Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:40 am
Time: 11:40 am
Results for military groups
1 results foundAuthor: Lonsdale, Mark V. Title: Criminal Activity in an Insurgent Environment and Counterinsurgency Summary: This paper looks at the criminal component of insurgency in Afghanistan and the inseparable influences of history, geography, culture, governance, and security. It also addresses the closely related issues of the on-going insurgency, terrorism, corruption, and deficiencies in government and military counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Beginning as a focused study of criminal activity in an insurgent environment, this paper grew to include a broader discussion of modern insurgency, terrorism, Islamic militancy, and traditionalist resistance, and how these have been perpetuated by ill-conceived and poorly executed counterinsurgency policies and practices. The reemergence, growth, and continued activity of these various militant groups also had to be viewed in context with the lack of security in Afghanistan, weak governance, slow progress in political, judicial and social reforms, and the often counterproductive effects of U.S. and NATO military operations. Glaring deficiencies in these processes, compounded by an ad hoc approach to counterinsurgency and half-hearted efforts by some donor nations, have fueled the insurgency while facilitating widespread corruption and criminal activity. With the above in mind, this paper addresses a number of questions: 1. What is the current criminal environment in Afghanistan and how have criminal networks and insurgents benefited from the instability? 2. Are the Taliban the only active insurgents or does the insurgency involve traditionalists, nationalists, and malcontents? 3. Is there a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign and has it been successful to date? 4. Why are conventional military forces unsuited to counterinsurgency? 5. Why are the U.S. efforts handicapped by an institutionalized conventional big-war mindset and a resistance to change? 6. Why are the token ISAF forces from several NATO troop-donors largely ineffective? 7. How is the counterinsurgency campaign hindered by a shortage of competent Foreign Service officers and civil-political advisors? 8. Why does the Coalition continue to tolerate rampant corruption and incompetence in the Afghan government and ministries? 9. Are narcotics funding the insurgency and why are the U.S. counter-narcotics policies unacceptable to their NATO allies? 10. How do the Afghans view the U.S. and Coalition forces, the Karzai government, local officials, and the national police? 11. What is the way forward for Afghanistan? 12. With all that we have learned from recent history, how should the counterinsurgency campaign be prosecuted in Afghanistan? Counterinsurgency requires patience, determination, innovation, an acceptance of risk, coupled to a long-term commitment, supported by adequate funding, the appropriate resources, and an unconventional mindset. Unfortunately, while built and trained for full-spectrum attrition and maneuver warfare, conventional brigade combat teams (BCT) are not structured, manned, or equipped for unconventional COIN operations. Nor can they effectively identify, target, and attack criminal-insurgent enterprises. The non-kinetic components of the COIN effort are further hindered by timid civilian administrations, as seen with several NATO contributors and the State Department’s lack of commitment, resources, and competent Foreign Service officers. This paper takes the reader through the full range of criminal and insurgent activities occurring on the ground in Afghanistan; points out deficiencies in current governance, security and military operations; and then offers suggestions on how to better prepare military units, national security forces, and civilian authorities for counterinsurgency and security sector reform. Details: Paris: Department de Recherche sur les Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines Universite Pantheon-Assas, Paris II, 2008. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 15, 2012 at: http://www.drmcc.org/IMG/pdf/COIN_MCC_Lonsdale_18_AUG_2008-2.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.drmcc.org/IMG/pdf/COIN_MCC_Lonsdale_18_AUG_2008-2.pdf Shelf Number: 126729 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal Violence (Afghanistan)InsurgencyMilitary GroupsTerrorism |