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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:55 am
Time: 11:55 am
Results for mexican cartels
4 results foundAuthor: U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Title: The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence Summary: The previous joint staff report entitled The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents chronicled Operation Fast and Furious, a reckless program conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and the courageous ATF agents who came forward to expose it. Operation Fast and Furious made unprecedented use of a dangerous investigative technique known as “gunwalking.” Rather than intervene and seize the illegally purchased firearms, ATF’s Phoenix Field Division allowed known straw purchasers to walk away with the guns, over and over again. As a result, the weapons were transferred to criminals and Mexican Drug Cartels. This report explores the effect of Operation Fast and Furious on Mexico. Its lethal drug cartels obtained AK-47 variants, Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, and FN Five-seveNs from Arizona gun dealers who were cooperating with the ATF by continuing to sell to straw purchasers identified in Operation Fast and Furious. In late 2009, ATF officials stationed in Mexico began to notice a large volume of guns appearing there that were traced to the ATF’s Phoenix Field Division. These weapons were increasingly recovered in great numbers from violent crime scenes. ATF intelligence analysts alerted Darren Gil, Attaché to Mexico, and Carlos Canino, Deputy Attaché, about the abnormal number of weapons. Gil and Canino communicated their worries to leadership in Phoenix and Washington, D.C., only to be brushed aside. Furthermore, ATF personnel in Arizona denied ATF personnel in Mexico access to crucial information about the case, even though the operation directly involved their job duties and affected their host country. Rather than share information, senior leadership within both ATF and the Department of Justice (DOJ) assured their representatives in Mexico that everything was “under control.” The growing number of weapons recovered in Mexico, however, indicated otherwise. Two recoveries of large numbers of weapons in November and December 2009 definitively demonstrated that Operation Fast and Furious weapons were heading to Mexico. In fact, to date, there have been 48 different recoveries of weapons in Mexico linked to Operation Fast and Furious. ATF officials in Mexico continued to raise the alarm over the burgeoning number of weapons. By October 2010, the amount of seized and recovered weapons had “maxed out” space in the Phoenix Field Division evidence vault.1 Nevertheless, ATF and DOJ failed to share crucial details of Operation Fast and Furious with either their own employees stationed in Mexico or representatives of the Government of Mexico. ATF senior leadership allegedly feared that any such disclosure would compromise their investigation. Instead, ATF and DOJ leadership’s reluctance to share information may have only prolonged the flow of weapons from this straw purchasing ring into Mexico. ATF leadership finally informed the Mexican office that the investigation would be shut down as early as July 2010. Operation Fast and Furious, however, continued through the rest of 2010. It ended only after U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was murdered in December 2010 with weapons linked to this investigation. Only then did the ATF officials in Mexico discover the true nature of Operation Fast and Furious. Unfortunately, Mexico and the United States will have to live with the consequences of this program for years to come. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 2011. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Joint Staff Report: Accessed August 11, 2012 at: http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/FINAL_FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/FINAL_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 125969 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGunsMexican CartelsOperation Fast and Furious (U.S.; Mexico)Organized CrimeWeapons |
Author: U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Title: The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents Summary: This report is the first in a series regarding Operation Fast and Furious. Possible future reports and hearings will likely focus on the actions of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona, the decisions faced by gun shop owners (FFLs) as a result of ATF’s actions, and the remarkably ill-fated decisions made by Justice Department officials in Washington, especially within the Criminal Division and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. This first installment focuses on ATF’s misguided approach of letting guns walk. The report describes the agents’ outrage about the use of gunwalking as an investigative technique and the continued denials and stonewalling by DOJ and ATF leadership. It provides some answers as to what went wrong with Operation Fast and Furious. Further questions for key ATF and DOJ decision makers remain unanswered. For example, what leadership failures within the Department of Justice allowed this program to thrive? Who will be held accountable and when? Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 2011. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2012 at: http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ATF_Report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ATF_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 126010 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGunsMexican CartelsOperation Fast and Furious (U.S.; Mexico)Organized CrimeWeapons |
Author: Coyne, John Title: 'Santa Muerte', are the Mexican cartels really coming? Summary: Whether in Mexico, the US or Australia, the image of the transnational serious and organised crime (OC) threat from 'Mexican cartels' used to construct policy doesn't appear to engage with the reality that there's no homogeneous Mexican cartel, cartels or OC group. In popular culture, the labels 'Mexican cartel' and 'street gang' conjure an image of a highly organised, hierarchically commanded and ultraviolent crime group. Even Mexico's infamous Sinaloa cartel, rumoured to have an increasingly ominous presence in Australia, is more an alliance of criminal figures than a hierarchical organisation. There should be little doubt that these groups, as a collective phenomenon, have consistently demonstrated a propensity to regularly use breathtakingly barbaric violence for revenge and intimidation. Unfortunately, popular characterisations of the structure and organisation of these groups does little justice to the complexity of the threat that they pose. These generalisations lack the necessary granularity to be useful in the development of disruption- and mitigation-focused strategies. For policymakers, it's convenient to conflate well-known US-based Mexican street gangs, transnational street gangs such as the 'Mexican Mafia' and transnational OC groups such as the 'Mexican cartels' into a singular homogeneous threat grouping or strategy: 'the cartels'. It's equally convenient to link all Mexican OC activity together with the cartel thread. With this kind of conflation, the seriousness of the threat at hand can clearly and concisely be communicated to government decision-makers in terms that will ensure funding and strategy responses. Frustration with the inability of law enforcement arrest and seizure strategies to undermine the drug trade and its associated OC has further complicated the policy decision-making in this space. In the US and Mexican governments' cases, it's likely that this frustration has underpinned government policy, thereby expanding the role of the military and intelligence agencies in the 'war on drugs'. Unfortunately, conflating these groups doesn't produce the kinds of policies and strategies that will result in operational activity that has long-term disruption impacts on the groups involved. Moreover, the current understanding arguably does not allow for the involvement and integration of enforcement operations with other whole-of-government social, economic and development strategies. This report argues that, for Australia and Asia, the menace of Mexican OC is no longer looming on the horizon; it has already arrived. However, the nature of the Mexican OC problem in Australia and Asia is not likely to be the same as that found in either the US or Mexico. To fully understand the implications of this development for Australia and the region, this threat needs to be viewed in context. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed April 2, 2018 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Shelf Number: 149648 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceMexican CartelsOrganized CrimeStreet Gangs |
Author: University of Texas School of Law. Human Rights Clinic Title: Summary: he Human Rights Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law, in cooperation with the Centro Diocesano para los Derechos Humanos Fray Juan de Larios from Coahuila, Mexico, has compiled a report based on analyzed witness testimonies from three U.S. federal trials. Between 2013 and 2016, Zeta members were put on trial in Austin, San Antonio, and Del Rio for crimes of homicide, conspiracy to import drugs and weapons, and money laundering. These trials brought new information to light and corroborated information that has already been documented about Zeta operations and human rights abuses. First-hand testimonies of ex-Zeta cartel members and victims provide a more comprehensive understanding of the dire situation in Coahuila and offer a glimpse into the Zeta structure, members, and nexus with state officials and institutions. After reviewing the witness testimonies, the Clinic has determined two major findings: (1) the Zeta cartel committed numerous human rights abuses in Coahuila with impunity; (2) public institutions and officials played a role, by actions or omissions, in the commission of these abuses. Testimonies describe the nature and degree of Zeta influence over state and municipal officials and institutions. The Zetas paid bribes and integrated police officers into their hierarchy to ensure the cartel would be able to continue their illicit operations without resistance. However, the Zetas did not only influence low level state or municipal police; witnesses described a level of Zeta control which extended to city police chiefs, state and federal prosecutors, state prisons, sectors of the federal police and the Mexican army, and state politicians. Multiple witnesses described bribery payments of millions of dollars to Humberto Moreira and Ruben Moreira, the former and current governors of Coahuila, in exchange for complete control of the state. According to the testimonies, the Zetas' influence over Coahuila government operations at all levels allowed them to conduct their business throughout the state with impunity and often with direct assistance from state officials and police officers. The report also documents the human rights abuses discussed in the witness testimonies, including the large-scale disappearances and killings in March and April of 2011, during what is known as the Piedras Negras and Allende Massacres. These crimes were perpetrated in response to information that three former Zeta operatives had begun to cooperate with U.S. authorities. In retaliation, the Zetas kidnapped, killed, and disappeared over 300 people who they believed to be associated with the former Zeta operatives. According to witnesses, this brutality was not unique to these massacres. The report documents a pattern of kidnappings, killings, torture and disappearance, targeting anyone whom the Zetas believed posed a threat to their illicit operations. In order to exercise control, Zetas also targeted innocent civilians who were completely unconnected to the cartel. Witnesses described the callous manner in which the Zetas stripped victims of their humanity, killed, and disposed of their bodies. The Zetas maintained a tight grip on Coahuila through violence and intimidation tactics such as death threats and through the forced recruitment of Coahuila residents, including the recruitment of minors. It is also clear from the testimonies that witnesses were being threatened even when members of the Zetas were already in custody in the United States. The testimonies also highlight the transnational nature of drug trafficking and the violence associated with this. In particular, witnesses discussed how weapons purchased in the United States were imported to Mexico and drugs produced in Mexico were trafficked into the U.S. Zeta operations extend to various cities in the United States, including San Antonio, Houston, Austin, Eagle Pass, Chicago and Atlanta, as well as to other states, such as New Mexico, California, and Oklahoma. The Zetas supported this transnational operation through a large network of businesses, which they used to launder money and fuel their operations in the trafficking of people, guns, and drugs. The Zetas owned ranches, race tracks, and breeding facilities in the U.S. and Mexico as a part of an elaborate horse racing scheme. Aside from owning properties connected to the horse racing scheme, the Zetas also exploited numerous businesses in Mexico, such as stores, casinos, restaurants, gyms, and carwashes. These enterprises were used as safe houses, as meeting points for drug and money trafficking operations, or instruments of the money laundering operations. Witnesses explained how the Zetas paid bribes and contributed to the campaigns of governors and political candidates to secure the free continuation of their illegal operations. These bribes also ensured that Zeta-owned companies received government contracts and building permits. Further, as has been made clear from the three analyzed trials, the U.S. government possesses valuable information regarding killings, disappearances, threats, and other violations perpetrated by the Zetas. Witness testimonies and the investigations carried out for these trials include key information, such as the location where disappearances and murders occurred. This indicates that the U.S. government may currently have undisclosed information that could lead to the clarification of murders and disappearances perpetrated in Mexico. However, witnesses made clear that the Mexican state has not conducted investigations into these murders, even when the U.S. government has directly shared vital information. Mexican State officials have willfully refused to pursue justice despite having knowledge of countless human rights abuses carried out by members of the Zeta cartel. Both the Zetas and the State are responsible for the violence in Coahuila. At best, the State turned a blind eye to the widespread corruption and grave human rights abuses committed by the Zetas in Coahuila, and at worst, directly participated in the perpetration of these abuses. Details: Austin: University of Texas School of law, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/11/2017-HRC-coahuilareport-EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/11/2017-HRC-coahuilareport-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 151321 Keywords: CartelsHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesMexican CartelsViolenceViolent CrimeZetas |