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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 2:29 am
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Results for mining
5 results foundAuthor: Title: Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic Summary: In the diamond mines of the Central African Republic (CAR), extreme poverty and armed conflict put thousands of lives in danger. President Franacois Boziza keeps tight control of the diamond sector to enrich and empower his own ethnic group but does little to alleviate the poverty that drives informal miners to dig in perilous conditions. Stringent export taxes incentivise smuggling that the mining authorities are too few and too corrupt to stop. These factors combined - a parasitic state, poverty and largely unchecked crime - over jealous factions to launch rebellions and enable armed groups to collect new recruits and profit from mining and selling diamonds illegally. To ensure diamonds fuel development not bloodshed, root and branch reform of the sector must become a core priority of the country's peacebuilding strategy. Nature scattered diamonds liberally over the CAR, but since colonial times foreign entrepreneurs and grasping regimes have benefited from the precious stones more than the Central African people. Mining companies have repeatedly tried to extract diamonds on an industrial scale and largely failed because the deposits are alluvial, spread thinly across two large river systems. Instead, an estimated 80,000-100,000 mostly unlicensed miners dig with picks and shovels for daily rations and the chance of striking it lucky. Middlemen, mostly West Africans, buy at meagre prices and sell at a profit to exporting companies. The government lacks both the institutional capacity to govern this dispersed, transient production chain and the will to invest diamond revenues in the long-term growth of mining communities. Chronic state fragility has ingrained in the political elite a winner-takes-all political culture and a preference for short-term gain. The French ransacked their colony of its natural resources, and successive rulers have treated power as licence to loot. Jean-Badel Bokassa, the CAR's one-time "emperor", created a monopoly on diamond exports, and his personal gifts to French President Giscard d'Estaing, intended to seal their friendship, became symbols of imperial excess. Ange-Falix Patassa saw nothing wrong in using his presidency to pursue business interests and openly ran his own diamond mining company. Boziza is more circumspect. His regime maintains tight control of mining revenues by means of a strict legal and fiscal framework and centralised, opaque management. Since Boziza came to power in 2003, industrial diamond mining companies have almost all left, in part because the authorities' high demands erode potential profits. Informal artisanal mining carries on apace, but the government's closure in 2008 of most diamond exporting companies - a ruse to better control the market - severely cut investment in the production chain, cost many miners their jobs and helped cause a spike in infant malnutrition. Expensive licences and corrupt mining police make it harder for miners to escape the poverty trap. A 12 per cent tax on diamond exports, the highest in the region, makes smuggling worthwhile and fosters illicit trading networks that deprive the state of much needed revenue. The government's refusal to distribute national wealth fairly has led jealous individuals and disenfranchised groups to take up arms for a bigger slice of the cake. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces damocratiques pour le rassemblement, UFDR), more ethnic militia than rebel group, has signed a peace agreement but still mines diamonds in the north east and sells them on the black market. Poor miners joined its ranks to improve their lot, and though taking power is no longer a prospect, diamond profits are a strong incentive not to disarm. Meanwhile, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix, CPJP), the most active rebellion, preys on miners and traders in the east. This insecurity, largely banditry under a rebel flag, severely restricts economic activity, inhibits the holding there of elections set for 23 January 2011 and puts civilian lives at great risk. Reform of the diamond sector is a crucial element, alongside wider governance and conflict resolution measures, for improving the living conditions of miners and their families, boosting the state's scant domestic revenues and helping break the cycle of armed conflict. The government needs first to improve governance of the mining sector, which is a question more of political will than capacity. Only when Boziza has shown commitment to instituting more democratic control of mining revenues and enhancing transparency in management processes should international partners support mining authorities in the capital and mining zones. The reform strategy should prioritise artisanal above industrial mining, which has less direct impact on mining communities, aim to reduce incentives for smuggling and tighten controls to stop armed groups profiting from diamonds. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 167: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.ashx Year: 2010 Country: Central African Republic URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.ashx Shelf Number: 120551 Keywords: CorruptionDiamond Smuggling (Africa)MiningPovertyViolence |
Author: Fajardo, Teresa Title: The Aznalcollar and Kolontar mining accidents: A case study on the criminal responsibility of operators and administrators Summary: Mining activities are of tantamount importance for the EU that has approved in the last years different strategies in order to guarantee the mineral supplies that our industry requires. Authorisations, licencing procedures and liability regimes that must be complied with by mining operators as well as administrations responsible for them, are matters of major concern. Mining activities that are highly profitable may test the effectiveness and capacity of deterrence of environmental criminal law for violations of licences and liability regimes. Big companies can afford to damage the environment and then delay legal proceedings but in other cases they cannot survive the cost of compensation and the penalties. The case study assesses the effectiveness of the EU environmental criminal law and liability to prevent and to resolve these problems in EU Member States, examining leading cases in Spain and Hungary. Details: Granada: University of Granada and University of Jaen, 2014. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: A study compiled as part of the EFFACE project. http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/EFFACE_The%20Aznalcollar%20and%20Kolontar%20Mining%20Accidents_revised.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/EFFACE_The%20Aznalcollar%20and%20Kolontar%20Mining%20Accidents_revised.pdf Shelf Number: 136520 Keywords: MiningOffenses Against the Environment |
Author: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Title: Tracking and Certification of Mineral Output in Southern Africa Summary: The illegal exploitation of minerals and fraudulent manipulation of the volume or the value of exported minerals are enduring challenges for producing countries in Southern Africa. Illegal exploitation of minerals in particular has regularly been linked to instability and conflict in the region. There have been calls for effective mechanisms for regulating the exploitation and movement of the minerals. Regulation of the mining industry in Southern Africa is quite challenging partly because of its history and partly because of its nature. Some of the mineral exploitation occurs in areas with difficult access either because of conflict or because of the nature of the terrain. This makes it difficult to verify any declarations of output issued from such areas. The estimated yield of each mine is based on the scientific analysis of samples collected at various stages of mineral processing. Intimately connected to the prospects for development, the mining industry is also capital intensive and taxing on the personnel and equipment of various stakeholders, including corporate institutions and Governments. This study was conducted against the backdrop of the commitment by SADC member States to gather information on the identity, origin and volume of SADC mineral output in order to develop standardized mechanisms for tracking and certification. This was motivated by the growing conviction within the region that the mineral value chains were being undermined by leakages through neighbouring countries. Gold is said to be illegally imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) into Kenya, Burundi and Uganda and re-exported further. Limited benefit accrues to the DRC as a result of the process. Diamonds are said to be illegally imported from Zimbabwe into Mozambique and South Africa for onward exportation. Similar allegations are heard about illegal tin, coltan and woframite which are exported through Rwanda. Monitoring mineral value streams in the producing countries is complicated by the large informal small-scale mining sector active within them. There are also concerns about such practices as transfer pricing by large-scale mining conglomerates taking advantage of intra-group agreements involving the holding companies based in low tax jurisdictions and the subsidiaries based in the region. Transfer pricing abuses take various forms, including over- or under-invoicing of exports and imports, overloading of costs onto the subsidiary, service contracts and intra-group loans. Through such agreements, the holding companies are able to transfer income and allocate costs in a hidden manner that unfairly favours them. These malpractices reduce revenue which would have accrued to the producing States, thus exacerbating poverty amidst a rich natural resources heritage - the so-called 'paradox of plenty!' (UNECA, 2010). The SADC Mining Protocol was adopted in September 1997 by twelve member States and came into force in February 2000. The SADC Mining Sector Co-coordinating Unit (SMSCU), under the previous SADC structure, promoted adoption of the Mining Protocol. The Protocol recognizes that a 'thriving mining sector can contribute to economic development, alleviation of poverty and the improvement of the standard and quality of life throughout the Region.' In principle, the SADC Protocol seeks to'harmonize national and regional policies, strategies and programmes related to the development and exploitation of mineral resources.' In this spirit, SADC aims to develop and adopt common mineral certification standards, in accordance with internationally acceptable standards, in order to minimize illegal trade in minerals and thereby optimize the benefits to member States. SADC member States intend to 'adopt policies that encourage the exploration for and commercial exploitation of mineral resources by the private sector.' Furthermore, the Protocol seeks to facilitate the development of small-scale mining through, among other initiatives, the establishment of marketing facilities, including exhibitions and mineral exchanges. The study on which this report is based proposes a tracking and certification regime that is motivated by the above tenets. It suggests that the same goals that motivated the formulation and adoption of a tracking and certification system for diamonds in Guyana could be adapted by SADC. The key points are: (a) To provide reliable data to States on producer, exporter and purchaser behaviour; (b) To ensure the payment of the royalties and taxes due to the State; (c) To strengthen the State's oversight function along the mineral value chain; and (d) To prevent the mixing of minerals that are lawfully produced and/or acquired with illicitly produced and/or acquired ones in order to reduce illegal trade in minerals and consequently increase legal revenue flows through legal trade at both the national and subregional levels. The Kimberley Process Certification System (KCPS) was prompted by the concern summed up in (d), specifically that lawful output could and, in several demonstrable instances, had been contaminated by rough diamonds originating from zones of conflict. The study on which this report is based concerns minerals other than diamonds. Since some of them, like emeralds, share many characteristics with diamonds, the study borrows some lessons from the KCPS. The scope of the study determined by the terms of reference, namely: (i) To assess legislation and licensing procedures relating to mining, sale and transportation of minerals to overseas markets and their effectiveness in preventing fraudulent trade in mineral commodities; (ii) To examine national technical reporting requirements for mining and export of SADC mineral products and their efficacy in providing needed data for preventing fraudulent trade in mineral commodities; (iii) To review national, regional and international systems for tracking and certifying mineral products and make proposals for a possible tracking and certification system that would ensure an effective product audit trail of SADC minerals; (iv) To examine export documents and regulations and recommend how they might be adjusted to form part of the certification audit trail; (v) To examine customs conventions and formalities to assess how these might affect the formulation and application of rules of origin for a SADC-wide certificate of origin for SADC mineral products; and (vi) To assess current regional integration efforts in trade and how these might help or hinder the development of a SADC certificate of origin for mineral products. The study considered prevailing legislation and licensing procedures in several countries in order to assess their effectiveness in preventing fraud in the trade of minerals. It found that most national legislation did not prioritize this objective, and could not be considered effective in preventing the most pernicious form of illegality in minerals marketing, namely transfer pricing. It found that a tracking regime on its own is not the appropriate vehicle for policing transfer pricing, and that this could be better done by combining centralization of the marketing of minerals and creating incentives for localized beneficiation of mineral output. Details: Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Subregional Office Southern Africa, 2014. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 20, 2015 at: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/tracking-and-certification-of-mineral-output-in-southern-africa.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/tracking-and-certification-of-mineral-output-in-southern-africa.pdf Shelf Number: 137044 Keywords: Crime PreventionIllegal MarketsIllegal TradeKimberley ProcessMetal TheftMineral TheftMiningTheft of Natural Resources |
Author: Amnesty International Title: "This Is What We Die For": Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt Summary: People around the world increasingly rely on rechargeable batteries to power their mobile phones, tablets, laptop computers, cameras and other portable electronic devices. Cobalt is a key component in lithium-ion rechargeable batteries. This report documents the hazardous conditions in which artisanal miners mine cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where more than half of the world's total supply of cobalt comes from. Using basic hand tools, artisanal miners dig out rocks from tunnels deep underground, and accidents are common. Many children are involved in artisanal mining. Despite the serious and potentially fatal health effects of prolonged exposure to cobalt, adult and child miners work with cobalt for long periods without even the most basic protective equipment. This report is the first comprehensive account of how cobalt from the DRC's artisanal mines enters the supply chain of many of the world's leading brands. It highlights the failure of these companies to put in place due diligence measures to identify where the cobalt in their products comes from and the conditions in which it is extracted and traded. The government of the DRC must extend and enforce labour and safety protections for all artisanal miners and create more authorized artisanal mining areas. The government, along with companies involved, should ensure that children are removed from hazardous working conditions and address the children's educational and other needs. All governments should enact and enforce laws requiring corporate due diligence and public disclosure in relation to cobalt and other minerals. Details: London: AI, 2016. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2016 at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/3183/2016/en/ Year: 2016 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/3183/2016/en/ Shelf Number: 138032 Keywords: Child LaborForced LaborHuman Rights AbusesMining |
Author: Matthysen, Ken Title: Review of the Burundian Artisanal Gold Mining Sector Summary: BGR commissioned PAC in partnership with IPIS to implement the assignment 'Outreach & Research on Responsible Engagement in the Burundian Gold Sector'. The assignment's overarching objective was to constructively engage relevant stakeholders associated with the Burundian mining sector including, in particular, the gold sector, as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the subject of due diligence and responsible mining and sourcing practices in support of the implementation of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) and the recommendations of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. To meet the overall project objectives, three sets of services were rendered from July 2014 to April 2015: The facilitation and organization of training and discussion workshops on supply chain due diligence as applicable in the Burundian context and including a national stakeholder analysis1; research and analysis of the Burundian gold sector; and, research on contraband gold (in-region cross-border and out-region); this report has been developed as the second deliverable listed above. It aims to review the context of the gold sector (mines and supply chains) in Burundi with a special focus on the artisanal nature of the sector. While it is known to host significant undeveloped Nickel resources possibly amenable to industrial mining, Burundi does not hold a deeply rooted tradition of mining, as opposed to its neighbours. Nevertheless, already during colonial times artisanal mining was practised in the country, supported by small Belgian mining enterprises. Gold, cassiterite, coltan and rare earths were the main products of these mining activities. The magnitude of Burundi's mining sector is minor compared to that of neighbouring countries. Just a simple comparison of the estimated number of artisanal miners illustrates the difference: While Burundi holds an estimated 10,000 artisanal miners working in gold and the 3T sector, there are an estimated 35,000 Rwandan 3T miners, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania hundreds of thousands of people are digging for various minerals, in particular gold, 3Ts and diamonds. Nevertheless, Burundi's geographical position does allocate it an important role with regards to regional gold trade and smuggling, and it is located in a geologically favourable metallogenic zone. In 2013, the country officially exported 2.8 tons of gold, which are believed to originate to a large extent from eastern DRC, but include a subordinate national production component of ca. 0.5 tons. Corresponding gold export values at USD 106 million in 2012 and USD 120 million in 2013 make gold the most significant Burundian export for these years. However, the relevance of the mining sector to the national economy is still rather limited. Mining accounted for less than 1% of Burundi’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2012, while subsistence agriculture accounts for more than 40% of the country's GDP and employs more than 90% of its population. On top of that, despite the considerable export values, fiscal revenues from the mining sector represent a mere 0.3% of the country's fiscal revenues. Nevertheless, over the last decade, Burundi's government has recognised that the artisanal mining sector is an important employer to many people and offers alternative livelihood options. It therefore considers the sector as a potentially important instrument for economic growth, poverty reduction and local development. As such, Burundi's artisanal mining and trading sector, dominated by gold, represents both a national development opportunity as well as a regionally relevant area to employ adequate supply chain due diligence in order to mitigate conflict risks through artisanal gold supply chains originating in the eastern DRC. This report represents a baseline review of the sector and its governance, largely based on literature research, including reports from international organisations, Burundian government sources, national and international civil society actors, and academics. A detailed list of all the sources used for the development of this report can be found in the bibliography at the end of this paper. Furthermore, a range of interviews were carried out in September 2014 in Bujumbura. To contextualize this review, the report draws on the experience of IPIS in neighbouring countries of the region, notably its multi-year efforts in mapping the eastern DRC's artisanal mining sector. Following on the introduction, Chapter 2 analyses the regulatory framework that is currently in place to manage Burundi' (gold) mining sector. Next, Chapter 3 analyses artisanal mining governance in the country. Several aspects will be discussed, including the institutional framework, the issue of decentralisation, formalisation efforts, taxation and mineral traceability efforts, and these are put into the regional perspective as well. Chapter 4 discusses the private actors that are involved in Burundi's gold mining sector. Subsequently, Chapter 5 deals with Burundi's artisanal gold supply chain in more detail. It will discuss, in turn, artisanal gold exploitation, selected environmental and socio-economic issues, and the gold trade. Finally, Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks based on the findings of the previous four chapters. Details: Antwerpen: International Peace Information Services (IPIS), 2015. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2016 at: http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015_04_Review-of-the-Burundian-Artisanal-Gold-Mining-Sector.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Burundi URL: http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015_04_Review-of-the-Burundian-Artisanal-Gold-Mining-Sector.pdf Shelf Number: 144804 Keywords: Gold MiningIllegal MiningMiningNational Resources |