Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 26, 2024 Fri
Time: 3:19 am
Time: 3:19 am
Results for jihadism
10 results foundAuthor: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe Summary: Although it has not suffered a successful attack since the July 7, 2005, bombings in London, Europe perceives itself to be under a constant threat from jihadist-inspired terrorism. Indeed, European authorities arrest some 200 individuals and thwart a handful of plots of jihadist inspiration every year. Based on a survey of legal documents, intelligence reports, academic literature, and media sources, and on conversations with experts and government officials, this paper provides an overview of current trends in jihadism in Europe from an operational perspective. Its main finding is that, although most European plots appear to have been independent, the most serious ones tended to involve extensive operational connections to groups operating outside of Europe. Moreover, contrary to common characterizations, there is little evidence indicating that al Qaeda and affiliated organizations operating outside of Europe conduct direct efforts to recruit European Muslims. Rather, connections between individuals or clusters in Europe on one hand and al Qaeda and affiliated movements on the other are forged through a process of linkage, often facilitated through personal connections and "jihad entrepreneurs," that typically occurs after radicalization and is initiated by European militants. The presence of this linkage characterizes the fourth and current phase of jihadism in Europe Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2011. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP333.html Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP333.html Shelf Number: 122089 Keywords: JihadismTerrorism (Europe)Terrorists |
Author: Erez, Edna Title: Jihad, Crime, and the Internet - Content Analysis of Jihadist Forum Discussions Summary: The study’s findings indicate that most Jihadist on-line forum discussions are brief, involve a small number of participants from among the registered forum members, and include few entries and pages. Forum participants often refer viewers to approved web site and share authentic Jihadist multimedia. References and quotes from religious sources are common. Just over one-third of the discussions include calls for Jihad, and 3 percent of the communications discussed non-terrorist illegal activities, particularly computer-related and software-related offenses. Content analysis of the forum discussions identified four categories of content: information dissemination, religious preaching, instruction or training, and social interactions. These content categories support three core activities of the terrorist organization: ideological foundation, organizational structure, and operational means. Based on these findings the study offers a number of policy recommendations. First, analyze the forum discussions to determine the current status of Jihadist attention and interest. Second, respond to threats by adding interference at any touch point along the communication process. Third, mitigate the harm posed by exposure of Web site viewers to violent imagery. Fourth, the content of forum discussions could increase understanding of the context of the Arab, Muslim, and Jihadist milieu in which the forum social interactions occur. Recommendations for further research are offered. The peer reviews seriously challenge the study’s methodology and conclusions. One of the core criticisms among peer reviewers is that sweeping generalizations are frequently made with little, if any, documented evidence to validate them. Extensive references from a literature review. Details: Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2011. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236867.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236867.pdf Shelf Number: 123756 Keywords: ComputersInformation TechnologyInternetJihadismTerrorism |
Author: Title: Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon Summary: Involvement in violent campaigns against vice and religious deviance has become one pathway to terrorism in Indonesia. "Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon," the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the radicalisation of a group from Cirebon, West Java that was behind the 2011 suicide bombings of a mosque and a church. It argues that ideological and tactical lines within the radical community are blurring, making it harder to distinguish “terrorists” from hardline activists and religious vigilantes. “The Cirebon men moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing ‘deviance’ to using bombs and guns, and this may become the common pattern”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Senior Adviser. Poorly educated and underemployed, the Cirebon men represent a generational shift from the jihadists trained abroad or those who fought a decade ago in two major communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso. They were radicalised through attending public lectures by radical clerics; most had taken part as well in attacks on stores selling liquor and anti-Ahmadiyah activities. They had been members of Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), an extremist organisation founded by well-known cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008, but then left to form their even more militant group. The two suicide bombers, Mohamed Syarif, who blew himself up at a Cirebon mosque on 15 April 2011, and Ahmed Yosefa Hayat, who died in an attack on a church in Solo, Central Java on 25 September, taught themselves bomb-making from the Internet and worked on their own. The others preferred targeted assassinations to suicide attacks and learned bomb-making from friends in a Solo-based group of vigilantes-turned-bombers. The briefing notes that the merging of vigilantes and jihadists has been facilitated by the proliferation of Islamist civil society organisations and the popularity of public taklim (religious lectures), as forums for spreading radical views. The government needs a strategy, consistent with democratic values, to counter clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or tyrants (thaghut), frequently meaning Indonesian officials and, especially, the police. The problem is that there is no agreement within the country’s political elite on the nature of the threat. If the radicalisation of groups like the Cirebon men is to be halted, the government needs to build a national consensus on what constitutes extremism; directly confront hate speech; and promote zero tolerance of religiously-inspired crimes, however minor, including in the course of anti-vice campaigns. “Expressions of shock and horror every time there is an incident of religiously-motivated violence as in Cirebon or Solo are not a substitute for prevention”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2012. 16p. Source: Update Briefing, Asia Briefing No. 132: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 28, 2012 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Shelf Number: 123846 Keywords: Extremist GroupsJihadismMale OffendersSuicide BombingsTerrorism (Indonesia)Vigilantism |
Author: Ungerer, Carl Title: Beyond bin Laden: Future trends in terrorism Summary: This Strategy report examines the shifting patterns of global terrorism. It provides a comprehensive assessment of the geographic, operational and ideological trends that are driving the current wave of jihadist terrorism around the world. In the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death, those trends point to the increasing diversification of the threat, as a new generation of terrorist leaders in South Asia, North Africa and the Arabian peninsula adapt and reinterpret al-Qaeda’s ideology. The report argues that with or without al-Qaeda as a coherent organisation at the forefront of the global Islamist movement, religiously-motivated terrorism is set to continue for many decades to come. Despite the obvious splintering and factionalisation within al-Qaeda and between al-Qaeda and its various franchises and affiliates around the world, there is little evidence that ‘al-Qaedaism’ as a motivating ideology is going to dissolve any time soon. Although many contemporary jihadist groups, especially in Southeast Asia, reject al-Qaeda’s methods, and most appear disconnected from the current Egyptian- and Saudi-dominated al-Qaeda leadership, the local and global manifestations of Islamist terrorism are in fact converging. For Australia, these trends will require a more agile and effective counter-terrorism response. In particular, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation strategies will need to focus more closely on those areas at home that are most at risk from the spread of ‘al-Qaedaism’—individuals, institutions and the internet. Details: Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2011. 52p. Source: ASPI Strategy: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2012 at Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 124424 Keywords: al QaedaCounterterrorism (Australia)Crime TrendsJihadismTerrorismTransnational Crime |
Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Summary: Even though over the last twenty years some of its citizens have been killed or kidnapped by various jihadist groups abroad, internally Switzerland has not witnessed jihadist activities on a significant scale. Unlike most Western European countries, in fact, no successful terrorist attack of jihadist inspiration has ever been perpetrated on its territory and there is no publicly available information indicating that concrete plans for an attack in Switzerland were ever made. Less than a dozen individuals have been tried for terrorism-related crimes, all of them involving non-violent activities of material support and propaganda. The number of Swiss residents who have traveled abroad to join jihadist groups is also estimated to be lower than in most other European countries. Yet Swiss authorities are not complacent and argue that "Switzerland is not an island." Counterterrorism officials have consistently claimed that there is ample evidence suggesting that some of the same radicalization trends that have long characterized other Western European countries also exist in Switzerland, albeit on a smaller scale. This report seeks to assess the size and dynamics of jihadist radicalization in the country. Its main findings are as follows: - While it is impossible to provide anything even close to an exact number, it can be argued that radicalization of jihadist inspiration involves a negligible cross-section of the Swiss Muslim community. There are probably only a couple of dozens of individuals in Switzerland who are actively involved in jihadist activities. Similarly, it can be argued that the number of those fully embracing jihadist ideology is somewhere in the hundreds, and of those with varying degrees sympathizing with it is somewhere in the lower thousands. - Basing the analysis on the admittedly limited number of Swiss-based individuals who are known to have embraced jihadist ideology, it is evident that jihadist enthusiasts, as elsewhere in Europe, do not have a common profile. In the 1990s and early 2000s most of them were first generation immigrants who had arrived in Switzerland already radicalized. An example is the case of Moez Garsallaoui and Malika el Aroud, the Fribourg-based administrators of prominent jihadist forums who had contacts with the upper echelons of al Qaeda, or members of various cells providing support to North African-based al Qaeda affiliates. Following a pattern common throughout Europe, over the last few years an increasing number of jihadist sympathizers have had homegrown characteristics: born (or at least raised) in Switzerland, they radicalized independently in the country and operated largely outside of the framework of established groups. Occasionally some Swiss-based radicalized individuals manage to link up with al Qaeda-affiliated groups outside of Europe and train or fight with them. - Militants are not born in a vacuum. Rather, radicalization takes place "at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory." This report identifies militant Salafism as the ideological milieu from which jihadists, in Switzerland as elsewhere, can come from. An automatic identification of Salafism with terrorism is a gross analytical mistake. Moreover, even among those who interact with the most radical fringes of the Salafist movement, only a marginal fraction will make the leap into violent radicalism. But militant Salafism is the larger sea in which the fish swim. - The report analyzes various factors that, often operating concurrently, contribute to radicalization: 1. The internet: the report finds evidence of a small, loose-knit community of Swiss-based jihad enthusiasts who interact among themselves and with likeminded individuals abroad on jihadist forums and online social networks. 2. Mosques: the overwhelming majority of Swiss mosques reject extremism, but small groups of jihad enthusiasts congregate at the margins of some of Switzerland's most conservative mosques or in private prayer rooms. 3. Gateway organizations: there are a handful of organizations in Switzerland which do not advocate violence themselves, but spread ideas that may lead others to do so. 4. Links abroad: Swiss militants regularly interact with like-minded individuals from countries where the Salafist scene is more developed. It is common for Swiss residents to travel abroad to participate in seminars and for foreign speakers to come to Switzerland. This interaction is particularly strong with the Salafist scenes in Germany and in the Balkans. - Patterns of linkage are very difficult to assess, but there are indications pointing to the presence of "gatekeepers" operating on Swiss territory that channel aspiring jihadists in the direction of established groups operating in Africa, the Middle East or South Asia. - As in any other European country, radicalization of jihadist inspiration seems to affect only a statistically marginal segment of the Swiss Muslim population. But radicalization in Switzerland appears to be a limited phenomenon also when compared to other European countries. Four factors can explain this difference: 1. Lack of an "infecting cluster": Switzerland never hosted an openly jihadist mosque or high profile jihadists, elements that in other countries have been crucial in spreading jihadist ideology. 2. Good degree of social, economic and cultural integration of most Muslims living in Switzerland, rendering them more resilient to extremist narratives. 3. Demographic characteristics of the Swiss Muslim population: some 80% to 90% of Swiss Muslims trace their origins to the Balkans or Turkey, where the vast majority of Muslims traditionally espouses forms of Islam that are tolerant and apolitical. 4. Switzerland's foreign policy, whose largely neutral stance does not provide a source of grievances. - While these concurrently operating factors can potentially explain the low levels of jihadist radicalization in Switzerland, none of them is a guarantee. Each, in fact, presents weaknesses and exceptions. Many of the dynamics present throughout Europe are visible also in Switzerland, albeit on a much smaller scale. There are loosely knit milieus in Switzerland, both in the virtual and physical world, that sympathize with jihadist ideology. And occasionally individuals who belong to these milieus do make the leap from words to action. Details: Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Switzerland URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Shelf Number: 132180 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization ProgramsExtremist GroupsJihadismMuslimsRadical GroupsTerrorists |
Author: Title: Tunisia's Borders: Jihadism and Contraband Summary: Tunisia is embroiled in recurrent political crises whose origins in security concerns are ever more evident. While still of low-intensity, jihadi attacks are increasing at an alarming rate, fuelling the rumour mill, weakening the state and further polarising the political scene. The government coalition, dominated by the Islamist An-Nahda, and the secular opposition trade accusations, politicising questions of national security rather than addressing them. Meanwhile, the gap widens between a Tunisia of the borders - porous, rebellious, a focal point of jihadism and contraband and a Tunisia of the capital and coast that is concerned with the vulnerability of a hinterland it fears more than it understands. Beyond engaging in necessary efforts to resolve the immediate political crisis, actors from across the national spectrum should implement security but also socio-economic measures to reduce the permeability of the country's borders. The security vacuum that followed the 2010-2011 uprising against Ben Ali's regime - as well as the chaos generated by the war in Libya - largely explains the worrying increase in cross-border trafficking. Although contraband long has been the sole source of income for numerous residents of border provinces, the introduction of dangerous and lucrative goods is a source of heightened concern. Hard drugs as well as (for now) relatively small quantities of firearms and explosives regularly enter the country from Libya. Likewise, the northern half of the Tunisian-Algerian border is becoming an area of growing trafficking of cannabis and small arms. These trends are both increasing the jihadis' disruptive potential and intensifying corruption of border authorities. One ought neither exaggerate nor politicise these developments. Notably, and against conventional wisdom, military equipment from Libya has not overwhelmed the country. But nor should the threat be underestimated. The war in Libya undoubtedly has had security repercussions and armed groups in border areas have conducted attacks against members of the National Guard, army and police, posing a significant security challenge that the return of Tunisian fighters from Syria has amplified. By the same token, the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and of the Libyan war has provoked a reorganisation of contraband cartels (commercial at the Algerian border, tribal at the Libyan border), thereby weakening state control and paving the way for far more dangerous types of trafficking. Added to the mix is the fact that criminality and radical Islamism gradually are intermingling in the suburbs of major cities and in poor peripheral villages. Over time, the emergence of a so-called islamo-gangsterism could contribute to the rise of groups blending jihadism and organised crime within contraband networks operating at the borders - or, worse, to active cooperation between cartels and jihadis. Addressing border problems clearly requires beefing up security measures but these will not suffice on their own. Even with the most technically sophisticated border control mechanisms, residents of these areas - often organised in networks and counting among the country's poorest - will remain capable of enabling or preventing the transfer of goods and people. The more they feel economically and socially frustrated, the less they will be inclined to protect the country's territorial integrity in exchange for relative tolerance toward their own contraband activities. Weapons and drug trafficking as well as the movement of jihadi militants are thus hostage to informal negotiations between the informal economy's barons and state representatives. Since the fall of Ben Ali's regime, such understandings have been harder to reach. The result has been to dilute the effectiveness of security measures and diminish the availability of human intelligence that is critical to counter terrorist or jihadi threats. In an uncertain domestic and regional context, restoring trust among political parties, the state and residents of border areas is thus as crucial as intensifying military control in the most porous areas. In the long term, only minimal consensus among political forces on the country's future can enable a truly effective approach to the border question. On this front, at the time of writing, an end to the political crisis seems distant: discussions regarding formation of a new government; finalising a new constitution and new electoral law; and appointing a new electoral commission are faltering. Without a resolution of these issues, polarisation is likely to increase and the security situation to worsen, each camp accusing the other of exploiting terrorism for political ends. Overcoming the crisis of trust between the governing coalition and the opposition is thus essential to breaking this vicious cycle. Yet the current political impasse should not rule out some immediate progress on the security front. Working together to reinforce border controls, improving relations between the central authorities and residents of border areas as well as improving relations among Maghreb states: these are all tasks that only can be fully carried out once underlying political conflicts have been resolved but that, in the meantime, Tunisian actors can ill-afford to ignore or neglect. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Middle East and North Africa Report N148: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Tunisia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tunisia/148-tunisias-borders-jihadism-and-contraband-english.pdf Shelf Number: 132473 Keywords: Border SecurityContrabandDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingJihadismOrganized Crime |
Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Terrorist Chatter: Understanding what terrorists talk about Summary: Since the early 2000s the Internet has become particularly crucial for the global jihadist movement. Nowhere has the Internet been more important in the movement's development than in the West. While dynamics differ from case to case, it is fair to state that almost all recent cases of radicalization in the West involve at least some digital footprint. Jihadists, whether structured groups or unaffiliated sympathizers, have long understood the importance of the Internet in general and social media, in particular. Zachary Chesser, one of the individuals studied in this report, fittingly describes social media as "simply the most dynamic and convenient form of media there is." As the trend is likely to increase, understanding how individuals make the leap to actual militancy is critically important. This study is based on the analysis of the online activities of seven individuals. They share several key traits. All seven were born or raised in the United States. All seven were active in online and offline jihadist scene around the same time (mid- to late 2000s and early 2010s). All seven were either convicted for terrorism- related offenses (or, in the case of two of the seven, were killed in terrorism- related incidents.) The intended usefulness of this study is not in making the case for monitoring online social media for intelligence purpose - an effort for which authorities throughout the West need little encouragement. Rather, the report is meant to provide potentially useful pointers in the field of counter- radicalization. Over the past ten years many Western countries have devised more or less extensive strategies aimed at preventing individuals from embracing radical ideas or de- radicalizing (or favoring the disengagement) of committed militants. (Canada is also in the process of establishing its own counter- radicalization strategy.) Radicalization is a highly complex and individualized process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors. It is no surprise then that counter-radicalization initiatives are equally complex. Even among the seven subjects in this project there are only limited commonalities in terms of interests and views. While all seven subjects share a common background, based on the evidence of their online activities, their interests, views and approaches remain highly diverse. Some are focused mostly on religion; others are more interested in political issues. Some immediately adopt a jihadist mindset; others seem to undergo a long radicalizing trajectory. Given this diversity, it becomes obvious that any counter- radicalization needs to be tailored to the specifics of the case. Flexibility is the name of the game. Another key finding is that, at least in the beginning of their trajectories, the individuals studied here are all avid seekers of knowledge and information on religion. All refer to religious concepts and frames throughout their posts. Jihadism is a complex ideology that mixes religion and politics. But this study confirms the importance of its religious aspect for many of those who embrace violence - a fact some studies have dismissed. Any counter-radicalization effort, while not ignoring other aspects, should take into consideration the centrality of religious issues for those embracing jihadism. While for legal, political and cultural reasons it might be difficult to replicate in the West some of the religion-based counter- radicalization efforts adopted in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Singapore, the religious aspect should take a central role. The study also shows that those interested in religion are extremely inquisitive during the first stages of their radicalization trajectories. In the first months or even years of their posting life, in fact, these individuals constantly engage with fellow posters for sources and opinions on religious matters. They seem to be constantly searching for validation of their opinions. Over time, this openness seemed to slowly decrease, and by the end of the posting trajectory, there are only limited traces of questions. In the late stages, instead of questions, statements appear, often filled with confident pronouncements of their own knowledge. This attitude provides an enormous opportunity for counter- radicalization. It is arguable that it is in this phase that any kind of intervention might be more likely to succeed. Details: Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: NPSIA Working Paper Series: Working Paper No. 03, 2015: Accessed February 26, 2016 at: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Shelf Number: 137979 Keywords: InternetJihadismOnline CommunicationsRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid Summary: In pledging to destroy the Islamic State (ISIS), U.S. President Donald J. Trump looks set to make counter-terrorism a centrepiece of his foreign policy. His administration's determination against groups that plot to kill Americans is understandable, but it should be careful when fighting jihadists not to play into their hands. The risks include angering local populations whose support is critical, picking untimely or counterproductive fights and neglecting the vital role diplomacy and foreign aid must play in national security policy. Most importantly, aggressive counter-terrorism operations should not inadvertently fuel other conflicts and deepen the disorder that both ISIS and al-Qaeda exploit. The new U.S. administration has inherited military campaigns that are eating deep into ISIS's self-proclaimed caliphate. Much of Mosul, its last urban stronghold in Iraq, has been recaptured; Raqqa, its capital in Syria, is encircled. Its decisive defeat is still a remote prospect while the Syrian war rages and Sunnis' place in Iraqi politics is uncertain. The threat it poses will evolve in its heartlands and elsewhere, as fighters disperse. But ISIS is in retreat, its brand diminished. For many adherents, its allure was its territorial expansion; with that gone, its leaders are struggling to redefine success. Al-Qaeda could prove harder to suppress. Its affiliates fight across numerous war zones in coalitions with other armed groups, its operatives are embedded in local militias, and it shows more pragmatic adaptability to local conditions. Though the roots of ISIS's rise and al-Qaeda's resurgence are complex and varied, the primary catalyst has been the turmoil across parts of the Muslim world. Both movements grow when things fall apart, less because their ideology inspires wide appeal than by offering protection or firepower against enemies, rough law and order where no one else can or by occupying a vacuum and forcing communities to acquiesce. The U.S. can do only so much to reboot Arab politics, remake regional orders or repair cracked fault lines, but its counter-terrorism strategy cannot ignore the upheaval. So long as wars continue and chaos persists, jihadism will thrive, whatever ISIS's immediate fate. In particular, the new administration should avoid: 1. Angering communities. Campaigns against jihadists hinge on winning over the population in which they operate. Offensives against Mosul, Raqqa or elsewhere need to avoid destruction but also need plans to preserve gains, prevent reprisals, stabilise liberated cities and rebuild them; as yet, no such plan for Raqqa seems to exist. "Targeted" strikes that kill civilians and alienate communities, as appears to have been the case in the January Yemen raid and the 16 March strike in Syria's Aleppo province, are counterproductive, regardless of immediate yield. Loosening rules and oversight designed to protect civilians, as has been suggested, would be a mistake. 2. Aggravating other fronts. The new administration’s fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda intersects a tinderbox of wars and regional rivalries. No regional state's interests dovetail precisely with those of the U.S.; few consider jihadists their top priority; most are more intent on strengthening their hand against traditional rivals. The U.S. should be careful that the Raqqa campaign does not stimulate fighting elsewhere, particularly among Turkish and Kurdish forces and their respective allies. Success in Mosul hinges on preventing the forces involved (the Iraqi army, Kurdish peshmerga units, Shiite militias and Sunni tribes; Turkey and Iran) battling for turf after ousting ISIS. Likewise, support for Gulf allies should not mean a blank check for the Saudi-led Yemen campaign, which – if wrongly prosecuted – would play further into al-Qaeda’s hands. 3. Picking other fights. Confronting Iran, which the administration identifies as a priority alongside the fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda, requires careful consideration. Militarily battling Tehran in Iraq, Yemen or Syria, questioning the nuclear deal’s validity or imposing sanctions that flout its spirit could provoke asymmetric responses via non-state allies and put Iraq's government in an untenable position. Iran's behaviour across the region is often destabilising and, by aggravating sectarian tensions, provides fodder to jihadist groups; as with similar conduct by others, it calls for a calibrated U.S. response. But the answer ultimately lies in dampening the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, not stimulating it with the attendant risk of escalating proxy wars across the region and reinforcing sectarian currents that buoy jihadists. Similarly, sabre-rattling with China hinders diplomacy with Pakistan and thus efforts to stabilise Afghanistan; effective counter-terrorism in South Asia requires cooperation with Beijing. 4. Defining the enemy too broadly. ISIS and al-Qaeda thrive on confusion generated by how the U.S. defines its foe: violent jihadists, political Islam or Muslims as a whole. Designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group would be a self-inflicted wound, alienating an ideological and political counterweight to jihadism. Similarly, many armed groups fight beside al-Qaeda in alliances that are tactical and do not signal support for jihadists’ goals of attacking the West or establishing a caliphate. Prising them away from al-Qaeda would be wiser than fighting them all. 5. Neglecting peace processes. From Libya to Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, no country where ISIS or al-Qaeda branches hold territory has a single force strong enough to secure the whole country. Without accommodation, factions will either ally with jihadists against rivals or use the fight against them for other ends. Backing forces for counter-terrorism while neglecting efforts to promote compromise will deepen instability. 6. Fighting terrorism without diplomacy. Navigating allies’ rivalries, preventing a free-for-all in Mosul, managing the fallout from Raqqa, mediating between Afghan, Iraqi or Libyan factions – all are diplomats’ work. Multilateral engagement matters too, whether to back UN mediation, enlist its help for reconstruction and stabilisation or use UN and other multilateral frameworks for counter-terrorism cooperation. Staffing the State Department's top levels and sustaining its expertise are priorities. The cuts proposed to U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance, including to the UN’s budget, would damage U.S. security. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report No. 3: Accessed April 3, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/003-counter-terrorism-pitfalls.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/003-counter-terrorism-pitfalls.pdf Shelf Number: 144702 Keywords: al-Qaeda Counter-Terrorism ISIS JihadismTerrorism Violent Extremists |
Author: Fahmi, Georges Title: Market for Jihad: Radicalization in Tunisia Summary: While Tunisia is the only Arab country undergoing a successful democratic transition as of 2015, it has also been home to a growing Salafi-jihadi movement since the fall of former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. Ben Ali's monopolization of the religious sphere and neglect of socioeconomic issues opened the door to radicalization, and these factors, combined with the disillusionment of the youth and the mishandling of Salafists after the revolution, have resulted in escalating violence in Tunisia and the export of jihadists to Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The Roots of Salafi Jihadism - Ben Ali's tight control of the religious sphere meant that there were few religious actors to step in after the revolution. The fall of the regime created a vacuum that allowed radical groups to preach their ideas and recruit new members among the disenfranchised youth. - Ennahdha, a major Islamist religious movement as well as a political party, has focused on constitution building and political struggles and has not struck a healthy balance between politics and religion. - Ennahdha has acted pragmatically to consolidate its political standing. But its failure to break with the former political system has further opened up space for social and political contestation. - The socioeconomic situation in Tunisia has worsened since the revolution, which has led to the disenchantment of the lower and middle classes and the youth in particular. Recommendations for the State and Ennahdha Address socioeconomic grievances. Tunisian youth are drawn to Salafi jihadism because of feelings of disillusionment and stagnation, so improving social mobility and stemming frustration among the younger generation should be high priorities. Strengthen political inclusion of the Salafi movement. Those who would like to work within formal politics and civil society should be allowed to operate freely as long as they respect laws. Balance state control over the religious sphere. The state should allow all nonviolent religious actors a voice, while also encouraging official imams to compete with Salafi preachers to create a diverse marketplace of religious ideas. Separate religious and political activities. Two distinct organizational structures within Ennahdha will allow the political party to operate without any interference from the religious movement and the religious movement to operate without being manipulated by the party for political gains. Form de-radicalization coalitions. Religious and secular actors should coordinate to formulate and implement policies aimed at de-radicalizing, disengaging, and reintegrating members of radical groups into society Details: Beirut, Lebanon: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2017 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_55_FahmiMeddeb_Tunisia_final_oct.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Tunisia URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_55_FahmiMeddeb_Tunisia_final_oct.pdf Shelf Number: 145057 Keywords: Extremist Groups JihadismRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Conway, Maura Title: Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online in 2018: The Year in Review Summary: This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 December 2017 to 30 November 2018.1 It is divided into three parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of violent jihadis, particularly the so-called 'Islamic State' (hereafter IS); Part II supplies information on contemporary extreme right online activity; and Part III identifies issues in the violent extremism and terrorism online realm that bear watching in 2019. In terms of overarching trends, the focus of policymakers, internet companies, media, and thus also publics has, since 2014, been almost exclusively on IS's online activity. A growing concern with extreme right activity, both its online and offline variants, began to be apparent in 2017 however, especially in the wake of events in Charlottesville. This solidified in 2018 due to a number of factors, including a decrease in IS terrorist attacks in the West and an uptick in extreme right and hate attacks and terrorist events, a number of the latter of which appeared to have significant online components. Having said this, IS is still active on the ground in numerous locales globally and continues to produce and widely disseminate online content, as do a large number of other groups that share core tenets of its ideology. IS may be down therefore, but it is certainly not out. Details: Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence (NoE), 2019. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154690 Keywords: Internet CrimesIslamic State Jihadism Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists |