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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:53 pm
Time: 9:53 pm
Results for judicial systems
4 results foundAuthor: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role Summary: Fostering security, stability, and democracy in neighboring Mexico is seen by analysts to be in the U.S. national security and economic interest. Reforming Mexico’s often corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and better protecting citizen security and human rights in the country. Congress has provided significant support to help Mexico reform its justice system in order to make current anticrime efforts more effective and to strengthen the system over the long term. U.S. and Mexican officials assert that fully implementing judicial reforms enacted through constitutional changes in June 2008 is a key goal. Under the reforms, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a judge to an adversarial public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. These changes are expected to help make the system less prone to corruption and more transparent and impartial. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are expected to adopt means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help them be more flexible and efficient, thereby ensuring that cases that go to trial involve serious crimes. More than halfway into the reform process, judicial reform efforts in Mexico are at a critical juncture. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico’s 32 states had enacted new criminal procedure codes (67%), but only 12 states (36%) had begun operating at least partially under the new system. Reform states have seen positive initial results as compared to non-reform states: faster case resolution times, less pre-trial detention, and tougher sentences for cases that go to trial. Daunting challenges remain, however, including counter-reform efforts and opposition from some key justice sector operators (including judges). Although reform efforts have lagged at the federal level, President Enrique Peña Nieto, inaugurated in December 2012 to a six-year term, has said that advancing judicial reform will be a top priority. U.S. policymakers are likely to follow how the Peña Nieto government moves to enact a unified penal code and code of criminal procedure to hasten reform at the federal level and to increase support to states transitioning to the new system. The United States has been supporting judicial reform efforts in Mexico since the late 1990s, with assistance accelerating since the implementation of the Mérida Initiative in FY2008, an anticrime assistance program for which Congress has provided $1.9 billion. While the Mérida Initiative initially focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces, it now emphasizes providing training and technical assistance to help reform Mexico’s justice sector institutions. Funding for “Institutionalizing the Rule of Law” now dwarfs other types of U.S. assistance to Mexico. This report provides an overview of Mexico’s historic 2008 judicial reforms and an assessment of how those reforms have been implemented thus far. It then analyzes U.S. support for judicial reform efforts in Mexico and raises issues for Congress to consider as it oversees current U.S. justice sector programs and considers future support to Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: R43001: Accessed March 21, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43001.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43001.pdf Shelf Number: 128064 Keywords: Criminal Justice ReformCriminal Justice Systems (Mexico)Judicial Systems |
Author: Carrera, Sergio Title: Europe’s Most Wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System Summary: This paper assesses the uses and misuses in the application of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system in the European Union. It examines the main quantitative results of this extradition system achieved between 2005 and 2011 on the basis of the existing statistical knowledge on its implementation at EU official levels. The EAW has been anchored in a high level of ‘mutual trust’ between the participating states’ criminal justice regimes and authorities. This reciprocal confidence, however, has been subject to an increasing number of challenges resulting from its practical application, presenting a dual conundrum: 1. Principle of proportionality: Who are the competent judicial authorities cooperating with each other and ensuring that there are sufficient impartial controls over the necessity and proportionality of the decisions on the issuing and execution of EAWs? 2. Principle of division of powers: How can criminal justice authorities be expected to handle different criminal judicial traditions in what is supposed to constitute a ‘serious’ or ‘minor’ crime in their respective legal settings and ‘who’ is ultimately to determine (divorced from political considerations) when is it duly justified to make the EAW system operational? It is argued that the next generation of the EU’s criminal justice cooperation and the EAW need to recognise and acknowledge that the mutual trust premise upon which the European system has been built so far is no longer viable without devising new EU policy stakeholders’ structures and evaluation mechanisms. These should allow for the recalibration of mutual trust and mistrust in EU justice systems in light of the experiences of the criminal justice actors and practitioners having a stake in putting the EAW into daily effect. Such a ‘bottom-up approach’ should be backed up with the best impartial and objective evaluation, an improved system of statistical collection and an independent qualitative assessment of its implementation. This should be placed as the central axis of a renewed EAW framework which should seek to better ensure the accountability, impartial (EU-led) scrutiny and transparency of member states’ application of the EAW in light of the general principles and fundamental rights constituting the foundations of the European system of criminal justice cooperation. Details: Brussels, Belgium: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe no. 55: Accessed March 26, 2013 at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/europe%E2%80%99s-most-wanted-recalibrating-trust-european-arrest-warrant-system Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.ceps.eu/book/europe%E2%80%99s-most-wanted-recalibrating-trust-european-arrest-warrant-system Shelf Number: 128131 Keywords: Arrest and ApprehensionArrest Warrants (Europe)Criminal ProcedureJudicial Systems |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Trial by Error: Justice in Post- Qadhafi Libya Summary: There are many necessary cures to Libya’s pervasive insecurity, but few more urgent than repairing its judicial system. Qadhafi-era victims, distrusting an apparatus they view as a relic, take matters in their hands; some armed groups, sceptical of the state’s ability to carry out justice, arbitrarily detain, torture or assassinate presumed Qadhafi loyalists; others, taking advantage of disorder, do violence for political or criminal aims. All this triggers more grievances, further undermining confidence in the state. Breaking this cycle requires multi-pronged action: delivering justice to former regime victims by reforming the judiciary and kick-starting transitional justice; screening out ex-regime loyalists guilty of crimes while avoiding witch-hunts; and reining in armed groups, including those operating under a state umbrella. Unless there is a clear message – the justice system is being reformed; no violence or abuse, done in the past by Qadhafi-era officials or in the present by armed groups will be tolerated – there is a real risk of escalating targeted assassinations, urban violence and communal conflicts. It has been well over a year since Qadhafi’s regime was ousted and still there is no functioning court system in many parts of the country, while armed groups continue to run prisons and enforce their own forms of justice. The severe deficiencies of the current judicial system are rooted, first and foremost, in the failings of the one that, in principle, it has replaced. Under Qadhafi, the judiciary suffered from politicisation of appointments, rampant corruption and the use of extrajudicial means to target political opponents. Four decades of such arbitrary justice served as a burdensome backdrop to the new government’s efforts; faced with a choice between summarily dismissing judicial officers who served under Qadhafi or gradually screening them one-by-one, the new authorities so far have opted for the latter. While this was the right decision, it has contributed to public scepticism regarding the scope of change. The situation has been complicated by the proliferation of armed groups. Distrustful of the Qadhafi-era judiciary and police, frustrated by the slow pace of trials against former officials, facing state security forces in disarray and emboldened by their new power, so-called revolutionary brigades – and, at times, criminal gangs posing as such – have been operating above the law, hindering the work of investigators and judges. They all at once assume the roles of police, prosecutors, judges and jailers. Armed brigades create investigation and arrest units; draft lists of wanted individuals; set up checkpoints or force their way into people’s homes to capture presumed outlaws or people suspected of aiding the former regime; and, in some cases, run their own detention facilities in their own headquarters, isolated farms or commandeered former state buildings. Thousands of individuals are in their hands, outside the official legal framework and without benefit of judicial review or basic due process. Assassinations and growing attacks against government security forces have further darkened the picture. This has all the hallmarks of a vicious cycle: impatience with the pace of justice and overall mistrust embolden armed groups; their increased activism undermines the state’s ability to function, including on matters of law and order; and this in turn vindicates the armed groups’ claim that it is their duty to fill the vacuum. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Middle East/North Africa Report N°140: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/libya/140-trial-by-error-justice-in-post-qadhafi-libya.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Libya URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/libya/140-trial-by-error-justice-in-post-qadhafi-libya.pdf Shelf Number: 128416 Keywords: CourtsCriminal Justice ReformCriminal Justice Systems (Libya)Judicial Systems |
Author: Tribal Law and Policy Institute Title: Promising Strategies: Tribal-State Court Relations Summary: Tribal courts and state courts interact across an array of issues, including child welfare, cross-jurisdictional enforcement of domestic violence orders of protection, and civil commitments. In Public Law 2801 (PL 280) jurisdictions, the concurrent jurisdiction of state and tribal courts over criminal prosecutions and civil actions arising in Indian Country creates even more interactions and complications. Tensions and misunderstandings have been common features of tribal and state court relations in the past, sometimes erupting in jurisdictional conflicts. The different cultures, legal traditions, political systems, histories, and economic positions of state and tribal courts have contributed to these challenges. Since the early 1990s, however, initiatives by judges' organizations within both judicial systems have focused on an agenda of greater mutual understanding and cooperative action. Individual judges and court systems have also taken up the challenge, devising innovative programs that sidestep conflict in the interests of common goals such as greater community safety and child protection. State court leadership and court improvement organizations, such as the Conference of Chief Justices and the National Center for State Courts, and funding agencies, such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) in the U.S. Department of Justice, have supported their undertakings. This publication spotlights some of the most successful strategies within these initiatives. The authors hope is that other tribes and states seeking to negotiate complicated relationships will discover new options for solutions and find inspiring stories of collaboration within this publication. Details: West Hollywood, CA: Trial Law and Policy Institute, 2013. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.walkingoncommonground.org/files/Promising%20Strategies%20Tribal-State%20Court%20Final%203-13.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.walkingoncommonground.org/files/Promising%20Strategies%20Tribal-State%20Court%20Final%203-13.pdf Shelf Number: 134175 Keywords: American Indians Child WelfareCourt SystemsDomestic ViolenceIndians of North AmericaJudicial SystemsTribal Courts |