency to Islamic State Province Summary: Militancy in Egypt's North Sinai governorate-a serious problem since that country's January 2011 uprising - was compounded in November 2014 when Ansar Bayt al Maqdis ("Supporters of Jerusalem", ABM), the main salafi jihadist organisation in Sinai, swore allegiance to the group that calls itself the Islamic State (IS). This Research Paper closely inspects ABM/Wilayat Sinai and ways in which the group changed over three phases of its existence: from the 2011 uprising to Morsi's 2013 ouster, from that point until the group's pledge to IS in 2014, and since the emergence of Islamic State affiliate Wilayat Sinai. This in-depth documentation is meant to serve as a case study of the impact that affiliating with IS has on local salafi jihadist groups. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICCT-Zach-Gold-Salafi-Jihadist-Violence-in-Egypts-North-Sinai-April2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Egypt URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICCT-Zach-Gold-Salafi-Jihadist-Violence-in-Egypts-North-Sinai-April2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147915 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamic StateJihadistsTerrorism |
Author: Cassim Cachalia, Raesah Title: The dynamics of youth radicalisation in Africa: Reviewing the current evidence Summary: Youth radicalisation towards violent extremism is a global phenomenon that threatens peace, security and stability. This paper reviews the evidence on the factors that may contribute to the dynamics of youth radicalisation. Available findings from East Africa and the Horn of Africa, West Africa and the Sahel, and North Africa are used to understand the dynamics that may contribute to radicalisation and, potentially, to violent extremism. Many factors emerge including political, economic, social and individual factors. Religion, identity and gender also arise as topics for further analysis. Youth radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that cannot be attributed to any one explanation or set of factors. This paper recognises these complexities, offers recommendations and identifies additional issues that should be explored further. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 296: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140598 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Milton, Daniel Title: Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State's Media Efforts Summary: This report breaks down the Islamic State's media activities through a two-fold approach. First, it examines a small number of declassified documents captured from the group's predecessors to provide a baseline understanding its present-day media structure and operations. Second, through an examination of over 9,000 Islamic State official media products, this report offers detailed insight into what the group is saying and what a study of its propaganda can tell us about its strengths, weaknesses, and struggles. A number of findings emerge from these analyses. First, the Islamic State's media network is adaptive and complex. Second, the group publishes products on a variety of themes, only one of which has to do with the violence for which the group is so well-known. Third, the frequency of the group's products has declined significantly since its high-point in the summer of 2015. Fourth, the Islamic State's provincial media bureaus are not all equal in terms of their production content. Finally, although advances have been made in limiting the group's media activities, there is still more than can be done to limit the group's outreach efforts. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Shelf Number: 145442 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateSocial MediaTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Amnesty International Title: 'Punished for Daesh's Crime': Displaced Iraqis Abused by Militias and Government Forces Summary: Paramilitary militias and government forces in Iraq have committed serious human rights violations, including war crimes, by torturing, arbitrarily detaining, forcibly disappearing and extrajudicially executing thousands of civilians who have escaped areas controlled by the armed group calling itself the Islamic State (IS), said Amnesty International in a new report published today. The report 'Punished for Daesh's crimes': Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces exposes the terrifying backlash against civilians fleeing IS-held territory, raising alarm about the risk of mass violations as the military operation to recapture the IS-held city of Mosul gets underway. The report is based on interviews with more than 470 former detainees, witnesses and relatives of those killed, disappeared or detained, as well as officials, activists, humanitarian workers and others. After escaping the horrors of war and tyranny of IS, Sunni Arabs in Iraq are facing brutal revenge attacks at the hands of militias and government forces, and are being punished for crimes committed by the group," said Philip Luther, Research and Advocacy Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International. "Iraq is currently facing very real and deadly security threats from IS, but there can be no justification for extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture or arbitrary detention. "As the battle to retake Mosul begins, it is crucial that the Iraqi authorities take steps to ensure these appalling abuses do not happen again. States supporting military efforts to combat IS in Iraq must demonstrate they will not continue to turn a blind eye to violations." The report highlights widespread revenge attacks and discrimination faced by Sunni Arabs suspected of being complicit in IS crimes or supporting the group. Many were displaced during major military operations in 2016 across the country, including in Falluja and surrounding areas (in the governorate of Anbar), al-Sharqat (Salah al-Din governorate), Hawija (Kirkuk governorate) and around Mosul (Ninewa governorate). The predominantly Shi’a militias involved in abuses, known as the Popular Mobilization Units, have long been backed by the Iraqi authorities, which have provided them with financial support and weapons. They were officially designated part of the Iraqi forces in February 2016. The government's responsibility for these violations cannot be ignored and states supporting or participating in the ongoing military effort to combat IS in Iraq should have rigorous checks in place to ensure that any support or equipment they provide does not contribute to abuses. Mass abductions, killings and torture Amnesty International's research reveals that war crimes and other gross human rights violations were committed by predominantly Sh'ia militias, and possibly government forces, during operations to retake Falluja and surrounding areas from IS in May and June 2016. In one shocking incident at least 12 men and four boys from the Jumaila tribe who fled al-Sijir, north of Falluja, were extrajudicially executed after they handed themselves in to men wearing military and federal police uniforms on 30 May. Men and older boys were separated from the women and younger children before being lined up and shot dead. At least 73 other men and older boys from the same tribe were seized a few days earlier and are still missing. Details: London: AI, 2016. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2016 at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/punished_for_daeshs_crimes.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/punished_for_daeshs_crimes.pdf Shelf Number: 145773 Keywords: Extrajudicial ExecutionsHuman Rights AbusesISISIslamic StateMilitiasTorture |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Grounds for Concern: Belgium's Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks Summary: In November 2015, coordinated attacks by armed extremists killed 130 people in Paris. Four months later, attackers struck in Brussels, killing 32. The attacks were the deadliest in France and Belgium in decades. In both cases, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed responsibility. Perpetrators in both strikes had connections to Belgium. The Belgian authorities responded by enacting a ra‚ of counter-terrorism laws and deploying 1,800 soldiers in major cities. The police have carried out several hundred raids, detentions, and stops-and-searches. These actions have helped the authorities charge and convict dozens of terrorism suspects. But as Grounds for Concern reveals, these laws, particularly if enforced arbitrarily or in ways that could be perceived as discriminatory, threaten basic rights including those to movement, liberty, free expression and privacy. In addition, some police operations have involved alleged beatings or other use of excessive force. Human Rights Watch investigated 26 incidents of alleged police abuse. In all but one case those targeted were Muslim. The Belgian authorities should amend and monitor counter-terrorism laws and policies to ensure they do not erode fundamental rights and enforce zero tolerance for police abuse. Governments have a responsibility to protect people from attack and to hold those responsible to account. But disproportionate responses are not only unlawful, they also risk driving a wedge between the Belgian authorities and communities that feel targeted—the very outcome that ISIS seeks to provoke. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Shelf Number: 147308 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist ViolenceExtremistsHuman Rights AbusesISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Ingram, Haroro J. Title: A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: A Two-Tiered Framework for Practitioners Summary: This Policy Brief outlines a "linkage-based" approach to combating militant Islamist propaganda tailored for practitioners. It argues for a two-tiered approach to counter-terrorism strategic communications that addresses a spectrum of target audience motivations: antis, curious, engaged, tacit supporters and active supporters. The first tier undermines the key arguments at the heart of militant Islamist narratives and offers alternative narratives. This approach is designed to dismantle the "systems of meaning" at the heart of militant Islamist propaganda via the deployment of pragmatic- and identity-choice messages tailored to dissolve the linkages violent extremists draw between themselves and solutions and their enemies and crisis. The second tier uses strategies of network disruption and disengagement strategies to catalyse behavioural changes in target audiences away from joining or acting on behalf of violent extremist groups like al Qaeda or so-called Islamic State (IS). These tiers are mutually reinforcing: the first degrades the appeal of violent extremist messaging in an effort to constrict those who may become engaged in or even supporters of violent extremists while the second disturbs the trajectory of individuals from tacit to active supporters. The framework is designed to not only assist practitioners with synchronising campaign planning and message design but provides a way to categorise messaging and facilitate metric collection for better informed decision-making. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed December 13, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 146040 Keywords: Counter-terrorismIslamic StateTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Whiteside, Craig Title: Lighting the Path: the Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-2016) Summary: The media products of the revolutionary movement known as the Islamic State (also IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) have received a significant amount of attention from analysts and journalists alike. While extremely helpful, most of this effort is focused at performing content analysis of fairly recent products. As part of the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication (CTSC) project's effort to better understand propaganda messaging in the 21st century, the author of this Research Paper examined primary documents and other media published by the Islamic State movement during its entire existence in order to develop a history of the media department since 2003. The framework for analysis focused on the interaction between key media leaders, the ever-expanding structure and institutions, and the process of innovation used to experiment with different media techniques in different phases of the group's evolution. Based on this history, the paper presents six observations about the media department and its role in the larger movement – in the hopes that this knowledge will be helpful in efforts to combat this particular group and its inevitable imitators in the future. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 144914 Keywords: Counter-terrorismISISIslamic StateMediaRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Dodwell, Brian Title: Then and Now: Comparing the Flow of Foreign Fighters to AQI and the Islamic State Summary: Using two different sets of data derived from internal, bureaucratic documents produced by the Islamic State (and its predecessor group) during two distinct periods of time (2006-2007 and 2011-2014), this report evaluates how the make-up, scale, and scope of the Iraq- and Syria-bound foreign fighter problem has changed over the last decade. It does so across three dimensions. First, it outlines the similarities and differences that exist in the backgrounds of the foreign fighters who joined the Islamic State during separate blocks of time. Second, it provides insight into the local travel and flow of foreign fighters across time as well as the mobilization infrastructure that the Islamic State had in place to facilitate the travel of recruits into Syria or Iraq. Third, it details changes in the preferences of foreign fighters, as reflected by the roles they wanted to fill within the organization. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Then-and-Now.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Then-and-Now.pdf Shelf Number: 144885 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateTerrorism |
Author: United States Institute of Peace Title: The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond Summary: The West failed to predict the emergence of al-Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate — and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strategies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analysis and diverse views. his report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, and jihadism who held a series of conferences between August and November 2016. "The Jihadi Threat" reflects the broad — and often diverse — views of the coauthors. Not every one agreed on all points, but the variety of ď¬ndings, trend lines, and scenarios for the future covers the best thinking about the evolution of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. The United States Institute of Peace was the primary sponsor of this initiative, with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Fifteen other think tanks and universities were represented in the Working Group on Extremism. The goal was always to reflect the widest expertise and the full spectrum of views. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 146146 Keywords: Al QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Davis, Lynn E. Title: A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat Summary: The debate in the past over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the focus to policies beyond the military dimension. Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on removing the underlying conditions sustaining ISIL and other violent jihadist groups, i.e., the lack of security, justice, and political representation. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with future territorial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria. In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspective: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Shelf Number: 145032 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland SecurityISIS Islamic StateRadical Groups Terrorist |
Author: Pape, Robert Title: The American face of ISIS: Analysis of ISIS-related terrorism in the US: March 2014-August 2016 Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is mobilising sympathisers in the US at rates much higher than seen for previous terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. To understand this new American face of ISIS, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) study examined 112 cases of individuals who perpetrated ISIS-related offences, were indicted by the US Justice Department for such offences, or both, in the US between March 2014 and August 2016. This is the first comprehensive analysis of ISIS-related cases to examine the profiles of indictees overall, as well as to identify characteristics associated with each of the offence types. The findings are striking, and provide a valuable contribution to understanding the contemporary face of ISIS-related terrorism in the US. Details: Barton ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Shelf Number: 145772 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Patel, Sophia Title: The Sultanate of Women: Exploring female roles in perpetrating and preventing violent extremism Summary: This paper examines the appeal of Islamic State (IS) to Western women and explores how women can be employed in countering violent extremism (CVE) structures to prevent further involvement. It aims to deliver a comprehensive analysis for academics, policymakers and practitioners working in CVE program and policy design and implementation in order to bridge the gap between community development work and security and intelligence. Two case studies of Australian women - Zehra Duman (a.k.a. Umm Abdullatif al-Australi) and Zaynab Sharrouf (a.k.a. Umm Hafs) - illustrate the appeal as well as the contradictions. A series of recommendations suggests changes to existing CVE structures and their approaches to integrating, women. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 145767 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateViolent Extremism |
Author: Barrett, Richard Title: The Islamic State Summary: The self-styled Islamic State is an accident of history, emerging from multiple social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. It has challenged the territorial divisions imposed on the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by carving out for itself a large area of territory. But ultimately, its impact will flow as much from its challenge to established concepts of government, national sovereignty, and national identity. The Islamic State is most notable for the violence with which it asserts control, but its ruthless tactics will likely prevent the group from ruling effectively and building broader support beyond the front line fighters who protect its security and the authoritarian killers who patrol its streets. The Islamic State is a highly visible but clandestine organization. Despite the vast amount of publicity and analysis it has generated since 2011, verifiable facts concerning its leadership and structure remain few and far between. The picture is obscured by the misleading propaganda of the State itself and by the questionable accounts of people who claim to be familiar with it. It is a movement that has accelerated fast along the path from terrorism through insurgency towards proto-statehood, but it is also one that for all its bravado seems fearful that it could just as quickly be forced back underground. As a result, this paper relies on the group's own publications, the observations of defectors, and analysis by others who take an interest in its progress, despite the paucity of information. Nonetheless, The Soufan Group believes that enough is available to draw a useful picture of the evolution of the State, its structure and its operations, even though it may lack clarity and detail. The paper refers throughout to the organization as The Islamic State, being the name it uses to describe itself. The only alternative would be to call it by its Arabic acronym, commonly transliterated as Da'ish or Daesh (al Dawla al Islamiya fi al Iraq wa al Sham). Clearly, the use of its full name does not imply any endorsement or recognition of its self-description. Details: New York: Soufan Group, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Shelf Number: 141177 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Islamic State 2021: Possible Futures in North and West Africa Summary: The Islamic State (referred to in this report as ISIL) has seen its prospects in North and West Africa grow increasingly dim since early 2015. ISIL has experienced significant losses in North Africa in the past year, especially in Libya, which was once ISIL's most valuable territory outside of Syria and Iraq, and was home to the group’s unofficial African capital. Meanwhile, the Nigerian militant group popularly known as Boko Haram, which is ISIL's West Africa Province (ISWAP), has experienced major internal schisms, as different factions vie for resources, compete for the attention of ISIL's senior leadership, and renew longstanding personal, ideological and strategic disputes. But despite these setbacks, ISIL continues to pose a threat to North and West Africa, and is capable of mounting high-profile terrorist attacks in the region and beyond. Additionally, continued political instability and conflict in countries like Mali and Libya could undermine counter-ISIL efforts, and provide the group an opportunity to rebuild its networks and mount a resurgence. Indeed, two recent occurrences – the reemergence of ISIL in northern Mali and the group's temporary takeover of the town of Qandala in Puntland (a region in northeastern Somalia) – illustrate ISIL's ability to exploit ungoverned spaces and fragile states. It is possible that ISIL's global decline could also paradoxically help the group in North and West Africa, as state and non-state actors shift resources from combatting ISIL to other seemingly more urgent issues, giving ISIL the breathing room it needs to regenerate. Several factors will have a fundamental impact on ISIL’s future trajectory in North and West Africa: 1. The future of ISIL’s Sirte network: In order to survive and rebuild in North and West Africa, ISIL will likely need to preserve at least some of the militant infrastructure it developed during its year-plus in control of the Libyan city of Sirte. The Sirte network has been a key bridge between ISIL's Syria-Iraq leadership and its African allies, and ISIL has relied heavily on the Sirte network to maintain its patronage of its provinces (as ISIL refers to its affiliates) in the region. While ISIL has lost its foothold in Sirte, the group may be able to preserve some of the jihadist apparatus that had ruled and administered the city. 2. ISWAP's organizational dynamics: ISWAP's internal schisms threaten to cripple the group and weaken, if not sever, its ties to ISIL. The loss of its Nigerian province would be a major blow to ISIL's expansion efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and would further tarnish the group’s brand. Conversely, if ISWAP remains in ISIL's orbit, ISWAP could provide ISIL with a vehicle through which to expand its presence into other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Senegal and Mali. 3. The resilience of ISIL in northern Mali: ISIL's recent resurgence in northern Mali gives the group a new foothold at a time when it is struggling elsewhere in the region, and across the globe. But ISIL's presence in Mali remains tenuous, as both regional and French security forces, as well as rival al-Qaeda militants, will likely target ISIL. 4. Political stability in North Africa: ISIL's prospects in North Africa hinge to a considerable extent on the future of the region's politics, especially in Libya. Ongoing tensions between rival political and armed factions in Libya continue to threaten to escalate into a high-intensity civil conflict, with destabilizing effects for the rest of the region. Spillover from Libya would test Tunisia's already fragile young democracy. Algeria’s political future is similarly uncertain, given the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Political turmoil could provide ISIL with the opening it needs to rebuild its flagging networks. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 141325 Keywords: Extremist GroupsISILIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadical ViolenceTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Heissner, Stefan Title: Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State's Financial Fortunes Summary: About this Study • The so-called Islamic State has often been described as the richest terrorist organization in the world. • This estimate of Islamic State revenues for the years 2014–2016 results from a collaboration between EY and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London. It is based on a systematic review of open source information about the finances of Islamic State in its core territory in Syria and Iraq. Key Findings • Estimates vary widely. It remains impossible to say exactly how much money Islamic State has at its disposal. • The group's most significant sources of revenue are closely tied to its territory. They are: (1) taxes and fees; (2) oil; and (3) looting, confiscations, and fines. We have found no hard evidence that foreign donations continue to be significant. Similarly, revenues from the sale of antiquities and kidnap for ransom, while difficult to quantify, are unlikely to have been major sources of income. • In the years since 2014, Islamic State’s annual revenue has more than halved: from up to $1.9b in 2014 to a maximum of $870m in 2016. There are no signs yet that the group has created significant new funding streams that would make up for recent losses. With current trends continuing, the Islamic State’s "business model" will soon fail. Assessment • Evaluating Islamic State finances through traditional approaches towards "countering terrorist finance" leads to serious misconceptions. Islamic State is fundamentally different because of the large territory it controls and the unique opportunities this offers for generating income. • Conversely, its reliance on population and territory helps to explain the group's current financial troubles. According to figures provided by the Global Coalition, by November 2016 Islamic State had lost 62 per cent of its mid-2014 "peak" territory in Iraq, and 30 per cent in Syria. From a revenue perspective, this means fewer people and businesses to tax and less control over natural resources such as oil fields. Prospects • There are good reasons to believe that Islamic State revenues will further decline. In particular, capturing Mosul, the Caliphate's "commercial capital", will have a significant detrimental effect on Islamic State finances. • Nevertheless, Islamic State, and its Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) predecessor, have repeatedly demonstrated that financial and military setbacks can be overcome. • Moreover, the decline in revenues may not have an immediate effect on the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks outside its territory. While hurting Islamic State finances puts pressure on the organization and its state-building project, wider efforts will continue to be necessary to ultimately defeat it. Details: London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London: 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Shelf Number: 141335 Keywords: CaliphateIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamist Terrorism: A Look at Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS Summary: This Research Paper seeks to explore what 'sympathy' and 'support' actually mean when it comes to terrorism. The text addresses some of the problems of public opinion surveys, includes a conceptual discussion and then continues with the presentation of data from public opinion surveys. It notes that opinion polls can be helpful in gauging (verbal) support for terrorism but also finds that the questions asked in opinion polls are generally lacking precision while the answers are often influenced by political pressures. When translating (generally low) percentages of sympathy and support for al Qaeda and so-called Islamic State in various countries into actual population figures, it emerges that there is a sizeable radical milieu in both Muslim-majority countries and in Western Muslim diasporas, held together by the world wide web of the internet. While large majorities of Muslims in most countries have no love for jihadist extremists, there are more than enough breeding grounds for terrorism. The Research Paper concludes that better instruments for measuring sympathy and support for jihadist terrorism are needed to inform counter-terrorist strategies Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Shelf Number: 141336 Keywords: al QaedaCounter-TerrorismExtremists GroupsIslamic StateJihadistsPublic OpinionTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al QaedaCounter-TerrorismCountering-ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Title: Culture in Crisis: Preserving Cultural Heritage in Conflict Zones Summary: There is nothing new about the looting and destruction of cultural property. The Roman Emperor Titus looted and then razed the Jewish temple in Jerusalem, Napoleon shipped art taken during his conquests back to the Louvre, the Nazis and Soviets emptied museums and private collections, their fellow Americans have looted Native American sites. Even in peacetime, monuments like the Elgin marbles and the Pergamon Altar have found their way into foreign hands, often claiming to provide protection. The monuments and works of art that remain intact and in place from prior civilizations are only those that happened to survive. Twenty-first-century technology has, however, changed the scale and quality of the looting and destruction. When the Islamic State took over a large part of Syria and Iraq in 2014, it organized a massive effort to loot artifacts that could be transported and destroyed what it could of the rest. The objective was two-fold: to demonstrate disdain for the culture that preceded Islam and to enrich the Islamic State's financial resources. Modern technology, including high explosives and earth-moving equipment, and global transportation networks made this possible on a scale not previously attempted. Many thousands of sites were looted and their artifacts sold into a world market, major monuments were destroyed, and many millions of dollars flowed into Islamic State coffers. This appalling contemporary evolution of an age-old practice has attracted a good deal of public attention in the United States, Europe, and beyond. The 2001 Taliban destruction of the Bamian Buddhas and the looting of the Baghdad Museum after the 2004 invasion had sensitized Europeans and Americans, but they were still unprepared for the systematic, high-profile destruction that the Islamic State indulges in. The desire to "do something" was immediate and compelling. What to do is far less clear. That was the issue the Antiquities Coalition raised in December 2015 with six master's students at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) enrolled in a practicum on "cultural racketeering and cleansing." Antiquities Coalition wanted to know about best practices for law and law enforcement in the fight against the illicit antiquities trade, including what is done that works for nature conservation and historical preservation. Could easements or buying land be used to protect archaeological sites? How does the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) compare with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property? How can the UNESCO Convention be improved and strengthened? For those of us who live and work in the U.S., American government policy is an area of particular concern. Through the use of bilateral agreements, the U.S. has imposed import restrictions on archaeological material from 16 countries, in an effort to reduce the incentive for pillage by discouraging trade in undocumented cultural objects. What effect have these memoranda of understanding had on the antiquities market? On imports into the U.S.? The U.S. has not designated a lead agency for combatting the illicit antiquities trade. Duties currently fall variously to the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Treasury, and others. How can the government develop an internal reporting structure to better address interagency coordination - especially as antiquities trafficking relates to terrorist financing? International peacekeeping forces, whether through the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations like NATO, could do more to protect cultural resources in times of instability. Have archaeological sites, museums, or other heritage sites ever been included in a peacekeeping mandate? Are there parallels for the protection of natural resources or even similar economic resources? What is the process for inclusion? The SAIS students divvied up these issues and worked through the spring 2016 semester to elucidate them, with guidance from their Antiquities Coalition "client." This small volume contains the results of their work, which was presented both to the Antiquities Coalition and publicly at SAIS in April 2016. We plan some further work in spring 2017 on these and related issues, in a practicum devoted to the broader issue of "Dealing With Extremists." The already ongoing implosion of the Islamic State and its control of territory should not lull us into forgetting the cultural destruction it has wrought. We should do what we can to beef up efforts to counter cultural racketeering and cleansing. The trade will continue with objects already looted and no doubt grow with the next insurgent onslaught. "Never Again" is a motto all too often observed in the breach. There will be a next time. We need to be ready for it. Details: Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University; and The Antiquities Coalition, 2017. 150p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Shelf Number: 146167 Keywords: AntiquitiesArchaeological SitesConflict ZonesCultural PropertyExtremist GroupsIslamic StateLootingPillagingTerrorism |
Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West Summary: "What is coming is tougher and worse for the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers", the so-called Islamic State declared in its statement taking credit for the May 22, 2017 bombing of a crowded Manchester, England arena. Among the victims were scores of children and their parents - callously derided in the IS claim as "polytheists" and "Crusaders" attending "a profligate concert". Seven children perished, including an eight-year-old girl. It is worthwhile to recall that only a few years ago the end of terrorism was being heralded with the killing of bin Laden and advent of the Arab Spring. As one pundit then reassuringly pleaded, "So, can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of an impending caliphate, and put [the] problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective?". Today, there is indeed a very different perspective on this ongoing and, as some analysts believe, worsening threat: shaped not only by this most recent tragedy but by the events of the past two years that have seen a succession of attacks linked to IS convulse the West. Within the span of four weeks last summer, for instance, persons pledging or professing some allegiance to the IS were responsible for four terrorist incidents in three European countries that claimed the lives of more than 120 persons. It is too soon to tell whether the Manchester attack will prove to be a harbinger of another summer of tragedy and terrorism. But we now fortunately have a better understanding of this campaign along with an ability to anticipate the future evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat to the West as a result of the publication of Fear Thy Neighbor. Written by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, this report sheds important light on the historical record and characteristics of jihadist attacks against the West between 2014 and 2017. Among the study's most revealing findings is the United States' own prominence in this pantheon of Islamist terrorist attacks in the West as the country targeted most frequently after France - and with the second highest number of casualties. The report also incisively assesses the role of women and persons with criminal backgrounds in this campaign; the involvement of converts; and, most importantly the exact nature and dimensions of the ties between the attackers and the IS. The emergence of "radicalization hubs" in abetting or facilitating these heinous acts of violence is perhaps this work's single most important conclusion. Fear Thy Neighbor is an invaluable resource that will be of great use to scholars, students, governmental agencies, non-governmental and community organizations, and the media. It presents a sober and compelling depiction of this threat and the measures needed to counter it. Details: Milano, IT, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Shelf Number: 146333 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Warner, Jason Title: Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers Summary: Introduction Since 2009, the Islamist group known as Boko Haram (formally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, or more recently, the Islamic State's West Africa Province [ISWAP]) has ushered in a wave of violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, at the intersection of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Among other tactics that it has employed during its reign of terror, the group has been noted for its use of suicide bombers. While the prevalence of suicide bombings has been duly recognized, little remains known about the broader arc of their existence and efficacy: What strategic and operational trends underlie Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers, and how effective have they been at achieving their objectives? Just who are Boko Haram's suicide bombers? Where are they deployed, what do they target, and how do diferent bomber demographics difer in their actions? More broadly, what does Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers reveal about the past, present, and future of the terrorist group? Methodology Drawing on analysis of an original dataset of all Boko Haram suicide bombings from their first deployment in April 2011 to June 2017, this report presents the fullest picture available to date that tracks and analyzes Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers. To do so, we investigate two main phenomena from our dataset: operational trends of bombers (longitudinal trends, lethality, injuries, geography, and targeting trends) and demographic trends of bombers (gender, age, and recruitment). From these trends, we assert that it is possible to categorize Boko Haram's suicide bombing eforts into four distinct historical phases. In light of our understanding of the group's past and present operational and demographic trends, we conclude by suggesting how the group might act in the future and how counter-terrorism efforts might best address its likely incarnations. Overall Findings In the main, we argue that Boko Haram's operational profile is noteworthy in that, despite the attention the group garners for its deployment of suicide bombers, it shows itself to be less effective than otherwise expected in using them. Concurrently, we argue that Boko Haram's demographic profile is unique in that it created novel uses for women and children in its suicide bombing efforts, rendering it distinctive among extant and historical terrorist groups. Our dataset reveals that from April 11, 2011, to June 30, 2017, Boko Haram deployed 434 bombers to 247 diferent targets during 238 suicide-bombing attacks. At least 56% of these bombers were women, and at least 81 bombers were specifically identified as children or teenagers. A more comprehensive overview follows. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2017. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Shelf Number: 146957 Keywords: Boko HaramIslamic StateSuicide BombersSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Greenberg, Karen J., ed. Title: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States: The ISIS Cases Summary: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States - The ISIS Cases is the third in a series of reports issued by the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School on federal prosecutions of individuals accused of ISIS-related crimes. Notably, this report reveals several new trends since the Center's last report was published. 2016 was a year of growing concern about the threat ISIS posed within the United States. In addition to a record number of terrorism arrests carried out since 9/11, there had been several attacks that resulted in deaths, including the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando - the latter particularly noteworthy because it doubled the casualties resulting from jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks that had occurred cumulatively between 9/11 and 2015. By contrast, 2017 has shown a decline in incidents of ISIS-related terrorist attacks and attempted attacks. At the same time, there has been a significant decrease in the number of federal indictments for ISIS-related crimes. The 2017 edition of Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States examines these and other trends in an effort to glean insight concerning both the individual defendants accused of ISIS-related crimes and the dispositions of the criminal cases against them in federal court. This report has several new features meant to illustrate these developments. First, the charts include illustrations of changes over time. In addition, this edition of our ongoing study on terrorism includes, where possible, comparisons between terrorism prosecutions and U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. The findings contained in this year's report are summarized as follows: Finding No. 1: Although the federal courts have shown a capacity to handle these cases, the dispositions of these cases differ markedly from those of U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. ISIS cases are more likely to go to trial than federal cases generally. Those terrorism prosecutions that have been resolved have proceeded more quickly through the courts than the average case. ISIS defendants are granted pre-trial release with much less frequency than criminal defendants overall. Every case that has been resolved has resulted in conviction, in contrast to the national average conviction rate of 92.5%. Sentences are comparatively higher in these cases, exceeding the national average by 10 years. In fact, the average ISIS sentence of 14.5 years more than triples the average federal sentence of 3.75 years. Finding No. 2: ISIS-related prosecutions rely increasingly on the use of FBI undercover agents or informants. The use of informants, a controversial strategy challenged by civil liberties groups, has continued to rise in ISIS prosecutions. In 2014, 33% of the ISIS-related cases involved government informants or undercover agents. However, the share of ISIS prosecutions involving FBI undercover agents or informants has since increased to 65%. For the new cases in 2017, it is even higher- 83%. Finding No. 3: The personal details of the individual defendants differ from those of non-terrorism defendants generally. Terrorism defendants are significantly younger than typical criminal defendants. They are more frequently American citizens. They are less likely to have spent prior time in prison than their criminal justice counterparts overall. Finding No. 4: ISIS-related defendants are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam than Muslim by birth. This year's findings show Muslim defendants in ISIS-related cases are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam. In addition, there were fewer allegations of interfamilial coconspirators, and fewer incidences of romantic ties among and between co-conspirators. In sum, federal terrorism prosecutions in the 16 years since 9/11 are still not normalized in terms of their disposition. The use of material support statutes that are relied upon in the majority of these cases, as well as the terrorism enhancements available in sentencing guidelines, have provided the legal framework for this trend, while the details of investigation, prosecution, and litigation have, as this report shows, solidified the harsh practices evident for terrorism cases. Nor are terrorism prosecutions trending towards normalization. Instead, it seems, the federal courts have made an exception - one that maximizes the punitive aspect of criminal justice - for these cases, and continue to do so. More than a decade and a half since the Sept. 11 attacks, this report suggests that it's time to acknowledge that terrorism cases have evolved from the prosecutions of complex, sophisticated, trained networks of individuals towards individual actors in search of purpose and attention. As such, normalization of these criminal proceedings might appropriately lie on the horizon. Details: New York: Center on National Security, Fordham University School of Law, 2017. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Shelf Number: 147247 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateProsecutionsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Conway, Maura Title: Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts Summary: This report seeks to contribute to public and policy debates on the value of social media disruption activity with respect to terrorist material. We look in particular at aggressive account and content takedown, with the aim of accurately measuring this activity and its impacts. Our findings challenge the notion that Twitter remains a conducive space for Islamic State (IS) accounts and communities to flourish, although IS continues to distribute propaganda through this channel. However, not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS, and we show that there is differential disruption taking place. IS's and other jihadists' online activity was never solely restricted to Twitter. Twitter is just one node in a wider jihadist social media ecology. We describe and discuss this, and supply some preliminary analysis of disruption trends in this area. Details: Dublin, Ireland: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2017 at: http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf Shelf Number: 148131 Keywords: DaeshInternetIslamic StateJihadistsSocial MediaTerrorism |
Author: Warner, Jason Title: Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of al-Shabaab Summary: Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group that has been plaguing Somalia since 2006, was named the most deadly terror group in Africa in 2017 by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). One tactic that al-Shabaab uses in its reign of terror is suicide bombing. Despite recognition of the seriousness of the threat that al-Shabaab's suicide bombers pose, very little is known about how, when, and why al-Shabaab elects to employ the tactic of suicide bombings. This report answers these questions. By analyzing a unique dataset compiled by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that tracks all instances of al-Shabaab suicide bombings between the group's first suicide attack on September 18, 2006, to the end of our data collection in October 2017, the authors offer the most comprehensive account to date on the emergence, evolution, and efficacy on al-Shabaab's suicide bombers. They find that al-Shabaab has deployed at least 216 suicide attackers who carried out a total of 155 suicide bombing attacks, killing at least 595 and as many as 2,218 people. Their data indicates that al-Shabaab's suicide attacks are highly targeted, aimed at degrading the Somali state and members of the international community (United Nations, African Union, or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) that are combating it. Unlike certain other terrorist groups, al-Shabaab's suicide attacks tend to attempt to avoid targeting non-combatant civilians, and thus do not seem to be undertaken simply to engender shock and awe. Their data also reveals information about just who serves as al-Shabaab's suicide bombers; where they target; al-Shabaab's suicide bombing delivery tendencies; and timing trends along months and days of the week. In conclusion, they offer suggestions about how to combat the group's suicide bombing efforts in the future. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Shelf Number: 149106 Keywords: Boko HaramIslamic StateSuicide BombersSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption Summary: Terrorists and extremists are increasingly moving their activities online - and areas of the web have become a safe haven for Islamic State to plot its next attacks, according to a report published today by the Henry Jackson Society. Terror in The Dark: How Terrorists use Encryption, the Darknet and Cryptocurrencies shows how those planning to commit terrorist atrocities are using extremist networks on the 'Darknet' to indoctrinate sympathisers, create a reservoir of propaganda, evade detection and fundraise. It calls for urgent action by government and the policing and security services to step up intelligence gathering and action to counter online extremist activity. The report shows how terrorists are: Using encrypted apps such as Telegram to hide, communicate and plan attacks. Drawing interested sympathisers from the 'surface' world of the web into the Darknet in order to recruit and indoctrinate new supporters. Building up reservoirs of propaganda - saving it from deletion by the security services or tech companies and removing it as potential evidence for use by law enforcement. Using cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin to fundraise, taking advantage of the anonymity they offer. Following the five terror attacks on British soil in 2017, the Government has dedicated more time and funds to the combating of online extremism. However, the report makes a strong case for more attention to be paid to the Darknet, as terrorists mask their actions and intentions unchallenged on a currently anarchic platform. The report recommends: That tech companies should create a self-regulatory system to remove and audit extremist content - and release public annual reports outlining their efforts, including stats on content flagged by users, the outcome of companies' investigations and areas for improvement. That there should be a new internet regulatory body appointed by government, with the role of scrutinising tech companies' efforts to remove extremist content - with the potential for fines if companies consistently fail to take down offending material. More resources for the Joint Terrorism Action Centre to build up intelligence on the Darknet. Social media companies should work with law enforcement to ensure that extremist material is not lost when it is deleted, but is archived - to ensure that we understand extremists' patterns of behaviour online and retain evidence. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Shelf Number: 149759 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDark NetDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Mahmood, Omar S. Title: Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges. The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism. While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations. Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected. Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern, beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet. Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society. Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history. Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery. The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 151026 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist ViolenceExtremistsIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismVigilantismViolent Extremism |
Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social Media Networks Summary: The Islamic State, also known as ISIS, has distinguished itself as a pioneer in the use of social media for recruitment. But, while ISIS continues to be one of the most influential terrorist groups in the material world, other extremists are closing the gap in the virtual realm. On Twitter, ISIS's preferred social platform, American white nationalist movements have seen their followers grow by more than 600% since 2012. Today, they outperform ISIS in nearly every social metric, from follower counts to tweets per day. This study examines and compares the use of Twitter by white nationalists, Nazi sympathizers, and ISIS supporters respectively, providing some preliminary comparisons of how each movement uses the platform. Major findings include: 1. Major American white nationalist movements on Twitter added about 22,000 followers since 2012, an increase of about 600%. The increase was driven in part by organized social media activism, organic growth in the adoption of social media by people interested in white nationalism, and, to some extent, the rise of organized trolling communities seeking to flood social media platforms with negative content, regardless of participants' actual beliefs. 2. The most popular theme among white nationalists on Twitter was the concept of “white genocide,” the notion that the "white race" is directly endangered by the increasing diversity of society. Social media activists tweeted hundreds of times per day using repetitive hashtags and slogans associated with this trope. 3. Followers of white nationalists on Twitter were heavily invested in Donald Trump's presidential campaign. White nationalist users referenced Trump more than almost any other topic, and Trump-related hashtags outperformed every white nationalist hashtag except for white-genocide within the sets of users examined. 4. White nationalism is highly factionalized, and includes a number of competing movements. On Twitter, accounts focused on Nazi sympathies were more prevalent than any other white nationalist movement, and pro-Nazi propaganda was tweeted more often than any other content. 5. Within the broader community of white nationalists, organized recruitment, proselytization, and social media activism were primarily carried out by a highly interconnected network of users drawing on common themes/ Activity with a Nazi slant was more organic and less organized. Recruitment focused on the theme of white genocide and used terminology drawn from popular entertainment. 6. The white nationalist datasets examined outperformed ISIS in most current metrics and many historical metrics. White nationalists and Nazis had substantially higher follower counts than ISIS supporters, and tweeted more often. ISIS supporters had better discipline regarding consistent use of the movement's hashtags, but trailed in virtually every other respect. The clear advantage enjoyed by white nationalists was attributable in part to the effects of aggressive suspensions of accounts associated with ISIS networks. 7. Small groups of users tweeting in concert at high volumes can amplify their effect, causing hashtags and content to trend in numbers significant enough to prompt mainstream media coverage. White nationalist sympathizers used this strategy in October 2015 with calls to boycott Star Wars: The Force Awakens as "anti-white." Media coverage can lead to increased curiosity about extremist groups, feeding their social media success. 8. In general, these findings suggest that the battle against ISIS on social media is only the first of many challenges to mainstream, normative values, some of which are ongoing, but most of which lie ahead. Details: Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 6, 2018 at: https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS%20Final_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS%20Final_0.pdf Shelf Number: 153332 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Islamic StateRadical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Conway, Maura Title: Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online in 2018: The Year in Review Summary: This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 December 2017 to 30 November 2018.1 It is divided into three parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of violent jihadis, particularly the so-called 'Islamic State' (hereafter IS); Part II supplies information on contemporary extreme right online activity; and Part III identifies issues in the violent extremism and terrorism online realm that bear watching in 2019. In terms of overarching trends, the focus of policymakers, internet companies, media, and thus also publics has, since 2014, been almost exclusively on IS's online activity. A growing concern with extreme right activity, both its online and offline variants, began to be apparent in 2017 however, especially in the wake of events in Charlottesville. This solidified in 2018 due to a number of factors, including a decrease in IS terrorist attacks in the West and an uptick in extreme right and hate attacks and terrorist events, a number of the latter of which appeared to have significant online components. Having said this, IS is still active on the ground in numerous locales globally and continues to produce and widely disseminate online content, as do a large number of other groups that share core tenets of its ideology. IS may be down therefore, but it is certainly not out. Details: Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence (NoE), 2019. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154690 Keywords: Internet CrimesIslamic State Jihadism Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Radicalising Our Children: An Analysis of Family Court Cases of British Children at Risk of Radicalisation, 2013-2018 Summary: At least 156 children have been involved in family court cases in which concerns over extremism or radicalisation have been cited, according to a new study released by the Henry Jackson Society. Of the cases examined, the think tank found that 48% of families had one family member or more who joined IS. Nikita Malik, Director of the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism and the report's author, today warns that the UK's courts are not currently up to the task of handling a wave of women who joined the 'caliphate' returning with their children. The report concludes that the family court is frequently powerless to take steps to protect the welfare of children, even when the counter-terrorism division is aware that parents involved are often terrorists with extremist mindsets. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile, welcomed the report, and stated it is "apparent that the family court is not always able to take the appropriate steps to protect" the children of extremists. Meanwhile, Tim Loughton MP, the former Children's Minister, stressed that the Family Courts require "better protocols, guidance and support" to deal with this "increasingly urgent part of their role". Contrary to claims the girls of Islamic State were vulnerable brides, the report finds that, far more so than boys, girls who travel to the 'caliphate' made their own decisions. The author concludes that boys tended to join Islamic State under the influence of their families, whereas girls were more active and independent in seeking out extremist material - often online. All of the girls in cases analysed by the study who had self-radicalised were motivated in part by the possibility of marriage to a person of their choice. The study, which qualitatively analyses the 20 cases with the most comprehensive court records over recent years, also found that: 55% of cases had links to Al-Muhajiroun, the banned group founded by Anjem Choudary. 67% of families had a history of domestic abuse or a history of wider criminal conduct. Almost 20% of the children involved were home-schooled; while, 38% families contained children absent from school. In cases where gender was known, 64% of children involved in court actions were boys. The report calls for a bespoke set of powers for judges to use in cases of extremism involving children. Citing the high burden of proof required for the more traditional option of care orders, the report argues that the powers imbued with wardship have proved more suitable in many cases, to meet the growing and pertinent challenge of countering radicalisation. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2019. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Shelf Number: 154812 Keywords: At-Risk YouthExtremismIslamic StateRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |