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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for ms-13
6 results foundAuthor: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: Gangs in Central America Summary: Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America, as well as domestic anti-gang programs. Two recent developments may affect congressional interest in Central American gangs: a truce between rival gangs has dramatically lowered violence in El Salvador and the U.S. Treasury Department has designated the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) as a significant transnational criminal organization (TCO). MS-13 and its main rival, the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18) continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have among the highest homicide rates in the world. In recent years, some governments have moved away, at least on a rhetorical level, from repressive anti-gang strategies, with the government of El Salvador now facilitating a historic—and risky—truce involving the country’s largest gangs. The truce has resulted in a dramatic reduction in homicides since March 2012, but carries risks for the Salvadoran government such as what might happen if the gangs were to walk away from the truce and emerge stronger as a result of months of less-stringent prison conditions. U.S. agencies have been engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive sides of dealing with Central American gangs; an inter-agency committee developed a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico that was first announced in July 2007. The strategy focuses on diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. agencies consider strengthening the anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide its implementation. U.S. law enforcement efforts may be bolstered by the Treasury Department’s October 2012 decision to designate and sanction MS-13 as a major TCO pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. In recent years, Congress has increased funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Between FY2008 and FY2012, Congress appropriated roughly $35 million in global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central America, and, more recently, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the impact of the Treasury Department’s TCO designation on law enforcement efforts against MS-13. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Also see: CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS RL34112: Accessed January 30, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Shelf Number: 127358 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangs (Central America)HomicidesMS-13 |
Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Organizations: The Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil Summary: On October 11, 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-‐13) a significant transnational criminal organization (TCO). The gang was targeted for its involvement in “serious transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex trafficking, murder, assassinations, racketeering, blackmail, extortion and immigration offenses.”1 The designation, which came as a surprise to Central American governments, has caused considerable debate within the U.S. policy and law enforcement communities over whether the step was merited and whether it would, or could, have a significant impact. This report attempts to offer some insights into those questions at a time when the gangs themselves are in a tremendous state of flux and interacting in new ways amongst themselves and with regional governments. This is particularly true in El Salvador, the spiritual homeland of the MS-‐13. Relying primarily on original fieldwork, the report examines the relationship of the MS-‐13 and Calle 18 gangs to the transnational criminal networks that are growing in strength and sophistication across Central America, particularly in the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Details: Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2013. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2013 at: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf Shelf Number: 127916 Keywords: Criminal NetworksGang ViolenceGangs (Central America)MS-13 |
Author: Hampton-Gaines, Berthea G. Title: State Capacity and Effectiveness in Combating Crime: A Comparative Study of El Salvador and Guatemala Summary: Less than two decades after the conclusion of brutal civil wars, El Salvador and Guatemala are once again faced with high levels of violence stemming from drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, and gangs. Overall, El Salvador was more successful in post-war state building. However, despite having stronger institutions and more capabilities, it is not better off when it comes to public security when compared to Guatemala, a state with weaker institutions and fewer resources. In fact, El Salvador’s homicide rates have been consistently higher. According to prevailing conventional wisdom, a country with stronger institutions and more resources should be more capable and effective at maintaining order, but this is not the case. This thesis examines the nature of crime, institutional capacity, and the effectiveness of government responses to reduce violent crime. It argues that decisions made during the transition period set these states on different paths. Furthermore, while strong institutions are important to maintaining order, government policy can strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of the institution. Strong institutions are necessary, but not sufficient. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=719163 Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=719163 Shelf Number: 129145 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangs (El Salvador, Guatemala, Central America)HomicidesM-18Mara SalvatruchaMS-13Organized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Brands, Hal Title: Criminal Fiefdoms in Latin America: Understanding the Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces Summary: The problems of criminal fiefdoms—alternatively governed spaces (AGSs) in which criminal organizations, rather than formal authorities, effectively control the population and act as the arbiter of internal order—have become a serious security issue in Latin America. In several countries, criminal fiefdoms have taken shape against the backdrop of rampant criminality that has afflicted much of the region over the past two decades, with this phenomenon intensified by competition between rival transnational drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In nations as varied as Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Brazil, criminal organizations ranging from youth gangs to sophisticated DTOs control large portions of the national territory. They serve as de facto governments as they collect “taxes” through dues and extortion, demand the loyalty, or at least the acquiescence, of the people under their control, and punish those who interfere with their illicit activities. Such groups wage irregular warfare—defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations”—against their competitors and governments.1 While criminal organizations like MS-13 and the First Capital Command (PCC) of São Paulo sometimes provide order and limited social services, they also exploit and terrorize the populace. Criminal fiefdoms have thus exposed the weakness of governance, showing that states cannot control their territory or protect their citizens. This is having a corrosive impact on the public psyche, material conditions and is undermining democracy. Addressing this problem will be a difficult and complex task. The issue of criminal fiefdoms is rooted in structural problems—inequality, lack of opportunity, corruption, and above all, weak state capacity. Efforts must concentrate on building broad political compacts in support of holistic anti-crime programs and efforts to strengthening the state. • Within this context, there are several initiatives to consider, including: Smarter targeting and efforts to develop tools necessary to sustain long-term investigations and successful prosecutions; Creative policing strategies that focus on policecivilian interaction and protection of the population; Short and long-term efforts to strengthen honest law enforcement and judicial officials to reduce corruption; Building the institutional capacity of the agencies and offices charged with combating and prosecuting organized crime; Macro and micro-economic initiatives to broaden opportunity and stem the stream of recruits for organized crime; Intensified U.S. efforts to deal with the demand side of the DTO problem and a capacity and willingness for innovation and experimentation. During the Cold War, Latin America was roiled by Marxist insurgencies that, in the process of seeking to overthrow governments, carved out “liberated zones” in which insurgents could operate freely and extract resources from the population. Today, ideological violence has faded, but the problem of alternatively governed spaces (AGSs)—areas in which some groups other than the government are the de facto arbiter of internal order—continues to plague the region. A variety of criminal organizations, ranging from youth gangs to transnational drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), have established “criminal fiefdoms” in which they operate with little or no interference from the authorities and have established a form of dominance—complete with “taxation,” limited social services, and often-brutal punishment—over the population. This phenomenon is most pronounced in Central American countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, but it is also evident in Brazil. Where fiefdoms exist, states are essentially experiencing irregular warfare, as criminal groups compete with established governments for control and influence over the civilian population. This phenomenon has highlighted the weakness of many states, and is having a severely corrosive impact on democratic governance and the rule of law. This paper thus analyzes the origins, manifestations, and ramifications of the problem of criminal fiefdoms. The first section offers an analytical framework for understanding the issue. The second and third sections present case studies, focusing on the current situation in Guatemala and São Paulo, Brazil. The fourth section discusses policy implications. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2010. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 25, 2013 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=whemsac Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 129154 Keywords: Drug TraffickingFirst Capital Command (PCC)GangsMS-13Organized Crime (Latin America)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: Gangs in Central America Summary: Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated significant amounts of funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America, as well as domestic anti-gang programs. This report focuses primarily on U.S.-funded international anti-gang efforts. The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang (also known as M-18), continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have had among the highest homicide rates in the world. Recently, some governments have moved away from repressive anti-gang strategies, with the government of El Salvador having facilitated a historic-and risky-truce involving the country's largest gangs in 2012. The truce contributed to a large reduction in homicides, before beginning to unravel in recent months. The truce carries risks for the Salvadoran government that will take office on June 1, 2014, such as what might happen if the gangs were to walk away from the truce stronger than before and/or if the truce were to end abruptly and prompt an escalation in intra-gang violence. U.S. agencies have engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive sides of dealing with Central American gangs; an inter-agency committee developed a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico that was announced in July 2007. The strategy focuses on diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. agencies consider strengthening the anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide its implementation. U.S. law enforcement efforts may be bolstered by the Treasury Department's October 2012 designation of the MS-13 as a major Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. In recent years, Congress has dedicated funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region through the Merida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central America, and, more recently, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the impact of the Treasury Department's TCO designation on law enforcement efforts against MS-13. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: RL34112: Accessed March 18, 2014 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Shelf Number: 131956 Keywords: 18th Street GangGang-Related ViolenceGangsM-18Mara SalvatruchaMS-13Violence |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: El Salvador's Politics of Perpetual Violence Summary: El Salvador, a small country in the isthmus of Central America, is wracked by an implacable strain of gang warfare. Exceptionally intense and persistent violence pits rival street gangs against one another and in opposition to the police and state. Formerly hailed for its smooth transition to democracy and for turning the two foes of its 1980s civil war into political forces competing vigorously yet peaceably for power, El Salvador once again is famed for its bloodletting. Its recent murder rates rank among the highest in the world and its jails are among the most overcrowded. For the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, its main gang, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), personifies the menace of undocumented immigration. Although the Salvadoran state has developed a series of strategies for violence prevention, its mainly repressive efforts over the past fifteen years have checked the influence of these alternative approaches. It should now implement plans to prevent crime, rehabilitate gang members and spur development in marginalised communities. Most urgently, El Salvador will require protection from the turbulence that U.S. mass deportations could provoke. The permanence of violence owes as much to the success as to the failings of the peace accords. The two former wartime foes have jostled for democratic supremacy, repeatedly using security policy for electoral purposes by seeking to satisfy public demand for mano dura (iron fist) against the gangs. Although government has changed hands, security methods have not altered: mass detentions and incarceration, as well as militarisation of policing, have become standard procedure whether under the rule of right-wing elites or former guerrillas. U.S. authorities have recently offered support to this approach, pledging to "dismantle" the MS-13. In private, however, high-level officials from across the country's political divide lament the harmful effects of this crackdown on over-stretched courts and front-line police. Blueprints geared to preventing the drift of young men from low-income neighbourhoods into gang life have been drafted: the government launched the most recent, the "Safe El Salvador" plan, as a holistic strategy to restore the states territorial control. But as violence soared after 2014 following the disintegration of a truce with the gangs, extreme measures of jail confinement and police raids have once again become the government's predominant methods to choke the gangs. Allegations of police brutality and extrajudicial executions have multiplied. Recent surveys suggest that veteran members of these gangs wish to cease the violence. However, the economic dead-end of El Salvador's urban outskirts the countrys recent GDP growth rate of 1.9 per cent is among the lowest in Central America - continues to drive a supply of willing young recruits, and consolidate a rearguard of sympathisers dependent on income from the gangs' extortion schemes and other rackets. The reality and stigma of gang violence combine to block off alternative ways of life for those born into these communities, cutting years of schooling for young people in areas of high gang presence and alienating potential employers. Instead of succumbing to the state's offensive, gangs set up roadblocks in their neighbourhoods and impose their own law; their fight against security forces has claimed the lives of 45 police officers so far this year. The deadlock between a tarnished set of security policies and a gang phenomenon that thrives on the ostracism and contempt of mainstream Salvadoran society can only now be resolved by recasting the way the country treats its security dilemmas. Judicial and security institutions require careful reform to ensure resources are distributed to areas with the highest concentrations of violence, and used to boost intelligence-led policing that targets gang members committing the most serious crimes. Jail-based reinsertion schemes, and cooperation with diverse churches, NGOs and businesses that offer second chances to former gang members, must be strengthened to provide a legal framework for rehabilitation as well as material incentives for the gangs to eventually disband. Although the countrys main political parties and most of the public oppose any hint of negotiation with gangs, the reality in many poor areas is of constant daily encounters with these groups. Tolerance for these grassroots efforts, despite the existing legal restrictions on any contact with gangs, is essential to build the confidence that will be required for dialogue in the future. None of this will be easy, nor is it likely to be assisted by U.S. policy toward either gangs or Salvadoran immigrants. The potential cancellation of the rights to residency in the U.S. of 195,000 beneficiaries of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program threatens to overwhelm the Salvadoran state's capacity to accommodate returnees, not unlike the experience of the late 1990s when mass deportations of gang members from the U.S. to El Salvador exported the criminal capital that led to the lightning rise of the MS-13 and its main rival, the 18th Street gang. El Salvador is simply unprepared, economically and institutionally, to receive such an influx, or to handle their 192,700 U.S. children, many of them at the perfect age for recruitment or victimisation by gangs. At a time when levels of violence remain extraordinarily high, with exhaustion toward an unwinnable conflict voiced on both sides, the arrival of thousands of migrants back to their crime-affected homeland would impose huge strains. To escape its perpetual violence, El Salvador needs support, not the recurrence of past mistakes Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 64: July 30, 2018 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/064-el-salvador-s-politics-of-perpetual-violence.pdf Year: 2018 Country: El Salvador URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/064-el-salvador-s-politics-of-perpetual-violence.pdf Shelf Number: 150953 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsMara SalvatruchaMS-13Violent Crime |