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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
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Results for maritime crime
154 results foundAuthor: Chambers, Matthew Title: International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Hindering Maritime Trade and Water Transportation Around the World Summary: Acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea have incensed the international community and brought about a sense of cooperation among nations, international law enforcement, and treaty organizations. In turn, this has led to information sharing and joint naval patrols. This report uses statistical data to demonstrate where and in what numbers pirate attacks take place globally. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, 2010. 4p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118409 Keywords: Armed RobberyMaritime CrimePirates |
Author: Elleman, Bruce A. Title: Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies Summary: This monograph is an academic and comparative examination of twelve selected case studies from maritime history used to illuminate a range of concepts and uses of piracy suppression. The twelve case studies provide the basis for the conclusions, an approach that provides a more thorough understanding of the uses and limitations of naval antipiracy operations in the context of new maritime technologies and within a wider range of modern national policy goals than might otherwise be achievable. Above all, this collection provides a sound basis for comparative analysis of varying historical experiences that can stimulate new and original thinking about a basic but often overlooked naval duty. Details: Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010. 272p. Source: Internet Resource; Naval War College, Newport Papers No.35 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119219 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates |
Author: Struwe, Lars Bangert Title: For a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol: A Strategic Analysis of the Somali Pirate Challenge Summary: Incidents of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have more than doubled to 111 attackes in 2008. Somali pirates thus constitute a grave threat to navigation through the Suez Canal and thereby one of the most vital maritime routes in the world. Pirates are criminals who should be pursued by the local police authority. As such an authority does not exist in Somalia, and as it appears there are no states prepared to intervene to stop the 20-year-old civil war, only the symptoms of piracy have hitherto been treated by combating it at sea. Some progress has been made, but is it necessary to take steps towards a far more permanent, regionally-based solution. The solution suggested in this report is to establish a regionally-based maritime unit: a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol, to carry out surveillance in the area to secure free navigation and take on tasks such as fishery inspection and environmental monitoring. Such a patrol would comprise elements from the coastal states - from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south. The unit would be established with the support of the states that already have a naval presence in the area. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Military Studies, 2009.; 44p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: Shelf Number: 118824 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates |
Author: Haveman, Jon D. Title: Protecting the Nation's Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost Summary: This report "describes and analyzes what could happen if a terrorist attack on a port where to occur, what can be done to deter such and attack, the characteristics of U.S. port security programs, what factors stand in the way of an adequate port security policy, and some alternative methods for financing that policy." Details: San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2006. 271p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119379 Keywords: Harbors, Security MeasuresMarine Terminals, Security MeasuresMaritime CrimePort SecurityTerrorism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment Summary: "In The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, UNODC analyses a range of key transnational crime threats, including human trafficking, migrant smuggling, the illicit heroin and cocaine trades, cybercrime, maritime piracy and trafficking in environmental resources, firearms and counterfeit goods. The report also examines a number of cases where transnational organized crime and instability amplify each other to create vicious circles in which countries or even subregions may become locked. Thus, the report offers a striking view of the global dimensions of organized crime today." Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 303p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119407 Keywords: CounterfeitingCybercrimeHuman TraffickingMaritime CrimeMigrant SmugglingOrganized CrimePiratesTransnational Crime |
Author: Vignard, Kerstin Title: Maritime Security Summary: This issue focuses on maritime security — a multifaceted and complex topic that touches on some of the most critical security challenges of the moment. Armed non-state actors are exploiting busy shipping lanes for piracy and, some fear, for terrorist purposes. In this regard, there is rising concern about the security of sensitive materials in transit by sea. This issue of Disarmament Forum examines how these maritime security risks are being addressed. It explores efforts to minimize risks of WMD proliferation through regional and international cooperation at sea, for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative. It considers the extent of the threat posed by pirates and other non-state actors at sea—with a particular emphasis on the security of maritime shipping of sensitive materials. Details: Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource; Disarmament Forum, No. 2 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119467 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPiratesTerrorism |
Author: Lennox, Patrick Title: Contemporary Piracy Off the Horn of Africa Summary: There were 115 reported pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in 2008. Of those attacks, 46 were converted into the seizure of a commercial vessel by Somali pirates. The average ransom for the release of hijacked vessels increased from $1 million US dollars in July of 2008, to $1.5 million by December. At the time of writing 12 vessels are being held along with approximately 200 crew members in pirate towns along Somalia’s unlawful coasts. The Gulf of Aden (GOA), where most of the attacks have occurred, and through which 20,000 commercial vessels transit each year, is slowly being choked off as a viable shipping route. More and more shipping companies are opting to take the long route around the Cape of Good Hope rather than risk an attack or a hijacking, and insurance rates for vessels transiting the GOA have increased ten-fold in the last four months. Despite the increased presence of warships in the GOA in recent months, Somali piracy is escalating and will get worse before it gets better. As Somalia fails more and more spectacularly as a state, the size, value and number of the ships Somali pirates seize can be expected to grow along with the complexity of the pirate network, the sophistication of their weapons, crafts, and techniques, and the number of functional pirates. Essentially rational actors operating in pursuit of their own survival and self-interest and not in pursuit of a ideologically inspired fundamentalist aims, Somali pirates can be expected to adapt their tactics to international responses, and continue to ply their trade until the risks of doing so outweigh the rewards. The range of criminal activities involving the unruly maritime regions of the Somali peninsula can be expected to grow. The unfortunate and potentially unintentional future outcome of such a growing diversity of criminal activity is that it might not be long before the line between pirate attack and terrorist attack is crossed, resulting in significant human and ecological casualties. The coordinated international response to this issue is escalating in tandem with the escalation of Somali piracy. Currently, twenty warships from fourteen nations patrol off the Horn of Africa. However, as this paper will make clear, Somali piracy is directly tied to the failure of the Somali state. Accordingly, any comprehensive solution to the problem will have to involve ground operations to stabilize the country itself, as well as to unsettle pirate sanctuaries and destroy pirate infrastructure. Details: Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2010 at: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Contemporary%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Contemporary%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 118802 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: Bateman, Sam Title: Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for Action Summary: "This report proposes a 21-Point Action Plan for enhancing maritime safety and security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. It builds on the significant measures already identified at the 2005 Shangri-La Dialogue; in the Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in August 2005; and in the Jakarta Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore agreed at the meeting convened by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Indonesian Government in September 2005. The report focuses on maritime safety and security at sea in the Straits themselves, specifically on the need for cooperation between the different stakeholders, national governments, international and regional organizations, and the private sector, and on the measures that might be introduced to ensure maritime safety and security in the Straits. It recommends a comprehensive and integrated approach that brings together institutional arrangements and operational measures for safety, security and marine environmental protection. The ultimate objective should be to establish a system of information exchange and situational awareness in the Straits that engages the states in the approaches to the Straits (i.e. India and Thailand), as well as the main littoral countries (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore)." Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2010 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=&lng=en&id=26417 Year: 2006 Country: Asia URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=&lng=en&id=26417 Shelf Number: 119643 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates |
Author: Bateman, Sam Title: Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia Summary: This policy paper examines the threats to good order at sea in Southeast Asia . Threats to good order include piracy and armed robbery against ships, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking in drugs and arms, people smuggling, pollution, illegal fishing and marine natural hazards. This paper reviews the current situation and makes recommendations for non-governmental actions that would enhance cooperation in addressing the problem. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Policy Paper: Accessed August 20, 2010 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf Shelf Number: 119644 Keywords: Drug SmugglingHuman SmugglingIllegal FishingIllicit TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOffenses Against the EnvironmentPiratesWildlife Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain Summary: Over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets. GAO was asked to review cruise ship security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency on maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) guidance and identified risks; and (2) federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect cruise ships and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, analyzed 2006 through 2008 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at seven ports. GAO selected these locations based on factors such as the number of sailings from each port. Results of the visits provided additional information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the unified border security agency in DHS, conduct a study to determine whether requiring cruise lines to provide passenger reservation data to CBP would benefit homeland security, and if found to be of substantial benefit, determine the appropriate mechanism to issue this requirement. DHS concurred with the recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10400.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10400.pdf Shelf Number: 119650 Keywords: Border SecurityCruise Ships, SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorism, Prevention |
Author: Vogel, Augustus Title: Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the Roles of African Maritime Security Forces Summary: Piracy, illegal fishing, and narcotics and human trafficking are growing rapidly in Africa and represent an increasingly central component of the threat matrix facing the continent. However, African states’ maritime security structures are often misaligned with the challenges posed and need coast guard capabilities and an array of intra-governmental partnerships. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2009. 6p Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 2: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AfricaBrief_2.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AfricaBrief_2.pdf Shelf Number: 119708 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates |
Author: King, Rawle O. Title: Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on Insurance Summary: Many Members of 111th Congress are concerned about the sharp rise in pirate attacks in the strategic waterways in the Gulf of Aden off the East coast of Africa. The hijacking of a Saudi Arabia-owned oil tanker, Sirius Star, off the coast of Kenya on November 15, 2008, by pirates, and its release after a $3 million ransom payment on January 8, 2009, was another in a series of seizures and releases that have focused worldwide attention on economic and humanitarian threats posed by pirates to the global seafaring community and the smooth flow of international trade. Given the sharp increase in the number of pirate attacks, the cost of transporting cargo in international waters could rise dramatically because of the sharp increase in ocean marine insurance rates for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden. Commercial insurers, for example, could require a special war risk insurance premium costing an additional ten of thousands of dollars a day. These additional costs could adversely impact international trade during the current global economic slowdown. In addition to proposals for military deterrence and diplomatic engagements, policymakers may elect to consider adjustments to the federal statute (Title XII of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended) that authorizes the federal government to underwrite marine war risk insurance in circumstances such as piracy. Title XII, administered by the U.S. Department of Transportations Maritime Administration, authorizes the federal government to act as an insurer or reinsurer of last resort to facilitate waterborne commerce should private ocean marine insurance markets not be able to ensure that financial losses due to war risks (and piracy) will be largely covered. Policymakers may also elect to maintain the status quo on this statutory authority. The property and casualty insurance industry policyholder surplus is calculated to be approximately $505 billion (as of June 2008). Vessel hull and war risk premiums in the U.S. market paid to insurers totaled approximately $350 million in 2007, and the total value of cargo insurance premiums paid in that year was approximately $833 million, according to industry data. Some may contend, as a result, that the insurance industry appears to be financially capable of handling U.S. exposure to the current piracy threat and that the existing policy backstop will be adequate. This report will be updated as events warrant. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2010 at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40081_20090206.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40081_20090206.pdf Shelf Number: 119809 Keywords: Costs of CrimeEconomicsInsurance and CrimeMaritime CrimePirates |
Author: International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast Title: Piracy Off the Somali Coast: Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah Summary: In order to develop a coordinated response to the challenge of maritime piracy along the Somali coast, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) commissioned an international expert consultation on the issue. The consultation took place in Nairobi from the 10th to the 21st of November. It was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia and hosted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Nairobi. The international group consisted of private experts, national officials and representatives of international organizations covering expertise in organized crime, maritime law, Navy operations, risk management, migration management, marine contingency management, state of law, development and livelihoods, humanitarian relief, peace keeping and security sector reform. Many of the experts possess expertise and experience in Somalia as well as in neighboring countries and seas. The assessment aimed at providing a practical interdisciplinary overview on piracy rather than a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of piracy in Somalia. The report starts off with a short history on Somalia (chapter 1) and a general chapter on piracy in international waters (chapter 2). This is followed by an assessment on the piracy situation off the Somali coast (chapter 3), its legal framework (chapter 4), and the costs associated with the phenomenon (chapter 5). Chapter 6 lists the additional costs to Somalia, the region and the international community, of allowing the situation to escalate without international intervention, on land and sea. Chapter 7 summarizes what is currently being done to address the problem and the final chapter (chapter 8) provides a summary of recommendations for short-, medium- and long-term impact. The detailed recommendations are listed in an Appendix. Details: Nairobi: International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, 2008. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2010 at: http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf Shelf Number: 119847 Keywords: Maritime CrimeOrganized CrimePirates/Piracy |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should be Reviewed Summary: U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats—including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others—in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials. To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. DHS agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-337: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Shelf Number: 114343 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa Summary: Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa have attacked more than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages since 2007. A small number of U.S.-flagged vessels and ships have been among those affected. As Somalia lacks a functioning government and is unable to repress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration with international and industry partners. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and any challenges they face in doing so, and (2) have collaborated with partners in counterpiracy efforts. GAO examined counterpiracy plans, activities, collaborative practices, and data, and interviewed industry and international partners and officials at U.S. agencies and the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain. The U.S. government has made progress in implementing its Action Plan, in collaboration with international and industry partners, but pirates have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of operations, almost doubling the number of reported attacks from 2008 to 2009, and the U.S. government has yet to evaluate the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of its efforts or update its plan accordingly. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded prosecution arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles. Officials credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels in 2009. However, from 2007 to 2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast Indian Ocean. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. activities--such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting suspected pirates--nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks. GAO's prior work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision makers will lack information that could be used to target limited resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S. agencies. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has shared information with partners for military coordination. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable--in part because the Action Plan does not designate which agencies should lead or carry out 13 of the 14 tasks. For instance, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. The NSC, the President's principal arm for coordinating national security policy among government agencies, could bolster interagency collaboration and the U.S. contribution to counterpiracy efforts by clarifying agency roles and responsibilities and encouraging the agencies to develop joint guidance to implement their efforts. GAO recommends that the NSC reassess and update its Action Plan; identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities. The NSC did not comment. The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury provided comments to clarify facts in the report. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-856: Accessed October 23, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10856.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10856.pdf Shelf Number: 120061 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: Mason, R. Chuck Title: Piracy: A Legal Definition Summary: Pirate attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought continued U.S. and international attention to the long-standing problem of piracy in the region. The United States has been an active participant in piracy interdiction and prevention operations focusing on the Horn of Africa region. As part of piracy interdiction operations, the U.S. military has detained individuals accused of acts of piracy against U.S.-flagged vessels. In some instances these individuals have been released to return to land, while others have been brought to the United States for criminal prosecution in the federal courts. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.” Since 1819, U.S. law has defined piracy not as a specific act, but rather “as defined by the law of nations.” Supreme Court decisions have upheld Congress’s power to define piracy in terms of the law of nations. Contemporary international agreements, including the Convention on the High Seas, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) address piracy. The United States is party to two of the agreements, and the third (UNCLOS) is generally accepted as reflecting customary international law. A recent development in a piracy trial in federal court in Norfolk, VA, has highlighted a potential limitation in the definition of piracy under the United States Code. In ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court stated that the act of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, requires a robbery on the high seas. Thus, it appears that absent an actual robbery at sea, individuals may not be found guilty of the act of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651, but may be tried for other offenses, including the offenses of attack to plunder a vessel, or committing violence against a person on a vessel. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report for Congress, No. R41455: Accessed November 10, 2010 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41455.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41455.pdf Shelf Number: 120276 Keywords: Armed Robbery Against ShipsMaritime CrimePiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: Gilpin, Raymond Title: Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy Summary: The upsurge in attacks by Somali pirates between 2005 and mid-2009 reflects decades of political unrest, maritime lawlessness and severe economic decline. Piracy has dire implications for economic development and political stability in Somalia, with economic prospects constrained, business confidence compromised and human security worsening. It could also have a destabilizing effect on global trade and security unless immediate steps are taken to craft a coordinated strategy to address the complex factors that trigger and sustain crime and impunity on the high seas. However, poorly designed and implemented strategies could inadvertently strengthen the hand of extremists in and around Somalia. The Somali authorities and their international partners should plan for a sustained application of “smart power” by all stakeholders. This paper offers practical strategies to mitigate the rising costs of Somali piracy and lay the foundation for lasting peace. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed November 27, 2010 at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.pdf Shelf Number: 120282 Keywords: Armed Robbery Against ShipsCosts of CrimeMaritime CrimePiracy/PiratesPirates (Somalia) |
Author: Percy, Sarah Title: The Business of Piracy in Somalia Summary: This paper argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, Somali piracy is likely to increase if Somalia's domestic stability is improved, and that naval counter-piracy efforts had limited and unpredicted effects. To make this argument we analyze the underlying factors driving piracy off the coast of Somalia and examine the effectiveness of the international naval anti-piracy mission. We show that while the navies perform well with respect to their declared aims, they failed to resolve the piracy problem through 2009: pirates were not deterred from attacking ships in the Gulf of Aden and have expanded their operations in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Evidence from domestic conditions in Somalia suggests that land-based approaches focusing on rebuilding state capabilities may also backfire as economic development and greater stability aid pirates. We examine the incentives of the various interest groups in the Gulf of Aden and conclude that the key players have an interest in the continuation of the piracy off Somalia, as long as violence does not escalate and ransoms remain at their current modest levels. Details: Berlin: German Institute for Economic Research, 2010. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper 1033: Accessed November 27, 2010 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.358500.de/dp1033.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.358500.de/dp1033.pdf Shelf Number: 120283 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracy/PiratesPirates (Somalia) |
Author: King, Michael G., Jr. Title: Modern Piracy and Regional Security Cooperation in the Maritime Domain: The Middle East and Southeast Asia Summary: This thesis examines the development of cooperative maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Recent regional efforts to combat maritime security threats in the Gulf of Aden have drawn comparisons to similar efforts undertaken in the Malacca Straits. However, such comparisons fail to address the unique nature of security cooperation in the Persian Gulf, specifically the necessity of external security support for states in the region. This thesis argues that despite similarities shared by the two regions, the states of the Persian Gulf must deal with issues of prioritization, regional animosities, and external dependence before they can attempt to develop cooperative maritime security arrangements akin to those existing in Southeast Asia. Success will require a concerted effort by these states as well as the realization, by the United States, that it is undermining effective security cooperation in the region. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 27, 2010 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Mar/10Mar_King.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Mar/10Mar_King.pdf Shelf Number: 120284 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates (Middle East - Southeast Asia) |
Author: Hansen, Stig Jarle Title: Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception and Remedies Summary: This report explores several of the most commonly stated causes of Somali piracy, as well as the history and structure of Somali piracy, showing that piracy is rather a spatiotemporal and geographically constrained phenomenon than a general Somali phenomenon, which started after the collapse of Somalia in 1991. Solutions must take this into consideration, focus on local conditions in the pirate areas and the causes that made piracy explode, first in 2004-2005, and most recently in 2008 and onwards. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2009. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: NIBR Report 2009:29: Accessed November 27, 2010 at: http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf Shelf Number: 120285 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates (Somalia) |
Author: Mulugeta, Kidist Title: Piracy Off the Somali Coast Summary: The aim of this brief is to determine the threat of piracy in the coastal waters of Somalia. The brief in divided into five parts. The definition and historical development of worldwide piracy will be examined in the first section. The second part explores the causes and consequences of piracy in Somalia. Herein, the danger of maritime Piracy to international navigation will be investigated. The third part examines the international response in combating and controlling this threat. The fourth part analyzes major challenges encountered in combating piracy. Finally, various possible options for combating maritime piracy will be forwarded. Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: InterAfrica Group, Center for Dialogue on Humanitarian, Peace and Development Issues in the Horn of Africa, 2009. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://interafricagroup.org/pdf/Human%20Security%20Program/Briefing13%20on%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Socali%20coast.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://interafricagroup.org/pdf/Human%20Security%20Program/Briefing13%20on%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Socali%20coast.pdf Shelf Number: 120347 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiratesPirates/Piracy |
Author: Arky, Aaron S. Title: Trading Nets for Guns: The Impact of Illegal Fishing on Piracy in Somalia Summary: Somali piracy reached a record high level in 2008, with 111 of the 293 worldwide attacks occurring in the waters surrounding Somalia. The incidence of piracy in Somali waters almost doubled in 2009, and the Somali share of total piracy attacks worldwide increased from under 40% to over 50%. Often overlooked is the initial upsurge in piracy, following the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, which contributed to a sharp increase in piracy in 2005 and again in 2008. This thesis addresses why this initial surge occurred when it did. This increase can be attributed to the transformation of the pirate business model from fishermen who started to defend themselves, to the organized crime that displaced them in 2004 due to the opportunistic behavior of warlords. A convergence of factors contributing to the conditions at the time of the tsunami had short-term effects in 2005 that were enough to provide a boost to the already increasing business model of piracy. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=131926&coll=limited Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=131926&coll=limited Shelf Number: 120362 Keywords: Illegal FishingMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the EnvironmentOrganized CrimePiracy/PiratesPiratesWildlife Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security Summary: Ferries are a vital component of the U.S. transportation system and 2008 data show that U.S. ferries carried more than 82 million passengers and over 25 million vehicles. Ferries are also potential targets for terrorism in the United States and have been terrorist targets overseas. GAO was asked to review ferry security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance and what risks it identified; and (2) federal agencies, ferry and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect ferries and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements, analyzed 2006 through 2009 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at five domestic and one international locations with varying passenger volumes and relative risk profiles. Site visits provided information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. This is the public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. The Coast Guard assessed the risk--including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--to ferries in accordance with DHS guidance on risk assessment and, along with other maritime stakeholders, identified risks associated with explosive devices, among other things. Although in April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that there have been no credible terrorist threats identified against ferries and their facilities in at least the last 12 months, maritime intelligence officials have identified the presence of terrorist groups with the capability of attacking a ferry. Many of the Coast Guard, ferry system and law enforcement officials GAO spoke with generally believe ferries are vulnerable to passenger- or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, although not all ferry systems transport vehicles. The Coast Guard has also identified the potential consequences of an attack, which could include possible loss of life and negative economic effects. In April 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that the relative risk to ferries is increasing, as evidenced by attacks against land-based mass transit and other targets overseas. Federal agencies--including the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--ferry operators, and law enforcement entities report that they have taken various actions to enhance the security of ferries and facilities and have implemented related laws, regulations, and guidance, but the Coast Guard may be missing opportunities to enhance ferry security. Security measures taken by the Coast Guard have included providing a security presence on ferries during transit. Coast Guard officials also reported that they are revising regulations to improve ferry operator training and developing guidance on screening. Ferry operators' security actions have included developing and implementing security plans and screening vehicles and passengers, among other things. However, the Coast Guard had not evaluated and, if determined warranted, acted on all findings and recommendations resulting from five agency-contracted studies on ferry security completed in 2005 and 2006. Reports from these studies included several recommendations for standardizing and enhancing screening across ferry operators. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that agencies should ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved, and that managers take action to evaluate and resolve matters identified in these audits and reviews. As a result of our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast Guard officials stated they planned to review the reports. Taking action to address the recommendations in these reports, if determined warranted by the Coast Guard's evaluation, could enhance ferry security. Furthermore, Coast Guard documents from 2004 state that the agency should reassess vehicle screening requirements pending the completion of the ferry security reports or if the threat changes. However, no specific plans were in place to reassess these requirements. By taking action to reassess its screening requirements, the agency would be better positioned to determine if changes are warranted. GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, after evaluating the completed studies on ferry security, reassess vehicle screening requirements and take further actions to enhance security, if determined warranted. DHS concurred with our recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-207: Accessed December 7, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11207.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11207.pdf Shelf Number: 120395 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecuritiyTerrorism |
Author: Martin, Tony Title: Report on Foreign Fishing Vessel Security Issues in the Pacific Islands Region Summary: The threat of terrorist activity associated with foreign fishing vessels operating in the Pacific region is regarded as very low. These vessels do, however, represent a security risk in a number of areas: illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, people smuggling, trafficking in persons, illegal immigration, smuggling of weapons and drugs, prostitution, money laundering and corruption. The extent of risk in each of these areas is difficult to quantify with any certainty because of the lack of reliable data. At the international, regional and sub-regional levels, fisheries management is the subject of a large number of international and regional regulatory instruments. This is not the case when it comes to fishing vessel safety, training and conditions of employment of crews and protection of the marine environment where there has been a marked reluctance internationally to adopt and enforce standards. In the Pacific region, there is a lack of understanding on the part of those responsible for fisheries management, maritime administration and border management issues, of the respective roles each plays and the issues they face. Communication and information sharing between these sectors occurs infrequently if at all. In this report, specific measures are proposed to mitigate the security risks posed by foreign fishing vessels including wider use of existing information for monitoring vessels’ locations and their activities and, in due course, an ILO-based system for seafarer identification. The measures, with some modification, reflect some of the provisions of the maritime security regime (the ISPS Code) for international merchant shipping that might usefully be applied to the fishing sector for border management control purposes. Details: Noumea, New Caledonia: Regional Maritime Programme, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2005. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2010 at: dns1.spc.int/coastfish/Reports/HOF5/FFVsecurity.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Asia URL: Shelf Number: 120441 Keywords: Fishing IndustryMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOffenses Against the EnvironmentTerrorism |
Author: Wombwell, James A. Title: The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends Summary: This study surveys the experience of the United States, Great Britain, and other seafaring nations in addressing the problem of piracy at sea, then derives insights from that experience that may be relevant to the suppression of the current surge of piratical activity. Wombwell, a retired naval officer, traces the course of several outbreaks of piracy during the past 300 years in a variety of geographical areas. Although each case varies in its details, Wombwell concludes that enough similarities exist to permit several useful generalizations. Among these are the causes of piracy, the factors that permit the behavior to flourish, and the range of countermeasures that have been available to policymakers seeking to eradicate the problem. When conditions are favorable for piracy to develop, and no strong response is made by the forces of law and order, what began as low-level brigandage often grows to outrageous proportions, ultimately requiring significant military resources to suppress or eliminate the threat posed to legitimate commerce. Details: Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2010. 195p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 32: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/wombwell_32.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/wombwell_32.pdf Shelf Number: 120498 Keywords: Historical StudiesMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: Bradford, John Title: Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: U.S., Japanese, Regional, and Industry Strategies Summary: Pirate activity in strategically important waterways around the globe, from the Strait of Malacca to the waters off the Horn of Africa, has garnered significant attention recently from states dependent on these waters for international trade and the free movement of goods. State responses have ranged from independently dispatching naval forces to patrol major sea lines of communication, to multinational patrols and information sharing mechanisms to increase domain awareness. Less visible, but of equal-or perhaps greater-importance are the efforts of ship owners, operators, and maritime industry groups toward increasing ship security and combating pirate attacks. Originally presented at a workshop NBR collaborated on with the Japan Forum on International Relations in Tokyo, Japan, in May 2010, this special report focuses on U.S., Japanese, regional, and industry strategies to combat piracy and other maritime security threats in Southeast Asian waterways. Details: Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: NBR Special Report #24: Accessed December 16, 2010 at: http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR24_MaritimeSecurity.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR24_MaritimeSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 120532 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiratesPirates/Piracy |
Author: Bellamy, Liam Title: What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy? Summary: This paper examines the tactical options available to ships that are under threat from piracy off the Somali coast. It argues that we may be witnessing the first asymmetric naval campaign and that vessels should adopt protective tactics to match this reality and the changing tactics of the pirates themselves. Details: Athens, Greece: Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), 2009. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 129: Accessed December 17, 2010 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=97573 Year: 2009 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=97573 Shelf Number: 120539 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Moller, Bjorn Title: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy Summary: Piracy is an old problem which is now again attracting attention, mainly because of the surge of pirate attacks off the coasts of Somalia. Closer analysis shows the problem to be of quite modest proportions. The international naval protection of merchant shipping holds out some prospects of containing the problem, but it is most likely to solve itself. If international shipping opts for the route south of Africa, piracy will die out for a lack of targets. Maritime terrorism is, likewise, a problem of very limited proportions. It is often conflated with piracy, but there are significant differences between the two phenomena, the latter being undertaken for selfish reasons, the former for the sake of some higher cause. Whereas it is conceivable that maritime terrorists will gradually transform themselves into pirates, a transformation in the opposite direction is well nigh inconceivable. Besides the analysis of these two phenomena, the overlap between them and certain naval strategies are also briefly touched upon. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2009. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2009:02: Accessed December 21, 2010 at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-02_%20Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-02_%20Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 120561 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyTerrorism |
Author: Bowden, Anna Title: The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy Summary: At the end of 2010, around 500 seafarers from more than 18 countries are being held hostage by pirates. Piracy clearly affects the world‘s largest trade transport industry, but how much is it costing the world? One Earth Future (OEF) Foundation has conducted a large-scale study to quantify the cost of piracy as part of its Oceans Beyond Piracy project. Based on our calculations, maritime piracy is costing the international economy between $7 to $12 billion, per year. This report details the major calculations and conclusions made in the study. The project focuses on direct (first) order costs, but also includes some estimates of secondary (macroeconomic costs), where data is available. It concentrates on the supply-side costs to both industry and governments. The study set out to analyze the cost of piracy to the Horn of Africa, Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea, and the Malacca Straits. The focus is inevitably on the costs of Somali piracy because this is the region where contemporary piracy is most highly concentrated and is the greatest source of current data and information. This project is designed to be a collaborative effort, and we welcome feedback and suggestions from stakeholders concerned with the issue of maritime piracy. We hope that it will be a useful tool for analysts and policy makers working towards solutions to piracy. Details: Louisville, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed January 31, 2010 at: http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 120641 Keywords: Costs of CrimeMaritime CrimePiracy (Pirates)Pirates |
Author: Raidt, John Title: Advancing U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain Summary: This report presents the analysis and recommendations of the Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center in cooperation with the On the Horizon Project to advance U.S. strategic interests in West Africa. Unaddressed problems of poor governance, severe poverty, widespread public corruption, and growing insecurity from the presence of criminal and militant enterprises engaged in theft, terrorism, trafficking, piracy, poaching, and pollution will continue to punish local populations and create conditions of instability that undermine public order from greater levels of armed confl ict and mass migration and threaten the reliable flow of oil from the region. As noted in a recent United Nations report, the “combination of coups from the top and insurgencies from below render West Africa in the opinion of the UN the least politically stable region in the world.” While this report focuses on the maritime domain, the Atlantic Council approaches the regional security challenges from a broad perspective. Security issues are holistic and must be addressed as such. The dynamics and consequences of insecurity in the maritime domain are part of a wider, more complex political and security dynamic encompassing rule of law, governance, public capacities, and economic and human development across geographic, societal, and national domains. Just as the causes, manifestations, and consequences of insecurity are comprehensive, so too must be the preventatives and remedies. This document provides a broad strategic-level analysis and corresponding recommendations for action that can, and we believe should, be supported and implemented by U.S. and allied policymakers, African leaders, and key stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2010. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/advancing-us-african-global-interests-security-stability-west-africa-maritime-domain.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/advancing-us-african-global-interests-security-stability-west-africa-maritime-domain.pdf Shelf Number: 120632 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPoachingTerrorismTraffickingTransnational Crime |
Author: Marts, Charles Title: Piracy Ransoms -- Conflicting Perspectives Summary: This paper presents both sides of the debate over whether States should allow payment of ransoms to pirates. United States Executive Order 13536 and other recent national and international legislation have brought increased awareness to this issue. This paper does not attempt to settle the ransom debate, but instead highlights the key issues, which perhaps will inspire progress in the fight to curb piracy. In their simplest distillations the positions are the pro-ransom stance advocating use of all means available to limit immediate threats of violence and disaster; versus the anti-ransom stance advocating use of all means available to limit acts of piracy over a longer term. Maritime industry practitioners assert that paying ransoms are the only tool available once a ship has been hijacked. Paying ransoms, they claim, minimizes risks of escalated violence, revenue liability, and environmental disaster. Those individuals/States opposed to paying ransoms believe that each ransom payment fuels and perpetuates the menace of piracy and that the eventual outcome of this escalation would likely be military intervention. In the final section of this paper, we briefly examine recent legislation and a small sample of international views that illustrate the practical complexity of ransom policies. A reader unfamiliar with the laws and opinions concerning this issue may find it useful to read this section before jumping into the arguments. Details: Louisville, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed February 2, 2011 at: http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Ransom-%20Charlie%20Marts.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Ransom-%20Charlie%20Marts.pdf Shelf Number: 120657 Keywords: Hijacking of ShipsMaritime CrimePirates/PiracyRansoms |
Author: Andersen, Elizabeth Title: Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring the Options in International Law Summary: Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring the Options in International Law captures the discussions and recommendations of a distinguished group of international law and governance professors, legal experts, and judges who met in Washington D.C. for a workshop convened through the efforts of One Earth Future Foundati on, the Academic Council on the United Nations System, and the American Society of International Law. The workshop examined the legal framework currently employed to suppress piracy and explored potential alternatives or augmentations to the existing structures. More than anything else, the workshop revealed the immense complexity surrounding piracy. Two important aspects of the problem that emerged during the workshop are worth highlighting here: First, although there is a general tendency today to associate piracy with the failed state of Somalia, only about 40% of piracy events actually occur around the Horn of Africa. Maritime piracy is a persistent global criminal activity, and solving the Somali problem does not solve piracy in the rest of the world. It is important to keep in mind, while considering the findings of this workshop, that the legal framework applies globally. Second, piracy is a distinct crime in itself, but it often involves a complex nexus of other crimes, which are subject to different jurisdictional and legal rules than piracy. Pirate groups often commit, for example, assault, theft , kidnapping, torture, extortion, money laundering, and arms dealing — some of which may under certain circumstances constitute piracy while others may not. The legal responses to piracy should take into consideration this complexity. The report indicates that while the legal framework for dealing with piracy is well established, there are practical difficulties in implementation and outstanding questions that require further research. Our organizations welcome the opportunity to engage with others to develop appropriate avenues for this research. Details: Louisville, CO: One Earth Future, 2010. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2011 at: http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Piracy-OneEarthFuture.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Piracy-OneEarthFuture.pdf Shelf Number: 120659 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened Summary: The State Department and two components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard, are responsible for preventing illegal immigration at U.S. seaports and identifying individuals who are potential security risks. The International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (ILO 185) to establish an international framework of seafarer identification documents and reduce their vulnerability to fraud and exploitation. GAO was asked to examine (1) measures federal agencies take to address risks posed by foreign seafarers and the challenges, if any, DHS faces; (2) the challenges, if any, DHS faces in tracking illegal entries by foreign seafarers and how it enforces penalties; and (3) the implementation status of ILO 185. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, interviewed federal and industry officials, and visited seven seaports based on volume of seafarer arrivals. The visits provided insights, but were not projectable to all seaports. GAO recommends that DHS assess risks of not electronically verifying cargo vessel seafarers for admissibility, identify reasons for absconder and deserter data variances, and, with the Department of Justice (DOJ), develop a plan with timelines to adjust civil monetary penalties for inflation. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO’s recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-195: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11195.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11195.pdf Shelf Number: 120669 Keywords: Cargo SecurityImmigrationMaritime CrimeMaritime SecuritySeaports |
Author: Carafano, James Jay Title: Taking the Fight to the Pirates: Applying Counterterrorist Methods to the Threat of Priacy Summary: Piracy is a growing threat to global commerce and is becoming a U.S. security issue. While anti-piracy efforts have successfully reduced piracy in the Malacca Strait, Somali pirates have expanded their operations further into the Indian Ocean. Ending the threat from Somali pirates will require shifting from a defensive posture of trying to protect ships passing through the high-risk zones—there are too many ships, too few military vessels, and too many pirates—to an offensive strategy of attacking the pirates at their weak points. The United States and other countries should use every means at their disposal to deny the pirates any safe haven—geographical, financial, or legal—and bring them to justice wherever it is most convenient. Details: Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Backgrounder No. 2524: Accessed March 14, 2011 at: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2524.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2524.pdf Shelf Number: 120929 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Vogel, Augustus Title: Investing in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges Summary: A growing number of Africa’s security challenges – narcotics trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, and armed robberies, among others – take place at sea. Illicit actors exploit Africa’s maritime space given its expansiveness and the limited number of vessels African governments can field to interdict this activity. In this Africa Security Brief, Augustus Vogel argues that technology can dramatically improve Africa’s maritime security coverage. However, to do so will require engaging Africa’s scientists who can guide and sustain these efforts. This will yield not only security but environmental and meteorological benefits for the continent. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 10: Accessed March 15, 2011 at: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/ACSS-Research-Papers/ACSS-10.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/ACSS-Research-Papers/ACSS-10.pdf Shelf Number: 120917 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllegal FishingKidnappingsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesViolence (Africa) |
Author: Caldwell, Stephen L. Title: Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa Summary: As GAO reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made progress in implementing its plan for countering piracy, in collaboration with industry and international partners. However, piracy is an escalating problem, and the U.S. government has not updated its plan as GAO recommended. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles. Many stakeholders credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels, but since 2007 the location of attacks has spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast and much harder to patrol Indian Ocean. Also, from 2007 to 2010 the total number of reported hijackings increased sevenfold, and, after dropping in 2008 and 2009, the pirates' success rate rebounded from 22 percent in 2009 to almost 30 percent in 2010. In addition, the number of hostages captured and the amount of ransom paid increased sharply, and pirate attacks have grown more violent. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa as effectively as possible, but as pirate operations have evolved, changes to the plan have not kept pace. The United States has not systematically tracked the costs of its counterpiracy efforts and is unable to determine whether counterpiracy investments are achieving the desired results. According to a statement by an NSS official, the United States is reviewing U.S. piracy policy to focus future U.S. efforts. These recent steps are encouraging because the growing frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa provides a renewed sense of urgency for taking action. GAO's September 2010 report found that U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but they could take additional steps to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has, among other things, collaborated with international partners to support prosecution of piracy suspects and worked with industry partners to educate ship owners on how to protect their vessels from pirate attack. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple U.S. agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable. For instance, the departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect or examine information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. In September 2010, GAO recommended that the NSC identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and develop guidance to ensure agency efforts work together efficiently and effectively. In March 2011, an NSS official stated that an interagency policy review will examine roles and responsibilities and implementation actions to focus U.S. efforts for the next several years. It is too early to assess this effort's effectiveness in bolstering interagency collaboration in U.S. counterpiracy efforts. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the NSC (1) update its Action Plan; (2) assess the costs and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (3) clarify agency roles and responsibilities. A National Security Staff (NSS) official provided a statement that an interagency group is reviewing U.S. piracy policy, costs, metrics, roles, and responsibilities. Agencies also commented to clarify information in this statement Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-449T: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf Shelf Number: 121026 Keywords: Hijackings of ShipsHostagesMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords. European Union Committee Title: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta: Report with Evidence Summary: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean is a serious and ongoing threat to UK and EU interests. It could spread within the region, which is unstable. The EU’s Operation Atalanta, with its operational headquarters based in Northwood, UK, has made a strong contribution to combating piracy, in particular protecting World Food Programme (WFP) ships and coordinating with other maritime forces in the area. However there are a number of areas that need improvement and require action. Naval vessels and their crews are very expensive resources in short supply. With more surveillance aircraft the Atalanta fleet could be far more effective and efficient. Similarly, the permanent availability of a tanker would prevent Atalanta vessels from having to return to port on a regular basis solely to refuel. The WFP’s use of small, slow ships makes them especially vulnerable to pirate attacks. As a result they require greater military protection and resources. The Government and the EU should insist that the WFP charter faster, larger and more modern vessels. It is even more efficient for military contingents to be placed on these vessels rather than having warships and their crew shadowing each delivery. It should be a condition of the award of a WFP contract that, when requested, the flag state allow these vessels to carry Atalanta military forces on board. Military personnel placed on commercial shipping should be given specialised training. We agree with UK policy that private security guards should not be placed on commercial shipping because of the increased risks to crew and ships. The insurance industry is not taking sufficient responsibility for ensuring that commercial shipping transiting the area complies with readily available, tried and tested procedures to reduce the risk of capture by pirates. At a minimum the industry should impose increased insurance premiums on ship operators who do not comply. We agree with the increasingly robust action taken against pirates by Atalanta forces. There is a need to change the perceived risk/reward ratio for pirate activity. We welcome the EU’s agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles to prosecute pirates, and the negotiations now taking place with other states in the region. We wait to see the number of successful prosecutions that result. There will be no solution to the problem of piracy without a solution to the root causes of the conflict on land in Somalia. We support the EU’s efforts to deal with Somalia’s problems by building up the security sector in line with democratic norms, providing humanitarian assistance and assisting the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland to strengthen their coastguards. Details: London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010. 114p. Source: Internet Resource: 12th Report of Session 2009-10: Accessed March 29, 2011 at: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf Shelf Number: 121191 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Mair, Stefan, ed. Title: Piracy and Maritime Security: Regional Characteristics and Political, Military, Legal and Economic Implications Summary: Maritime security has deteriorated over the past 15 years, with a sharp increase in pirate attacks on vessels and installations. The worst affected region is no longer Southeast Asia (in particular the Straits of Malacca) but the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. Although the issue attracts enormous public attention in Europe, the direct economic costs are actually relatively limited. Piracy and maritime insecurity become a matter for action by the international community principally when the direct economic impact becomes conflated with a complex situation of regional insecurity. In that case military action is central to containing the problem. But a purely military operation cannot eliminate the causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, in the Somali Basin or anywhere else. As the example of the Straits of Malacca demonstrates, multilateral international efforts to resolve political conflicts and establish effective statehood are crucial. Details: Berlin:Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), 2011. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2011 at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP03_mrs_ks.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP03_mrs_ks.pdf Shelf Number: 121306 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Brannon, Stephen Title: Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy Summary: Once thought to be the scourge of a bygone age, maritime piracy has re-emerged in recent years as a serious threat to both crews and property on the high seas. Globally, attacks have risen from 239 in 2006 to 445 in 2010, with 1181 seafarers taken hostage taken last year alone. The total annual economic cost is estimated at $7-12 billion. Despite growing awareness of the threat, and a variety of national, regional and international initiatives, the tide of piracy continues to rise. It is in this context that the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DP World convened the conference entitled “Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy,” held in Dubai on April 18-19, 2011. The gathering brought leaders from government, the shipping industry and non-governmental organizations together with renowned experts in the field of counter-piracy to discuss ways in which the international response to the global challenge of maritime piracy might be supported and enhanced, and to identify specific, tangible opportunities for collaborative action. In order to stimulate innovative thinking on the subject, the conference organizers engaged the Dubai School of Government to commission a series of short briefing papers reflecting the cutting edge of academic and expert thought on piracy and related issues. These papers correspond to the four conference content categories: General Background and Regional Overviews; Addressing Root Causes; Opportunities for Information Sharing and Civil-Military Cooperation; and, Relevant Issues in International Law. The selected papers cover a wide range of topics and broach a number of key themes, ranging from the hidden economy of piracy to the plight of captive seafarers. Collectively, however, the papers share a common perspective: In spite of substantial investments in a number of areas, the current international response falls short of what is required to end this phenomenon. Furthermore, an effective and enduring solution to the global challenge of maritime piracy must entail a long-term, comprehensive effort, both onshore and offshore, which involves all relevant public and private sector stakeholders. Details: Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2011. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.dsg.ae/PUBLICATIONS/PublicationDetail.aspx?udt_826_param_detail=3099 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.dsg.ae/PUBLICATIONS/PublicationDetail.aspx?udt_826_param_detail=3099 Shelf Number: 121456 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Padavan, Frank Title: At the Water's Edge: Port Security in the Age of Terrorism Summary: The goal of the New York State Senate Majority Task Force on Port Security was to identify the state issues involved in an area of national, and global concern. The first part of the report looks at the maritime transportation system, from its creation to today, including an assessment of the importance of our ports; to commerce; to our national security; and to the environment. Part II discusses the terrorist threat, including an analysis of the vulnerability of our ports, particularly since September 11, 2001. Part III focuses on the federal and state response to the terrorist threat. Part IV looks at ways of securing our ports, including a proposal for an integrated approach to maritime transportation security. Details: Albany, NY: New York State Senate Majority Task Force on Port Security, 2006. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2011 at: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/001-nysl/ocn432663413 Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/001-nysl/ocn432663413 Shelf Number: 121583 Keywords: Maritime CrimePort SecurityTerrorism (New York) |
Author: Groot, Olaf J. de Title: Gov-arrrgh-nance: Jolly Rogers and Dodgy Rulers Summary: In this paper, we argue that the effect of governance on the emergence of crimes of different levels of sophistication is highly non-linear. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive to establishing any business, including illicit enterprises. At the bottom of the spectrum, therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved governance. With further improvements in governance criminal activities decline. We find strong and consistent support for this hypothesis using the International Maritime Bureau's dataset on piracy. Piracy is reported by ship-owners, giving a unique insight into crime in badly governed countries which were systematically excluded from previous analyses. We show that profitable forms of piracy flourish where on the one hand there is stability and infrastructure, but on the other hand the state does not have the capacity to intervene and/or bureaucrats can be bribed to turn a blind eye. For minor acts of theft from ships the pattern is quadratic: piracy first rises and then falls as governance improves. Details: Berlin: DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research, 2010. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: DIW Berlin Discussion Papers 1063: Accessed May 5, 2011 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.361831.de/dp1063.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.361831.de/dp1063.pdf Shelf Number: 121650 Keywords: Illegal BehaviorMaritime CrimePirates/Piracy |
Author: de Coning, Eve Title: Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry. Focus on: Trafficking in Persons; Smuggling of Migrants; Illicit Drugs Trafficking Summary: The study posed the questions whether there is transnational organized crime and other criminal activity in the fishing industry and, if so, what the vulnerabilities of the fishing industry are to transnational organized crime or other criminal activity. The research took the form of a six-month desk review of available literature, supplemented by ad hoc consultations and a two-day expert consultation held in Vienna, Austria. Importantly the study did not set out to tarnish the fishing industry. Rather, the study sought to determine whether criminal activities take place within the fishing industry to the detriment of law-abiding fishers, the legitimate fishing industry, local fishing communities and the general public alike. The study considered the involvement of the fishing industry or the use of fishing vessels in trafficking in persons (Chapter 2); smuggling of migrants (Chapter 3); illicit traffic in drugs (Chapter 4); and other forms of crime such as marine living resource crime, corruption, and piracy and other security related crimes (Chapter 5). Details: Vienna: United Nations, 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 9, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_in_the_Fishing_Industry.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_in_the_Fishing_Industry.pdf Shelf Number: 121659 Keywords: Child TraffickingDrug TraffickingForced LaborHuman TraffickingIllegal FishingIllegal MigrantsMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the EnvironmentOrganized CrimePirates/Piracy |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Counter-Piracy Programme: Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects Summary: The UNODC counter-piracy programme (CPP) began in 2009 with a mandate to help one country - Kenya - deal with an increase of attacks by Somali pirates. That mandate has now widened and the UNODC CPP is working in six countries in the Somali Basin region. The CPP has proved effective in supporting efforts to detain and prosecute piracy suspects according to international standards of rule of law and respect for human rights. But Somali criminals are outpacing international efforts to stem the menace. The root causes of piracy are found on land and tackling them requires security on the ground. As long as piracy is so lucrative and other economic options so bleak, the incentives are obvious. The CPP focuses on fair and efficient trials and imprisonment in regional centres, humane and secure imprisonment in Somalia, and fair and efficient trials in Somalia. The efforts of UNODC and its multilateral partners have had considerable success across the criminal justice sector. Kenya is currently trying 69 suspects, having convicted 50, and Seychelles, despite its tiny size, has undertaken 31 prosecutions and already convicted 22 suspects. Mauritius has declared that it too will assist in the prosecution of pirates. These countries, as well as Tanzania and Maldives, continue to be assisted by UNODC with judicial, prosecutorial and police capacity building programmes. Prisons and other buildings have been supplied in some countries as well as office equipment, law books and specialist coast guard equipment. The Executive Director of UNODC, Mr Yury Fedotov, has called for support to expand his office's regional programme to even more countries; to enable Somalia to upgrade its prisons and courts; and ensure that Somali pirates convicted in other countries can serve their sentences in their home country. With some 740 men currently in detention in 13 countries UNODC is addressing an urgent situation, given that long-term imprisonment places a "very substantial burden" on prosecuting countries. Sentences generally range from 5 to 20 years, although sentences of up to more than 33 years have been handed down. Somalia's prison system has been chronically under-funded and its capacity to prosecute and imprison pirates needs to be urgently strengthened. UNODC has already started this work by completing work on a new prison in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. By building up weak institutions in the parts of Somalia where we can work, UNODC is helping to address the problem within a rule-of-law framework, and also beginning to build pride and capacity in Somalia's own institutions. "It is clear that the only viable long-term solution to the Somali piracy problem is to restore law and order in Somalia (including in its waters)," Mr. Fedotov said. "It is also clear that this solution is some years off and will require concerted and coordinated international effort." Piracy is feeding off the instability, weak governance and poverty that plague Somalia. By strengthening the rule of law to combat piracy, the UNODC also helping Somalia to rebuild a more just and stable society for all its citizens. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: UNODC Regional Office in Eastern Africa, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/piracy/20110209.UNODC_Counter_Piracy_February_Issue.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/piracy/20110209.UNODC_Counter_Piracy_February_Issue.pdf Shelf Number: 121733 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Africa) |
Author: Delicato, Vincenzo Title: Maritime Security and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Approaches Summary: The Mediterranean Sea is particularly affected by illicit trafficking in drugs. Italy’s Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for all initiatives aimed at preventing and combating illicit drug trafficking in Italy and is also entrusted with planning and coordinating sea activities. In the last few years, a set of international rules has been drawn up to facilitate intervention at sea and standardize control procedures. In the field of drug trafficking, ad hoc European regulations have been developed and two centers for analysis and coordination in operations against drug trafficking at sea set up. However, Italy — while participating in the most recent operational cooperation initiatives — has not yet ratified the Council of Europe agreement implementing article 17 of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. It would be desirable to adopt more comprehensive legislative measures and establish intervention criteria for all law enforcement actors involved. Details: Washington, DC: Th e German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Mediterranean Paper Series 2010: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Delicato_drugs_final_Sept10.pdf;jsessionid=aJAqWaBkuOX8Pfhoia Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Delicato_drugs_final_Sept10.pdf;jsessionid=aJAqWaBkuOX8Pfhoia Shelf Number: 121761 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Kraska, James Title: The Report on the U.S. Naval War College Workshop on Somali Piracy: Fresh Thinking for an Old Threat Summary: On April 7 and 8, the International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College conducted a Counter-piracy Workshop comprised of 50 legal and policy experts from across the globe. The Workshop was designed to take a fresh look at the threat of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa, assess the tremendous progress in international law and diplomacy that has transpired to address the problem, and to take a measure of the way forward. By collecting many of the world’s top experts to consider the threat of maritime piracy, and by providing a forum to discuss the issue in a frank and open dialogue, the Workshop revisited some conventional thinking and explored new approaches. The participants brought significant diversity and depth of expertise. Many are involved in day-to-day decision-making on counter-piracy operations, policy and international law in Europe, Asia and the United States. Details: Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 2009. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2011 at: http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/521cc632-2c29-4190-97d0-2d3a9dacd2c6/Countering-Maritime-Piracy Year: 2009 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/521cc632-2c29-4190-97d0-2d3a9dacd2c6/Countering-Maritime-Piracy Shelf Number: 121779 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy |
Author: Ploch, Lauren Title: Piracy Off the Horn of Africa Summary: Pirate attacks in the waters off Somalia and the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought renewed international attention to the long-standing problem of maritime piracy. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), at least 219 attacks occurred in the region in 2010, with 49 successful hijackings. Somali pirates have attacked ships in the Gulf of Aden, along Somalia’s eastern coastline, and outward into the Indian Ocean. Using increasingly sophisticated tactics, these pirates now operate as far east as the Maldives in good weather, and as far south as the Mozambique Channel. Hostage taking for ransom has been a hallmark of Somali piracy, and the IMB reports that more hostages, over 1,180, were taken at sea in 2010 than any year since records began; over 86% of those were taken by Somali pirates. The increase in pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa is directly linked to continuing insecurity and the absence of the rule of law in war-torn Somalia. The absence of a functioning central government there provides freedom of action for pirates and remains the single greatest challenge to regional security. The lack of law enforcement capacity creates a haven where pirates hold hostages during ransom negotiations that can last for months. Some allege that the absence of Somali coastal security authorities has allowed illegal international fishing and maritime dumping to go unchecked, which in turn has undermined coastal communities’ economic prospects, providing economic or political motivation to some pirates. The apparent motive of most pirate groups, however, is profit, and piracy has proven to be lucrative. Somalia’s “pirate economy” has grown substantially in the past two years, with ransoms now averaging more than $5 million. These revenues may further exacerbate the ongoing conflict and undermine regional security. The annual cost of piracy to the global economy ranges between $7 and $12 billion, by some estimates. The U.N Security Council has issued a series of resolutions since 2008 to facilitate an international response, which is coordinated by a multilateral Contact Group. The Council has authorized international navies to counter piracy both in Somali territorial waters and ashore, with the consent of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and has also authorized, as an exemption to the U.N. arms embargo on Somalia, support for the TFG security forces. Counter-piracy patrols by multinational naval forces near Somalia are intended to compliment mariners’ self-protection measures. Increased patrols and proactive efforts by ships have reduced attacks in the Gulf of Aden, but the U.N. Secretary-General warns that “while the effectiveness of naval disruption operations has increased and more pirates have been arrested and prosecuted, this has not stopped piracy. The trend of the increased levels of violence employed by the pirates as well as their expanding reach is disconcerting.” Some suggest that a perception of impunity exists among pirates and financiers; nine out of ten Somali pirates apprehended by naval patrols are reportedly released because no jurisdiction is prepared to prosecute them. The United States has sought to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute Somali piracy through a range of interagency and multilateral coordination and enforcement mechanisms. The Obama Administration has initiated a new “dual track” policy toward Somalia, where some contend that international efforts to build a credible central authority have failed. Congress has examined options to address piracy both diplomatically and militarily. Congress appropriates funding and provides oversight for policy initiatives with implications for piracy in the region, including maritime security assistance to regional governments, support to peacekeeping operations in Somalia, and funding for U.S. Navy operations. Congress continues to debate options for addressing pirate safe havens and improving the prospects for prosecution of pirate suspects. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf Shelf Number: 121821 Keywords: Hijacking of ShipsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyRansom |
Author: Hurlburt, Kaija Title: The Human Cost of Somali Piracy Summary: In 2010, thousands of seafarers in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden were subjected to assaults with automatic gunfire and RPGs, beatings, and extended confinement as hostages. In some cases, hostages were used as human shields to protect pirates from navy vessels or were forced to crew “motherships” that were then used to lure and attack other merchant traffic. Some captive seafarers also were abused, both physically and psychologically. There is a genuine fear that abuse and even torture will be used with increasing frequency to provide additional leverage during ransom negotiations. Somali communities are also suffering, and their youth are put at risk by this criminal activity. In spite of the violent nature of these crimes, the human cost of piracy is still underreported and misunderstood by the public. In most communities ashore, the type of violent crime occurring in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean would be reported in a systematic and consistent way, allowing the public to grasp the significance of these crimes. However, the unique challenges of coordinating rule of law operations and public affairs in international waters, and the multinational nature of crews and the shipping industry, have resulted in inconsistent reporting of these violent crimes. The economic cost of piracy is well known. This report illustrates that the human cost of piracy may be less known, yet staggering. Details: Louisville, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 6, 2011 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/human_cost_of_somali_piracy.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/human_cost_of_somali_piracy.pdf Shelf Number: 121976 Keywords: Hijacking of ShipsHostagesMaritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: D'Agostino, Davi M. Title: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness Summary: Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness — that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions — a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a previous, sensitive report. GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD’s corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-621: Accessed July 7, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11621.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11621.pdf Shelf Number: 122007 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyTerrorism |
Author: Graham, Euan Title: Transnational Crime in the Fishing Industry: Asia’s Problem? Summary: On 13 April 2011 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) launched a report on transnational organised crime in the fishing industry. It focuses on three areas: trafficking in persons to work within the fishing industry, people smuggling and drug trafficking. There are other linkages to environmental crime, corruption and piracy. The findings have particular relevance for Asia, which accounts for 85 per cent of the world’s fishers and 75 per cent of motorised fishing vessels. Southeast Asians, including children, also feature prominently among the victims of trafficking for forced labour. Details: Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International STudies, 2011. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Commentaries, no. 62: Accessed July 12, 2011 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0622011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0622011.pdf Shelf Number: 122032 Keywords: Illegal Fishing IndustryMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the Environment (Asia)Transnational CrimeWildlife Crime |
Author: Birch, Paul R. Title: Old Glory and the Jolly Roger: The Cultural Constraints and Strategic Imperatives of Modern Piracy Summary: This thesis discusses piracy on the open seas. It describes acts of piracy, puts the practice into historical perspective, and shows how a recent surge in maritime piracy incidents differs from other maritime piracy afflicting the world’s oceans at the turn of the twentyfirst century. This is half of the reason for writing. The second purpose for is to examine the US military response to the dramatic increase in piracy near Somalia that occurred in 2008. The thesis examines the US response through the theoretical lenses of strategic culture and structural realism. These theories seldom appear alongside each other in security studies literature; their juxtaposition explains the US behavior toward the contemporary African piracy epidemic and provides a framework for examining other national security issues. This thesis concludes that although certain national security elites push US strategic culture toward interventionist or isolationist extremes, some world events elicit foregone responses best described by the ideas of structural realism. Tacit realization by national security actors that these events exist in spite of what elite groups profess or desire in turn defines strategic culture in a fundamentally different way. Given its place in the existing world order, the United States had little choice but to respond to piracy, even though its strategic preference was to ignore the problem. The valuable lesson from piracy represents in microcosm many problems of national strategy. If US cultural preference is again at odds with a strategic imperative to use force, and elites indulge the former, the nation may forfeit its structural role as the world’s existing hegemon. This is historically significant, as ceding the role of hegemon at this time would be a voluntary act, not forced by a stronger nation or an altered balance of power. The United States would become the first superpower to lay down that mantle voluntarily. Although US foreign policy appears now to have reconciled strategic cultural preferences with structural imperatives in the case of piracy, strategists must recognize the potential for the same kind of tension in all international relations problems. If the tension between preference and imperatives goes unresolved, the outcome can diminish national power. The United States should not proceed down that path unawares. Details: Maxwell AFB, AL: School Of Advanced Air And Space Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2009. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 10, 2011 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA540653 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA540653 Shelf Number: 122365 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Kaczynski, Vlad M.. Title: Illegal Activities in Marine Protected Areas: The Case of Guinea-Bissau, West Africa Summary: At the time when many industrialized economies enjoy healthy economic growth, many developing countries including these located in Sub-Saharan Africa suffer an outright decline in welfare, economic crisis and deterioration of their natural environments. In many poor countries, in spite of great potential of their coastal resources, technological, economic and managerial capabilities to use them do not exist or in order to gain badly needed hard currency they export or allow to take away by foreigners their natural resources thus feeding other markets including these in rich industrialized countries. As a result deficit of food and malnutrition is deepening in the developing countries and Africa is the most appealing example of this trend. Coastal lands in poorest African countries are increasingly cleared of mangroves, their fishery resources are exploited by foreign operators and drug trafficking is expanding because of weak or absent capabilities of these states to control these pressures and activities. The United States interests in successful economic growth and good governance in developing countries of Africa are multifaceted. Some of these interests are economic: the economic success or failure of these countries determine the gains from trade and investment that the United States reaps in its economic relations with many African countries. Other US interests are of security nature and illegal resource exploitation combined with growing smuggling of drugs to Europe and the US are of great concern for the US Home Security Department as well as to the US development and aid programs. The poor state’s failure is both the cause and consequence of international criminality, including pirate operations and international drug trafficking. Such states are easy prey for criminal groups, pirates and drug smugglers. The poor coastal African country of Guinea-Bissau cannot afford to establish or maintain necessary controls and surveillance system to prevent these negative trends and these include environmental degradation that is caused by tropical deforestation, overfishing, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity and long-term climate change. Additional challenge this country faces is quickly growing drug trafficking that transits through Guinea-Bissau waters and land routes to push drugs from Africa and South America to the industrialized markets, particularly Europe and the United States. Is there a strategic significance of inequities in income levels, economic growth and, in capabilities of poor nations to assure good governance and sustainable use of their natural resources and if so, which policy might the industrialized countries pursue to address those strategic concerns? The similar question may be posed in regard to ther ocean policy toward developing countries having in mind continuing deterioration of their marine and coastal environments and declining possibilities to produce food of aquatic origin for their growing populations. Details: Seattle, WA: School of Marine Affairs and Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington; Republic of Guinea-Bissau, West Africa: Ministry of Interior, 2006. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 15, 2011 at: http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/~trusek/globalization/papers/kaczynski-djassi.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/~trusek/globalization/papers/kaczynski-djassi.pdf Shelf Number: 122390 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllegal FishingIllegal LoggingMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the Environment (Guinea-Bissau) |
Author: Mansfield, Charles T. Title: Modern Piracy: The Impact on Maritime Security Summary: Although acts of piracy are generally criminal as opposed to terrorist in nature, their unpredictable time and location of occurrence, the wide variety of vessels targeted, and their increasing frequency creates an opportunity for terrorists to use pirates' methods as a means to achieve their goals. This paper will provide a brief historical perspective on piracy, examine its modern dimensions, and analyze the impact of modern piracy on U.S. maritime security. The thesis examines the efforts that U.S. and foreign governments, military, business, and civilian organizations expend to combat the problem, and piracy's tangible costs in capital resources to combat. The sea, a largely unregulated space, is a safe haven for criminals and terrorists to act unopposed by military or law enforcement efforts. Although piracy is generally not politically motivated, it is invariably linked to prevailing political conditions and the proximity of weak or failed states. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the international community has been forced to assess the vulnerabilities of maritime security. In the post- 9/11 and USS Cole era, there has been a resurgence in worldwide piracy incidents. The increase in attacks has demanded the serious attention of global maritime trading partners. The possible use of a maritime vessel as a weapon is a real and credible threat. The United States and her maritime partners are constantly working to achieve a secure global maritime environment. The focus is on assisting failed and failing states to create functional governments that will develop their law enforcement and coast guard capabilities. Until these weak and lawless lands can maintain control of their territorial waters, the global maritime partners will be required to use their naval and law enforcement assets to patrol piracy hot spots to prevent a further escalation of robberies, violence, and potentially terrorist acts. Details: Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps, Command and State College, 2008. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA490682&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA490682&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 122431 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyTerrorism |
Author: Termansen, Dan B. Title: Counter Piracy Off Somalia; A Case for Applying the Comprehensive Approach Strategy Summary: Some argue for a robust military solution inside Somalia to counter the piracy problem while others maintain that the problem is not at all suited for employing military force. Many articles focus on the impact of piracy on the International Shipping. Only very few take a holistic view on the issue, and discuss 2. or 3. order consequences of piracy in the area as a whole. Counter Piracy Operations have been going on for some years but, so far, only military means have been employed by the international community to counter piracy in the region. No unified holistic strategy has been applied, even though there seems to be consensus that the root causes are found in Somalia itself. With a holistic focus on the piracy issue off the coast of Somalia, this paper will analyze the root causes of piracy, the actors to influence, the Push-Pull factors and balance of risk involved. The paper identifies that the international community has so far primarily addressed the Pull factors focusing on naval force, disrupting pirate camps and law enforcement while leaving the Push Factors ashore largely unaddressed. Looking towards Afghanistan, the paper suggests employing elements in NATO's Comprehensive Approach in order to address all factors driving piracy, and recommends a design for how the Comprehensive Approach can be applied to the case of Somalia. The paper combines the current military efforts on Counter Piracy with a local civilian support to the Somali costal population primarily in Northeastern Somalia in a mutually supportive way From the Sea suggesting a naval PRT construction supporting Ink Blots of engagements ashore. In contrast to Afghanistan, the suggested Comprehensive Approach is applied bottom up, because it is focused only to counter piracy leaving the strategic effort to restore governance in Somalia to another time horizon. Details: Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536267&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536267&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 122437 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Kilpatrick, Richard L., Jr. Title: Borrowing from Civil Aviation Security: Does International Law Governing Airline Hijacking Offer Solutions to the Modern Maritime Piracy Epidemic Off the Coast of Somalia? Summary: Maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia continues to spiral into an increasingly threatening international crisis, with attacks in the Gulf of Aden increasing during the first half of 2011. While more states have been prosecuting pirates in their national courts during the last year, United Nations officials have indicated that as many as 90 percent of pirates captured by national navies are subsequently released due to complicated legal and financial burdens associated with prosecution. In the search for solutions to the current maritime piracy problem, international legal initiatives addressing civil aviation security may offer insight. A global trend of airline hijackings beginning in the late 1960s and culminating in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, catalyzed various initiatives that have improved the efficacy of aviation security. The international legal regime governing civil aviation security developed through various international treaties, conventions, agreements, declarations, and resolutions from important international institutions. Likewise, the United States, as the world’s largest aviation market, has also contributed to the international civil aviation regime through its domestic legislation. Taken together, this broad international legal regime offers a valuable example of cooperation and collaboration between various international stakeholders to address a trend in international crime. While there are limitations that must be considered in drawing an analogy between airline hijackings and maritime piracy due to contextual and legal distinctions, there are significant similarities that foster effective comparison of approaches. In particular, the civil aviation security regime may inform the following initiatives relevant to maritime piracy: the elimination of safe havens through the enforcement of international agreements obliging states to prosecute piracy crimes; increased port security to ensure the use of Best Management Practices to avoid piratical acts; economic sanctions targeting financers of piracy crimes; and enhanced communication and coordination among stakeholders affected by the piracy crises. Details: Louisvilla, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: OBP Working Paper: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/kilpatrick_borrowing_from_civil_aviation.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/kilpatrick_borrowing_from_civil_aviation.pdf Shelf Number: 122446 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Osiro, Deborah Title: Somali Pirates Have Rights Too: Judicial Consequences and Human Rights Concerns Summary: The international community’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia has had limited success, despite a proliferation of initiatives and resources. Although the large military presence has increased the number of piracy suspects that are being brought to trial, it has not reduced the number of pirates taking to the high seas. Rather, the increased militarisation and the strategies designed to bypass human rights obligations vis-à-vis the Somali pirates has undermined the credibility of the counter-piracy initiatives. The regional piracy prosecutions in Kenya, in particular, have raised various human rights issues, such as the failure to observe due process and the lack of appropriate jurisdiction. This paper highlights the fact that the strategy of enforcing legal accountability for pirates at sea but not for those on shore breeds a disregard for the human rights of a very vulnerable group of people, and results in an increase in piratical activities Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 224: Accessed August 23, 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1860.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1860.pdf Shelf Number: 122470 Keywords: Human RightsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: de Bont, Saoirse Title: Prosecuting Pirates and Upholding Human Rights Law: Taking Perspective Summary: Incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia have increased in recent years, rising by 47% between 2005 and 2009. With a growing number of states involved in the determent and disruption of attacks, there is a need to outline their human rights obligations when engaging in counter-piracy operations, so that suspected pirates are treated in accordance with international law. In addition, providing clarity to states regarding their responsibilities enables them to make informed decisions about whether, and how, to prosecute suspected pirates. Focusing on Somalia, this paper examines the piracy as situated within international law, while addressing the application of human rights treaties, and issues such as detention, right to asylum, non-refoulement, and the transfer of pirates to third parties. While ambiguity remains regarding the obligations of states dealing with suspected pirates, existing case law does provide some guidelines. However, other factors, such as political processes and expediency, have sometimes taken precedence over the protection and fulfilment of human rights. Details: Louisville, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2010. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed August 26, 2011 at: http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Human%20Rights%20Law%20-%20Saoirse%20de%20Bont.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Somalia URL: http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Human%20Rights%20Law%20-%20Saoirse%20de%20Bont.pdf Shelf Number: 122508 Keywords: Human RightsMaritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia)Prosecution |
Author: Whiteneck, Daniel J. Title: Piracy Enterprises in Africa Summary: Piracy has a long history in all areas of Africa, and the navies of nations affected by that piracy have a long history of counterpiracy operations all around the continent. This report examines the background and development of piracy off Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea, with a specific look at how recent activities have been organized and how they sustain themselves as ongoing criminal concerns. The ‘piracy enterprise’ consists of several elements, including recruitment of people, finance, intelligence and knowledge of the maritime space, shipping patterns, and the vulnerabilities of targets, as well as tactics and operations, internal organization, connections to the local communities, and the creation of ‘safe havens’ ashore. Piracy in Somalia has evolved from the simple model of coastal residents accosting fishing vessels in Somali waters and extorting payments at gunpoint, to complex criminal pirate groups staging and deploying multiple action groups to seize large commercial ships far out at sea, seize them, take them back to a safe home port, and hold them for months for negotiated ransoms. This paper looks at how the current enterprise is structured and its evolution from humble beginnings. Across the continent, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are engaged in what can best be described as a crime wave of 'robbery at sea' attacks. A small number of recent attempted attacks have mimicked the more sophisticated tries on commercial vessels and tankers, but the mainstay of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has been ‘smash and grab’ night strikes on ships at anchor or oil platforms. While this is a different type of piracy/robbery, using the enterprise model reveals much about how it works, why it has not evolved like in Somalia, and what vulnerabilities it has. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2011. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/OTA%20Piracy%20Enterprises%20in%20Africa%20D0023394%20A2.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/OTA%20Piracy%20Enterprises%20in%20Africa%20D0023394%20A2.pdf Shelf Number: 122783 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Africa) |
Author: Whiteneck, Daniel Title: The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? Summary: For the past 60 years, since roughly the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. response to that war, the Navy has had a consistent strategy for the structure, deployment, and posturing of the fleet. American maritime dominance has been based on forces that were deployed forward and always ready to respond quickly to emerging situations in areas of vital interest to American foreign policy. Because of the perceived need to be able to respond at the highest levels of warfare throughout the Cold War, those forces were built, trained, and equipped to be “combat credible” against capable challengers. “Combat credible” meant the ability to project power against advanced air defenses, conduct and enable littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats. In the post-Cold War environment, and since 9/11, evidence illustrates that the demand signal for naval forces has not waned. In fact, the Navy continues to be tasked with a range of operations, from disaster response to peacetime engagement and shows of force, and from counter-piracy and maritime interdiction to participation in major combat operations by TACAIR and other power-projection forces. This demand signal did not go down during the 1990s (“reaping the peace dividend”) as the Navy took on persistent operations in the Balkans, the Caribbean, and the Arabian Gulf after Desert Storm, continued its role in Asia, and expanded its peacetime engagement as COCOMs increased “shaping” activities. After 9/11, the Navy shed its role in the Balkans and the Caribbean but increased its homeland defense role and its ballistic missile defense missions, and it has played a major part in strike operations for OIF and OEF for the past decade. The Navy also picked up significant roles in humanitarian assistance, maritime partnership building, littoral combat, and special operational forces (SOF), and routinely had over 10,000 sailors ashore in CENTCOM to support operations there. If the Navy hoped that reductions in the demand signal would give it breathing room to reset the force and invest in platforms and assets at the expense of operations, its hopes have proved to be false. The Navy battle force has shrunk by 20 percent in the last decade, while the number of ships on deployment has remained relatively steady. In a period of constant demand, resources to meet those demands, pay for needed future structure, and meet growing demands for spending on people and health care have shrunk. They will not grow in the future. There is a gap that must be addressed. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2011 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/The%20Navy%20at%20a%20Tipping%20Point%20D0022262.A3.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/The%20Navy%20at%20a%20Tipping%20Point%20D0022262.A3.pdf Shelf Number: 122787 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyU.S. Navy |
Author: Conley, Christopher J. Title: Interdicting Maritime Migrant Smuggling: Applying Some Concepts of Operational Art to Coast Guard Operations Summary: The issue of illegal human trafficking, smuggling, and migration in the maritime domain presents a challenge to the organizations charged with protecting the borders of the United States. As an agency responsible for enforcing laws on the high seas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the primary instrument for interdicting illegal maritime migration. Except in extreme circumstances of mass migration, the Coast Guard has relied on the principle of effective presence to accomplish its mission and done so with measurable success. However, with the growing transnational criminal nature of human trafficking and increased pressure on U.S. maritime borders due to tougher border enforcement, the Coast Guard should seek to expand its concept of operations for interdiction of human smuggling in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard could do this by inviting relevant agencies to participate in a Joint Interagency Task Force to bring a unified effort to counter maritime smuggling. Furthermore, the Coast Guard should apply the appropriate concepts of operational art consistent with joint doctrine in planning and executing its mission to ensure the most effective and efficient application of national resources. Details: Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2008. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484333.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484333.pdf Shelf Number: 123003 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal AliensMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityMigrantsU.S. Coast Guard |
Author: Gunther, Michael J. Title: A Cooperative Strategy of 21st Century Seapower: 200 Years of Repressing Piracy and Still Missing the Boat Summary: Piracy on the high seas is increasing. This is especially true for the waters off the African coast, which are some of the most dangerous in the world. The violence and negative economic aspects of piracy present challenges to international security and stability, especially for African coastal nations. Repressing piracy is a complicated process that requires coordination and cooperation among national and international military and nonmilitary agencies. Joint Interdiction Planning and Homeland Defense Doctrine address piracy repression but fail to provide adequate guidance and processes to successfully complete the operation. The only threat response plan that could be used to address acts of piracy is the national-level Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan. To succeed at repressing piracy around Africa, the regional Geographic Combatant Commander must build a regional command and control structure capable of executing all phases of piracy repression, advocate the development of new joint doctrine, and promote implementation of regional interagency threat response plans. This paper will analyze the abilities of U.S. maritime forces to successfully create and maintain security on the high seas around Africa from piracy as outlined in "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower." The analysis examines strategic guidance provided in the "National Strategy for Maritime Security," evaluates the law of the sea, assesses threat response plans, and analyzes AFRICOM's role. Finally, the paper concludes that improvements are required to the existing process to successfully combat piracy around Africa. Details: Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484354.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada484354.pdf Shelf Number: 123004 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Liss, Carolin Title: Privatising the Fight Against Somali Pirates Summary: The recent audacious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the horn of Africa have fuelled the debate about the privatisation of maritime security. Ship owners and maritime security experts, as well as representatives of industry organisations, have stated that private security companies may be able to ensure safe passage for vessels through these pirate infested waters, a task at which government agencies have failed, despite international efforts. In fact, with more than 35 hijacked vessels this year, the first hijacking of a super tanker, attacks on UN aid ships and the unprecedented payment of millions of US dollars ransom for kidnapped crew and hijacked vessels, the arguments for hiring PSCs are strong. However, the employment of PSCs in Iraq and other places around the world has clearly shown that there are problems associated with the services provided by PSCs and the regulation of such companies in conflict zones. This paper explores the risks and benefits of employing PSCs to secure shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the horn of Africa. Details: Perth, Western Australia: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2008. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 152: Accessed October 21, 2011 at: http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp152.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Somalia URL: http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp152.pdf Shelf Number: 123078 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia)Private SecurityPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Coast Guard Should Conduct Required Inspections of Offshore Energy Infrastructure Summary: Congressional interest in the security of offshore energy infrastructure has increased because of the lives lost and the substantial damages that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of offshore energy infrastructure. The Coast Guard oversees two main types of offshore energy infrastructure--facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and deepwater ports. GAO was asked to examine (1) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities and what additional actions, if any, are needed; (2) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports and what additional actions, if any, are needed; and (3) what limitations in oversight authority, if any, the Coast Guard faces in ensuring the security of offshore energy infrastructure. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, such as inspection records, and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed Coast Guard inspectors and officials, including those at Coast Guard headquarters and the two Coast Guard districts that oversee all OCS facilities and deepwater ports that are subject to security requirements. The Coast Guard has taken actions to address the security of OCS facilities (that is, facilities regulated for security pursuant to 33 C.F.R. part 106), but could improve its process for managing security inspections. For example, the Coast Guard developed a security plan for the Gulf of Mexico, in which all 57 OCS facilities are located, and it reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of OCS facilities. It has also issued guidance, which states that Coast Guard personnel should conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually, but has conducted about one-third of these inspections from 2008 through 2010. Further, the Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to ensure that its field units conduct these inspections. Consequently, the Coast Guard may not be meeting one of its stated goals of reducing the risk and mitigating the potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel, the OCS facility, the environment, and the public. The Coast Guard also faces challenges in summarizing inspection results. Specifically, its database for storing inspection data has limitations that make it difficult to determine if security inspections were conducted. For example, there is no data field to identify OCS facilities, which makes it difficult to readily analyze whether required inspections were conducted. By addressing some of these challenges, Coast Guard managers could more easily use the data as a management tool to inform decision making. The Coast Guard has also taken actions to ensure the security of the four deepwater ports, but opportunities exist for improvement. The Coast Guard's actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports are similar to actions it has taken to ensure the security of OCS facilities. For example, Coast Guard security plans address security at deepwater ports, and the Coast Guard also reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of the deepwater ports. However, Coast Guard guidance for deepwater ports does not call for annual security inspections, and it has conducted only one security inspection at a deepwater port from 2008 through 2010. Coast Guard officials said that the Coast Guard plans to begin annual security inspections of deepwater ports in recognition of the risk of a transportation security incident. However, limitations in the Coast Guard's inspection database and lack of guidance available to database users may complicate the Coast Guard's management and oversight of inspections at deepwater ports. For example, the data field for deepwater ports has been incorrectly applied to other types of infrastructure and some deepwater ports are recorded under multiple names. Unless the Coast Guard addresses these database limitations and issues updated guidance to database users, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to verify that the deepwater ports are complying with applicable maritime security requirements. The Coast Guard has limited authority regarding the security of mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) registered to foreign countries, such as the Deepwater Horizon. The Coast Guard is taking action, though, to gain a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs by conducting a study to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs. GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop policies or guidance to ensure that (1) annual security inspections are conducted at OCS facilities and (2) information entered into its database for both OCS facilities and deepwater ports is more useful for management. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-37: Accessed October 31, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1237.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1237.pdf Shelf Number: 123185 Keywords: Critical InfrastructureMaritime CrimeMaritime Security (U.S.)Risk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: Veiter, Daniela Title: Cargo Security Initiatives in the United States, Canada and Mexico and their Effect on Trade in the NAFTA Region Summary: Cross-border trade today is an essential driver of nations’ prosperity. A prolonged disruption in a supply chain has an enormous impact on a country’s as well as the global economy. The international transportation network and its long supply chains are very fragile and vulnerable to terrorist abuse or similar attacks. The high number of agents add another level of risk. The products, factories, supply chain facilities and supply chain partners, carriers, people and information could all present danger to the supply chain. Globalization turned the market place into a competitive environment where companies seek to hire the most affordable workers as well as choose the cheapest suppliers or service providers. This trend spreads business practices out all over the world and increases the need for transportation while adding complexity to a company’s value chain. The most effective way is a worldwide cooperation of countries on securing the global trade system without hindering the trade flow. A global partnership involving all agents along a supply chain with harmonised and compatible systems, both for customs work and for the exchange of information would be the perfect solution. And collaboration and coordinated work reduces the risk of disruptions and is more cost-effective too. Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington DC, the international trade community has dedicated more time and money on the issue of security. The U.S. government, the Canadian government and the Mexican government have established a multi-layered defense strategy to protect their people and country. International cargo that is being shipped to certain target countries poses a significant security risk. In particular, cargo containers can be abused to carry weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other dangerous items. Those containers are particularly vulnerable to changes from their legitimate commercial purpose due to the numerous transfers within the transport chain they are subject to. Those very same internationally moving containers, though, are of utter importance to global commerce as they ship about 95% of the world’s international cargo, in terms of value. Over 48 million containers are being shipped between seaports around the world. Intermodal transport has enabled trucks and trains to move goods around continents in the ocean containers. Any terrorist actions can have largescale damage to a country’s society and economy and thus it is essential to have systems in place that can prevent such events from happening beforehand. The United States of America was the first country to start introducing plans to identify high risk cargo shipments and soon Canada and Mexico followed. The initiatives seek to ensure security over different levels. There are three main areas of risk that these security initiatives seek to address. First, the security of vital cargo information relating to the contents and destination of the shipment must be accessible by customs authorities. This also includes IT security. Then there is the level of physical control through inspections and screening. The last level covers the entire supply chain through screening and background checks of every agent involved in the process. This includes all groups between the manufacturer and the final destination of the product. This thesis talks about cargo security initiatives in the NAFTA countries of the United States, Canada and Mexico for any shipments crossing borders between those countries by either road, sea, air or rail. It shows the development and intensification of those security regulations over the last years, analyses their purpose and recommends how to best deal with them if you are a business located in this area. Details: Vienna: Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2009. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: http://epub.wu.ac.at/822/1/document.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/822/1/document.pdf Shelf Number: 123240 Keywords: Cargo Security (U.S., Canada, Mexico)Cargo TheftMaritime CrimeStolen GoodsStolen PropertySupply ChainsTerrorism |
Author: Giampaolo, Amanda Title: Changes in Maritime Practice as a Result of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden Summary: Piracy off the coast of Somalia, particularly in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, is a growing problem for shipping companies whose vessels frequently travel through this area to transport goods. The International Chamber of Commerce's [ICC] Commercial Crime Service [CCS] has declared this area “piracy prone”. According to The Journal of Navigation 2010 report entitled, “Piracy at Sea: Somalia an Area of Great Concern”, piracy emerged off the coast of Somalia following the collapse of the Said Barre government in 1991. However, piracy in the Gulf of Aden did not generate much alarm until 2005 when the number of incidences in a year exceeded 35 for the first time, says report author Santiago Iglesias Baniela. This was followed by a brief decline in recorded piracy in 2006, which Baniela links to the short lived governance by the Islamic Courts Union [ICU] in Somalia. The report further notes that the piracy problem grew exponentially in 2008, leading to great international concern and the formation of three international task forces: [i] the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's [NATO] counterpiracy initiatives: Operation Allied Provider [October – December 2008], Operation Allied Protector [March 2009 – August 2009], and Operation Ocean Shield [August 2009 to present]; [ii] the European Union Naval Force Somalia [EU NAVFOR] Operation Atalanta [launched in response to UN Resolutions in 2008-2009]; and [iii] the Combined Maritime Force's [CMF] Combined Taskforce 151 [CTF 151], which was created in January 2009. Despite these initial efforts, piracy continues to be a major threat to the shipping industry, explains Martin Murphy author of “Somalia: the New Barbary”. This paper provides an overview of changes in maritime practice as a result of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Rerouting of vessels, group transits and the use of private security are discussed in more detail. Details: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2011. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Maritime_Changes_Sep_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Maritime_Changes_Sep_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 123302 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia)Private Security |
Author: Ramsay, Amber Title: Barriers to Prosecution: The Problem of Piracy Summary: Despite a global response by some of the world‟s most powerful navies, Somali piracy continues to wreak havoc on ships attempting to navigate the Gulf of Aden and parts of the Indian Ocean, says Time Magazine. Maritime piracy has been on the rise for years, but the international community only chose to take decisive action against it in 2008 when increasing attacks off the coast of Somalia led to economic burdens that affected the entire world. Over the past four years, efforts have been made in a variety of areas to address the issue of piracy, including through naval intervention, the development of Best Management Practices and political efforts within Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa region. However, one of the major responses, piracy prosecutions, has also proven to be one of the most difficult to manoeuvre. In attempting to establish a strong legal regime to undertake piracy prosecutions, a number of obstacles have become apparent, among them, questions of jurisdiction, customary law, financing, the capacity of regional states, and other judicial hurdles that arise when attempting to prosecute criminal acts committed in international waters. The following report will attempt to outline some of these issues and list possible next steps offered by experts in the area of maritime piracy. Details: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2011. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: https://portal.mmowgli.nps.edu/c/wiki/get_page_attachment?p_l_id=33393&nodeId=10773&title=Published+papers&fileName=Published+papers%2FCFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Prosecution_Aug_2011_FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: https://portal.mmowgli.nps.edu/c/wiki/get_page_attachment?p_l_id=33393&nodeId=10773&title=Published+papers&fileName=Published+papers%2FCFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Prosecution_Aug_2011_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 123316 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Ramsey, Amber Title: Alternative Approaches: Land-based Strategies to Countering Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia Summary: This report outlines some recommended alternative land-based strategies that could be utilised to develop greater resistance to pirate activities by Somali communities and reinforce existing grassroots efforts to highlight its negative effects. Details: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2011. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 26, 2011 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Alternative%20Approaches_NOV_2011_FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Alternative%20Approaches_NOV_2011_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 123454 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Small Vessel Security Strategy Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) exists within the framework of other security strategies. It does not replace any of the current strategies or relevant documents. Rather, this strategy harmonizes directions from related strategies into a multi-layered, unified approach for the component agencies within the DHS, and to lay the groundwork for DHS participation in coordination across all levels of government, as well as other public, private and international stakeholders in the maritime domain. This strategy’s purpose is to address the risk that small vessels1 might be used to smuggle terrorists or WMD into the United States or might be used as either a stand-off weapon platform or as a means of a direct attack with a WBIED. The resulting risks are difficult to manage because small vessels are not centrally registered, operators have not always demonstrated proficiency in small vessel operations, and the ability to screen or detect vessel-borne hazards is extremely limited. There is, moreover, a tradition and expectation among the large population of small vessel operators of largely unrestricted access to U.S. waterways. This strategy also describes the small vessel community and the environment in which it operates. It discusses and identifies the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences resulting from four key risk scenarios. Understanding the relationship of the threat, risk, vulnerability, and consequence of a small vessel terrorist attack on the United States will help to reduce the risk of such an attack. The guiding principles and overall goals of this strategy complement existing solutions for large vessels. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 123566 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeShipping, Security MeasuresTerrorism |
Author: Shortland, Anja Title: Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy Summary: There are increasing pressures to develop land-based approaches to Somali piracy. By making use of non-traditional data sources including local market data and satellite images, this paper is intended to be an objective analysis of who benefits from pirate ransoms. Significant amounts of ransom monies are spent within Somalia, but conspicuous consumption appears to be limited by social norms dictating resource-sharing. Around a third of pirate ransoms are converted into Somali shillings, benefiting casual labour and pastoralists in Puntland. Data analysis is complemented by examination of satellite imagery to establish where the beneficiaries are located. Pirates probably make a significant contribution to economic development in the provincial capitals Garowe and Bosasso. Puntland’s political elites are therefore unlikely to move decisively against piracy. The positive economic impacts of piracy are spread widely and a military strategy to eradicate it could seriously undermine local development. However, coastal villages have gained little from hosting pirates and may be open to a negotiated solution which offers a more attractive alternative. Details: London: Chatham House, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Programme Paper: AFP PP 2012/01; Accessed January 17, 2012 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0112pp_shortland.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0112pp_shortland.pdf Shelf Number: 123632 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Issue Paper: Smuggling of Migrants by Sea Summary: Smuggling of migrants is defined by Article 3 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol supplementing the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC), as “...the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national.” The specific nature of the sea‐based component of the smuggling journey resulted in a dedicated section on the issue in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. While smuggling by sea accounts only for a small portion of overall migrant smuggling around the world, the particular dangers of irregular travel at sea make it a priority for response; though more migrant smuggling occurs by air, more deaths occur by sea. The journey of the migrant smuggled by sea often starts a significant distance away from the coast of departure. Some journeys to the coast may take mere days, but others can take place over years during which the migrant must work en route to raise money for his passage. Arduous desert crossings and victimization by smugglers and other criminals en route mean that some do not survive overland journeys to the coast. Contrasted with these extreme experiences, economically empowered migrants can afford a higher level of smuggling service and may experience no particular hardship, simply travelling through various international airport hubs toward the coastal country from where their sea journey commences. The type and size of vessel used to smuggle migrants by sea depends on the time, place and financial capacity of migrants undertaking the smuggling journey. In some countries, boats of only a handful of passengers are commonly intercepted by authorities, while in others vessels of several hundred people have been used. While voyages may be comfortable when conditions at sea are mild and the vessel is equipped with adequate food, water and sanitation, the journey is a harrowing one for the majority of migrants who report rough conditions, terrible cold and scarce food and water. The nature of the crime and its relationship with smuggling of migrants by land and by air means that it is a successful crime type that yields high profits for smugglers with all the risks being borne by migrants. Indeed, migrant smuggling by sea can be understood as a criminal business, which is competitively run as such. Smuggling by sea is generally carried out by flexible criminal groups or individuals operating on the basis of repeated contractual arrangements, rather than by hierarchical organizations. There are two methods used when vessels approach coasts of destination. One aims to reach land by evading detection by authorities, the other sets out to be detected and intercepted or rescued by authorities in territorial waters of destination coastal countries. In both situations, detecting smuggling vessels at sea is a key challenge for coastal states which may have limited resources and large search and rescue areas of responsibility. Upon detecting vessels, the key challenge is to balance objectives with obligations at international law, including the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Smugglers are generally well‐informed about states’ protection obligations and act to exploit them, instructing migrants what to do upon interception to increase their chances of gaining entry into and remaining in countries of destination. For instance, officials responsible for intercepting vessels at sea have been faced with situations of people sabotaging their own vessels to force authorities to carry out rescues. Suggestions made in respect of encountering migrant smuggling at sea include Page 8 of 71 increased support of coastal states through joint patrols and provision of resources, and increased compliance with international legal standards and obligations in carrying out interceptions of smuggling vessels at sea. While responding to the situation at hand and ensuring that persons on board are appropriately assisted, a key challenge is to seize evidentiary opportunities to investigate smuggling‐related crimes. The complex nature of migrant smuggling networks and their modus operandi means that smugglers cannot be identified purely by looking to smugglers who may be on board boats; the transnational criminal network itself must be traced from a smuggling vessel, back to the coast of embarkation, and from there back to countries of transit and origin. Suggestions made for improved investigation and prosecution of migrant smuggling by sea include harmonizing domestic legislation with the UNTOC and the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Further it is suggested that sentences imposed for smuggling offences be publicized as a means of deterring would‐be smugglers. Capacity building measures are also suggested so as to increase identification of smugglers on vessels, and to better link sea‐based crimes with land‐based smugglers. Preventing migrant smuggling by sea requires states to balance their obligations in international law with their legitimate interests in protecting state sovereignty from violation by organized crime groups. But law enforcement efforts alone are not adequate to prevent migrant smuggling by sea; the Migrant Smuggling Protocol stresses that prevention efforts must address root causes that lead a person into the hands of smugglers in the first place. Suggestions made for preventing migrant smuggling at sea include raising awareness about the dangers of sea smuggling journeys and the criminality of smuggling. Suggestions are also made to raise awareness of those who influence political and policy decisions, so policies put in place protect state sovereignty, uphold international obligations, and are not vulnerable to exploitation by smugglers. Also emphasised is the responsibility of coastal states of departure to intercept smuggling vessels before they embark on sea journeys. Beyond this, comprehensive data collection, analysis and research are suggested to strengthen evidence‐based responses. Experts from countries of origin, transit and destination unanimously agree that the most essential ingredient for effective and comprehensive response to migrant smuggling by sea is strengthened international cooperation to remove areas of impunity for smugglers along smuggling routes. Suggestions made for cooperating in response to migrant smuggling at sea include aligning activities with the Migrant Smuggling Protocol and increasing the role of UNODC in facilitating cooperative response. The value of bilateral and regional cooperation arrangements is stressed, with emphasis on flexible cooperative networks for effective and efficient on‐the‐ground response. Regular coordination meetings and joint operations are suggested to improve strategic and operational interagency coordination, as is the empowerment of central designated authorities to address migrant smuggling by sea. In short, while it is difficult to make generalizations about migrant smuggling by sea, two key points hold true around the world. Firstly, migrant smuggling by sea is the most dangerous type of smuggling for the migrants concerned, making it a priority concern for State response. Secondly, efforts to combat smuggling of migrants will be unsuccessful unless cooperation is strengthened not only between countries of sea departure and arrival, but also among the countries of origin, transit and destination along the entire smuggling route. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_Smuggling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_Smuggling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf Shelf Number: 123647 Keywords: Human SmugglingHuman TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal MigrantsMaritime Crime |
Author: Monzini, Paola Title: Human Smuggling To/Through Italy Summary: This report contains the following two papers: The Irregular Immigration Industry on the North-East Border, by Giuseppe Sciortino and Migrant Smuggling via Maritime Routes, by Paola Monzini. Details: Rome (?):Centre Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2004. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.cespi.it/cnr/Monzini-Sciortino-ing_rev_.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Italy URL: http://www.cespi.it/cnr/Monzini-Sciortino-ing_rev_.pdf Shelf Number: 123737 Keywords: Human SmugglingHuman TraffickingMaritime Crime |
Author: Rinehard, Britta Title: Armed Guards on Merchant Vessels Summary: The threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia, as well as in the Gulf of Aden (GoA), Horn of Africa (HoA) and the Indian Ocean has sparked a new discussion on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board merchant vessels to prevent pirates from successfully boarding and hijacking a vessel. Vessels with low freeboard and/ or low speed are more vulnerable to pirate attacks. Therefore hiring armed guards on these vulnerable vessels are more likely. However, employing private armed guards to protect commercial vessels traveling through pirate-prone waters is controversial for a number of reasons, such as legal issues, safety concerns for seafarers and varying national regulations. This paper will provide a brief overview of the on-going debate over the use of PCASPs as well as recent movements related to this matter. Details: Norfolk, VA: Civil-Military Fusion Centre (www.cimicweb.org), 2011. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 26, 2012 at https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Armed%20Guards%20October%202011_Final_rmb.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Armed%20Guards%20October%202011_Final_rmb.pdf Shelf Number: 123774 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPrivate SecuritySecurity GuardsTransnational Crime |
Author: Osei-Tutu, Joana Ama Title: The Root Causes of the Somali Piracy Summary: This paper aims, among other things, to answer a few questions; firstly, what are the root causes of piracy in Somalia. Secondly, the efforts the international community has adopted to address the piracy issues and its effectiveness. Thirdly, how these international efforts addressed the root causes; and possible alternative routes to the international community‟s attempts. The answers to these questions will give a clearer picture of the Somali piracy problem and its genesis as well as why stakeholders‟ efforts have not resolved the problem. There will be an initial presentation of scholarly discussion on the Somali piracy issue. This would be followed by an account of attempts by both Somalis and international organizations to bring to bear some of the causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The findings of these would be stated and finally, recommendations for addressing the piracy would be proposed. Details: Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 31: Accessed January 27, 2012 at: http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Documents/Occasional-Paper-31-Joana.aspx Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Documents/Occasional-Paper-31-Joana.aspx Shelf Number: 123785 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Bezkorovainiy, Volodymyr Title: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Disorder at Sea: The View from Ukraine Summary: This English version of the Ukrainian paper, offers data and analysis on the growth of piracy and maritime terrorism, with a special emphasis on the Ukranian perspective. Details: London: The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London, 2012. 21p. Source: Corbett Paper No. 8: Internet Resource Accessed on January 29, 2012 at http://maritimesecurity.asia/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Corbett%20Paper%20No8%20MaritimeSecurity.Asia.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Ukraine URL: http://maritimesecurity.asia/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Corbett%20Paper%20No8%20MaritimeSecurity.Asia.pdf Shelf Number: 123868 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracyTerrorismUkraine |
Author: Iyigun, Murat Title: Learning Piracy on the High Seas Summary: We introduce a novel dataset of 3,362 modern-day piracy incidents that occurred around the world between 1998 and 2007. Our data include detailed information on the location, timing and success of each attack, as well as the material damage and violence inflicted upon the crew and the cargo. We combine these incident-based data with macroeconomic and aggregate measures of per-capita incomes, rates of economic growth and institutional quality of countries whose territorial waters either witnessed these piracy incidents or were in closest proximity. We find that economic factors and the law do matter: higher per-capita incomes as well as more effective legal and political institutions dampen both the physical violence and material damage of modern-day piracy. But we also document significant learning-by-doing and skill accumulation among the pirates: A history of successful attacks improves the odds of future success, making it more likely that pirates launch successful raids aimed at larger vessels closer to land. The learning-by-doing effects are detectable even after controlling for our proxies for capital use and labor input (the number of pirates). Details: Unpublished: 2011. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 29, 2012 at http://www.colorado.edu/Economics/courses/iyigun/IRPiracy10062010.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.colorado.edu/Economics/courses/iyigun/IRPiracy10062010.pdf Shelf Number: 123875 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracyRecidivism |
Author: FATF-GAFI Title: Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom Summary: In recent years, there has been a growing concern over organised piracy on the high seas and kidnapping for ransom. These activities present a number of potential risks to the international financial system and challenges to the law enforcement and regulatory framework worldwide. Piracy for ransom and kidnapping for ransom are considered separate categories of serious criminal offences and as such, they are addressed independently in this study: 1) Maritime piracy for ransom: This section examines the financial implications of piracy as a major proceeds-generating offences. It provides a clear overview of patterns of illicit financial activity associated with this offence. 2) Kidnapping for ransom: This section focuses specifically on kidnapping as a means of financing terrorism and as a means to collect funds and support operations of terrorist groups. It provides a unique insight into the significance of revenue generated from this offence for a number of terrorist groups and criminal organisations, and the role of the formal financial sector. In addition to raising awareness of these important issues, the report also highlights some of the challenges associated with identifying, investigating, and tracing illicit flows associated with maritime piracy for ransom and kidnapping for ransom. Details: Paris, France: FATF-GAFI (Financial Action Task Force), 2011. 48p. Source: FATF Report: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 29, 2012 at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/40/13/48426561.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/40/13/48426561.pdf Shelf Number: 123876 Keywords: KidnappingMaritime CrimeOrganized CrimePiracy |
Author: Chambers, Matthew Title: International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Hindering Maritime Trade and Water Transportation Around the World Summary: Over the 11-year period, 1998-2008, more than 3,600 acts of international piracy and armed robbery at sea have occurred. Figure 1 clearly shows that piracy affects all corners of the globe—from the Caribbean, to the Mediterranean, to the South China Sea. In 2008, East Africa accounted for the greatest number of incidents with 134, followed by the South China Sea (72 incidents) and West Africa (50 incidents). Table 1 shows the overall number of attacks has been on the decline in many parts of the world with acts of piracy occurring at a rate of about 25 per month in 2008, down from a peak of nearly 40 incidents per month in 2000. This decline was global in nature with one notable exception—the waters surrounding East Africa (e.g., Gulf of Aden, Red Sea) saw a 123 percent (74-incident) increase from the prior year. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2010. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 6, 2012 at: http://www.bts.gov/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/special_report/2010_04_22/html/entire.html Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.bts.gov/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/special_report/2010_04_22/html/entire.html Shelf Number: 123990 Keywords: Armed Robbery, ShipsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy |
Author: Australia. Office of the Inspector of Transport Security Title: International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Security Inquiry Report Summary: This Inquiry was conducted pursuant to a direction issued on 2 February 2009, in accordance with subsection 11(1) of the Inspector of Transport Security Act 2006 (the Act), to inquire into International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, as a relevant transport security matter within the terms of the Act. The direction was given by the Federal Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, the Honourable Anthony Albanese MP, and arose from a concern to ensure that the Australian Government had an accurate understanding of the prevailing international piracy and robbery at sea environment and the potential implications for Australian-related shipping trade. While the primary focus of the Inquiry was the threat of piracy to Australia and Australian shipping and crews, it included an international benchmarking assessment of the global piracy and armed robbery at sea situation. Before the late 1990s, the most sophisticated of pirate attack profiles involved the seizing of a ship to steal its cargo for future resale. In many cases it involved the re-birthing of a ship, often called ‘a phantom ship’, under another name and registry. In these attacks the pirates sometimes confined the crew for a time and then set them adrift; on other occasions they are believed to have murdered their victims. Since the 1990s, however, hijack and ransom has become the pirate modus operandi causing most international concern, with the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean region recognised as the epicentre of the contemporary global piracy problem. Significant incidents of piracy are increasingly occurring in the Gulf of Guinea area of West Africa, centring on Nigeria. Other areas of continuing concern are the waters of the Indian subcontinent, Central America, the South China Sea and the Caribbean Sea. Details: Canberra: Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, 2010. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 6, 2012 at: http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/oits/files/IPARS_SecurityInquiryReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/oits/files/IPARS_SecurityInquiryReport.pdf Shelf Number: 123991 Keywords: Armed Robbery, ShipsMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy |
Author: Oceans Beyond Piracy, One Earth Future Foundation Title: The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 Summary: This report is One Earth Future Foundation’s (OEF) second assessment of the Economic Cost of Piracy. It estimates that Somali piracy cost between $6.6 and $6.9 billion in 2011. Our previous report on the Economic Cost of Piracy in 2010, estimated that piracy cost the world $7 - $12 billion. That initial report generated a significant amount of dialogue and feedback on the cost of piracy. This report is the result of extensive research conducted by OEF with the collaborative participation of multiple different stakeholders, and includes significant contributions made by commentators, experts, and others impacted by piracy. It assesses nine different direct cost factors, and is focused specifically on the economic impact of Somali piracy. While the report assesses the cost of piracy for the year of 2011, there were significant changes and developments in piracy throughout that year, and in many ways 2011 was the ‘tale of two years’: Overall, 2011 saw an increase in attacks by Somali pirates. This was driven by a rapid escalation in the number of hostages and hijackings in the first quarter of 2011. As expected, hijackings declined during the monsoon period. But in the last quarter of the year, the anticipated resurgence of piracy following the monsoon period did not eventuate. A number of factors may explain this pattern, including an extended period of monsoonal rough weather off the coast of Somalia, and the use of deterrence mechanisms such as private armed security. Other developing trends throughout the year included an altered re-routing model where ships transited close to the western Indian coastline (rather than around the Cape of Good Hope); and pirates’ changing use of mother ships from large vessels to smaller fishing boats. Further, 2011 saw a more aggressive response from military forces conducting counter-piracy missions in the region. The project finds that of the total costs of Somali piracy in 2011, the shipping industry bore over 80% of these costs, or between $5.3 and $5.5 billion. Details: Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2011. 62p. Source: Working Paper, One Earth Foundation: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 124078 Keywords: Costs of CrimeMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy (Somalia)Transportation Security |
Author: Daxecker, Ursula Title: Insurgents of the Sea: Institutional and Economic Opportunities for Maritime Piracy Summary: While piracy may evoke romanticized visions of swashbuckling, rum swigging, and skirt chasing pirates hoisting the Jolly Roger, it is not a relevant description of modern piracy. Maritime piracy has changed substantially by taking advantage of modernization and substantial upgrading of the weapons, vessels, and weapons it employs. In addition, as documented by the International Marine Bureau (IMB), the frequency of pirate attacks has increased significantly, with more than 2,200 piracy incidents occurring since 2004. We argue that piracy is a result of permissive institutional environments and the lack of legal forms of employment in states‟ fishing sectors. We investigate these arguments empirically using systemic and monadic-level data for the 1991-2009 period. Our empirical analyses show that state weakness and reductions in fish catch affect piracy as expected. These findings suggest that international efforts in combating piracy should center on improving the institutional environments and labor opportunities driving maritime piracy. Details: Unpublished, Undated. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2012 at http://ursuladaxecker.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/1/8/2618117/prins_and_daxecker_04-18-11.pdf Year: 0 Country: International URL: http://ursuladaxecker.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/1/8/2618117/prins_and_daxecker_04-18-11.pdf Shelf Number: 124087 Keywords: Maritime CrimeOrganized CrimePiracy/PiratesPirates |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management of Interagency Operations Centers Summary: The Coast Guard—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is responsible for establishing Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) in response to provisions of the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. IOCs are designed to, among other things, share maritime information with the Coast Guard’s port partners (other agencies and organizations it coordinates with). To facilitate IOCs, the Coast Guard is implementing an information-management and sharing system called WatchKeeper. GAO was asked to assess IOC and WatchKeeper implementation. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS and the Coast Guard have implemented IOCs, (2) port partners use WatchKeeper and the Coast Guard has facilitated its use to enhance IOC capabilities, and (3) the Coast Guard has adhered to established guidance in defining WatchKeeper requirements and its associated cost and schedule. GAO analyzed laws and documents, such as implementation plans, and interviewed Coast Guard and port-partner officials at the first four sectors (field locations) where WatchKeeper was implemented. The results of the four sector visits are not generalizable, but provide insights. GAO recommends that the Coast Guard collect data on port partners’ access and use of WatchKeeper; develop, document, and implement a process on how to incorporate port-partner input; implement requirements-development practices; and revise the cost estimate and the integrated master schedule. DHS concurred subject to the availability of funds. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-202: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588476.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588476.pdf Shelf Number: 124294 Keywords: Coast GuardMaritime CrimeMaritime Security (U.S.)Seaports |
Author: Griffiths, Hugh Title: Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows Summary: Maritime transport flows are the lifeblood of global trade. They are also the dominant means of transporting a range of potentially destabilizing commodities that threaten states and societies throughout the developing and developed worlds. This SIPRI Policy Paper aims to fill an important knowledge gap by—for the first time in a public document—providing a comprehensive mapping and analysis of the ships involved in the clandestine transport of narcotics, arms and dual-use goods essential to the development of weapons of mass destruction. It also offers practical solutions to one of the most important global security challenges for policymakers, civil society and industry in the 21st century. Details: Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2012. 64p. Source: SIPRI Policy Paper 32: Internet Resource: Accessed March 11, 2012 at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP32.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP32.pdf Shelf Number: 124460 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMartime SecurityTrafficking |
Author: Goslin, Charles Title: Maritime and Port Security: White Paper Summary: Worldwide Port and Maritime operations and their associated facilities and infrastructure collectively represent one of the single greatest unaddressed challenges to the security of nations and the global economy today. The reason that ports and shipping activity are so difficult to secure lies primarily in their topography. Ports are typically large, asymmetrical activities dispersed over hundreds of acres of land and water so that they can simultaneously accommodate ship, truck and rail traffic, petroleum product/liquid offload, storage or piping, and container storage. The movement of freight, cargo (solid or liquid), and transport through a port is generally on a “queuing” system, meaning that any delay snarls all operations1. Whether or not delays are related to security, security generally falls by the wayside in the interest of time management or convenience. Globally, there are very few uniform standards for point-to-point control of security on containers, cargoes, vessels or crews - a port’s security in one nation remains very much at the mercy of a port’s security, or lack thereof, in another nation. Organized crime is entrenched in many ports, and a large majority of them still do not require background checks on dock workers, crane operators or warehouse employees. Most ports lease large portions of their facility to private terminal operating companies, who are responsible for their own security. The result of this is a “balkanized”, uneven system of port security and operations management as a whole. In spite of awareness by public policymakers that ports remain critically vulnerable, funding and government-led efforts to harden port facilities worldwide is moving at a glacial pace. Terrorists, in particular, are aware of this unaddressed vulnerability. As outlined below, the threats to the maritime industry are very real. Unfortunately, the question of whether terrorists will act to exploit the weaknesses in port facilities is, unfortunately, not a matter of “if” they will, but “when” they will. Details: Jacksonville, FL: duostechnologies International, 2008 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2012 at: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 124796 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPort SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Gambler, Rebecca Title: Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and Assessment Efforts Summary: Border Patrol, within DHS’s CBP, is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the national borders between the U.S. ports of entry (POE). DHS has completed a new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) that Border Patrol officials stated will emphasize risk management instead of increased resources to achieve border security and continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). This statement highlights key issues from prior GAO reports that discuss Border Patrol’s progress and challenges in (1) implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy and (2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the border. This statement is based on GAO reports issued since 2007 on border security, with selected updates from April and May 2012 on Border Patrol resource needs, actions taken to address prior GAO recommendations, and efforts to develop performance measures. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed agency documents such as operational assessments and interviewed DHS officials. In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to, among other things, strengthen border security technology, infrastructure, and partnerships. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has reported actions planned or underway to address them. CBP reviewed a draft of information contained in this statement and provided comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-688T: Accessed May 16, 2012 at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Gambler.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Gambler.pdf Shelf Number: 125315 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Maritime Crime |
Author: Metaparti, Satya Prakash Title: Risk Management Initiatives for Post 9/11 Maritime Security Summary: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, there has been a major worldwide focus on the threat of terrorism to trade, transportation and critical infrastructures. One area that has received particular attention is maritime trade and international shipping. The relative vulnerability of ports, ships, containers, and other maritime facilities worldwide combined with the importance of maritime trade to the global economy have resulted in several international and national measures to manage security risks in this area. Among these, the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code by the United Nations, and domestic legislations of the United States such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) have an international effect and are of particular significance. Despite the emergence of strong security responses, concerns about their adequacy and cost-effectiveness remain. Differing threat perceptions and erosion of sovereignty also impede effective implementation of these security measures. Based on these perceptions, this study questions whether the post 9/11 maritime security measures resulted from a sound application of the principles of risk management or were excessively politicized. This study also examines in detail the intrinsic factors within the shipping industry that contribute to its vulnerability or resilience, the underlying dynamics security responses, as well as their cost and effectiveness. Gaps in the effectiveness of these security measures are identified and possible remedial measures are suggested. This multidisciplinary study is based on the concepts of securitization from the political science domain and risk management principles from business studies, and is an attempt at reaching across disciplines to examine this important topic of contemporary interest. Qualitative inputs for this study were obtained through interviews with seafarers, industry experts and government/port officials and quantitatively backed by a user perception survey on the ISPS Code. Findings indicate that post 9/11 maritime security measures have enhanced the overall security of shipping. However, large gaps remain. Further, at a strategic level, there are differences among various stakeholders with regards to threat perceptions and the cost effectiveness of security. At an operational level, the study findings show excessive reliance on paper work, bureaucratization and restrictions on movement of goods and personnel. Recommendations at a strategic level include wider international cooperation and a decision making process that aims for broader consensus among all stakeholders. At a tactical/operational level, this study recommends better information sharing, reduced paperwork and integration of various shipboard sub-processes, such as those for safety, environment, quality, and security - which are currently separate - into a unified process that optimizes the available resources and reduces conflicting requirements. Details: Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 2009. 334p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2012 at: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/56504 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/56504 Shelf Number: 125344 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityRisk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: Bekkevold, Jo Inge Title: Anti-Piracy and Humanitarian Operations Summary: Given the last decade's maritime cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations after the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 earth quake and tsunami in Japan, and the last years' anti-piracy efforts off-Somalia and elsewhere, the first workshop on “Anti-Piracy and Humanitarian Operations” was a timely and important event. The first paper by a team of Norwegian scholars and naval officers assesses Norway’s contribution to multilateral anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean and Somalia. The paper by Bernard Cole, professor at the US National War College, is an analysis of several recent US HADR operations in the Asia-Pacific region. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, discusses the importance of HADR operations in India’s National Strategy. The last paper by Øystein Tunsjø, associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, adresses the impact of recent and future maritime developments in Asia on Norwegian security. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2012. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2012 at: http://ifs.forsvaret.no/publikasjoner/IOS/Sider/IOS_1_2012.aspx Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://ifs.forsvaret.no/publikasjoner/IOS/Sider/IOS_1_2012.aspx Shelf Number: 125512 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Sethi, Suresh A. Title: Poaching and the Performance of Marine Reserves as Ocean Management Tools Summary: Noncompliance in fisheries management is unavoidable and is likely to occur in marine reserves. This Master’s thesis presents two models exploring the effects of poaching on a reserve-fishery system: an age-structured reserve model that explores the effects of poaching on the biological and fishery performance of the system under different policy choices for the open area, and a reserve model with logistic population growth and simple poaching fleet dynamics to explore considerations about harvester noncompliance behavior. Both models make similar predictions about the biological and fishery outcomes of poaching. Departures from the traditional assumptions of full compliance to reserve boundaries alter the conclusions of prior modeling work that demonstrate yield equivalence to no-reserve effort control management and augmented reproductive benefits when small reserves are implemented. By degrading the recruitment subsidization effect to nonreserve areas from protected reserve populations, poaching results in negative externalities on yield for compliant fishermen in open areas and degrades the reproductive output and age-structure of the system. Due to the biological link between reserve and nonreserve areas, poaching in closed areas requires effort reduction in open areas to maintain management reference points. Results from the model with simple poaching fleet dynamics suggest that there are two main approaches to manage noncompliance in the marine reserve context. First is to reduce the expected benefits of poaching through enforcement and fines, and the second is to change the characteristics of the poaching fleet itself. “Community based” policies that incorporate resource users into management and enforcement may be helpful in altering the characteristics of the poaching fleet towards reducing noncompliance. The results of these simulations emphasize the importance of garnering compliance to reserve boundaries from resource users for spatial closures to be successful ocean management tools. Details: Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 2007. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Essay: Accessed July 30, 2012 at: http://fish.washington.edu/research/publications/ms_phd/Sethi_S_MS_Su07.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://fish.washington.edu/research/publications/ms_phd/Sethi_S_MS_Su07.pdf Shelf Number: 125808 Keywords: Animal PoachingFisheriesMaritime CrimeOcean ManagementWildlife Crime |
Author: Hongzhou, Zhang Title: China’s Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security Summary: Having the world’s largest fishing fleet while facing depleting fishery resources in its inshore waters, China’s marine catch sector has been experiencing two major structural adjustments: a shift from inshore to offshore fishing and expanding Distant Water Fishing (DWF). The shift from inshore to offshore fishing is leading to growing illegal fishing operations by Chinese fishermen in neighboring countries’ EEZs and disputed waters, particularly in the East China Sea and South China Sea. These operations become triggers for maritime tensions and clashes in the region. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of China’s distant water fishing fleet also has notable implications for global maritime security. China’s growing distant water fishing fleet is also one of the factors leading to China’s efforts to build a blue water navy to safeguard China’s maritime interests. However, it might also contribute to overfishing and illegal fishing which threatens the sustainability of the global fishing sector. The root causes of fishing disputes between China and other countries are China’s worsening supply and demand imbalances for aquatic products, and overcapacity of its marine catch sector. Thus, in order to manage fisheries disputes and prevent fishing disputes from escalating into regional and global diplomatic and security conflicts, efforts at national, regional and global levels are needed. At the national level, China needs to step up efforts to address the demand and supply imbalances and at the regional and global level, cooperation and coordination among countries are essential to prevent fishing disputes from escalating. If the structural shifts of China’s fishing industry could be well managed, the fishing sector could be an ideal field for cooperation to achieve maritime safety and security at both regional and global levels. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Working Paper, 246: Accessed August 23, 2012 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP246.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Singapore URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP246.pdf Shelf Number: 126109 Keywords: Illegal FishingMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the Environment (Singapore)Overfishing |
Author: Charlton, Alexandra Title: The Challenges to Responding to Human Smuggling in Canada: Practitioners Reflect on the 1999 Boat Arrivals in British Columbia Summary: During the summer of 1999, four boats arrived off the west coast of British Columbia (BC) carrying a total of 599 migrants smuggled directly from Fujian, China. After their arrival, most of the migrants made refugee claims. Once the first group of migrants had been processed and released, many disappeared, thus abandoning their refugee claims. In response, the federal government detained most of the migrants who arrived on the following three boats. Because of the scale of the boat arrivals and the decision to detain refugee claimants, Canadian governmental and non-governmental institutions faced unprecedented challenges in responding to this migration. Many of these challenges involved collaboration and resource sharing among institutions. While other federal departments and other levels of government were involved, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) held primary responsibility, with its mandate to facilitate immigration and to enforce international borders in relation to human migration. This paper is a collective contribution made by seven people – with distinct perspectives – involved in the response to human smuggling in BC in 1999. They convened at a workshop held at the Fifth National Metropolis Conference in Ottawa on 20 October 2001 with the goal of furthering the dialogue about the cross-institutional response to human smuggling. The objective of this paper is to continue the dialogue about the many challenges to responding to human smuggling in Canada, as outlined by speakers. Speakers were asked to address the following questions: (1) What is the framework within which you work (e.g., the mandate and culture of your institution)? (2) What are your roles and responsibilities in responding to human smuggling? (3) What have been the main challenges in the cross-institutional coordination of the response? Details: Vancouver: Vancouver Centre of Excellence, 2002. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis Working Paper Series, No. 02-23: Accessed August 28, 2012 at: http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2002/WP02-23.pdf Year: 2002 Country: Canada URL: http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2002/WP02-23.pdf Shelf Number: 126155 Keywords: Human Smuggling (Canada)Human TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Australia. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Title: Inquiry Into the Adequacy of Aviation and Maritime Security Measures to Combat Serious and Organised Crime Summary: On 14 September 2009, the then Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission (PJC-ACC) initiated an inquiry into the adequacy of aviation and maritime security measures to combat serious and organised crime. The terms of reference required the committee to examine the effectiveness of current administrative and law enforcement arrangements to protect Australia's borders from serious and organised criminal activity. In particular the committee examined: (a) the methods used by serious and organised criminal groups to infiltrate Australia's airports and ports, and the extent of infiltration; (b) the range of criminal activity currently occurring at Australia's airports and ports, including but not limited to: •the importation of illicit drugs, firearms, and prohibited items; •tariff avoidance; •people trafficking and people smuggling; •money laundering; and •air cargo and maritime cargo theft; (c) the effectiveness of the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC)and Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) schemes; includingthe process of issuing ASICs and MSICs, the monitoring of cards issuedand the storage of, and sharing of, ASIC and MSIC information between appropriate law enforcement agencies; (d) the current administrative and law enforcement arrangements and information and intelligence sharing measures to manage the risk of serious and organised criminal activity at Australia's airports and ports; and (e) the findings of the Australian Crime Commission's special intelligence operations into Crime in the Transport Sector and Illegal Maritime Importation and Movement Methodologies. Details: Canberra: Parliamentary Joint Cmomittee on Law Enforcement, 2011. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2012 at: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=le_ctte/aviation_maritime/report/index.htm Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=le_ctte/aviation_maritime/report/index.htm Shelf Number: 126228 Keywords: AirportsAviation SecurityBorder SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime Crime (Australia)Organized Crime |
Author: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Title: Calming Troubled Waters: Global and Regional Strategies for Countering Piracy Summary: Last October the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy co-chaired a forum on piracy in the margins of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth, attended by Indian Ocean Rim countries and stakeholders promoting security in Somalia and off the Horn of Africa. The Australian Government at that time agreed to host a Counter-Piracy Conference in Perth this year designed to explore further options to reduce piracy in Somalia and beyond. This Conference was held on 16–17 July 2012. It was attended by delegates from 59 countries and organisations and chaired by Mr Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The Conference addressed global issues with piracy and armed robbery against ships. It compared the situation in the three main areas where these crimes are most prolific—in Southeast Asia, off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea—with a view towards gaining ideas about the lessons to be learned and how the fight against piracy and sea robbery might be strengthened at the national, regional and international levels. This Special Report opens with the speech presented by Warren Snowdon, Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, on behalf of Stephen Smith, Australian Minister for Defence to the Perth Counter-Piracy Conference. The report sets out a background paper prepared for the Conference by Dr Sam Bateman, Maritime Security Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, who was assisted in this task by ASPI’s Deputy Director, Dr Anthony Bergin. The report concludes with some personal reflections on the Perth international meeting by the Chairman of the Counter-Piracy Conference, as well as the final Chairman’s Statement, issued immediately following the conclusion of the Conference. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institiute, 2012. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report -- Issue 47; Accessed September 17, 2012 at: http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=347&pubtype=10 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=347&pubtype=10 Shelf Number: 126362 Keywords: Armed RobberyMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiates/Piracy |
Author: Onuoha, Freedom C. Title: Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as Microcosm Summary: The resurgence of pirate attacks in African waters is now a subject of serious concern to African states and indeed the international community. For the last decade, piracy in African waters is concentrated in three main regions, namely the Somali coast/the Gulf of Aden along the East African Coast; Nigeria’s territorial waters in West Africa; and the Mozambique Channel/Cape sea route in Southern Africa. Since 2007 when African waters overtook waters off Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Philippines – as the traditionally dangerous hotspots of global piracy, much of the international attention and efforts at countering piracy in Africa have been on Somali maritime piracy. This is understandably so, because piracy off the Somali coast accounts for more than half of pirate attacks recorded annually in Africa, if not globally. For instance, there were 439 piracy attacks worldwide in 2011, more than half of which were attributed to Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of Oman (Alessi, 2012). The spike in attacks prompted the deployment in 2008 of an ongoing international coalition of navies to fight Somali piracy. Yet violence at sea is also brewing in another African gulf: the Gulf of Guinea (GG). The increase in the number of attacks in 2011 in the GG and the fear that this would further increase in 2012 have prompted analysts to question whether foreign 3 navies will intervene to shore up maritime security in the region as they did in waters off the coast of Somalia (Baldauf, 2012). It is in this light that this article examines the dynamics of piracy in the GG region by highlighting, the trend in piracy in the region, contributing factors underlying the scourge, implications of piracy for the region and efforts being made to suppress violence at sea in the region. Details: Doha, Qatar: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2012. 12p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 1, 2012 at http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/6/12/201261294647291734Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria URL: http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/6/12/201261294647291734Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdf Shelf Number: 126543 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracyPirates/Piracy |
Author: Brown, James Title: Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean's Private Security Book Summary: The fight against Somali-based pirates is becoming a private battle as global defence cuts reduce naval counter-piracy deployments. Because governments have struggled to contain the spread of piracy in the Indian Ocean, shipping companies have turned to private military security companies to guarantee the safety of their crews and cargo. Private armed teams have proliferated on commercial shipping and several private armed vessels are operating in the region. Meanwhile, some governments are hiring out their own national militaries as security guards onboard ships. However, this private counter-piracy boom is creating fresh problems. Already shootings at sea have led to international disputes and accidental confrontations. And murky legal and consular difficulties loom. There is a legitimate role for private companies in fighting piracy. But the challenge for governments will be to recapture the policy agenda and define the limits of what that role is before it leads to new kinds of trouble on the high seas. Downloadable map showing private counter-piracy forces - attribute to Lowy Institute. Key Findings - The maritime security business in the Indian Ocean is booming as ships turn to private military security companies to help in the fight against piracy. Over 140 companies now provide armed protection for ships in the Indian Ocean. At least 2700 individual contractors are employed as armed guards on ships and 18 floating armouries are operating in waters near the Gulf of Aden. - 40 private armed patrol boats are now, or will soon be, operating in the Indian Ocean. The most sophisticated of these private navies is outfitting three large boats in Singapore - each with a crew of 20, capable of carrying 40 private marines, and equipped with a helicopter and drones. The use of these boats, and the aggressive tactics they employ, should be discouraged by governments and the International Maritime Organization. - Because of shipping company demands for armed teams and shrinking defence budgets, governments are now privately hiring out their soldiers to provide security onboard commercial ships as "vessel protection detachments". The use of these teams potentially has serious legal and political consequences for states should they be involved in disputes. Details: Sydney, NSW: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2012 at: http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/brown_pirates_and_privateers_web.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/brown_pirates_and_privateers_web.pdf Shelf Number: 126563 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates (Somalia)Private Security |
Author: Richardson, Mark Title: Protecting America’s Pacific Marine Monuments: A Review of Threats and Law Enforcement Issues Summary: In January 2009, President George W. Bush exercised his authority under the Antiquities Act of 1906 to establish the Marianas Trench, Pacific Remote Islands, and Rose Atoll Marine National Monuments. Collectively, the three monuments encompass nearly 200,000 square miles of low coral islands and their surrounding pelagic zones, which extend roughly 50 nautical miles (nm) seaward of island shorelines. These areas harbor some of the last relatively pristine marine ecosystems in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, and are home to countless species of marine wildlife, including dolphins, whales, turtles, seabirds, fish, invertebrates, and corals. The presidential proclamations creating these areas prohibit all commercial resource extraction activities, explicitly ban commercial fishing, and allow limited subsistence or recreational fishing. The creation of the monuments reflects a growing trend in ocean protection as nations shift their focus away from smaller, coastal Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in favor of larger areas that capture an array of marine ecosystems and biodiversity (e.g., the South Georgia & South Sandwich Islands Marine Protected Area created in 2012 spans 386,372 square miles). Unfortunately, large ocean areas remote from human populations are difficult and costly to manage and enforce. Without the provision of sufficient resources, even government agencies of wealthy nations cannot monitor these places on a consistent basis, let alone manage and protect them at a level commensurate with their status as internationally recognized conservation areas. To ensure that the US Pacific marine national monuments (MNMs) in the Western and Central Pacific do not simply linger as “paper parks,” Marine Conservation Institute assessed the major human threats to these areas and reviewed the current performance of US law enforcement agencies in deterring and prosecuting activities that could prove catastrophic to monument ecosystems. Based on an analysis of vessel traffic in the region, damage to the Pacific MNMs is likely to occur in one of the following ways: 1) illegal fishing activity by US or foreign fishing vessels; 2) accidental groundings and oil spills by large commercial vessels (e.g. container ships or tankers) or fishing vessels; or 3) introduction of invasive marine or terrestrial species by small recreational vessels (e.g. sailboats) that trespass in nearshore island waters or on the islands themselves. A synthesis of government documents, personal interviews with federal enforcement staff, and information from international fishery management organizations shows that vessel-based threats continue to manifest themselves inside Pacific marine national monuments. For example: Since the monuments were created in January 2009, there have been low but consistent levels of illegal fishing by US-registered vessels inside the boundaries of Rose Atoll and Pacific Remote Islands MNMs. Foreign fishing vessel incursions are a regular occurrence in the vast and discontinuous US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean; there have been at least two documented cases of foreign vessels fishing illegally inside Marianas Trench MNM, and many more suspected violations. There have been several documented cases of attempted or actual illegal trespass by recreational sailing vessels at various islands within the Pacific Remote Islands MNM; in one case the presence of an invasive terrestrial species (a rat) was linked to a trespassing vessel at Johnston Atoll, which previously had been cleared of rats. Historically, commercial fishing vessels have posed the greatest threat of accidental groundings and spills; in the last 25 years there have been groundings on Rose Atoll, Palmyra Atoll, and Kingman Reef, all of which caused significant and lingering damage. Large container and tanker vessels pose a potential threat of catastrophic contamination and physical damage to the monuments through accidental groundings and spills, but the frequency and location of commercial vessel traffic are not routinely tracked or made public by federal agencies or international agencies. In addition to documenting these threats, we analyzed routine law enforcement operations in the Pacific Islands region to assess government agency capabilities to track, respond to, and deter illegal activity. To effectively deal with threats, federal law enforcement agencies need to have a minimum set of things in place, including: 1) clear and enforceable regulations; 2) adequate financial, human, and technological resources; 3) a surveillance and monitoring system that detects vessels in real-time; 4) an effective public outreach and education program that contributes to voluntary compliance; and 5) a mechanism for interagency cooperation that allows agencies to leverage scarce resources and find collaborative solutions to problems. Details: Marine Conservation Institute, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2012/10/04/pacific_islands_enforcement_final_case_studyfull_version.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2012/10/04/pacific_islands_enforcement_final_case_studyfull_version.pdf Shelf Number: 126665 Keywords: Illegal FishingMaritime CrimeWildlife Crime |
Author: Brooke, Sandra Title: Review of Surveillance and Enforcement of Federal Fisheries in the Southeastern U.S. Summary: Over the past several decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of marine protected areas including those that are remote from shore and cover large areas of the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The large size of the areas and the complex assortment of regulations within them pose many challenges to policy-makers and resource managers. One of the greatest challenges is monitoring activity in these areas and enforcing regulations so that the designated areas are truly protecting the resources and are not merely ‘paper parks’. The overarching objective of this project entitled ‘Review of surveillance and enforcement of federal fisheries in the southeastern US’ was to increase the effectiveness of resource protection within the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (SAFMC) boundaries through identification of potential improvement of monitoring and enforcement. The Marine Conservation Institute, in collaboration with the law enforcement and management agencies within the SAFMC region, has identified surveillance and enforcement challenges and suggests a series of recommendations for addressing some of these problems. Selected recommendations are listed briefly below and are described in more detail in the full report. Details: Seattle, WA: Marine Conservation Biology Institute, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2012 at http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2012/03/23/safmc_serma_final_report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.marine-conservation.org/media/filer_public/2012/03/23/safmc_serma_final_report.pdf Shelf Number: 126693 Keywords: FisheriesMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOcean ManagementSurveillanceWildlife Crime |
Author: Kemp, Geoffrey Title: Maritime Security East of Suez: Sustaining the U.S. Role as the Key Policeman in Times of Change Summary: This report examines U.S. power and the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and South China Seas. This report is organized into three major sections. The first section provides background on how the Indian Ocean became such an important theater. It draws upon a study done for the Center for the National Interest (then known as the Nixon Center) by Justin de Rise, which we are publishing separately. We believe this study, especially the extensive database that supports it, makes a unique contribution to our understanding of the large number of maritime confrontations that have taken places in the Indian Ocean over the last 70 years. It provides a most useful tool for analysts to work with, given the extraordinary amount of data we have assembled and the use of new Google Maps interfaces. The second section focuses on one of our key findings, namely the growing importance of the U.S.-Indian maritime relationship. It includes the summary of a workshop held in New Delhi in February 2011 which drew together American and Indian maritime specialists, and has been published by the Center separately in expanded form under the title Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region. The report concludes with a summary of the emerging maritime environment and the challenges for all Middle Eastern and Asian powers, the United States, and others such as Britain, France, and Australia. Details: Washington, DC: Center for the National Interest, 2012. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2012 at: http://www.cftni.org/Maritime%20Security%20East%20of%20Suez.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.cftni.org/Maritime%20Security%20East%20of%20Suez.pdf Shelf Number: 126793 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Shortland, Anja Title: The Business of Pirate Protection Summary: Somali piracy is often described as a form of organized crime. There is an implicit assumption that pirate gangs handle the entire process from hijack to ransom, including the provision of security for hijacked ships. This approach fails to distinguish between different actors within modern piracy and leads to policies focusing on deterring pirate recruits and lowering the returns to investors. Drawing on Protection Theory developed for the study of Mafias, a detailed analysis of Bloomberg maps of hijacked vessels’ routes, field interviews and Somali press reports, we show that there is a clear distinction between protectors of piracy and pirates. Clan elders and their militias facilitate piracy, because they protect hijacked ships in their anchorages and have well-established channels for coordinating actions where business interests cut across clan lines. This explains the relative stability and order within the piracy business, such as the lack of re-hijacking. The paper concludes by arguing that the solution to piracy needs to focus on the enablers rather than the executors of the crime, and should be at the substate, clan level. Details: Berlin: Economics of Security, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Economics of Security Working Paper 75: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.408691.de/diw_econsec0075.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.408691.de/diw_econsec0075.pdf Shelf Number: 127030 Keywords: HijackingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System Summary: The U.S. economy is dependent on the expeditious flow of millions of tons of cargo each day. Cargo containers are an important instrument of global trade but also can present security concerns. CBP is responsible for administering container security programs, and its strategy for securing maritime cargo containers includes analyzing information to identify shipments that may contain terrorist weapons or other contraband. Because CBP has insufficient resources to examine every container, targeters use ATS to target which container shipments should be examined. GAO was asked to assess CBP's targeting efforts. This report addresses (1) how ATS supports CBP's targeting of maritime cargo container shipments for national security purposes and (2) the extent to which CBP assesses the effectiveness of ATS's national security targeting rules. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2011 CBP data on shipments and containers arriving at U.S. ports and containers scanned at these ports. GAO also visited six CBP units selected on the basis of the percentage of maritime shipments that were scored as high risk or medium risk for national security purposes at these locations in fiscal year 2011, among other factors. GAO also analyzed documents, such as CBP's ATS performance measures. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CBP (1) ensure that future updates to the weight set are based on assessments of its performance and (2) establish targets for performance measures and use those measures to regularly assess effectiveness of the weight set. DHS concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-9: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649695.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649695.pdf Shelf Number: 127035 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecuritySupply Chain Security |
Author: Great Britain. House of Lords. European Union Committee Title: Turning the Tide on Piracy, Building Somalia's Future: Follow-Up Report on the EU's Operation Atalanta and Beyond Summary: Operation Atalanta is the EU’s first naval operation. It was launched in 2008 under UK leadership, with the purpose of protecting World Food Programme ships delivering aid to Somalia, and preventing and combating piracy off the Somali coast. The Committee first reported on Atalanta in April 2010, when we outlined a number of concerns about the mission and the situation in Somalia. Since then two further EU missions have been launched, one, based in Uganda, to train Somali security forces, (EUTM Somalia), and one to support regional maritime capacity-building in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean states (EUCAP Nestor). In this report we welcome the progress made in reducing the number of pirated ships as a result of efforts by the international naval task forces, including Atalanta, and by the shipping industry, which has increasingly used ship protection measures. In June 2012 eight pirated vessels and 215 hostages were held, compared with 23 vessels and 501 hostages in June the previous year. We consider that Operation Atalanta must be continued up to and beyond the expiry of its current mandate in December 2014 in order to avoid an upsurge in pirate activity. We welcome the increased involvement of Somalia’s neighbours, led by the Seychelles, in conducting piracy trials, though we have doubts about the transfer of sentenced pirates back to Somalia. We also have concerns about the problems created for the countries involved by the higher standards of prisons for pirates than for their other prisoners. We believe that some measure of rehabilitation should be established, especially for younger pirates, though we recognise that imprisonment needs to be a real deterrent. We note with satisfaction the extent of practical international cooperation in countering piracy, including by China, and the cooperation with regional organisations such as the African Union. We believe, however, that the Gulf States should make a greater effort to assist in solving the problems of piracy and Somalia. We concluded in our previous report that piracy would not be ended until the root causes of the problems in Somalia were successfully tackled. Since that report, the EU has developed its activity by formulating a Strategy for the Horn of Africa and appointing a Special Representative for the area, as well as launching EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor. We believe that the missions should be taken forward pro-actively and that the EU’s development aid should focus on providing alternative livelihoods for the Somali people. These missions must continue until the incentives for piracy are removed and the coastal states of the region are able to police their own coastlines. Taken together, we welcome these developments as assisting the necessary comprehensive solution to Somalia’s problems under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Details: London: The Stationery Office, 2012. 35p. Source: HL Paper 43: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2012 at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/43/43.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/43/43.pdf Shelf Number: 127242 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime Piracy (Somalia)Maritime SecurityPiracy (Somalia) |
Author: Environmental Justice Foundation Title: Dirty Fish: EU Hygiene Standards facilitates illegal fishing in West Africa. Summary: • Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) or ‘pirate’ fishing is devastating marine environments and stealing from some of the poorest people of the world. IUU is the term given to any fishing activity that contravenes national or international laws, such as: banned fishing gears; targeting protected species; operating in protected or reserved areas or at times when fishing is prohibited; or operating without any form of permit or license to fish. IUU fishing vessels cut costs to maximise profits and use a variety of means, including ‘flags of convenience’ to avoid detec- tion and penalty for wrongdoing. • Globally, pirate fishing accounts for US$10 – 23.5 billion a year, representing between 11 and 26 million tons of fish. It is driven by the enormous global demand for seafood, and threatens the future of world fisheries. The impacts are social, economic, and environmental, and in many cases IUU operators specifically target poor developing countries. • Investigations by the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) have demonstrated the direct links between pirate fishing in the West African nation of Sierra Leone, the illegal operators, and the Asian and European seafood markets, the largest in the world. • South Korean and Chinese vessels dominate the pirate fishery in West Africa, in clear contravention of those countries’ international responsibilities to ensure that the vessels flagged to them operate legally. • Investigations show that many South Korean and Chinese pirate fishing vessels carry import numbers designated by the European Commission, specifically the Food and Veterinary Office of the Directorate-General of Health and Consumers (DG Sanco). The DG Sanco number infers that the vessel has met supposedly strict EU hygiene standards, and is therefore allowed to export fish to the European Union. EJF investigations reveal that fish is handled and packed in extremely unhygienic conditions; • There appears to be no coordination between the EU’s DG Sanco and the Directorate-General of Fisheries and Mari- time Affairs (DG Mare) to ensure that known IUU vessels are identified, and then barred and/or eliminated from DG Sanco lists. Vessels that fish illegally do so to minimize costs associated with legal fishing methods. Lack of official licenses and proper safety equipment, unsanitary conditions and appalling crew conditions have all been documented by EJF aboard IUU vessels. • Sierra Leone is desperately vulnerable to pirate fishing - as a result of recent civil war, struggling economy and dependency on fish. 70% of the population live on less than one dollar a day and the country is ranked by the United Nations as bottom of 179 countries on its Human Development Index, one of the poorest in the world. Foreign illegal fishing vessels are stealing around US$29million of fish from Sierra Leone each year; in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the total value of illegal fish is approximately US$1billion. Fishing is a vital source of income for the Sierra Leonean men and women – around 230,000 people are engaged in traditional fish capture, and fisheries represents around 10% of GDP. Fish is also a crucial component of food security, contributing 80% of the total animal protein to the country. • IUU fishing is devastating marine environments – bottom trawl nets catch everything in their path, and only those species considered commercially valuable are kept; the remainder, around 75% of the total, is discarded dead. IUU is a growing threat to marine species including turtles and sharks, as well as commercial fish species and juvenile fish needed to replenish stocks. Details: London: Environmental Justice Foundation, 2009. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2013 at:http://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/files/public/report-dirty%20fish.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/files/public/report-dirty%20fish.pdf Shelf Number: 127685 Keywords: Illegal Fishing (West Africa)Maritime CrimeWildlife Crime |
Author: Norris, John Title: Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia Summary: The disastrous famine in Somalia is the worst the world has seen in 20 years, and it again casts a harsh spotlight on the situation in that country. With millions of people now at risk of starvation, and appalling stories of human hardship dominating the evening news, the name “Somalia” once again conjures images of crisis and despair—a famished, suffering country peopled by pirates, terrorists, and warlords. Somalia is best known for the civil war and famine of the early 1990s, which killed some 250,000 people and triggered a massive, U.S.-led humanitarian intervention that culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1994. More recently, the rise of indigenous Islamist movements in southern Somalia has rekindled fears that the anarchic territory could—or has—become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist movements. Western and regional efforts to reduce the terror threat by establishing a central government in Somalia have failed to improve governance. A recent confidential audit of the Somali government suggests that in 2009 and 2010 some 96 percent of direct bilateral assistance to the government had simply disappeared, presumably into the pockets of corrupt officials.19 The repeated failure of international efforts to produce positive change in Somalia has generated fatigue among donors at a time when Somalia’s needs have never been greater. “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” is rightfully a well-worn adage. Yet in the world of foreign policy it is an exceedingly difficult credo to translate from convenient talking point into practice. As much as policy experts and others, including the U.S. secretary of defense, call for sensible investments in crisis prevention, international development, and expanded diplomatic capabilities, the default setting of the U.S. government and its partners in the international community is to scrimp on crisis prevention while pouring money into crisis response and containment. By and large, the U.S. government ends up spending far more time and money responding to crises or tinkering with tactical responses than preventing crises or nurturing effective peacebuilding efforts. This paper explores the staggeringly high cost of this approach by looking at the case of Somalia. This research tries to determine—using a variety of official and unofficial sources and some educated guesswork—a reasonable estimate of the financial cost of Somalia’s conflict since 1991. We tried to be as exhaustive as possible in determining the money spent on Somalia by the international community, regional actors, and the Somali diaspora, regardless of the specific intentions of spending and whether these expenditures were sensible and effective or not. It is our hope that the data explored in this paper can provide the foundation for a useful cost-benefit analysis of what has and has not worked in Somalia. We welcome any additional insights into our methodology and findings. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2011. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf Shelf Number: 127696 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMaritime CrimePiracy/PiratesTerrorism (Somalia) |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment Summary: Key Findings • The flow of cocaine through West Africa appears to have declined to about 18 tons, down from a peak of 47 tons in 2007. These 18 tons would be worth US$1.25 billion at wholesale in Europe, providing West African traffickers with substantial income. • Modes of conveyance for cocaine from South America to Europe via West Africa have shifted over time in response to enforcement efforts. Much of the cocaine headed to West Africa today comes from Brazil, where Nigerian crime groups are exporting the drug. Recently, these groups have been moving into containerized consignments and maritime shipping, adopting these methods in addition to their traditional methods of air couriering and postal shipments. From West Africa, an increase in the use of Benin as a departure point for air couriers has been noted. • Methamphetamine production in the region is a growing concern, with two methamphetamine laboratories detected in Nigeria in 2011-2012. The main market for West African-made meth is East Asia, and to a lesser extent, South Africa. The income from trafficking West African-made methamphetamines to East Asia is remarkably high for such a new flow, but the long-term prospects are limited in light of competition from producers located in the destination markets. • Due to the economic downturn, the flow of smuggled migrants from West Africa to Europe has declined in recent years. The prominence of the many routes has shifted significantly, with routes moving eastwards. • Given the number of weapons still circulating from past conflicts in the region, there is very little need to import large numbers of weapons into West Africa. Most of the illicit flow of weapons in the region is diverted or stolen from licit national stocks held by to 20,000 firearms from Libya does represent a serious threat to stability in the region, a threat that appears to have been realized in northern Mali. • The prevalence of fraudulent medicines is highest not in the markets where profits would be the greatest, but in those where chances of detection are lowest. At least 10% of the imported medicines circulating in West Africa are fraudulent, posing a grave threat to public health and safety. • Maritime piracy has generated renewed attention in the Gulf of Guinea, with 22 pirate attacks occurring off the coast of Benin in 2011. In 2012, Togo became the new hotspot for attacks on petroleum tankers. These vessels are attacked because there is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa. • Unless the flows of contraband are addressed, instability and lawlessness will persist, and it will remain difficult to build state capacity and the rule of law in the region. Each of these flows requires a tailored response, because the commodities involved respond to distinct sources of supply and demand. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 127736 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingFraudulent MedicinesHuman SmugglingMaritime CrimeMethamphetaminesOrganized Crime (West Africa)Piracy/Pirates |
Author: Carker, Cat Title: The People Smugglers' Business Model Summary: This paper examines first some of the more recent international research, and second, relevant Australian case law and the more limited body of Australian research on people smuggling, to determine whether this business model can be identified. It does not seek to evaluate the appropriateness or efficacy of specific anti-people smuggling policies that have been or are currently being pursued by Australian Governments. Key points: •Since the late 1990s, people smuggling has been a key focus of political debate on irregular migration to Australia. Most recently, attention has turned to how to ‘break the people smugglers’ business model’ . While there is continuing debate about how best to achieve this objective, the business model being referred to remains largely unarticulated, at least publicly . •Examination of recent open source research and Australian case law reveals there is no single ‘people smugglers’ business model’ that explains how people smugglers operate, either internationally or to Australia . However, certain themes are evident, including the predominance of fluid networks over more hierarchical organisations and the flexibility, adaptability and resilience of those involved. It appears that a variety of business models are employed (either explicitly or implicitly) and that they are constantly evolving. •Some basic characteristics of maritime people smuggling from Indonesia to Australia can be discerned from open source information that can be used to outline some of the basic components of a common business model that seems to operate. However, there appear to be many variations on different components of the model. Further, the Indonesia to Australia leg is only part of a much longer journey, and Indonesia is not the only departure point for boats to Australia organised by people smugglers. Finally, while political and popular attention has focused largely on irregular maritime arrivals, people smuggling to Australia also occurs by air. •The use of the singular terms ‘the people smugglers’ business model’ or ‘the people smuggling business model’ gives the impression of a homogeneous market for which a single measure or ‘one size fits all’ solution might exist. The reality of a variety of business models operating at different stages of the supply chain between source countries and destination countries, including Australia, points to the need for a more tailored and considered approach. The points at which to intervene in order to ‘break’ a certain business model, and the most appropriate modes of intervention, will depend on the particular characteristics of that model. Details: Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 2, 2012-13: Accessed March 7, 2013 at: http://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/docs/ParliamentaryLibrary_SmugglersBusinessModel_Feb2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/docs/ParliamentaryLibrary_SmugglersBusinessModel_Feb2013.pdf Shelf Number: 127862 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman Smuggling (Australia)Human TraffickingIllegal ImmigrationMaritime CrimeMigrantsRefugees |
Author: JALA – the Advocacy Network for North Sumatra Fisherfolk Title: When Fishing Turns Deadly: The Environmental and Social Impacts of Illegal Trawling in North Sumatra Summary: North Sumatra is particularly significant to the antitrawler movement in Indonesia because it is here that the numbers of trawlers are greatest, and therefore also here that the conflict between traditional fishing communities and trawlers has been the most widespread and severe. The large increase in the number of trawlers in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in large decreases in catch and income levels for local fishermen10, particularly in the 3 mile zone reserved for traditional fishing activities. Trawlers have often illegally entered these areas, a practice that frequently continues to this day. There was and is little enforcement of the law by any level of government. The result has been anger and frustration on the part of local fishing communities over their decrease in income and the lack of government action. The incursions by trawlers into the traditional fishing zone and resulting contact with local fishermen have had tragic consequences. Trawlers have crushed small fishing boats, resulting in injuries and loss of equipment, and in some cases deaths11. In response traditional fishermen have attacked and burnt trawlers. These clashes between traditional fishermen and trawlers result in injury and loss of life on both sides; many fishermen have been injured, disappeared or died. JALA estimates that the conflict has resulted in over 200 casualties in North Sumatra over the last 15 years. These events continue to be of serious concern; the most recent deadly confrontation occurred at the end of February 2007 near Pantai Cermin, Deli Serdang district. JALA strongly condemns the violent actions taken by both sides, and promotes non-violent solutions amongst the local fishing communities to the problem of trawlers. Together with other NGOs and fishermen organizations, JALA is active in resolving the conflict by providing non-litigation support for traditional fishermen. JALA also works with the NGO Legal Aid Foundation (LBH), which provides professional legal representation for local fishermen impacted by the conflict, who otherwise would not be provided with any information or assistance Details: London: Environmental Justice Foundation, 2008. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed March 21, 2013 at: http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/when_fishing_turns_deadly_north_sumatra.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/when_fishing_turns_deadly_north_sumatra.pdf Shelf Number: 128055 Keywords: Illegal Fishing (North Sumatra, Indonesia)Maritime CrimeWildlife CrimeWildlife Law EnforcementWildlife Management |
Author: Feldt, Lutz Title: Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach Summary: Challenges to “Maritime Security” have many faces – piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking by sea, i.e. narcotics trafficking, small arms and light weapons trafficking, human trafficking, global climate change, cargo theft etc. These challenges keep evolving and may be hybrid in nature: an interconnected and unpredictable mix of traditional and irregular warfare, terrorism, and/or organized crime. In our study we focus on piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism. Starting with principle observations regarding Maritime Security and the threat situation, we have a look at operational requirements and maritime collaboration featuring Maritime Domain Awareness. Finally, we give recommendations for political, military and business decision makers. Details: Berlin: Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW, 2013. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue No. 222: Accessed May 9, 2013 at: www.ispsw.de Year: 2013 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128690 Keywords: Armed RobberyMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityMaritime TerrorismPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Thiele, Ralph D. Title: Building Maritime Security Situational Awareness Summary: Maritime domain security relies on the ability to build a comprehensive awareness of maritime activity. Although it is still in the developmental stages situational awareness is the prerequisite of maritime domain security. Today technological developments such as space‐based systems, over‐the‐horizon radar, and nearshore and harbour acoustics can be incorporated into a layered approach to increase security. To identify and address weaknesses in the system, industry and academia have been discussing ways in which technology, based on advanced modelling and simulation tools can be used to identify threats and determine potential impacts. Numerous governmental, military and business organizations already possess valuable inputs into shared situational awareness. However, no one source captures all of the maritime information needed or currently available. The information exchange between government agencies and with private industry, in particular, sharing common databases, is the real power behind maritime domain awareness centres. Details: Berlin: Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW, 2013. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue No. 182: Accessed May 13, 2013 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=140759 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=140759 Shelf Number: 128696 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Whitman, S. Title: Children and Youth in Marine Piracy: Causes, Consequences and the Way Forward Summary: According to the Failed States Index Data 2011, created by the Fund for Peace Organization, 6 countries most affected by piratical activity fall within the top 15 most fragile states. This includes Somalia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Pakistan, Yemen and Nigeria. Piracy is not the main factor as to why these countries are fragile, at the same time, not all fragile littoral states have marine piracy. However, this does demonstrate the importance of looking at the broader social, political and economic environment that enables piracy. Understanding the human factors associated with piracy activity and the root causes is critical to the development of solutions to address piracy. The Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project (DMPP) has undertaken such an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to addressing the problem of contemporary piracy and its impact on the shipping and coastal communities. In so doing, it comprehensively examined the four interdependent themes of Law and Governance, Socio-Economic, Operational Responses, and Information Management; assessed current literature on the topic of contemporary marine piracy; and, through analysis of that work, highlighted potential areas for policy development and implementation. Piracy appears to develop where weak or non-existent government and enforcement capabilities, impoverished coastal communities, and shipping targets exist in relatively close proximity. Other elements such as organized criminality, youth unemployment, political conflict and even natural disasters may also contribute to the likelihood of piracy emerging as a major threat to shipping in a particular region. The DMPP has examined the economic, political and social conditions, which have led to contemporary outbreaks of piracy with the intention of identifying and evaluating the effectiveness of current and proposed responses to piracy. This paper highlights an important and growing issue identified from the DMPP research. Of deep concern is the increasing evidence that children and youth are being recruited by piracy gangs with little recognition among those responsible for addressing piracy and the complexities this introduces. For this particular problem, however, it is important to note that systematic collection of data on this matter does not currently exist and as such, it has been difficult to conduct a clear, evidenced-based assessment of the situation. As such, three key objectives of this paper are: (i) to raise the awareness of the failure to address the question of the involvement of children and youth by those involved in either studying or addressing piracy and (ii) to provide a rationale for the collection and accessibility of disaggregated data on those committing piracy by those who are capturing, releasing, reporting and prosecuting those involved in piracy activity and (iii) to provide possible alternatives to addressing marine piracy by focusing on the challenges posed by the involvement of children and youth. In addition, it should be noted that many who are involved in studying or addressing marine piracy have failed to pose questions regarding the involvement of children and youth. This means that a critical gap in the data collection, research, and responses to marine piracy have yet to be considered as a potential approach in the overall effort to halt or reduce marine piracy. Details: Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project, 2012. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Marine Affairs Program Technical Report #5: Accessed May 20, 2013 at: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%235-2012-12.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Dalhousie-Marine-Affairs-Program-Technical-Report-%235-2012-12.pdf Shelf Number: 128759 Keywords: Child ProtectionMaritime CrimePirates/PiracyYouth Gangs |
Author: Stiles, Margot L. Title: Stolen Seafood: The Impact of Pirate Fishing on Our Oceans Summary: Pirate fishing may be understood best by standing on the beach and gazing out to sea. Almost all crime at sea takes place beyond the horizon line, hidden from view. This vast wilderness is exploited not only for fish, but as a hiding place for criminal activities. Stolen fish are caught illegally, evading a wide range of safeguards to undercut the costs of doing business. Blatant violation of catch limits, gear restrictions and safety precautions are frequently carried out by a small fraction of fishermen, undermining the efforts of responsible fishing companies. The resulting damage to marine resources can lead to smaller catches, slowed recovery of depleted stocks or even collapse for the most vulnerable fisheries. Pirate, or illegal, fishing is often lumped together with unregulated and unreported fishing under the abbreviation “IUU.” Unregulated fishing takes place in nations that lack the resources to establish fisheries laws or monitoring. Some unreported fishing stems from a lack of scientific data collection, while other unreported catches conceal illegal activity. These three dimensions of illegal fishing are a major threat to the oceans, consumers and seafood businesses around the world. Details: Washington, DC: Oceana, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 25, 2013 at: http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/Oceana_StolenSeafood.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/Oceana_StolenSeafood.pdf Shelf Number: 128825 Keywords: Fishing IndustryIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeNatural ResourcesPirate FishingWildlife Crimes |
Author: Zach, Danielle A. Title: Burden-sharing Multi-level Governance: A Study of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia Summary: The world confronts many threats with transnational dimensions that transcend the capacity of states, individually or collectively, to address. While the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can mitigate obstacles to international cooperation, such institutions at present are unable to fill governance gaps at the global level, as they are oftentimes under-resourced by their member states, lack compliance mechanisms, and are procedurally hidebound. Today's challenges require novel approaches that include diverse stakeholders. The subject of this study is one such initiative: the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which emerged with a UN Security Council imprimatur in January 2009. The CGPCS is a voluntary mechanism for states to collectively address maritime piracy emanating from Somalia as a threat to regional stability, trade, and energy security and has increasingly embraced nongovernmental actors as necessary partners. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to analyze the contact group's historical development, its efforts to fill governance gaps in the anti-piracy regime, and the challenges it faces; and second to evaluate the CGPCS's utility as a model mechanism for solving complex transnational problems. It seeks to engage policy and academic specialists concerned with maritime crime and global governance more broadly. This study begins with a brief examination of the contemporary development of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Horn of Africa. This review details trends in their occurrence and success as well as their economic and human costs. It then analyzes governance gaps as they relate to these maritime crimes. It subsequently examines the international community's response to what governments have called a "scourge" in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, documenting the CGPCS's historical development, dissecting its institutional configuration and output, and assessing the effectiveness of its efforts on land and at sea to suppress piracy off Somalia's coast. It concludes with a critical analysis of the value of this mechanism as a model global governance initiative. The study finds that the CGPCS has indeed fostered the emergence of an anti-piracy community. Given that piracy is a cross-cutting issue area involving multiple ministries/departments within governments (e.g., defense, transportation, foreign affairs, finance), the contact group has cultivated horizontal linkages among national bureaucracies. The mechanism has also fostered the development of counter-piracy institutions in various countries and in international organizations, including UN agencies. The CGPCS is most remarkable for its flexibility and inclusiveness of a broad range of states, relevant IGOs, and private industry actors. While somewhat constrained by diplomatic norms and processes, the group's informal structure has allowed it to adapt its working methods, extend participation to non-state actors, and circumvent procedural constraints that can hamstring creativity and efficiency in finding solutions to problems. The trade-off, however, is limited visibility and inclusiveness in agenda-setting and decision-making processes. The CGPCS is almost as state-centric as its counterpart UN and regional organizations - undeniably power lies with states, and particularly the most resourced among them. This analysis suggests that the CGPCS will be a useful model for collective efforts that address problems requiring fast and adaptive responses to changing situations on the ground, and on issues where power imbalances between actors will not scuttle the collaborative execution of collective goals. However, the CGPCS's applicability as a model for other issue areas is limited by the scope conditions that allow for its effectiveness: a convergence of state interests - particularly among powerful states, some of whom are unlikely bedfellows - to suppress the problem; a coalition of the willing able to bear costs; and a very circumscribed geographic area of concern. One broad lesson that can be garnered from the CGPCS is that large global governance dilemmas are perhaps best addressed in small pieces. Another lesson is that problem solving can be more effective when state and non-state actors are encouraged to assume responsibility for tasks in which they have a comparative advantage. Details: Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2014. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2014 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Burden_Sharing_Apr29.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Somalia URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Burden_Sharing_Apr29.pdf Shelf Number: 132313 Keywords: Maritime CrimePirates/Piracy (Somalia) |
Author: Madsen, Jens Vestergaard Title: The State of Maritime Piracy 2013 Summary: This report is the latest in a series by Oceans Beyond Piracy tracking the economic and human costs of maritime piracy. For the past three years, OBP has attempted to model the overall impact of Somali piracy on the global economy and on people affected by piracy. In this report, we look at the impact of piracy in 2013. Trends in maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in 2013 represent a continuation and in some cases an acceleration of issues marked by observers in 2012. The decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia continued, as did attacks, kidnapping, and violence associated with piracy off the West Coast of Africa. Alongside these shifts, the use of armed security aboard ships in the Indian Ocean continued. In recognition of these trends, this report represents an expansion of the scope of the research offered by Oceans Beyond Piracy. Acknowledging the changing face of maritime piracy, this year's report extends the geographic focus of our research to include West African piracy, and compiles both the economic and human costs into one omnibus report. As with previous years, the numbers presented here represent a good-faith effort by Oceans Beyond Piracy and our partners to provide an estimate of the scope and impact of maritime piracy on the maritime community and the other stakeholders impacted by these crimes. Practically, this estimate is limited because of serious challenges relating to the availability of good data on the scope of the problem. This is particularly true in considering piracy and armed robbery at sea off the West Coast of Africa, where the multinational reporting systems supported as a part of the joint effort to address Somali piracy are largely absent. As a result, the information presented here should be considered a studied estimate of the impacts of piracy rather than a definitive and precise report. We welcome comments and constructive suggestions on how to improve our methods used, and as with previous years we have incorporated responses to prior reports into the methods used in this report. Structure of the Report This year's report is broken into four sections. First, we present an overview of what our research has identified as the number of attacks and other key aspects of piracy in 2013. Second, we review the economic and human costs of piracy off the horn of Africa. Third, we do the same for the West Coast of Africa. Finally, we address some of the long-term impacts of piracy. Details: Broomfield, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2014. 115p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2014 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2013-Digital_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2013-Digital_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132481 Keywords: Armed Robbery Against ShipsEconomics of CrimeMaritime CrimeMaritime PiracyMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Scott, Kenneth Title: Prosecuting Pirates: Lessons Learned and Continuing Challenges Summary: Since 2005, there has been growing consensus and frequently recurring calls in the international community for the leaders, financiers, and land-based facilitators of modern maritime piracy to be prosecuted. There is broad recognition (at least in concept and rhetoric) that successfully prosecuting the low-level skiff pirates, while part of the equation, will ultimately have limited impact on ending or substantially reducing piracy, at least in terms of the law enforcement and prosecution components of national and international counter-piracy efforts. Indeed, one of the four priorities of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for 2013 and beyond is "[t]o strengthen and focus law enforcement efforts to disrupt pirate networks ashore, including by establishing effective information exchanges among prosecutors, investigators and private industry" Yet to date, with the exception of the conviction of two pirate negotiators (which might be considered mid-level management) and the recent arrest of pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan (better known as "Afweyne") in Belgium, there have been no prosecutions of higher- or top-level pirate leaders, financiers, or facilitators. While approximately 1,200 pirates have been, or are being prosecuted in various parts of the world (primarily in Somalia, 402; Kenya, 164; Yemen, 129; and Seychelles, 124),2 almost none of them can be considered anything more than low-level skiff pirates. Why is that the case, and what lessons can the international community and national authorities learn from our experience fighting East African piracy, in fighting piracy elsewhere, or indeed dealing with other international and transnational crime? Details: Broomfield, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2014. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ProsecutingPiratesReportDigital_2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ProsecutingPiratesReportDigital_2.pdf Shelf Number: 132579 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Coast Guard: Resource Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands Summary: The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the transit zonethe area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United Statesduring fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 daysa 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measurethe removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zoneonce, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets. In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increasedfrom about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-527: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Shelf Number: 132631 Keywords: Border SecurityCoast GuardDrug EnforcementDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency Assessments Summary: Piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa's east coast near Somalia have declined sharply since 2010, but U.S. agencies have not assessed their counterpiracy efforts as GAO recommended in 2010. Since 2010, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports piracy incidents declined from 219 to 15 in 2013. Similarly, from 2010 to 2013 hostages taken by pirates declined from 1,016 to 34. Also, a World Bank report stated that total ransoms declined by 2012. Officials participating in counterpiracy activities from the Departments of Defense and State, among others, as well as shipping industry officials and international partners, attribute the decline to a combination of prevention, disruption, and prosecution activities. However, officials cautioned that this progress is tenuous, and discontinuing these efforts could allow piracy to resurge. Despite changing conditions, U.S. agencies have not systematically assessed the costs and benefits of their counterpiracy efforts. Agency officials stated that their decisions and actions are guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. GAO has previously noted that assessments of risk and effectiveness in an interagency environment can strengthen strategies and resource usage. As such, GAO's prior recommendations remain valid and could help U.S. agencies identify the most cost effective mix of efforts and prioritize activities as they respond to changing conditions and fiscal pressures while avoiding a resurgence in piracy. Off the west coast of Africa, piracy and maritime crime has been a persistent problem in the Gulf of Guinea, as shown in the figure below. Although the United States has interagency and international efforts underway with African states to strengthen maritime security, it has not assessed its efforts or the need for a collective plan to address the evolving problem in the region. The U.S. role in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has focused on prevention, disruption, and prosecution, through training and assistance to African coastal states. However, according to U.S. agencies working in the region, the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) has not directed them to collectively assess their efforts to address piracy and maritime crime. An assessment of agencies' Gulf of Guinea efforts could strengthen their approach by informing the appropriate mix of activities to achieve the most effective use of limited resources, as well as help determine if additional actions are needed. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-422: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=755244 Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=755244 Shelf Number: 132795 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy |
Author: Schbley, Ghassan Title: Piracy, Illegal Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania Summary: Long coastlines, porous borders, a lack of government capacity, weak enforcement mechanisms, corruption, and other factors have enabled illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing to thrive in Somalia's waters. The same factors have allowed other transnational threats to develop in Somalia-and spread further south into Kenya and Tanzania. This study, which draws on extensive field research along the East African littoral, identifies and analyzes linkages between piracy and IUU fishing. In addition, the report examines the role of the maritime sector in facilitating the illegal movement of drugs, weapons, and people through the region. This study also highlights the role of small vessels in a system that transports terrorists from al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda's East Africa affiliate, to and from Somalia. Details: Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf Shelf Number: 133298 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Africa)Wildlife Crimes |
Author: Burnett, Mark Title: Illegal Fishing in Arctic Waters: Catch of Today - Gone Tomorrow? Summary: Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is a global concern, costing nations upwards of $10 billion (US$15.5 billion) annually. Few places are of such great concern as the Arctic, home to some of the most outstanding marine ecosystems and most productive fisheries in the world. Indeed, between them the Barents Sea cod fishery and the Russian Far Eastern pollock fishery alone account for between 20 and 25% of the global catch of whitefish. Recent years have seen significant progress in reducing - though by no means eliminating - IUU fishing in the Barents Sea. A new WWF report, Illegal Fishing in Arctic Waters, finds, however, that it remains a concern in the western Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk in the Russian Far East. Moreover, globalization of the fishing industry has resulted not only in new markets and new governance structures, but also in new challenges and obstacles to combating the truly international criminal activity that IUU fishing has become. Details: Oslo: World Wildlife Fund International Arctic Programme, 2008. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed February 3, 2015 at: http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/iuu_report_version_1_3_30apr08.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/iuu_report_version_1_3_30apr08.pdf Shelf Number: 134523 Keywords: Fishing IndustryIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeNatural ResourcesWildlife Crimes |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and Oversight of High-Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments Summary: From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, less than 1 percent of maritime shipments arriving in the United States were identified as high risk by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but CBP does not have accurate data on their disposition (i.e., outcomes). CBP officials (targeters) are generally required to hold high-risk shipments for examination unless evidence shows that an examination can be waived per CBP policy. In particular, targeters at Advance Targeting Units (targeting units)-responsible for reviewing shipments arriving at ports within their respective regions-can waive an examination if they determine through research that (1) the shipment falls within a predetermined category (standard exception), or (2) they can articulate why the shipment should not be considered high risk (articulable reason), such as an error in the shipment's data. GAO found that CBP examined the vast majority of high-risk shipments, but CBP's disposition data are not accurate because of various factors-such as the inclusion of shipments that were never sent to the United States-and that the data overstate the number of high-risk shipments. On the basis of GAO's analyses and findings, CBP is taking steps to correct its data. When determining the disposition of high-risk shipments, CBP's targeting units are inconsistently applying criteria to make waiver decisions and are incorrectly documenting the reasons for some waivers. CBP policy lacks definitions for standard exception waivers. As a result, targeters are inconsistently applying and recording standard exception waivers. Because of these inconsistencies, some targeting units may be unnecessarily holding shipments for examination, while others may be waiving shipments that should be examined. Developing definitions for standard exceptions could help ensure that CBP examines shipments as intended. Further, some targeters at targeting units GAO visited were unaware of the guidance on articulable reason waivers and were incorrectly documenting these waivers. As a result, CBP cannot accurately determine the extent to which articulable waivers are being issued and used judiciously per CBP policy. Updating and disseminating guidance in policy could help ensure targeters correctly document such waivers. CBP has efforts in place, such as self-inspections, to provide oversight of its policies on the disposition (whether examined or waived) of high-risk shipments; however, these efforts are not sufficient. For example, the limited sample size of shipments used in self-inspections does not provide CBP with the best estimate of compliance at the national level. In addition, CBP's method for calculating the compliance rate does not accurately reflect compliance because it is not based on the number of shipments sampled. Developing an enhanced methodology for selecting sample shipments, and changing the method for calculating compliance, could improve CBP's estimate of compliance and its ability to identify and correct deficiencies. The U.S. economy is dependent on a secure global supply chain. In fiscal year 2013, approximately 12 million maritime cargo shipments arrived in the United States. Within the federal government, CBP is responsible for administering cargo security, to include identifying "high-risk" maritime cargo shipments with the potential to contain terrorist contraband. GAO was asked to review CBP's disposition of such shipments. This report discusses (1) how many maritime shipments CBP determined to be high risk and the extent to which CBP has accurate data on the disposition of such shipments, (2) the extent to which CBP consistently applies criteria and documents reasons for waiving examinations, and (3) the extent to which CBP ensures its policies on the disposition of high-risk shipments are being followed. GAO analyzed CBP data on maritime shipments arriving in the United States during fiscal years 2009 through 2013. GAO also visited four CBP targeting units selected on the basis of the percentage of maritime shipments they waived, among other factors. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-294: Accessed February 4, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668098.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668098.pdf Shelf Number: 134536 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeSupply Chain Security (U.S.) |
Author: United Nations Institute for Training and Research Title: UNOSAT Global Report on maritime piracy: A geospatial analysis 1995-2013 Summary: This global report on maritime piracy has identified several important trends related to maritime security. Based on a refined and detailed analysis of primarily data from International Maritime Organization (IMO) Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) "Piracy and Armed Robbery" module UNITAR has been able to explore how trends in geospatial patterns and severity of reported piracy incidents are developing, from 1995 to 2013. Some detailed geospatial analyses focus on the period 2006-2013 due to improved records for geo-locating incidents. Our analysis includes the added cost of piracy for the maritime industry at a global level and how these are linked to anti-piracy initiatives. Furthermore, costs related to paid ransoms and effects on the local economy in piracy land-bases are explored. There are two areas where significant trends in piracy activities are observed: the Western Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea. In other areas, notably eastern Indian Ocean, including the Malacca Strait, and in South America, no major trends are observed. While activities in South America are relatively minor, piracy in the Malacca Strait continues to be a major disruptior for safe routes in the eastern Indian Ocean. Details: Geneva: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2015 at: http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/unitar/publications/UNITAR_UNOSAT_Piracy_1995-2013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/unitar/publications/UNITAR_UNOSAT_Piracy_1995-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 135104 Keywords: Geospatial AnalysisMaritime CrimeMaritime PiracyMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyRansoms |
Author: Bondaroff, Teale N. Phelps Title: The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime Nexus: Illegal Fishing as Transnational Organized Crime Summary: More than 90% of the world's fisheries are currently fully or over-exploited. A 2008 study estimated that the annual global illicit fishing catch was between 11 - 26 million tonnes, equal to more than 1,800 pounds of wild-caught fish stolen from the oceans every second. Despite this, illicit fishing is treated predominantly as a regulatory issue, a matter of different actors violating regulations, perhaps opportunistically or out of ignorance. However, as this report, "The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime Nexus," commissioned jointly by the Global Initiative with The Black Fish, a Netherlands-based international organisation working to end illegal overfishing, now proves, illicit fishing practices are increasingly taking the form of a highly organized transnational crime. Rather than fishers accidentally violating regulations, this evidence-based account documents systematic and highly coordinated efforts to violate fishing laws and regulations around the world, putting the stability of marine ecosystems in serious jeopardy. We see how illicit fishers enable their activities through the violation of labour and environmental standards, corruption, bribery and violence. Case studies presented in the report also reveal an even darker side to illicit fishing - connected to human trafficking, illegal drug smuggling, serious violence and murder. It demonstrates the engagement of known mafia groups and criminal networks that profit from the practice. Despite this evidence, illicit fishing continues to be treated as a regulatory issue instead of as a form of transnational crime, and as such this practice is able to flourish with minimal enforcement or penalties. The report concludes that urgent and multilateral action is to be initiated to halt the growing multi-billion dollar illegal fish market. Recommendations advocate for the importance of urgently strengthening international regulations regarding shipping and vessels, creating domestic legislation designed to treat IUU fishing as a crime; dramatically increasing the punishments of offenders and significant enhancement of monitoring and enforcement are additional recommendations. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2015. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/GI%20Black%20Fish%20-%20Illegal%20Fishing%20and%20Organized%20Crime%20Nexus%20-%20April%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/GI%20Black%20Fish%20-%20Illegal%20Fishing%20and%20Organized%20Crime%20Nexus%20-%20April%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 135390 Keywords: Illegal FishingMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the EnvironmentOrganized CrimeWildlife Crimes |
Author: Ohlenschlaeger, Jens Peter Title: Reducing ship generated marine litter - recommendations to improve the EU port reception facilities directive Summary: Marine litter is an increasing threat to the health of European and global marine ecosystems, with costly environmental, economic and social consequences. One of the sources to this pollution comes from ships, which legally or illegally discharge their solid waste (waste) into the sea.The EU Port Reception Facilities (PRF) Directive (2000/59/EC) regulates how ships discharge their waste to port reception facilities in the EU. The PRF Directive pursues the same aim as the MARPOL Convention, namely to reduce the amount of pollution in seas and coastlines of Member States caused by ship generated waste and cargo residues discharged into the sea by shipping. The Directive came into force in 2002 and an EMSA study published in 2012 has shown an increase in waste delivery to Member State ports since then. Despite this increase, illegal discharges of ship generated waste into the sea still take place. There are several explanations for this. These include insufficient control and inspection of the ships, and the difficulties in doing so, and a lack of appropriate economic incentives for waste delivery, or indeed, perverse incentives for waste delivery. Little transparency regarding the operation of the waste handling facilities and a lack of clarity in some ports regarding the role and responsibilities of the various actors involved may also be responsible. It has become apparent that the Directive is not prescriptive enough in these respects and clearer guidelines and stricter requirements would be desirable and beneficial for the ports. This is especially true regarding the cost recovery system, as the Directive leaves a lot of room for interpretation, which has resulted in many different systems being implemented across European ports, thereby creating an uneven playing field and allowing less than optimal systems to be implemented. This study recommends that the Directive should be revised to put a stronger focus on: - The applied cost recovery system (degree of indirect fee); - The efficiency of the waste notification system; - The port authority involvement in ship waste handling (taking responsibility, control and monitoring); - The "one stop shop" approach, and - The inspection regime in the port regarding waste delivery. Details: London: Institute for European Environmental Policy, 2013. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.ieep.eu/assets/1257/IEEP_2013_Reducing_ship_generated_marine_litter_-_recommendations_to_improve_the_PRF_Directive.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.ieep.eu/assets/1257/IEEP_2013_Reducing_ship_generated_marine_litter_-_recommendations_to_improve_the_PRF_Directive.pdf Shelf Number: 135424 Keywords: Illegal DumpingLitterMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the EnvironmentPollution |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Transport-related (civil aviation and maritime) Terrorism Offences Summary: The present Counter-Terrorism Legal Module focuses on transport-related (civil aviation and maritime navigation) terrorist offences. It was prepared by the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Its purpose is to assist practitioners and policymakers to identify, understand, and effectively incorporate and implement a set of international legal tools into national legislation. These legal tools are found in conventions and protocols developed to combat transport-related terrorism since the 1960s. The module introduces the relevant instruments, places them in their context so they can be correctly understood, analyses their content and explains their use. Training tools and aids are interspersed with the explanatory text so that the structure, terminology and practical application of the relevant instruments will be clear. The increasing ease and availability of international travel resulted in increased risks to aviation security in the 1960s and 1970s. Violent groups seeking international publicity for their political, ideological or other goals focused on international air travel as a vulnerable target, attacks on which produced immediate and intense publicity. Continuing into the 1980s terrorist groups seized or bombed international flights, murdered passengers, crew members and persons in airports and destroyed multiple aircraft. These actions were designed to gain visibility for the causes to which the various groups were dedicated, to intimidate and to coerce compliance with those groups' demands. Maritime transportation also became a target in the 1980s. A body of international law has been developed over the decades since 1963 to deal with these threats to the travelling public and the transport industry, both with regard to aviation and maritime transportation. Details: New York: UNODC, 2014. 151p. Source: Internet Resource: Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum Module 5: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Transport/13-89032_Ebook_from_DM_9-9-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Transport/13-89032_Ebook_from_DM_9-9-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 135649 Keywords: Aviation SecurityAviation TerrorismCounter-Terrorism ProgramsMaritime CrimeMaritime SafetyMaritime TerrorismTerrorismTransportation |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Combating Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the guardian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its supplementary Protocols, and of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), in its twentieth session in 2011 considered the problem of combating transnational organized crime committed at sea. Resolution 20/5 mandates UNODC to convene an expert meeting to "facilitate the investigation and prosecution of such cases by Member States, including by identifying gaps or possible areas for harmonization, and measures to strengthen national capacity, in particular in developing countries, to more effectively combat transnational organized crime". This Issue Paper is the product of discussions held in Vienna on 12-13 November 2012 at the expert group meeting convened pursuant to resolution 20/5 of the CCPCJ. It is also based on a desk review of research carried out on the issue, with particular emphasis on existing UNODC materials concerning transnational organized crime at sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its goal is to serve as a background document to the recommendations of the expert meeting, which will be presented to the CCPCJ at its twenty-second session to be held 22-26 April 2013. The Issue Paper underscores the common and interlinked emerging crimes at sea, including piracy and armed robbery at sea, migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, organized crime within the fishing industry and oil bunkering; it identifies the applicable maritime laws and regulations and their potential gaps as well as the relevant good practices and challenges in international cooperation at the legal and operational level with respect to crimes at sea; it discusses the problems concerning the investigation and prosecution of crimes at sea, including questions such as where capacity-building is needed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Paper: Accessed July 22, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_at_Sea.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_at_Sea.pdf Shelf Number: 136126 Keywords: Drug TraffickingFishing IndustryHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingMaritime CrimeOrganized CrimePiracy |
Author: Janecek, Michael J. Title: Policing Iranian Sanctions: Trade, Identity, and Smuggling Networks in the Arabian Gulf Summary: There are continual debates regarding the effectiveness of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803 and 1929 as tools for limiting the Islamic Republic of Iran's goals for a nuclear program. This thesis examines the enforceability of the maritime sections of both resolutions at the police level in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Arab nations along the Arabian Gulf have had long-standing maritime trade relations with Iran and the greater Indian Ocean that extend generations into history. This relationship led to the extensive merging of Arab and Persian cultures in the GCC, as well as the growth of an immigrant workforce from South Asia. With this influx of identities and nationalities, challenges were developed in enforcing both resolutions, specifically as it relates to the inspection of Iranian maritime cargo. Alongside this merging of cultures, is the growth of successful maritime drug-smuggling networks that weapons proliferators could exploit to intentionally violate UNSCR 1803 and 1929. Based on the challenges of maritime trade, cultural and national identity, as well as criminal activity, it is argued that both resolutions are an unnatural fit in the Arabian Gulf, and are therefore questionable as policy choices in the GCC countries. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2013. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Iran URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 136483 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecuritySmuggling |
Author: Katsouris, Christina Title: Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil Summary: This report analyses the international dimensions of Nigerian crude oil theft and explores what the international community could do about it. - Nigerian crude oil is being stolen on an industrial scale. Nigeria lost at least 100,000 barrels of oil per day, around 5% of total output, in the first quarter of 2013 to theft from its onshore and swamp operations alone. Some of what is stolen is exported. Proceeds are laundered through world financial centres and used to buy assets in and outside Nigeria, polluting markets and financial institutions overseas, and creating reputational, political and legal hazards. It could also compromise parts of the legitimate oil business. - Officials outside Nigeria are aware that the problem exists, and occasionally show some interest at high policy levels. But Nigeria's trade and diplomatic partners have taken no real action, and no stakeholder group inside the country has a record of sustained and serious engagement with the issue. The resulting lack of good intelligence means international actors cannot fully assess whether Nigerian oil theft harms their interests. - Nigeria's dynamic, overcrowded political economy drives competition for looted resources. Poor governance has encouraged violent opportunism around oil and opened doors for organized crime. Because Nigeria is the world's 13th largest oil producer - exports often topped two million barrels per day in 2012 - high rents are up for grabs. The report recommends the following four first steps for building a cross-border campaign against Nigerian oil theft: - Nigeria and its prospective partners should prioritize the gathering, analysis and sharing of intelligence. - Nigeria should consider taking other steps to build the confidence of partners. - Other states should begin cleaning up parts of the trade they know are being conducted within their borders. - Nigeria should articulate its own multi-point, multi-partner strategy for addressing oil theft. Details: London: Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 2013. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf Shelf Number: 131149 Keywords: Maritime CrimeOil TheftOrganized Crime |
Author: Shelala, Robert M., II Title: Maritime Security in the Middle East and North Africa: A Strategic Assessment Summary: The waterways of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) are among the most important in the world. They facilitate the export of large volumes of oil and natural gas from the region, while also bridging traders in the Eastern and Western worlds through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. While political tensions in the region have at times played out in these waterways since the mid- 20th century, their vulnerability has been exasperated in recent years by the failure of bordering governments to promote internal stability, the lack of adequate maritime security capabilities of nearby states, and the potential naval threats posed by the government of Iran. The purpose of this study is to identify key threats to maritime security posed by state and nonstate actors in the MENA region, to assess what actions have been taken by stakeholders to promote security, and to explore what further steps could be taken by those stakeholders to close the gap between threats and capabilities. These threats will be addressed in broader strategic context, with the hope of mitigating threats and capability shortcomings that impact a variety of stakeholders. Three waterways in the MENA region are at particularly high risk and will be the focus of this assessment: the Suez Canal, the Gulf, and the Gulf of Aden. In the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden, maritime commerce is threatened by a severe lack of stability in the environment around the waterways. In Egypt, the repeated coups in Cairo have led to security dilemmas in which an uprising driven at least in part by radical Islamists has threatened the military government - and the canal by extension. The situation in the Gulf Aden bears similarities, as the poor economic and security conditions in Somalia have led to the development of piracy enterprises that target commercial traffic in the Gulf and broader Indian Ocean. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24808/uploads Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24808/uploads Shelf Number: 136597 Keywords: Maritime CrimeTerrorism |
Author: Presidia Security Consulting Title: Economic Sectors Vulnerable to Organized Crime: Marine Port Operations Summary: The goal of this project is to provide a comprehensive description and analysis of the vulnerabilities of Canadian commercial marine ports to organized crime. Research for this project places particular emphasis on the following key issues: - the different purposes behind the usage of marine ports by criminals and criminal organizations; - commodities smuggled through Canadian marine ports; - methods and techniques used to facilitate the criminal use of marine ports; - recent trends with respect to the vulnerability of marine ports to organized crime; - marine ports in Canada that are particularly vulnerable to organized crime; - conditions that contribute to the vulnerability of marine ports to organized crime; and - successful enforcement measures at Canadian marine ports. The vast majority of information for this study was gathered through a review of open source literature. Interviews were conducted with seven officials from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canada Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, and the Montreal Port Authority Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2011. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 25: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/412723/publication.html Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: The goal of this project is to provide a comprehensive description and analysis of the vulnerabilities of Canadian commercial marine ports to organized crime. Research for this project places particular emphasis on the follow Shelf Number: 136698 Keywords: Marine SecurityMarine TerminalsMaritime CrimeOrganized CrimePort Security |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Somali Prison Survey Report: Piracy Motivations & Deterrents Summary: The joint survey of UNODC and OBP finds that: - Poor economic conditions were reported as the major reason for engaging in piracy, and long-term solutions to piracy should address this. - Prisoners report being very impacted by prison, and express a strong desire to avoid future prison time. - International navies, more than any other counter-piracy activity, were listed as the primary deterrent. Armed guards aboard ships were also frequently listed. - A substantial number of prisoners rejected the term pirate or piracy, maintaining that they were fishermen who were not guilty of piracy. - For those pirates who knew someone who left piracy, the dominant reason was family or community pressure. - The illegal fishing narrative remains a rationalization for piracy. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2015. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/SomaliPrisonSurveyReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Somalia URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/SomaliPrisonSurveyReport.pdf Shelf Number: 136866 Keywords: Illegal FishingMaritime CrimePiracy/Pirates |
Author: Allan, Peter Title: In-depth evaluation of the Counter Piracy Programme: Combating maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean; Increasing regional capacities to deter, detain and prosecute pirates Summary: The Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008) provided the basis for the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), with the purpose of coordinating activities among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. This international forum has brought together more than 60 countries and international organizations all working towards the prevention of piracy off the Somali coast. UNODC counter piracy activities were given official endorsement through the 1851 (2008) SC Resolution and encouraged further UNODC involvement in the region. The programme documentation refers to the Secretary General's report on piracy (S/2010/738 of 22 October 2012). UNODC programming and activities in the region have been built on the tenet of combining the efforts to bring piracy suspects to justice with wider support for the region. UNODC commenced its Counter Piracy Programme in April 2009 and it soon gained the strong support of the donor community, reflected in the growing project's budget. The original project document set out the ambition to base an international programme expert in UNODC's Regional Office to prepare and set up the necessary preconditions for the launching of the larger programme with the objective of "combating maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa through increasing regional capacities to deter, arrest, prosecute and detain pirates". This objective was developed as the programme began and at the end of 2009 the three objectives were defined as: (a) 1. Objective: Fair and efficient trials and imprisonment of piracy suspects in regional countries; (b) 2. Objective: Humane and secure imprisonment in Somalia; and (c) 3. Objective: In the longer term fair and efficient trials in Somalia itself (mainly taken forward by UNDP, but with UNODC support). Objective 1 has been achieved. For example, in Kenya (as of January 2013) there were 64 piracy suspects on remand, 74 convicted pirates, 17 acquitted and returned to Somalia and 10 completed their sentence and repatriated to Somalia. In Seychelles there were 21 piracy suspects on remand, 102 convicted pirates, 34 transferred back to Somalia to complete their sentences and 1 has completed their sentence and was repatriated to Somalia. Significant steps have been taken to achieving objectives 2 and 3 with the capacity building work currently being done in Somali including the refurbishment and building of prisons and the training of prison staff among other initiatives to improve criminal justice capacity. This is an in-depth evaluation, the purpose of which is to provide guidance to the CPP team and UNODC on key issues that may impact upon its future development and to inform the CPP's various stakeholders on the quality of the programme. The evaluation was conducted using desk review of appropriate documentation and the interviewing of relevant stakeholders. These interviews were semi-structured and consisted of some standard questions and additional questions targeted at the relevant stakeholder group(s) in order to answer the specific requirements of the Terms of Reference (ToR). The ToR can be found at Annex I, the standard questionnaire at Annex II, the data collection matrix at Annex III, the list of individuals interviewed throughout the course of this evaluation at Annex IV and the desk review material at Annex V. Objectivity was built into the overall methodology by triangulating the analysis from different sets of stakeholders to ensure the effect that inherent biases have on the analysis and evaluation process was reduced. Limitations included an inability to visit Somalia, the ToR being altered during the evaluation process, over 47 questions asked within the ToR many requiring in-depth research and limited time during the Inception phase. Details: Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Independent Evaluation Unit, 2013. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 1, 2015 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth-evaluations/2013/CPP_Evaluation_Report_-_Final_incl_Management_Response_27NOV2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth-evaluations/2013/CPP_Evaluation_Report_-_Final_incl_Management_Response_27NOV2013.pdf Shelf Number: 136933 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime PiracyPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Great Britain. Ministry of Defence Title: The UK national strategy for maritime security Summary: 1.1 The UK considers 'maritime security' to be the advancement and protection of the UK's national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK's prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world. 1.2 This strategy places the maritime domain in context and explains why it matters to the UK. It sets out our approach and the objectives we wish to achieve, as well as explaining how we intend to improve our efforts in future. Finally, it outlines the governance structure which will allow us to deliver effective and efficient maritime security. Details: London: HM Government, 2014. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 138484 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: The Afghan Opiate Trade and Africa - A Baseline Assessment Summary: This report presents a "Baseline Assessment" of the illicit Afghan opiate trafficking situation in Africa, with a focus on heroin trafficking along the southern route out of Afghanistan into, through and from Africa. The main objective of this report is to provide an initial evidence base to support policymakers and law enforcement officials in evaluating the trafficking of Afghan opiates into and across the continent, and to allow the development of effective responses to the issue. While Africa has traditionally been perceived as a transit region for heroin and other drugs moving to destination markets in Europe, North America and Asia, drug trafficking and organized crime is increasingly posing a multifaceted challenge to health, the rule of law and development within the continent itself. Eastern Africa faces many challenges. Natural disasters and civil war, recurrent food shortages and droughts have left many of the region's 180 million people struggling under extreme poverty, and this has been exacerbated by corruption and poor governance. Eastern Africa is increasingly becoming a major landing point for heroin shipped from Afghanistan to Africa via the Indian Ocean. However, despite this increase in maritime smuggling, seizure rates of opiate within Eastern Africa remain low. In Western Africa, drug trafficking, notably via air couriers, has been going on for decades with trafficking networks making extensive use of established courier networks to move drugs, both heroin and cocaine, towards destination markets. This is one of the poorest regions in the world, and in many of the countries in this region governance and law enforcement continues to face challenges as a result of a lack of resources, making the region vulnerable to organised crime. These factors, combined with West Africa's geographic location along major and well established trafficking routes between, for example, South America and Europe, make it attractive to organized crime. Northern Africa appears to be somewhat of an outlier in this analysis of the opiate trade in the African continent, possibly due to being separate from wider drug trafficking trends seen in sub-Saharan Africa, and as a result of being mainly supplied by a sub-section of the Balkan route rather than the southern route. Heroin seizures in Northern Africa are limited and drug addiction rates are generally low. Knowledge of the current drug trafficking picture in Southern Africa is limited. A lack of heroin seizure, purity and consumption data is notable across the region, largely due to a lack of law enforcement capacity and poor data collection processes. While Mozambique and South Africa are known to be major transshipment countries for Afghan opiates, the broader picture of how this affects Southern Africa remains largely unknown. There remains a risk that traffickers will exploit limited law enforcement capacity in Southern Africa, leading to increasing drug trafficking and use, which in turn will further inhibit economic and social development within the region. Comprehensive data on the prices of opiates throughout Africa is currently unavailable. Although heroin commands a reasonably high price in parts of Africa, greater profits can generally be made in other destination markets and it is likely that prices of heroin in Africa remain significantly lower than in other international markets. There is limited data on the purity of heroin trafficked into, through and out of Africa, and there is no evidence to suggest that heroin is produced in Africa itself. Globally, Africa is estimated to be home to 11 per cent of global opiate users and of this 11 per cent of users living in Africa, more than 50 per cent live in Western and Central Africa. While cannabis remains the number one illicit drug used both on the continent and globally, and the only drug produced in Africa for export in large quantities, heroin appears to be becoming more popular in some areas, particularly in Eastern Africa. Synthetic opiates such as Tramadol are also used in Africa and use of such opiates may lead to the use of Afghan opiates, should market conditions for heroin change. Use of Afghan-sourced heroin has wider public health impacts in Africa, including on transmission rates of HIV and Hepatitis C, although data on this area remains limited. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2016. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opiate_trade_Africa_2016_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opiate_trade_Africa_2016_web.pdf Shelf Number: 138840 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug SmugglingDrug TraffickingHeroinMaritime CrimeOpiumOrganized Crime |
Author: Bergenas, Johan Title: Secure Oceans: Collaborative Policy and Technology Recommendations for the World's Largest Crime Scene Summary: Later this year, the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, will welcome leaders from all around the world to a conference focused on the security of our oceans. High on the agenda is safeguarding marine protected areas (MPA) and addressing the growing threat posed by illegal fishing. The Stimson Center has a long track record of identifying policy and capacity building solutions for issues that have serious implications for our environment, global economic development and U.S. and global security. In the last few years, Stimson has researched and analyzed oceans as the world's largest crime scene and identified a wide range of policy opportunities to increase ocean security, particularly focused on combating illegal fishing. We have also examined the role of technology as a tool to keep our oceans safe. Today is World Oceans Day and in anticipation of the Our Ocean Conference taking place in September, we are releasing a first set of public policy and technology recommendations. This brief report is a snapshot of a broader and evolving body of work aimed at safeguarding our oceans and combating a wide range of natural resource crimes and challenges. Details: Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2016 at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Secure-Oceans.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Secure-Oceans.pdf Shelf Number: 139439 Keywords: Illegal FishingMaritime CrimeWildlife Crime |
Author: Daniels, Alfonso Title: Western Africa's missing fish: The impacts of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and under-reporting catches by foreign fleets Summary: Overfishing in the world's oceans is at the centre of a crisis of sustainability. Nowhere is that crisis more visible than in western Africa. Current rates of extraction are driving several species towards extinction while jeopardising the livelihoods of artisanal fishing communities across a broad group of countries, including Senegal, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mauritania. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is at the heart of the problem. Drawing on a unique satellite tracking database, this report presents new evidence of the scale and pattern of IUU fishing. It focuses on 'reefers' - large-scale commercial vessels receiving and freezing fish at sea and at port - and the use of containers. We provide evidence of practices that compromise the effectiveness of multilateral governance rules aimed at curtailing IUU fishing and promoting sustainable, legal practices. Proposals set out in the report identify pathways for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to greater transparency and sustainable management of fisheries which avoids the irreversible depletion and possible extinction of species, as well as the preservation of the marine ecosystem where the fishing activities take place for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Details: London: Overseas Development Institute, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2016 at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf Shelf Number: 139591 Keywords: Fishing IndustryIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeOffenses Against the Environment Wildlife Crime |
Author: Metropolican Police Authority Title: Under Lock and Quay: Reducing Criminal Opportunity by Design Summary: Under Lock and Quay Foreword Londons Waterways are an accessible cult ural and environmental asset which also act as a catalyst for regeneration and inward investment. They are playing an increasingly important role in the capital's tourism industry as well as becoming popular for residential, commercial and leisure development, all of which impact substantially on the patterns of movement along the waterways and the growing number of different users. There is a growing national awareness of the added value and commercial betterment of development alongside water, and recent major schemes have demonstrated the success and potential for future development. There is a real opportunity to capitalise on this resource and British Waterways are striving to improve access to, and enhance the vitality of, the waterway network. It is important therefore that issues relating to crime and the fear of crime are tackled using positive and long-term solutions which are in keeping with the built and natural heritage of this historic transport network to encourage greater and safer use of waterside facilities. Inland waterways are an integral part of London's natural and industrial heritage as well as having a vital social role to play through the provision of publicly accessible areas for informal recreation and educational purposes. However, British Waterways and the Metropolitan Police recognise that the linear nature of the waterways, particularly canals which have a limited number of crossing points, often result in segregation of waterside areas from their surroundings and increased opportunity for criminal activities to occur. It is often the fear of crime rather than actual danger itself which discourages peop le from venturing along the towing path. Safety and security issues are inextricably bound up with enhancement, conservation and development, yet addressing the problem is often done on an ad-hoc basis once development is complete. This leads to ineffective and inappropriate treatment which can have two negative impacts upon the waterway environment: - creates an environment which can be inad vertently perceived as being unsafe; or - changes the historic charac ter of the waterway irrevocably as to make it less desirable to visit. Therefore, British Waterways and the Metropolitan Police are of the view that design measures to improve security should ideally be included at the planning stage as part of an integral approach to new development, regeneration, and environmental improvement schemes in order to design out crime. Details: London: Canal River Trust, 2000. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2016 at: https://canalrivertrust.org.uk/media/library/309.pdf Year: 2000 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://canalrivertrust.org.uk/media/library/309.pdf Shelf Number: 139626 Keywords: Built EnvironmentCrime PreventionDesign Against CrimeMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Tallis, Joshua Title: Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory Summary: This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand phenomena of political violence. To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful influence of an individual or community's environment on behavior. These two themes, as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the Broken Windows theory. Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one primary and two illustrative) - the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature. Details: Fife, Scotland: University of St.Andrews, 2016. 311p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 20, 2016 at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Shelf Number: 139719 Keywords: Broken Windows TheoryMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracySmugglingTerrorism |
Author: Kuperman, Mark I. Title: Re-Thinking Maritime Risk: Linking Piracy, Global Shipping and Ports - and - what Cruise/Ferry Terminals Can Learn from Airports Summary: This thesis addresses two issues related to maritime risk. The first concerns recognizing high-volume shipping destined for U.S. ports initially journeys through foreign waters and ports where crime, piracy and terrorism are hazards. The second issue is prioritizing maritime risk mitigation in response to multi-variable threats and vulnerabilities. This subject is compounded by limited resources and a reliance on collaborative partnerships. The thesis mainly focuses on the relationship between piracy and U.S. maritime interests since piracy has a nexus offshore and in waterways where U.S.-bound ships originate or transit. The approach is three-fold. First, the initial two chapters identify piracy as a threat which shipping encounters in global hot-spots before entering U.S. waters. Chapter 1 associates connections between piracy and terrorism, mariners' safety in regions/waterways, and challenges of eradicating piracy, with a focused study on the Straits of Malacca. Chapter 2 identifies when offshore piracy may threaten the U.S., emphasizing the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter 3 transitions back to U.S. solutions in protecting ferry and cruise passengers within confined terminal spaces. The thesis results indicate risk-related findings. Chapter 1 highlights collaborative challenges foreign nations need to overcome while trying to protect citizens and eradicate crime/piracy. Also in Chapter 1, the findings reveal piracy and terrorism in the Straits of Malacca do not appear related. Chapter 2 categorizes the types of offshore piracy that pose risk to the U.S. Chapter 3 undertakes a multi-variable analysis of inter-modal risk mitigations and suggests certain airport models may work in ferry and cruise terminals. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2014. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 29, 2016 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37227 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37227 Shelf Number: 139889 Keywords: Airport Security Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy Risk MitigationVessel Security |
Author: World Wildlife Fund Title: Illegal Fishing: Which fish species are at highest risk from illegal and unreported fishing? Summary: New analysis by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) finds that over 85 percent of global fish stocks can be considered at significant risk of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. This evaluation is based on the most recent comprehensive estimates of IUU fishing and includes the worlds' major commercial stocks or species groups, such as all those that are regularly assessed by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Based on WWF's findings, the majority of the stocks, 54 percent, are categorized as at high risk of IUU, with an additional 32 perent judged to be at moderate risk. Of the 567 stocks that were assessed, the findings show that 485 stocks fall into these two categories. More than half of the world's most overexploited stocks are at the highest risk of IUU fishing. Examining IUU risk by location, the WWF analysis shows that in more than one-third of the world's ocean basins as designated by the FAO, all of these stocks were at high or moderate risk of IUU fishing. The U.S. imports more than 100 different wild-caught species, which represent more than 400 diverse wild-caught products. In October 2015, the U.S. National Ocean Council (NOC) Working Group on IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud released a list of species it identified as "at risk" of IUU fishing. While there is some alignment between the species the NOC identified as "at risk" of IUU fishing and the species identified in this study, the WWF analysis demonstrates that IUU fishing is pervasive across species and regions. An effective solution to ending IUU imports into the United States must ultimately address all species entering the U.S. market. Details: Washington, DC: WWF, 2015. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/834/files/original/Fish_Species_at_Highest_Risk_from_IUU_Fishing_WWF_FINAL.pdf?1446130921 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/834/files/original/Fish_Species_at_Highest_Risk_from_IUU_Fishing_WWF_FINAL.pdf?1446130921 Shelf Number: 140136 Keywords: Fishing IndustryIllegal FishingMaritime Crime Unregulated FishingWildlife Crimes |
Author: Potgieter, Thean Title: Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features Summary: For millennia the peoples living around the Indian Ocean have benefited from its rich trade, while the interaction resulting from these maritime exploits, whether of a cultural and religious nature, or of conquest and slavery, invariable influenced their lives fundamentally. These traditional patterns of trade and communication changed drastically when first the Portuguese and then other European powers began sailing around the Cape of Good Hope to establish trade links and empires in the East. Initially Africa was little affected by European maritime activity as the focus was on trade with the East. Africa's primary value was to provide refuge and provisions along a long and often hazardous route. The formidable warships of the European naval powers were rapidly able to establish dominance in the Indian Ocean and projected their influence to the furthest corners of region. Naval forces were crucial for the establishment of national interests and for countering the activities of other European nations. Over the centuries, the British in particular, because of their effective utilisation of sea power, were able to create a large Indian Ocean empire. During the course of the 19th century, European navies also played an important role in maintaining good order at sea, eradicating piracy and countering slavery. The decolonisation process after the Second World War ended British hegemony in the Indian Ocean. The subsequent Cold War was again marked by superpower rivalry in the region, enhancing the region's global strategic value. When this period came to an end, Indian Ocean countries to a certain extent rediscovered some of the economic, social and cultural facets that made the ocean the bridge between Africa, Asia and Australasia. However, regional interaction and cohesion still leave much to be desired. Indian Ocean security is now no longer the domain of colonial states or superpowers, but has become multifaceted and dynamic. New role players such as India and China have become major powers, and new national alliances are changing the scene. But current global realities have introduced maritime security problems as non-state actors are influencing security in the area directly and fundamentally. This is a serious development since the rich Indian Ocean maritime trade, which includes much of the world's energy trade, is crucial to the global economy. It seems that many of the lessons of centuries gone by are again being learned - rather than doing battle, navies have to project power and play a diplomatic role to maintain good order at sea. Maritime security is a broad, somewhat amorphous area of focus, and the relevant literature covers everything from physical safety and security measures to port security, terrorism and more. A coherent definition is therefore difficult to determine, but, for the purpose of this paper, maritime security deals with the prevention of illicit activities in the maritime domain. It could be linked directly to the national security efforts of a specific country, or it could cover regional and international efforts to enforce maritime security. This paper centres on the strategic value of the Indian Ocean and the relevant maritime security characteristics and threats. Particular attention is given to issues relevant to Africa. The paper concludes with possible solutions and highlights the importance of international and regional cooperation. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Paper no. 236: Accessed September 29, 2016 at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf Shelf Number: 140516 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy/Pirates |
Author: Sahan Foundation Title: Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route Summary: As Europe struggles to manage its largest migrant crisis in more than half a century, attention has focused largely upon the refugee flows from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where years of war and instability are driving the exodus. But in 2015, an estimated 154,000 migrants entered Europe via the Central Mediterranean Route – an increase of nearly 400% over the previous year, and more than 1,000% over 2012 – most of them from the Horn of Africa. By far the largest contingent of migrants – nearly 39,000 in 2015 – is from the sub-region's second smallest country: Eritrea. In contrast with the mass, largely uncontrolled movements of refugees from the Middle East, irregular migration from the Horn of Africa is dominated by highly integrated networks of transnational organised criminal groups. Coordinated by kingpins based chiefly in Libya and the Horn of Africa, these networks "recruit" their clients via schools, the Internet and word of mouth; they corrupt government officials to ensure seamless travel across borders; they collude with Libyan militias to secure safe passage across the desert to launching points on the southern shores of the Mediterranean; and they cast their human cargoes adrift at the limit of Libyan territorial waters in order to avoid interdiction and arrest by European security forces. Inception and Purpose of the Report Security has long been a shared preoccupation of countries of the region. The "revitalisation" of IGAD in 1996 expanded the organisation’s mandate to more directly address challenges of peace and stability in the sub-region, including, under Article 18(a), "effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability." In 2002, the states of the region signed the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, which outlined the various components of a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) built around structures, objectives, principles, and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. In this context, in 2003, the IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government endorsed a new strategy for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR), which was enlarged upon in October 2005 to develop an IGAD “Peace and Security Strategy” in line with APSA. Although the new strategy remained heavily focused on inter-state and intra-state conflict, it called for the enhancement of IGAD activities on countering emerging transnational security threats. IGAD, coming to terms with the expanding scope of regional security challenges, adopted a new Security Strategy in December 2010 and, in October 2011, launched the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP), whose expanded mandate included counter-terrorism, transnational organised crime (TOC), maritime security, and security institutions' capacity-building. Details: Sahan Foundation, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IGAD-Sahan-2015-Trafficking-Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IGAD-Sahan-2015-Trafficking-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 147783 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOrganized Crime |
Author: Policy Research Corporation Title: The impact of 100% scanning of U.S.-bound containers on maritime transport Summary: On the 3rd of August 2007 former President Bush signed into law the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act which requires the scanning of all U.S.-bound containers by radiation detection and non-intrusive inspection equipment at a foreign port before being loaded on a vessel. At the European Commission level it was agreed to prepare a "long-term assessment of the impact of 100% scanning in order to be ready for the discussion with the new U.S. Congress and administration". The study ‘The impact of 100% scanning of U.S.-bound containers’ was awarded to Policy Research Corporation and analyzes the impact of the obligation of 100% scanning of U.S.- bound containers before shipping: - on port facilities and ports, including their competitiveness; - on transport towards ports and on adjacent regions; - and finally also on the U.S. production using components shipped via European ports. The study started in October 2008 with an extensive literature search, in particular legal documents and papers considering the operation and economic impact of the 100% scanning rule. In a second phase data collection was combined with a series of interviews and field trips, directed to Port Authorities, Terminal Operating Companies, transport operators, professional associations, forwarders and any other stakeholders. For these interviews and field trips a selection was made of 14 European ports including the main U.S.-bound containerized cargo. Details: Antwerp: European Commission, Directorate-General Energy and Transport, 2009. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/security/studies/doc/2009_04_scanning_containers.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/security/studies/doc/2009_04_scanning_containers.pdf Shelf Number: 147790 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime TransportShipping IndustryTransportation Security |
Author: Ghosh, P.K. Title: Waiting to Explode: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Summary: Till the early 1980s, piracy was often dismissed as being "archaic Tand folklore of the past", rarely entering the main maritime discourse. But true to its nature, 'modern' piracy has emerged with a vengeance in many hotspots of the world. Modern piracy is an extremely complex problem that is often the manifestation of various socio-political dynamics of a particular area. Each area has its own unique methodology of piracy that is often different from other regions. In an attempt to fully understand the intricacies of piracy, different methodologies can be adopted. While some experts follow the geographic classification, others prefer categorising according to the intensity of attacks or the differing rationale behind such attacks. The most commonly accepted method is geographic classification, i.e. where the attacks take place. It has been noticed that pirates operating in a particular area naturally fellow certain ethos and a distinct methodology. Thus, there is the overarching 'Asian Piracy', which has various subtypes depending on the precise area of operation. This includes Malaccan piracy, once rife in the Strait of Malacca, which has now waned due to combined multi-pronged response strategies by the bordering States of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Piracy in the South China Sea is similar to Malaccan piracy in many ways. The Bangladeshi variety, occurring mainly off Chittagong, and the Indian variety, off the eastern and the western coasts, are similar and often amount to petty theft. They can be termed as armed robbery occurring near the coast. While media hype has riveted global attention on piracy emanating from the failed state of Somalia (and the semi-autonomous state of Puntland), piracy elsewhere has not received the attention it deserves. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, on the western side of Africa, has often been glossed over by the world at large even though it is rising exponentially and is considered more violent and complex than piracy in the Indian Ocean. The reason for this lack of focus could be that, unlike in the Gulf of Guinea, Somalian piracy affects a larger number of shipping companies and their merchant ships. The keen interest of affected countries is evident from the large military presence in the Horn of Africa coupled with a demand for greater synergy between the myriad task forces and respective navies. No such intense international effort is visible in the Gulf of Guinea although the situation is equally grave with oil supplies being affected and heightened chances of attacks taking place. This paper aims to analyse the reasons for the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, its characteristics, the primary drivers for the growing menace and international responses; it also compares the differences in modus operandi between Gulf of Guinea and Somalian piracy. Finally, the paper suggests a set of recommendations on how to overcome the problem given the constraints of the prevailing atmospherics. Details: New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/OccasionalPaper_46.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Guinea URL: http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/OccasionalPaper_46.pdf Shelf Number: 146976 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Hammond, Paul Title: Piracy. When does a successful criminal business model become a political priority to defeat? Summary: Piracy is not an ectopic phenomenon, rather one where states are forced to address the challenge either collectively or individually. Thus, piracy should be viewed as a microcosm of transnational crime. Its ability to function as a cogent business model relies on five interconnected factors: relative political and economic instability, illicit financial gain, lacing deterrence and security, vulnerable shipping practises and ineffective legal implementation. These factors dispel the assertion that poverty is the leading catalyst of piracy alone; instead examining why certain populations embrace piracy rather than other criminal ventures. It is in fact the coalescence of poverty with high risk factors as a consequence of operating in the maritime environment, all of which determine the allure and viability of piracy. Fundamentally, piratical symptoms are a consequence of a failing state or region, and its existence can be used as a clear indicator of a fractured civil society. The business model for piracy differs from other crimes due to the array of factors. Prevalently, piracy remains a land-based activity extended to the maritime domain, and can be targeted with correct application of resources and political perseverance. This is a classic 'wicked problem', requiring a comprehensive approach, but with a propensity to change. Details: London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2012. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Seaford House Paper: Accessed May 12, 2017 at: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/piracy-when-does-a-successful-criminal-business-model-become-a-political-priority-to-defeat-14677 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/piracy-when-does-a-successful-criminal-business-model-become-a-political-priority-to-defeat-14677 Shelf Number: 131355 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracy Pirates |
Author: Rohwerder, Brigitte Title: Piracy in the Horn of Africa, West Africa and the Strait of Malacca Summary: Modern piracy became a significant threat in the late 1990s and early years after the Millennium in Southeast Asia and, particularly, in the Malacca Strait, with piracy hotspots also developing off the coasts of West and East Africa in the 2000s and 2010s. Piracy in West Africa has tended to be focused in the Gulf of Guinea. Levels of piracy in these regions have fluctuated over this period, with the hotspot for piracy in 2015 in Southeast Asia, especially around the Malacca or Singapore Straits. Piracy varies by region in terms of frequency, violence, tactics, level of organisation, distance from the shore, time of day and the ship's position. Nigerian pirates in the Gulf of Guinea have tended to focus on oil tankers, Somali pirates have tended to prefer collecting ransom through kidnapping, and pirates in Southeast Asia have tended to focus on opportunistic theft when ships are at anchor or berth. However, syphoning oil cargo from product tankers - similar to incidents in the Gulf of Guinea - has been reported in the Malacca Strait; and kidnappings for ransom have occurred in the Gulf of Guinea. In July 20162 a new report from the International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that piracy and armed robbery at sea had fallen to its lowest levels since 1995, despite a surge in kidnappings off West Africa. This drop is attributed to 'recent improvements around Indonesia, and the continued deterrence of Somali pirates off East Africa'. However, kidnappings have risen, with 44 crew captured for ransom in 2016 - 24 of them in Nigeria - up from 10 in the first half of 2015. The Gulf of Guinea is reported to be the most dangerous region for seafarers in 2015, with 23 people killed in pirate attacks. A combination of factors in each of the regions at different times have served to encourage, as well as discourage, piracy. The factors which encourage or discourage piracy may differ for subsistence pirates (consisting largely of gangs made up of part-timers who are often poor and seeking an alternative source of income) and professional pirates. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/piracy_rohwerder.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/piracy_rohwerder.pdf Shelf Number: 145161 Keywords: Armed RobberyMaritime CrimePiracy/Pirates |
Author: Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs Title: Troubled Waters: Inquiry into the arrangements surrounding crimes committed at sea Summary: 1.1 Almost 700 000 Australians took a cruise in 2012, and the Australian cruising market has been growing strongly for nearly a decade. It is almost five times bigger than it was ten years ago. For most cruising passengers, cruises are a time of relaxation, celebration and adventure. Most Australian cruise passengers expect that the cruising environment reflects Australian social and legal standards, especially as cruising operators have Australian companies and run cruises from Australian ports. However, cruises are an international destination in themselves, and passengers must treat them as such. 1.2 On the infrequent occasions that accidents or crimes occur on a cruise, the cruising environment can pose particular challenges to safety and justice. Cruise ships can hold over 5 000 people, and are often a long way from law enforcement. Additionally, establishing which country has jurisdiction to enforce its laws can be extremely complex. 1.3 Past crimes and accidents have highlighted the risks of cruising to Australian consumers. The tragic death of Ms Dianne Brimble in 2002, and the recent disappearance overboard of Mr Paul Rossington and Ms Kristen Schroder in May 2013 serve as reminders that an accident or crime at sea can be profoundly tragic. This inquiry focusses on the proactive ways that Australian and foreign cruise passengers can be kept safe at sea, on the actions the Australian Government can take to improve safety and justice on cruises, and on the steps that industry and government need to take to ensure that their responses to tragedies are appropriate. Details: Canberra: The Committee, 2013. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=spla/crimes%20at%20sea/report.htm Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=spla/crimes%20at%20sea/report.htm Shelf Number: 131260 Keywords: Crime at SeaCruise ShipsMaritime CrimePassengers |
Author: Willmer, Stephen Title: Battling the Bogeyman Lessons from History on Fighting Piracy Summary: This paper assesses how the Romans, Spanish and British conducted sustained campaigns against what they saw as piracy and with what success. It then reviews these in the context of current anti-piracy policies and operations in the Horn of Africa to identify any relevant lessons. Details: London: Royal College of Defence Studies, 2009. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Seaford House Paper: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/93/battling-the-bogeyman-lessons-from-history-on-fighting-piracy-18719 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/93/battling-the-bogeyman-lessons-from-history-on-fighting-piracy-18719 Shelf Number: 145481 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracy/Pirates |
Author: FishWise Title: Trafficked: Human Rights Abuses in the Seafood Industry Summary: It is important for companies to focus on social responsibility in supply chains, especially human rights, in order to demonstrate a real commitment to people, planet, and profit. Documentation of human trafficking and forced labor in seafood supply chains has been growing with increasing media attention, nongovernmental organization (NGO) investigations, and government reports. Discussions of environmental sustainability within the seafood industry are now commonplace, but efforts to improve human rights in the industry are nascent and just beginning to gain the momentum necessary to catalyze real change. In the last five years, seafood companies have created sustainable seafood sourcing policies, and are now working to meet the commitments within them. Human and labor rights are often not incorporated into these policies for seafood, as the historical focus of such efforts has been on industries such as coffee, minerals, and textiles. The seafood industry is not free of these concerns however, and the time is ripe for companies to expand their sustainable seafood policies to address these issues. This is appropriate because environmental sustainability and human rights issues do not operate independently. Vessels and companies operating illegally often commit environmental and social crimes in tandem. Eliminating human rights abuses in seafood supply chains is not an easy task. Challenges include corruption, exemptions within international standards for fishing vessels, lack of transparency via the use of flags of convenience and transhipment, the globalized nature of the supply chain, lack of enforcement, incomplete traceability, and the prevalence of illegal fishing. Amidst these challenges there are also opportunities. Brand value, shareholder opinion, and corporate social responsibility can benefit from companies addressing this issue in an honest and transparent manner. After improvements have been made, companies can actively promote the associated success stories, such as social and fair trade compliance, engagement in fishery improvements, and support for entrepreneurial ventures in the developing world. An important step toward mitigating, and eventually eliminating these risks is to ensure comprehensive traceability systems are in place throughout the supply chain. Additionally, companies need to create policies to ensure specific attention is paid to address human rights in seafood supply chains. Conducting a risk assessment, seeking certification, and creating fishery improvement projects to address deficiencies can help companies improve and meet their commitments. Engaging with countries to ratify and implement relevant legislation, eliminating illegal fishing globally, and contributing financially to international efforts to aid victims of trafficking will also enable progress. Lastly, communicating success stories and transparent self-reporting will inform consumers and stakeholders of the problem and ensure they are aware of companies' progress towards eliminating modern slavery and illegal fishing. This white paper aims to: 1) serve as a resource for seafood businesses seeking to prevent and eliminate human rights abuses in their supply chains and 2) improve the knowledge base and coordination of NGOs and other groups working on human and labor rights within the industry. It provides an overview of human rights issues in seafood supply chains, and then explores how more than fifty international and regional government programs, certification systems, NGOs, companies, and industry groups are working on human and labor rights. Companies can review the recommended next steps in this report to address human rights within their own businesses Details: Santa Cruz, CA: FishWise, 2013. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://www.fishwise.org/images/pdfs/fishwise_human_rights_seafood_white_paper_nov_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.fishwise.org/images/pdfs/fishwise_human_rights_seafood_white_paper_nov_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 145801 Keywords: Fishing IndustryForced LaborHuman Rights AbusesMaritime CrimeModern SlaverySeafood IndustrySupply Chains |
Author: FishWise Title: Trafficked II: An Updated Summary of Human Rights Abuses in the Seafood Industry Summary: Media outlets are increasingly covering human rights abuses in seafood supply chains all over the world. Unfortunately, many seafood companies who have worked hard to create environmentally sustainable seafood sourcing policies remain unaware that human rights abuses are occurring, most likely in their own supply chains. These companies have made a commitment to provide their customers with environmentally sustainable seafood products, a commitment that could be undermined by these human rights abuses. Trafficking and forced labor, among other abuses, have been documented in several supply chains of popular seafood items in the United States. In such supply chains human rights abuses are not the only concern - often fishing interests that commit social crimes against their workers are also committing environmental crimes. The time has come for companies to take responsibility for both environmental sustainability and social aspects of their seafood supply chains. This can reduce the risk of negative attention as documented human rights abuses continue to grab headlines and also provide opportunities to improve brand value with consumers. This is the second release of a white paper that aims to serve as a resource for seafood businesses seeking to prevent and eliminate such human rights abuses. It provides an overview of both human rights issues in seafood supply chains and the major challenges to reform, including corruption, lack of transparency, lack of enforcement, and the prevalence of illegal fishing. It explores how more than fifty international and regional government programs, certification systems, NGOs, companies, and industry groups are working on human and labor rights. Companies can use the recommended steps in this report to address human rights in an honest and transparent manner. This report can also serve as a tool to help conservation NGOs and human rights experts join forces to improve human rights in the seafood industry. Human rights experts have traditionally focused their work on industries such as coffee, minerals and textiles and are not familiar with the seafood industry. Many ocean conservation groups lack this expertise, but have extensive knowledge of the seafood industry. This paper explores ways to connect these two important allies. This revised version includes: - An updated summary of media stories and reports on human rights abuses in seafood supply chains that have been released since November 2013. - The results of an online survey of the following stakeholder groups: NGOs, the seafood industry, and seafood consumers. - Additional groups working on human rights that could serve as resources on these issues. Details: Santa Cruz, CA: FishWise, 2014. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://www.fishwise.org/images/pdfs/Trafficked_II_FishWise_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.fishwise.org/images/pdfs/Trafficked_II_FishWise_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 145804 Keywords: Fishing Industry Forced Labor Human Rights AbusesMaritime CrimeModern SlaverySeafood IndustrySupply Chains |
Author: International Organization for Migration Title: Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries Crime in the Indonesian Fishing Industry Summary: In 2015 the mass rescue of foreign fishers trafficked for labour exploitation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels in Benjina and Ambon highlighted the lack of adequate policing of the fishing industry and a lack of scrutiny of working conditions on vessels and in fish processing plants. The case highlighted the expansive nature of this transnational criminal venture. Victims were recruited from numerous countries and forced to work illegally within Indonesia. National laws and regulations were breached and international conventions ignored. Front companies were established and illegally caught fish transshipped in the Indonesian EEZ and boundary areas, thus preventing interception by the Indonesian authorities. Ultimately the catch entered the global supply chain and was handled by legitimate suppliers of fish, unaware of its provenance and the human toll behind the catch. The situation in Benjina and Ambon is symptomatic of a much broader and insidious trade in people, not only in the Indonesian and Thai fishing industries, but indeed globally. This research provides a glimpse into a far-reaching and well-entrenched criminal industry operating alongside the legitimate fishing industry, and often overlapping. The situation represents the spread of transnational organized crime at sea and the threat it poses as a maritime security threat to nations, and a human security threat to fishers, seafarers and fishing communities. Human Trafficking and Forced Labour in Indonesia fishing industry is characterized by: - systematic and highly organized deceptive recruitment and exploitation of fishers and seafarers from multiple source countries in South East Asia; witness testimony of murder and the unlawful disposal of corpses; - extreme cases of labour exploitation with fishers working in excess of 20 hours per day up to 7 days per week; and - a lack of awareness at the local level of human trafficking and forced labour and associated criminal activity. IUU fishing in Indonesia is characterized by: - overlapping Indonesian government legislation and regulations has created confusion over the responsibilities of key government bodies responsible for the oversight of worker recruitment, conditions, and monitoring of fishing companies, manning agencies, and fishing vessels; - collaboration of more than 2 people: double-flagged vessels are registered in two different countries. This act of forging the deletion certificate is done by at least the ship-owner, the backers and field actors; - suspected commission of serious criminal offences: illegal fishers violate numerous laws, from deactivating the transmitter, using prohibited and destructive fishing gear, illegal transshipment, forging vessel documents and the logbook; - foreign masters working illegally for indefinite periods of time: although there has been a national law prohibiting the use of foreign crews, there are still lots of foreign fishing masters working on board vessels undertaking lengthy voyages. This shows that there is considerable planning to conduct the crime; - the pursuit of profit and/or power: the very reason for fisheries crime is to gain more profit and financial benefits with the least minimum effort in regards to compliance and exploiting the corruptible tendencies of some high level authorities and politicians; - operating at an international level: illegal fishers operate in multiple countries, fish in various areas, fly flags of convenience and land their catch directly to another State, and sell the fish in the international market at high cost; and - using commercial or businesslike structures: most illegal fishing operations are managed using large companies, often established with foreign investment, have valid licences, yet they are violating laws and evading taxes. - That port authorities record the movements of vessels, particularly foreign affiliated vessels; - That port officials fisheries investigators be trained in identifying indicators of human trafficking , forced labour and IUU fishing; - Minimise overlapping regulation / authority between Government agencies; - That all deaths on board fishing vessels or in port are investigated and an autopsy performed; - That Flag States take more responsibility for the actions of IUU Fishing vessels flying under their flags; - Efforts to establish a global vessel record (registry) are supported; - Support increased inspections and accessibility to fishing vessels and remote fish processing plants; - Support an increased role for investigators (navy, marine police and fisheries) to conduct inspections of fishing vessels for evidence of trafficking and IUU fishing; - Conduct human rights due diligence and human rights audits on fishing companies before issuing licences; - Establish centres for fishers and seafarers at ports (centre for fishers to report abuse, injuries, deaths and seek protection); - Support multi-agency inspections and investigations at ports; - Introduce a multi traceability policy to prevent human rights violations and reduce IUU fishing; and - Increase and consumer awareness of human trafficking in the fishing industry. Details: Geneva, SWIT: IOM, 2016. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/indonesia/Human-Trafficking-Forced-Labour-and-Fisheries-Crime-in-the-Indonesian-Fishing-Industry-IOM.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/indonesia/Human-Trafficking-Forced-Labour-and-Fisheries-Crime-in-the-Indonesian-Fishing-Industry-IOM.pdf Shelf Number: 145805 Keywords: Fishing IndustryForced LaborHuman Rights AbusesHuman TraffickingIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeModern SlaveryPort Security |
Author: Jimoh, Akinsola Title: Maritime Piracy and Lethal Violence Offshore in Nigeria Summary: The Nigeria Watch (NW) dataset recorded 18,009 fatalities caused by violence in Nigeria's coastal states from 2006 to 2014. During the same period, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) dataset reported less than 20 deaths resulting directly from piracy attacks; however, the IMB does not record all fatal incidents at sea, near the shore, and in the creeks of the Niger Delta, such as gun attacks on oil offshore services and facilities, clashes among youth cult groups, and militant engagements with naval forces. There is indeed a link between onshore and offshore violence. The spatial distribution of fatalities confirms it. Hence coastal local governments in Lagos State - namely, Apapa, Badagry, and Eti-Osa - accounted for the highest number of offshore deaths, according to NW, among costal states in Nigeria during the period 2006-2014. As for the IMB data, it also shows that most piracy attacks occurred in locations around Lagos, especially at Apapa Port. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, , 2015. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 51; Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP2Jimoh.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP2Jimoh.pdf Shelf Number: 145819 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracy/PiratesViolent Crime |
Author: Randrianantenaina, Jean Edmond Title: Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Exploring the Legal and the Operational Solutions. The Case of Madagascar Summary: Maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships are one of the contemporary challenges of the maritime industry. These two phenomena have a global impact on maritime trade and security. Nowadays, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean are considered high risk areas in terms of piracy and armed robbery against ships activities. In this regard, both the international community and the coastal States of the region have deployed every effort to try to find ways to address the problem. Being part of the region, Madagascar faces the same challenges like the coastal States of the Eastern Africa and the Western Indian Ocean region in terms of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships threat level, and the organization as well as the response capacity to tackle these crimes. The following research paper proposes a piracy response model for Madagascar by analyzing the manifestation of the modern maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships, the existing international and national legal framework on the matter, the experiences of the international community and regional coastal States in addressing the Somalia case and the current operational arrangement Madagascar in addressing the issue. Considered to be at the basis of any solutions to maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships, the legal and the operational aspects are thoroughly discussed. The first part of the research paper analyzes the international legal framework on maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships, the national legislation models of Madagascar's neighboring countries on the matter, and the existing Malagasy legal framework. Recommendations are proposed to reform the legislation and the necessity of improving the judicial capacity. The second part of the research paper focuses on how to improve the operational arrangement to combat maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships in Madagascar by looking at the international and regional operational initiatives in the Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, assessing the current operational response of Madagascar and suggesting solutions for the improvement. It is acknowledged that without political will and support the legal and operational solutions will not be efficient and achieved. Throughout the research paper, the intricacy of addressing maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships and the necessity of federating and integrating several components are highlighted, moreover the value of coordination and cooperation at the national, regional and international levels is underlined. Details: New York: United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 2013. 197p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/Randrianantenaina_1213_Madagascar.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Madagascar URL: http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/Randrianantenaina_1213_Madagascar.pdf Shelf Number: 145826 Keywords: Armed Robbery Against ShipsMaritime CrimeMaritime PiracyPiracy/Pirates |
Author: Smith, Zak Title: Net Loss: The Killing of Marine Mammals in Foreign Fisheries Summary: Few realize it, but nearly every foreign fish product sold in the United States enters the U.S. market in violation of federal law. From the cod and haddock that go into the fish sticks enjoyed by children to the sea bass served at fine restaurants, if it was imported, it probably entered this country illegally. The reason is simple: The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) requires that all imported fish or fish products be accompanied by proof that the technology used to land the catch does not kill or seriously injure whales, dolphins, and other marine mammals in excess of U.S. standards. Collecting dust for more than 40 years, this measure has never been enforced by the federal government, with predictable results: Foreign fisheries fail to invest in measures limiting harm to whales and dolphins; U.S. fisheries, which do make these investments, are placed at a disadvantage; and Americans unwittingly consume foreign fish or fish products caught using techniques that needlessly kill a multitude of marine mammals each year. Details: New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2017 at: https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/mammals-foreign-fisheries-report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/mammals-foreign-fisheries-report.pdf Shelf Number: 131759 Keywords: Fishing Industry Maritime CrimeOcean Management Wildlife Crime |
Author: Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) Title: Party to the Plunder: Illegal Fishing in Guinea and its links to the EU Summary: - Illegal fishing by foreign trawlers in Guinea's coastal zone is widespread and increasing, despite the attention that has been focussed on illegal fishing by the international community in recent years. - Marine resources and the coastal communities that depend upon them are suffering from unsustainable fishing activities, including massive bycatch and discards, problems that are being significantly compounded by the presence of illegal fishing vessels. - Illegal fishing is aided by the widespread use of flags of convenience that are used to conceal the identity of the true beneficial vessel owners. Various tactics are used to confuse the identity of fishing vessels, including multiple vessel names and frequent changes in name and registry. Penalising wrongdoers can therefore be very difficult, and penalties do not in many cases serve as sufficient deterrent given the lucrative gains to be made from illegal fishing. - Some of the vessels arrested by Guinean authorities have been seen in Las Palmas, Spain, suggesting that illegal fish is being marketed in the European Community. Once the fish has been landed in Las Palmas, it is extremely difficult to track it to its final market destination. There are significant problems in the traceability of fish within the EU to ensure that illegally-caught fish does not enter the marketplace. - Guinea has serious problems in keeping these illegally operating vessels at bay, given their lack of logistical and financial resources. A unique and novel experimental method has been tried in recent years by integrating artisanal fishermen in the surveillance system. Despite its promising beginning, the programme is currently facing difficulties and international support is decreasing. - Regional efforts and cooperation need to be enhanced in order to ensure that enforcement efforts in one area do not result in displacement of illegal activity to more remote areas where surveillance is lacking. - The European Union, as a major market for Guinean fish and an important partner though its bilateral fisheries agreement, has an important role to play. Crucially, the EU must take steps to ensure that it does not facilitate or promote IUU fishing in Guinea, by examining traceability from the sea to the marketplace; ensuring that fishing agreements promote sustainable and legal fisheries; remedying the role of Las Palmas in IUU fishing; and the involvement of EU nationals and associated companies in undertaking IUU fishing in Guinea and elsewhere in the region. Details: London: EJF, 2005. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2018 at: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/party-to-the-plunder.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Guinea URL: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/party-to-the-plunder.pdf Shelf Number: 149416 Keywords: Fishing Industry Illegal Fishing Maritime Crime Offenses Against the Environment Unregulated FishingWildlife Crimes |
Author: Shaver, Amanda Title: Casting a Wider Net: The Security Implications of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Summary: The world's fisheries are on the brink of collapse. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (UNFAO) estimates nearly 90 percent are fully exploited or overexploited and depleted, while demand for seafood continues to increase. Faced with this reality, fishing fleets are scavenging the globe to meet the growing demand, and in the process often engage in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. These pervasive operations do not just pose a threat to the environment, but also a significant threat to national, regional, and global security. This report details those threats, which are the: 1 Threat to ecological security 2 Threat to economic security 3 Threat to food security 4 Threat to geopolitical stability 5 Threat of maritime piracy 6 Threat of transnational organized crime The perpetrators of IUU fishing are not just the local fisherman catching a bit more than his quota allows, but include a range of offenders: from foreign vessels fishing illegally in another nation's sovereign waters to criminal networks that participate in a variety of illicit activities, including trafficking in drugs, arms, and humans, as well as utilizing shell companies to launder money and slaves to carry out their operations. For these reasons and many others explored within this report, IUU fishing poses a risk to national security and addressing it will require more effort and focus than can be addressed by the conservation community and natural resource management agencies alone. These threats necessitate countries across the world, and particularly the United States, to develop a whole-of-government strategy to combat IUU fishing. This integrated approach involves tapping into the expertise of agencies across government, including those with knowledge spanning from natural resource management, development, trade and finance, to intelligence gathering and law enforcement, as well as the wide community of stakeholders interested in combating IUU fishing. Casting a Wider Net: The Security Implications of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, argues that IUU fishing is a threat to national security due to its multivariate impacts on individuals, communities, economies, institutions, and governments. It sets out a series of recommendations that articulate a whole-of-government strategy that the U.S. government and other foreign partners can utilize to curb the impacts of IUU fishing, which are to: - Create a whole-of-government approach - Increase engagement of Combatant Commands (COCOMS) - Expand shiprider agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries - Encourage countries to ratify, implement, and enforce the Port State Measures Agreement - Dedicate resources to increase monitoring and enforcement capacities - Advocate for comprehensive foreign domestic fisheries regulations and catch reporting requirements - Encourage greater transparency of the fishing industry Details: Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2018 at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Casting%20a%20Wider%20Net%20Report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Casting%20a%20Wider%20Net%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 150135 Keywords: Fishing IndustryIllegal FishingMaritime Crime Offenses Against the Environment Unregulated FishingWildlife Crime |
Author: University of Washington. Jackson School of International Studies Title: The Challenge of Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Task Force 2012 Summary: In the failed state of Somalia, piracy is increasing at an alarming rate, impacting all nations that engage in trade or travel in the region. In 2011, Somali pirates attacked 122 vessels and successfully hijacked 28. Since the problem of piracy fi rst escalated in 2008, thousands of hostages have been taken, including a number of American citizens. Th ese hostages have oft en suff ered systematic abuse and torture, and have on some occasions been used as human shields. In the last year alone, four American hostages were murdered by their captors. Although the economic cost of piracy is comparatively low for the U.S., it is imperative to address the issue before the economic and human costs of piracy become overwhelming. From 2010 to 2011, total ransom payouts to Somali pirates increased from $111 million USD to $160 million USD, raising the global cost of piracy in 2011 to approximately $6.75 billion USD. In response to the three international task forces protecting ships in the Gulf of Aden, pirates have expanded their attack areas and are now venturing farther out into the Indian Ocean. While the international task forces cannot eff ectively patrol the entire High Risk Area in the Indian Ocean, they have successfully intervened in many attacks. To deter attacks without military assistance, the International Maritime Bureau has issued Best Management Practices for vessels traveling in the area. Th e use of both passive security measures and private security companies has decreased the number of successful pirate attacks. However, the problem of piracy is not one that can be resolved exclusively at sea. Piracy fl ourishes on land due to the lack of governance and rampant poverty in Somalia. Before piracy can be eliminated, the land-based causes must be addressed. To increase stability in Somalia, a region with signifi cant U.S. interests, the State Department has adopted the Dual-Track Approach, designed to increase engagement with Somalias relatively eff ective semi-autonomous governments, primarily Somaliland and Puntland. Th e Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was created to coordinate global counter-piracy eff orts in 2009. Th is organization includes experts on subjects ranging from fi nance to military operations and is a combination of representatives from multiple countries. Th e fi ve working groups under this organization address multiple aspects of the issue of piracy. One important topic is the diffi culty associated with successful prosecution and detention of alleged pirates. 90% of arrested suspects are released without trial because there are no nations willing to prosecute or detain them. Th e few who are not immediately released are transferred to and prosecuted in any willing nation. Despite current eff orts to address the problem, many challenges remain. Coordination of military patrols between task forces is insuffi cient, especially in light of the fact that it is impossible to patrol the entire High Risk Area. Somalia does not currently have the capacity to prosecute or detain all persons accused of piracy, and neither does any sole country in the region. In U.S. diplomatic relations with Somalia, a failure to directly engage with clan and religious leaders limits the infl uence of expanded diplomacy. It is in the urgent interest of the U.S. to directly and immediately address the issue of piracy off the Horn of Africa, because the situation will only continue to deteriorate and cannot be resolved without U.S. involvement. Th ough the overall economic cost to the U.S. is currently minimal, experts such as Martin Murphy predict that if piracy goes unchecked, the enterprise will help create a permissive environment for maritime terrorism, which will be more widespread and diffi cult to contend with. Th e success of piracy in the Gulf of Aden has exposed the high seas as a vulnerable platform for attacks because of the lack of security and clear jurisdiction. Th e U.S. must augment its counter-piracy eff orts before more American lives are lost, and piracy at sea spirals out of control. Details: Seattle: The Jsckson School of International Studies, 2012. 209p. Source: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/19664/B%20Lorenz%20Task%20Force%20Final%20Report.pdf?sequence Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/19664/B%20Lorenz%20Task%20Force%20Final%20Report.pdf?sequence Shelf Number: 140184 Keywords: Maritime CrimePiracy/Pirates |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Theft of Goods in Ports: A review of TAPA EMEA IIS statistics Summary: This report examines patterns of reported cargo thefts at maritime transport facilities in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) with respect to frequency, incident category, modus operandi, and targeted product category. The analysis is based on data obtained from the Incident Information Service (IIS), a database of transport-related crimes from the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in the EMEA region. The results are analysed and discussed within a frame of reference based on supply chain risk management and criminology theories. We find that maritime transport facilities constitute a rare target location for cargo thieves, as only 102 of more than 24,500 incidents (0.4%) in the IIS database occur there. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be made. First, there seems to be seasonality in day of the week, but probably not in month of the year. Second, violent and fraudulent modi operandi of theft at maritime transport facilities are about as common as in the whole data set. Thus, it could be conjectured that the impact from violent and fraudulent incidents is several times higher than the most common types of incident category or modus operandi, although this is unsupported in this study. The product categories signal that there is big variation in value in stolen goods. Third, it is possible that potential perpetrators consider security levels at maritime transport facilities to be higher, leading to fewer theft attempts. This study is limited by the content of and classifications within the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Details: Turku, Finland: HAZARD Project, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, 2018. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Publications of the Hazard Project, 18:2018: Accessed November 27, 2018 at: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Shelf Number: 153852 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCargo TheftHot ProductsMaritime CrimePort SecurityStolen GoodsTheft of Goods |
Author: Balogun, Wasiu Abiodun Title: Crude oil theft, petrol-piracy and illegal trade in fuel:an enterprise-value chain perspective of energy-maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea Summary: he Gulf of Guinea (GoG) has developed into a global energy-maritime crime hotspot, with Nigeria being the epicentre of illegal oil-related maritime activities in the region. For several decades, scholars have sought to justify crude oil theft, petro-piracy and illegal fuel trade especially in the waters of Nigeria, in the context of greed-grievance. While that approach provides a basis for understanding the realities of illegal energy-maritime activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, it does little to explain how the illicit activities have evolved into a global enterprise it is today, the dynamics of the business and the infrastructure that sustain the criminality. Against the backdrop of this limitation in existing theoretical underpinning of illegal energy-maritime activities in the GoG, this study adopts an enterprise-value chain model which, moving beyond the greed-grievance narrative, emphasises the primacy of both the enterprise and the marketplace (not players in the market) in explaining, and understanding the dynamics, complexities and persistence of crude oil theft, petro-piracy and illegal fuel trade in the GoG. The enterprise-value chain approach as adopted in the study, offers an advantage of interdisciplinary perspective, combining Smith's enterprise theory of crime and Porter's business management concept of value chain to understanding energy-maritime criminality in the GoG. The enterprise-value chain model sees the tripod of crude oil theft, petro-piracy and illegal trade in fuel as an organised crime; a well-structured economic activity whose business philosophy hinges on the provision of illegal goods and services. Such activities exist because the legitimate marketplace has limited capacity to meet the needs of potential customers. Within the enterprise-value chain framework, the study identifies, and analyses the dynamics of overlap, cooperation and conflict among the different players in the illegal energy-maritime industry as well as mutually beneficial relationships between formal and informal energy-maritime economies. Such an overlap is critical to understanding both the nature of the business and its sustaining value chain. The study concludes that current energy-maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea does not capture the organised, enterprise nature of illicit offshore and onshore activities and its sustaining value chain, which highlights its inherent limitation viz-a-viz the region-s quest for energy-maritime security. There is therefore an urgent need to address this seeming gap as it determines significantly how the phenomenon is considered both for academic purposes and public policy. It is this obvious gap in both academic literature and policy on maritime security in the GoG that this study intends to fill. The study, in the context of its theoretical framework, develops a business approach to enhancing energy-maritime security in the GoG. Details: Lancaster, UK: Lancaster University, 2018. 313p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 19, 2019 at: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/129813/ Year: 2018 Country: Guinea URL: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/129813/ Shelf Number: 154670 Keywords: Crime HotspotsIllegal TradeMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityOil TheftPiracy |
Author: Anele, Kalu Kingsley Title: The Economic Effect of Piracy in Nigeria: An Overview of the Fishing Industry Summary: The fishing industry plays a crucial role in the economic development of Nigeria. Aside from providing revenue for the government, the fishing sector also provides employment for the teeming population in the coastal states in Nigeria, as well as being a rich source of food for the country. Thus, the challenges posed by piracy to the fishing industry, as well as other economic activities in Nigeria, must be reduced to the barest minimum in other to continue to benefit from this natural resource. With the aid of data, pictograms, conventions, United Nations Security Council resolutions, soft laws and opinions of writers, this paper examines piracy and its effects on the fishing industry in Nigeria. The paper further interrogates the causes, consequences and challenges in combating piracy in Nigeria with a view to proffering countermeasures to this maritime crime. The paper concludes by reiterating the fact that Nigeria must domesticate and implement relevant international instruments on maritime security and other related conventions, and make use of the instrumentality of regional cooperation in combating piracy in other to protect the fishing industry in the country. Details: s.l.: The Author, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2019 at: https://www.academia.edu/15605579/The_Economic_Effect_of_Piracy_in_Nigeria_An_Overview_of_the_Fishing_Industry Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: https://www.academia.edu/15605579/The_Economic_Effect_of_Piracy_in_Nigeria_An_Overview_of_the_Fishing_Industry Shelf Number: 155025 Keywords: Fishing IndustryMaritime CrimePiracy/Pirates |