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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
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15 results foundAuthor: Stewart, James G. Title: Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources Summary: Since the end of the Cold War, the illegal exploitation of natural resources has emerged as a primary means of financing armed violence. In countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the sale of natural resources within conflict zones has not only created perverse incentives for war, it has also furnished warring parties with the finances necessary to sustain some of the most brutal hostilities in recent history. As a consequence of the illegal trade in minerals, metals, timber, and other natural resources, armed conflicts in which participants are able to draw upon easily accessible natural resource wealth are often more bloody, financially costly, and intractable than other forms of armed violence. Resource wars also contribute to the so-called resource curse, whereby the richest nations in terms of resource endowment are poorest in terms of social development and most prone to violent upheaval. While there is broad consensus that the correlation between resource wealth and armed violence must be addressed through a range of initiatives geared at fighting corruption, policing the resource sector domestically, and building judicial capacity in countries recovering from war, the liability of foreign businesses for trading in illicit conflict commodities is also vital. Resource wars, after all, are entirely dependent on commercial actors to purchase, transport, and market the resources that are illegally acquired in order to sustain violence. As part of this growing interest in resource wars, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources explores the elements of corporate liability for the war crime of pillage. Although the term pillage has a long pedigree in the laws of war, the offense also features as a contemporary war crime in the statutes of all modern international criminal courts and a large number of domestic criminal systems. In essence, pillage means theft during war, and is synonymous with other equally evocative terms such as looting, spoliation, and plunder. A substantial body of jurisprudence has applied the offense in practice. Modern courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) enforce the offense as a matter of course. At present, Liberia’s former president Charles Taylor and the former vice-president of Congo Jean- Pierre Bemba are facing trial before international courts for having allegedly perpetrated acts of pillage during war, but the most important precedents derive from World War Two. In the wake of that conflict, a significant number of business representatives were prosecuted for pillaging natural resources in circumstances that are often strikingly similar to corporate practices in modern resource wars. By exploring these cases and the law governing pillage in detail, Corporate War Crimes seeks to guide investigative bodies and war crimes prosecutors engaged with the technicalities of these issues. We also hope that this manual will be useful for advocates, political institutions, and companies interested in curbing resource wars. Our belief is that the deterrent effect created by even a single case is likely to transform conflict financing in a large number of ongoing conflicts. At the same time, we are conscious of the potential humanitarian consequences of depriving warring factions of access to resource wealth in some contexts, and of the serious dangers of tarnishing reputable companies that provide the legitimate investment essential to rehabilitating economies ravaged by war. With this balance in mind, this project seeks to act as a catalyst for reinvigorating prosecution of the war crime of pillage and to bring accountability to companies that illegally trade in conflict commodities. Details: New York: Open Society Institute, 2010. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2010 at: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/anticorruption/articles_publications/publications/pillage-manual-20101025/pillage-manual-20101025.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/anticorruption/articles_publications/publications/pillage-manual-20101025/pillage-manual-20101025.pdf Shelf Number: 120138 Keywords: Illegal TradeLootingOffenses Against the EnvironmentPillagingProsecutionTheft |
Author: Morrell, Gareth Title: The August Riots in England Understanding the Involvement of Young People Summary: In early August 2011, there were outbreaks of significant crime and disorder in some of England’s major cities. The riots and disturbances began in Tottenham in North London on Saturday 6 August following a peaceful protest in response to the police handling of the shooting of Mark Duggan. An apparent incident between a young girl and police sparked clashes which escalated to wide-scale rioting. Windows were smashed and offices, shops and homes set on fire. Looting broke out in the early hours of Sunday in neighbouring Wood Green and Tottenham Hale. Over the course of the next few days, similar disturbances occurred in other parts of London and in other cities. Different areas of London experienced varying levels of violent protest, vandalism and looting. In some areas like Peckham (8 August), clashes between police and groups of largely local young people sparked violence that turned into looting. Events took a different course in other areas, such as around Clapham Junction station in Battersea (8 August). Here, looting by local people, and others from surrounding areas, was not preceded by any significant protest or clashes with police and continued for several hours before police could arrive in sufficient numbers to halt proceedings. Similar events took place outside London. In Birmingham, looting in the city centre followed by clashes between police and rival groups in suburban areas took place across two nights (8–9 August). In Salford (9 August), events followed a similar pattern to Peckham, with initial aggression towards the police developing quickly into looting. NatCen was commissioned by the Cabinet Office to conduct an independent study into the motivations of young people involved in or affected by the riots - the report is the first, and currently only, major study to be based on what young people themselves have to say. The report focuses on the motivations of young people in five areas affected by the riots, and two areas which were not affected by the riots. It analyses how young people's motivations were shaped by a dramatic and unfamiliar set of circumstances. Whilst examining the background to the riots, the report retains a clear focus on the moral and practical decisions made by different people. The study was delivered by an experienced team of qualitative researchers at NatCen who conducted interviews and focus groups with young people, business owners, youth workers and community leaders in affected and non-affected areas, speaking both to those directly involved and those who chose not to be. The evidence-based analysis provides Cabinet Office, wider government departments and the Independent Riots Communities and Victims Panel, with a deeper understanding of the contributing factors for the sequence of events which took place this summer. Details: London: NatCen, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 4, 2011 at: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/study/the-august-riots-in-england- Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/study/the-august-riots-in-england- Shelf Number: 123227 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductLootingRiots (U.K.) |
Author: Davies, Toby P. Title: A Mathematical Model of the London Riots and their Policing Summary: In August 2011, several areas of London experienced episodes of large-scale disorder, comprising looting, rioting and violence. Much subsequent discourse has questioned the adequacy of the police response, in terms of the resources available and strategies used. In this article, we present a mathematical model of the spatial development of the disorder, which can be used to examine the effect of varying policing arrangements. The model is capable of simulating the general emergent patterns of the events and focusses on three fundamental aspects: the apparently-contagious nature of participation; the distances travelled to riot locations; and the deterrent effect of policing. We demonstrate that the spatial configuration of London places some areas at naturally higher risk than others, highlighting the importance of spatial considerations when planning for such events.Wealso investigate the consequences of varying police numbers and reaction time, which has the potential to guide policy in this area. Details: London: University College London, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Scientific Reports: Accessed March 1, 2013 at: http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130221/srep01303/pdf/srep01303.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130221/srep01303/pdf/srep01303.pdf Shelf Number: 127748 Keywords: Crowd ControlLootingPublic DisorderPublic Order ManagementRiots (London, U.K.) |
Author: Okombo, Okath Title: The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums Summary: Nairobi’s informal settlements and slums were the epicentre of the post-election violence (PEV) that erupted in December 2007 and led to massive destruction of property, looting, displacement and forceful eviction of some ethnic communities from their homes. In many cases, minority rival communities were forced to relocate to other estates where their community members constitute a dominant group. Slum-based vigilante and militia groups consolidated themselves into two main rival factions in order to defend their communities and lawlessness threatened to engulf the city. Despite the fact that youth were at the centre of the crisis, most interventions that were initiated soon after the PEV failed to involve them. It is against this background that the Citizens Against Violence (CAVi) in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) sought to make a contribution to the country’s peace restoration effort, targeting six affected slums in Nairobi. In 2008, the “slum tenants and landlords dialogues” series began. This was a special intervention to reduce ethnic tension and reconcile the two groups so that residents could return to their homes. This led to the formation of interest groups representing the landlords and tenants respectively for purposes of formal negotiation, paving the way for some landlords to recover their houses and tenants to move back. The initiative also enabled youth and community leaders to deliberate on postpoll challenges in their estates as a step towards finding sustainable solutions to violence. Issues of cultural assimilation, access to land titles, widespread poverty and unemployment among the youth and fanatical support for some political players emerged as challenges that could still precipitate future ethnic conflicts. Candid discussions provoked many of the young leaders in the slums to aspire for better living conditions and improved socio-ethnic relations. This led in 2009 to the launch of the Nairobi Slums Assembly, a forum in which the young leaders from the six slums met every month to discuss specific issues affecting their particular environments and to come up with proposals which they then shared with the provincial administration, the police and elected leaders. In many cases, this has led to positive change as well as the building of bridges with the authorities. However, more work needs to be done. Integrated ethnic co-existence may be difficult to achieve in the urban slums without a multi-pronged effort by both government and civil society. It is our hope that sharing the findings of the project with a wider group of stakeholders will mobilize public interest and goodwill towards improving the conditions in the Nairobi slums for sustainable peace and socio-economic development. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 2010. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2013 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/07884.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Kenya URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/07884.pdf Shelf Number: 129508 Keywords: LootingPoverty and CrimeSlums (Nairobi, Kenya)Socioeconomic ConditionsVigilantismViolence |
Author: Agger, Kasper Title: Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic Summary: The situation in the Central African Republic, or CAR, remains chaotic and violent with public lynchings and daily attacks terrorizing civilians across the country. The United Nations estimates that more than 1 million people - roughly one-quarter of the total population - have been displaced or fled the country. Thousands of people have been killed - at least 2,000 since December alone, although no one knows the exact figure, which is likely much higher. Despite having the largest number of peacekeepers ever deployed to the country, the violence in CAR continues unabated. At least 60 people were killed in the capital city of Bangui over a period of just 10 days in March. Armed groups in CAR are financing their activities in part with significant revenues from natural resources and looting. When the Seleka rebel alliance captured the capital in March 2013, heavily armed and well-trained wildlife poachers and mercenary fighters from Chad and Sudan - some of whom were members of the Sudanese government-supported Janjaweed militia-backed the group. Seleka rebels and foreign fighters have been plundering, looting, and smuggling diamonds and ivory to pay for arms, fuel, food, and soldiers. Meanwhile, Anti-Balaka militias have been looting and killing in Muslim communities and have taken control of diamond-rich areas in the western part of CAR. Seleka forces used violence and threats against local populations in CAR to extract diamond revenues through forced mining, theft, and cheap purchases from local traders. The diamonds were then sold to local traders or taken out of the country and sold to intermediaries, mainly in South Darfur, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC. CAR was suspended in May 2013 from the Kimberley Process, an international certification mechanism designed to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the international market. However, the diamond trade has continued in CAR and conflict diamonds are likely entering markets abroad. Other countries have pursued political and economic interests that have exacerbated violence in CAR and destabilized the country. Neighboring Chad and Sudan provided support to the Seleka with the goal of installing a cooperative government that could help protect Chadian oil interests and prevent CAR from becoming a safe haven for rebels that could potentially destabilize the two countries. South Africa deployed up to 400 soldiers to protect South African investments in the oil and diamond sectors when former President Francois Bozize was in office. South African soldiers fought to protect the Bozize government when Seleka fighters attacked Bangui, leading to the death of 13 South African soldiers. The Chadian and French governments, which also sent soldiers to CAR, did not intervene to save President Bozize, as they had done previously in his decade-long rule. They helped him to capture power in 2003 but gradually withdrew support when he favored South Africa and China for trade and military cooperation arrangements. Bozize's shift, and that of France and Chad, helped enable Seleka forces to capture power. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 17, 2014 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf Shelf Number: 132386 Keywords: Animal PoachingConflict DiamondsHomicidesLootingViolenceWildlife Crime |
Author: Hallaj, Omar Abdulaziz Title: The balance-sheet of conflict: criminal revenues and warlords in Syria Summary: The conflict in Syria is forging new forms of territorial control, and a political economy that is not unlike the patronage system that was previously fostered by the ruling Ba'ath party. As a result of the extended war efforts and the need for revenues to fund them, the national economy is now deeply affected by illicit activities such as trade in antiquities, oil and drugs, as well as smuggling, kidnapping, looting and extrajudicial land expropriations. Warlords and armed groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (or the al-Nusra Front) must fund their military campaigns. However, at the same time, they have to balance the extraction of local revenues with the loyalty of the civilian populations they control. At stake are their reputations and their abilities to raise money from foreign donors and to perpetuate their coercive governance. This paper proposes a rough estimate of the size of the funding streams used by loyalist and rebel militias. The paper also argues that the creeds and beliefs that initiated the conflict are no longer the sole motors of violence; indeed, greed is increasingly shaping the nature of hostilities and the strategies adopted by armed groups. As a result, the framework proposed in the Geneva Communique for achieving peace in Syria is not likely to succeed alone in solving the conflict. Recent experiences in other countries suggest that transitional political arrangements for the transfer of power are failing to dislodge war profiteering. Additional approaches to enable a progressive recovery of livelihoods and the provision of local services should be considered a key part of the peacebuilding process. It is also vital to consider other factors sustaining the war economy, including international sanctions and external funding. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2015. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Hallaj_NOREF_Clingendael_The%20balance-sheet%20of%20conflict_criminal%20revenues%20and%20warlords%20in%20Syria_Apr%202015_FINAL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Syria URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Hallaj_NOREF_Clingendael_The%20balance-sheet%20of%20conflict_criminal%20revenues%20and%20warlords%20in%20Syria_Apr%202015_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135841 Keywords: Illicit TradeLootingSmugglingTerrorism OrganizationsTerrorist Financing |
Author: Paris, Jeffrey Jonathan Title: Crime, Contraband, and Property Rights: Explaining Variations in Violent Crime Rates Summary: Violent crime affects quality of life on an individual level and development on a national level (Kleiman, 2009), and could be the most important factor in determining whether many low and middle-income countries develop stable governments and implement effective economic policies. I propose a political and natural resource based explanation of the variation in crime rates in order to overcome the lack of connections between macro-level statistical data and causal mechanisms identified up to this point. My explanation involves the dynamics between state strength, property rights formation and enforcement, and the specific nature of criminal markets. When the state is weak crime rates usually increase due to the state's inability to enforce property rights, including the inability to control contraband markets (or adequately taxing legal markets), and the inability to effectively punish defectors. Property rights are established through a political bargaining process between actors that generally depends on the capacity for violence of interested parties (DeSoto, 2000; Umbeck, 1981). Well-defined and enforced property rights reduce transaction costs, and therefore reduce levels of violence (Anderson and Hill, 2003). The specific properties of markets, including the resources they are based on, can shape the market environment, including legality, and affect the resulting "institutions of extraction" (Snyder, 2006, 952). Lootable resources make property rights harder to enforce and interact with the state's ability to provide the rule of law, especially in the case of prohibitions. Illicit markets engender violence because normal business disputes are often settled with violence (Kleiman, 1993, 104-107, 115). My hypotheses examine the relationship between the production of lootable products, while controlling for other factors commonly attributed to crime. My analysis suggests that, all else being equal, the production of lootable resources increases crime rates, while the enforcement of property rights, whether by a state, non-state actor, or community, reduces violent crime rates. To test my hypotheses I use a mix of statistical analysis, case studies based on archival research, and structured interviews. Cross-national data was collected through archival research and existing databases, spanning over seventy countries and fifty years. Local level data comes from fieldwork in Colombia, and includes quantitative data for every municipality in Colombia over a span of nine years, and qualitative data for several regions critical to testing my hypotheses. Details: Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 2012. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/08t0s726 Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/08t0s726 Shelf Number: 136779 Keywords: ContrabandCrime RatesIllicit MarketsLootingProperty RightsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Fanusie, Yaya J. Title: Monumental Fight: Countering the Islamic State's Antiquities Trafficking Summary: As the nation's largest professional organization of archaeologists on the Middle East holds its annual meeting this week in Atlanta, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) has released a new report analyzing the strategic role of antiquities trafficking in funding the terrorist group known as Islamic State (IS). The report, "Monumental Fight: Combatting Islamic State's Antiquities Trafficking," provides the most comprehensive look to date at IS's involvement in the illicit trade. The report is co-authored by former CIA intelligence analyst Yaya J. Fanusie, now director of analysis at FDD's Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF), and Alex Joffe, an archaeologist and historian specializing in the Middle East and contemporary international affairs. The report explains how antiquities looting evolved in the region, analyzes how it fits within IS's overall system of territorial control and governance, and identifies strategies to stem the illegal trade. Fanusie and Joffe explain that although antiquities trafficking may not provide IS as much money as other revenue streams like oil smuggling, "the importance of the antiquities trade for IS lies ... in the market's strategic and operational benefits." Excavation sites are unlikely to be targeted by coalition military strikes. Moreover, they note, looting antiquities does not alienate the local population like IS's other common practices of extortion and theft. To capitalize on this strategic resource, IS completely dominates the antiquities trade in the areas under its control, forcing civilians to be licensed by IS before they can dig for artifacts, and takes 20 percent or more of the revenue from any items sold to smugglers, the report finds. The authors note that IS also leverages its plundering for its global propaganda. The group video records choreographed destruction of pre-Islamic heritage sites in Iraq and Syria to portray itself as a defender of religious purity. The authors point out the irony of IS's antiquities trade; the group makes money through end-buyers who mainly come from the U.S. and Europe--representatives of the very societies IS has pledged to destroy. The authors explain that although the precise smuggling routes, middlemen, and buyers are difficult to uncover because of the market's opacity, a review of official trade data shows an uptick in antiques exiting the Levant since the Syrian civil war began. They argue it is likely that much of this increase comes from looted items masqueraded as legally owned artifacts. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 2015. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/new-report-outlines-ways-to-combat-islamic-states-antiquities-trafficking/ Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/new-report-outlines-ways-to-combat-islamic-states-antiquities-trafficking/ Shelf Number: 137732 Keywords: AntiquitiesArt TheftIllicit TradeIslamic StateLootingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Agger, Kasper Title: Warlord Business: CAR's Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power Summary: The two main armed groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) - the ex-Seleka and the Anti-Balaka, along with their multiple factions - make millions of dollars in profits from illicit activities, which support their operations and create wealth for ruthless warlords and business owners. Killings, extortion, and other forms of violence are used to control areas with gold and diamonds throughout CAR, and the groups are deeply involved in this high-value trade in several ways. The two groups also generate income through illicit taxes and "protection money" from civilians, road travelers, businesses, local organizations, and state institutions. Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka groups profit from a large illicit minerals trade. They do this directly by the mining and theft of diamonds and gold that they then sell to middlemen. They also profit indirectly by looting, extortion, and predatory taxation of miners and traders. Research presented in this report estimates the total current value of the illicit diamond trade and taxation by armed groups in CAR to be between $3.87 and $5.8 million dollars annually, a sufficient amount in CAR to fund widespread military operations. The majority of the diamonds and the gold are smuggled out of CAR to neighboring countries - mainly Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan - and then on to international markets; a lesser amount is sold on the local market within CAR. Some of the diamonds sold locally are purchased by three Central African diamond buying houses that currently have a total stock of diamonds worth close to $8 million. This domestic diamond trade is not prohibited by the Kimberley Process (KP) suspension of CAR's membership and the decision by KP members to refrain from sending or receiving diamond shipments from CAR that has been in effect since May 2013 and only restricts exports of rough Central African diamonds. Deliberations are, however, underway concerning the possibility of a partial lifting of the KP restrictions. There are concerns that the combination of an inadequate diamond tracing system in CAR and control by armed groups of diamond mines could result in conflict diamonds, which have provided financing for armed groups, entering the KP-approved diamond trade. To counter this danger, any lifting of CAR's KP diamond restrictions should be conditioned on the removal of all armed groups from mining sites, full control of diamond trading markets by U.N. peacekeepers or local gendarmes, and a credible tracing and due diligence system for diamonds bought and sold by Central African diamond companies, including those for export. In addition to natural resource exploitation, ex-Seleka factions in particular have set up efficient tax collection practices. Conservative assessments estimate that different factions within the group collect $1.5 to $2 million annually from illicit road taxation throughout the areas they control in central and eastern CAR. They gain an additional estimated $210,000 to $420,000 in taxation of cattle traders and $200,000 to $240,000 from taxation of coffee traders. Meanwhile, Anti-Balaka groups that roam western CAR collect illicit road taxes, extort money from rural villages, and demand sums that range from $600 to $1,000 as a one-time payment for "protection." Additional research is needed to estimate the total annual profits collected by Anti-Balaka groups through road taxation, looting, and other abusive activities. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: The Political Economy of African Wars: No. 2: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Warlord%20Business%20061615.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Warlord%20Business%20061615.pdf Shelf Number: 139294 Keywords: DiamondsExploitation of Natural ResourcesExtortionIllicit TradeLootingNatural ResourcesViolence |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Cultural Property: Protection of Iraqi and Syrian Antiquities Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other groups have seized upon the conflicts in Iraq and Syria to destroy, loot, and traffic cultural property, including antiquities. According to the United Nations (UN), this destruction and looting has reached unprecedented levels. The UN has also reported that since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, ISIS has used the sale of looted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property to generate income to strengthen its capabilities to carry out attacks. Under the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, signed into law in 1983, and other laws, the United States has restricted the importation of certain, but not all, Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. GAO was asked to examine the protection of Iraqi and Syrian cultural property, including views of art market experts. This report describes (1) activities undertaken by U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian Institution to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property since 2011, and (2) art market experts' suggestions for improving U.S. government activities. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed U.S., international, and foreign officials. GAO interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of U.S.-based art market experts representing different categories of the art market to obtain suggestions for potentially improving U.S. government activities. GAO then asked experts to rate the importance of these suggestions and obtained U.S. officials' views on experts' top-rated suggestions. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-673: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679061.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679061.pdf Shelf Number: 140094 Keywords: AntiquitiesArt CrimesCultural PropertyISISIslamic StateLooting |
Author: Lavris, Jennifer L. Title: Perfect Pothunting Day: An Examination of Vandalism to the Cultural Resources of Canyon de Chelly National Monument, its Motivations, and Potential Solutions Summary: In the United States, federal land managers such as the National Park Service (NPS) are mandated by legislation such as the Antiquities Act (1906), the National Historic Preservation Act (1966, amended 1976), the National Environmental Policy Act (1969) and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (1979) to identify, manage and protect cultural resources for future generations. These resources are irreplaceable and provide a tangible link to the past for the scholars that study them, the cultures that are connected to them, and the interested layperson. At Canyon de Chelly National Monument, in the Four Corners Region of the U.S. Southwest (Figure 1), cultural resources are endangered by natural and human‐caused agents. These agents of resource destruction are outlined in Figure 2; the focus of this study is the damage caused by agents that are predatory and malicious in nature, such as defacement and looting, or illegal activity such as visitation. This study will aim to determine the amount of damage that has occurred to the cultural resources of Canyon de Chelly, to determine the factors that have attracted visitors, vandals and looters to certain sites, to compare those data to other estimates, and will offer potential solutions to curtail future vandalism. Details: Leicester, UK: University of Leicester, School of Archaeology and Ancient History, 20-09. 147p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 6, 2016 at: http://traffickingculture.org/app/uploads/2015/11/A_Perfect_Pothunting_Day_-_An_Examinatio.pdf Year: 2998 Country: United States URL: http://traffickingculture.org/app/uploads/2015/11/A_Perfect_Pothunting_Day_-_An_Examinatio.pdf Shelf Number: 140308 Keywords: Antiquities LootingVandalism |
Author: Enough Project Title: Sudan's Deep State: How Insiders Violently Privatized Sudan's Wealth, and How to Respond Summary: The report details how President al-Bashir and his ruling National Congress Party have transformed Sudan into a system of violent kleptocracy that has endured for almost three decades. Regime elites, along with their enablers and facilitators, have amassed personal fortunes by looting and corrupting the country's oil, gold, and land resources in particular, along with other natural resource wealth, productive sectors of the economy, state assets, and the governing institutions that had been in place and largely functioned before this regime took power. For nearly three decades, President al-Bashir has maintained his position at the pinnacle of Sudan's political order after seizing power through a military coup in 1989. During his rule, the government of Sudan has perhaps been best known for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other Islamic militants in the 1990s, for committing genocide and mass atrocities against its citizens in Darfur, for the secession of South Sudan in 2011, and for ongoing armed conflict-marked by the regime's aerial bombardment of civilian targets and humanitarian aid blockade-in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Often portrayed as a country wracked by intractable violence and hampered by racial, religious, ethnic and social cleavages, Sudan ranks consistently among the most fragile or failed states. At the same time, Sudan has considerable natural resource wealth and significant economic potential. Political standing and proximity to the country's ruling elites most often determines on which side of the poverty line a Sudanese citizen lives. The idea that Sudan is a classic failed state is not fully accurate. Sudan is a failed state for the millions of displaced people living in IDP camps in Darfur, for those living in conflict areas and cut off from humanitarian assistance in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and for those struggling in marginalized communities in eastern Sudan or in the sprawling informal settlements outside Khartoum. However, Sudan is an incredibly successful state for a small group of ruling elites that have amassed great fortunes by looting the country's resources for personal gain. In that sense, Sudan is more of a hijacked state, working well for a small minority clique but failing by all other measures for the vast majority of the population. To more effectively support peace, human rights, and good governance in Sudan, U.S. policymakers should work with a range of Sudanese and other international partners to construct a new policy approach to counter Sudan's system of violent kleptocracy. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2017. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 3, 2017 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/SudansDeepState_Final_Enough.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Sudan URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/SudansDeepState_Final_Enough.pdf Shelf Number: 145254 Keywords: Illicit Financial FlowsLootingMoney LaunderingPolitical Corruption |
Author: Byrd, William Title: Industrial-Scale Looting of Afghanistan's Mineral Resources Summary: Afghanistan has been plagued by large-scale, open looting of mineral resources, involving significant mining operations, bulk transport of minerals along main roads, and crossing the border at just a few, government-controlled points. This mineral looting, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars per year, involves widespread corruption, entrenches warlords and their networks, and fuels both local conflicts and the wider insurgency in Afghanistan. The government needs to begin to get a better handle on resource exploitation and to collect more substantial royalties and taxes from ongoing mining activities. Summary Afghanistan is well endowed with underground resources, but hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of minerals are being extracted yearly, unaccompanied by payment of applicable royalties and taxes to the state. The bulk of this industrial-scale mineral looting - which has burgeoned over the past decade - has occurred not through surreptitious smuggling but openly, in significant mining operations, with visible transport of minerals on large trucks along major highways and across the Afghan border at a few government-controlled points. The prior political penetration of power holders and their networks in government, who became increasingly entrenched over time, explains this pattern of looting, which is engaged in with impunity owing to massive corruption of government agencies charged with overseeing the extractives sector, main highways, and borders. The current political and security climate favors continued and even further increased looting, which strengthens and further entrenches warlords, corrupts the government, partly funds the Taliban and reportedly ISIS, and fuels both local conflicts and the wider insurgency. Although the situation is dire and no answers are easy, near-term recommendations that could begin to make a dent in the problem include halting the issuance of new mining contracts, enforcing existing contracts to ensure taxes and royalties are paid, monitoring the transport of minerals on main roads and across borders, and imposing an emergency levy on mineral exports. The recent appointment of a new minister of mines is a good step forward, but a well-functioning, effective ministry management team will be key to success. Over the medium term, a political consensus is needed that part of the proceeds of mineral exploitation goes to the government budget and that ownership arrangements of mining companies are transparent. In addition, a system of monitoring flows of some Afghan minerals outside the country- as conflict minerals - should be considered. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/sr404-industrial-scale-looting-of-afghanistan-s-mineral-resources.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/sr404-industrial-scale-looting-of-afghanistan-s-mineral-resources.pdf Shelf Number: 145931 Keywords: LootingMineral ResourcesMineral TheftMining IndustryNational Heritage SitesNatural ResourcesProperty Theft |
Author: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Title: Culture in Crisis: Preserving Cultural Heritage in Conflict Zones Summary: There is nothing new about the looting and destruction of cultural property. The Roman Emperor Titus looted and then razed the Jewish temple in Jerusalem, Napoleon shipped art taken during his conquests back to the Louvre, the Nazis and Soviets emptied museums and private collections, their fellow Americans have looted Native American sites. Even in peacetime, monuments like the Elgin marbles and the Pergamon Altar have found their way into foreign hands, often claiming to provide protection. The monuments and works of art that remain intact and in place from prior civilizations are only those that happened to survive. Twenty-first-century technology has, however, changed the scale and quality of the looting and destruction. When the Islamic State took over a large part of Syria and Iraq in 2014, it organized a massive effort to loot artifacts that could be transported and destroyed what it could of the rest. The objective was two-fold: to demonstrate disdain for the culture that preceded Islam and to enrich the Islamic State's financial resources. Modern technology, including high explosives and earth-moving equipment, and global transportation networks made this possible on a scale not previously attempted. Many thousands of sites were looted and their artifacts sold into a world market, major monuments were destroyed, and many millions of dollars flowed into Islamic State coffers. This appalling contemporary evolution of an age-old practice has attracted a good deal of public attention in the United States, Europe, and beyond. The 2001 Taliban destruction of the Bamian Buddhas and the looting of the Baghdad Museum after the 2004 invasion had sensitized Europeans and Americans, but they were still unprepared for the systematic, high-profile destruction that the Islamic State indulges in. The desire to "do something" was immediate and compelling. What to do is far less clear. That was the issue the Antiquities Coalition raised in December 2015 with six master's students at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) enrolled in a practicum on "cultural racketeering and cleansing." Antiquities Coalition wanted to know about best practices for law and law enforcement in the fight against the illicit antiquities trade, including what is done that works for nature conservation and historical preservation. Could easements or buying land be used to protect archaeological sites? How does the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) compare with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property? How can the UNESCO Convention be improved and strengthened? For those of us who live and work in the U.S., American government policy is an area of particular concern. Through the use of bilateral agreements, the U.S. has imposed import restrictions on archaeological material from 16 countries, in an effort to reduce the incentive for pillage by discouraging trade in undocumented cultural objects. What effect have these memoranda of understanding had on the antiquities market? On imports into the U.S.? The U.S. has not designated a lead agency for combatting the illicit antiquities trade. Duties currently fall variously to the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Treasury, and others. How can the government develop an internal reporting structure to better address interagency coordination - especially as antiquities trafficking relates to terrorist financing? International peacekeeping forces, whether through the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations like NATO, could do more to protect cultural resources in times of instability. Have archaeological sites, museums, or other heritage sites ever been included in a peacekeeping mandate? Are there parallels for the protection of natural resources or even similar economic resources? What is the process for inclusion? The SAIS students divvied up these issues and worked through the spring 2016 semester to elucidate them, with guidance from their Antiquities Coalition "client." This small volume contains the results of their work, which was presented both to the Antiquities Coalition and publicly at SAIS in April 2016. We plan some further work in spring 2017 on these and related issues, in a practicum devoted to the broader issue of "Dealing With Extremists." The already ongoing implosion of the Islamic State and its control of territory should not lull us into forgetting the cultural destruction it has wrought. We should do what we can to beef up efforts to counter cultural racketeering and cleansing. The trade will continue with objects already looted and no doubt grow with the next insurgent onslaught. "Never Again" is a motto all too often observed in the breach. There will be a next time. We need to be ready for it. Details: Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University; and The Antiquities Coalition, 2017. 150p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Shelf Number: 146167 Keywords: AntiquitiesArchaeological SitesConflict ZonesCultural PropertyExtremist GroupsIslamic StateLootingPillagingTerrorism |
Author: Brodie, Neil Title: How to Control the Internet Market in Antiquities? The Need for Regulation and Monitoring Summary: Illicit antiquities, some pilfered from war zones where jihadist groups operate, are increasingly finding their way online where they are being snapped up by unknowing buyers and further driving the rampant plunder of archaeological sites. These internet sales are spurring a vicious cycle: increasing demand for antiquities, which drives the looting, producing a greater supply of artifacts, which further increases demand. While global auction sales of art and antiquities declined in 2015 - falling as much as 11 percent -online sales skyrocketed by 24 percent, reaching a staggering $3.27 billion dollars. According to Forbes, "This suggests that the art market may not be 1 cooling, exactly, but instead shifting to a new sales model, e-commerce." How can an online buyer guarantee that a potential purchase is not stolen property, a "blood antiquity," or a modern forgery? The best protection is to demand evidence of how the object reached the market in the first place. However, as in more traditional sales, most antiquities on the internet lack any such documentation. Online shoppers therefore have limited means of knowing what they are buying or from whom. This is a particularly serious concern given the industrial scale looting now taking place in Iraq and Syria, which the United Nations Security Council warns is financing Daesh (commonly known as ISIS, ISIL, or Islamic State), al Qaeda, and their affiliates. Despite the clear implications for both cultural preservation and national security, so far public policy has completely failed to regulate the online antiquities trade. This is particularly true in the United States, which remains the world's largest art market and a major center for the internet market in antiquities. American inaction has 3 made it impossible to combat the problem globally, and moreover, is in great contrast to positive steps taken by other "demand" nations like Germany. This paper offers practical solutions to help better protect good faith consumers from purchasing looted or fake antiquities - while also protecting online businesses from facilitating criminal behavior. After briefly reviewing what is known of the organization and operation of the internet market in antiquities, it considers some possible cooperative responses aimed at educating consumers and introducing workable regulation. These responses draw upon the German example, as well as recent criminological thinking about what might constitute effective regulation. Finally, the paper makes seven policy recommendations, which while geared towards the American market, are applicable to any country where antiquities are bought and sold online. Details: Washington, DC: Antiquities Coalition, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 3: Accessed September 15, 2017 at: http://thinktank.theantiquitiescoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Policy-Brief-3-2017-07-20.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://thinktank.theantiquitiescoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Policy-Brief-3-2017-07-20.pdf Shelf Number: 147333 Keywords: Antiquities Cultural Property Heritage Crime Internet CrimeInternet TradeLooting Stolen Property Trafficking in Antiquities |