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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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22 results foundAuthor: Keller, Dennis E. Title: U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap Summary: Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, but it is a task for which the U.S. Government is the least prepared and capable. The establishment of an effective police force is critical to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation’s security forces. But the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state. Because hesitation in addressing such problems causes delays in forming and training new police forces, and, even worse, emboldens corrupt and abusive locals who enable insurgents, terrorist groups, and organized criminal networks, the U.S. military must be prepared to support stability operations at regional level and below by assessing, advising, and even training police units until such time as civilian police trainers and mentors arrive on the ground. Army doctrine emphasizes the importance of community-focused civilian police forces during stability operations and suggests that clear separation of police and military roles is essential to successful rebuilding. Doctrine also recognizes that military forces may have to perform police functions during the initial response. But history is replete with examples of local police becoming targets of opportunity for insurgencies; having trained, operationally ready police is always important and no more so than in current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. At one time, the U.S. Government had a better institutional response than it does now. From 1954 to 1974, first the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), and then its successor organization, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), established in 1961, presented balanced programs providing technical advice, training, and equipment for civil and paramilitary police organizations. In 1963, USAID established the International Police Academy in Washington, DC, to train foreign police officers. At its peak, the USAID arm had 590 permanent employees, to include staff at the International Police Academy, and advisors in 52 countries at different times. This academy graduated over 5,000 students from 77 countries until it was closed because of congressional fears that the program approved, advocated, or taught torture techniques that had damaged the image of the United States. Thus, legislation was passed that prohibited foreign assistance funds for training and financial support of law enforcement forces within or outside the United States. The reluctance to be associated with local police continues to haunt U.S. Government efforts to train police of fragile and failed states to this day. As a result, the U.S. Government continues to lack the capacity for timely deployment of civilian police trainers in the early phases of stability operations. Using military personnel to train and advise civilian police is being justifiably criticized. Military personnel, even military police, are not prepared to train and advise civilian police in most tasks. Instead, their training is skewed toward the higher end stability policing tasks such as riot control, convoy security, motorized patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and weapons training. The emphasis on such tasks makes it more difficult to transition to community-based policing. A clear delineation needs to be established between stability policing and community-based policing, with phased transitions as appropriate. Focusing only on the technical skills must cease, while instruction in such normative principles as responsiveness to the community, accountability to the rule of law, defense of human rights, and transparency to scrutiny from the outside, must be institutionalized. Such an adjustment will result in an organizational culture that abjures abuse. Such success will require embedding of quality advisors for a significant period of time, though even then expectations must be kept realistic. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: PKSOI Paper: Accessed September 7, 2010: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1013 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1013 Shelf Number: 119757 Keywords: CorruptionMilitaryOrganized CrimePolice ReformPolice TrainingPolicing |
Author: Weger, Michiel de Title: The Potential of the European Gendarmerie Force Summary: The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) is a relatively young international organisation. In October 2007 the governments of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands signed a treaty to formally establish it. At present in the EGF the following gendarmerie forces cooperate: the Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee (KM), the French Gendarmerie Nationale (GN), the Italian Arma dei Carabinieri (AdC), the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), the Spanish Guardia Civil (GC) and the Romanian Jandarmeria Româna (JR). Although they have different names, all have a dual police-military character. The EGF is intended for international policing operations. Its creation has received considerable attention, but no major study seems to have been made thereon. Within the EGF and in the national capitals it is also the case that no long-term vision seems to have been developed. While being relatively insignificant at present, the EGF has the potential to become (far) more important in international security and a valuable asset for a far larger group of states, as will be argued in this paper. The basic question it intends to answer is the following: How can the potential of the EGF be used in the next 10-20 years to best serve the interests of its Member States? To find an answer to this question the EGF and its background will be described in chapter two. In the third chapter it is argued that the EGF could become a success in the kind of operations it is currently aimed at. Chapter four’s focus is on the interests of the present EGF Member States in further developing the organisation – this study analyses the options from the interests of the states involved, which are not necessarily the same as those of the participating gendarmerie forces. In chapter five the potential to expand gendarmerie cooperation in the EGF is described. Chapter six analyses the implications of long-term trends to the the EGF’s potential. This study ends with final conclusions and policy recommendations for the Dutch and other EGF Member States. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2010 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090400_cscp_gendarmerie_weger.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090400_cscp_gendarmerie_weger.pdf Shelf Number: 119895 Keywords: MilitaryPolice AdministrationPolicingSecurity |
Author: Williamson, Emma Title: Pilot Project: Domestic Abuse and Military Families Summary: This pilot project will seek to ascertain, via a focus group and on-line survey, i) the nature and extent of abuse experienced by military families, ii) service use, and iii) service needs of both perpetrators and victims of abuse in this context. During this developmental (pilot) phase we will be seeking to establish baseline data which identifies service need and potential interventions. The families of service personnel and the personnel themselves will benefit if we are able to identify triggers to abusive behaviour at home and external and internal interventions which may reduce the likelihood of domestic abuse occurring in these families. This research project examines the: 1) Nature and extent of domestic violence within military families; 2) Impact of this abuse and identify potential interventions; 3) Kind of services families may, or may have tried, to access in the past; 4) Ways in which service personnel explain the reasons for their abusive behaviour and whether specialist interventions might be developed to assist them. Details: Bristol, UK: University of Bristol, 2009. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2010 at: http://www.bris.ac.uk/sps/research/projects/completed/2009/rk7020/finalreport.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.bris.ac.uk/sps/research/projects/completed/2009/rk7020/finalreport.pdf Shelf Number: 119958 Keywords: Domestic ViolenceFamily ViolenceMilitaryVictims of Domestic Violence, Services forViolence Against Women |
Author: Napo: The Trade Union and Professional Association for Family Court and Probation Staff Title: Armed Forces and the Criminal Justice System Summary: A survey conducted by Napo during the summer of 2009 found that 12,000 former armed service personnel were under the supervision of the Probation Service in England and Wales on either community sentences or on parole. Research published by Napo last year found that 8,500 former veterans were in custody at any one time in the UK, following conviction of a criminal offence. There are therefore twice as many veterans in the criminal justice system than are currently serving in military operations in Afghanistan. Indeed the total number of men and women in active service in all locations on 31-05-09 was 13,400 (not including Iraq). The Probation Service caseload on 31-12-08 was 243,000 including 165,000 on court order supervision and a further 47,000 on pre or post release from prison supervision. During the course of 2008, 205,000 persons started supervision. Napo’s survey would suggest therefore that at least 6% of those currently under supervision are former veterans. The custodial study of 2008 concluded that 8.5% of the prison population had an armed service record. Previous studies by the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence had found that the proportion of those in prison with a service record varied from between 4-6% (Home Office) to 16.7% (MOD). A 2007 study carried out by Veterans in Prison, based on prisoners self certification, concluded that 9% of all inmates were veterans. Details: London: Napo, 2009. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2010 at: http://www.napo.org.uk/publications/Briefings.cfm Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.napo.org.uk/publications/Briefings.cfm Shelf Number: 120328 Keywords: Armed ForcesInmatesMilitaryParoleesVeterans |
Author: Howard League for Penal Reform Title: Leave No Veteran Behind: The Inquiry into Former Armed Service personnel in Prison Visits the United States of America Summary: A Howard League for Penal Reform inquiry reveals that veterans in both the United States of America and England and Wales are less likely to go prison than their respective civilian populations, but when they do veterans are more likely to be serving sentences for violent and sexual offences. The briefing Leave No Veteran Behind follows a visit to the USA and is part of Howard League's inquiry into former armed service personnel in prison, chaired by Sir John Nutting QC, which aims to uncover why veterans enter the penal system and will make recommendations to the government about how to prevent offending. The inquiry finds that: Veterans are less likely to be in prison In England and Wales, civilians are thought to be 43 per cent more likely to end up in prison, and in the USA, veterans are less than half as likely to be in prison as other adult males; Veterans in prison are older In the United States, 65 per cent were over 55 (compared to 17 per cent of non-veteran prisoners). In England and Wales, 29 per cent are over 55, which compares to 9 per cent of the general prison population being 50 or over; Veterans are more likely to be serving sentences for violent offences Among State prisoners, 57 per cent of veterans were categorised as 'violent offenders', compared to 47 per cent of non-veterans. In the UK, 32.9 per cent of veterans are in prison for violence against the person, compared to 28.6 per cent of the non-veteran prison population; and Veterans are more likely to be serving sentences for sexual offences 23 per cent of veterans were in US prisons for sexual offences, compared to 9 per cent of civilian prisoners. In England and Wales, 25 per cent of veterans are in prison for sexual offences, compared to 19 per cent of the civilian prison population. Details: London: Howard League for Penal Reform, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://www.howardleague.org/fileadmin/howard_league/user/pdf/Veterans_inquiry/Leave_No_Veteran_Behind_.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.howardleague.org/fileadmin/howard_league/user/pdf/Veterans_inquiry/Leave_No_Veteran_Behind_.pdf Shelf Number: 120340 Keywords: Armed Services PersonnelInmatesMilitaryVeterans (U.S. and England) |
Author: Farris, Coreen Title: Physical and Psychological Health Following Military Sexual Assault: Recommendations for Care, Research, and Policy Summary: Awareness of military sexual assault — sexual assault of a servicemember — has been increasing within the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD is striving to improve this situation, but unique conditions of life in the military may make response to these events more difficult than within the civilian sector. This paper reviews the prevalence of sexual assault among servicemembers, victim responses in the immediate aftermath of a sexual assault, barriers to disclosure, victim needs, and DoD efforts to provide necessary resources to victims. The authors review civilian guidelines for the care of physical injuries, response to STI/HIV and pregnancy risk, forensic services, advocacy and support services, and formal mental health care. They then review DoD directives, forms, and guidelines for sexual assault victim care, revealing that these generally are consistent with civilian guidelines. However, little is known about the fidelity with which these DoD recommendations are implemented. The authors close with recommendations for future research to support the DoD's commitment to a culture free of sexual assault, including a comprehensive, longitudinal epidemiological study of military sexual assault, a needs assessment of disclosed and undisclosed military victims, an evaluation of the training enterprise, and an evaluation to document the extent to which DoD directives requiring immediate, evidence-based care for military victims are being implemented with fidelity. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed July 19, 2013 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/OP300/OP382/RAND_OP382.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/OP300/OP382/RAND_OP382.pdf Shelf Number: 129462 Keywords: MilitaryPsychological TraumaRapeSexual Assault (U.S.)Sexual Violence |
Author: U.S. Department of Defense. Inspector General Title: Evaluation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations Summary: What We Did - We evaluated the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations’ (MCIOs’) sexual assault investigation training to determine whether it adequately supports the Department. Our evaluation focused on the following questions: • What sexual assault investigation training do the MCIOs provide? • How do the MCIOs ensure that sexual assault investigation training is effective? • How do the MCIOs leverage their resources and expertise? What We Found - Each MCIO provides initial baseline, periodic refresher, and advanced sexual assault investigation training to assigned criminal investigative personnel who may conduct sexual assault investigations. Between MCIOs, the training hours devoted to initial baseline training tasks varied. Further, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) initial baseline training materials did not cover four required essential training subtasks. All MCIO training academies measure the effectiveness of initial and advanced training courses, and they use the results to adjust training content to increase effectiveness. Conversely, the MCIOs do not measure the effectiveness of periodic refresher training. CID has attempted to consolidate MCIO advanced sexual assault investigation training. CID and NCIS share highly qualified and subject matter experts (HQE and SME) to assist with training course development and delivery. Also, CID assisted NCIS by instructing at their advanced sexual assault investigation training course. What We Recommend • The Director, NCIS, ensure lesson materials for initial sexual assault investigation training covers all essential training tasks. • The Director and Commanders of the MCIOs form a working group to review (1) initial baseline sexual assault investigation training programs to establish common criteria and minimum requirements, (2) periodic refresher sexual assault investigation training programs to establish common criteria and minimum requirements for measuring effectiveness, and (3) advanced sexual assault investigation training programs to further capitalize on efforts to leverage training resources and expertise. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. Inspector General, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. DODIG-2013-043; Accessed August 5, 2013 at: http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-043.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-043.pdf Shelf Number: 129520 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsMilitaryRapeSexual Assaults (U.S.)Sexual Violence |
Author: Torreon, Barbara Salazar Title: Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in Congress and Related Resources Summary: This report focuses on activity in Congress regarding recent high profile incidents of sexual assault in the military. Included are separate sections on the official responses related to these incidents by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Administration, and Congress including legislation in the 113th Congress. The last section is a resource guide for sources in this report and related materials on sexual assault and prevention. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: R43168: Accessed August 6, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43168.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43168.pdf Shelf Number: 129555 Keywords: MilitaryRapeSexual AbuseSexual Assault (U.S.) |
Author: U.S. Department of Defense. Inspector General Title: Evaluation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations Summary: We evaluated the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations’ (MCIOs’) sexual assault investigations completed in 2010 to determine whether they completed investigations as required by DoD, Military Service, and MCIO guidance. Our evaluation focused on the following question: Did the MCIOs investigate sexual assaults as required by guiding policies and procedures? Findings • Most MCIO investigations (89 percent) met or exceeded the investigative standards. • We returned cases with significant deficiencies (11 percent) to the MCIOs for corrective action. • Although 83 cases had no deficiencies, most of the remaining investigations had deficiencies that were not deemed significant. • The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) policy guidance does not direct the collection of clothing articles that a victim or suspect might have placed on themselves shortly after the assault, if different from the clothing worn during the assault. • Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) policy does not require NCIS investigators to notify or coordinate with their servicing judge advocate(s) upon initiating an investigation. • CID guidance regarding records checks does not provide a definitive timeliness requirement. NCIS policy on this topic needs improvement. • NCIS needs policy to require Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) notifications and documentation. Recommendations • The Director and Commanders of the MCIOs implement measures to improve crime scene processing, evidence collection, supervision, and documentation to reduce investigative deficiencies. • The Commanders of CID and AFOSI evaluate their existing policies regarding the collection of clothing worn by suspects and victims subsequent to a sexual assault. • The Director of NCIS evaluate current policy regarding the timely notification and coordination with servicing judge advocates upon the initiation of sexual assault cases, as well as the continued coordination with the servicing judge advocates until final case disposition. • The Commander of CID and Director of NCIS evaluate existing policy guidance regarding the timely completion of records checks. • The Director of NCIS implement policy requiring SARC notifications and documentation. Comments Overall, the Commander, CID, agreed with our recommendations. The Director, NCIS, and the Commander, AFOSI, agreed in part with our recommendations, but objected to our assessment in a number of areas in the report. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General, 2013. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-091.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-091.pdf Shelf Number: 129649 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationMilitarySexual Assault (U.S.) |
Author: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Title: Sexual Assault in the Military Summary: The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights chose to focus on sexual assault in the U.S. military for its annual 2013 Statutory Enforcement Report. This report examines how the Department of Defense and its Armed Services - the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force (the Services) - respond to Service members who report having been sexually assaulted ("victims") and how it investigates and disciplines Service members accused of perpetrating sexual assault ("perpetrators"). This report also reviews how the military educates Service members and trains military criminal investigators and military lawyers about sexual assault offenses. The topic is both relevant and timely, as Congress is currently considering ways to address this issue. The Commission has authority to examine questions related to sexual assault in the military because the issues involve both sex discrimination and the denial of equal protection in the administration of justice. The issue of sex discrimination involves female Service members, who represent 14 percent of the military population, but are disproportionately likely to be victims at a rate five times that of their male counterparts. The questions related to a possible denial of equal protection in the administration of justice led the Commission to examine cases in which sexual assault victims, as well as Service members accused of sexual assault, claim unfair treatment in the military justice system. Through this report, the Commission sheds light on the scope, response, investigation, and discipline of sexual assault in the U.S. military. The Commission held a briefing on January 11, 2013 to hear the testimony of military officials, scholars, advocacy groups, and practitioners on the topic of sexual assault in the military. In response to written questions from the Commission, the Department of Defense and its Armed Services provided documents and other materials, including data on investigated sexual assault allegations, which the Commission analyzed. The results of these efforts are memorialized in this report. The report reveals that the Department of Defense may benefit from greater data collection to better understand trends in sexual assault cases and to implement improvements in future initiatives. Although the Department of Defense has already implemented policies to reduce sexual and sexist material from the military workplace in an effort to reduce sexual harassment, the effects of such recent efforts have yet to be measured. The Department of Defense also has a plan to standardize sexual assault response and prevention training across the Services to promote best practices. There will be a need to track the success of such policies over time. Greater commander accountability for leadership failures to implement such policies, especially in cases where victims claim sexual assault at the hands of superiors within the chain of command, should also be considered. Without increased data collection, however, it is difficult to measure the effects of any new changes the military chooses to implement. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Commission Civil Rights, 2013. 238p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2013 at: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_Statutory_Enforcement_Report_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_Statutory_Enforcement_Report_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf Shelf Number: 131639 Keywords: MilitaryMilitary Justice SystemRapeSex Crimes (U.S)Sex DiscriminationSexual AssaultSexual harassmentVictims of Sexual Assaults |
Author: Women's League of Burma Title: Same Impunity, Same Patterns: Sexual abuses by the Burma Army will not stop until there is a genuine civilian government Summary: Almost a decade ago, the Women's League of Burma (WLB) denounced systematic patterns of sexual crimes committed by the Burma Army against ethnic women and demanded an end to the prevailing system of impunity. Today WLB is renewing these calls. Three years after a nominally civilian government came to power; state-sponsored sexual violence continues to threaten the lives of women in Burma. Women of Burma endure a broad range of violations; this report focuses on sexual violence, as the most gendered crime. WLB and its member organizations have gathered documentation showing that over 100 women have been raped by the Burma Army since the elections of 2010. Due to restrictions on human rights documentation, WLB believes these are only a fraction of the actual abuses taking place. Most cases are linked to the military offensives in Kachin and Northern Shan States since 2011. The Kachin Women's Association Thailand (KWAT) documented that 59 women have been victims of acts of sexual violence committed by Burmese soldiers. The Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) reports 30 cases of sexual violence involving 35 women and girls in the past three years. The incidence of rape correlates with the timing of conflict. These crimes are more than random, isolated acts by rogue soldiers. Their widespread and systematic nature indicates a structural pattern: rape is still used as an instrument of war and oppression. 47 cases were brutal gang rapes, several victims were as young as 8 years old and 28 of the women were either killed or died of their injuries. Over 38 different battalions are implicated in these cases, while several battalions are involved across multiple cases and timeframes, and the incidents took place in at least 35 different townships. These rapes cannot be explained away as a human impulse gone astray. The use of sexual violence in conflict is a strategy and an act of warfare that has political and economic dimensions that go beyond individual cases. In Burma, counterinsurgency tactics designate civilians in ethnic areas as potential threats. Sexual violence is used as a tool by the Burmese military to demoralize and destroy ethnic communities. Army officers are not only passively complicit in these sexual crimes but often perpetrators themselves. Combined with blatant impunity, soldiers are given a "license to rape", as SWAN highlighted in 2002. Several international treaties to which Burma is party, and other sources of international law applicable to Burma prohibit sexual violence; rape is also criminalized under Burma's penal code. But neither international nor domestic laws are enforced effectively. The systematic and widespread use of sexual violence by the Burma Army makes the abuses documented in this report potential war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law, requiring thorough independent investigation. It is high time for Burma's government to take responsibility and live up to the expectations the recent changes have created, to restore the dignity that women of Burma deserve. This can only be achieved through truth and justice for the violence women endure. It necessitates not only an immediate end to the violence, but also a deep reform of Burma's legal framework. Changing the 2008 Constitution, which gives the military the right to independently administer all its affairs, is the first step towards ensuring justice for the women of Burma. Judicial independence has to be guaranteed by the constitution, to allow for reform of the judicial system that will ensure its impartiality. The court-martial system, established by the Constitution to adjudicate all crimes committed by the military, has an unrestricted mandate and overly broad powers: it needs to be reformed to place the military under civilian judicial control. In both military and civilian jurisdictions, victims' access to justice has to be ensured through appropriate complaint mechanisms. At the moment, the National Human Rights Commission does not have the mandate, capacity and willingness to address serious human rights violations in an independent and transparent manner. If the government is serious about its commitments to address violence against women, it should acknowledge ongoing abuses against ethnic women, sign the recent international declaration for prevention of sexual violence in conflict, and adopt laws specifically aimed at protecting women from violence. Recent proposals set out concrete requirements for effective legal protection for women. In addition, the government needs to deeply change its political approach to the peace process, in order to make it a meaningful way to end abuses. Achieving sustainable peace and putting an end to abuses against women will not happen without women's representation in the political dialogue for peace. The fact that almost all the participants involved in the official peace process are male excludes critical perspectives on peace and conflict, and preserves structural gender inequality. Moreover, it is crucial that the upcoming political dialogue addresses past human rights violations as well as the role of the army. This includes accepting that, in a free country, the military is subject to civilian authorities representing the genuine will of the people. Unless and until the military is placed under civilian control through constitutional amendments, we will not see an end to militarized sexual violence. Details: Chiang Mai, Thailand: Women's League of Burma, 2014. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 20, 2014 at: http://womenofburma.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SameImpunitySamePattern_English-final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Burma URL: http://womenofburma.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SameImpunitySamePattern_English-final.pdf Shelf Number: 133741 Keywords: Gang RapesMilitaryRape (Burma)Sexual ViolenceViolence Against Women |
Author: Ferstman, Carla Title: Criminalizing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers Summary: Summary - Sexual exploitation and abuse continue to pervade peacekeeping missions, and peacekeepers benefit from near-total impunity. - Several seminal United Nations (UN) studies and expert reports provide a useful blueprint of where the gaps lie, what must be done to address them, and how to do so. - Zero-tolerance UN policies have focused on preventing new abuse and strengthening codes of conduct. These goals are laudable but undermined when not accompanied by consistent discipline and criminal accountability. - Despite eight years of annual resolutions that underscore the need to address the problems, there is no evidence of greater accountability. - More work is needed to finish the job. States are responsible for disciplining and punishing their troops, but the UN must do more to ensure that this happens. - The UN needs to work actively with states to bridge the gaps in domestic legislation by issuing written advice and publishing model legislation. - The UN should publicly name and shame those states that fail to investigate and prosecute credible cases. - The UN should refrain from accepting troop contingents from countries that repeatedly fail to live up to their written assurances to investigate and prosecute. - The memorandum of understanding governing the relationship between the UN and troop-contributing countries should be further revised to introduce greater conditionality into the acceptance and removal of troop contingents. Details: Washington, DC: United State Institute of Peace, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed November 15, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335-Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekeepers.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335-Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekeepers.pdf Shelf Number: 134091 Keywords: MilitaryRapeSex OffendersSex OffensesSexual AbuseSexual Exploitation |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Sexual Assault: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Prevention Strategy and to Help Ensure It Is Effectively Implemented Summary: Sexual assault is a crime that devastates victims and has a far-reaching negative impact for DOD because it undermines DOD’s core values, degrades mission readiness, and raises financial costs. DOD data show that reported sexual assaults involving service-members more than doubled from about 2,800 reports in fiscal year 2007 to about 6,100 reports in fiscal year 2014. Based on results of a 2014 survey, RAND estimated that 20,300 active-duty service-members were sexually assaulted in the prior year. Senate Report 113-176 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD’s efforts to prevent sexual assault. This report addresses the extent to which DOD (1) developed an effective prevention strategy, (2) implemented activities department-wide and at military installations related to the department’s effort to prevent sexual assault, and (3) developed performance measures to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent sexual assault in the military. GAO evaluated DOD’s strategy against CDC’s framework for effective sexual-violence prevention strategies, reviewed DOD policies, and interviewed cognizant officials. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD link prevention activities with desired outcomes; identify risk and protective factors for all domains; communicate and disseminate its strategy to all program personnel; align service policies with the strategy; and fully develop performance measures. DOD concurred with all recommendations and noted actions it was taking. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-61: Accessed November 6, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673515.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673515.pdf Shelf Number: 137209 Keywords: MilitaryRapeSexual AssaultSexual Violence |
Author: Keller, Kirsten M. Title: Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces : recommendations for hazing prevention policy and practice Summary: Initiation activities have long been part of U.S. military culture as a way to mark significant transitions, status changes, and group membership. However, along with these activities have often come acts of hazing, in which individuals were subjected to abusive and harmful treatment that went beyond sanctioned ceremonies. In recent years, extreme cases of alleged hazing have led to the high-profile deaths of several service members, resulting in renewed interest from the public and Congress in seeing these hazing rituals eliminated from military culture. The Department of Defense (DoD) asked RAND to examine and provide recommendations on current hazing policy and practices across the services. To do so, the researchers examined current DoD and service-specific policy, practices, and data collection related to hazing; reviewed the scientific literature and interviewed leading experts in the field; and reviewed existing DoD incident tracking databases. This report addresses ways to improve the armed forces' definition of hazing, the effects of and motivations for hazing, how the armed forces can prevent and respond to hazing, and how the armed forces can improve the tracking of hazing incidents. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 147p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR941/RAND_RR941.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR941/RAND_RR941.pdf Shelf Number: 137235 Keywords: Bullying Hazing Military |
Author: Bronson, Jennifer Title: Veterans in Prison and Jail, 2011-2012 Summary: Presents counts and rates of veterans in state and federal prison and local jail in 2011 and 2012. This report describes incarcerated veterans by demographic characteristics, military characteristics, and disability and mental health status. It describes current offense, sentencing, and criminal history characteristics by veteran status. It also examines combat experience associated with lifetime mental health disorders among incarcerated veterans. Findings are based on data from the National Inmate Survey, conducted between February 2011 and May 2012. Data from previous BJS surveys of inmates in prison and jail are used to establish historical trends regarding incarcerated veterans. Highlights: The number of veterans incarcerated in state and federal prison and local jail decreased from 203,000 in 2004 to 181,500 in 201112. The total incarceration rate in 201112 for veterans (855 per 100,000 veterans in the United States) was lower than the rate for nonveterans (968 per 100,000 U.S. residents). Non-Hispanic black and Hispanic inmates made up a significantly smaller proportion of incarcerated veterans (38% in prison and 44% in jail), compared to incarcerated non-Hispanic black and Hispanic nonveterans (63% in prison and 59% in jail). A greater percentage of veterans (64%) than nonveterans (48%) were sentenced for violent offenses. An estimated 43% of veterans and 55% of nonveterans in prison had four or more prior arrests. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vpj1112.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vpj1112.pdf Shelf Number: 137800 Keywords: Jail InmatesMilitaryPrison InmatesPrisonersVeterans |
Author: de Leon-Escribano, Carmen Rosa Title: Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua Summary: A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attaches in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 10. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140540 Keywords: Drug TraffickingIllicit ArmsMilitaryOrganized CrimePolicingPublic SecurityViolence |
Author: Palmer, David Scott Title: Peru's Shining Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects Summary: Although soundly defeated in the early to mid-1990s, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) did not disappear. Over the past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially different form, with both a military and a political component. The organization, once again coordinated by jailed leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso, has eschewed shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term strategy of slowly rebuilding popular support and establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In so doing, it has also moved from extreme Maoist ideological rigidity to a more pragmatic, though perhaps only tactical, approach. Financial support is derived once again from cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Although there may be some individual exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization. At the same time, Sendero is still very small, in no way a threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based political organization and the military wing in the UHV continue to follow Guzman's leadership, while the Apurímac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to the armed struggle. The Government of Peru (GOP) response to date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate. VRAE military operations are hampered by poor leadership, ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE development resources have been cut, and the long-promised paved road remains in the planning stage. Without significant GOP adjustments, Shining Path is likely to continue to grow. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 2. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Peru URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140541 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMilitaryShining PathViolence |
Author: Pacula, Rosalie Liccardo Title: Preventing, Identifying, and Treating Prescription Drug Misuse Among Active-Duty Service Members Summary: Prescription drug misuse (PDM) is of critical concern for the military because of its potential impact on military readiness, the health and well-being of military personnel, and associated health care costs. The purpose of this report is to summarize insights gleaned from a series of activities that the RAND Corporation undertook for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness to address this important health and military readiness issue. The authors completed a review of U.S. Department of Defense policies and a comprehensive literature review of clinical guidelines and the empirical literature on the prevention and treatment of PDM and conducted individual face-to-face interviews with 66 health and behavioral health care providers at nine medical treatment facilities across three regions within the contiguous United States to identify best practices in the prevention, identification, and treatment of PDM and the extent to which those practices are known and followed. The report also presents the framework of an analytic tool that, once informed by data available to the military but not available to the authors, can assist the military in predicting future trends in PDM based on current demographics of active-duty service members and rates of injury and prescribing of prescription drugs. The findings from this work led the authors to formulate a set of key insights that they believe might improve the rapid identification and treatment of service members dealing with PDM, thereby improving future force readiness. Key Findings More Information Is Needed to Make the Best Decisions Moving Forward Few available evidence-based solutions focus specifically on the prevention or treatment of prescription drug misuse (PDM) in the military or civilian practice. Those guidelines that do exist largely focus on assessing risk, but generally within context of broader substance use. Many health providers lack general knowledge or training on how to deal with complex patient cases suffering from acute or chronic pain and PDM. U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) regulations are complex, emphasizing a general zero tolerance approach to drugs with little mention of addressing prescription drug use and misuse. Providers reported greater collaboration between providers since the institution of patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) through the use of embedded case managers and behavioral health therapists to facilitate chart reviews and communication about and management of active-duty service members (ADSMs) with PDM and at risk for PDM. Pain management and patient-centered, complementary services are not readily available or accessible to those suffering from chronic pain, which leads many to rely on prescription pain medications. Few within the Military Health System (MHS) provide these services; where they are available, waiting lists can be long. There is a need for more consistent guidelines for PDM patients and adherence to those guidelines in both the military and civilian practice. Recommendations Implement and parameterize the compartmental model developed in this report to enable a clear assessment of the extent to which the current prescription drug misuse (PDM) problem within the military stems from abuse following legitimate medical need or simple inappropriate use. Dedicate resources to providing remedial training and support to all military health care providers in the identification and treatment of PDM in patients. Facilitate interdisciplinary provider coordination in approaches to identifying and treating PDM, as well as the transition to integrated care. For those suffering with chronic pain, expand the availability of and access to pain management and patient-centered practices within the military health system. Encourage military provider access to and participation in state-run prescription drug monitoring programs, which are designed to help prevent over-prescribing of opioids to patients in civilian practice. Determine whether military substance abuse programs should provide unique, PDM-focused treatment for service members who develop dependence on prescription medications. Consider adoption, implementation, and improved dissemination of a U.S. Department of Defense–wide limited-use policy. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 149p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1345.html Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1345.html Shelf Number: 140786 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Abuse Treatment MilitaryPrescription Drug Abuse |
Author: Daly, Sarah Zukerman Title: Wartime Networks and the Social Logic of Crime Summary: Failure of ex-combatants to reintegrate into legal, civilian life is a source of disorder around the world. Leading explanations for such failure focus on individualistic decisions based on economic or psychological factors. Yet, ex-combatants are embedded in networks that persist following demobilization. We contrast an individual to a social logic of ex-combatant criminality, combining administrative data from Colombia with original survey data that accounts for the challenges of studying sensitive subjects. The results show that conflict networks predominate in explaining criminality while individual factors do not. Further analysis suggests that commanders enter into crime first, recruiting rank-and-file from their networks. As criminal behavior pervades a network, peer relations drive individual crime while peer and commander relations drive gang-related crime through norms, status-seeking, and social pressure. These results provide some of the first evidence of how wartime networks evolve following demobilization, with important implications for understanding reintegration and social stability. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://sarahzukermandaly.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/colombia_main_submit.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://sarahzukermandaly.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/colombia_main_submit.pdf Shelf Number: 145319 Keywords: Criminal NetworksEx-MilitaryGangsMilitaryWars and Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Sexual Assault: Better Resource Management Needed to Improve Prevention and Response in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve Summary: The Army National Guard (Guard) and Army Reserve (Reserve) have implemented sexual assault prevention and response programs, but face challenges in areas such as staffing, budget management, and investigation timeliness that may hinder program implementation. Staffing: The Guard and the Reserve have staffed their sexual assault prevention and response programs, but their use of full-time and collateral-duty personnel has produced sizeable workload disparities. For example, the Guard allots two full-time staff to each state and territory, which provides Rhode Island—a state with about 2,000 soldiers—the same number of staff as Texas, which has about 18,600 soldiers. Similar imbalances exist in the Reserve, with one full-time staff at one command responsible for about 9,000 soldiers located in 16 different states, while the one full-time staff member at another command is responsible for 300 soldiers in 4 states. Officials said that collateral-duty personnel are used to mitigate workload disparities, but these positions are not always filled in the Guard, and the Reserve does not know the number filled. Without evaluating their staffing structures, the Army does not know the extent of such issues and their effect. Budget Management: The Guard has developed budget guidance on the use of funds but has not effectively communicated it to program staff, and the Reserve has not developed or distributed this guidance to its staff. Thus, Guard and Reserve program staff do not have information needed to develop their budget allocations and help ensure the efficient use of program funds. Investigation Timeliness: Data on Guard cases investigated by its Office of Complex Administrative Investigations (OCI) in fiscal year 2015 show that 57 percent, or 45 of 79 cases, took 6 to 9 months to complete; 39 percent, or 31 of 79 cases, took 3 to 6 months; and the remaining 4 percent (3 of 79 cases) took longer than 9 months. According to OCI officials, investigations take longer to complete because OCI does not have enough personnel to handle its growing caseload, which more than doubled from 2014 to 2015. The Army and the Guard have not reassessed OCI's resources since the increase in investigation requests to help ensure it has the staff needed to complete investigations within 3 weeks, as required by OCI guidance. Eligibility for follow-up or long-term health-care services paid for or provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) varies based on a Guard or Reserve victim's duty status at the time of an assault. Victims in the Guard and Reserve must go through a process, known as a line of duty determination, to determine their eligibility for care. The Guard has established an expedited process for making a determination within 72 hours of the process being initiated. However, the Reserve's process is lengthy, and in prior work GAO found that 80 percent of these determinations were overdue. Reserve officials said they plan to include an expedited process in the new Army regulation that is being drafted; however, Reserve officials did not provide details about the planned process or documentation about how it would be implemented. Without an expedited process to provide more timely decisions, sexual assault victims in the Reserve may continue to pay for their care up front, or else face delayed access to care. Why GAO Did This Study Sexual assault in the Army is often discussed in terms of its incidence among active-duty forces. Sexual assault is a crime that similarly confronts the more than 550,000 members who collectively serve in the Guard and Reserve, who together reported 604 sexual assault incidents in fiscal year 2015; however, sexual assault is generally an underreported crime. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review sexual assault prevention and response in the Army's reserve components. This report addresses the extent to which (1) the Guard and Reserve face any challenges implementing programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault; and (2) medical and mental health-care services are available to victims in the Guard and Reserve. GAO reviewed DOD and Army policies; administered two web-based surveys; conducted site visits to four installations; and interviewed officials. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD evaluate program staffing structure, communicate and develop budget guidance, assess the Guard's investigation timeliness and resources, and develop an expedited process for determining Reserve eligibility for healthcare services. DOD concurred with three recommendations partially concurred with two, and did not concur with assessing Guard investigation timeliness, stating that the Army has limited authority over OCI. GAO continues to believe that actions are needed to fully address the two recommendations, and redirected the OCI recommendation to the Guard, as recommended by DOD. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-217: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683046.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683046.pdf Shelf Number: 141229 Keywords: ArmyMilitarySexual AssaultSexual ViolenceViolence Against Women |
Author: Till, Geoffrey Title: The Real "Long War": The Illicit Drug Trade and the Role of the Military Summary: Since the end of the Cold War, for the United States and everyone else, the concept of security has widened enormously. It has moved far beyond the confines of national defense against military threats from other nation states, incorporating threats ranging from transnational criminality, through cyber attack, international terrorism, and aggression from rogue and other hostile states. This poses increasing challenges to the world's militaries, especially those also grappling with the consequences of reduced financial support. It raises the question of choice and priority. How should the United States allocate its priorities and resources, for example, between the worst kind of threat the nation faces and the most likely? In this monograph, Dr. Geoffrey Till explores the seriousness of the threat posed to U.S. security by the illicit trade in drugs. He shows that the threat needs to be seen in both direct and indirect terms and that it ranges from the extent of human suffering at one end of the spectrum to international destabilization at the other. He explores the extent to which the military can make a cost-effective contribution to the control of this illicit trade and concludes with a review of the adjustments that the U.S. Army and the other military services may need to make in order to accomplish this. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 17, 2017 at: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1173.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Iran URL: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1173.pdf Shelf Number: 131246 Keywords: Drug Trade Drug Trafficking Illicit Drug Trade Military |
Author: Powers, Edward Title: The Military's Role in Countering Violent Extremism: Repurposing Stability Operations Summary: Summary - Despite persistent counterterrorism (CT) operations, globally the threat of violent extremism (VE) is higher today than in August 2001. - Though it has effective CT capability, the U.S. military lacks a comprehensive strategy for countering and eliminating the drivers of VE. - Because unstable, fragile states provide gateways for violent extremist organizations to establish a territorial base and recruit, the Department of Defense should adopt a comprehensive counter (VE) strategy that complements reactive CT operations with preventative, proactive stability operations. - Stability operations as part of CVE strategy should be grounded in an understanding of local context that identifies and addresses the grievances that lead to VE. Such operations require close partnering with civil society organizations. Details: Washington, DC: United State Institute of Peace, 2017. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief no. 225: Accessed June 17, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/pb225-the-military-s-role-in-countering-violent-extremism.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/pb225-the-military-s-role-in-countering-violent-extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 146235 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups MilitaryTerrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism |