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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
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Results for lone wolf terrorism
16 results foundAuthor: Teich, Sarah Title: Trends and Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World: An Analysis of Terrorist Attacks and Attempted Attacks by Islamic Extremists Summary: This paper reviews current literature on the recent and growing phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism. It aims to add data to this subject by analyzing trends and developments using a dataset created using RAND, START, and LexisNexis Academic databases. Analysis of the dataset clarifies five (5) finding trends: 1. increased number of countries targeted by lone wolf terrorists, 2. increased number of fatalities and injuries caused by lone wolves, 3. increased success rate of United States law enforcement to apprehend lone wolves before they can carry out their attacks, 4. high prevalence and success rate of loners over Pantucci's other three types of lone wolf terrorists, and 5. increased targeting of military personnel. To complement these findings, five case studies from the dataset are examined in-depth. These were chosen for their significance in terms of high rates of fatality or injury. The case studies are shown to be consistent with previous research themes, including psychopathology, social ineptitude, the facilitating role of the Internet, and a combined motivation of personal grievances and broader radical Islamic goals in the process of Islamic self-radicalization. Details: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 14, 2014 at: http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qAv1zIPJlGE%3D&tabid=66 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qAv1zIPJlGE%3D&tabid=66 Shelf Number: 131922 Keywords: IslamLone Wolf TerrorismTerrorism |
Author: Hamm, Mark Title: Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways To Forge Prevention Strategies Summary: This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf's preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness. The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or "signatures" - as minimal as they may appear-that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism. Details: Terre Haute, IN: Indiana State University, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Shelf Number: 135540 Keywords: Homeland SecurityLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Georgetown University, Justice Policy Institute Title: Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism Summary: The United States (US) is the primary target among western states for lone wolf terrorist (LWT) attacks, and the frequency of attacks continues to increase. Even though LWT attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than terrorist attacks conducted by organizations, the US must continue to focus counterterrorism resources and encourage further research to combat this threat to national security. In this assessment, the Georgetown National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF) hopes to inform key stakeholders about the most critical lone wolf terrorism issues and spark new policy discussions on how to address the problem. The NSCITF articulates eight findings that inform the collective understanding of lone wolf terrorism and offers three actionable recommendations to address those findings. First, the NSCITF finds that no single USG definition on lone wolf terrorism exists. Second, the NSCITF identifies the following four current trends in domestic LWT attacks, each of which highlight multiple issues that US policymakers must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies directed at LWTs: 1) Increased targeting of law enforcement (LE) and military personnel; 2) Overwhelming use firearms to conduct attacks, compared to LWTs in other western countries who rely on hijackings or bombs; 3) Increased radicalization via the Internet, extremist media, and the civilian workplace; and, 4) Proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized extremist groups. Third, despite the presence of overarching trends among domestic LWTs, the NSCITF determines that profiling fails to target potential LWTs effectively. Consequently, in the fourth finding, the NSCITF provides a framework to understand how an individual becomes a LWT and to identify possible intervention points. Fifth, the NSCITF develops a typology that organizes lone wolves in terms of their ideological autonomy and social competence to explicate why lone wolves operate alone, a key gap in the extant literature on terrorism. The final three findings address US federal and local law enforcement policies to prevent LWT attacks. In the sixth finding, the NSCITF identifies the challenges of using traditional law enforcement tactics to identify and stop LWTs. Specifically, the NSCITF highlights how the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals an ability to become radicalized without physically interacting with others and research various attack methodologies undetected. The seventh finding demonstrates that aggressive law enforcement tactics - namely, surveillance and monitoring of targeted individuals - risk community mistrust because of perceived infringements on civil liberties and privacy rights. In the final finding, the NSCITF notes that the US lacks a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach that coherently and systematically organizes the federal, local, and state efforts to combat lone wolf terrorism. Based on the above findings, the NSCITF offers three recommendations. First, the USG should adopt a standard definition of lone wolf terrorism. Second, the USG should appoint clear leadership over the problem of lone wolf terrorism to streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels. Finally, the USG should emphasize the prevention and short-circuiting of the radicalization process. Each recommendation will help the USG streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent future LWT attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 137881 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityLaw EnforcementLone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Cohen, Katie Title: Who Will Be a Lone Wolf Terrorist? Mechanisms of self-radicalisation and the possibility of detecting lone offender threats on the Internet Summary: Solo actor terrorism, also known as lone wolf terrorism, is a growing threat against civil security, partly due to the fact that Internet access makes it easier than ever to engage in study and dissemination of extremist views. A large variation regarding factors such as ideology, social background, psychopathology and personality type means there is no clear profile for lone wolf terrorists. An assessment of which individuals from a population of political extremists that will go on to commit acts of terrorism can therefore not only be based on factors such as individual experiences or personality traits. A threat assessment should rather be based on the potential perpetrator's behaviour during the time closely preceding the attack. Hence, behaviours that have been empirically proven to precede terrorist attacks and other incidents of planned violence, such as mass murder or school shootings, so called warning behaviours, can have an important role in assessing lone wolf terrorist threats. Warning behaviours often precede terrorist acts and are in their turn preceded by a radicalisation process, where an individual gradually enters a state of mind characterised by a proneness to premeditated violence with the purpose of advancing an ideology. Most lone wolf terrorists have gone through a process of self-radicalisation, wherein media has had a crucial role. Internet is indisputably the medium that has had the greatest influence on the radicalisation process during the last decade. However, while it has facilitated the process, the Internet has also created new possibilities of discovering warning behaviours prior to an actual terrorist attack. From an existing typology of eight different warning behaviours, the three that can most easily be inferred from the subject's Internet communication will be discussed in the following report: (1) Leakage, when the subject, more or less specifically and more or less intentionally, informs a third party about an intent to perpetrate a terrorist attack, (2) fixation, which expresses an extreme preoccupation with a person or cause or extensive gathering of facts about a target, and (3) identification, which comprises a self-image characterised by fantasies about being a hero or warrior and/or a strong interest in weapons and military paraphernalia, as well as a strong influence from other radical proponents of lone wolf terrorism. The aim of the following report is firstly, to shed light on different hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms behind self-radicalisation and the interaction between the individual and the environment during the radicalisation process, and secondly, to examine the possibility of using semi-automatic techniques for text analysis of the subjects Internet communication to discover warning behaviours. Details: Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2015 at: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Shelf Number: 137887 Keywords: Lone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsThreat Assessment |
Author: Coultas, Bryan T. Title: Crowdsourcing intelligence to combat terrorism: Harnessing bottom-up collection to prevent lone-wolf terror attacks Summary: U.S. officials have acknowledged that attackers of the lone-wolf and isolated-cell organizational type are on the rise and now pose a greater threat than major coordinated actions. Traditional intelligence methods, using a top-down approach with an emphasis on signals intelligence, are ill-equipped to identify and prevent terrorists using lone-wolf tactics. Crowdsourcing, as a problem-solving technique, is a relatively new idea but has shown great promise in tackling issues similar to the identification of lone-wolf terrorists. At its core, crowdsourcing is a method for thousands or even millions of people to contribute their knowledge, expertise, or skills towards a unified task. Done correctly, it has produced results unachievable by traditional tasking of humans or computers. This thesis identifies how the signals surrounding lone-wolf attacks are different and more subtle in nature from those mounted by organized terror groups. In turn, the thesis examines the potential benefits of crowdsourcing intelligence in order to strengthen the U.S. intelligence community's ability to approach this emerging problem of lone-wolf terrorism. In short, this thesis proposes that the U.S. intelligence community harness the power of U.S. citizens to help prevent identify the subtle indictors presented by lone-wolf terrorists in order to prevent lone-wolf terrorist attacks. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley Knox Library, 2015. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45174/15Mar_Coultas_Bryan.pdf?sequence=3 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45174/15Mar_Coultas_Bryan.pdf?sequence=3 Shelf Number: 137891 Keywords: Domestic IntelligenceLone Wolf TerrorismLone Wolf TerroristRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review Summary: This paper is the first publication in the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project, which aims to improve understanding of, and responses to, the phenomenon of (potentially) violent lone actors through analysis of comprehensive data on cases from across Europe. Despite recent depictions within the media, lone-actor terrorism is not a new phenomenon; however, research suggests the threat is increasing as pressure from security services forces a tactical adaptation and groups - including Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) - call on those who share their ideology to act alone without direction or support. This paper examines the current state of knowledge surrounding the phenomenon, assessing the limitations of the literature and identifying where further research should focus to add real value to countering the threat. Three recommendations are made: first, increased methodological rigour in empirical research; second, focus on process as well as perpetrators; and third, specific examination of the confluence between returning foreign fighters, domestic Daesh supporters, and the lone-actor threat. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 1: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137894 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismLone Wolf TerrorismLone Wolf TerroristRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Shelf Number: 137895 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland SecurityIslamic StateIslamistsJihadLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Palombi, Simon Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 2: Attack Methodology and Logistics Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the second of four policy papers in the CLAT series, published by RUSI on behalf of Chatham House. The CLAT project identified a need to understand the factors underlying the attack methodology and logistics of lone-actor terrorists. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the key variables of the data set. The results are then used to develop a more nuanced understanding of the lone-actor terrorism threat in Europe. Details: London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper; Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 6: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138006 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Smith, Melanie Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the third of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Preventing every single instance of lone-actor terrorism is impossible. This is particularly true in countries where freedom of thought, speech and privacy are highly valued and must be protected. The recommendations stemming from this paper's analysis provide practical suggestions for preventing instances of lone-actor terrorism - based on findings relating to motivations, political engagement and online activity - that adhere to these principles. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 7: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Shelf Number: 138004 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityLone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Social MediaTerrorism |
Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This fourth paper of the series conducts a detailed examination of the lone-actor terrorist database. The findings reaffirm a key assertion from the earlier literature review: there is no consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the time leading up to the attack. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 4: Accessed march 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 138012 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf TerrorismRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Online Activism and Social Media Usage among Indonesian Extremists Summary: Indonesian extremists have a long history of online activism, but links to the Islamic State (still better known in Indonesia by its former acronym ISIS) have raised questions about whether social media usage is significantly changing patterns of radicalisation and recruitment. The answer seems to be a qualified no, but ISIS propaganda seems nevertheless to be having an impact, persuading some Indonesians that the "caliphate" in Syria and Iraq is a well-run state where devout Muslim families can find fulfilment. Where social media has made a difference is in its ability to turn anyone with a Twitter account into a potential propagandist, meaning that the ISIS message may start with friends and family linked into online networks but quickly reaches a much broader public. Despite the heavy reliance of Indonesian extremists at home and abroad on Facebook, Twitter a"d WhatsApp and similar services, "self-radicalization" and "lone wolf " actions have been extremely rare. Personal contacts and direct face-to-face engagement in religious discussion groups (pengajian) remain important, with friendships reinforced through Internet messaging and mobile phone communication. As one analyst notes, individuals do not become supporters of ISIS by simply by being exposed to propaganda, but the propaganda can help transform them from passive supporters into active members. Social media may play a more important role in recruitment in countries like Malaysia with a very strict legal regime, where police monitoring of suspected extremists is so strict that the only relatively "safe" means of interaction is online - and then only with some form of encryption. In Indonesia, however, it is easy for extremists to hold meetings and discussions, and this is where recruitment generally begins. The very few Indonesian groups that have identified potential members through Facebook have been among the least competent, in part because they have not been able to vet potential members properly. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 24: Accessed March 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf Shelf Number: 138034 Keywords: ExtremismExtremistsLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial Media |
Author: Cedros, Christopher R. Title: Lone-wolf terrorist radicalization and the prisoner's dilemma: ensuring mutual cooperation between at-risk Muslim Americans and local communities Summary: While scholars study the radicalization process that produces lone-wolf terrorists in America, news stories regularly report on Muslim Americans leaving their local communities to join terrorist organizations. Currently, radicalizing individuals to act as lone wolves is the most successful method of Islamist attack on the American homeland. A novel approach to analyzing radicalization is employment of the prisoner's dilemma, which examines the motivations behind individual decision-making. The prisoner's dilemma is used by game theorists and international-relations scholars to demonstrate how persons who might ordinarily be expected to cooperate may actually work against each other and defect from previous agreements or understandings. Because lone-wolf attacks will likely continue to pose the most frequent threat to the U.S. homeland, it is imperative to learn how potential homegrown terrorists can be encouraged to identify with their local communities rather than defect from the social bonds of church, school, neighborhood, and workplace. This thesis explores how the prisoner's dilemma may reveal ways to discourage radicalism in at-risk Muslim Americans. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47237/15Sep_Cedros_Christopher.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47237/15Sep_Cedros_Christopher.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138134 Keywords: Homeland SecuritiyLone Wolf TerrorismLone Wolf TerroristMuslimsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Buggy, Kate Title: Under the Radar: How might Australia enhance its policies to prevent 'lone wolf' and 'fixated person' violent attacks? Summary: This paper addresses the detection, intervention and prevention of so-called 'lone wolf' and 'fixated perso' violent attacks in Australia. It argues that while the threat of terrorism may vary over time, the increase in lone wolf terrorism over the past decade requires a more focused approach to the identification and monitoring of individuals who are moving along the pathway from radical ideology to radical violence. The paper proposes that a specialised unit, the National Fixated Threat Assessment Centre, be established to assess the threat posed by such persons, regardless of whether they fall into the category of lone wolf, fixated persons or other, grievance-fuelled violent actors. It also proposes community-friendly options of e-referral and a new hotline in an effort to identify persons on a radicalisation pathway. With research confirming that the majority of such individuals suffer from mental illness or mental instability, the paper concludes that these initiatives should reduce the risk by providing an opportunity to intervene before violent activity occurs. Details: Canberra: Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers: Accessed June 1, 2016 at: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 139257 Keywords: ExtremistsLone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Bakker, Edwin Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Definitional Workshop Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. During the first workshop of the CLAT Consortium, held in The Hague in January 2015, several academics and professionals were invited to help to define lone-actor terrorism (LAT). The aim of this two-day meeting was to arrive at a working definition of LAT that will be used when collecting cases for the database. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 2: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_definitional_workshop.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_definitional_workshop.pdf Shelf Number: 145621 Keywords: Lone Wolf TerrorismLone-Actor Terrorism |
Author: Keatinge, Tom Title: Lone-Actor and Small Cell Terrorist Attacks: A New Front in Counter-Terrorist Finance? Summary: As the threat from lone-actor and small cell terrorism evolves, this paper examines the financing of both disrupted and successful plots since 2000 in Great Britain, France and Australia. These plots often require minimal amounts of funding, making proactive identification through financial means challenging. Nonetheless, this paper highlights a number of key themes that warrant further investigation, showing the potentially disruptive role that financial intelligence can play. Efforts to disrupt the funding of Daesh have taken up a significant amount of the time and resources of policymakers, law enforcement and the military. These efforts have also involved mobilising the private sector, particularly banks, oil companies and antiquities dealers. However, little attention has been paid to understanding and addressing the financing associated with the plots (whether successful, failed or disrupted) of lone actors and small cells that have acted beyond Daesh-controlled territory. This paper seeks to provide insight into the financing connected with a sample of 63 lone-actor and small cell terrorist plots in Great Britain and France since 2000, including those that are religiously inspired, right wing, nationalist, and single issue. The aim is to inform thinking and raise awareness among those charged with tackling this threat. The report also draws on a similar study by Australia's financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC, thereby providing an overview of lone-actor and small cell terrorist finance from the perspective of three countries, each with individual and distinct experiences. What is clear from both studies is that the simplicity and spontaneity of these attacks, particularly those attempted by a lone assailant as opposed to a dyad or triad, means that assailants are often able to make use of their own funding resources, offering limited opportunities for traditional counter-terrorist financing (CTF) approaches to reveal financial indications of plans prior to their execution. Despite this challenge, the research conducted for this paper has highlighted a number of key themes that it is hoped can contribute to the approaches taken by law enforcement and security authorities as they adapt their CTF response to the evolving threat posed by such terrorists: While there has been an undoubted need to focus on disrupting the significant financing accrued by Daesh over the past two years, a comprehensive CTF strategy should not lose sight of the fact that lone actors and small cells operating at home present a considerably more immediate threat to citizens than Daesh, given that the latter mainly operates in Iraq and Syria. Although it has traditionally been the case in many countries that terrorist financing has been addressed separately from broader financial crime, the increasing intersection of lone actors and small cells with low-level criminality suggests that this separation needs to be reconsidered. Investigations need to at least acknowledge this emerging connection and create dedicated inter-agency links to combat it. Attacks undertaken with knives have certainly resulted in casualties; however, the use of firearms (particularly automatic weapons) has resulted in casualties on a far greater scale. As such, increased focus should be placed on identifying and disrupting financial flows related to the trade in illicit firearms. Information about the financial tools employed by lone actors and small cells must be more widely disseminated to raise awareness among those agencies and actors = in both the public and private sectors - who are less familiar with terrorist financing techniques. These might include certain types of retailer, payday lenders and student loan companies, as well as online payment systems that may increasingly be the target of terrorist-related fraud. Closer monitoring of the welfare system is also advised, in light of cases identified where benefits were used to fund terrorist plots. The financial patterns of lone actors and small cell operators are often indistinguishable from legitimate financial behaviour, and proactive identification of these individuals through financial reporting remains challenging. National financial intelligence units must therefore act as a critical bridge between national security and law enforcement agencies (that identify subjects of interest via non-financial means) and the private sector, to allow financial institutions to conduct more targeted monitoring. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Shelf Number: 145541 Keywords: Counter-terrorismLone Wolf TerrorismTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Orton, Kyle Title: Foreign Terrorist Attacks By The Islamic State, 2002-2016 Summary: Terrorist attacks by the Islamic State (IS) around the world have, since IS established its "caliphate" in Iraq and Syria in June 2014, become an increasingly regular feature of the international news landscape. But IS began its efforts to conduct foreign attacks before that, with several plots discovered earlier in 2014, and a trail of violence in Europe and beyond back to 2002, when IS had entered Iraq and the United States had not. IS's attacks fall into several categories in relation to the strength of their connection to the organisation headquartered in Raqqa. Some attacks are wholly controlled by IS: conceived by IS's leaders and carried out by operatives trained in its statelet, operating with IS funding, under its express, specific instructions, and maintaining regular contact to the "centre". At the other end of the spectrum are individuals who act wholly alone, inspired by IS's calls for Westerners and others to attack the citizens of states not under IS's rule. Between these two is a spectrum. This report documents 152 attacks and evidence is available to categorize 145 of these attacks. 106 attacks (73%) were linked directly to the IS organisation, 17 attacks (12%) were carried out by small cells or larger networks of operatives loyal to IS's ideology and strategic programme as expressed by its caliph and spokesmen, and just 22 attacks (15%) were conducted by lone, "inspired" individuals - the much-feared "lone wolves". Many recent attacks in the West and other countries that appear to be the work of individuals are increasingly often transpiring, on examination, to be guided by IS's foreign intelligence service, Amn al-Kharji. This body, which at one time helped IS expand by infiltrating and subverting areas of Iraq and Syria before IS formally conquered them, now operates an online apparatus, through encrypted messaging software and other means, to train and guide loyalists, allowing IS to reach into its enemies' societies to carry out acts of terrorism by remote control. It is crucial in devising counter-terrorism strategies to understand that these attacks are the work of a determined foreign adversary, rather than self-radicalized loners, not least because one of the premises built into the current anti-IS policy is that the fall of its caliphate will diminish its external reach. The political developments inside Iraq and Syria give little reason to believe this is true. The ground war and IS's foreign appeal are now largely separate phenomena. IS will be able to operate its online infrastructure and maintain a global support base long after its statelet is destroyed. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 16, 2017 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FINAL-Foreign-Terrorist-Attacks-Paper.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FINAL-Foreign-Terrorist-Attacks-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 146216 Keywords: Lone Wolf TerrorismRadical Groups Terrorism Terrorists |